SIIA Papers No 4

Between Isolation and Internationalization:

The State of Burma
Conference Report edited by
Johan Lagerkvist
 Between Isolation
and Internationalization:
The State of Burma
Edited by Johan Lagerkvist

© The Authors and The Swedish Institute of International Affairs

Edited by Johan Lagerkvist

ISBN 91-7183-706-X

Printed by Hallvigs Reklam AB 2008

2 3
 Table of Contents
Lagerkvist, J: Introduction
Steinberg, D I: Burma’s Multiple Crises:
Globalized Concerns and Myanmar’s Response
Babson, B O: Future Policy Options
for Multilateral Engagement with Myanmar/Burma
Chellaney, B: Promoting Political Freedoms
in Burma: International Policy Options
Kivimäki, T: Can the International Community
Help Prevent Conflict in Burma/Myanmar?
Goshal, B: Political Developments
in Burma and India’s Strategic Interests
Ni, X: For Closer China – U.S.
Collaboration on Myanmar
Storey, I: China’s Manifold Interests in Burma:
Resources, Markets and Strategic Location
Haacke, J: Comparing ASEAN Countries’ Efforts
to Influence Political Developments in Myanmar:
Towards a New Regional Approach?
Chachavalpongpun, P: Neither Constructive nor
Engaging: The Debacle of ASEAN’s Burmese Policy
Lintner, B: The Staying Power
of the Burmese Military regime
Guo, X: The Challenge of Ethnicity to Nation Building
Yawnghwe, H: Multi-Party Talks on Burma:
Overseeing a Transition from Military Rule
von Hauff, M: The Economic Development of Burma
and the Sanctions against Burma – An Assessment
Oo. Z: The Political Economy of Resource Curse
in Burma: Implications for International Policies
Sakhong, L H: A Struggle for Democracy, Equality
and Federalism in Burma: An Ethnic Perspective
4 5
Introduction
5
Johan Lagerkvist
11
On May 8 and 9, 2008, the Swedish Institute of International Affairs
convened an international conference on Myanmar/Burma with ge-
31 nerous sponsorship from the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
The conference took place only six days after cyclone Nargis– the worst
57 natural disaster in Burmese history– hit the lower Irrawaddy Delta on
May 2 with gusts of wind reaching 190 km/h. As of June 24, the of-
ficial death toll was 84,537 people and 53,386 people were reported
85 missing. The number of people displaced by the calamity may be as
high as 800,000.1 Despite the magnitude of the disaster, the Burmese
111 junta failed to act swiftly in the wake of the cyclone, revealing not only
the junta’s incompetence and contempt for the suffering of its people,
but also its xenophobia as Burmese military rulers dragged their feet in
137 issuing visas to foreign aid workers for fear of losing control over the
political situation in the run-up to the controversial referendum on the
draft constitution.
153
How is one to understand the continuing political impasse between
Burma/Myanmar and the international community even in the face of
such a large-scale tragedy? And what are the options available to the
173 international community and multilateral and regional organizations
to facilitate a break away from this isolation? These questions were
central to the conference held at the Swedish Institute in May. Leading
201 researchers, diplomats, experts and practitioners in the field gathered
to discuss available policy options for engaging the military junta in
223 Burma, the role of Burma’s big neighbors (including China, India, and
the ASEAN countries), and future prospects for a democratic transition
253 in Burma given the paranoid nature of its ruling military junta and
longstanding ethnic tensions between the ruling Burman majority and
273 ethnic minorities inside the country.
In order to promote domestic change and reform, the international
community needs to adopt a richer “insider perspective” on various
293 Burmese interests, in particular one that includes assessments of the
role of civil society organizations and associational life in Burma, since
these have an important part to play in promoting change, reconcilia-
315 tion and reform in the country. The international community should
identify, invest in and work with incipient civil society organizations
335 within the country and support alternative channels of news and infor-
 mation that are not state-controlled such as weeklies and satellite televi-
sion. Recent media technological developments show how information
from the outside is already reaching the Burmese people in many novel
ways. Such efforts need to be sustained and strengthened so that the
Burmese public gains more access to valuable and much-needed alter-
native sources of information. There is also a need to further support
capacity-building programs for advocacy groups and political parties in
Burma. The capacity of the so-called ”88-generation” – those involved in
the mass protests of 1988 – to organize displays of popular discontent
and mass protests through a loose network of people and activists (as
opposed to the older generation’s opposition tactics through the more
hierarchical National League for Democracy) was an encouraging sign
for exiled Burmese and outside observers concerned with the impact
and effectiveness of civil society organizations in Burma. A stronger
and more credible opposition movement in Burma capable of offering
a more inclusive platform and agenda for national reconciliation and
political reform needs to materialize so that the Burmese electorate is
given an alternative way of moving forward.
In addition, conference participants discussed a wide array of policy
options available to international agencies given the continuing dete-
rioration of socio-economic standards in Burma and the long-time po-
litical impasse between the military junta and the domestic opposition,
and between the junta and the international community. Providing
immediate humanitarian assistance to the Burmese people affected
by the cyclone was regarded as one window of opportunity for the
international community to show its concern and serious intention to
engage both the Burmese government and the Burmese general public.
Moreover, multilateral institutions such as the World Bank, the Asian
Development Bank, and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) could,
if given the opportunity, provide valuable assistance in Burma’s post-
cyclone reconstruction phase, providing economic and development
assessments of social and economic needs throughout the country, and
offering comprehensive capacity-building assistance in such areas as
public health, food production, and education. Second, realignment
of international engagement inside and outside of the United Nations
could help promote international collaboration between key actors
across the “North-South” and “East-West” divides, i.e. between on the
one hand the west, and on the other hand India and China – especially
on the issues of humanitarian intervention, sovereignty and political
reform. Despite the hopes and demands that stakeholders interested
in political and humanitarian progress in Burma have often placed
on ASEAN, ASEAN’s policy of engagement, its role and its impact
Introduction
6 7
on the political reform process in Burma have been rather marginal.
In recent years, however, some of the leaders of the ASEAN countries
have publicly criticized Burma/Myanmar for not undertaking political
reform.2
Although engaging the junta as a legitimate partner poses a fun-
damental moral-political dilemma for the international community,
there is nonetheless a need to establish a multi-party mechanism for
intensified dialogue that will include major multilateral organizations
such as the European Union and ASEAN as well as China, India, Rus-
sia and the United States – countries that have an increasing stake in
national reconciliation, more meaningful political reform, and con-
tinued stability within and around Burma. The issue of sanctions
or/versus engagement and financial investment could also be an item
of discussion within such a multilateral format. Are ”smart sanctions”
targeting only the military leadership minimizing effects on ordinary
people coupled with trade, investments and foreign aid preferable to
a full spectrum of sanctions targeting the Burmese economy in total?
Conference participants generally agreed that the largely Western-dri-
ven program of sanctions directed at Burma has been ineffective and
that ”smart sanctions” – sanctions that specifically target the higher
echelons of the junta – have proven more of an irritant than a force for
regime change. On a bilateral basis, it would also be wishful thinking
for the international community to expect to rely/to continue to rely
on China and India to undertake more decisive action in sanctioning
Burma. The military junta itself is highly nationalistic and has been
regarded by some as a xenophobic regime that will continue to hedge
in its dealings with neighboring powers so as to avoid becoming overly-
reliant on any particular country. China and India will continue to be
important stakeholders in issues pertaining to Myanmar/Burma, albeit
their influence is likely to be wielded to a limited degree. Policymakers
in Beijing and New Delhi will almost certainly continue to weigh their
own national interests (e.g., continued stability along the porous China-
Burma and India-Burma borders) against the interests of other regional
and international stakeholders and actors, and can be expected to take
decisive and collective action in tandem with the United Nations only
when core national interests are at stake. For many outside observers,
it is difficult to make sense of the isolationism of the Burmese military,
the Tatmadaw. One key to understanding the attitude and behavior of
the regime is the culture of isolation cultivated since the coup of gene-
ral Ne Win in 1962, when the peoples of Burma were forced to take the
”Burmese Way to Socialism.” Ensuing long periods of near constant
civil war between ethnic groupings such as Mon, Kachin, Karen and
 the Burmese military have added to the state of alert against internal
enemies in Burma, whether they be ethnic minorities in border areas
or discontented Burmans in Rangoon.
It is also of crucial importance to understand how asymmetrical re-
lations make the military junta vulnerable if it should proceed to hold
meetings about Burma’s future with both internal and external actors.
It would seem plausible to assume that the junta feels it lacks the know-
ledge and capacity to negotiate with multilateral and bilateral actors.
The lack of this capacity would prove daunting were the junta to choose
to seriously engage with international stakeholders in order to initiate
a reform process legitimate to all. Thus, the building of state capacity
in Burma together with the initiation of confidence building measures
offers perhaps one way of reversing Burma’s isolationism and overco-
ming its political impasse with the world.
In concluding conference discussions, many called for a sober
reassessment of the situation on the ground in Burma as a basis for
future policy approaches to the country at the multilateral, bilateral and
internal/civil society levels. More important, participants agreed that
despite all of the talk about the military junta as the problem, it has
become increasingly clear that the junta must also be part of any future
solution in Burma. Although many actors in the international system
are hesitant, to say the least, to engage with the Burmese military junta
and never believe that the junta will enter in earnest into a serious dia-
logue of engagement with the outside world, any long-lasting change
will have to come from within Burma. Therefore, it is necessary to find
ways to identify actors inside the ruling military bureaucracy who will
agree to a step-by-step approach to open up their isolated country to the
outside world. As Burma’s military rulers will never be quick to believe
in the promises and prospects offered by foreigners and exiled opposi-
tion groups, the potential value of establishing a confidence-building
mechanism capable of making these officers more intellectually and
emotionally secure and ready to engage with the outside world ought
to be discussed and developed further. Since such an endeavor is likely
to be viewed by many as both controversial and hazardous, it may be
more important to identify specific issues of potential change within
the Burmese military establishment rather than asking individual per-
sons to act as catalysts for change—individuals who may be purged the
minute they are identified as reform-minded, or associated with foreign
elements. These are some of the many issues that were discussed at-
length in what proved to be a most timely and rewarding conference in
May and are now available in edited and revised form in the conference
proceedings that follow.
