CRIMINAL LAW

For the Exclusive use of SHARMEN D. GALLENERO

Accomplice/Accessory
To hold a person liable as an accomplice, two elements must be present:
(1) the community of criminal design; that is, knowing the criminal design of the
principal by direct participation, he concurs with the latter in his purpose; and (2)
the performance of previous or simultaneous acts that are not indispensable to
the commission of the crime.
Conspirators and accomplices have one thing in common: they know and
agree with the criminal design. Conspirators, however, know the criminal
intention because they themselves have decided upon such course of action.
Accomplices come to know about it after the principals have reached the
decision, and only then do they agree to cooperate in its execution. Conspirators
decide that a crime should be committed; accomplices merely concur in it.
Accomplices do not decide whether the crime should be committed; they merely
assent to the plan and cooperate in its accomplishment. Conspirators are the
authors of a crime; accomplices are merely their instruments who perform acts
not essential to the perpetration of the offense. (People v. Edwin De Vera, GR
No. 128966, August 18, 1999; People v. Norlito Tan, GR No. 132324, September
28, 1999)
If the accused, took advantage of the effects of the crime and profited
thereby, he can be held liable as an accessory. (People v. Raul Mondaga, GR
No. 115351, March 27, 1998)
While the dismissal of a charge against the principal accused would carry
the charges against the accomplices and the accessories, the discharge of the
latter would not necessarily benefit the former. The responsibility of an accessory
or an accomplice is subordinate to that of the principal. Indeed, an accessory or
an accomplice is like a shadow that follows the principal, not the other way
around. (Presidential Commission on Good Government v. Aniano A. Desierto,
GR No. 132120, February 10, 2003)
Acts of Lasciviousness
The elements of acts of lasciviousness are: (1) the offender commits any
act of lasciviousness or lewdness; (2) the act is done under any of the following
circumstances -- (a) when force or intimidation is used, or (b) when the offended
party is deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious, or (c) when the offended
party is under 12 years of age, or (3) when the offended party is another person
of either sex. (People v. Iladio Caralipio, GR Nos. 137766-67, November 27,
2002)
Section 32, Article XIII of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of RA
7610, defines lascivious conduct as follows: The intentional touching, either
directly or through clothing, of the genitalia, anus, groin, breast, inner thigh, or
buttocks, or the introduction of any object into the genitalia, anus or mouth of any
person, whether of the same or opposite sex, with an intent to abuse, humiliate,
harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual desire of any person, bestiality,

masturbation, lascivious exhibition of the genitals or pubic area of a person.

(People v. Ernesto Larin, GR No. 128777, October 7, 1998)
Agent of Person in Authority
An agent of a person in authority is any person who, by direct provision of
law or by election or by appointment by competent authority, is charged with the
maintenance of public order and the protection and security of life and property,
such as barrio councilman, barrio policeman and barangay leader, and any
person who comes to the aid of persons in authority. (People v. Julio Recto, GR
No. 129069, October 17, 2001)
Aggravating Circumstances
Qualifying and aggravating circumstances must be alleged in the
information, per Sections 8 and 9 of Rule 110 of the Rules of Court x x x.
Considering that the above procedural provisions are favorable to the accused,
they should be given retroactive effect. (People v. Reynaldo De Guzman, GR
No. 124037, October 2, 2001; People v. Nerio Suela, GR Nos. 133570-71,
January 15, 2002; People v. Alfredo Baroy, GR Nos. 137520-22, May 9, 2002;
People v. Sixto Paragas, GR No. 146308, July 18, 2002; People v. Jose Casitas
Jr., GR No. 137404, February 14, 2003; People v. Veno Esperas, GR No.
128109, November 19, 2003)
Qualifying and aggravating circumstances must be proven as clearly as
the crime itself. In any event, even if they are established beyond reasonable
doubt, they cannot be appreciated unless they are alleged in the information,
pursuant to the current Rules on Criminal Procedure. This is a requirement of
due process. (People v. Jose Casitas Jr., GR No. 137404, February 14, 2003;
People v. Marcelo Mendoza, GR Nos. 132923-24, June 6, 2002; People v. Sixto
Paragas, GR No. 146308, July 18, 2002)
Abuse of Superior Strength
To appreciate abuse of superior strength, there must be shown a
deliberate intent on the part of the malefactors to take advantage of their greater
number. They must have notoriously selected and made use of superior strength
in the commission of the crime. To take advantage of superior strength is to use
excessive force that is out of proportion to the means for self-defense available to
the person attacked; thus, the prosecution must clearly show the offenders
deliberate intent to do so. Where armed assailants seize upon their greater
number and superior power to overwhelm an unarmed victim, the aggression
must be considered as having been attended with abuse of superior strength.
(People v. Ramil Beruega, GR No. 142931, April 11, 2002; People v. Artemio
Obzunar, GR No. 92153, December 16, 1996; People v. Dione Palomar, GR
Nos. 108183-85, August 21, 1997; People v. Marcos Asuela, GR Nos. 14039394, February 4, 2002)
Not even the use of a bladed instrument would constitute abuse of superior
strength if the victim was adequately prepared to face an attack, or if he was

obviously physically superior to the assailant. (People v. Robert Castillo, GR No.

120282, April 20, 1998)
The aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength x x x is
deemed absorbed in treachery. (People v. Ulysses M. Cawaling, GR No.
117970, July 28, 1998; People v. Cadiz Lapay, GR No. 123072, October 14,
1998; People v. Julie Villamor, GR Nos. 111313-14, January 16, 1998; People v.
Rogelio Andres, GR No. 122735, September 25, 1998; People v. Erick Macahia,
GR No. 130931, May 19, 1999)
Superior strength is not appreciated by the mere fact of superiority in the
number of malefactors, but rather by the deliberate employment of excessive
force which is out of proportion to the means of defense available to the person
attacked. Note also must be made of the fact that the victim was not alone.
(People v. Romeo Nell, GR No. 109660, July 1, 1997; People v. Diarangan
Dansal, GR No. 105002, July 17, 1997)
Aid of Armed Men
The information alleged that the accused were armed with long firearms.
Under paragraph 1, Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, the aid of armed
men qualifies a killing to murder. (People v. Norlito Cara, GR No. 117483-84,
December 12, 1997)
Dwelling
Dwelling aggravates a felony when the crime was committed in the
residence of the offended party and the latter has not given any provocation. It is
considered an aggravating circumstance primarily because of the sanctity of
privacy that the law accords to human abode. As one commentator puts it, ones
dwelling place is a sanctuary worthy of respect; thus, one who slanders another
in the latters house is more severely punished than one who offends him
elsewhere. According to Cuello Calon, the commission of the crime in anothers
dwelling shows worse perversity and produces graver alarm. (People v.
Alexander Tao, GR No. 133872, May 5, 2000; People v. Jose Casitas Jr., GR
No. 137404, February 14, 2003)
Although dwelling (morada) is considered as inherent in crimes which can only
be committed in the abode of the victim, such as trespass to dwelling and
robbery in an inhabited house, it has been held as aggravating in robbery with
homicide because the author thereof could have accomplished the heinous deed
of snuffing out the victims life without having to violate his domicile. (People v.
Antonio Pareja, GR No. 88043, December 9, 1996)
Evident Premeditation
For evident premeditation to be appreciated, there must be proof, as clear
as the evidence of the crime itself, of the following elements: 1) the time when
the offender determined to commit the crime, 2) an act manifestly indicating that
he clung to his determination, and 3) a sufficient lapse of time between
determination and execution to allow himself time to reflect upon the
consequences of his act. (People v. Robert Castillo, GR No. 120282, April 20,

1998; People v. Rogelio Doepante, GR No. 102772, October 30, 1996; People v.
Danny Angeles, GR No. 109660, July 1, 1997; People v. Gerry Sumalpong, GR
No. 124705, January 20, 1998; People v. Orlando Pallarco, GR No. 119971,
March 26, 1998; People v. Willy Manalili, GR No. 121671, August 14, 1998;
People v. Buenaventura Batidor, GR No. 126027, February 18, 1999; People v.
Joel Pinca, GR No. 129256, November 17, 1999; People v. Norberto Sabado,
GR No. 135963, November 20, 2000; People v. Rafael D. Torres Jr., GR No.
138046, December 8, 2000; People v. Edmundo Briones Aytalin, GR No.
134138, June 21, 2001; People v. Sixto Paragas, GR No. 146308, July 18, 2002;
People v. Timoteo Escarlos, GR No. 148912, September 10, 2003)
To establish [evident premeditation], it must be shown that there was a
period sufficient to afford full opportunity for meditation and reflection and a time
adequate to allow the conscience of the actor to overcome the resolution of his
will. The premeditation to kill must be sufficiently proven by evidence of outward
acts showing the intent to kill. (People v. Renato Albao, GR No. 117481, March
6, 1998; People v. Diarangan Dansal, GR No. 105002, July 17, 1997; People v.
Dione Palomar, GR Nos. 108183-85, August 21, 1997; People v. Sueene
Discalsota, GR No. 136892, April 11, 2002)
Mere lapse of time is not equivalent to evident premeditation. Time and
again, we have held that evident premeditation cannot be appreciated to qualify a
killing to murder in the absence of evidence, not only of sufficient lapse of time,
but also of the planning and preparation to kill when the plan was conceived.
The prosecution evidence simply showed that after the fight was broken up,
appellant returned to kill the victim. From said circumstances, we cannot deduce
with certainty that appellant clung to a decision to kill the victim. (People v.
Romeo Nell, GR No. 109660, July 1, 1997; People v. Edmundo Briones Aytalin,
GR No. 134138, June 21, 2001)
Ignominy
The appreciation of ignominy as a generic aggravating circumstance,
absent any mitigating one to offset it, entitles the victim to exemplary damages.
(People v. Temestocles Lozano, GR No. 125080, September 25, 1998)
Nighttime
The fact alone that the crimes were committed at night does not
automatically aggravate the crimes. Nocturnity becomes a modifying element
only when (1) it is specially sought by the offender; (2) the offender takes
advantage of it; or (3) it facilitates the commission of the crime by insuring the
offenders immunity from identification or capture. (People v. Laudemar De La
Cruz, GR Nos. 109619-23, June 26, 1998; People v. Edelciano Amaca, GR No.
110129, August 12, 1997; People v. Orlando Pallarco, GR No. 119971, March 26,
1998)
The time-settled rule is that nocturnity, as an aggravating circumstance,
must have been deliberately sought by the offender to facilitate the crime or
prevent its discovery or evade his capture or facilitate his escape. The culprit
must have purposely taken advantage of the cover of night as an indispensable
factor to attain his criminal purpose. (People v. Alejandro Atop, GR Nos. 124303-

05, February 10, 1998; People v. Constancio Merino, GR No. 132329, December
17, 1999; People v. Alfredo Baroy, GR Nos. 137520-22, May 9, 2002)
Price, Reward or Promise
As defined by Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code, murder is the crime
committed by a person who kills another in consideration of a price, reward, or
promise. Said qualifying circumstance of price or reward equally affects both
the offeror and offeree -- the former becomes a principal by inducement and the
latter, a principal by direct participation. (People v. Roberto Gerolaga, GR No.
89075, October 15, 1996)
Relationship
The scope of relationship as defined by law encompasses the following:
(1) the spouse
(2) an ascendant
(3) a descendant
(4) a legitimate, natural or adopted brother or sister, or
(5) a relative by affinity in the same degree.
(People v. Alejandro Atop, GR Nos. 124303-05, February 10, 1998)
Relationship by affinity refers to a relation by virtue of a legal bond such as
marriage. Relatives by affinity therefore are those commonly referred to as inlaws, or stepfather, stepmother, stepchild and the like; in contrast to relatives by
consanguinity or blood relatives encompassed under the second, third and fourth
enumeration above. The law cannot be stretched to include persons attached by
common-law relations. (People v. Alejandro Atop, GR Nos. 124303-05, February
10, 1998)
Treachery
There is treachery when the offender commits any of the crimes against
the person employing means, methods, or forms in the execution thereof which
tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising
from the defense which the offended party might make. It is present when the
attack comes without warning, is sudden and unexpected and the unsuspecting
victim is not in a position to parry the assault. (People v. Orlando Pallarco, GR
No. 119971, March 26, 1998; People v. Gerardo Cogonon, GR No. 94548,
October 4, 1996; People v. Eddie Isleta, GR No. 114971, November 19, 1996;
People v. Robert Dinglasan, GR No. 101312, January 28, 1997; People v.
Bonifacio Zamora, GR No. 101829, August 21, 1997; People v. Gerry
Sumalpong, GR No. 124705, January 20, 1998; People v. Robert Castillo, GR
No. 120282, April 20, 1998; People v. Veriato Molina, GR Nos. 115835-36, July
22, 1998; People v. Ulysses M. Cawaling, GR No. 117970, July 28, 1998; People
v. Rolusape Sabalones, GR No. 123485, August 31, 1998; People v. Noel
Navarro, GR No. 129566, October 7, 1998; People v. Hilario Rebamontan, GR
No. 125318, April 13, 1999; People v. Erick Macahia, GR No. 130931, May 19,
1999; People v. Glenn Lotoc, GR No. 132166, May 19, 1999; People v. Isabelo

Perez, GR No. 130501, September 2, 1999; People v. Norlito Tan, GR No.

132324, September 28, 1999; People v. Alfredo Cabande, GR No. 132747,
February 8, 2000; People v. Eulogio Ignacio, GR No. 134568, February 10, 2000;
People v. Efren Mendoza, GR No. 133382, March 9, 2000; People v. Abdulajid
Sabdani, GR No. 134262, June 28, 2000; People v. Ponciano Aglipa, GR No.
130941, August 3, 2000; People v. Rafael D. Torres Jr., GR No. 138046,
December 8, 2000; People v. Wilbert Cabareo, GR No. 138645, January 16,
2001; People v. Pedro Ramirez, GR No. 138261, April 17, 2001; People v.
Florante Leal, GR No. 139313, June 19, 2001; People v. Edgar Ayupan, GR No.
140550, February 13, 2002; People v. Sueene Discalsota, GR No. 136892, April
11, 2002; People v. Timoteo Escarlos, GR No. 148912, September 10, 2003)
The essence of treachery is the swift and unexpected attack on an
unarmed victim without the slightest provocation on the part of the victim.
(People v. Alex Oliano, GR No. 119013, March 6, 1998; People v. Ernesto
Santiago Jamiro, GR No. 117576, September 18, 1997; People v. Cadiz Lapay,
GR No. 123072, October 14, 1998; People v. Gerry Sumalpong, GR No. 124705,
January 20, 1998; People v. Rogelio Andres, GR No. 122735, September 25,
1998; People v. Rizal Espiritu, GR No. 128287, February 2, 1999; People v.
Estanislaw Jaberto, GR No. 128147, May 12, 1999; People v. Eleno Paracale,
GR No. 141800, December 9, 2002)
Equally axiomatic is the rule
argument or a quarrel, treachery
circumstance, because the deceased
to have anticipated aggression from
GR No. 135981, January 15, 2004)

that when a killing is preceded by an

cannot be appreciated as a qualifying
may be said to have been forewarned and
the assailant. (People v. Marivic Genosa,

Granting arguendo that no evidence was presented to show the start of the
attack, the fact that the appellants continued to stab [the victim], even when he
was already pleading for his life, sufficiently proves the qualifying circumstance of
treachery. (People v. Rogelio Andres, GR No. 122735, September 25, 1998)
Indeed it has time and time again been held that the killing of minor
children who, by reason of their tender years, could not be expected to put up a
defense is considered attended with treachery even if the manner of attack was
not shown. (People v. Guillermo Samus, GR Nos. 135957-58, September 17,
2002)
Well-settled is the rule that treachery must be proved by clear and
convincing evidence as conclusively as the killing itself. The same degree of
proof to dispel any reasonable doubt is required before treachery may be
considered as an aggravating or a qualifying circumstance. Any doubt as to its
existence must be resolved in favor of the accused. (People v. Conrado De
Leon, GR No. 144052, March 6, 2002; People v. Eleno Paracale, GR No.
141800, December 9, 2002; People v. Marivic Genosa, GR No. 135981, January
15, 2004)
Because of the gravity of the resulting offense, treachery must be proved
as clearly as the crime itself. Treachery cannot be established from mere
conjectures. Absent any particulars as to the manner in which the aggression
commenced or how the act which resulted in the death of the victim unfolded,
treachery cannot be appreciated. (People v. Bonifacio Zamora, GR No. 101829,
August 21, 1997; People v. Florante Leal, GR No. 139313, June 19, 2001;

People v. Rolando Mendoza, GR No. 142654, November 16, 2001; People v.

