Evaluating Pakistans foreign policy

Dr Maleeha Lodhi
Tuesday, November 12, 2013
From Print Edition/ The News

Much of Pakistans experience - and present predicament - has

been shaped by a complex interplay of internal and external factors. A book waiting
to be written is about how this intersection between domestic and foreign policies
helps to explain both the multiplicity and intensity of challenges that Pakistan faces
today.
External developments have had an important influence on the countrys fate and
fortunes. But internal dynamics have also driven Pakistans foreign policy
alignments and entanglements. The two have been so closely intertwined in the
countrys history that often it has been hard to establish the source and direction of
causation what is driving what. A comprehensive analysis of the intersection
between the two would be a rewarding study.
The available literature consists of studies that either have an exclusively domestic
or foreign policy focus. Abdul Sattars review of Pakistans foreign policy from 1947
to 2012 falls in the latter category. Its recently published fourth edition, like earlier
ones, will be a useful introductory guide to students of international relations and
those interested in regional politics. It remains a good primer on foreign policy along
with S M Burke and Lawrence Zirings historical analysis and Shahid Amins more
recent appraisal.
Sattar brings forty years of experience as a practitioner to his book as well as
thoughtful reflections on key developments. The new edition adds chapters that, for
example, take into account the crisis that rocked Pakistan-US ties in 2011 and drove
relations to near rupture.
The book is more history than analysis. It reflects the authors interpretation of
events, many of which he participated in. This makes, for example, Sattars
narration of negotiations that yielded the 1971 Simla agreement very insightful.
Thematic treatment of issues including terrorism and nuclear matters provide a
basic introduction to complex policy areas. But as with the rest of the study, these
chapters do not offer much detail. But then the book seeks to only provide a
concise history.
The foreword by Agha Shahi, among Pakistans most respected practitioners and
foreign policy thinkers, places the predicament of the newly independent state in
sharp perspective. Idealistic in inspiration, Pakistans foreign policy had to quickly

come to grips with the reality of the challenge to its right to peaceful coexistence.
The failure of its own efforts and of the UN for settlement of disputes in the wake of
partition illustrated the tyranny of power disparity in the region, he says. To
ameliorate that tyranny Pakistan looked outwards for friends and allies. That is
until 1971, when the war, Indias intervention and the failure of allies to come to
Pakistans assistance, urged the countrys leaders to embark on developing a
nuclear capability.
Sattar describes the formative period in Pakistans strategic thinking and how, given
Delhis conduct, Pakistans foreign policy was moulded in the crucible of its
interaction with India even as it was imbued by the idealistic vision of its founding
father, Mohammed Ali Jinnah to seek good neighbourly relations and resolve
differences through logic and law.
With India intent on imposing unilateral preferences by exploiting the power
disparity, the contours of Pakistans foreign policy came to be shaped in those
formative years by the desperate need for arms to secure the new state and
funds to finance its economic development.
This led to Pakistans prolonged pursuit of a strategy of external balancing, although
Sattar does not use this expression in describing the countrys search for
alliances. He gives a rundown of the period when Pakistan became Americas most
allied ally and refers to early engagement between Pakistan and Washington that
produced several false starts. Subsequently both countries had second thoughts
about their close embrace. Pakistan was aware of the costs of its policy of alliances
yet stayed that course for what seemed the only counterweight to Indias
hegemonic impulses.
The book depicts 1962-63 as the turning point in the strategic environment, and for
Pakistans foreign policy. Pakistans growing relationship with China and
Washingtons increasing lurch toward India led to significant realignments. US
warnings were cast aside that Washington would re-examine relations with Pakistan
if it built relations with China.
After 1965, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto elevated Pakistans shift distancing from the West
and opening to the East into a doctrine. But Bhuttos role in the post-1971
geopolitical reorientation of Pakistans foreign policy towards the Middle East and
west Asia is for some reason not mentioned even though that was a watershed in
the evolution of policy.
The book does however identify several turning points in Pakistans foreign policy.
Other than the first three mentioned above, the fourth was the 1971 war that led to
a reversal of Pakistans policy of nuclear abstinence. The fifth came with the
Soviet occupation of Afghanistan and the sixth followed 9/11 and its transformation
of relations with America.
In recounting the post-9/11 period, when Sattar was, for a time, foreign minister, he
counters the impression that Pakistan totally acquiesced to US demands. In fact
the decision taken in the wake of 9/11 was to indicate a generally positive
disposition and negotiate details later. This yes-but approach aimed to allow

tactical flexibility and later seek modification of US expectations of Islamabad.

And he is emphatic in stating that Pakistan did not participate in US military action
in Afghanistan.
In several places Sattar acknowledges policy blunders made at various points of
Pakistans history. Wrong calculations in 1965 for example. And Kargil in 1999,
which he casts as the consequence of misconceived policies. This not only left
Pakistan internationally isolated but also gravely damaged the Kashmir cause. He
cites Pakistans recognition of the Taliban in 1997 as another case of not being able
to foresee how this would lead to the countrys diplomatic isolation and the failure
of its efforts to moderate the Taliban.
Reading Sattars retrospect on foreign policy leaves one with the impression of
significant continuity in official thinking even as the world transformed in
consequential ways. From this history I see two paradoxical themes to have
punctuated the countrys foreign policy behaviour. One, the sense of internal
weakness that drove successive governments irrespective of political complexion
to seek outside support to compensate for that weakness. Not surprisingly, this goal
was to prove elusive. And two, foreign policy was sometimes conducted with little
regard for its domestic ramifications. Pakistans protracted Cold War engagements
capped by its role in the war to eject the Red Army from Afghanistan are prime
examples.
The first generated a syndrome of external dependence, which the countrys rulers
found hard to escape, but was deeply resented by the people and eroded the
nations self-esteem. The constant search for external means to solve internal
problems also meant that the primacy of domestic issues was never fully
established. Nor did a culture of self-help take root among the governing elites,
much less one that looked within to craft indigenous solutions.
This is illustrated by the kind of economic management practiced by successive
governments for much of the countrys history. This viewed external financing made
available because of the countrys foreign alignments as a substitute to mobilise
domestic resources or undertake much-needed reform. This approach was not just
unsustainable but compounded Pakistan structural problems, which in turn retarded
the countrys economic progress. What was supposed to address the sources of
internal weakness ended up doing the very opposite.
The second theme requires less elaboration: the pursuit of foreign policy goals while
failing to anticipate their domestic cost or consequences. The most obvious
example is of course the countrys prolonged entanglement in the Afghan war in the
1980s and beyond. The deadly blowback and destabilising consequences were not
only poorly anticipated but also ineptly managed by ruling elites blindsided by
short-term goals and self-preservation.
Therefore, the book that should be written is one that objectively evaluates how the
confluence of internal and external policies has contributed to Pakistans present
challenges.Abdul Sattar, Pakistans Foreign Policy 1947-2012: A concise history,
Third Edition, Karachi, Oxford University Press, 2013.