Koha Digest # 136

Front Page: EDUCATION SEEKS IMPLEMENTATION

Date: 12 February 1997

EDITORIAL

FEBRUARY'S WIND CARRIES THE SCREAMS

by VETON SURROI

They bring him to the cell covered with a blanket. Even the threads of the blanket hurt as they
touch the wound. They bring them in three-by-three, after interrogations, and let them on the
ground. The ones who try to stand up understand how bad they are, feeling that even the
attempt to move away from the blanket that is adhered to the bloody wound, hurts so much.
In the basement, where the investigations are prepared, the cleaning person doesn't enter. The
bloody saliva remains, the scent of the relatively fresh blood stays, pieces of bloody teeth are
there. The interrogator, after a couple of blows with the baton, reminds his young clients that
they must speak out, because "you will spit even worse than the guys before you".

Outside the Prishtinë prison, people come and ask about their relatives. Neither they nor their
attorneys are allowed to cross the few meters that separate the metallic doors of the prison
from the thick Ottoman-Austro/Hungarian-Yugoslav walls of the elliptic prison.

The evening is prepared in the halls. Proportionally to the reduction of noise in town, the
corridors witnesses the increasing shrieks of people who can't control pain any longer.
Sometimes, during the pauses, the shouts of those who can't control violence any longer are
heard. The ecstasy of the man that is happy for breaking someone's bones, who is happy with
the cries of the others, can be heard.

In the floor dedicated for the arrested women, not even mamma's cry can help.

In towns and villages people will carefully listen to the words of the people dealing with
politics. As soon as a stronger wind blows, they will also hear the screams of the people in the
Prishtinë Prison, in February 1997.

The weekly Koha (The Times) was published in Prishtina (Kosovo) between 1994 and 1997. Edited by Veton
Surroi, a young Kosovar journalist and one of the pioneers of democratisation in former Yugoslavia, Koha
soon became a symbol of quality among the region's media. In 1997 it started to be published daily under the
name of Koha Ditorë. W ith the kind permission of Mr. Surroi, Koha digests were originally posted on
http://koha.estudiosbalcanicos.org.
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KOSOVA

THE POLICE STICK AND THE POLITICAL CARROT

by YLBER HYSA / Prishtinë

The last week in Kosova was characterized by the Serbian police

action of massive arrests accompanied by raids, simultaneously
in several municipalities. The last wave of arrests, according
to some sources has reached 100 people. The first arrests have
started on 26 January and continued till 3 February, resulting
with around 70 arrested. Fifteen of them were released (mainly
relatives of the other arrested), and over ten persons were
looked for by the police, but were not found at home...

During this massive action of the police, many houses were

searched (and a lot of material was confiscated, as well as
books, video-cassettes, photographs, etc.), and many people were
mistreated as the raids were conducted (as was the case of Islam
Shehu who was hit with the butt of an automatic rifle in the
presence of his parents, Ilir Gashi who was beaten in front of
his relatives, Nait Hasani, who after being beaten so much in
prison, was transferred to the Prishtina hospital in deep coma,
and other serious cases reported by KIC's, the Informative Office
of the Republic of Kosova's sources and the statements of the
defending attorneys).

The arrested come from different municipalities of Kosova, a

total of 15. The biggest number is made up by those from Ferizaj
(13), Deçan (10), Obiliq (9), Vushtrri (6), Mitrovicë (5),
Podujevë (4), Pejë (4), Gllogovc (3), Prishtinë (3), Lipjan (3),
Rahovec, Kaçanik, Malishevë, Istog, Suharekë, etc. As it regards
their social and professional structure, 10 of the arrested are
university students (and other five of them were not found),
there are also unemployed, teachers, workers, doctors, an MP that
is fugitive, etc. Many of the arrested are also members of the
CDHRF, the LDK, PPK, and UNIKOMB.