Edgar Ayupan, GR No. 140550, February 13, 2002; People v. Edgar Ayupan, GR
No. 140550, February 13, 2002; People v. Conrado De Leon, GR No. 144052,
March 6, 2002; People v. Lolito Estoya, GR No. 153538, May 19, 2004)
A frontal attack does not necessarily rule out treachery. The qualifying
circumstance may still be appreciated if the attack was so sudden and so
unexpected that the deceased had no time to prepare for his or her defense.
(People v. Domingo Perez, GR No. 134756, February 13, 2001; People v.
Reynaldo De Guzman, GR No. 124037, October 2, 2001)
The suddenness of the attack does not by itself suffice to support a finding
of alevosia, even if the purpose is to kill, so long as the decision is sudden and
the victims helpless position is accidental. In order to appreciate treachery as a
modifying circumstance in a continuous aggression, as in the present case, it
must be shown to have been present at the inception of the attack. (People v.
Edgar Ayupan, GR No. 140550, February 13, 2002; People v. Eleno Paracale,
GR No. 141800, December 9, 2002)
Treachery; Elements
For treachery to be considered a qualifying circumstance, two conditions
must be satisfied:
(a) the malefactor employed such means, method or manner of execution
as to ensure his or her safety from the defensive or retaliatory acts of
the victim; and
(b) the said means, method or manner of execution was deliberately
adopted.
The essence of treachery is that the attack is deliberate and without
warning -- done in a swift and unexpected manner, affording the hapless,
unarmed and unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or to escape.
(People v. Laudemar De La Cruz, GR Nos. 109619-23, June 26, 1998;
People v. Gerry Sumalpong, GR No. 124705, January 20, 1998; People v.
Nicomedes Fabro, GR No. 95089, August 11, 1997; People v. Eleuterio Costelo,
GR No. 134311, October 13, 1999; People v. Joel Pinca, GR No. 129256,
November 17, 1999; People v. Restituto Rendaje, GR No. 136745, November
15, 2000; People v. Nomer Delos Santos, GR No. 132123, November 23, 2000;
People v. Mario Abendan, GR Nos. 132026-27, June 28, 2001; People v.
Rolando Mendoza, GR No. 142654, November 16, 2001; People v. Gerry
Cuenca, GR No. 143819, January 29, 2002; People v. Sam Hinaut, GR No.
143764, February 15, 2002; People v. Conrado De Leon, GR No. 144052, March
6, 2002; People v. Eleno Paracale, GR No. 141800, December 9, 2002; People
v. Timoteo Escarlos, GR No. 148912, September 10, 2003; People v. Ma.
Lourdes Felipe, GR No. 142505, December 11, 2003; People v. Lolito Estoya,
GR No. 153538, May 19, 2004)

Treachery; Failure to Allege in Information

We cannot appreciate treachery to qualify the crime to murder for the
simple reason that this was not alleged in the Information. Treachery is an
element of the crime. The Constitution requires that the accused must be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. Obviously, this
failure to allege treachery in the Information is a major lapse of the prosecution.
Since every doubt must be resolved in favor of the accused, we cannot convict
him of murder through treachery under an Information that charged him with
murder qualified by evident premeditation. (People v. Edelciano Amaca, GR No.
110129, August 12, 1997; People v. Nelson Agunias, GR No. 121993, September
12, 1997)
Alibi
Alibi is always viewed with suspicion, because it is inherently weak and
unreliable. Like denial, it amounts to nothing more than negative and self-serving
evidence undeserving of any weight in law. Alibi assumes significance or
strength only when it is amply corroborated by a credible witness. For it to
prosper, the accused must be able to prove the following:
(a) that they were in another place at the time of the perpetration of the
offense; and
(b) that it was physically impossible for them to be at the scene of the
crime at the time it happened.
(People v. Sixto Paragas,GR No. 146308, July 18, 2002; People v. Pedrito
Aonuevo, GR No. 112989, September 18, 1996; People v. Danilo Layno, GR
No. 11083, November 21, 1996; People v. Victor Timon, GR No. 97841-42,
November 12, 1997; People v. Gregorio Tulop, GR No. 124829, April 21, 1998;
People v. Buenaventura Batidor, GR No. 126027, February 18, 1999; People v.
Edgar S. Alojado, GR No. 122966-67, March 25, 1999; People v. Eduardo
Tabones, GR No. 129695, March 17, 1999; People v. Dominador Tabion, GR No.
132715, October 20, 1999; People v. Felipe Hofilea, GR No. 134772, June 22,
2000; People v. Ronnie Navales, GR No. 135230, August 8, 2000; People v.
Restituto Rendaje, GR No. 136745, November 15, 2000; People v. Emmanuel
Mana-ay, GR No. 132717, November 20, 2000; People v. John Kenneth de
Guzman, GR No. 137806, December 14, 2000; People v. Asterio Cordero, GR
Nos. 136894-96, February 7, 2001; People v. Eladio Viernes, GR Nos. 13673335, December 13, 2001; People v. Gerry Cuenca, GR No. 143819, January 29,
2002; People v. Dennis Edem, GR No. 130970, February 27, 2002; People v.
Conrado De Leon, GR No. 144052, March 6, 2002; People v. Boy Domingo, GR
No. 143660, June 5, 2002; People v. Ernie Baro, GR Nos. 146327-29, June 5,
2002; People v. Rogelio del Ayre, GR Nos. 139788 & 139827, October 3, 2002;
People v. Rogelio Bitancor, GR No. 147968, December 4, 2002; People v. Eleno
Paracale, GR No. 141800, December 9, 2002; People v. Tomas Visperas Jr., GR
No. 147315, January 13, 2003; People v. Jose Casitas Jr., GR No. 137404,
February 14, 2003; People v. Danilo Caraang, GR Nos. 148424-27, December
11, 2003; People v. Lolito Estoya, GR No. 153538, May 19, 2004)
Alibi is a weak defense not only because it is inherently unreliable but also
because it is easy to fabricate. In the absence of strong and convincing
evidence, alibi cannot prevail over the positive identification of the appellant by

an eyewitness who has no improper motive to testify falsely. Such defense must
necessarily fail. (People v. Orlando Pallarco, GR No. 119971, March 26, 1998;
People v. Gerardo Cogonon, GR No. 94548, October 4, 1996; People v. Antonio
Pareja, GR No. 88043, December 9, 1996; People v. Robert Dinglasan, GR No.
101312, January 28, 1997; People v. Bienvenido Ombrog, GR No. 104666,
February 12, 1997; People v. Nelson Agunias, GR No. 121993, September 12,
1997; People v. Gerry Sumalpong, GR No. 124705, January 20, 1998; People v.
Cirilo Balmoria, GR Nos. 120620-21, March 20, 1998; People v. Ulysses M.
Cawaling, GR No. 117970, July 28, 1998; People v. Robert Daraman, GR No.
126046, August 7, 1998; People v. Temestocles Lozano, GR No. 125080,
September 25, 1998; People v. Rogelio Andres, GR No. 122735, September 25,
1998; People v. Cadiz Lapay, GR No. 123072, October 14, 1998; People v.
Virgilio Siguin, GR No. 125910, November 24, 1998; People v. Tito Reduca, GR
Nos. 126094-95, January 21, 1999; People v. Crisanto Oliver, GR No. 123099,
February 11, 1999; People v. Rafael D. Torres Jr., GR No. 138046, December 8,
2000; People v. John Kenneth de Guzman, GR No. 137806, December 14, 2000;
People v. Mario Abendan, GR Nos. 132026-27, June 28, 2001; People v. Vicente
Basquez, GR No. 144035, September 27, 2001; People v. Romeo Manayan, GR
Nos. 142741-43, October 25, 2001; People v. Conrado De Leon, GR No.
144052, March 6, 2002; People v. Boy Domingo, GR No. 143660, June 5, 2002;
People v. Rogelio del Ayre, GR Nos. 139788 & 139827, October 3, 2002; People
v. Atanacio Mendoza, GR Nos. 143844-46, November 19, 2002; People v. Jose
Casitas Jr., GR No. 137404, February 14, 2003; People v. Felix Montes, GR Nos.
148743-45, November 18, 2003; People v. Lolito Estoya, GR No. 153538, May
19, 2004)
Courts have always looked upon the defense of alibi with suspicion, and
have always received it with caution not only because it is inherently weak and
unreliable, but because it is easily fabricated. For alibi to serve as basis for
acquittal, it must be established with clear and convincing evidence. The
requisites of time and place must be strictly met. Appellant must demonstrate
that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime at
the time of its commission. (People v. Julian, GR Nos. 113692-93, April 4, 1997;
People v. Narciso Barera, GR No. 99867, September 19, 1996; People v.
Dionisio Marollano, GR No. 105004, July 24, 1997; People v. Bonifacio Zamora,
GR No. 101829, August 21, 1997; People v. Victoriano Pontilar Jr.; GR No.
104865, July 11, 1997; People v. Edelciano Amaca, GR No. 110129, August 12,
1997; People v. Alex Oliano, GR No. 119013, March 6, 1998; People v. Cirilo
Balmoria, GR Nos. 120620-21, March 20, 1998; People v. Orlando Pallarco, GR
No. 119971, March 26, 1998; People v. Dominador Pili, GR No. 124739, April 15,
1998; People v. Gregorio Tulop, GR No. 124829, April 21, 1998; People v.
Rolusape Sabalones, GR No. 123485, August 31, 1998; People v. Nilo Barredo,
GR No. 122850, October 7, 1998; People v. Efren Cabebe, GR No. 125910, May
21, 1998; People v. Ulysses M. Cawaling, GR No. 117970, July 28, 1998; People
v. Alfredo Cabande, GR No. 132747, February 8, 2000; People v. Roberto
Mendoza Pacis, GR No. 146309, July 18, 2002; People v. Ma. Lourdes Felipe,
GR No. 142505, December 11, 2003)
When an accused invokes alibi and denial, which are deemed the
weakest of all defenses, the courts should not at once have a mental prejudice
against him. For, taken in the light of all the evidence on record, it may be
sufficient to acquit him. Thus, the Court has recognized that it is precisely when
the prosecutions case is weak, as in this instance, that the defense of alibi
assumes importance and becomes crucial in negating criminal liability. (People

v. Mark Perucho, GR No. 128869, April 14, 1999; People v. Renato Albao, GR
No. 117481, March 6, 1998; People v. Jaime Ibay, GR No. 132690, August 10,
1999)
Animus Possidendi
Knowledge refers to a mental state of awareness of a fact. Since courts
cannot penetrate the mind of an accused and thereafter state its perceptions with
certainty, resort to other evidence is necessary. Animus possidendi, as a state of
mind, may be determined on a case-to-case basis by taking into consideration
the prior or contemporaneous acts of the accused, as well as the surrounding
circumstances. Its existence may and usually must be inferred from the
attendant events in each particular case. (People v. William Robert Burton, GR
No. 114396, February 19, 1997)
A person found in possession of a thing taken from the recent execution of
a wrongful act is presumed to be both the taker and the doer of the whole act.
(Eutiquio A. Peligrino v. People, GR No. 136266, August 13, 2001)
Arson; Penalty
Republic Act 7659 provides that the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death
shall [be] imposed when the arson is perpetrated by two (2) or more persons or
by a group of persons, regardless of whether their purpose is merely to burn or
destroy the building or the burning merely constitutes an overt act in the
commission of another violation of law. (People v. Virgilio Siguin, November 24,
1998)
Battered Woman Syndrome
While new in Philippine jurisprudence, the concept has been recognized in
foreign jurisdictions as a form of self-defense or, at the least, incomplete selfdefense. By appreciating evidence that a victim or defendant is afflicted with the
syndrome, foreign courts convey their understanding of the justifiably fearful
state of mind of a person who has been cyclically abused and controlled over a
period of time.
A battered woman has been defined as a woman who is repeatedly
subjected to any forceful physical or psychological behavior by a man in order to
coerce her to do something he wants her to do without concern for her rights.
Battered women include wives or women in any form of intimate relationship with
men. Furthermore, in order to be classified as a battered woman, the couple
must go through the battering cycle at least twice. Any woman may find herself
in an abusive relationship with a man once. If it occurs a second time, and she
remains in the situation, she is defined as a battered woman.
Battered women exhibit common personality traits, such as low selfesteem, traditional beliefs about the home, the family and the female sex role;
emotional dependence upon the dominant male; the tendency to accept
responsibility for the batterers actions; and false hopes that the relationship will
improve.

More graphically, the battered woman syndrome is characterized by the

so-called cycle of violence, which has three phases:
(1) the tension-building phase;
(2) the acute battering incident; and
(3) the tranquil, loving (or, at least, nonviolent) phase.
During the tension-building phase, minor battering occurs -- it could be
verbal or slight physical abuse or another form of hostile behavior. The woman
usually tries to pacify the batterer through a show of kind, nurturing behavior; or
by simply staying out of his way. What actually happens is that she allows
herself to be abused in ways that, to her, are comparatively minor. All she wants
is to prevent the escalation of the violence exhibited by the batterer. This wish,
however, proves to be double-edged, because her placatory and passive
behavior legitimizes his belief that he has the right to abuse her in the first place.
However, the techniques adopted by the woman in her effort to placate him
are not usually successful, and the verbal and/or physical abuse worsens. Each
partner senses the imminent loss of control and the growing tension and despair.
Exhausted from the persistent stress, the battered woman soon withdraws
emotionally. But the more she becomes emotionally unavailable, the more the
batterer becomes angry, oppressive and abusive. Often, at some unpredictable
point, the violence spirals out of control and leads to an acute battering incident.
The acute battering incident is said to be characterized by brutality,
destructiveness and, sometimes, death. The battered woman deems this
incident as unpredictable, yet also inevitable. During this phase, she has no
control; only the batterer may put an end to the violence. Its nature can be as
unpredictable as the time of its explosion, and so are his reasons for ending it.
The battered woman usually realizes that she cannot reason with him, and that
resistance would only exacerbate her condition.
At this stage, she has a sense of detachment from the attack and the
terrible pain, although she may later clearly remember every detail. Her apparent
passivity in the face of acute violence may be rationalized thus: the batterer is
almost always much stronger physically, and she knows from her past painful
experience that it is futile to fight back. Acute battering incidents are often very
savage and out of control, such that innocent bystanders or intervenors are likely
to get hurt.
The final phase of the cycle of violence begins when the acute battering
incident ends. During this tranquil period, the couple experience profound
relief. On the one hand, the batterer may show a tender and nurturing behavior
towards his partner. He knows that he has been viciously cruel and tries to make
up for it, begging for her forgiveness and promising never to beat her again. On
the other hand, the battered woman also tries to convince herself that the battery
will never happen again; that her partner will change for the better; and that this
good, gentle and caring man is the real person whom she loves.
A battered woman usually believes that she is the sole anchor of the
emotional stability of the batterer. Sensing his isolation and despair, she feels
responsible for his well-being. The truth, though, is that the chances of his
reforming, or seeking or receiving professional help, are very slim, especially if

she remains with him. Generally, only after she leaves him does he seek
professional help as a way of getting her back. Yet, it is in this phase of
remorseful reconciliation that she is most thoroughly tormented psychologically.
The illusion of absolute interdependency is well-entrenched in a battered
womans psyche. In this phase, she and her batterer are indeed emotionally
dependent on each other -- she for his nurturant behavior, he for her
forgiveness. Underneath this miserable cycle of tension, violence and
forgiveness, each partner may believe that it is better to die than to be
separated. Neither one may really feel independent, capable of functioning
without the other. (People v. Marivic Genosa, GR No. 135981, January 15, 2004)
Because of the recurring cycles of violence experienced by the abused
woman, her state of mind metamorphoses. In determining her state of mind, we
cannot rely merely on the judgment of an ordinary, reasonable person who is
evaluating the events immediately surrounding the incident. A Canadian court
has aptly pointed out that expert evidence on the psychological effect of battering
on wives and common law partners are both relevant and necessary. How can
the mental state of the appellant be appreciated without it? The average
member of the public may ask: Why would a woman put up with this kind of
treatment? Why should she continue to live with such a man? How could she
love a partner who beat her to the point of requiring hospitalization? We would
expect the woman to pack her bags and go. Where is her self-respect? Why
does she not cut loose and make a new life for herself? Such is the reaction of
the average person confronted with the so-called battered wife syndrome.
To understand the syndrome properly, however, ones viewpoint should not
be drawn from that of an ordinary, reasonable person. What goes on in the mind
of a person who has been subjected to repeated, severe beatings may not be
consistent with -- nay, comprehensible to -- those who have not been through a
similar experience. Expert opinion is essential to clarify and refute common
myths and misconceptions about battered women.
Just as the battered woman believes that she is somehow responsible for
the violent behavior of her partner, she also believes that he is capable of killing
her, and that there is no escape. Battered women feel unsafe, suffer from
pervasive anxiety, and usually fail to leave the relationship. Unless a shelter is
available, she stays with her husband, not only because she typically lacks a
means of self-support, but also because she fears that if she leaves she would
be found and hurt even more. (People v. Marivic Genosa, GR No. 135981,
January 15, 2004)
Bigamy
A judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is necessary before a
subsequent one can be legally contracted. One who enters into a subsequent
marriage without first obtaining such judicial declaration is guilty of bigamy. This
principle applies even if the earlier union is characterized by statute as void.
(Vincent Paul G. Mercado v. Consuelo Tan, GR No. 137110, August 1, 2000)
Bouncing Checks Law (BP 22)

There are two ways of violating BP 22: 1) by making or drawing and

issuing a check to apply on account or for value, knowing at the time of issue
that the check was not sufficiently funded; and 2) by having sufficient funds in or
credit with the drawee bank at the time of issue, but failing to keep sufficient
funds or credit with the said bank to cover the full amount of the check when
presented to the drawee bank within a period of ninety (90) days. (Kenneth Ngo
v. People, GR No. 155815, July 14, 2004)
This Court has held that the elements of the crime are as follows:
1.