Introduction
8 9
1. See Post-nargis Joint Assessment, http://ocha.unog.ch/humanitarianreform/Portals/
1/cluster%20approach%20page/Myanmar/21_07_08_asean.nargis.pdf. According
to UN Officials and ASEAN representatives, the relief and reconstruction work in
Burma/Myanmar after Nargis is likely to cost a minimum of 1 billion USD, http://
news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/7517655.stm
2. See Myanmar: State, Society and Ethnicity, N.Ganesan and Kyaw Yin Hlaing (eds.),
Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2007, p.3; See “Asean delivers rare re-
buke,” 21 July 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/7516251.stm
Conference Program
Morning, 8 May
Welcoming remarks, SIIA Director Tomas Ries, Research
Director Gunnar Sjöstedt and Research Fellow Johan Lagerkvist
Keynote address
Burma’s Multiple Crises: Globalized Concerns and Myanmar’s Response
David I. Steinberg
Discussion
International Policy Options
Future Policy Options for Multilateral Engagement with Burma/Myanmar
Brad Babson
Promoting Political Freedoms in Burma: International Policy Options
Brahma Chellaney
Can the International Community Help Avoid Ethnic War in Burma/Myanmar
Timo Kivimäki
Discussion
Afternoon, 8 May
Burma and Its Big Neighbors China and India
Prospects for Change in Myanmar: Thinking Out of the Box
Baladas Goshal
For Closer China-US Collaboration on Myanmar
Ni Xiayun
China’s Manifold Interests in Burma: Resources, Markets, Strategic Location
Ian Storey
Discussion
 ASEAN Perspectives on Burma
Comparing Policies towards Myanmar within ASEAN
Burma’s Multiple Crises:
Jurgen Haacke
Neither Constructive, Nor Engaging: The Debacle of ASEAN’s Burmese Policy,
Globalized Concerns
Pavin Chachavalpongpun
Discussion
and Myanmar’s Response
Morning, 9 May
The Military Junta, Nation building
David I. Steinberg
and Prospectsfor Democratic Transition The Burmese military is in a state of denial.1 By all estimates a half-cen-
The Staying Power of the Burmese Military Regime tury ago, Burma should have become the richest nation in Southeast
Bertil Lintner Asia. It is now the poorest. The junta’s complete public rejection of
The Challenge of Ethnicity to Nation Building acknowledging the multiple tragic conditions of the Myanmar people
Guo Xiaolin is appalling to outside observers. More importantly, it upsets and even
Multi-Party Talks on Burma: Overseeing a Transition from Military Rule traumatizes those on the inside. But this denial may be more complex
Harn Yangwhe then the junta’s simplistic, self-serving lack of a public response that
Discussion has been equally insensitive to internal and international concerns
about the crises facing that state and its population.
Sanctions, Economic Development,
and the scramble for national resources This paragraph, and much of this paper, reflects the author’s apprai-
sal of the sorry state of Myanmar before cyclone Nargis hit the lower
The Economic Development of Burma
and the Sanctions against Burma – An Assessment,
portion of the country in early May 2008. The reaction of the Burmese
Michael von Hauff junta to this tragic event seems to confirm this pessimistic analysis,
Political Economy of Resource Curse in Burma: International Policy Implications and is in stark contrast to the Chinese leadership’s reaction to the mas-
Zaw Oo sive earthquake in Szechuan Province in the same month. The initial
secrecy connected with the Myanmar response to allowing foreign aid
Discussion
teams into the country was probably linked in part to the May 10 date
Afternoon, 9 May for the referendum for the new constitution. The apparent reluctance
Recipes for Change of the military to change the date, except in the Irrawaddy Delta where
Roundtable discussion moderated by Anders Hellner it was delayed for two weeks until May 24, probably relates to the choice
Press meeting with Swedish journalists
of that date as astrologically appropriate.2 According to the government,
there has been 92.4 percent approval of the new constitution with about
99 percent of those eligible to vote having done so, a result reminiscent
of the Stalinist period of the Soviet Union, and has a similar lack of
credibility.
The slow reaction of the military to respond to the situation in the
delta reflects both the apparent low priority of concern for the people so
affected and a much higher priority to the military’s own control and the
attempted portrayal of military efficacy. The junta did not want foreign
observers (including emergency aid workers) in the country before and
during the referendum on the constitution, and they even failed in their
public relations efforts both to their internal audience and to foreigners,

Conference Program

10 11
 in contrast to the Chinese who played up the highest level of senior in-
volvement (including premier Wen Jibao) in their rescue efforts.
Fear of the U.S. has been palpable since 1988, and the cyclone has
exacerbated that fear. Burmese military intelligence have long believed
the U.S. could invade Myanmar, since it was on the record insisting
on “regime change,” and that Thailand, a surrogate of the U.S. with a
mutual defense treaty between them, could play a role. The U.S. navy
positioned in the Bay of Bengal some thirty miles offshore, and the joint
“Cobra Gold” annual military exercise between the U.S. and Thailand,
together with senior Western diplomats and some think tank specialists
calling for support to the Burmese victims of the cyclone even against
the wishes of the junta, and even the absurdly violent movie “Rambo
IV,” all contributed to this anxiety.3
Most, if not all, governments are prone to deny publicly any em-
barrassing crises in which they are involved. Their responses are often
blatant propaganda, or in a somewhat less pejorative term, “spin” (as
we say in the United States)–making the best out of a poor situation by
reinterpreting events in one’s favor. Yet in Myanmar the situation may
even be more insidious–one questions whether the top leadership has
been even aware before the cyclone of the severity of some of the issues
facing the people and their state. The most senior Myanmar leaders
may have been living in a Potemkin-like society, in which they were
carefully encased in a self-inflicted cocoon and thus shielded from the
grotesque reality facing their own population. Their erroneous beliefs
that Myanmar, if not the Panglossian best of all possible worlds, was at
least a good and developing one, and on the road to a multi-party “dis-
cipline-flourishing democracy,”as the Senior General is want to say and
the proposed constitution stipulates. This view may have been as sin-
cerely held as it is dismissed by many of their own people and external
observers. As a retired general indicated, the official and abnormally in-
flated growth rates for the country (some 12 percent--more than China)
and the highest in the world were presented not to convince the outside
world of the regime’s efficacy, but rather for the highest level’s internal
consumption. The leadership may claim that this natural disaster has
not diminished the regime’s internal efficacy (as they will take credit
for the relief operations), although in many traditional societies in East
Asia a regime’s legitimacy was closely related in the mind of the public
by benign natural conditions and good harvests, and adversely affected
when disasters struck. The implications for those who wish to negotiate
with such individuals are, then, that those foreigners must distinguish
between the junta’s perceptions of reality, however erroneous, and their
propaganda concerning existential conditions. Although it is tempting
Burma’s Multiple Crises: Globalized Concerns and Myanmar’s Response
12
to discard all statements as falsified claims, that could be a serious er-
ror.
Spurious as well is the oft-held position by some foreigners, and
more than a few expatriate Burmese, that the military command is only
interested in self-aggrandizement–their perks and positions at the acme
of power and the socio-economic ladder of their imposed social order.
Although no doubt true among many of the tatmadaw (military), this
ignores various strongly held ideological beliefs of the military and its
leadership-- positions that are deeply inculcated through the military’s
educational system and to the public at large. It seems evident to this
writer that their tenets concerning the role of the military in national
unity and national sovereignty, their primary goals, are vigorously and
sincerely held, although their destruction of other Burmese institutions
that might have contributed to those ends are ignored. To deny the
tatmadaw its ideological commitment, no matter how erroneous that
position may be, is to fail in negotiations as well.
The evidence for such apparent insensitivity to reality is, by its nature,
indirect. If such a vacuum exists, it does so at the highest levels of govern-
ment. The Burman areas of the country under civilian rule contained a
highly mobile society, but present conditions force the conclusion that po-
wer is highly stratified through the hierarchical nature of Burmese society,
a military command structure that demands obedience and compliance,
and the nature of Burmese social relations that encourages subordinates
to avoid raising issues that would embarrass or antagonize superiors. All
this is compounded by the fear of foreign influences and power, resulting
in highly nationalistic response to outside pressure, interpreted as “in-
terference.” This, in turn, is reflected in an enforced orthodoxy, resulting
in the attempted control and censorship of all avenues of imported or
internal publications and media. When access to unpleasant information
is institutionally controlled, and when such information cannot even be
personally conveyed, Potemkin-like conditions result. All media are cen-
sored and no independent or alternative views disseminated. Even in im-
perial China and Korea, the Censorate institutionally was established to
provide moral and practical guidance and to present alternative views to
the rulers, to whom they had access. In medieval Europe, the court jester
sometimes was an instrument of informal, oblique personal criticism of
the ruler’s actions. In many developed countries, the independent media
play this role. There is in Myanmar neither institutional nor even perso-
nal avenues of remonstrance. The leader is isolated from the reality that
surrounds but does not intrude upon him.4
To the most senior leaders, thus, evidence of the regime’s success
have been ubiquitous. From the number of roads, bridges, dams, irriga-
13
 tion systems, and other infrastructure built during the SLORC/SPDC
period, and the numbers dwarf all previous administrations since in-
dependence, the evidence would seem to them to be overwhelmingly
positive. These figures are repeated ad infinitum at public meetings. A
new capital has been built at Naypyidaw in central Myanmar at vast ex-
pense. Cease-fires have been arranged with most dissenting minorities.
The foreign exchange holdings of the state are at an all-time high and
future prospects are even brighter from off-shore gas reserves, goods
have been available for those who can afford them, and the military was
shielded from external reality through its proprietary stores, schools,
hospitals, and even pagodas. As they seem to interpret it, the physical
attributes and evidence of military legitimacy–the building of infras-
tructure-- has been apparent to the leadership. Burmese history has also
been rewritten to stress the military’s accomplishments. Military muse-
ums have been constructed. Legitimacy and the military’s historical and
present role have been conflated. As has been written, the military is a
state within a state, or perhaps it is in their view the state itself. The cur-
rent cyclone crisis will not diminish the claims of the leadership of their
own efficiency, as they will take credit for any foreign assistance.
Not all high level military are so deluded. Some grumbling has occur-
red at the cabinet level even before the cyclone, and those who travel to the
ubiquitous ASEAN or other international meetings must be aware of the
external reactions to misguided policies or their implementation. But their
concerns are to date kept in check by perhaps a mixture of loyalty, fear, and
the belief that progress is in evidence. Loyalty is highly personal, which leads
to weakened institutions and limited continuity of policies or programs.
Although the color of the monks’ robes was changed from yellow to
rust a generation or so ago, the so-called “saffron revolution” of the fall of
2007 must have sorely tested the hierarchy, since all the senior military
are Burman Buddhists and are believed to be devout. It is unlikely that
the state’s explanation that those monks demonstrating were “bogus”
incited by the imperialists and their perfidious minions, together with
the opposition, was totally believed by the military itself. Since foreign
observers have limited access to the military hierarchy, it is only by indi-
rect or surrogate evidence that any cracks, splits, or fissures in the junta
and its associates may be prognosticated as a result of the crackdown on
the monks and their supporters, and later by the cyclone. Differences in
personalities and programs have been evident for some time, but, as we
have seen, such issues do not necessarily result in open, public splits.
They military may recognize that open fissures in the tatmadaw could
lead to chaos (which the military always invoke as one of their constant
fears) and/or the end of military rule.
Burma’s Multiple Crises: Globalized Concerns and Myanmar’s Response
14
Foreign attempts to catalogue the dire conditions and crises facing
the population prior to the cyclone have been greeted with more than
disdain–the United Nations Resident Representative’s visa was not
renewed in November 2007 when he discussed this issue. Other such
attempts to date have proven to be inconsequential. Yet the limited sta-
tistical evidence that is available, together with the results of a variety
of analyses of socio-economic trends, surely and undeniably record the
crises facing that society.
These multiple crises, however, have been treated only peripherally
in the foreign media, and indeed in many policy circles. The previous
concentration on the most obvious of these crises, that of politics and
governance, including the house arrest of the Nobel Prize laureate and
the administrative destruction of the organizational outreach of the Na-
tional League for Democracy (NLD), should not diminish our attention
from other broad issues, including, but not limited to, the effects of the
cyclone. The myopic cry that to solve the political impasse would thus
resolve other issues was always likely to be spurious as well. That also
would unlikely to have been the best of all possible worlds.