Therefore, a broad structure of people, with a relatively wide

regional extension. The first news coming from the Serbian
police, which were few, suggested that this was the capture of
a terrorist organization. The first mentioned argument was Avni
Klinaku, from Mazgit (Obiliq), who was qualified as one of the
"leaders of the terrorist organization". In fact, Klinaku, known
previously as member of illegal organizations of the eighties and
former political prisoner, is chairman of the National Movement
for the Liberation of Kosova (LKÇK). And the problem appeared
immediately in the beginning when the spokesman, the "legal
representative" of the LKÇK, Sejdi Veseli, communicated that in
principle, LKÇK was in favor of the armed struggle but does not

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apply terrorism and has not committed any armed attack in Kosova
since its establishment in 1993. Moreover, Çlirimi, LKÇK's organ
(by the way, whose illegal print-shop was confiscated by the
Serbian police) stated that only UÇK has been organizing attacks
in the field! So the issue is how come LKÇK is accused pursuant
Art. 136:2 (hostile activities), in conjunction with Art. 116:1
(threat to territorial integrity of FRY) of the Penal Code of
FRY, while Klinaku is accused of terrorism (Art. 125 in
conjunction with Art. 26)?

Investigating Judge, Danica Marinkovic grounds her accusation on

the information "gathered" by the police claiming that LKÇK has
created the "Rexhep Mala Guerilla Group" (after an activist
working in illegality, killed by the Yugoslav police in 1984),
which counted five members and which, according to the
accusation, had gone to the field twice in Prishtinë, to kill
members of police patrols, but hadn't done it!

In fact, the District Court has already decided to "expand its

investigations" and now allows the police to continue with the
interrogations. This group is composed by 15 people. And,
according to the attorneys, it seems that the intention of the
district attorney is to classify them in three groups. The
indictments are expected to come out soon...

Such posture of the Serbian judiciary seems to have been inspired

by the logic and the fact that this is a heterogenous group, made
of different people, members of different parties or
associations, and is difficult to put them all together in one
category. The defending attorneys have also noticed the
phenomenon that all these people are being kept captive in
Prishtinë, although they originate from 15 municipalities,
meaning that the courts in their municipalities should be
competent to pursue their cases. The concentration of the
interrogations in one place (it is expected that they could last
quite long), could also bring the trial in only one court - make
a similar show as was the case of the trial against the "Ministry
of Interior of Kosova", which was celebrated in the premises of
the Kosova Parliament...

It is hard to talk about the conclusion of the court, however it

still remains to be seen how will the judge put all of them
together, how will she select LKÇK, UÇK and LPK, whose members
are also arrested, according to the Serbian press. The latter
also claims that among the arrested are some types of persons
that have been directly engaged in "terrorist actions" undertaken
lately in Kosova. Moreover, the Serbian press based on police
sources states that there is no dilemma that this is "only one
part of the terrorist organization and following these arrests,
new actions, even bloodier, can be expected".

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And, for the time being, the only trace of UÇK in the hands of
the police and the Serbian judiciary is the murder of three
Albanians: Zahir Pajaziti, Hakif Zejnullahu and Edmond Hoxha.
The Serbian police qualified them, especially Pajaziti, as
members of UÇK's headquarters, and this was corroborated by UÇK,
whoever it may represent, in its Communique #30, which says: "On
31 January, in the late hours of the afternoon, three members of
our military units...headed to accomplish a special task,
confronted many Serbian occupying police forces. After a heroic
resistance, in an unequal battle, they gave their life for the
liberation of the country".

Thus it comes out that the Serbian police has only three members
of the UÇK, who are dead...

The characterization of a part of the text of the communique:

"...headed to accomplish a special task", deserves a more
detailed analysis. According to "Nedeljni Telegraf" which is
grounded on police sources that had been involved in the police
action in which the three of them were killed, the three members
of UÇK, on which the police had exact information and had been
following in the "Japanese style", were headed to Vushtrri in
order to turn towards Drenica, where the other part of the
organization was actually stationed. And this was being done for
reorganization sake, because they had noticed that something
strange was happening and that they could be discovered following
the massive arrests. But, as experienced illegal activists - as
the Belgrade weekly states - the moment they noticed that they
were being followed, they turned and attacked the police, on
which occasion three Serb policemen were wounded. But, shots
against the Lada came from another police car that was
participating in this action, and this is how the Albanians were
killed.

