Legal Medicine

Case Digest Requirement for Finals

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G.R. No. 46961

EL PUEBLO DE FILIPINAS, querellante-apelado,
vs.
ANASTACIA LACENA, acusado-apelante.

Facts: About 3 oclock in the morning of August 16, 1938, Marciano Dante awoke with a
start because his wife, the appellant defendant, who was sick with a fever, said, "Patay
ka ngayon" (You're going to die now), digging in the abdominal a pair of scissors. The
wound was the cause of acute peritonitis that the injured later died.
It has been proven that in the day of the event, the appellant was experiencing high
fever and delirium. She attacked anybody who lived with her in the house. In the
analysis of his blood on the October 12, 1938, she was found suffering from malaria
plasmodium falciparum or malignant disease that causes disturbance in the nervous
system, causing complications including acute mania, madness and outstanding
melancholia sometimes because their common sequel is neuralgia.
The circumstances in which the appellant struck and gave her husband cut reveals that
such an act was in moments of madness suffered as a result of its illness.
Issue: Whether or not the accused appellant can validly invoke insanity.
Ruling: The accused is acquitted because her action is of without criminal intent by
reason of the disease she suffered that affects her nervous system causing
complications including acute mania.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
DONATO BASCOS, defendant-appellant.
Facts: The accused Donato Bascos was charged in information filed in the Court of
First Instance of Pangasinan with the murder of Victoriano Romero. On arraignment, he
entered a plea of not guilty. The proof for the prosecution established that the accused
was the one who had killed Victoriano Romero, while the latter was sleeping. The
defense was that of insanity.
Following the conclusion of the trial, the presiding judge rendered judgment finding the
accused guilty of the crime of homicide.
Issue: Whether or not the accused should be judge according to article 8 or article 100
of the revised final code.

Ruling: In the Philippines, among the persons who are exempted from criminal liability
by our Penal Code, is the following: An imbecile or lunatic, unless the latter has acted
during a lucid interval. When the imbecile or lunatic has committed an act which the law
defines as a grave felony, the court shall order his confinement in one of the asylums
established for persons thus afflicted, which he shall not be permitted to leave without
first obtaining the permission of the same court. (Art. 8-1.)
Article 100 of the Penal Code applies when the convict shall become insane or an
imbecile after final sentence has been pronounced.lawphil.net
We are convinced that the accused was a lunatic when he committed the grave felony
described in the record and that consequently he is exempt from criminal liability, and
should be confined in an insane asylum.
G.R. No. L-37673
March 31, 1933
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
POTENCIANO TANEO, defendant-appellant.

Facts: Potenciano Tadeo live with his wife in his parent's house of the barrio of Dolores,
municipality of Ormoc, Leyte. On January 16, 1932, a fiesta was being celebrated in the
said barrio and visitors were entertained in the house. Among them were Fred Tanner
and Luis Malinao. Early that afternoon, Potenciano Taneo, went to sleep and while
sleeping, he suddenly got up, left the room bolo in hand and, upon meeting his wife who
tried to stop him, he wounded her in the abdomen. Potenciano Taneo attacked Fred
Tanner and Luis Malinao and tried to attack his father after which he wounded himself.
Potenciano's wife who was then seven months pregnant, died five days later as a result
of her wound, and also the foetus which was asphyxiated in the mother's womb.
It appears from the evidence that the day before the commission of the crime the
defendant had a quarrel over a glass of "tuba" with Enrique Collantes and Valentin
Abadilla, who invited him to come down to fight. On the day of the commission of the
crime, it was noted that the defendant was sad and weak, and early in the afternoon he
had a severe stomachache which made it necessary for him to go to bed. It was then
when he fell asleep. The defendant states that when he fell asleep, he dreamed that
Collantes was trying to stab him with a bolo while Abadilla held his feet, by reason of
which he got up; and as it seemed to him that his enemies were inviting him to come
down, he armed himself with a bolo and left the room. At the door, he met his wife who
seemed to say to him that she was wounded. Then he fancied seeing his wife really
wounded and in desperation wounded himself. As his enemies seemed to multiply
around him, he attacked everybody that came his way.
Issue: Whether or not the defense that the accused was dreaming during the
commission of the crime is tenable.
Ruling: Our conclusion is that the defendant acted while in a dream and his acts, with
which he is charged, were not voluntary in the sense of entailing criminal liability.