Even before the cyclone, there were multiple, overlapping, and urgent
crises are that were not being addressed by the government, but now
have become even more acute. Each of us could come up with a list; this
writer would like to suggest four such crises that need to be resolved in
unison, rather than sequentially, although some have suggested the poli-
tical crisis needs attention first. These in turn seem to be exacerbated or
based on broad, almost philosophical conceptions of the role of power
and authority in that society. The tatmadaw, if they were to respond,
might claim that the constitutional referendum of May 10, 2008 and the
elections that will follow in about two years will resolve these issues and
result in their version of a discipline-flourishing democracy. They are li-
kely to be mistaken that this will solve the society’s ills. The use of the ad-
jectivally modified term “democracy” is also questionable in international
circles, for once the term is modified (see “peoples’,” “guided,” etc.) the
core of the meaning of democracy is likely to be diminished.
These four crises facing the state are:
• The economic crisis of the population
• The social crisis of youth
• The political crisis
• The minority crisis.
These are reviewed sequentially, and then consider broader issues that
have impacts on these problems.
15
 The Economic Crisis of the Population
Although the government has banned unofficial surveys of the econo-
mic conditions in the society even before the cyclone, the evidence that
is available indicates a profound malaise in the conditions of the bulk of
the population. Some 30 percent of the population has been under the
World Bank’s poverty line and unable to access basic food and non-food
requirements, and another 20-30 percent are at it, thus vulnerable to the
inexorable rise in inflation that the state underestimates. Some 73 per-
cent of family income has been spent on food, an indicator of extreme
poverty and far higher than any other Southeast Asian country. Drop-
out rates for primary school were said to be about 40 percent. Malnutri-
tion affected some 30 percent of infants and the vulnerable child popu-
lation. Infant mortality has been high, and 80 percent of health care is
borne by the patients. Various diseases, such as malaria and tuberculo-
sis have been rampant. HIV/AIDS is prevalent. Debt has risen, and of-
ficial credit is inadequate and unofficial lending usurious. Landlessness
is estimated at some 40 percent of the rural population. Although the
government claims it increasingly expends higher amounts on educa-
tion and health, on a per capita basis and in constant currency there has
been a decrease in such expenditures in real terms. Myanmar is said
to have the second worst health care system in the world, after Sierra
Leone. The cyclone means that some 10-15 percent of the total popula-
tion, those in the delta region, will be more susceptible to diseases such
as dysentery, cholera, and malaria. Hunger may become apparent as
salt water intrusion and lack of draft cattle or tractors may limit the new
rice crop. Rises in food costs could severely limit the prospects for the
survivors of cyclone Nargis and place them in greater jeopardy.
The abrupt, arbitrary, and unexplained steep rise in energy costs in
August 2007 triggered the saffron revolution, as monks found people
could no longer afford to make their normal donations of food to the
monasteries (to make merit) and that parents brought children to the
monks to feed, as they could no longer do so themselves. The lack of
warning or explanation of the increase in prices in itself indicates the
junta’s essential disregard for the people. The brutal suppression of
the demonstrations, when they turned overtly political, highlighted the
lingering and increasing plight of the rural poor. There had been gro-
wing recognition of the seriousness of economic conditions by interna-
tional observers, where international humanitarian assistance from all
sources is in the range of about US$2.00 per capita compared to about
25 times that amount per capita for Laos. This understanding was, in te
world’s perception, in the shadows, but the drama of the forcible disper-
Burma’s Multiple Crises: Globalized Concerns and Myanmar’s Response
16
sal of the monks and younger people brought Burma/Myanmar back to
the international center stage.
Pockets of hunger are evident, and poverty, while pervasive, is more
extreme in some areas, both among the minorities and in central My-
anmar, as well as in combat zones. It will now also be evident in the
Irrawaddy Delta. Although international NGOs have attempted to fill
certain localized gaps, recent restrictions over the past two years have
inhibited some of their activities, and the effective banning of the for-
mer UN resident representative will have a chilling effect on efforts to
inform the government of objective conditions on the ground.
The Social Crisis of Youth
Equally insidious, even though in itself not life-threatening, and un-
recognized in Myanmar as an emergency, is a stealth social crisis af-
fecting youth. It became manifest in the scenes of younger monks,
together with young people–often students–in the streets, the latter
forming cordons to protect the monks from possible attack. This scene
reflected not only the immediate economic and political frustrations
that have been built up over many years, but the lack of social mobility
in a society under complete military domination.
In contrast, under civilian rule, no matter the political and econo-
mic problems facing the state at that time (and they were numerous),
conditions were better. Before 1962, there was no “brain drain” from
Burma in contrast to most Asian states. Although the country was poor,
the culture was congenial and comfortable. Youth then had four clear
avenues to social mobility. Only one of these was the military, which
was an honored and desired profession. Youth could also rise through
free higher education and attendance at good universities, and many
sons and daughters from obscure and impoverished villages were to
be found at the Universities of Rangoon and Mandalay. The sangha
was a respected avenue of both education and social prestige, and from
which one could exit at any time with ease and increased dignity. Mass
political organizations allowed those with some charisma to seek status.
Mobility through the bureaucratic route was respected, and civilian pre-
stige was the norm. But mobility through the private sector was limited
unless family money or connections were available, and was completely
shut down following the imposition of the “Burmese Way to Socialism”
following the coup of 1962.
Today, all avenues are militarily controlled. Higher education is both
in shambles even as institutions have mushroomed, and attendance is
dependent on military approval. The sangha is administratively control-
17
 led by the government; access to private capital through the banking
system, which in any case is limited, is heavily dependent on military
approval; most organizations are under military control or scrutiny–in-
cluding those in civil society; and the military itself has become the
central and essential avenue of advancement. Employment is severely
limited, with the result that students have little incentive to study un-
der a system in which promotion seems impossible, and the teaching
profession at all levels has become corrupted through requirements for
payments to faculty to ensure a modest standard of living for those in
that profession. Teachers must often provide tutorial instruction outsi-
de of the curriculum to meet their living expenses; they teach extra-cur-
ricularly what they should have taught in the schools. Even just access
to better schools often involved illegal funding.
The social crisis and frustrations of youth are dangerous to the well
being of the state for two reasons. The first is that any significant inci-
dent, egregiously poor policy choice, or almost any other event could
set off demonstrations that would likely be more bloody than those
of the saffron revolution. Such frustrations build, and the plateau of
dissatisfaction rises, with dangerous consequences for all concerned.
Those most prone to respond are the voices of social conscience and
concern–students and monks.
The second are the attempts to leave the country for more economic
opportunities and political space by the very population that the country
needs to staff its future professions and bureaucracy. Since 1962, some
one percent of the total population, and those with educational creden-
tials, have fled to Thailand, Australia, Singapore, and other countries
depopulating the state of the very people it will need for future devel-
opment. This diaspora does not count the exodus of the four percent
of marginally educated peasants and workers or refugees who have
escaped war and/or sought menial employment abroad. The expansion
of military educational institutions and the officer corps as a whole may
not only be for the tatmadaw’s perceived security concerns, however
spurious they may be, but it may be a strategic move to make up for this
deficiency and/or to ensure that it will have a future core loyal cadre of
bureaucrats and professionals who will have had military training, and
thus be more compliant.
This generation knows that something is wrong in their society. Some
of them call for democracy, but since their birth they have not been legally
able to read a modern textbook on this subject, let alone experience the
give and take and compromises inherent in a democratic system. Perhaps
the cries for democracy are rather an inchoate demand for some new form
of governance and to get the military out of administrative control.
Burma’s Multiple Crises: Globalized Concerns and Myanmar’s Response
18
The history of the sangha and student involvement in the anti-colo-
nial struggle are instructive to understanding the present, for as Mark
Twain is said to have remarked, if history does not repeat itself it often
rhymes. The military’s perception of the politically delicate nature of
the involvement of monks in the demonstrations became apparent
when there was no attempt at first to stop them, and some monks were
even allowed to march undisturbed past Aung San Suu Kyi’s house–an
unprecedented event. Monks were leaders, along with students, of the
anti-colonial struggle, and both have lead important demonstrations
against the authorities. And so to the junta, there are lessons to be
learned from Burmese history.
The insensitivity of the junta to the concerns of youth, both for
their society and the future, is apparent , for if the state has denied
the economic crisis, it has not even recognized the social concerns of
youth.
The Political Crisis
International attention has concentrated on the obvious political crisis
that has galvanized international opinion since the elections of May
1990. This concentration is in part because the international com-
munity thinks of human rights in political terms, and elections are
held to be the benchmark of democratic governance, or so the media
simplistically informs us. So restrictions on, interference with, or lack
of recognition of the results of, elections are primary foci. The political
crisis has been smoldering since the SLORC agreed to hold multi-party
elections shortly after the coup of 1988. Although the votes in the 1990
election seem to have been fairly counted, the campaigning up to that
election was severely restricted. Since that time, there has been an evi-
dent attempt to emasculate the National League for Democracy, which
won 80 percent of the seats and 59 percent of the votes in that election,
and effectively to deprive the NLD of the services of its leader, Daw
Aung San Suu Kyi. Both sides in this essentially lopsided struggle, have
made tactical errors that mutually increased antagonisms.
Although sops were made to the international community by
allowing UN special envoys Ambassadors Razali and Gambari into the
country and to have access to the Nobel Laureate, the military clearly
had no intention of agreeing to any system that would loosen their
immediate and, I would argue, continued control over that political
process. The employment of the military’s captive mass organizations,
such as the Union Solidarity and Development Association (USDA),
to demonstrate publicly against the opposition in the most extreme
19
 language, and indeed on occasion physically to disrupt opposition
activities, has been the obvious civilian surrogate of direct military
action. They also have been involved in cyclone relief efforts. The USDA
is apparently based on the Indonesian model of Golcar (“functional
groups”). Which started as a social organization that became General
Suharto’s political party. The USDA may follow this pattern.
It is the political crisis that has galvanized world opinion, now inten-
sified by the cyclone, and the encapsulation of political ideals into the
person of Aung San Suu Kyi has attracted international attention even
more than her South African Nobel Peace Prize counterpart, Nelson
Mandela. The seeming image of the ostensibly fragile woman, having
given up her family, standing up to a rough and stern-looking military
junta cannot but evoke attention, sympathy, and admiration. This
personalization of more profound issues makes political action more
accessible to the public even as it may obfuscate more nuanced and
complex policy questions.
The result of this confrontation, made more acute by the fall of Gen-
eral Khin Nyunt in October 2004, who had been the spark of the efforts
to have the UN have external dialogue with her and was the member of
the junta most aware of world opinion, is political stasis. Perhaps stasis
is too mild a term, for deterioration of the potential for any relationship
is evident, as it seems that the Senior General is not prepared to have
any dealings with her, and is said to want to avoid hearing her name
mentioned in his presence.
She is still kept under house arrest, and likely to remain so perhaps
even until the elections of 2010 have been held; the junta clearly has
no intention of having her become the head of state or exert any inde-
pendent administrative power; this provision has been built into the
proposed constitution. Future military leaders may feel less constrained
in dealing with “the lady,” as she is called (because to invoke her name
is to bring up her embarrassing–to the junta-- relationship of her to
her publicly revered father). Although some in the opposition have
declared that resolution of the political crisis is the crux to solving all
other issues, and thus this must precede changes in socio-economic or
minority relations, this approach is contradicted by the experience in a
number of other countries.