The description presented by NT and based on police sources looks

very much alike the description we find in UÇK's Communique:
"...headed to accomplish a special task"! According to this, they
were on a mission trying to save their people, they discover they
were being followed and they decided to confront with the police,
maybe conscious that they make this happen in a place as far as
possible from the destination they were headed to. In fact, NT
states that the intention of the police was to catch UÇK in
flagrance, but all of it was made impossible when the people in
the LADA started shooting!

It is interesting how Lëvizja Popullore e Kosovës (The People's

Movement of Kosova), once an illegal organization in Kosova which
came out from illegality at the beginning of the '90s and whose
seat is currently in Switzerland, analyzes the last action of the
Serbian police: "...(this action)... aims at several things: to

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break the increasing morale of the people following the actions
of the UÇK. Second: to find out where UÇK is, by arresting and
interrogating people. Third: the occupiers intend to intimidate
the people, so they stop supporting the freedom warriors. To
incite panic among the people, to subjugate it, and to accept
functioning politically within the frames that Serbia
determines..."

In fact LPK, since some time ago and through its organ "Zëri i
Kosovës", has supported UÇK, as illustrated in the following
sentences: "The attack of the strong occupying police forces in
Kosova against those who fight for the liberation of Kosova, has
failed completely, although Belgrade's propaganda speaks strongly
of the successes in their `struggle against terrorism'". Further
on it says: "LPK calls all its members, sympathizers and all
Albanians wherever they are to strengthen the trust in their
forces, to become stronger in the struggle for liberation. To
materially and morally support the fighters for freedom...". And,
at the end of the communique, it is said: The struggle of our
people for national liberation can't be stopped and will be
crowned with the victory. Long live the Albanian people! Long
live UÇK! Glory to our martyrs!"

Thus, once again does LPK support UÇK and puts itself on the
latter's side. And can LPK be called the political wing of the
UÇK? - this can't be replied to exactly, unless LPK or UÇK would
confirm this. But, one thing is sure - that there is a whole
front of those who propagate another form, alternative, of
political struggle for the solution of Kosova's question,
differing from political parties in Kosovë, especially symbolized
by the largest one, LDK, which is criticized by both LKÇK and LPK
and in a way even the UÇK!

But, coming back to the last events in Kosovë. In order to

undertake such a broad action, the Serbian police should have had
exact information and good sources, in order to arrest and kill
so many people. The Serbian police - which talks about the
existence of illegal groups, whose members it claims to have
arrested - should have had at its disposal first hand information
in order to have arrested the #1 leader of LKÇK in Kosova or to
apply "the Japanese persecution" and kill the members of UÇK's
headquarters. But, one thing remains unclear. Why did the Serbian
police, which, as stated by NT and its police sources, has had
information on Klinaku and who had him followed for six months,
has done nothing to prevent and arrest him, knowing that in the
past six months, many bloody incidents have occurred!? In other
words, why has the Serbian police decided to undertake this
action right now?

Maybe one of the possible replies could be linked to the actual

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situation and political moment, which Milosevic has decided to
use. So, in the same time in which Karadzic publicly states that
if Brcko will not be given to the Serbs, then war will start
again (!), and in the same time when the Serbian opposition
demonstrators are beaten brutally by the police in Belgrade, at
the same time we have a large concentrated and brutal police
action in which 100 people are arrested - this is a public
question asked also by Haris Silajdzic! And, all of it is
happening in times when official Tirana has suffered the
pyramidal knock-down and when Bosnia is visited by the American
envoy... In fact, the Americans have been refusing, since some
time, to send their senior envoys to Belgrade, but Milosevic's
last manoeuvre has forced them to establish a hot-line with their
representative in Belgrade, Miles, who has spent all his time in
Belgrade, expressing the official concern...