The accused makes, draws or issues any check to apply to account or for
value.

2.

The check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency

of funds or credit; or it would have been dishonored for the same reason
had not the drawer, without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop
payment.

3.

The accused knows at the time of the issuance that he or she does not
have sufficient funds in, or credit with, drawee bank for the payment of the
check in full upon its presentment.

(Betty King v. People, GR No. 131540, December 2, 1999; Kenneth Ngo v.

People, GR No. 155815, July 14, 2004)
Under Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (BP 22), the prosecution must prove not
only that the accused issued a check that was subsequently dishonored. It must
also establish that the accused was actually notified that the check was
dishonored, and that he or she failed, within five banking days from receipt of the
notice, to pay the holder of the check the amount due thereon or to make
arrangement for its payment. Absent proof that the accused received such
notice, a prosecution for violation of the Bouncing Checks Law cannot prosper.
(Betty King v. People, GR No. 131540, December 2, 1999)
The cause or reason for the issuance of a check is inconsequential in
determining criminal culpability under BP 22. (Kenneth Ngo v. People, GR No.
155815, July 14, 2004)
The gravamen of the offense punished by BP 22 is the act of making and
issuing a worthless check; that is, a check that is dishonored upon its
presentation for payment. The mere act of issuing a worthless check is malum
prohibitum. Lozano v. Martinez has declared that it is not the nonpayment of the
obligation that is being punished, but the making of worthless checks. In People
v. Nitafan, this Court has ruled that a check issued as an evidence of debt -though not intended to be presented for payment -- has the same effect as an
ordinary check and would fall within the ambit of BP 22. Que v. People has
affirmed the application of BP 22 to cases in which dishonored checks have been
issued in the form of deposit or guarantee. Indeed, the law does not make any
distinction between checks issued in payment of an obligation and those made
merely to guarantee that obligation. (Kenneth Ngo v. People, GR No. 155815,
July 14, 2004)
Settled is the rule that the single act of issuing a bouncing check may give
rise to two distinct criminal offenses: estafa and violation of Batas Pambansa

Bilang 22 (BP 22). The Rules of Court allow the offended party to intervene via a
private prosecutor in each of these two penal proceedings. However, the
recovery of the single civil liability arising from the single act of issuing a
bouncing check in either criminal case bars the recovery of the same civil liability
in the other criminal action. While the law allows two simultaneous civil remedies
for the offended party, it authorizes recovery in only one. In short, while two
crimes arise from a single set of facts, only one civil liability attaches to it. (Mary
Ann Rodriguez v. Thelma A. Ponferrada, GR No. 155531-34, July 29, 2005)
The following alternative penalties are imposable under BP 22: (1)
imprisonment of not less than 30 days, but not more than one year; (2) a fine of
not less or more than double the amount of the check, a fine that shall in no case
exceed P200,000; or (3) both such fine and imprisonment, at the discretion of the
court. (Susan Go v. Fernando L. Dimagiba, GR No. 151876, June 21, 2005)
SC-AC No. 12-2000, as clarified by SC-AC No. 13-2001, established a rule
of preference in imposing the above penalties. When the circumstances of the
case clearly indicate good faith or a clear mistake of fact without taint of negligence,
the imposition of a fine alone may be considered as the preferred penalty. The
determination of the circumstances that warrant the imposition of a fine rests upon
the trial judge only. Should the judge deem that imprisonment is appropriate, such
penalty may be imposed.
SC-AC No. 12-2000 did not delete the alternative penalty of imprisonment.
The competence to amend the law belongs to the legislature, not to this Court.
The penalty to be imposed depends on the peculiar circumstances of each
case. It is the trial courts discretion to impose any penalty within the confines of
the law. (Susan Go v. Fernando L. Dimagiba, GR No. 151876, June 21, 2005)
Bribery
The crime of direct bribery exists when a public officer 1) agrees to perform
an act that constitutes a crime in consideration of any offer, promise, gift or
present; 2) accepts the gift in consideration of the execution of an act that does
not constitute a crime; or 3) abstains from the performance of official duties.
(Acejas III v. People, GR Nos. 156643 & 156891, June 27, 2006)
Cattle Rustling
Presidential Decree 533 penalizes cattle rustling, which it defines as the
taking away by any means, method or scheme, without the consent of the
owner/raiser, of any of the abovementioned animals whether or not for profit or
gain, or whether committed with or without violence against or intimidation of any
person or force upon things. It includes the killing of large cattle, or taking its
meat or hide without the consent of the owner/raiser. (Joebert Santiago v. Court
of Appeals, GR No. 128517, September 10, 1998)
Child Exploitation

A child is deemed exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual

abuse, when the child indulges in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct if the
same is done:
(a) for money, profit, or any other consideration; or
(b) under the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group.
Under RA 7610, children are persons below eighteen years of age or
those unable to fully take care of themselves or protect themselves from abuse,
neglect, cruelty, exploitation or discrimination because of their age or mental
disability or condition. (People v. Ernesto Larin, GR No. 128777, October 7,
1998)
Civil Indemnity
Indemnity is different from other damages. Civil indemnity is automatically
granted to the offended party or his/her heirs in case of the formers death,
without need of further evidence other than the fact of the commission of the
crime and the appellants culpability therefor. Actual or moral damages may be
additionally granted upon sufficient proof that the private complainant is legally
entitled thereto. Exemplary damages may also be awarded if the crime was
committed with one or more aggravating circumstances duly proven. (People v.
Gerry Sumalpong, GR No. 124705, January 20, 1998; People v. Rolly Obello,
GR No. 108772, January 14, 1998; People v. Julie Villamor, GR Nos. 111313-14,
January 16, 1998; People v. Alejandro Atop, GR Nos. 124303-05, February 10,
1998; People v. Renato Albao, GR No. 117481, March 6, 1998; People v.
Dominador Pili, GR No. 124739, April 15, 1998; People v. Rodelio Bugayong, GR
No. 126518, December 2, 1998; People v. Edmundo Briones Aytalin, GR No.
134138, June 21, 2001)
Complex Crimes
Under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, a complex crime refers to:
(1) the commission of at least two grave or less grave felonies that must
both (or all) be the result of a single act; or
(2) one offense must be a necessary means for committing the other (or
others).
Negatively put, there is no complex crime when:
(1) two or more crimes are committed, but not by a single act; or
(2) committing one crime is not a necessary means for committing the
other (or others).
(Aurea R. Monteverde v. People, GR No. 139610, August 12, 2002)
When a complex crime under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code is
charged, it is axiomatic that the prosecution must allege in the information and
prove during the trial all the elements of all the offenses constituting the complex
crime.
We stress that the failure of the prosecution to prove one of the component
crimes and the acquittal arising therefrom will not necessarily lead to a

declaration of innocence for the other crimes. Settled is the rule that when a
complex crime is charged and the evidence fails to establish one of the
component offenses, the defendant can be convicted of the others, so long as
they are proved. (Aurea R. Monteverde v. People, GR No. 139610, August 12,
2002)
Since appellant was convicted of the complex crime of parricide with
unintentional abortion, the penalty to be imposed on him should be that for the
graver offense which is parricide. This is in accordance with the mandate of
Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, which states: When a single act
constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, the penalty for the most
serious crime shall be imposed. (People v. Melecio Robios, GR No. 138453,
May 29, 2002)
In relation to the charge that rape was complexed with the crime of serious
physical injuries, we stress the settled principle that a person who creates in
anothers mind an immediate sense of danger that causes the latter to try to
escape is responsible for whatever the other person may consequently suffer.
(People v. Celerino Castromero, GR No. 118992, October 9, 1997)
Confederation
It is worthy to note that confederation is not enumerated as an aggravating
circumstance under Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code. Like conspiracy which
must be alleged in and not merely inferred from the information, confederation is
but a mode of incurring criminal liability and may not be considered criminal in
itself unless specifically provided by law. Neither may confederation be treated
as an aggravating circumstance in the absence of any law defining or classifying
it as such. (People v. Alfredo Baroy, GR Nos. 137520-22, May 9, 2002)
Conspiracy
The elements of conspiracy are the following:
(1) two or more persons came to an agreement;
(2) the agreement concerned the commission of a felony; and
(3) the execution of the felony was decided upon.
Proof of the conspiracy need not be based on direct evidence, because it
may be inferred from the parties conduct indicating a common understanding
among themselves with respect to the commission of the crime. Neither is it
necessary to show that two or more persons met together and entered into an
explicit agreement setting out the details of an unlawful scheme or objective to be
carried out. The conspiracy may be deduced from the mode or manner in which
the crime was perpetrated; it may also be inferred from the acts of the accused
evincing a joint or common purpose and design, concerted action and community
of interest. (People v. Reyderick Lago, GR No. 121272, June 6, 2001; People v.
Erick Macahia, GR No. 130931, May 19, 1999; People v. Rodrigo Maldo, GR No.
131347, May 19, 1999; People v. Edwin De Vera, GR No. 128966, August 18,
1999; People v. Isabelo Perez, GR No. 130501, September 2, 1999; People v.
Nomer Delos Santos, GR No. 132123, November 23, 2000; People v. Reynaldo
De Guzman, GR No. 124037, October 2, 2001; People v. Conrado De Leon, GR
No. 144052, March 6, 2002)

Like the elements of an offense, conspiracy must be established by proof

beyond reasonable doubt. To establish conspiracy, there must be proof that two
or more persons agreed to commit the crime. Direct proof of the said agreement
is not indispensable, because conspiracy may be inferred from the concerted
acts of the accused indubitably revealing their unity of purpose, intent and
sentiment in committing the crime. (People v. Renato Albao, GR No. 117481,
March 6, 1998; People v. Robert Dinglasan, GR No. 101312, January 28, 1997;
People v. Norlito Cara, GR Nos. 117483-84, December 12, 1997; People v. Rolly
Obello, GR No. 108772, January 14, 1998; People v. Gerry Sumalpong, GR No.
124705, January 20, 1998; People v. Veriato Molina, GR Nos. 115835-36, July
22, 1998; People v. Carlos Boco, GR No. 129676, June 23, 1999; People v.
Eleuterio Costelo, GR No. 134311, October 13, 1999; People v. Arnulfo Quilaton,
GR No. 131835, February 3, 2000; People v. Chen Tiz Chang, GR Nos. 13187273, February 17, 2000; People v. Ignacio Cupino, GR No. 125688, March 31,
2000; People v. Mario Abendan, GR Nos. 132026-27, June 28, 2001; People v.
Sam Hinaut, GR No. 143764, February 15, 2002; People v. Sixto Paragas,GR
No. 146308, July 18, 2002; People v. Mila Razul, GR No. 146470, November 22,
2002; People v. Lomer Mandao, GR No. 135048, December 3, 2002; People v.
Rosdia Hajili, GR Nos. 149872-73, March 14, 2003; People v. Danilo Caraang,
GR Nos. 148424-27, December 11, 2003)
Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement
concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. Once
established, the act of one becomes the act of all. Further, conspiracy must be
shown to exist as clearly as the commission of the offense itself, although direct
proof is not essential. Prior agreement or assent to the crime is usually inferred
from the acts of the accused showing concerted action, common design and
objective, actual cooperation, concurrence of sentiments, or community of
interest. In most cases, proof of conspiracy is frequently made by evidence of a
chain of circumstances only. But such proof must always be established by
evidence that satisfies the requirement of proof beyond reasonable doubt.
(People v. Raul Mondaga, GR No. 115351, March 27, 1998; People v. Dione
Palomar, GR Nos. 108183-85, August 21, 1997; People v. Ulysses M.
Cawaling, GR No. 117970, July 28, 1998; People v. Rogelio Andres, GR No.
122735, September 25, 1998; People v. Vicenta Medina Lapis, GR Nos. 14573435, October 15, 2002; People v. Ma. Lourdes Felipe, GR No. 142505, December
11, 2003)
All the conspirators are liable as principals regardless of the extent and the
character of their participation, because the act of one is the act of all. (People v.
Rolly Obello, GR No. 108772, January 14, 1998; People v. Gerry Sumalpong,
GR No. 124705, January 20, 1998; People v. Wilson Catampongan, GR No.
131732, November 19, 1999; People v. Nerio Suela, GR Nos. 133570-71,
January 15, 2002; People v. Danilo Caraang, GR Nos. 148424-27, December 11,
2003; People v. Homer Magdaraog, GR No. 151251, May 19, 2004)
Mere presence, however, does not amount to conspiracy. It must also be
shown that the accused performed an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy.
Indeed, it is axiomatic that conspiracy must be established beyond reasonable
doubt. It must be founded on facts, not on mere surmises or conjectures.
(People v. Marcos Mucam, GR No. 137276, July 13, 2000; People v. Lomer

Mandao, GR No. 135048, December 3, 2002; People v. Gatudan Balag-ey, GR

No. 141532, April 14, 2004)
Corpus Delicti
Corpus delicti refers to the fact of the commission of the crime charged or
to the body or substance of the crime. In its legal sense, it does not refer to the
ransom money in the crime of kidnapping for ransom or to the body of the person
murdered.
Hence, to prove the corpus delicti, it is sufficient for the prosecution to be
able show that:
(1) a certain fact has been proven -- say, a person has died or a building
has been burned; and
(2) a particular person is criminally responsible for the act.
(Arturo G. Rimorin Sr. v. People, GR No. 146481, April 30, 2003)
Criminal Liability
Article 4, par. 1 of the Revised Penal Code states that criminal liability shall
be incurred by any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act
done be different from that which he intended. The essential requisites for the
application of this provision are that:
(a) the intended act is felonious;
(b) the resulting act is likewise a felony; and
(c) the unintended albeit graver wrong was primarily caused by the
actors wrongful acts.
(People v. Benjamin Ortega Jr., GR No. 116736, July 24, 1997; People v.
Wilbert Cabareo, GR No. 138645, January 16, 2001)
Dangerous Drugs Act
The elements of illegal possession of prohibited drugs are as follows:
(a) the accused is in possession of an item or object which is identified to
be a prohibited drug;
(b) such possession is not authorized by law; and
(c) the accused freely and consciously possessed the prohibited drug.
(People v. Noriel Lacerna, GR No. 109250, September 5, 1997; Alain
Manalili v. Court of Appeals, GR No. 113447, October 9, 1997; People v. Chen
Tiz Chang, GR Nos. 131872-73, February 17, 2000; People v. Michael Sy, GR
No. 147348, September 24, 2002; People v. Rosdia Hajili, GR Nos. 149872-73,
March 14, 2003; People v. Gatudan Balag-ey, GR No. 141532, April 14, 2004)
Jurisprudence has firmly entrenched the following as elements in the crime
of illegal sale of prohibited drugs:
(1) the accused sold and delivered a prohibited drug to another, and
(2) he knew that what he had sold and delivered was a dangerous drug.