The political crisis has been compounded by the government’s
loss of an essential element of its attempt to instill its political legiti-
macy. The junta, using all its controlled avenues of communication and
media, has used Buddhism as a critical component of its attempt to
convince the public that its legitimacy is in accordance with Burmese
norms of behavior. The daily outpouring of stories and pictures, as well
Burma’s Multiple Crises: Globalized Concerns and Myanmar’s Response
20
as sermons, of appropriate acts of religiosity by the military all attest
both to the political importance of Buddhism and its public advocacy
by the government; it also illustrates as well the deeply held religious
beliefs of the hierarchy. Yet in a few days of violence against the monks,
the tatmadaw has lost its claim to its devout standing. This loss of le-
gitimacy, then, is perhaps the most important internal element in the
overall political crisis facing the state, for this strikes at the one, essen-
tial primordial value of the Burman population. The loss of Buddhist
legitimacy is likely to be matched by a loss of regime efficacy, if not by
the cyclone itself than by the delays allowing foreign assistance and its
belated response to the cyclone.
The Minority Crisis
Burma/Myanmar is the quintessential multi-ethnic state with perhaps
one-third of its population composed of minority groups. The minority
crisis seems less apparent then the other multiple crises facing the
state, for it did not explode during the saffron revolution or during the
cyclone. Yet it is likely to be the most enduring of all the national is-
sues, for in multi-cultural states these primordial concerns of ethnicity
and culture loom larger than immediate economic, social, or political
problems, and is less easily resolved. The importance and likely conti-
nuing concern over minority affairs is compounded by the insistence
of the military that devolving various types of authority to local, mino-
rity groups, often called “federalism” by those peoples, is the first step
toward secession, the great fear of the military and its first principle of
its incessantly repeated ideological manifesto. This was articulated as
early as 1962 by General Ne Win. The military was, after all, the core
that held the state together in the early 1950s at the height of the Karen
insurrection, and since that time under multiple revolts.
These concerns have been real, compounded by a still-remembered
history of all the surrounding states of Burma, and others such as the
U.S. and the UK, supporting various rebellions a half-century or so ago.
These Burman suspicions are outmoded but still palpable, and have
been compounded by the isolation of the Burman majority during the
socialist period when most of the minority groups were in contact with
their ethnic peers across the various ethnically arbitrary Burmese bor-
ders, and when Burmese Christian and Muslim groups were in touch
with, and supported by, their foreign co-religionists.
Minority issues were temporarily ameliorated by the multiple cease
fires initiated and negotiated by General Khin Nyunt. These were
simply cease fires, not peace accords, in which the various insurgents
21
 were allowed to keep their weapons. As part of the process of building
toward the state’s discipline-flourishing democracy, all arms were to be
surrendered to the government prior to the referendum. It was evident
that this would not have happened to any appreciable degree, and it
also clear that General Khin Nyunt had been considering some means
of incorporating some of the insurgents as militia or national guard to
allow them to keep some of their armaments, give them some status,
and yet exert some central control. Not only do many of the minorities
fear Burman domination, for the military has often acted as if they were
a foreign occupying force (which in some cases they were in minority
areas), but they may also fear their own ethnic compatriots.
The proposed constitution will not give local, minority governments
the degree of local power, let alone national influence, than they have
wanted, as indicated in the various draft constitutions those groups pre-
pared outside of the country, for to so write internally was considered
an offense. Some form of federalism has been their goal, but even the
use of such a term is regarded by the junta as anathema. Instead, active
duty military will be represented at all national and local levels of ad-
ministration, and aside from six smaller minority areas5 of contiguous
townships that will have authority over certain local laws and customs,
and a bicameral legislature, an essential unitary state is in place. No
doubt the military will say that under the new constitution some minor-
ity groups will have more autonomy than they had under the socialist
period, and indeed in the civilian era, but this is still far removed from
their aspirations.
Many of the minorities have articulated that they would regard as
legitimate a central government in Naypyidaw that allowed them the re-
tain their language, literature, and customs, while providing the subsi-
dies necessary for the operations of local governance and development.
The central government has never allowed them to do this. In spite of
hortatory comments in the constitution6 on the protection of local cus-
toms, language, culture and diversity, the state has refused to authorize
the use of local languages in the official school curriculum. This is in
contrast to some other countries in the region. Yet, surveys in the Wa
areas of the Shan State indicate that many of the primary schools there
teach in Chinese, and a few in Wa, and some in the Mon areas teach in
Mon, but perhaps these are regarded as private schools or are beyond
the government’s control. Other local languages are taught outside of
the state-authorized curricula.
Although the tensions between the minorities and the Burman
majority are often blamed on the divide and rule policies of the British
colonialists, similar policies have been followed by the military since
Burma’s Multiple Crises: Globalized Concerns and Myanmar’s Response
22
they took power. The fear that the Kachin were coming too close to the
NLD may have been one cause of the Depeyin incident in May 2003. Ef-
forts by the minorities to come together in coalitions are regarded with
considerable suspicion by the state.
The fragility of the relative peace along most of Myanmar’s frontiers
may become evident following the results of the referendum. Although
there is war-weariness among groups that for one or two generations
have been in revolt from time to time, the tatmadaw, the leaders of
which have risen through the ranks by their anti-insurgent fighting,
view minority power with extreme suspicion. The resolution of this
crisis is unlikely for some time.
The Political Culture and Its Consequences
Central to the amelioration of these separate but intertwined crises fa-
cing the Burmese state are broader forces that impede the alleviation of
these problems. A series of tendencies in the political culture present
further difficulties in achieving tidy and timely solutions to the crises
noted above. Burma/Myanmar is by no means unique in this regard. In
summary form, these stem from a socio-political system in which loy-
alties are highly personal, and a “loyal opposition” is an oxymoron. This
is based on finite concepts of power, under which to share or delegate
authority is to lose it. The leader, then, has the incentive to avoid sha-
ring power, or even information, with subordinates who in turn have
difficulty in contradicting their leaders. This attempt to control internal
information is related to efforts to limit foreign comments and influen-
ces, both viewed as interference in the political culture. The leader may
then wish to keep his plans for succession private, for to divulge these
plans could mean diminished authority.7
Personalized power results, most obviously, in weakened institu-
tions, and in the development of factions and entourages. So, if one
purges a leader (e.g., Khin Nyunt, Tin Oo), one also purges his loyal
entourage, thus decimating any institution that the purged leader had
commanded (e.g., military intelligence in 1983 and 2004). Since there
is a reluctance to share power, which is essentially to lose some of it, the
central authority is usually not prepared to delegate significant authori-
ty to lower echelons of institutions, such as local governments. There is
thus a tendency for centralized control, and the development of federal
structures, or independent judiciaries, legislatures, powerful advocacy
civil society groups, autonomous business concerns, a central banking
system, or other institutions is often more difficult. This concept of
unitary control extends to information, which is viewed as power, and
23
 thus there is a lack of transparency. The entourage system, in societies
that are economically underfunded, requires the exchanges of monies,
goods, services, and elements of power down from the top to ensure
loyalty, and in some cases up from the bottom as well. Thus, corruption
and rent-seeking are likely to be endemic.
Thus, to resolve these crises requires a more comprehensive ap-
proach than some simple administrative decision by mid-level offi-
cials. Ironically, insofar as the leadership addresses the problems, the
solutions (if there are any) would tend to increase the authority and
arbitrariness of those in command. Simple solutions of each of these
crises is difficult, and at least in part will be dependent for long-range
amelioration to modifications in the more basic political culture, which
is malleable over time. All of these problems have been made more
acute by Cyclone Nargis.
The Globalization of the Crisis
The tendency for the tatmadaw in Myanmar since 1962 has been to
revert to an isolationist position in the face of outside pressures. The
statement, often officially declaimed, is that we Burmese were isolated
for thirty years and we can go that route again, if necessary. We have
rice, raw materials, energy, and other resources we need. This oft-re-
peated chauvinistic response is inaccurate. Even at the height of their
isolationistic period, in 1972 the Burma Socialist Programme Party ad-
mitted that it was necessary to reform its poor economic relations with
the outside world.8 China has loomed large in its support to the junta.
The reluctance to “globalize” the cyclone response was in part the rea-
son for denying visas to aid workers (as well as journalists).
More basic, however, than the catalogue of locally available assets
may be the attitudes formed through a culture perceived as under siege.
The traumatic colonial experience, the perceived threat of the diminu-
tion or even the extinction of Burman culture, attacks on Buddhism,
immigration especially from India have all perhaps created a fear of vul-
nerability that isolation (real or imagined) could eliminate, and results
in nationalistic, even xenophobic, responses to perceived threats to the
regime or to its culture. Myanmar leaders feel vulnerable in the face of
more powerful neighbors and the U.S. and EU.
Whatever the basic causes, the influence of globalization is far more
acute today than it was a generation ago. The exposure to foreign invest-
ment, however ineptly that 1988 policy was implemented, has brought
in the outside world, as has the policy to encourage tourism as a foreign
exchange earner for the state. The new technology of television, e-mail,
Burma’s Multiple Crises: Globalized Concerns and Myanmar’s Response
24
cell phones, the internet, and other recent intrusions into Burmese life
has transformed the exposure of Burmese to international trends.
As outsiders, we saw the horrific visions of the repression of the saf-
fron revolution on television broadcast worldwide; this was an element
of globalization important in galvanizing world opinion on Myanmar
and the Burmese. To this writer, that is a less important issue compared
to the reverse element of globalization. That is, foreigners saw all these
images, but more importantly many of the urban Burmese did as well.
The new urban phenomena of a myriad satellite television dishes, both
registered and unregistered, has enabled important elements of the
Burmese population for the first time to see the repression in their own
homes and offices. This is unique in Burmese history. No longer does
hearsay or rumor in a society of completely controlled media have to
be the means by which people are informed of the repression. Instead,
there is a palpable, vital set of images that the military regime will not
be able to erase. It is for this reason that the saffron revolution, as rela-
tively small as it was compared to the failed peoples’ revolution of 1988
and as far fewer casualties resulted, may have the most profound effect
on the people and the future of direct military rule. As the saying goes,
“To be Burman is to be Buddhist,” and the infliction of terror on those
who exemplify one of the primordial values of Burman society will pro-
foundly affect the future of the regime in Myanmar.
Ironically, as Myanmar has relied on Chinese assistance for
building infrastructure, economic assistance, military equipment,
private Chinese investment, and perhaps two million illegal Chinese
immigrants, China has become one avenue of Burmese globalization if
of a particular brand and approach.
The Government’s Proposed Solution
The government’s proposed solution to these crises has been, first, to
deny their existence (and to minimize the cyclone’s effects), and then
to lay out the road map toward their proposed and desirable future.
The rural population, so said the spokesman of the government before
the cyclone, is better off and there are no real problems with the rural
population. The bogus monks and other nefarious traitors stirred up
the demonstrations, which did not represent the true feelings or beliefs
of either the people on the sangha. Senior monks (the Buddhist hierar-
chy is under the government’s administrative control) warned younger
members to go back to their monasteries and avoid illegal activities,
and since it was Buddhist “lent” in any case, they should not have been
on the streets. The problems of youth are being met through increased
25
 budgets for education and the expansion of institutions of higher lear-
ning to include Ph.D. degree programs. The political problems would
be resolved if Aung San Suu Kyi were not so intransigent, so they say,
and if she were to agree with the preconditions set forth by the Senior
General for talks, although there is no indication that even if talks were
held, they would accomplish anything tangible.
In any case, the tatmadaw incessantly repeats the mantra that the
roadmap toward the multi-party discipline-flourishing democracy is
in place and proceeding as planned. It is, according the junta, the re-
sponsibility of every citizen to support this process.