And, immediately after a surprising demonstration of the "radical

face", in a very short period of time, Milosevic changed his
political course for 180 degrees. He meets his police officials
and congratulates them on the "successful action in Kosova" (thus
proving that he is the master of the situation in the South) and
immediately sends a letter to premier Marijanovic, in which he
admits OSCE's suggestions and the opposition's victory!
Milosevic's step is, of course, supported by the diplomatic
centers, although they don't have it altogether clear what is
Milosevic doing now. But, one thing is certain. In such a
situation, there are no chances for a war about Brcko and that
there will be never that open concern about what is happening in
Kosova! Especially if after the "police stick" action in Kosova
comes the political carrot, in form of concessions on the
educational agreement...

Judged upon thus, Kosova and its reality prove to be present in

the political relations, but always as an object and not as a
political subject! In these circumstances, it is expected that
the trial against "the terrorist organization" continues without
the initial noise but with the possibility with "UÇK's revenge",
as it is stated in its last communique!

There will be noise in Kosova again...!

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INTERVIEW

SALI VELIU, one of the leaders of LPK

THE DEFENSE OF KOSOVA IS A CONSTITUTIONAL OBLIGATION

Interviewed by KOHA

KOHA: What is your comment about the last events in Kosova,

characterized by the arrests of the Serbian police?

VELIU: The last events prove that Kosova is living in a state of

emergency. There is no doubt that Milosevic's first goal is to
stop the struggle for liberation. This is the frame of the last
terrorist actions of Serbia. The support that the armed struggle
has found in Kosova and the plans to come out on streets, which
was supposed to happen at the beginning of the second semester
created panic among the Serbian regime. It started the campaign
of terror forced also by the accusations that it is incapable of
controlling the situation in Kosova.

With the present campaign and the felicitations he conveyed to

his policemen, Milosevic wants to create the impression that he
has destroyed the armed resistance of the Albanians.That he has
killed the leaders of the armed units and that he has arrested
many others. As in similar cases, he will manipulate during the
investigation period and thus cover his failures in Kosova,
presenting them as "big successes" achieved in the struggle "for
the stabilization " of the situation in Kosova. He will soon see
that he has achieved no real objectives. The armed struggle in
Kosova has surpassed the initial phase and it is hard to stop it
regardless of Serbia's efforts.

In this period, it is worth analyzing Rugova's attitude too. He

had been declaring that the situation was under his control.
Lately, he has stopped repeating this statement, because not even
the LDK has things under control any longer. Just before the
arrests, he expressed his dissatisfaction with the lack of
efficiency of the Serbian police in catching "terrorists" and
asked for Interpol (although Interpol doesn't intervene in the
solution of political crises and liberating struggles). He is not
at all honest when he expresses his sorrow for the arrested and
the killed. Serbia did try to find the "terrorists".

Anyhow, Rugova has objectively been helped by the arrests. They

started when the second semester was due to start. Some of the
arrested were also students of the University and also high
school students who have expressed their dissatisfaction with the
political developments in Kosova. Following the petition made by
550 students of the UP, the students had announced that the

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deadline for the answer would be 8 January. That day, they
announced that they would demonstrate on 13 January. Although the
LDK prevented with a lot of difficulties the students' protests
in April '96, in January it acted differently. It influenced
Minister Bicaj, that has no idea of what is going on in Kosova
and who is easily convinced by the absurd justifications of the
"parallel" Prishtinë, to postpone the beginning of the semester
for two weeks.

The students kept silent and are awaiting to see when is the
second semester going to start. They received no answer from
Rugova. Someone else replied - the terror of Rugova's collocutor
that dictates the agreements - Milosevic.

KOHA: What do you think about LDK's suggestion to organize

meetings with political subjects in Kosova?