(People v. Roberto Mendoza Pacis, GR No. 146309, July 18, 2002; People
v. Mila Razul, GR No. 146470, November 22, 2002; People v. Rosdia Hajili, GR
Nos. 149872-73, March 14, 2003; People v. Gatudan Balag-ey, GR No. 141532,
April 14, 2004)
The prevailing doctrine is that possession of marijuana is absorbed in the
sale thereof, except where the seller is further apprehended in possession of
another quantity of the prohibited drugs not covered by or included in the sale
and which are probably intended for some future dealings or use by the seller.
(People v. Noriel Lacerna, GR No. 109250, September 5, 1997; People v.
Gatudan Balag-ey, GR No. 141532, April 14, 2004)
Possession is a necessary element in a prosecution for illegal sale of
prohibited drugs. It is indispensable that the prohibited drug subject of the sale
be identified and presented in court. That the corpus delicti of illegal sale could
not be established without a showing that the accused possessed, sold and
delivered a prohibited drug clearly indicates that possession is an element of the
former. The same rule is applicable in cases of delivery of prohibited drugs and
giving them away to another. (People v. Noriel Lacerna, GR No. 109250,
September 5, 1997; People v. Gatudan Balag-ey, GR No. 141532, April 14, 2004)
Indispensable in every prosecution for illegal sale of marijuana, a
prohibited drug, is the submission of proof that the sale of the illicit drug took
place between the poseur-buyer and the seller thereof, coupled with the
presentation of the corpus delicti as evidence in court. The element of sale must
be unequivocally established in order to sustain a conviction. (People v.
Saturnina Salazar, GR No. 98060, January 27, 1997; People v. Carlos Boco, GR
No. 129676, June 23, 1999; People v. Chen Tiz Chang, GR Nos. 131872-73,
February 17, 2000; People v. Mila Razul, GR No. 146470, November 22, 2002;
People v. Teresa Corpuz, GR No. 148919, December 17, 2002)
Section 4, Article II of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, penalizes not
only the sale but also the delivery of prohibited drugs. The law defines deliver as
a persons act of knowingly passing a dangerous drug to another with or without
consideration. Considering that appellant was charged with the sale, the
delivery and the giving away of prohibited drugs, the consummation of the crime
may be sufficiently established even in the absence of marked money. (People
v. Evangeline Ganenas, GR No. 141400, September 6, 2001)
Section 21 [of RA 6425, as amended by RA 7659] punishes an attempt or
a conspiracy, among others, in the [s]ale, administration, delivery, distribution
and transportation of dangerous drugs. This is one of the few instances when
the law specifically punishes mere conspiracy. (People v. Gatudan Balag-ey, GR
No. 141532, April 14, 2004)
The non-presentation of the marked money does not create a hiatus in the
evidence for the prosecution, so long as the sale of the dangerous drugs is
adequately proven and the drug itself is presented before the court. (People v.
Carlos Boco, GR No. 129676, June 23, 1999; People v. Michael Sy, GR No.
147348, September 24, 2002; People v. Ruel Eugenio, GR No. 146805, January
16, 2003)

This Court has consistently ruled that it is not uncommon for drug dealers
or pushers to sell their commodities to total strangers at any time and at any
place. In any case, the law does not prescribe as an element of the crime that
the vendor and the vendee be familiar with each other, or that the transaction be
consummated in a particular place and time. The law simply penalizes the actual
sale of shabu. (People v. Cheng Ho Chua, GR No. 127542, March 18, 1999)
In prosecutions involving prohibited drugs, the state has a right to specify
what proofs shall constitute prima facie evidence of guilt, and thereafter to place
upon the accused the burden of showing that his act or acts are innocent and are
not committed with any criminal intent or intention. The existence of animus
possidendi is only prima facie. Thus, it is subject to contrary proof and may be
rebutted by evidence that the accused did not in fact exercise power and control
over the thing in question, and did not intend to do so. The constitutional
presumption of innocence will not apply as long as there is some rational
connection between the fact proved and the ultimate fact presumed, and the
inference of one fact from proof of another shall not be so unreasonable as to be
(a) purely arbitrary mandate. The burden of evidence is thus shifted to the
possessor to explain absence of animus possidendi. A mere uncorroborated
claim of the accused that he did not know that he had a prohibited drug in his
possession is insufficient. Any evasion, false statement, or attempt at
concealment on his part, in explaining how the drug came into his possession,
may be considered in determining his guilt. (People v. William Robert Burton,
GR No. 114396, February 19, 1997)
Delay in Reporting Crime
It has been held that delay or vacillation in making a criminal accusation
does not necessarily weaken the credibility of a witness where such delay is
satisfactorily explained. (People v. Arnulfo Astorga, GR No. 110097, December
22, 1997; People v. Julie Villamor, GR No. 111313-14, January 16, 1998; People
v. Roderick Santos, GR Nos. 135454-56, November 13, 2001; People v. Dennis
Edem, GR No. 130970, February 27, 2002; People v. Atanacio Mendoza, GR
Nos. 143844-46, November 19, 2002)
Deeply imbedded in our jurisprudence is the rule that the failure of the
complainant to report the rape immediately to the members of her family or to the
police authorities does not detract from her credibility, her hesitation being
attributable to her age, the moral ascendancy of appellant or his threats against
her. It is not unlikely that a minor would be intimidated into silence by the mildest
threat against her life or the lives of members of her family. A young girl, unlike a
mature woman, cannot be expected to have the courage and the intelligence to
report immediately a sexual assault committed against her, especially when a
death threat hangs over her head. (People v. Emmanuel Quezada, GR Nos.
135557-58, January 30, 2002; People v. Antonio Alimon, GR No. 87758, June 28,
1996; People v. Gerald Tayaban, GR No. 128481, September 25, 1998; People
v. Efren Buendia, GR Nos. 133949-51, September 16, 1999; People v. Alexander
Tao, GR No. 133872, May 5, 2000; People v. Rolando Tabanggay, GR No.
130504, June 29, 2000; People v. Ernie Baro, GR Nos. 146327-29, June 5, 2002;
People v. Atanacio Mendoza, GR Nos. 143844-46, November 19, 2002; People
v. Jovito Manalo, GR Nos. 144989-90, January 31, 2003; People v. Ignacio
Sinoro, GR Nos. 138650-58, April 22, 2003; People v. Felix Montes, GR Nos.
148743-45, November 18, 2003)

The alleged delay in reporting the incident and in divulging to the

authorities the identities of the perpetrators was sufficiently explained.
Considering that what the eyewitness saw was a brazen and brutal manner in
which the victim was killed, it is understandable why the former was at first
hesitant to point to appellants as the malefactors. The fear and bewilderment
experienced by the eyewitness upon seeing appellants criminal propensity for
violence may have initially silenced him.
In any case, the failure of witnesses to volunteer information to law
enforcement officers does not necessarily impair their credibility. The Supreme
Court understands the natural reticence and fear of some people to get involved
in a criminal case. It has observed their reluctance, if not aversion, to have any
involvement in a criminal case. Their initial hesitancy to volunteer information
about a crime due to fear of reprisal is common. When adequately explained,
such reluctance has been judicially declared as having no effect on credibility.
(People v. Ramil Beruega, GR No. 142931, April 11, 2002; People v. Noel
Navarro, GR No. 129566, October 7, 1998; People v. Cadiz Lapay, GR No.
123072, October 14, 1998; People v. Mario Abendan, GR Nos. 132026-27, June
28, 2001)
Denial
Denials, if unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence, are deemed
negative and self-serving evidence unworthy of credence. They have no
evidentiary value ranged against the testimonies of credible witnesses on
affirmative matters. (People v. Mildred Villas, GR No. 112180, August 15, 1997;
People v. Dione Palomar, GR Nos. 108183-85, August 21, 1997; People v.
Alejandro Atop, GR No. 124303-05, February 10, 1998; People v. Reynaldo
Corre Jr., GR No. 137271, August 15, 2001; People v. Romeo Manayan, GR
Nos. 142741-43, October 25, 2001; People v. Marcos Asuela, GR Nos. 14039394, February 4, 2002; People v. Ruel Eugenio, GR No. 146805, January 16,
2003; People v. Ignacio Sinoro, GR Nos. 138650-58, April 22, 2003; People v.
Homer Magdaraog, GR No. 151251, May 19, 2004; Elsa Jose v. People, GR No.
148371, August 12, 2004)
It is elementary that alibi and denial are outweighed by positive
identification that is categorical, consistent and untainted by any ill motive on the
part of the eyewitness testifying on the matter. Alibi and denial, if not
substantiated by clear and convincing evidence, are negative and self-serving
evidence undeserving of weight in law. (People v. Ulysses M. Cawaling, GR No.
117970, July 28, 1998; People v. Temestocles Lozano, GR No. 125080,
September 25, 1998; People v. Eladio Viernes, GR Nos. 136733-35, December
13, 2001; People v. Dennis Edem, GR No. 130970, February 27, 2002; People v.
Ramil Beruega, GR No. 142931, April 11, 2002; People v. Alfredo Baroy, GR Nos.
137520-22, May 9, 2002; People v. Jaime Gonzales, GR No. 140676, July 31,
2002; People v. Mila Razul, GR No. 146470, November 22, 2002; People v.
Tomas Visperas Jr., GR No. 147315, January 13, 2003; People v. Felix Montes,
GR Nos. 148743-45, November 18, 2003; People v. Veno Esperas, GR No.
128109, November 19, 2003)
However, giving it a different name does not increase its probative value.
A denial, like other defenses, remains subject to the strength of the prosecution

evidence which is independently assessed. When the evidence for the

prosecution convincingly connects the crime and the culprit, the probative value
of the denial is negligible. (People v. Nicomedes Fabro, GR No. 95089, August
11, 1997; People v. Cadiz Lapay, GR No. 123072, October 14, 1998)
The appellants bare denial is a weak defense that becomes even weaker
in the face of the prosecution witnesses positive identification of him.
Jurisprudence gives greater weight to the positive narration of prosecution
witnesses than to the negative testimonies of the defense. Between positive and
categorical testimony which has a ring of truth to it on the one hand, and a bare
denial on the other, the former generally prevails. (People v. Jailon Kulais, GR
Nos. 100901-08, July 16, 1998; People v. Florante Leal, GR No. 139313, June
19, 2001; People v. Dionisio Bataller, GR Nos. 134540-41, July 18, 2001; People
v. Evangeline Ganenas, GR No. 141400, September 6, 2001; People v. Rogelio
Barrozo, GR Nos. 138726-27, July 3, 2002; People v. Rogelio Bitancor, GR No.
147968, December 4, 2002)
Death Penalty
The Constitution did not merely suspend the imposition of the death
penalty, but in fact completely abolished it from the statute books. The automatic
commutation or reduction to reclusion perpetua of any death penalty extant as of
the effectivity of the Constitution clearly recognizes that, while the conviction of
an accused for a capital crime remains, death as a penalty ceased to exist in our
penal laws and thus may no longer be carried out.
The Constitution inexorably placed upon Congress the burden of
determining the existence of "compelling reasons" and of defining what crimes
are "heinous" before it could exercise its law-making prerogative to restore the
death penalty. (Dissenting Opinion in People v. Leo Echegaray, GR No. 117472,
February 7, 1997)
I also believe that the heinousness clause requires that:
1)

The crimes should be entirely new offenses, the elements of which have
an inherent quality, degree or level of perversity, depravity or viciousness
unheard of until then; or

2)

Even existing crimes, provided some new element or essential ingredient

like "organized" or "brutal" is added to show their utter perversity,
odiousness or malevolence; or

3)

The means or method by which the crime, whether new or old, is carried
out evinces a degree or magnitude of extreme violence, evil, cruelty,
atrocity, viciousness as to demonstrate its heinousness. (Dissenting
Opinion in People v. Leo Echegaray, GR No. 117472, February 7, 1997)

I hold that the judicial taking of life cannot be left to mere legal logic. Life is
too precious to be settled by legalism, however, exalted. I believe that this Court
cannot abandon its sacred duty to God and country to see to it that a lower court
judgment that takes away life is ERROR FREE and can stand THE MOST
SEARCHING SCRUTINY. And at the same time, this Court must not enable an
escaped convict to make a mockery of the foundations of human justice.

Consequently, I believe we must combine the sacred with the human. After
prayer, study, reflection and discernment, I am thoroughly convinced that this
Court has the inescapable duty to review this and similar life-taking decisions, but
only after the accused is re-arrested and taken back into the custody of law.
(Separate Opinion in People v. Josefina A. Esparas, GR No. 120034, August 20,
1996)
Direct Assault
Direct assault, a crime against public order, may be committed in two
ways: first, by any person or persons who, without a public uprising, shall
employ force or intimidation for the attainment of any of the purposes
enumerated in defining the crimes of rebellion and sedition; and second, by any
person or persons who, without a public uprising, shall attack, employ force, or
seriously intimidate or resist any person in authority or any of his agents, while
engaged in the performance of official duties, or on occasion of such
performance. The first mode is tantamount to rebellion or sedition, without the
element of public uprising. The second mode, on the other hand, is the more
common form of assault, and is aggravated when: (a) the assault is committed
with a weapon, or (b) when the offender is a public officer or employee, or (c)
when the offender lays a hand upon a person in authority. (People v. Julio
Recto, GR No. 129069, October 17, 2001)
Entrapment
Entrapment has been held to be a lawful police tactic for trapping and
capturing lawbreakers in the very act of executing their criminal plan. In buy-bust
operations, the policemen execute a plan to catch a drug dealer the act of plying
his nefarious trade. (People v. James Atad, GR No. 114105, January 16, 1997;
People v. Roberto Mendoza Pacis, GR No. 146309, July 18, 2002)
In entrapment, the criminal intent or design to commit the offense
charged originates in the mind of the accused, and the law enforcement officials
merely facilitate the commission of the crime. (Eutiquio A. Peligrino v. People,
GR No. 136266, August 13, 2001)
Estafa
The elements of estafa are:
(1) the accused defrauded another :
(a) by abuse of confidence or
(b) by means of deceit; and
(2) the offended party or third party suffered damage or prejudice capable
of pecuniary estimation.
(Elbert Tan v. Court of Appeals, GR No. 110715, December 12, 1997;
Erlinda de la Cruz v. Court of Appeals, GR No. 105213, December 4, 1996)

Under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code, estafa is
committed by any person who defrauds another by using a fictitious name; or by
falsely pretending to possess power, influence, qualifications, property, credit,
agency, business; by imaginary transactions or similar forms of deceit executed
prior to or simultaneous with the fraud. Moreover, these false pretenses should
have been the very reason that motivated complainants to deliver property or pay
money to the perpetrators of the fraud. (People v. Vicenta Medina Lapis, GR
Nos. 145734-35, October 15, 2002)
There is estafa if, through insidious words and machinations, appellants
deluded complainants into believing that, for a fee, the latter would be provided
overseas jobs. (People v. Vicenta Medina Lapis, GR Nos. 145734-35, October
15, 2002)
Deceit refers to a false representation of a matter of fact (whether by
words or conduct, by false or misleading allegations, or by concealment of that
which should have been disclosed) which deceives or is intended to deceive
another so that he shall act upon it to his legal injury. (Elsa Jose v. People, GR
No. 148371, August 12, 2004)
The institution of the civil actions with the estafa cases and the inclusion of
another set of civil actions with the BP 22 cases are not exactly repugnant or
inconsistent with each other. Nothing in the Rules signifies that the necessary
inclusion of a civil action in a criminal case for violation of the Bouncing Checks
Law precludes the institution in an estafa case of the corresponding civil action,
even if both offenses relate to the issuance of the same check.
The purpose of Section 1(b) of Rule 111 is explained by Justice Florenz D.
Regalado (ret.), former chairman of the committee tasked with the revision of the
Rules of Criminal Procedure. He clarified that the special rule on BP 22 cases
was added, because the dockets of the courts were clogged with such litigations;
creditors were using the courts as collectors. While ordinarily no filing fees were
charged for actual damages in criminal cases, the rule on the necessary
inclusion of a civil action with the payment of filing fees based on the face value
of the check involved was laid down to prevent the practice of creditors of using
the threat of a criminal prosecution to collect on their credit free of charge.
Clearly, it was not the intent of the special rule to preclude the prosecution
of the civil action that corresponds to the estafa case, should the latter also be
filed. The crimes of estafa and violation of BP 22 are different and distinct from
each other. There is no identity of offenses involved, for which legal jeopardy in
one case may be invoked in the other. The offenses charged in the informations
are perfectly distinct from each other in point of law, however nearly they may be
connected in point of fact.
What Section 1(b) of the Rules of Court prohibits is the reservation to file
the corresponding civil action. The criminal action shall be deemed to include the
corresponding civil action. Unless a separate civil action has been filed before
the institution of the criminal action, no such civil action can be instituted after the
criminal action has been filed as the same has been included therein. (Mary
Ann Rodriguez v. Thelma A. Ponferrada, GR No. 155531-34, July 29, 2005)

EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCES
Accident
Before the accused may be exempted from criminal liability by reason of
Article 12 (paragraph 4), the following elements must concur:
(1) a person is performing a lawful act;
(2) with due care, and
(3) he causes an injury to another by mere accident and
(4) without any fault or intention of causing it. For an accident to become
an exempting circumstance, the act has to be lawful. The act of firing a
shotgun at another is not a lawful act.
An accident is an occurrence that happens outside the sway of our will,
and although it comes about through some act of our will, lies beyond the bounds
of humanly foreseeable consequences. It connotes the absence of criminal
intent. Intent is a mental state, the existence of which is shown by a persons
overt acts. (People v. Ricardo Agliday, GR No. 140794, October 16, 2001;
People v. Ricardo Janairo, GR No. 129254, July 22, 1999; Roweno Pomoy v.
People, GR No. 150647, September 29, 2004)
Accident is an exempting circumstance under Article 12 of the Revised
Penal Code.
Exemption from criminal liability proceeds from a finding that the harm to
the victim was not due to the fault or negligence of the accused, but to
circumstances that could not have been foreseen or controlled. (Roweno Pomoy
v. People, GR No. 150647, September 29, 2004)
Insanity
Insanity presupposes that the accused was completely deprived of reason
or discernment and freedom of will at the time of the commission of the crime. A
defendant in a criminal case who relies on the defense of mental incapacity has
the burden of establishing the fact of insanity at the very moment when the crime
was committed. Only when there is a complete deprivation of intelligence at the
time of the commission of the crime should the exempting circumstance of
insanity be considered.
The presumption of law always lies in favor of sanity and, in the absence of
proof to the contrary, every person is presumed to be of sound mind. Accordingly,
one who pleads the exempting circumstance of insanity has the burden of
proving it. (People v. Melecio Robios, GR No. 138453, May 29, 2002; People v.
Alberto Medina, GR No. 113691, February 6, 1998)
The defense of insanity or imbecility must be clearly proved, for there is a
presumption that acts penalized by law are voluntary. (People v. Alberto Medina,
GR No. 113691, February 6, 1998)
Care must be taken to distinguish between lack of reason (insanity) and
failure to use reason or good judgment due to extreme anger (passion). xxx [I]t
is now well settled that mere mental depravity, or moral insanity, so called, which

results, not from any disease of mind, but from a perverted condition of the moral
system, where the person is mentally sane, does not exempt one from
responsibility for crimes committed under its influence. Thus, before the
defense of insanity may be accepted as an exempting circumstance, Philippine
case law shows a common reliance on the test of cognition, which requires a
complete deprivation of intelligence -- not only of the will -- in committing the
criminal act. (People v. Alberto Medina, GR No. 113691, February 6, 1998)
Mere abnormality of the mental faculties does not exclude criminal
culpability. (People v. Alberto Medina, GR No. 113691, February 6, 1998)
Irresistible Force
A person who invokes the exempting circumstance of compulsion due to
irresistible force must prove his defense by clear and convincing evidence. He
must show that the irresistible force reduced him to a mere instrument that acted
not only without will but also against his will. The compulsion must be of such
character as to leave the accused no opportunity to defend himself or to escape.
(People v. Diarangan Dansal, GR No. 105002, July 17, 1997)
The duress, force, fear or intimidation must be present, imminent and impending;
and it must be of such a nature as to induce a well-grounded apprehension of
death or serious bodily harm if the act is not done. A threat of future injury is not
enough. A speculative, fanciful or remote fear, even fear of future injury, is
insufficient. (People v. Diarangan Dansal, GR No. 105002, July 17, 1997)
Forcible Abduction
The two elements of forcible abduction, as defined in Article 342 of the
Revised Penal Code, are as follows:
(1) taking a woman against her will; and
(2) doing so with lewd designs.
This complex crime occurs when there is carnal knowledge of the
abducted woman; when force or intimidation is used; when the woman is
deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious; and when the woman is under
twelve years of age or is demented. (People v. Danilo Caraang, GR Nos.
148424-27, December 11, 2003)
The employment of deception suffices to constitute forcible abduction.
This Court has previously ruled that if the victims consent was obtained through
deceit and there was therefore no valid consent, the crime is forcible abduction,
as the deceit may be considered as constructive force. (People v. Danilo
Caraang, GR Nos. 148424-27, December 11, 2003)
Forgery
The counterfeiting of any writing, consisting in the signing of anothers
name with intent to defraud, is forgery. (Casa Montessori Internationale v. Bank
of the Philippine Islands, GR Nos. 149454 & 149507, May 28, 2004)

Forgery cannot be presumed. It must be established by clear, positive

and convincing evidence. Under the best evidence rule as applied to
documentary evidence like the checks in question, no secondary or
substitutionary evidence may inceptively be introduced, as the original writing
itself must be produced in court. But when, without bad faith on the part of the
offeror, the original checks have already been destroyed or cannot be produced
in court, secondary evidence may be produced. (Casa Montessori Internationale
v. Bank of the Philippine Islands, GR Nos. 149454 & 149507, May 28, 2004;
Nora T. Jimenez v. Commission on Ecumenical Mission and Relations, GR No.
140472, June 10, 2002)
Frame-Up
Frame-up, often imputed to police officers, requires strong proof when
offered as a defense, because of the presumption that public officers acted in the
regular performance of their official duties. (People v. Carlos Boco, GR No.
129676, June 23, 1999)
Frame-up, like alibi, is invariably viewed with disfavor because, as a line of
defense in most criminal prosecutions of this nature, it is easily concocted,
common or standard. (Eutiquio A. Peligrino v. People, GR No. 136266, August
13, 2001; People v. Walpan Ladjaalam, GR Nos. 136149-51, September 19,
2000; People v. Evangeline Ganenas, GR No. 141400, September 6, 2001;
People v. Michael Sy, GR No. 147348, September 24, 2002; People v. Ruel
Eugenio, GR No. 146805, January 16, 2003)
Anti-Graft Law
Public officers entering into an agreement appearing to be manifestly and
grossly disadvantageous to the government, in violation of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, invite their indictment for corruption under the said law.
(Francisco I. Chavez v. PCGG, GR No. 130716, December 9, 1998)
To hold a person liable under Section 3[e] of the Anti-Graft Law, the
following elements must be established beyond reasonable doubt by the
prosecution:
1) that the accused is a public officer or a private person charged in
conspiracy with the former;
2) that said public officer commits the prohibited acts during the
performance of his or her official duties or in relation to his or her public
positions;
3) that he or she causes undue injury to any party, whether the
government or a private party; and
4) that the public officer has acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith
or gross inexcusable negligence.
(Cresente Llorente v. Sandiganbayan, GR No. 122166, March 11, 1998;
Ruperto V. Peralta v. Aniano Desierto, GR No. 153152, October 19, 2005; Cesar
T. Villanueva v. Mayor Felix V. Ople, GR No. 165125, November 18, 2005)

In a prosecution for violation of Section 3 [e] of the Anti-Graft Law, that is

causing undue injury to any party, the government must prove actual injury to
the offended party; speculative or incidental injury is not sufficient. (Cresente
Llorente v. Sandiganbayan, GR No. 122166, March 11, 1998)
Unlike in actions for torts, undue injury in Section 3[e] cannot be presumed
even after a wrong or a violation of a right has been established. Its existence
must be proven as one of the elements of the crime. In fact, the causing of
undue injury or the giving of any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference
through manifest partiality, evident bad faith gross inexcusable negligence
constitutes the very act punished under this section. Thus, it is required that the
undue injury be specified, quantified and proven to the point of moral certainty.
(Cresente Llorente v. Sandiganbayan, GR No. 122166, March 11, 1998)
The elements of a violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 fall outside the
realm of those of falsification of a public document and vice versa. Clearly, one
offense does not include the other. (Andres S. Suero v. People, GR No. 156408,
January 31, 2005)
To convict the accused in a prosecution for the violation of Section 3(b) of
the Anti-Graft Law, mere receipt of a gift or any other benefit is enough, even
without any express demand for it. The duration of the possession is not
controlling. Important are the appellants words, action and reactions showing
acceptance thereof. These are factual in nature and, absent any arbitrariness,
abuse of discretion, or palpable error, the trial courts assessment of their
presence or absence is generally binding on appellate review. (Eutiquio A.
Peligrino v. People, GR No. 136266, August 13, 2001)
The elements of this offense [Section 3(b) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act (RA 3019, as amended)] were summed up in Mejia v. Pamaran,
and we restate them here:
(1) the offender is a public officer;
(2) who requested or received a gift, a present, a share, a percentage, or a
benefit;
(3) on behalf of the offender or any other person;
(4) in connection with a contract or transaction with the government; and
(5) in which the public officer, in an official capacity under the law, has the
right to intervene.
(Eutiquio A. Peligrino v. People, GR No. 136266, August 13, 2001)
Section 3(b) of RA 3019 penalizes three distinct acts -- (1) demanding or
requesting; (2) receiving; or (3) demanding, requesting and receiving -- any gift,
present, share, percentage, or benefit for oneself or for any other person, in
connection with any contract or transaction between the government and any
other party, wherein a public officer in an official capacity has to intervene under
the law. These modes of committing the offense are distinct and different from
each other. Proof of the existence of any of them suffices to warrant conviction.
The lack of demand is immaterial. After all, Section 3(b) of RA 3019 uses the
word or between requesting and receiving. (Eutiquio A. Peligrino v. People, GR
No. 136266, August 13, 2001)
The elements of the crime of violating Section 3(g) of RA No. 3019, as
amended, are as follows:

(1) The offender is a public officer;

(2) Who enters into a contract or transaction on behalf of the government;
and
(3) The contract or transaction is grossly and manifestly disadvantageous
to the government.
Manifest means obvious to the understanding, evident to the mind and is
synonymous with open, clear, visible, unmistakable, indubitable, evident and selfevident. Gross means flagrant, shameful, such conduct as is not to be
excused. (Eulogio Morales v. People, GR No. 144047, July 26, 2002; Venancio
R. Nava v. Rodolfo G. Palattao, GR No. 160211, August 28, 2006)
Unlawful and unauthorized use of government property by incumbent
public officers constitutes fraud [under Section 13 of RA 3019]. (Rogelio Juan v.
People, GR No. 132378, January 18, 2000)
Plainly, the law does not use the word "signing." It employs the word
"entering." Definitely, signing is not the only way of entering into a transaction.
Those who authorized, approved or assented to such contract must be held
equally, if not more, accountable for having entered into the agreement. The
campaign against graft and corruption would be seriously undermined, if only the
obedient underlings are punished, while the bigwigs who ordered, authorized,
approved or assented to such anomalous contracts are freed of accountability.
That is simply unconscionable! (Dissenting Opinion in Marcos v. Sandiganbayan,
GR No. 126995, October 6, 1998)
Grave Coercion
Grave coercion or coaccion grave has three elements: (a) that any person
is prevented by another from doing something not prohibited by law, or
compelled to do something against his or her will, be it right or wrong; (b) that the
prevention or compulsion is effected by violence, either by material force or such
a display of it as would produce intimidation and, consequently, control over the
will of the offended party; and (c) that the person who restrains the will and liberty
of another has no right to do so or, in other words, that the restraint is not made
under authority of a law or in the exercise of any lawful right. (People v. Arnulfo
Astorga, GR No. 110097, December 22, 1997)
Highway Robbery
A finding of brigandage or highway robbery involves not just the locus of
the crime or the fact that more than three (3) persons perpetrated it. It is
essential to prove that the outlaws were purposely organized not just for one act
of robbery but for several indiscriminate commissions thereof. (Jose D. Filoteo
Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, GR No. 79543, October 16, 1996)
Homicide; Attempted
For reasons other than his own desistance, appellant was not able to
perform all the acts of execution necessary to consummate the killing, since the
wounds he inflicted were not mortal. In United States v. Eduave, this Court has

held that if the wounds would not normally cause death, then the last act
necessary to produce homicide has not been performed by the offender. Thus,
appellants liability amounted only to attempted, not frustrated, homicide. (People
v. Julio Recto, GR No. 129069, October 17, 2001)
Illegal Possession of Firearms; Elements
In crimes involving illegal possession of firearms, the prosecution has the
burden of proving the elements thereof: (1) the existence of the subject firearm
and (2) the fact that the accused, who owned or possessed the firearm, did not
have the corresponding license or permit to possess or carry the same outside
his residence. (People v. Veriato Molina, GR Nos. 115835-36, July 22, 1998;
People v. Noel Navarro, GR No. 129566, October 7, 1998; People v. Walpan
Ladjaalam, GR Nos. 136149-51, September 19, 2000; People v. Eugenio
Marquez, GR Nos. 138972-73, September 13, 2001)
The second element of illegal possession of firearms can be proven by the
testimony or the certification of a representative of the PNP Firearms and
Explosives Unit that the accused was not a licensee of the firearm in question.
(People v. Felicisimo Narvasa, GR No. 128618, November 16, 1998)
If an unlicensed firearm is used in the commission of any crime, there can
be no separate offense of simple illegal possession of firearms. Hence, if the
other crime is murder or homicide, illegal possession of firearms becomes
merely an aggravating circumstance, not a separate offense. (People v. Walpan
Ladjaalam, GR Nos. 136149-51, September 19, 2000; People v. Veriato Molina,
GR Nos. 115835-36, July 22, 1998; People v. Felicisimo Narvasa, GR No.
128618, November 16, 1998; People v. Honorable Presiding Judge, GR No.
151005, June 8, 2004)
Illegal Recruitment
Illegal recruitment is defined in and penalized by Art. 38 of the Labor Code,
as amended. (People v. Donnie Peralta, GR No. 114905, December 12, 1997)
Under Article 13(b) [of RA No. 8042], recruitment and placement refers to
any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or
procuring workers; and includes referrals, contract services, promising or
advertising for employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit or not. In the
simplest terms, illegal recruitment is committed when a person, who is not
authorized by the government, gives the impression that he or she has the power
to send workers abroad. (People v. Carmelita Alvarez, GR No. 142981, August
20, 2002; People v. Mildred Villas, August 15, 1997, GR No. 112180; People v.
Vicenta Medina Lapis, GR Nos. 145734-35, October 15, 2002)
The elements of the crime of illegal recruitment, as long-settled, are: (1)
the offender is a non-licensee or non-holder of authority to lawfully engage in the
recruitment and placement of workers, and (2) the offender undertakes any of the
recruitment activities defined under Art. 13 (b) of the Labor Code, as amended, or
any of the prohibited activities enumerated in Art. 34 of the same Code. (People
v. Donnie Peralta, GR No. 114905, December 12, 1997)

Section 6 of RA 8042, otherwise known as the Migrant Workers and

Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995, provides that illegal recruitment shall be
considered an offense involving economic sabotage when it is committed by a
syndicate or carried out by a group of three or more persons conspiring and
confederating with one another. (People v. Vicenta Medina Lapis, GR Nos.
145734-35, October 15, 2002)
Although appellant initially may not have done anything to entice
individuals to apply to her for employment abroad, such fact does not in any way
blot out her liability for engaging in illegal recruitment. Recruitment is a legal
term, its meaning must be understood in the light of what the law contemplates,
not of common parlance. (People v. Mildred Villas, GR No. 112180, August 15,
1997)
Where appellants made misrepresentations concerning their purported
power and authority to recruit for overseas employment, and in the process,
collected from complainants various amounts in the guise of placement fees, the
former clearly committed acts constitutive of illegal recruitment. In fact, this Court
held that illegal recruiters need not even expressly represent themselves to the
victims as persons who have the ability to send workers abroad. It is enough that
these recruiters give the impression that they have the ability to enlist workers for
job placement abroad in order to induce the latter to tender payment of fees.
(People v. Vicenta Medina Lapis, GR Nos. 145734-35, October 15, 2002)
Neither is there merit in the contention of the defense that appellant should
be exonerated for failure of the prosecution to present any receipt proving that
private complainants paid her anything. The defense argues that a receipt is the
best evidence to prove delivery of money and the absence thereof shows that no
payment was made. This argument is not novel. The Court has previously ruled
that the absence of receipts evidencing payment does not defeat a criminal
prosecution for illegal recruitment. (People v. Mildred Villas, GR No. 112180;
People v. Carmelita Alvarez, GR No. 142981, August 20, 2002)
Overseas employment offers hope for economic deliverance not only to the
unemployed but also to the underemployed and the underpaid. To them, anyone
who represents oneself as someone who can find them good-paying jobs abroad
is like an angel from heaven. A considerable number, however, turn out to be
fallen angels who prey upon innocent, unsuspecting victims. These poor
unfortunate individuals deserve no less than the full protection of the courts; and
the fallen angels, the full sanction of the law. (People v. Donnie Peralta, GR
No. 114905, December 12, 1997)
Victims of illegal recruitment are entitled to legal interest on the amount to
be recovered as indemnity, from the time of the filing of the information until fully
paid. (People v. Vicenta Medina Lapis, GR Nos. 145734-35, October 15, 2002)
Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale; Elements
The elements of the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale are as
follows:

1.