The response of the outside world has been predictable. The Chi-
nese, Indians, the Thai, ASEAN, and the Japanese assert that some
progress has been made, and they encourage the junta to keep up the
positive changes so outlined. The United States and most of the Euro-
pean Union say that the new constitution and the process envisioned
will simply enfeoff the military in power for the foreseeable future.
What the people believe can only be estimated, but their response may
be prompted by the fears of repression. There is this likely to be no una-
nimity on the future, but the government’s figures of almost universal
approval of the results of the partial referendum cast extreme skepti-
cism on the fairness of the process.
The Way Forward
Observers, commenting before the cyclone, may be conflicted in their
analyses of the Burma/Myanmar situation. Should we (as unfashiona-
ble as it is) quote Lenin and discuss the political changes in Myanmar
as two steps forward and one step backward, or should we turn Lenin
on his head and consider the Burmese situation as one step forward
and two steps backward? Does the immediate future indicate progress
through the constitutional process and eventual elections? Or are we in
a political stalemate or regression? It seems evident that if the forces
that control Myanmar remain in place, the next few years are likely to
see little if any improvement in the plight of the Burmese peoples, an
appraisal made profoundly more stark since the cyclone. Since 1988,
the military has made it evident that they had planned to remain in
effective power, eventually through a civilianized government such as
they had done under the BSPP 1974 constitution. We may, I believe,
presume there are moderates within the military structure who are li-
kely to believe that the new constitutional government, whatever its de-
leterious effects of concentrating power in the hands of the military, will
eventually evolve into something more open and catholic. If the outside
Burma’s Multiple Crises: Globalized Concerns and Myanmar’s Response
26
world believed that the elections of 1990 or those planned for 2010 will
provide for a government in which the military will effectively be sub-
ordinate to civilian politicians, then they were not carefully reading the
Rangoon tea leaves.
There is always the possibility of violent change through revolution
or coup or unrest of various kinds. Authoritarian regimes have a ten-
dency inadvertently to encourage such events because of their intense
hierarchical system that rewards lower level orthodoxy and conformity
to even the most bizarre whims and offhand remarks of the leadership.
The cyclone was so devastating that a preliminary assessment would
lead to the conclusion that it will not result in an immediate revolution,
although it will certainly contribute to future, perhaps violent, change.
One of the factors in change from military rule is the protection of the
tatmadaw leadership from retribution by any future government. The
new constitution so stipulates this. This provision was greeted with
despair among those hurt by that government; there will be many who
advocate the military relinquishing administrative power and want jus-
tice for past crimes committed. This is most unlikely to happen. The
Burmese will have to live with the ambiguities of past misrule if they
are to proceed to the next stage of national development
Yet we are caught in the grips of multiple orthodoxies. The military
orthodoxy is apparent and pervasive. That of the NLD is more subtle
but evident as well. The expatriate Burmese community too has its
singular approach to considering Myanmar problems, deviation from
which leads to exclusion from that uniformly informed club. So too,
in the policy circles of Washington, public debate on the problems of
Burma/Myanmar is usually lacking, for those who disagree with the of-
ficial position are cast as “pariahs,” as is the regime itself.
One could indeed argue that there is another looming crisis–that
of transition. That there will be changes over time is assured, although
how and when is unclear. Yet a simple change from military to civilian
rule, “nice and tidy as we learned in school” (as Bertol Brecht wrote
in the Threepenny Opera) is most unlikely. Planning for such change
internally seems anathema; planning for any realistic change externally
seems unexplored. Gaps in capacities, conceptions of governance,
laws and legal norms, administrative procedures, and institutional
authorities will all have to be reconstituted if any new government at
some undetermined time is to succeed in approaching the potential
that once was Burma and alleviating the suffering of its peoples. It is
to this end that concerned observers of the Burmese scene should give
attention.
In any future scenario or transition, there looms a possible lesson
27
 from the past. In the socialist era, there grew a gap between the Burma
Socialist Programme Party (BSPP), founded by the military and initially
staffed by many from the army, and the army itself, so that by the time
of the elections of 1990, the military was not anxious to see a victory
by the Union Party, the clear successor to the BSPP. So, if the USDA
evolves into a party by the 2010 elections, we may see a gradual split
after that time between the military and the USDA with further conse-
quences for Burmese political life and strife.9
Yet there are efforts that might be taken. Although some want sanc-
tions strengthened, others in senior positions allow that they have not
brought about regime or even attitudinal change, and that attempted
dialogue has not worked as well. ASEAN seems one fragile reed on
which one could try to lean. The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), which
includes the U.S., Japan, and China, among many others, might be an
auspices that could be brought into play. True, it lacks a secretariat and
has played no positive role to date in intra-ASEAN disagreements and
disputes. Under forceful leadership, however, it could advocate three
policies: [1] take the lead in assessing the cyclone tragedy and coordinat-
ing foreign assistance, which would be perhaps more acceptable to the
Burmese than coming from Western states; [2] invoke the new human
rights provision of the ASEAN Charter (approved in November 2007), a
provision without enforcement conditions, and begin its focus on pre-
venting human trafficking. This is prohibited under the new Burmese
constitution, and no ASEAN country could claim it was being targeted,
but it would begin the process of that institution trying to deal with
human rights issues in a non-threatening manner but one that could
have positive results; [3] under ARF, reaffirm the territorial integrity of
Burma/Myanmar, thus indicating to the junta that no foreign power is
interested in seeing the secession of any part of that state, and reassur-
ing the Burmese of the national unity that is a prime focus of the mili-
tary. Whether any or all of these efforts would produce practical results
in terms of bettering the lot of the Burmese peoples is unclear, but they
would be better than the present stasis.
If the past process has been a political journey without maps
because of the lack of transparency in the government but toward
a militarily controlled future, another landscape is emerging. The
ultimate destination is said to be the same, and the highway through it
is rough, tortuous, and now through a miasmal swamp. But beyond the
horizon may be detours, even alternative paths toward some other end.
Those may also be more than difficult, but ones that may be navigable
with care and concern. If the goal that we are striving for is democracy,
then it will be a long time before the long-suffering Burmese peoples
Burma’s Multiple Crises: Globalized Concerns and Myanmar’s Response
28
reach that end or that the term “democracy” itself is used in Myanmar
with any meaning.
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Kyaw Yin Hlaing. “Challenging the Authoritarian State: Buddhist Monks and Peaceful
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Petrie, Charles. ‘End of Mission Report.” United National Development Programme.
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Selth, Andrew. “Burma’s ‘Saffron Revolution’ and the Limits of International Influ-
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Steinberg, David I. “Globalization, Dissent, and Orthodoxy: Burma/Myanmar and the
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Bridge Books. 2006.
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2008.
Notes
1
In 1989, the military changed the name of the state from Burma to Myanmar, an old
written form. The opposition did not accept this change, considering the regime ille-
gitimate. The U.S. has continued to use “Burma,” while the UN and most other states
have adopted “Myanmar.” The name, thus, has become a surrogate indicator of political
opinion. Here, both are used without political intent; “Burma” for the pre-1989 period,
“Myanmar” thereafter, and both (Burma/Myanmar) to indicate continuity. Burmese here
is employed as an adjective and for citizens of that country. “Burman” indicates the ma-
jor ethnic group of that state.
2
Most important dates since independence at 4:20 a.m. on January 4, 1948 have been
so chosen.
3
Burma/Myanmar, even in the civilian period, has been most reluctant to ask publicly
for assistance, although they will often take it when proffered. This was true under the
civilian government as well as under the previous military-run socialist government
(1962-1988).
4
So deaths and destruction as a result of the cyclone will likely be underestimated, as
positive results in other cases are overestimated.
29
 5
Wa, Kokang, Danu, Palaung, Naga, and PaO, all “self-administered zones” except for
the Wa area, which is a larger “division.”
6
(Chapter I, 11 (a); Chapter VIII, 10 (d), 23). Unauthorized English version.
Future Policy Options
For an extended discussion, see David I. Steinberg, Turmoil in Burma: Contested
for Multilateral Engagement
7

Legitimacies in Myanmar. Norwalk: EastBridge, 2006.

8
See David I. Steinberg, Burma’s Road Toward development: Growth and Ideology Under
Military Rule. Boulder: Westview Press, 1981. Chapter 3.
9
I am indebted to Dr. Zaw Oo for this observation.
with Myanmar/Burma
Bradley O. Babson
The twin events of cyclone Nagris and formal announcement of the
approval of a new Constitution in the referendum held on May 10
have fundamentally altered the context for international engagement
with Myanmar/Burma.1 While frustrations are running high in the
international community over the government’s handling of both events,
moralistic outrage will not resolve these frustrations nor help the people
of Myanmar whose suffering not only demands an urgent humanitarian
response but also a much more deeply rooted transformation in the
governance of the country. This situation must be faced with realism and
fresh thinking against a backdrop where the UN has been floundering in
its efforts to promote national reconciliation, democracy, human rights
and humanitarian improvements in Myanmar/Burma.
The three prongs of UN engagement are political mediation through
the good offices of the Secretary General’s Special Advisor under a man-
date from the General Assembly, promotion of human rights by the
Special Rapporteur appointed by the Human Rights Council, and hu-
manitarian and social programs assistance provided by United Nations
agencies under the leadership of the UN Resident and Humanitarian
Coordinator. All three have floundered in their relationships with the
military leadership and in practical achievements in recent months, follo-
wing the monk-led anti-government protests in September and October
2007. The expulsion of Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator Charles
Petrie for issuing a statement on deteriorating humanitarian conditions,
denial of a visa to Special Rapporteur Paulo Sergio Pinheiro prior to filing
his last report to the Human Rights Council, and rejection of Special Ad-
visor Ibrahim Gambari’s proposals for constructive assistance to enhance
legitimacy in the process of adopting a new Constitution, all signal a wea-
kening of UN influence inside the country at the same time that there is
intensifying concern in the international community about worsening
political and social conditions. The wrangling over access and terms for
international aid to the cyclone victims simply reinforces in stark terms
the weakness of UN capacity to find a meaningful role in managing the
multiple crises now facing the country.

Burma’s Multiple Crises: Globalized Concerns and Myanmar’s Response

30 31
 At the present moment, Myanmar/Burma faces not only a humani-
tarian crisis but also a crisis of legitimacy in the announced timetable
for democracy. In addition to the widely held view that the constitu-
tional convention was not sufficiently inclusive in its participation and
processes, there is ample cause to believe that the referendum that was
forced upon the population in the wake of the cyclone disaster was not
conducted in a way that genuinely reflects the will of the people.
Beneath the surface is a rising tide of anti-government sentiment,
fed by revulsion at the treatment of monks, shock over extravagance
and corruption in the senior leadership revealed by widely viewed video
tapes of the wedding of Senior General Than Shwe’s daughter, despair
over growing poverty, and disappointment with the government’s xe-
nophobic response and inept management of international relief to
cyclone victims. Open expressions of public anger have been rare in the
past, as fear of reprisal has dominated the public space; but this too is
changing. Future eruptions of public anger are unpredictable, but have
been muted by the prospects for a new Constitution that promises an
eventual end to military government, even if the military will retain
ultimate controlling authority.
Rising anger is also a factor in the international community, even
before the frustrations on the handling of humanitarian relief to cy-
clone victims. The images of monk-bashing by the military authorities
in 2007 fueled international disgust of the regime and added pressures
to increase sanctions. In the US, public awareness of the plight of the
people of Myanmar/Burma has been significantly increased as a result
of widespread media coverage of these events and Laura Bush’s per-
sonal attention to this issue from the White House. There is a strong
bipartisan consensus to express official outrage and increase economic
sanctions, notably by targeting financial sanctions on individuals and
companies closely tied to the leadership and their families. Similar
sentiments are evident in Europe, Canada, and Australia, and in a more
nuanced way among the ASEAN democracies.