VELIU: Before the arrests, Rugova and the LDK evaded all meetings
with the other subjects. Moreover, he sabotaged all the previous
meetings of this character. Naturally, in these meetings, Rugova
can't proclaim the state of emergency nor can he mobilize anyone
to face the situation. Nor to find ways to oppose Serbia. Not
even to stop the negotiations with Milosevic while the violence
and terror keep going on in Kosova and until all political
prisoners are released. After the arrests, LDK feels strong.
This meeting has only one meaning: to explain the political
subjects that Rugova's political bloc, which includes Milosevic
with whom he has already reached an agreement, is stronger than
the political bloc the other parties speak of. All political
parties hurried to accept his invitation without any hesitation
and without analyzing Rugova's and LDK's attitude.

KOHA: Your organization's previous communique stated that

"..armed conflict is starting in Kosova...". How do you interpret
this posture?

VELIU: The beginning of the armed conflict in Kosova is proved

by the actions of the UÇK, known to all. LPK has known since the
beginning that the regime can't be removed without war. Our
communique is to wipe away the illusions of those who believe

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-9-
still bearable effect, when it is linked and placed within the
so called Yugoslavia, whose international borders are actually
backed by the international community.

The more defined framework and subject of expected negotiations

on the political status of Kosova, seem to be almost self-imposed
by the defiantly pronounced incompatibility of the ethnic
structure of the 'Federal Republic of Yugoslavia' with its
constitutional and political structuring. Namely the fact is that
the 'Federal Republic of Yugoslavia' (FRY), which was last year
recognized by EU, however not yet by the US, has a distinctly
prevailing three-national ethnic structure (Serbs, Albanians, and
Montenegrins) while at the same time its constitutional and
political structuring as a state is strictly two-national,
comprised of two ethnically based republics, i.e. Serbia and
Montenegro.

The conclusion that almost immediately imposes itself upon

realization of existence of the striking incompatibility of the
prevailing three-national ethnic structure of FRY and its bi-
republican constitutional structure is its necessary
harmonization through its re-federalization. The re-federalization would
provide for the restructuring of FRY into a three-republican
federation with an equal federal republican status for Kosova.
International support for such a concept of overcoming the crisis
in Kosova seems to be indicated by the US and EU declared
commitment for no unilateral change of borders of the five
successor countries of former Yugoslavia on one side, and by
their commitment for return of the extended autonomy of Kosova,
that in both US and EU latest documents are being formulated as
`reestablishment of extended autonomy' within Yugoslavia,
significantly omitting earlier phrasings `within Serbia'.

INTERNAL SELF-DETERMINATION AS FRAMEWORK FOR FEDERAL

REPUBLICAN STATUS FOR KOSOVA

In this instance it is appropriate to make some theoretical

observations about certain relevant notions relating to the
matter of self-determination. First of all the "there is no doubt
that right to self-determination has been a binding legal
principle of international law". A legal, internationally binding
definition of "people" as a social-cultural but also a legal
category and subject entitled to the right to self-determination,
does not exist. Consequently international practice, also as
sponsored by the UN, is contradictory and marked prevailingly by
political determinants and considerations. It is important that
in legal, but even more so in political sense, a 'people' must
have a territorial framework of reference in the form of compact
area of settlement, which Albanians in Kosova certainly have. In

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addition, based on numerical size and social-political and
military strength, a 'people' "must be capable of executing the
right to self-determination". Albanians in Kosova, at least for
the time being, apparently do not meet this requirement. This is
practically the only criterion not fulfilled currently by
Kosovars that would entitle them to full self-determination. The
contradiction therefore could be resolved by applying a sub-
variant of the self-determination referred to in literature as
'internal self-determination'. All the more so as the term
'minority' which has forcefully been imposed over Albanians by
ruling Serb authorities in order to deny them the claim on self-
determination, is also a social/cultural as well as legal
concept, for which a legal definition 'generally and
internationally acceptable does not exists either within the
terms of international law", but is rather subjected to the
interpretation of the political subject.