The accused undertook any recruitment activity defined under Art.

13[b] or any prohibited practice enumerated under Art. 34 of
Labor Code. ;

2.

He did not have the license or the authority to lawfully engage in the
recruitment and placement of workers; and

3.

He committed the same against three or more persons, individually

or as a group.

the

(People v. Mildred Villas, GR No. 112180, August 15, 1997; People v.

Donnie Peralta, GR No. 114905, December 12, 1997; People v. Rhodeline
Castillon, GR No. 130940, April 21, 1999; People v. Carmelita Alvarez, GR No.
142981, August 20, 2002; People v. Vicenta Medina Lapis, GR Nos. 145734-35,
October 15, 2002)
Instigation
Instigation is the employment of ways and means to lure persons into the
commission of an offense in order to prosecute them. As opposed to
entrapment, criminal intent originates in the mind of the instigator. (Acejas III v.
People, GR Nos. 156643 & 156891, June 27, 2006)
In instigation, officers of the law or their agents incite, induce, instigate or
lure the accused into committing an offense, which the latter otherwise would not
commit and has no intention of committing. (Eutiquio A. Peligrino v. People, GR
No. 136266, August 13, 2001)
Justifying Circumstances
It is axiomatic that once an accused-appellant admits killing the victim, he
bears the burden of establishing the presence of any circumstance like selfdefense, performance of a lawful duty or, for that matter, double jeopardy, which
may relieve him of responsibility, or which may mitigate his criminal liability. If he
fails to discharge this burden, his conviction becomes inevitable. (People v.
Ulysses M. Cawaling, GR No. 117970, July 28, 1998)
Lawful Performance of Duties
Such justifying circumstance [of lawful performance of duties] may be
invoked only after the defense successfully proves that (1) the accused acted in
the performance of a duty, and (2) the injury or offense committed is the
necessary consequence of the due performance or lawful exercise of such duty.
(People v. Ulysses M. Cawaling, GR No. 117970, July 28, 1998)
Obedience to Superiors Order
(1) The defense of obedience to superiors order is already obsolete. Fifty
years ago, the Nazi war criminals tried to justify genocide against the Jews and
their other crimes against humanity by alleging they were merely following the

orders of Adolf Hitler, their adored fuehrer. However, the International Military
Tribunal at Nuremberg in its Judgement dated October 1, 1946, forcefully
debunked this Nazi argument and clearly ruled that (t)he true test x x x is not the
existence of the order but whether moral choice was in fact possible.
In 1947, the United Nations General Assembly adopted a Resolution firmly
entrenching the principle of moral choice, inter alia, as follows:
The fact that a person acted pursuant to an order of his government
or of superior does not relieve him from responsibility under international
law, provided a moral choice was in fact possible to him.
In the Nuremberg trials, the defendants were military officers of the Third
Reich who were duty-bound to obey direct orders on pain of court martial and
death at a time when their country was at war. Nonetheless, they were meted out
death sentence by hanging or long-term imprisonments. In the present case, the
accused are civilian officials purportedly complying with a memorandum of the
Chief Executive when martial law had already been lifted and the nation was in
fact just about to vote in the snap presidential election in 1986. The
Sandiganbayan did not impose death but only imprisonment ranging from
seventeen years and one day to twenty years. Certainly a moral choice was not
only possible. It was in fact available to the accused. They could have opted to
defy the illegal order, with no risk of court martial or death. Or they could have
resigned. They knew or should have known that the P55 million was to be paid
for debt that was dubious and in a manner that was irregular. That the money
was to be remitted in cold cash and delivered to the private secretary of the
President, and not by the normal crossed check to the alleged creditor, gave
them a moral choice to refuse. That they opted to cooperate compounded their
guilt to a blatant conspiracy to defraud the public treasury.
(2) resurring this internationally discredited Nazi defense will , I respectfully
submit, set a dangerous precedent in this country. Allowing the petitioners to
walk deprives this Court of the moral authority to convict any subaltern of the
martial law dictator who was merely following orders. This ludicrous defense
can be invoked in all criminal cases pending not only before this Court but more
so before inferior courts, which will have no legal option but to follow this Courts
doctrine.
(3) Mercy and compassion are virtues which are cherished in every
civilized society. But before they can be invoked, there must first be justice. The
Supreme Courts duty is to render justice. The power to dispense pardon lies
elsewhere. Verily, the Constitution ordains a final conviction by the courts before
the President can exercise his power to wipe away penalty. Such is the legal and
natural precedence and order of things: justice first before mercy. And only he
who sincerely repents his sin, restitutes for it, and reforms his life deserves
forgiveness and mercy. (Dissenting Opinion in Luis A. Tabuena v.
Sandiganbayan, GR Nos. 103501-03, February 17, 1997)
Self-Defense
By interposing self-defense, appellant shifted the burden of proof, thereby
obligating himself to show that his act was justified and that he incurred no
criminal liability therefor. Consequently, he must establish clearly and

convincingly all the elements of self-defense, relying mainly on the strength of his
own evidence and not on the weakness of the prosecutions; for even if the latter
was weak, it could not be disbelieved after his open admission of the killing.
(People v. Danny Angeles, GR No. 109660, July 1, 1997; People v. Roberto
Gerolaga, GR No. 89075, October 15, 1996; People v. Rogelio Doepante, GR
No. 102772, October 30, 1996; People v. Norlito Tan, GR No. 132324,
September 28, 1999; People v. Abdulajid Sabdani, GR No. 134262, June 28,
2000; People v. Ponciano Aglipa, GR No. 130941, August 3, 2000; Josue R.
Ladiana v. People, GR No. 144293, December 4, 2002; People v. Timoteo
Escarlos, GR No. 148912, September 10, 2003)
Self-defense must be established by clear and convincing evidence.
Likewise, the fact that the victim initiated the unlawful aggression does not give
the person defending an absolute license to kill. Where unlawful aggression on
the part of the victim is not proven, there can be no self-defense. (People v.
Renato Albao, GR No. 117481, March 6, 1998; People v. SPO2 Magnabe Jr., GR
No. 143071 August 6, 2002)
Unlawful aggression refers to an attack or material aggression, an
offensive act positively showing the intent of the aggressor to cause injury. It
presupposes an actual, sudden and unexpected attack, or an imminent danger
thereof, not merely a threatening or an intimidating attitude. (People v. Ricardo
Janairo, GR No. 129254, July 22, 1999; People v. Abdulajid Sabdani, GR No.
134262, June 28, 2000; People v. Timoteo Escarlos, GR No. 148912, September
10, 2003)
Unlawful aggression on the part of the victim is a condition sine qua non
for the successful invocation of self-defense. Even assuming [that] it was initially
present, the accused no longer had any right to pursue the offender [after the
unlawful aggression had ceased]. Basic is the rule that when unlawful
aggression ceases, the defender no longer has the right to kill or even wound the
former aggressor. Upon the cessation of the unlawful aggression and the danger
or risk to life and limb, there should be a corresponding cessation of hostilities on
the part of the person defending himself. (People v. Ulysses M. Cawaling, GR
No. 117970, July 28, 1998; People v. Julio Recto, GR No. 129069, October 17,
2001; People v. Timoteo Escarlos, GR No. 148912, September 10, 2003)
In self-defense, an accused admits to having performed the criminal act.
He may, however, disclaim legal liability on the ground that his life had been
exposed to harm first, before he committed the act in defense of himself. (People
v. Laudemar de la Cruz, GR Nos. 109619-23, June 26, 1998)
A plea of self-defense cannot be justifiably appreciated, where it is not only
uncorroborated by independent and competent evidence, but also extremely
doubtful by itself. (People v. Laudemar de la Cruz, GR Nos. 109619-23, June 26,
1998; Josue R. Ladiana v. People, GR No. 144293, December 4, 2002)
Self-defense, by its very nature, requires the attendance of unlawful
aggression initiated by the victim. Unlawful aggression is an assault or attack, or
a threat thereof in an imminent and immediate manner which places the
accuseds life in actual peril. It must be such that it puts in real danger the life or
personal safety of the person defending himself. It cannot be merely an
imagined threat or a threatening or intimidating attitude. (People v. Danny

Angeles, GR No. 109660, July 1, 1997; People v. Marivic Genosa, GR No.

135981, January 15, 2004)
In self-defense, there should also be reasonable necessity for the action
taken as well as the means used. The latter requires a consideration of (1)
whether the aggressor was armed, (2) the nature and quality of the weapon
used, and (3) the physical conditions and sizes of both aggressor and the person
defending himself. (People v. Danny Angeles, GR No. 109660, July 1, 1997;
People v. Timoteo Escarlos, GR No. 148912, September 10, 2003)
Self-Defense; Elements
Once self-defense is invoked, the burden of proof is shifted to the accused
to establish the following elements:
(1) Unlawful aggression on the part of the victim,
(2) Reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it,
and
(3) Lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending
himself.
Of these requisites, the most indispensable is unlawful aggression on the
part of the victim. Failure of the defense to prove unlawful aggression results in
the failure of the claim of self-defense. (People v. Laudemar de la Cruz, GR Nos.
109619-23, June 26, 1998; People v. Veriato Molina, GR Nos. 115835-36, July
22, 1998; People v. Ricardo Janairo, GR No. 129254, July 22, 1999; Nerio
Salcedo v. People, GR No. 137143, December 8, 2000; People v. Julio Recto,
GR No. 129069, October 17, 2001; People v. Marcos Asuela, GR Nos. 14039394, February 4, 2002; People v. SPO2 Magnabe Jr., GR No. 143071, August 6,
2002; People v. Timoteo Escarlos, GR No. 148912, September 10, 2003)
Defense of Relative/Stranger
For defense of a relative to prosper, appellant must prove the concurrence
of the first and the second requisites of self-defense and the further requisite, in
case the provocation was given by the person attacked, that the one making the
defense had no part therein. (People v. Julio Recto, GR No. 129069, October
17, 2001; People v. Efren Mendoza, GR No. 133382, March 9, 2000; People v.
Emmanuel Mana-ay, GR No. 132717, November 20, 2000; People v. SPO2
Magnabe Jr., GR No. 143071, August 6, 2002)
Hulidap
Courts generally view with disfavor this defense [of hulidap] commonly
raised in drug cases, for it is easy to concoct and difficult to prove. Moreover,
there is a presumption that public officers, including arresting officers, regularly
perform their official duties. (People v. Cheng Ho Chua, GR No. 127542, March
18, 1999; People v. Rosdia Hajili, GR Nos. 149872-73, March 14, 2003)

Kidnapping
That the victims, who were public officers, were detained for only three
hours does not matter. In People v. Domasian, the victim was similarly held for
three hours, and was released even before his parents received the ransom
note. The Court justified the conviction by holding that the offense consisted not
only in placing a person in an enclosure, but also in detaining or depriving him, in
any manner, of his liberty. Likewise in People v. Santos, the Court held that
since the appellant was convicted under Article 267, paragraph 4, it was not the
duration of the deprivation of liberty which was important, but the fact that the
victim, a minor, was locked up. (People v. Jailon Kulais, GR Nos. 100901-08,
July 16, 1998; People v. Mercy Santos, GR No. 117873, December 22, 1997;
People v. Jose Obeso, GR No. 152285, October 24, 2003)
The elements of kidnapping under Article 267, paragraph 4 of the Revised
Penal Code are:
(1) The offender is a private individual;
(2) He kidnaps or detains another, or in any other manner deprives the
latter of his or her liberty;
(3) The act of detention or kidnapping is illegal; and
(4) The person kidnapped or detained is a minor, female or a public officer.
(People v. Mercy Santos, GR No. 117873, December 22, 1997; People
v. Jose Obeso, GR No. 152285, October 24, 2003)
Since the information charged the complex crime of kidnapping with
murder, the acts constituting slight illegal detention were necessarily included in
the information, and may thus be validly taken into account in the resolution of
the present appeal. (People v. Wilfredo Llaguno, GR No. 91262, January 28,
1998)
Life Imprisonment
Life imprisonment is not synonymous with reclusion perpetua. Unlike life
imprisonment, reclusion perpetua carries with it accessory penalties provided in
the Revised Penal Code and has a definite extent or duration. Life imprisonment
is invariably imposed for serious offenses penalized by special laws, while
reclusion perpetua is prescribed in accordance with the Revised Penal Code.
(People v. Jailon Kulais, GR Nos. 100901-08, July 16, 1998; People v. Nestor
Jimenez, GR No. 128364, February 4, 1999; Norgene Potenciano v. Dwight B.
Reynoso, GR No. 140707, April 22, 2003)
Malum Prohibitum
Nothing will prevent the indictment of petitioners for violation of EO 277 at
the time they were caught by the forest guards in flagrante delicto. The
prohibited act [possession of timber and other forest products within the
contemplation of PD 705] is a malum prohibitum, and absence of malice or

criminal intent will not save the day for them. (Alejandro Tan v. People, GR No.
115507, May 19, 1998; Rodolfo Caures, GR Nos. 104739-44, November 18,
1997)
Mens Rea/Criminal Intent
Actus non facit reum, nisi mens sit rea. Jurisprudence instructs us that a
crime cannot be committed if the mind of the one performing the act is innocent
and without any criminal intent; that is, bereft of mens rea, which is defined as a
guilty mind, a guilty or wrongful purpose or criminal intent. (People v. Jose
Moreno, GR No. 126921, August 28, 1998)
MITIGATING CIRCUMSTANCES
Analogous Circumstances
The severe beatings repeatedly inflicted on appellant constituted a form of
cumulative provocation that broke down her psychological resistance and selfcontrol. This psychological paralysis she suffered diminished her will power,
thereby entitling her to the mitigating factor under paragraphs 9 and 10 of Article
13 of the Revised Penal Code. (People v. Marivic Genosa, GR No. 135981,
January 15, 2004)
Intoxication
Intoxication, according to this article, is mitigating if not habitual or
subsequent to the plan to commit the felony; having been accidental and prior to
any criminal resolve, it was more out of impulse or delusion born of alcohol that
the offender committed the crime.
Drunkenness or intoxication is mitigating if accidental, not habitual or
intentional; that is, not subsequent to the plan to commit the crime. To be
mitigating, the state of intoxication of the accused must be proved or established
by sufficient evidence. But if intoxication is proved, then in the absence of truth
to the contrary, it is presumed to be unintentional or not habitual. (People v.
Alfredo Baroy, GR Nos. 137520-22, May 9, 2002; People v. Joel Pinca, GR No.
129256, November 17, 1999)
Passion and Obfuscation
Appellant should also be credited with the extenuating circumstance of
having acted upon an impulse so powerful as to have naturally produced passion
and obfuscation. The acute battering she suffered that fatal night in the hands of
her batterer-spouse, in spite of the fact that she was eight months pregnant with
their child, overwhelmed her and put her in the aforesaid emotional and mental
state, which overcame her reason and impelled her to vindicate her life and her
unborn childs. (People v. Marivic Genosa, GR No. 135981, January 15, 2004)

To appreciate this circumstance, the following requisites should concur:

(1) There is an act, both unlawful and sufficient to produce such a condition
of mind; and
(2) This act is not far removed from the commission of the crime by a
considerable length of time, during which the accused might recover
her normal equanimity.
(People v. Marivic Genosa, GR No. 135981, January 15, 2004)
Physical Defect
The fact that appellant suffers from a physical defect, a severed left hand,
does not mean that he should automatically be credited with the mitigating
circumstance contained in paragraph 8, Article 13 of the Revised Penal Code. In
order for this condition to be appreciated, it must be shown that such physical
defect limited his means to act, defend himself or communicate with his fellow
beings to such an extent that he did not have complete freedom of action,
consequently resulting in diminution of the element of voluntariness. Such
cannot be appreciated in the case at bar where the appellants physical condition
clearly did not limit his means of action, defense or communication, nor affect his
free will. (People v. Rogelio Doepante, GR No. 102772, October 30, 1996)
Voluntary Surrender
For voluntary surrender to be appreciated as a mitigating circumstance,
the following requisites must concur:
(1) The offender had not been actually arrested;
(2) The offender surrendered himself to a person in authority; and
(3) The surrender was voluntary.
(People v. Gerry Sumalpong, GR No. 124705, January 20, 1998; People v.
Alberto Medina, GR No. 113691, February 6, 1998; People v. Rizal Espiritu, GR
No. 128287, February 2, 1999; People v. Eduardo Tabones, GR No. 129695,
March 17, 1999; People v. Hilario Rebamontan, GR No. 125318, April 13, 1999;
People v. Joel Pinca, GR No. 129256, November 17, 1999; People v. Eulogio
Ignacio, GR No. 134568, February 10, 2000; People v. Efren Mendoza, GR No.
133382, March 9, 2000; Josue R. Ladiana v. People, GR No. 144293, December
4, 2002)
The act of surrender must be spontaneous, accompanied by an
acknowledgment of guilt, or an intention to save the authorities the trouble and
the expense that search and capture would require. Going to the police station
to clear his name does not show any intent of appellant to surrender
unconditionally to the authorities. (People v. Eladio Viernes, GR Nos. 136733-35,
December 13, 2001; People v. Rogelio Doepante, GR No. 102772, October 30,
1996)
If the only reason for the accuseds supposed surrender is to ensure his
safety, his arrest being inevitable, the surrender is not spontaneous and, hence,
not voluntary. (People v. Gerry Sumalpong, GR No. 124705, January 20, 1998)

Voluntary surrender cannot be appreciated where the evidence adduced

shows that it was the authorities who came looking for the accused. (People v.
Gerry Sumalpong, GR No. 124705, January 20, 1998)
Murder
To secure a conviction of murder or homicide, it is enough that the death of
the victim and the responsibility of the person who caused the death are proven
beyond reasonable doubt. (People v. Florante Leal, GR No. 139313, June 19,
2001; People v. Sam Hinaut, GR No. 143764, February 15, 2002)
While the prosecution established that there was intent to kill, it failed to
present evidence showing that the wound inflicted on [the victim] was fatal and
would have caused his death had medical help not been provided. Where the
wounds inflicted on the victim were not proven to be sufficient to cause his
death, the crime is only attempted murder, as the accused has not performed
all the acts of execution that would have brought about the victims death.
(People v. Tito Reduca, GR Nos. 126094-95, January 21, 1999)
The penalty imposable on a principal in an attempted murder, where there
is no aggravating or mitigating circumstance, is prision correccional in its
maximum period to prision mayor in its medium period. (People v. Laudemar de
la Cruz, GR Nos. 109619-23, June 26, 1998)
Parricide; Absolutory Clause
An absolutory cause is present where the act committed is a crime but for
reasons of public policy and sentiment there is no penalty imposed. Article 247
is an example of an absolutory cause. The defense must prove the following:
1.

That a legally married person (or a parent) surprises his

spouse (or his daughter, under 18 years of age and living with
him), in the act of committing sexual intercourse with another
person;

2.

That he or she kills any or both of them or inflicts upon any or

both of them any serious physical injury in the act or
immediately thereafter; and

3.

That he has not promoted or facilitated the prostitution of his

wife (or daughter) or that he or she has not consented to the
infidelity of the other spouse.

The burden of proof to show the concurrence of all three elements rests on
the defense. (People v. Jimmy Talisic, GR No. 97961, September 5, 1997;
People v. Roger Puedan, GR No. 139576, September 2, 2002)
Parricide; Offended Party
It should be remembered that the crime charged against the private
respondent is parricide; hence, the accused cannot be regarded as an offended

party. That would be a contradiction in terms and an absurdity in fact. Nor can
one expect the minor child to think and to act for himself. Hence, we rule that in
view of the peculiar circumstances of this case, the sister of the deceased is a
proper party-litigant who is akin to the offended party, she being a close relative
of the deceased. There is no closer kin who may be expected to take up the
cudgels of justice for the deceased. (Joselito V. Narciso v. Sta. Romana-Cruz,
GR No. 134504, March 17, 2000)
Physical Injuries
Where the evidence fails to show conclusively that the wounds inflicted on
the offended party were fatal or serious and where the medical treatment -- which
lasted less than nine days in the present case -- were merely first aid in nature,
appellants may be convicted only of slight physical injuries, not frustrated murder.
(People v. Marcos Asuela, GR Nos. 140393-94, February 4, 2002)
Plunder
The Plunder Law was enacted to curb the despoliation of the National
Treasury by some public officials who have held the levers of power and to
penalize this predatory act which has reached unprecedented heights and has
been developed by its practitioners to a high level of sophistication during the
past dictatorial regime. Viewed broadly, plunder involves not just plain thievery
but economic depredation which affects not just private parties or personal
interests but the nation as a whole. Invariably, plunder partakes of the nature of
a crime against national interest which must be stopped, and if possible,
stopped permanently. (Separate Opinion in Joseph Estrada v. Sandiganbayan,
GR No. 148560, November 19, 2001)
Section 4 of RA 7080 provides that, for purposes of establishing the crime
of plunder, it shall not be necessary to prove each and every criminal act done by
the accused in furtherance of the scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or
acquire ill-gotten wealth. This is because it would be sufficient to establish
beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the
overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy. (Separate Opinion in Joseph Estrada v.
Sandiganbayan, GR No. 148560, November 19, 2001)
Principal by Indispensable Cooperation
Appellants act effectively rendered the victim incapable of defending
himself against his assailant. Such act amounted to an indispensable
cooperation without which the crime would not have been accomplished.
(People v. Rolly Obello, GR No. 108772, January 14, 1998)
Qualifying Circumstances
A qualifying circumstance changes the nature of the crime. A generic
aggravating circumstance, on the other hand, does not affect the designation of
the crime; it merely provides for the imposition of the prescribed penalty in its
maximum period. Thus, while a generic aggravating circumstance may be offset

by a mitigating circumstance, a qualifying circumstance may not. (People v.

Efren Mendoza, GR No. 133382, March 9, 2000)
Well-settled is the rule that a qualifying circumstance must be established
as clearly as the elements of a crime. (People v. Wilbert Cabareo, GR No.
138645, January 16, 2001; People v. Edelciano Amaca, GR No. 110129, August
12, 1997; People v. Eduardo Tabones, GR No. 129695, March 17, 1999; People
v. Veriato Molina, GR Nos. 115835-36, July 22, 1998; People v. Tomas Visperas
Jr., GR No. 147315, January 13, 2003; People v. Jose Casitas Jr., GR No.
137404, February 14, 2003)
The qualifying circumstances of minority and relationship must at all times
be pleaded in the information, consistent with the constitutional right of the
accused to be informed of the charges against him. It is a matter of settled
jurisprudence that qualifying circumstances must be properly pleaded in the
indictment. (People v. Delfin dela Cruz, GR No. 137405, September 27, 2002;
People v. Jose Casitas Jr., GR No. 137404, February 14, 2003)
Quasi-Recidivism
Quasi-recidivism, like recidivism and reiteracion, necessitates the
presentation of a certified copy of the sentence convicting an accused. (People
v. Alberto Gaorana, GR Nos. 109138-39, April 27, 1998)
Rape
Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman under any of
the following circumstances: (1) when force or intimidation is used; (2) when the
woman is deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious; and (3) when the
woman is under twelve years of age. (People v. Alberto Gaorana, GR Nos.
109138-39, April 27, 1998; People v. Allan Erese, GR No. 120579, November 5,
1997; People v. Dominador Pili, GR No. 124739, April 15, 1998; People v.
Egmedio Lampaza, GR No. 138876, November 24, 1999; People v. Alexander
Tao, GR No. 133872, May 5, 2000; People v. Angel C. Baldoz, GR No. 140032,
November 20, 2001; People v. Marcelo Mendoza, GR Nos. 132923-24, June 6,
2002; People v. Florentino Quijano Sr., GR Nos. 144523-26, June 10, 2003;
People v. Danilo Caraang, GR Nos. 148424-27, December 11, 2003)
Evidence of force or intimidation is not material when the accused is arged
with statutory rape, which is established upon proof that the accused had carnal
knowledge of a girl below twelve years of age. (People v. Edgar S. Alojado, GR
No. 122966-67, March 25, 1999; People v. Ariel Oliva, GR No. 108505,
December 5, 1997; People v. Gregorio Bersabe, GR No. 122768, April 27, 1998;
People v. Rogelio del Ayre, GR Nos. 139788 & 139827, October 3, 2002)
The victims failure to resist the appellants assault successfully and to
escape when the opportunity presented itself should not be construed as a
manifestation of consent. It does not necessarily negate her charge of rape or
taint her credibility, for the indelible fact remains that the appellant employed
force and intimidation in the sexual assault, and the victim offered resistance.
(People v. Gerald Tayaban, GR No. 128481, September 25, 1998)

Intimidation is directed at the mind of the victim. Being subjective, its

presence cannot be tested by any hard and fast rule. It should instead be viewed
in the light of the victims perception and judgment at the time of the commission
of the crime. What is vital is that it is sufficient to consummate the purpose the
accused has in mind. That the threat produces reasonable fear that it would be
carried out if the victim resists the lust of the accused is enough. (People v.
Jovito Manalo, GR Nos. 144989-90, January 31, 2003)
Physical resistance need not be established in rape, if intimidation had
been exercised upon the victim who, out of fear for life and personal safety
submitted herself against her will to the rapists embrace. (People v. Gerald
Tayaban, GR No. 128481, September 25, 1998; People v. Victoriano Pontilar Jr.,
July 11, 1997; GR No. 104865; People v. Jovito Manalo, GR Nos. 144989-90,
January 31, 2003)
The force required in rape cases need not be overpowering or irresistible
when applied. The force or violence required is relative. Failure to shout or offer
tenacious resistance did not make voluntary complainants submission to the
criminal acts of the accused. What is necessary is that the force employed in
accomplishing it is sufficient to consummate the purpose which the accused has
in mind. The defense that complainant merely made token resistance is
unavailing. The resistance she had put up against appellant need not have
reached the point of her sustaining death or physical injuries at his hands; all that
was necessary was that the force or intimidation applied against her enabled the
assailant to effect sexual penetration. (People v. Joel Corea, GR No. 114383,
March 3, 1997; People v. Allan Erese, GR No. 120579, November 5, 1997;
People v. Crisanto Oliver, GR No. 123099, February 11, 1999; People v. Efren
Buendia, GR Nos. 133949-51, September 16, 1999; People v. Egmedio
Lampaza, GR No. 138876, November 24, 1999; People v. Ernesto Garchitorena,
GR No. 131357, April 12, 2000; People v. Renato Flores, GR No. 141782,
December 14, 2001; People v. Dennis Edem, GR No. 130970, February 27,
2002; People v. Rogelio del Ayre, GR Nos. 139788 & 139827, October 3, 2002;
People v. Toribio Galido, GR Nos. 148689-92, March 30, 2004)
The moral ascendancy of appellant as the common-law husband of
complainants mother takes the place of force and intimidation as an element of
rape. (People v. Eladio Viernes, GR Nos. 136733-35, December 13, 2001;
People v. Rogelio del Ayre, GR Nos. 139788 & 139827, October 3, 2002)
In the rape of a woman deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious, the
victim has no will. Sexual intercourse with an insane, deranged, or mentally
deficient, feebleminded, or idiotic woman is rape, pure and simple. The
deprivation of reason contemplated by law need not be complete; mental
abnormality or deficiency is sufficient. (People v. Ernesto Atuel, GR No. 106962,
September 3, 1996)
Pregnancy is not an element of the crime of rape and is, therefore, totally
immaterial to the resolution of this case. (People v. Domingo Sta. Ana, GR Nos.
115657-59, June 26, 1998)
The time of occurrence is not an essential element of rape. This being so,
its precise date and hour need not be alleged in the complaint or information.
(People v. Larry Cachapero, GR No. 153008, May 20, 2004)

Absence of spermatozoa does not necessarily mean that rape was not
committed; the slightest penetration of the female organ is enough. The
lacerations of the victim's hymen sufficiently established that sexual intercourse
took place. (People v. Antonio Magana, GR No. 105673, July 26, 1996; People
v. Ariel Oliva, GR No. 108505, December 5, 1997; People v. Crisanto Oliver, GR
No. 123099, February 11, 1999; People v. Antonio Gastador, GR No. 123727,
April 14, 1999; People v. Conde Rapisora, GR Nos. 140934-35, October 23,
2001)
Existing rulings on rape do not require complete or full penetration of the
victims private organ. Neither is the rupture of the hymen necessary. The mere
introduction of the penis into the labia majora of the victim's genitalia engenders
the crime of rape. Hence, it is the "touching" or "entry" of the penis into the labia
majora or the labia minora of the pudendum of the victim's genitalia that
consummates rape. Penile invasion necessarily entails contact with the labia.
Even the briefest of contacts, without laceration of the hymen, is deemed to be
rape. (People v.Vicente Basquez, GR No. 144035, September 27, 2001; People
v. Alejandro Gabris, GR No. 116221, July 11, 1996; People v. Celerino
Castromero, GR No. 118992, October 9, 1997; People v. Antonio Gastador, GR
No. 123727, April 14, 1999; People v. Loven Daganta, GR No. 122339, August 4,
1999; People v. Jose Dedace, GR No. 132551, March 22, 2000; People v.
Francisco Balas, GR No. 138838, December 11, 2001; People v. Jaime
Gonzales, GR No. 140676, July 31, 2002; People v. Rogelio del Ayre, GR Nos.
139788 & 139827, October 3, 2002; People v. Mario Umayam, GR No. 147033,
April 30, 2003)
Proof of external injuries is not indispensable to a prosecution for rape
committed with force or intimidation. Physical injury is not an element of rape.
(People v. Conde Rapisora, GR Nos. 140934-35, October 23, 2001; People v.
Antonio Alimon, GR No. 87758, June 28, 1996; People v. Veno Esperas, GR No.
128109, November 19, 2003)
A duly proven allegation of force and intimidation is sufficient for
conviction. It is not necessary for the consequent unconsciousness to be alleged
in the information. Indeed, in the present case, the loss of consciousness was
the immediate result of appellants violence. (People v. Emmanuel Quezada, GR
Nos. 135557-58, January 30, 2002)
Old age, by itself, is not a defense in a rape case. To overcome the
prosecutions evidence, the appellant must present convincing proof that he was
physically unable to consummate carnal knowledge of the victim. (People v.
Asterio Cordero, GR Nos. 136894-96, February 7, 2001)
Medical examination is not an indispensable requirement, and its absence
does not affect the verdict of conviction, if sufficient evidence is presented to
prove the crime charged. (People v. Eladio Viernes, GR Nos. 136733-35,
December 13, 2001; People v. Egmedio Lampaza, GR No. 138876, November
24, 1999; People v. Rolando Tabanggay, GR No. 130504, June 29, 2000; People
v. Ignacio Sinoro, GR Nos. 138650-58, April 22, 2003; People v. Mario Umayam,
GR No. 147033, April 30, 2003)
Rape is forced sexual congress with a woman. Absent any showing of the
slightest penetration of the female organ -- the touching of either the labia or the

pudendum by the penis -- there can be no consummated rape. (People v. Iladio

Caralipio, GR Nos. 137766-67, November 27, 2002)
Rape; Acknowledgment of Offspring
Article 345 of the Revised Penal Code provides that persons guilty of rape
shall also be sentenced to acknowledge the offspring, unless the law should
prevent him from so doing and in every case to support the offspring. The
additional sentence, therefore, theoretically finds support in the Revised Penal
Code. For the imposition of these additional sentences, however, there must be
a showing that the offspring was the result of the criminal sexual congress
between the accused and the victim. x x x (People v. Victoriano Pontilar Jr., GR
No. 104865, July 11, 1997)
Rape; Attempted
Under Article 6 in relation to Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, rape is
merely attempted when the offender commences the commission of the crime
directly by overt acts, but does not perform all the acts of execution by reason of
some cause or accident other than his own spontaneous desistance. The
penalty is two (2) degrees lower than the imposable penalty of reclusion
perpetua. (People v. Atanacio Mendoza, GR Nos. 143844-46, November 19,
2002)
Rape; Award of Damages
Aside from civil indemnity, a rape victim may be awarded moral and
exemplary damages. (People v. Temestocles Lozano, GR No. 125080,
September 25, 1998)
Moral damages may be awarded to rape victims, in addition to civil
indemnity. After all, the anguish and the pain that the victim had to endure are
evident. We need not belabor the fact that the offended party in a rape case is a
victim many times over. In our culture which puts a premium on the virtue of
purity or virginity, rape stigmatizes the victim more than the perpetrators.
(People v. Felipe Hofilea, GR No. 134772, June 22, 2000)
Moral damages are awarded to rape victims without need of pleading or
proof of the basis thereof. Exemplary damages, on the other hand, are granted
when an aggravating circumstance, which is not offset by a mitigating one,
attended the commission of the crime. In several cases, we have held that the
relationship between appellant and the rape victim justifies the award of
exemplary damages, in order to deter fathers with perverse sexual behavior from
sexually abusing their daughters. (People v. Dionisio Bataller, GR Nos. 13454041, July 18, 2001; People v. Antonio Alimon, GR No. 87758, June 28, 1996;
People v. Roderick Santos, GR Nos. 135454-56, November 13, 2001; People v.
Jovito Manalo, GR Nos. 144989-90, January 31, 2003; People v. Ignacio Sinoro,
GR Nos. 138650-58, April 22, 2003; People v. Veno Esperas, GR No. 128109,
November 19, 2003)