Along with growing anti-government sentiment is a pervasive sense
of frustration and helplessness in being unable to influence change in
attitudes and behaviors of the military regime. Internally, the hope that
the people and non-governmental stakeholders have invested in the
ability of the UN to play a helpful role has been fading. Externally, there
is a widespread perception that neither engagement nor sanctions have
worked in moving the minds of the senior military. This is reinforced
by the reality that the different policies towards Myanmar/Burma in the
international community, and particularly among the members of the
Security Council, together with the independent pursuit of interests of
Future Policy Options for Multilateral Engagement with Myanmar/Burma
32
neighboring countries in their relations with Myanmar/Burma, mili-
tate against an effective role for the UN as a broker of political change
or enforcer of a strong policy of sanctions and inducements for change.
Frustrations abound on all sides, including the military government
who do not feel they are being given credit for progress and conces-
sions they have made.2
In light of these developments, there is a viewpoint emerging in
some quarters that while the UN should continue its efforts in all three
areas of its engagement because there seems to be no other obvious
alternative, there should be some re-thinking of how the UN could
re-shape its engagement, and also how other multilateral approaches
might be developed in a complimentary way to strengthen overall im-
pact on the thinking and behavior of the military leadership and on
meeting the needs and aspirations of the people. The purpose of this
paper is to explore some of these policy options in relation to both in-
ternal and external factors that will determine their potential effective-
ness.
Historical Context
As Thant Myint-U (2006) and David Steinberg (2001, 2006) keep re-
minding us, it is very important to understand Myanmar/Burma’s his-
torical realities in framing policies towards influencing change in the
country. The transition from colonial rule to independent nationhood
after World War II was more the result of a hurried negotiation among
groups who had no binding common national identity other than geo-
graphic proximity after a long period of “divide and rule” under the Brit-
ish, than the result of a genuine hard fought independence movement
as took place in India and Vietnam. The democratic experiment held
together by ethnic consent based on the Panglong Agreement of 1947
lasted only a decade, replaced by a military-led caretaker government in
1958 and a full-scale military coup led by Ne Win in 1962. As a result,
the modern history of Myanmar/Burma has been marked by 60 years
of civil war among a multiplicity of contending groups, with the mili-
tary seeing its primary role to keep the nation whole and unified. Thus
the condition of the country should be more aptly viewed as similar to
conflict-ridden Africa, than as primarily a power struggle between the
military and a western-oriented pro-democracy movement.3 While the
historical context is dominated by ethnically and geographically based
civil strife, the recent clashes between the military and the monks and
their civilian supporters is essentially an intra-Burman ethnic group
conflict driven primarily by economic hardship, as was the case in the
33
 uprising of 1988. It is notable that the ethnic minority groups which
comprise about 30% of the population kept a very low profile during
the clashes of 2007.
Viewed from the historical perspective of pervasive conflict, there
is some merit in the military’s often stated priority that a measure of
stability be achieved through ceasefire agreements and other measures
before the country can successfully move down the road towards full-
fledged democracy that will succeed, bearing in mind the failure of the
democratic experiment of the 1950’s. In this sense, the image of the
military (Tatmadaw) as the protector of the nation since in its inception
under Aung San at the end of the British era, still has some validity in
the country today, despite the military’s image being severely tarnished
by violence towards monks and ordinary people, and by the hardships
created through gross economic mismanagement that have given rise
to the present day anger. Progress in reaching cease-fire agreements
with many of the insurgent groups is one reason that the senior military
leadership is willing to proceed with their road map towards democracy.
One has only to ask whether it is possible to conceive of a functioning
government throughout present day Myanmar/Burma without a strong
military presence and role. The answer for better or for worse is no, and
that the Tatmadaw will be a necessary if not sufficient part of a desirable
and legitimate governance equation for the foreseeable future.
Equally important is the question whether Myanmar/Burma has
the ingredients in place to establish a functioning modern democracy.
Despite high emotions to the contrary, the answer is also no. Non-
military related political institutions are weak and fragmented, worn
down by decades of military oppression. The National League for De-
mocracy (NLD) has an important voice, but is organizationally fragile
and dependent on its icon of democratic hope and determination,
Daw Aung San Suu Kyi. The newly emerging political players such as
the 88 Generation and All Burma Monks Alliance are driven by anti-
government protest motivations, but are loose networks without a
formal structure, and are not likely to evolve into new political parties
with national reach and platforms for future policies and governance
agendas. As a result of the grinding erosion of social services and
worsening poverty under military rule, the general population is also
poorly educated and lacking a cultural history of popular participa-
tion in governance, civil discourse and national debate. As in 1990,
the population is bound in a collective desire to end military rule, but
the country is not well-equipped to replace it with open democratic
processes and rules-based decision-making accompanied by a mea-
ningful role for the courts in dispute resolution.
Future Policy Options for Multilateral Engagement with Myanmar/Burma
34
The real question is how military adaptation and reform can be mo-
tivated and managed to accompany a democratization process where
the basic foundations and institutions for functional democracy have
yet to be put in place. This duality of institutional adjustments and
developments required for a successful democratic transition poses a
fundamental challenge for policies of future engagement by the inter-
national community with Myanmar/Burma. The UN frameworks for
engagement with Myanmar/Burma so far have not built this dimension
of military adaptation into any of the mandates. While UN experiences
in post-conflict transitions in Africa and Eastern Europe may have some
potential application in the Myanmar/Burma context, it is even more li-
kely that the experiences of other Asian nations which have undergone
transitions from military to democratic rule -- such as the Philippines,
Indonesia, Thailand and South Korea -- may hold lessons of experience
that could usefully be drawn upon in future dialogue initiatives with the
military regime in support of their own decision to move ahead with
the seven step process of democratization. This could be a potentially
productive area for ASEAN sponsorship or that of an informal regio-
nal grouping of Asian countries seeking to find helpful ways to sup-
port consideration of practical issues related to workable institutional
changes in the internally-determined process of moving forward on the
roadmap to democracy.
Beyond this fundamental institutional set of challenges, in recon-
sidering future policies for UN and other multilateral engagement it
is important to consider the present day realities that are rooted in the
country’s historical context and recent experiences.
Ethnic Minorities and Traditional Homelands
One priority is that more attention is needed to facilitate and empower
the politics of accommodation among ethnic rivalries amid the realities
on the ground in the geographically defined traditional homelands or
ethnic minority states. Mary Callahan (2007) describes the complexity
and diversity of political authority in the ethnic minority states and dis-
tinguishes between three types of situations: (a) states where authority
of the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) is limited and
there is near devolution of power to networks of former insurgent lead-
ers, traditional leaders, business people and traders; (b) states where the
SPDC military and other state agencies are dominant and oppressive
occupying authorities; and (c) states where a range of strategic partners
including ceasefire group leaders, business operators, Union Solidarity
and Development Association (USDA) leaders, traders, religious lead-
35
 ers, NGO personnel and government officials, have achieved a worka-
ble coexistence.
Recognizing these differences and the complexities of governance
in different regions of the country is important. UN humanitarian
agencies that are operationally active in Myanmar/Burma have been
working in at least some of these areas for many years. UNICEF,
UNDP, UNHCR, WFP, FAO, WHO, UNFPA, UNAIDS, and UNODC
have achieved modest but important and largely unrecognized and
acknowledged successes in their efforts. Such programs definitely de-
serve support and expansion. Collaboration among the UN agencies,
other official donors, local and foreign NGOs, and the government in
immunization campaigns and HIV/AIDS are examples of relative suc-
cess that have formed a foundation for other collaborative initiatives in
education, tuberculosis, and malaria. While small in scale compared
to need, there is a basic level of contextual operational experience and
knowledge that can be built upon when the international community is
prepared to make a significant expansion of resources available.
Beyond the potential value and impact of expanding the availability
of resources for locally-based humanitarian and development programs
in the ethnic states, Callahan makes several important recommenda-
tions for future international community involvement in the ethnic sta-
tes. One is to appreciate the evolving nature of the diverse and complex
social systems in the ethnic states, and approach peace building and
social and economic programs in a highly participatory manner adap-
ted to local situations. A second is to support strengthening capacity of
civil society to contribute to conflict resolution, social services, huma-
nitarian relief and development through support to local community
organizations, church service delivery networks and NGOs. A third is
to find ways to support military demobilization in the ethnic minority
areas as opportunities arise.
Another critical question for the future is how these understandings
of the dynamics of political authority in different ethnic minority areas
are handled in the new Constitutional provisions for power sharing
and for future central-local government authorities and relationships,
legally, financially, and administratively. Also, Constitutional design is
one thing and implementation will be quite another. The primary focus
of the UN Secretary General’s Special Envoy’s and Special Assistant’s
mandates since the mid-1990’s has been on mediation between the
NLD, particularly its leader Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, and the military
leadership. This focus has not reflected this deeper historical ethnic
dynamic, despite efforts by all the Special Envoys and Special Assistant
over the years to meet with leaders of ethnic groups and to reflect their
Future Policy Options for Multilateral Engagement with Myanmar/Burma
36
concerns in the dialogue with the government and NLD leadership. If
a new Constitution is approved by the upcoming national referendum,
however flawed it may be to outside observers, the implementation of
new power sharing arrangements between national and local govern-
ments and the development of political, administrative, and financial
capacities at the local as well as national level to implement these new
arrangements, will become critical to the longer-term process of accom-
modation of ethnic interests and national integration. A very useful role
for multilateral organizations, including not only the UN and its opera-
tional agencies, but also the World Bank and Asian Development Bank,
will be to find constructive roles and activities to support the evolutiona-
ry process of political, administrative, and financial development at the
local level as well as at the central government level amid all the diver-
sity around the country. Techniques developed and tested in post-con-
flict African countries may be approaches that can be transferred and
adapted to the Myanmar/Burma context in partnership with central and
local authorities and civil society networks. Principles of effectiveness
drawn from international experience, such as attention to harmoniza-
tion and alignment among donors and with government mechanisms,
will be important to pursue in the Myanmar/Burma context.
An additional factor in some ethnic areas is infrastructure construc-
tion and Chinese incursion into traditional homelands. Partly fueled by
Chinese and Thai economic interests, and partly supported internatio-
nally through the development of regional transport networks under
the Greater Mekong Sub-region program sponsored by the Asian De-
velopment Bank, the physical and social landscape particularly of the
Shan state and the Kachin state are being transformed. Depletion of
local resources, acquisition of Myanmar/Burmese assets by Chinese
immigrants, and increasingly affordable access to markets in China
and Thailand are spurring powerful dynamics of change that are evol-
ving in an unguided or unregulated way that creates new opportunities,
but also threatens the interests of local groups, and in some ways the
interests of the country as a whole.
This challenge is illustrated by the social, environmental, and econo-
mic issues involved in schemes for building hydropower dams on the
Salween river, largely to serve the energy demands of China and Thai-
land. The international community has been absent, and local interests
largely ignored in the developments on the Salween both in Myanmar/
Burma and in China, in sharp contrast to international cooperation in
the development of the Mekong River Basin. The huge appetite among
central governments for expanding energy trade between Myanmar/
Burma and Thailand and China is driving many activities that have
37
 consequences at the local level. A better understanding of these dy-
namics in the international community is needed, along with greater
willingness to increase attention and get involved in the development
challenges of these regions.