But even if the minority concept was defined in international

law, and if it was applicable to the case of Kosova i.e.
Albanians, the prevailing opinion in international law nowadays
is to grant the right to self-determination to such subjects,
especially in cases "of grievous and systematic offenses against
human rights and rights of minorities". Needless to say numerous
resolution of international organisms, inclusive UN ones, and
most strikingly the dire reality in Kosova itself, testify to
this effect in the case of Kosova. This despite the fact that
"international premise that both sovereignty of the state and the
right to self-determination have the same rank", the prevailing
opinion in international law is that even "secession is
permissible" in the above described cases, not to speak of right
to internal self-determination. "Thus the desired goal of self-
determination is to be strived for by way of peaceful
negotiations. These attempts might fail if the state authority
violently ignores self-determination concerns". All of the above
is certainly the case in Kosova with respect to Serbian
repression over Albanians. Then, and only then, can one have
recourse to resistance - even if it means violently enforcing the
right to self-determination."

It should be mentioned in this context, that inclination towards

a certain priority of sovereignty over self-determination is
granted only in cases of "firmly established states representing
stabilizing elements in the international community". This is
certainly not the case with FRY as the war in former Yugoslav
case has proved it to be generator of instability in the region,
that it continues being and therefore self-determination
principle is to have an unquestionable higher priority than
sovereignty. The completion of the disintegration i.e.
dismembering processes in the former Yugoslav space and
instabilities they cause might have not yet been reached as

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indicated by a very fluid situation in Bosnia produced by the
Dayton Agreement and on-going major political and structural
tensions in FRY.

Therefore one must keep in mind the stipulations of the Friendly

Relations Declaration of the UN General Assembly, formulated as
follows: "firstly the right to self-determination is to be
realized as federal or other autonomy in the existing state
association; if this not possible because of the state authority
discriminatingly ignores or represses implementation of right to
self-determination in this form, the right to self-determination
can be exercised by way of secession and with aim of founding an
independent state or associating with a existing state".

The priority of self-determination over sovereignty increases

proportionally with ethnic distance of involved subjects.

Needless to say the ethnic distance between Albanians and Serbs

is vast. And vice-versa: the smaller the ethnic and cultural
distance, the higher the priority of sovereignty. However in the
case of former Yugoslavia even the exceptionally small ethnic
distance of former Yugoslav Slavic nations, could not prevent the
exercise of self-determination right of kin Slavic nations from
Serbian-controlled former Yugoslavia.

In the rare, but pronounced case of divided, i.e., separated

people as Albanians are, especially if separation is effected
after the introduction of the nation-state era, self-
determination, via appropriate and before all, non-
confrontational models, are granted uncontested priority over
sovereignty. Especially in the case of more recent separations,
such as the one of Albanians, when the decisive aspect is whether
the separation is effected by foreign powers in contradiction to
the peoples right to self-determination.

An important additional component enhancing the necessity of

treatment of Albanians as a people or constituent nation(ality)
instead of as a minority, if successful negotiated solutions for
Kosova are to be searched, would be the recognition of the fact
that FRY is a 'state made up of different nationalities', within
which Albanians represent the second largest nationality, ergo
unrecognized politically. According to generalized definitions
of international law, such a classification applies to countries
where the share of national minorities, (should they be imposed
the status), exceeds ten percent. In the current framework of
FRY, Kosova Albanians however account for over 20% of the share.
As the share of nationalities or minorities increases further,
with the largest one comprising less than 50%, while the second
largest more than 10%, as a general rule for legal definitions,
one speaks of `multinational countries'.

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In such circumstances nationality problems can be solved by
forming association of states for which application of the term
"federalism", within which alternatively terms 'federation' and
'confederation', has become accepted usage. Federalism based in
the both territorial and ethnical principle has been applied in
Europe. It is reasonable to expect that in the case of Kosova its
application could be much more successful as there territorial
and ethnic spreading coincide almost fully.

Regionalism does not befall in this category as regionalism

serves other purposes, namely for satisfying regional minorities
or regionally spread people, most frequently only geographically
or economically rooted, and not fulfilling criteria of people or
minorities.