It has been the policy of the Court to award outrightly an amount not
exceeding P50,000 to victims of rape upon an indubitable showing of its
commission; this is categorized as civil indemnity ex delicto. In response to the
rising incidence of heinous crimes against chastity, the Court has laid down the
rule that if the crime of rape is committed and effectively qualified by any of the
circumstances under which the death penalty is authorized by law, the indemnity
for the victim shall be increased to the amount of P75,000. Since this case is not
qualified, the indemnity should properly be P50,000. As to the award of moral
damages, this Court has now been consistently awarding the amount of P50,000
as moral damages to the victim in a rape case. This amount is automatically
granted without need of further proof, other than the commission of the crime. It
is assumed that the offended party has suffered moral injuries entitling her to the
award of such damages. (People v. Romeo Manayan, GR Nos. 142741-43,
October 25, 2001; People v. Angel C. Baldoz, GR No. 140032, November 20,
2001; People v. Eladio Viernes, GR Nos. 136733-35, December 13, 2001;
People v. Renato Flores, GR No. 141782, December 14, 2001; People v. Pedro
Daramay Jr., GR Nos. 140235 & 142748, May 9, 2002; People v. Mario
Umayam, GR No. 147033, April 30, 2003; People v. Genaro Biong, GR No.
144445-47, April 30, 2003; People v. Danilo Caraang, GR Nos. 148424-27,
December 11, 2003)
Rape; Qualifying Circumstances
As provided under paragraph 1 of Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code
as amended, in incestuous rapes, the age of the victim and her relationship with
the offender must be both alleged in the information and proven during trial,
otherwise, the death penalty cannot be imposed. These attendant circumstances
alter the nature of the crime of rape and increase the penalty. As such, they are
in the nature of qualifying circumstances. (People v. Jaime Gonzales, GR No.
140676, July 31, 2002; People v. Felipe Pecayo Sr., GR No. 132047, December
14, 2000; People v. Francisco Balas, GR No. 138838, December 11, 2001;
People v. Benito Lachica, GR No. 143677, May 9, 2002; People v. Rogelio del
Ayre, GR Nos. 139788 & 139827, October 3, 2002; People v. Mario Umayam,
GR No. 147033, April 30, 2003; People v. Genaro Biong, GR No. 144445-47,
April 30, 2003; People v. Avelino Latag, GR Nos. 140411-13, December 11,
2003)
Verily, it would be a denial of due process if he is charged with simple rape,
on which he was arraigned, but convicted of qualified rape punishable by death.
(People v. Rolly Espejon, GR No. 134767, February 20, 2002)
Rape under Art. 335 of the Revised Penal Code is punishable by reclusion
perpetua to death when committed with the use of a deadly weapon. (People v.
Antonio Alimon, GR No. 87758, June 28, 1996)
When the alleged age of the victim at the time of the sexual assault is
between 13 and 18 years, neither her bare testimony nor that of her mother
would suffice to prove her age and consequently qualify the crime to justify the
imposition of the death penalty. This is because in this era of modernism and
rapid growth, the victims mere physical appearance is not enough to gauge her
exact age. For the extreme penalty of death to be upheld, nothing but proof
beyond reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime must be
substantiated. Verily, the minority of the victim should be not only alleged but

likewise proved with equal certainty and clearness as the crime itself. Be it
remembered that the proof of the victims age in the present case spells the
difference between life and death. (People v. Emmanuel Quezada, GR Nos.
135557-58, January 30, 2002; People v. Rolly Espejon, GR No. 134767,
February 20, 2002; People v. Rogelio Barrozo, GR Nos. 138726-27, July 3, 2002;
People v. Jaime Gonzales, GR No. 140676, July 31, 2002; People v. Iladio
Caralipio, GR Nos. 137766-67, November 27, 2002; People v. Mario Umayam,
GR No. 147033, April 30, 2003; People v. Veno Esperas, GR No. 128109,
November 19, 2003)
To justify the imposition of the death penalty on a father accused of raping
his own minor daughter, the prosecution must prove beyond reasonable doubt,
not only that he committed the offense charged, but also that it was perpetrated
under any of the qualifying circumstances mentioned in RA 7659. In the present
case, the prosecution failed to prove that the victim was below 18 years of age at
the time of the rape. Hence, the proper penalty is reclusion perpetua, not death.
(People v. Jose Virrey, GR No. 133910, November 14, 2001; People v.
Dominador Tabion, GR No. 132715, October 20, 1999; People v. Rolando
Tabanggay, GR No. 130504, June 29, 2000; People v. Felipe Pecayo Sr., GR No.
132047, December 14, 2000; People v. Dionisio Bataller, GR Nos. 134540-41,
July 18, 2001; People v. Veno Esperas, GR No. 128109, November 19, 2003)
The allegation and proof of the minority of the victim, without any allegation
and proof of her relationship to the appellant, cannot qualify rape as heinous.
Neither is minority of the offended party, by itself, an aggravating circumstance
that can increase the penalty to death. (People v. Dennis Edem, GR No.
130970, February 27, 2002; People v. Benito Lachica, GR No. 143677, May 9,
2002)
Reckless Imprudence
Reckless imprudence consists of voluntarily doing or failing to do, without
malice, an act from which material damage results by reason of an inexcusable
lack of precaution on the part of the person performing or failing to perform such
act. Malice is the antithesis of reckless imprudence. Once malice is proven,
recklessness disappears. (People v. Ricardo Agliday, GR No. 140794, October
16, 2001)
A deliberate intent to do an unlawful act is inconsistent with reckless
imprudence. (People v. Ricardo Agliday, GR No. 140794, October 16, 2001)
Reclusion Perpetua
We disagree with the trial court, however, in sentencing appellant to suffer
imprisonment of forty (40) years reclusion perpetua. There was no justification
or need for the trial court to specify the length of imprisonment, because
reclusion perpetua is an indivisible penalty. The significance of this fundamental
principle was laid down by the Court in People v. Diquit: Since reclusion
perpetua is an indivisible penalty, it has no minimum, medium or maximum
periods. It is imposed in its entirety regardless of any mitigating or aggravating
circumstances that may have attended the commission of the crime. (Art. 63,
Revised Penal Code) Reclusion perpetua is imprisonment for life but the person

sentenced to suffer it shall be pardoned after undergoing the penalty for thirty
(30) years, unless by reason of his conduct or some other serious cause, he shall
be considered by the Chief Executive as unworthy of pardon (Art. 27, Revised
Penal Code). (People v. Pedro Ramirez, GR No. 138261, April 17, 2001)
Reclusion perpetua entails an imprisonment of at least thirty years, after
which the convict becomes eligible for pardon. It carries accessory penalties
including civil interdiction. (Norgene Potenciano v. Dwight B. Reynoso, GR No.
140707, April 22, 2003)
The trial court erred in imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua to
death for each crime. Although that is the penalty prescribed by law for rape
committed with the use of a deadly weapon, the trial court cannot just impose the
whole range as penalty. It is tasked to go further. After taking into account the
presence or absence of aggravating or mitigating circumstances, it must
determine what specific penalty, within the range prescribed by law, to impose.
(People v. Dennis Edem, GR No. 130970, February 27, 2002)
Robbery
The elements [of robbery] are:
(1) The subject is personal property belonging to another;
(2) There is unlawful taking of that property;
(3) The taking is with the intent to gain; and
(4) There is violence against or intimidation of any person or use of force
upon things.
(People v. Alexander Tao, GR No. 133872, May 5, 2000)
Robbery with Homicide
In prosecuting robbery with homicide cases, the government needs to
prove the following elements:
(1) the taking of personal property is committed with violence or
intimidation against persons;
(2) the property taken belongs to another;
(3) the taking is done with amino lucrandi; and
(4) by reason of the robbery or on the occasion thereof, homicide (used in
its generic sense) is committed.
(People v. Domingo Salazar, GR No. 99355, August 11, 1997; People v.
Reyderick Lago, GR No. 121272, June 6, 2001; People v. Danilo Asis, GR No.
142531, October 15, 2002)
In robbery with homicide, it is imperative that the prosecution prove a direct
relation between the robbery and the killing. It must convincingly show that
robbery was the original criminal design of the culprit, and that homicide was
perpetrated with a view to the consummation of the robbery, by reason or on
occasion thereof. (People v. Eugenio Marquez, GR Nos. 138972-73, September
13, 2001)

The Spanish version of Article 294(1) of the Revised Penal Code reads:
1.0--Con la pena de reclusion perpetua a muerte, cuando con motivo o con
ocasion del robo resultare homicidio. Chief Justice Ramon C. Aquino explains
that the use of the words con motivo ... del robo permits of no interpretation
other than that the intent of the actor must supply the connection between the
homicide and the robbery in order to constitute the complex offense. If that intent
comprehends the robbery, it is immaterial that the homicide may in point of time
immediately precede instead of follow the robbery. Where the original design
comprehends robbery, and homicide is perpetrated by reason or on the occasion
of the consummation of the former, the crime committed is the special complex
offense, even if homicide precedes the robbery by an appreciable interval of
time. On the other hand, if the original criminal design does not clearly
comprehend robbery, but robbery follows the homicide as an afterthought or as a
minor incident of the homicide, the criminal acts should be viewed as constitutive
of two offenses and not of a single complex offense. Robbery with homicide
arises only when there is a direct relation, an intimate connection, between the
robbery and the killing, even if the killing is prior to, concurrent with, or
subsequent to the robbery. (People v. Domingo Salazar, GR No. 99355, August
11, 1997)
Robo con homicidio is an indivisible offense, a special complex crime. The
penalty for robbery with homicide is more severe because the law sees, in this
crime, that men placed lucre above the value of human life, thus, justifying the
imposition of a more severe penalty than that for simple homicide or robbery. In
view of said graver penalty, jurisprudence exacts a stricter requirement before
convicting the accused of this crime. Where the homicide is not conclusively
shown to have been committed for the purpose of robbing the victim, or where
the robbery was not proven, there can be no conviction for robo con homicidio.
(People v. Domingo Salazar, GR No. 99355, August 11, 1997)
When conspiracy is proven in a case of robbery with homicide, all those
who participated in the robbery will be held guilty of the special complex crime of
robbery with homicide, even if not all of them actually took part in the homicide
perpetrated by just one of them on the occasion or as a consequence of the
asportation. (People v. Reyderick Lago, GR No. 121272, June 6, 2001; People v.
Antonio Pareja, GR No. 88043, December 9, 1996; People v. Nerio Suela, GR
Nos. 133570-71, January 15, 2002)
Robbery with Rape
In the special complex crime of robbery with rape, the true intent of the
accused must first be determined, because their intent determines the offense
they committed. This felony contemplates a situation where the original intent of
the accused was to take, with intent to gain, personal property belonging to
another; and rape is committed on the occasion thereof or as an accompanying
crime. In other words, the offenders had an intent to take personal property
belonging to another, and such intent preceded the rape.
To sustain a conviction for robbery with rape, it is imperative that the
robbery itself must be conclusively established. To support a conviction
therefore, proof of the rape alone is not sufficient. Robbery with rape occurs
when the following elements are present:

(1) personal property is taken with violence or intimidation against persons;

(2) the property taken belongs to another;
(3) the taking is done with animo lucrandi, and
(4) the robbery is accompanied by rape.
(People v. Boy Domingo, GR No. 143660, June 5, 2002; People v.
Alexander Tao, GR No. 133872, May 5, 2000)
STAGES OF EXECUTION
Attempted Felony
A mere attempt to commit a felony is surely subsumed in the full execution
thereof. To attempt is to commence the commission of a crime by overt acts. If
one has been proven to have completely carried out all the acts necessary to
commit the crime, he has certainly been proven to have executed the initial act
required in an attempt. (People v. Carlos Boco, GR No. 129676, June 23, 1999)
Where the wound inflicted on the victim is not as severe as to cause his
death, the offender not having performed all the acts of execution that would
have brought it about, the crime is only attempted murder. (People v. Gerry
Sumalpong, GR No. 124705, January 20, 1998)
Frustrated Felony
In a frustrated felony, the perpetrator performs all acts necessary to
produce the crime but, for some reason other than his own spontaneous
desistance, the felony is not consummated. (People v. Laudemar de la Cruz, GR
Nos. 109619-23, June 26, 1998)
Sweethearts Theory
Besides, even assuming that the appellant and the private complainant
were indeed sweethearts, this fact alone would not negate the commission of
rape, especially when it has been established in this case that coitus took place,
not with the victims consent, but through force and intimidation. (People v.
Gerald Tayaban, GR No. 128481, September 25, 1998; People v. Nestor
Jimenez, GR No. 128364, February 4, 1999)
The sweethearts defense does not necessarily preclude rape. Even if it
were true, such relationship would not, by itself, establish consent, for love is not
a license for lust. A love affair could not have justified what appellant did -subjecting complainant to his carnal desires against her will. (People v. Renato
Flores, GR No. 141782, December 14, 2001; People v. Temestocles Lozano, GR
No. 125080, September 25, 1998; People v. Efren Buendia, GR Nos. 133949-51,
September 16, 1999; People v. Egmedio Lampaza, GR No. 138876, November
24, 1999; People v. Andrew Pacina, GR No. 123150, August 16, 2000; People v.
Sonny Bautista, GR No. 140278, June 3, 2004)

The sweethearts theory he proffers is effectively an admission of carnal

knowledge of the victim and consequently places on him the burden of proving
the supposed relationship by substantial evidence. To be worthy of judicial
acceptance, such a defense should be supported by documentary, testimonial or
other evidence. (People v. Ignacio Sinoro, GR Nos. 138650-58, April 22, 2003)
Undue Injury
In jurisprudence, undue injury is consistently interpreted as actual
damage. Undue has been defined as more than necessary, not proper [or]
illegal; and injury as any wrong or damage done to another, either in his person,
rights, reputation or property; that is, the invasion of any legally protected interest
of another. Actual damage, in the context of these definitions, is akin to that in
civil law. (Cresente Llorente v. Sandiganbayan, GR No. 122166, March 11, 1998)
Public Officers
A private individual who has in his charge any of the public funds or
property enumerated [in Article 222 of the Revised Penal Code] and commits any
of the acts defined in any of the provisions of Chapter Four, Title Seven of the
RPC, should likewise be penalized with the same penalty meted to erring public
officers. Nowhere in this provision is it expressed or implied that a private
individual falling under said Article 222 is to be deemed a public officer. (Alfredo
L. Azarcon v. Sandiganbayan, GR No. 116033, February 26, 1997)