Internal Dynamics of the Military
A second reality rooted in the historic context is the slow-burning crisis
of identity and control within the military itself that occasionally erupts
in overt intra-military conflict. After the coup of 1962, military rule un-
der Ne Win promulgated a culture of violence to maintain stability and
national control over divisive forces within the country. Coupled with
this was a culture of command that governed the relationship of the
state to society and dominated economic policy and management. The
vision of the Tatmadaw as protector of the nation was largely tolerated
in this period, but accompanied by both erosion of social capital and a
weakening economy. The transition from dictatorship to collective mili-
tary rule that followed Ne Win’s forced retirement, and the convulsions
of 1988-1990, brought open conflict between the military and society
which became vested in both domestic and international perception of
the legitimacy of the NLD. This also led to the emergence of widespread
international views of Myanmar/Burma as a pariah state. First as the
State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC), and later as the State
Peace and Development Council (SPDC), the military leadership ushe-
red in a period of activism in efforts to negotiate cease fire agreements
with rebel groups, stimulate economic innovation and private sector
development, and initiate discussions on constitutional revision.
Under the leadership of Senior General Than Shwe after he assu-
med power in 1992, the military slowed down these innovative efforts,
greatly expanded its ranks, reverted to growing use of coercive tactics
to achieve its security objectives, and increasingly devoted attention
to its own enrichment through prerogatives accorded military owned
economic enterprises. As a result, the Tatmadaw has radically trans-
formed its relationship with the people of Myanmar/Burma and effec-
tively become a state within a state, operating under different rules and
privileges. It secures its power by force and intimidation, control over
economic revenue earning activities, and offering social and economic
mobility only through military education and career building, and not
through civil institutions.
Internally, the Tatmadaw has been heavily influenced by intra-military
politics characterized by careful balancing of power among leadership
figures, entourages linked by loyalty and patronage to leading figures,
Future Policy Options for Multilateral Engagement with Myanmar/Burma
38
intimidation and coercion within the rank and file, alliances with elite fa-
milies, control over resources, and generational differences. A strong ethic
of nationalism and pride in the historic role of the Tatmadaw in modern
national identity has militated against internal fissures. Occasionally, ho-
wever, internal conflicts erupt that remove contenders to power, notably the
downfall of Prime Minister Khin Nyunt and dismantling of the powerful
military intelligence service in 2004.
While the present condition of the military leadership can be viewed
as stable, it is headed for transition. Health issues have required changes
in the senior leadership in the past year and the tenure of Senior General
Than Shwe himself is uncertain due to his age and reputed health condi-
tions. Competition for power between Than Shwe and the long-standing
number two in the regime, Maung Aye, is also an ongoing dynamic that
is affected not only by aging of both, but also by differences in their views
on the handling of the monk demonstrations in 2007. Speculation about
this competition and its impact on leadership transitions yet to come in
the upper levels of the military has been increasing recently, and intra-
military political developments are likely to be intertwined with the pro-
cess of implementing the road map to democracy that now has a specific
timetable attached to it.
Of particular concern to some within the military is the growing role
and influence of the Union Solidarity and Development Association
(USDA). This civilian organization is closely tied to a faction of the mili-
tary loyal to Than Shwe, and has been given a lead role in the management
of the Constitutional referendum and subsequent election process. Some
senior military officers are expected to shed their uniforms and take on
major Cabinet roles in a future civilian government with the endorsement
of the USDA. The division between who stays and who goes out of uni-
form, and the implications for future protection of economic and other
privileges of the military, is bound to raise loyalty issues within the mili-
tary establishment and raise questions about how the military will adapt
to democratic rule even it if retains significant powers and independence
under the new Constitution.
The generational issue is also important, as one fissure within the
military is between those focused on reaping the economic privileges of
power derived from past policies and practices, and those younger of-
ficers whose well-being will be more influenced by the future than the
past, and who thus are likely to be more invested in securing a future
that will benefit them and their families in a sustainable way, than hol-
ding onto old ways.
To date, none of the activities of the UN or other multilateral organi-
zations, including ASEAN and the International Financial Institutions,
39
 have had any major impact on the inner dynamics of the military esta-
blishment. The UN Security Council has been unable to forge a consen-
sus on an international policy response to human rights violations and
excessive use of violence against the population. The Special Advisor
to the Secretary General and the Special Rapporteur on Human Rights
have secured only minor concessions on treatment of political priso-
ners and political dialogue. The International Labor Office has been
able to make some progress in the area of forced labor practices, but
compliance is tenuous. ASEAN has tried, but failed, to achieve a mea-
ningful dialogue on governance and democratization. And the UNDP,
IMF, World Bank, and Asian Development Bank have conducted occa-
sional studies of economic developments and offered advice for more
economically efficient and equitable economic management that has
largely fallen on deaf ears at the top, even while lower level officials have
by and large been cooperative and receptive. In general, the civil service
is progressively minded and eager to work to improve the governance of
the country, but has been held in check by the military leadership.
A challenge for future policies for multilateral engagement is how
to relate to the realities of the intra-military political dynamics while
having positive influences on the directions of change that will be
largely determined by the evolving replacement of key individuals in
the senior leadership and by the ideas they espouse for future policy
and management of the country. By necessity, any approach taken
must be multi-dimensional, involving security, political and econo-
mic aspects, because the military is deeply involved in all these areas
of governance. It also must be incremental, recognizing the need for
confidence building as new leadership emerges, and also the need
to overcome gaps in knowledge and institutional capacity to manage
change that are rooted in Myanmar/Burma’s long-standing isolation
and mismanagement.
The Religious Factor
Culturally and politically, Myanmar/Burma is infused with religion,
and religious ideals and language are deeply ingrained in the fabric
of everyday life. Apart from the Tatmadaw, the religious orders and
networks are the only institutions capable of operating on a truly natio-
nal basis. As Callahan (2007) notes, there are substantial areas where
basic government services are not capable of operating or operate only
as agents of occupation. The Buddhist Sangha is vertically integrated
down to the pagodas at the village level, and has historically played a
vital role in providing basic education and fostering social cohesion in
Future Policy Options for Multilateral Engagement with Myanmar/Burma
40
the face of ongoing conflicts. Similarly, the Christian churches which
have a significant number of ethnic minority adherents, play a vital role
in supporting social needs of some of the neediest and hardest to reach
peoples in the country. The Myanmar Council of Churches (MCC), for
example, provides an ecumenical network of coordinated social service
capabilities that could potentially play an expanded role in peace buil-
ding, community development, and meeting humanitarian needs in
ethnic minority areas.
While some UN agencies and international NGOs have experience
working with religious service delivery networks where the government
has been willing to give permission, this possibility deserves more
attention for international engagement and leveraging of resources
through local capabilities. Much more could be accomplished in meet-
ing needs at the grass-roots level by forming partnerships with these re-
ligious networks and in helping to build their capacities for governance,
resource management, and technical skills.
Even more notable by its absence, is engagement with religious
leaders on normative issues such as human rights and peace building.4
The secular language and legalistic approaches pursued by Western
governments and organizations in talking about basic issues of human
rights, often fall on deaf ears in Myanmar/Burma, where discussions
of respect for human dignity and relationships are instead couched
in religious language – mainly Buddhism. Exploring the potential for
drawing upon culturally familiar religious language and ideals to pro-
mote reconciliation and cooperation is a good idea, but has been largely
ignored in debates about how to promote human rights and democracy
in Myanmar/Burma. For example, a core value in Burmese Buddhism
is Myitta, which is an understanding closely aligned with Christian and
Muslim values of “compassionate love.” The articulation of such inter-
faith shared common cultural values could provide an avenue for con-
sensus building on important elements of national identity in a highly
pluralistic society. So far this has eluded the international community,
which tends to keep religious and secular affairs independent of one
another, as has become the norm in Western societies; but such a neat
division is certainly not the case in other parts of the world, as we have
seen in the Middle East.
Paradoxically, this segmentation of the worlds of state and religion
has been strongly reinforced by the military government, who admo-
nish religious leaders to keep to their side of the policy line that divides
their two spheres of leadership for national governance and religious
activity. For their part, senior generals are often depicted in the media
as devoutly religious, paying homage to monks and sponsoring cons-
41
 truction of new pagodas. While the senior Burman military leadership
is Buddhist, there are Christian military officers who have reached Ca-
binet level positions and who maintain links to the Christian leadership
and networks. While there has always been a certain tension between
the military and the religious networks, and there have been incidents
of state sanctioned anti-Christian or anti-Moslem action, by and large
the diversity of religious communities and their worship practices have
been tolerated as long as they remain on the non-political side of the
fence.
The breakdown of this tacit division by the marching of the monks
in 2007 has changed the political equation in the country. The violence
perpetrated against the monks and other military acts of disrespect for
the spiritual role monks perform in Myanmar/Burma’s society, have
altered the national psychological landscape and reduced public accep-
tance of the many misbehaviors of the military in their rule of the coun-
try and management of its resources. There is both increased popular
willingness to speak openly against the government in public and an ex-
pressed sentiment that the decision of the monks to march, means that
the line between state governance and religion will no longer uphold
a national conspiracy of silence against the oppression, greed, and ar-
rogance of the military leadership. Theologically, the message from the
monks to the military and the people is that it is the military that must
amend its divergent ways from the true path of compassion exemplified
by the Buddha. This message was graphically illustrated by the image
of the overturned rice bowl – symbolic as refusal to accept alms to allow
the giver to earn merit towards his salvation.
Since Buddhism is the dominant religion in Myanmar/Burma, any
future governance system will have to reflect the Buddhist traditions
and culture of the country. But there has been little discussion in the
international debates about political mediation and democratization in
Myanmar/Burma about the role of Buddhist thought and practice in
framing expectations of good governance within the general popula-
tion and among those in positions of public authority. As recent events
make clear, Buddhism is a powerful force in Myanmar/Burma society
and cannot be isolated in the monasteries. A better understanding of
the relationship between Buddhism and governance would help the
international community play a more effective and constructive role in
both advocacy and practical support. This would seem to be a fruitful
area for more exploration, perhaps through conferences or writings on
the relationships of Buddhism and governance in other countries, such
as Thailand, Sri Lanka, Bhutan and Tibet.
Future Policy Options for Multilateral Engagement with Myanmar/Burma
42
Humanitarian Perspectives
The UN has been committed to promoting basic principles of humani-
tarian assistance to Myanmar/Burma in a politically complex situation,
both in dealings with the military government and in dealings with the
international community. These principles include impartiality, inde-
pendence, accountability and transparency.5 While operational results
have been constrained by many factors including problems of access
and also of resources, the UN effort has been important and multidi-
mensional. In addition, for almost a decade, the United Nations Coun-
try Team (UNCT), based in Yangon, has been writing publicly about de-
teriorating social conditions in Myanmar/Burma and the humanitarian
crisis that is largely unseen by the outside world. The statement issued
by the UNCT in October 2007 was only the latest expression of this
concern, but the government response in expelling the UN Resident
and Humanitarian Coordinator was new. This had to have been a cal-
culated measure to send a strong message to the UN and international
community.
At a minimum, what this points to is that a new kind of dialogue
with the military government on expectations of humanitarian work in
the country and its relation to what the government views as political
actions of the UN, will be needed. It also raises a question whether
combining the role of the UN Resident Coordinator with the role of
Humanitarian Coordinator is the right organization of responsibilities
for future UN activities. In a politically complex country like Myanmar/
Burma, where the UN is pursing multiple mandates, the Resident Co-
ordinator is called upon to provide in-country support and coordination
for all of the UN mandates and activities in the country. This involves
local support to the work of the Secretary General’s Special Assistant
and Human Rights Special Rapporteur, as well as for the in-country
operational work of UN agencies in humanitarian programs and deve-
lopment assistance.