Doctor Serafica, an expert witness in this case, is also of the same opinion. The doctor
stated that considering the circumstances of the case, the defendant acted while in a
dream, under the influence of a hallucination and not in his right mind. The defendant
did not dream that he was assaulting his wife but he was defending himself from his
enemies. And so, believing that his wife was really wounded, in desperation, he stabbed
himself.
In view of all these considerations, and reserving the judgment appealed from, the
courts finds that the defendant is not criminally liable for the offense with which he is
charged.
In the matter of the intestate estate of the late JUAN "JHONNY" LOCSIN, SR.,
LUCY A. SOLINAP (Daughter of the late Maria Locsin Araneta), the successors of
the late LOURDES C. LOCSIN, MANUEL C. LOCSIN, ESTER LOCSIN JARANTILLA
and the intestate estate of the late JOSE C. LOCSIN, JR., petitioners, vs. JUAN C.
LOCSIN, JR., respondent.
Facts: Here, respondent, in order to establish his filiation with the deceased, presented
to the trial court his Certificate of Live Birth but said to be spurious.
Petitioner since birth enjoyed the open and continuous status of an acknowledged
natural child of Juan C. Locsin, Sr.; he together with his mother was summoned to
attend to the burial as evidenced by a picture of relatives facing the coffin of the
deceased with petitioner and his mother in the picture.
Issue: Whether or not spurious birth certificate and respondent photograph with his
mother near the coffin of the late Juan C. Locsin is a conclusive evidence of filiation.
Ruling: A birth certificate is a formidable piece of evidence prescribed by both the Civil
Code and Article 172 of the Family Code for purposes of recognition and filiation.
However, birth certificate offers only prima facie evidence of filiation and may be refuted
by contrary evidence.
Incidentally, respondent's photograph with his mother near the coffin of the late Juan C.
Locsin cannot and will not constitute proof of filiation,[19] lest we recklessly set a very
dangerous precedent that would encourage and sanction fraudulent claims. Anybody
can have a picture taken while standing before a coffin with others and thereafter utilize
it in claiming the estate of the deceased.
Respondent Juan E. Locsin, Jr. failed to prove his filiation with the late Juan C. Locsin,
Sr. His Certificate of Live Birth is spurious. Indeed, respondent is not an interested
person within the meaning of Section 2, Rule 79 of the Revised Rules of Court entitled
to the issuance of letters of administration.
G.R. No. 142877

October 2, 2001

JINKIE CHRISTIE A. DE JESUS and JACQUELINE A. DE JESUS minors,

represented by their mother, CAROLINA A. DE JESUS, petitioners,
vs.
THE ESTATE OF DECEDENT JUAN GAMBOA DIZON, ANGELINA V. DIZON,

CARLOS DIZON, FELIFE DIZON, JUAN DIZON, JR. and MARYLIN DIZON and as
proper parties: FORMS MEDIA CORP., QUAD MANAGEMENT CORP., FILIPINAS
PAPER SALES CO., INC. and AMITY CONSTRUCTION & INDUSTRIAL
ENTERPRISES, INC. respondents.
Facts: The petitioner involves the case of the illegitimate children who, having been
born in lawful wedlock, claim to be the illegitimate scions of the decedent in order to
enforce their respective shares in the latter's estate under the rules of succession.
Danilo B. de Jesus and Carolina Aves de Jesus got married on 23 August 1964. It was
during this marriage that Jacqueline A. de Jesus and Jinkie Christie A. de Jesus, herein
petitioners, were born, the former on 01 March 1979 and the latter on 06 July 1982.
In a notarized document, dated 07 June 1991, Juan G. Dizon acknowledged
Jacqueline and Jinkie de Jesus as being his own illegitimate children by Carolina Aves
de Jesus. Juan G. Dizon died intestate on 12 March 1992, leaving behind considerable
assets consisting of shares of stock in various corporations and some real property.
Respondent, the surviving spouse and legitimate children of the decedent Juan G.
Dizon, including the corporations of which the deceased was a stockholder, sought the
dismissal of the case, arguing that the complaint, even while denominated as being one
for partition, would nevertheless call for altering the status of petitioners from being the
legitimate children of the spouses Danilo de Jesus and Carolina de Jesus to instead be
the illegitimate children of Carolina de Jesus and deceased Juan Dizon.
Issue: Whether or not legitimacy of filiation can be questioned in a complaint for
partition and accounting of assets or shall be brought up in a direct action to impugn
filiation.
Ruling: The rule is that the written acknowledgement made by the deceased Juan G.
Dizon establishes petitioners' alleged illegitimate filiation to the decedent cannot be
validly invoked to be of any relevance in this instance. This issue, i.e whether petitioners
are indeed the acknowledge illegitimate offsprings of the decedent, cannot be aptly
adjudicated without an action having been first instituted to impugn their legitimacy as
being the children of Danilo B. de Jesus and Carolina Aves de Jesus born in lawful
wedlock. Jurisprudence is strongly settled that the paramount declaration of legitimacy
by law cannot be attacked collaterally, one that can only be repudiated or contested in a
direct suit specifically brought for that purpose. Indeed, a child so born in such wedlock
shall be considered legitimate although the mother may have declared against its
legitimacy or may have been sentenced as having been an adulteress.