It is of relevance for further considerations to mention in this

context that Kosova Albanians claim a moderate statehood
experience in the seventies and eighties. Namely in the period
Kosova had the constitutional status of a constituent federal
unit directly represented at the Federal level and functioning
almost fully equally as the other republics of former Yugoslavia,
including Serbia and Montenegro, even with veto rights at the
federal Yugoslav level. This federal unit status and the
respective political consciousness is an always inspiring and
significant force in the on-going statehood quest of Albanians
in Kosova. Therefore no political force intending to survive
among Albanians can disregard it in the political struggle for
an appropriate political status of Kosova. The federal political
status of Kosova was otherwise forcefully taken away by Belgrade
at the beginning of the Yugoslav crisis and that eventually lead
to the collapse of the country and bloody war. In reference to
the once existing federal status of Kosova, which was forcefully
abolished, it is important to mention the following relevant
principle of international law: 'the once reached level of state
and constitutional development that might be suspended or lifted
in possible extraordinary circumstances, can not be downgraded
and should be reinstalled'.

A CATALOGUE OF COMMITMENTS AND CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES OF

RELEVANCE FOR FACILITATING FEDERAL REPUBLICAN STATUS FOR KOSOVA

I. SERBIAN COMMITMENTS

The principal commitments of the Serbian side would need to

assume and declare publicly could should include:

I.1 - commitment for cessation repression in Kosova;

I.2. - commitment to no use of force in Kosova should serious

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political contradictions arise;

I.3. - commitment to increased international presence in Kosova

in form of inter-governmental permanent missions including
reestablishment of the OSCE mission, as well as opening of other
foreign governmental information and other representative
offices;

I.4 - the commitment to declare readiness for substantial

political dialogue with legitimate representatives of Kosova
Albanians;

I.5 - the commitment for full observance of the principles of

international law including explicitly the right to self-
determination and federalism, democracy, rule of law and human
rights. In cases of disagreements, the issues would be arbitrated
by mutually acceptable international institutions;

I.6. - the commitment to consider and declare readiness for

substantial constitutional reform and restructuring in FRY in
order to facilitate shaping a long-standing stable political
solution;

I.7. - the commitment for mutually acceptable determination of

the scope of authorizations for the negotiated federal status of
Kosova as well as those of the federal state. In case of
disagreements the issues would be arbitrated by mutually
acceptable international institutions;

I.8. - the commitment to friendly oriented policies towards

Kosova and Albanians;

I.9. - the commitment to a constructive and flexible

reconsideration for balanced economic compensation for the
preceding period;

I.10. - the commitment for undertaking confidence building

measures that should be initiated by its side as the stronger
side in the conflict that controls the leverages of power and
repressive apparatus. Besides the earlier referred to cessation
of repression, they should include the following:

a. implementation of the Agreement for Normalization of Education

as a test case of the commitment for normalization of life in
Kosova;

b. facilitation of normalization of vital segments of life in

Kosova such as in health care, media, employment, judicial
system;

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 c. expression of intent for the readiness for the reestablishment
i.e. the restitution of all earlier abolished institutions of
Kosova including its Parliament and government;

d. expression of readiness for an interim Kosova Authority to

assume an orderly, balanced and nationally neutral administration
of Kosova in order to facilitate achieving the final negotiated
settlement of the issue of Kosova within FRY. The interim Kosova
Authority would have to established on the blueprint of
reinstalled Kosova government with a tripartite composition
representing on parity basis the Albanian side, the Serbian one
and an international authorized one.

d. demilitarization of Kosova, i.e., relocation of military units

on outer borders of Kosova, i.e., of the FRY;

e. civilian forms of military service for Kosova Albanians with

full military service only in Kosova as well as granted exemption
from service in a mutually agreed interim period;

f. release of all political prisoners and suspension of all legal

procedures and consequences for politically related offenses in
the preceding period;

g. liberalization of visa regimes for travel to and from Albania,

as well as commitment to efforts for fully enlightened travel
procedures to and from Macedonia given the large Albanian
population there having been cut off from unrestricted
inside communication existing in the former Yugoslav framework;

h. banning of propaganda and practices considered intolerant

and/or hostile to Albanians and/or Kosova;

j. stopping settlement of Serbs in Kosova;

k. allowing for safe return of Albanian refugees and/or asylum

seekers and other returnees from Western countries;

o. annulling all effects of all discriminatory or restrictive

legislation against Albanians in Kosova.

II. ALBANIAN COMMITMENTS

For the Albanian side the necessary commitments for facilitating

a negotiated settlement for federal republican status for Kosova
should include the following:

II.1 - reaffirmation of commitments to peaceful political

options and non-violence in realization of political aspirations;

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II.2 - commitment to inviolability of existing borders of FRY
enhanced by strong international guarantees;

II.3. - commitment to political dialogue and negotiated peaceful

solutions that would observe vital interests of Serbs in Kosova,
including Serbian-owned and run extra territorial status to
Serbian historic medieval monuments and monasteries with
internationally guaranteed free access;

II.4 - commitment to look ahead in search for constructive

solutions instead of for blame and responsibility for the
existing situation as the situation could deteriorate further;

II.5. - commitment to readiness for deferment of its declared

independence aspirations for Kosova within a mutually agreed
time frame that would be internationally guaranteed;

II.6. - commitment against propaganda and/or practices considered

intolerant and/or hostile to Serbs and/or Serbia;

II.7. - commitment to a international human rights ombudsman

in Kosova with final appeal authority of the Human Rights Court
of Council of Europe;

II.8. - commitment to friendly oriented policies towards Serbs

and Serbia;

II.9. - the commitment to a constructive and flexible

reconsideration for balanced economic compensation for the
preceding period;

III. INTERNATIONAL COMMITMENTS

The commitments of the international community that could

decisively facilitate reaching a negotiated settlement for an
extended, i.e., federal autonomy of Kosova as a republic within
the FRY should consist in the following:

III.1. - reaffirmation of the Bush and Clinton administration

warning to Belgrade against spreading of open conflict to Kosova;

III.2. - commitment to rigorous maintenance of positive

influencing pressure over FRY by means of the so-called 'outer
wall of sanctions' conditioning reintegration support with stable
solution for Kosova;

III.3. - commitment to an enhanced international presence in

Kosova in forms of permanent IGO missions such as OSCE, UN, EU
as well as governmental representative missions such as USIA
office, and other foreign consulates;

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III.4. - commitment to sustained and focused diplomatic efforts
for organizing an international conference on Kosova;

III.5. - appointment of a special UN or US envoy for Kosova;

III.6. - commitment to encouragement of active and constructive

involvement of government of Albania in multilateral and
bilateral efforts for negotiating a stable and long term
settlement for Kosova;

III.7. - commitment to encouragement of NGO activities aimed

at assisting establishment of dialogue and other communication
between the Serbian and Albanian side.

FEATURES OF RELEVANCE FOR FACILITATING FEDERAL REPUBLICAN STATUS

FOR KOSOVA WITHIN FRY

Features of relevance and authorizations that should be contained

in the solution with a federal republican status for Kosova
within the internationally accepted borders of FRY should provide
for the following:

1. internationally guaranteed federal character of FRY given its

multinational character;

2. explicit international guarantees for inviolability of

internationally recognized borders of FRY as well as the existing
ones of Kosova;

3. status of constituent federal republic or federal unit status

for Kosova with recognition of the existing territorial
definition of Kosova, i.e., its borders;

4. constituent nation status for Albanians given their size as

second largest nationality in FRY as multinational state;

5. constituent nation status for Serbs in Kosova;

6. own constitutional order of Kosova with self-standing

legislative, administrative and judicial authorities
proportionally determined inclusive with constitutional court and
federal veto rights for mutually decided issues of vital
importance for Kosova and its population and determined with
mutual agreement with the federal instance;

7. full and equal participation of Kosova on the federal level

based on principles of federalistic arrangements;

8. federally determined foreign policy based on consensus

principles ;

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9. federally determined defence policy based on consensus
principles;

10. federally determined financial and monetary policy based on

consensus principles;

11. official language status for Albanian in Kosova as well as

at the federal level;

12. internationally integrated free market economy.

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