The role of Humanitarian Coordinator was conceived to pursue an
integrated approach for the humanitarian activities of the UN system
and others both inside and outside Myanmar/Burma, so that there
would be greater coherence and coordination among them. This is
especially needed in efforts to address issues related to refugees in
the border areas with efforts related to internally displaced persons
inside the country, and in coordinated efforts to address cross-border
problems such as drug control, trafficking in women and children, and
HIV/AIDS. But the Humanitarian Coordinator also has a public role in
giving voice to the realities of the conditions and needs in Myanmar/
43
 Burma and in advocating responses by both the government and the
international community.
With the announcement of a timetable for a referendum on the
Constitution and elections, the intersection of domestic politics and in-
ternational humanitarian assistance is bound to become more sensitive
and complex in the coming months and years. Contending parties for
political authority will all want to be associated with delivery of huma-
nitarian services to the people, and to be seen as in control and not do-
minated by foreigners. This is as true for local political authority figures
and organizations as for the military government which will be aligned
with the USDA in promoting its policies and interests. This situation
requires a reassessment of international policies and humanitarian
strategies towards Myanmar/Burma.
Humanitarian donors have basically been following a script for
humanitarian assistance prepared by the UNCT in 2003. This was
anchored in what has been a surprisingly successful experience in
addressing HIV/AIDS. While initially denying the scale and com-
plexity of this disease in Myanmar/Burma, the government did agree
to cooperate in a coordinated and multi-faceted program that included
various UN agencies, bilateral donors, international NGOs, and local
civil society organizations. This experience has demonstrated that co-
ordinated operational programs are possible in the Myanmar/Burma
context when space is created for cooperation and division of labor
among groups that share the basic objectives of the program. The hu-
manitarian strategy has been to work toward expanding areas where
such cooperation can be achieved. Donor supported programs have
been developed for a Three Diseases Fund that includes tuberculosis
and malaria as well as HIV/AIDS, and for a multi-donor education
fund. This basic strategy continues to be valid, but needs to be expan-
ded, and operational modalities need to be adapted to the changing
internal political dynamics.
Informal reports from international NGOs working in Myanmar/
Burma indicate that obtaining central government approvals and de-
cisions has become more difficult as a result of growing bureaucratic
paralysis within the government and difficulties of communicating
with officials in the new capital in Nay Pyi Daw, but that cooperation
with local level officials continues to be very positive, and progress is
being made where central government involvement is not needed. The
implication of these developments for the future humanitarian strategy
of the international community is that a high level effort to establish a
humanitarian policy dialogue with the government is needed to define
the framework for expanded international humanitarian support and
Future Policy Options for Multilateral Engagement with Myanmar/Burma
44
gain the decisions and permissions that only the government can give;
and that operational priority should be given to expanding partnerships
with local authorities and organizations as well as national civil society
networks.
Beyond these dimensions of the underlying humanitarian challenges
facing Myanmar/Burma, the dramatic escalation of humanitarian crisis
in the delta area due to cyclone Nagris and its aftermath is bound to alter
fundamentally the equation of international cooperation. Large-scale re-
lief operations will be needed for a considerable period regardless of the
management of the short-term response. A critical aspect is balancing
roles of the government, domestic civil society, international NGOs, bila-
teral agencies, UN agencies, and the ASEAN “Coalition of Mercy” initia-
tive. Beyond the basic issue of access and admission of foreign aid experts
to work in the delivery of humanitarian relief, there will also be a need
for coordination among the organizations delivering humanitarian relief
and between these groups and the government. This will be an ongoing
need, and establishment of mechanisms for coordination of information
and operations will be unprecedented for Myanmar/Burma. How these
issues are handled will have long-term consequences for international
cooperation on the broader range of humanitarian challenges facing the
country. At a minimum there will be a need for an arrangement to align
domestic and international policies for delivery of relief and monitoring
process, and a mechanism for mobilization of resources and dialogue
among partners in the humanitarian relief effort.
Economic Policy and Management
Better economic policies would probably do more to transform the si-
tuation in Myanmar/Burma and trigger a dynamic of positive change
than any other area of international engagement with the country. Fin-
ding a way to pursue multilateral engagement in a serious high level
economic policy dialogue should be a major priority.
Recognizing that economic pressures were a stimulus for the upri-
sings in 1988, the government enacted a series of economic reforms to
stimulate private sector investment and economic growth. This policy
had initial success in the early 1990’s as the government allowed an
expanded role for market forces, attracted foreign investment, and sti-
mulated both formal and informal international trade. However, after
taking control of the SPDC, Senior General Than Shwe refused to de-
epen economic reform efforts, and instead pursued a policy of military
enrichment through military control of the Myanmar Holdings Corpo-
ration and the Myanmar Economic Corporation, and pursuit of impro-
45
 ved economic ties with China, India and Thailand, Myanmar/Burma’s
most important trade partners.
Exploitation of oil and gas resources to earn foreign exchange has
been a particularly high priority along with infrastructure investment
to facilitate increased trade. With revenues from sales of natural gas to
Thailand now over $ 2 billion a year and likely to expand with future sa-
les to China, and perhaps India, the government is running a balance of
payments surplus and has to make important choices in the allocation
of these revenues. These choices have important consequences for the
economy as a whole and for poverty reduction. Critical to the poverty
agenda will be official commitment to address chronic inflation, deepen
liberalization of the agriculture sector, and expand social services.
The major efforts of the international community to engage in ma-
croeconomic policy dialogue since 1990 have been the Article IV Con-
sultations of the International Monetary Fund, which typically occur
every 12 to 18 months; two reports prepared by the World Bank in 1995
and 1999 that looked at structural and social issues and advocated re-
forms to increase economic growth and efficiency and to reduce poverty;
a similar report prepared by the Asian Development Bank in 2002; and
a Japanese bilateral economic policy project that involved joint working
groups. Both Alvaro De Soto and Ismail Razali, the Special Envoys of
the United Nations, sought to link promotion of economic dialogue and
potential future assistance for economic reform and development, with
political dialogue on reconciliation and movement towards democracy.
More recently, Special Assistant Ibrahim Gambari proposed a broad-ba-
sed national economic forum that was rebuffed. The main lessons from
these experiences can be summarized as:
• All attempts to link economic dialogue with political dialogue
on democracy and human rights issues have failed to produce
any serious economic dialogue.
• Economic policy dialogue has not been productive in the ab-
sence of prospects for financing.
• The realities of the military domination of the government
and economy have trumped all efforts to engage in discussions
of systemic economic reform, although some reform measures
have been taken in recent years.
• It has been possible to engage mid-level officials in construc-
tive exchanges of information and dialogue on economic issues.
But the impact of this has been limited not only by lack of interest
and support from the top, but also by the poor quality of statisti-
Future Policy Options for Multilateral Engagement with Myanmar/Burma
46
cal information available to support policy dialogue, and limited
analytical capacities due to lack of training opportunities and
exposure to global best practices and knowledge.6
The unwillingness of the senior leadership to consider a serious
economic policy dialogue with the international community is linked
to its own economic interests in the status quo, deep-seated suspicions
of market economy dynamics, and the implications of economic libe-
ralization and reform for the state’s control over the population. Fun-
damentally, this is an issue of isolationist mentality and fear of change,
couched in nationalism and rationalization of the ongoing need for
total effective control of the country by the Tatmadaw. The absence of
domestic processes for policy analysis and debates among economic ex-
perts and within the bureaucracy, coupled with the command culture of
the military hierarchy, have essentially foreclosed objective formulation
of economic policies that would serve the best interests of the country.
An understandable government predilection for infrastructure projects
and success in exploiting oil and gas resources for both financial and
political gains, together with privileges accorded military-owed state
enterprises, have trumped rational economic policy-making and mana-
gement in the larger national interest.
The ongoing international debates about the efficacy of economic
sanctions versus economic engagement with the government of
Myanmar/Burma definitely affect the willingness of the senior leader-
ship to engage in dialogue on economic policy issues. The reason given
to Special Assistant Gambari for the government’s refusal of a recent
proposal to convene a national economic forum, was that “sanctions
were the primary cause of any socio-economic problems in Myanmar
and the central obstacle to the country’s development. Technically, there-
fore, (the government) considered the utility of the proposed forum or
similar proposals limited, since, in their view, such vehicles would only
produce a “distorted” diagnosis of the situation…Nonetheless, the gov-
ernment has expressed an interest in finding areas of convergence in
that area, with a view to addressing concerns and challenges.”7 In this
situation, it is important that future interlocutors with the government
on economic policy matters be seen by all parties to be objective and
apolitical. The government’s statement reveals openness to some level
of dialogue, but wariness about how this could be conducted in a pro-
ductive way. This is an opening that deserves further exploration.
Cyclone Nagris caused an economic as well as humanitarian shock
to the status quo that requires an urgent and robust response. Not only
will the storm affect this year’s rice crop that threatens food security
47
 nation-wide, but it has destroyed infrastructure and other assets such
as housing and schools, that will require a large-scale reconstruction
effort. Typically in other countries that have experienced similar disas-
ters, such as Indonesia, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh in recent years, the
international community not only provides humanitarian aid, but also
rehabilitation assistance and financing. The World Bank and Asian De-
velopment Bank would normally take the lead in preparing reconstruc-
tion programs and funding them, but both have been out of business
in Myanmar/Burma since 1988 and are not presently positioned to play
their normal emergency role. Efforts by ASEAN and the UN to build a
linkage between humanitarian aid and economic reconstruction sup-
port are important steps that should be exploited to rebuild a working
relationship of the development banks with the Myanmar/Burma gov-
ernment. There is also a high likelihood that the impact of the cyclone
on agricultural production this year will add to inflationary forces that
are already high in the economy that will require careful macroeconom-
ic management and rethinking of expenditure priorities in the govern-
ment budget and use of foreign exchange reserves. It is important that
the IMF also respond to the crisis by providing advice and if needed
also stabilization assistance. The humanitarian crisis thus provides an
opportunity for the international community to gain entry to a new
framework for economic engagement.
The movement towards adoption of a new Constitution and fu-
ture civilianized economic management also provides an opening for
dialogue with the international community on future economic policy
options, as well as a rationale for supporting capacity building in eco-
nomic policy analysis and management. The earlier studies on poverty
and economic development potential by the World Bank and Asian
Development Bank, and the largely unnoticed support of the UNDP
and other UN agencies, as well as NGOS in conducting household and
other surveys in recent years, provide a starting point for updating and
putting future policy discussions in the context of implementing a new
Constitution. If the referendum leads to a situation where the country
moves towards formal adoption of a new Constitution and elections,
consideration should be given to the UN and International Financial
Institutions preparing a major report in partnership with the transitio-
nal government authorities on the economic policy and management
issues that will need to be addressed. This should involve not only atten-
tion to questions of macroeconomic policy and management, but also
the restructuring of fiscal relations and responsibilities between central
and local governments. Such a report should also address external deve-
lopments that will affect the domestic situation, including the implica-
Future Policy Options for Multilateral Engagement with Myanmar/Burma
48
tions of rising food and energy prices throughout the Asia Region and
globally. The potential for mapping out an agenda of practical measures
to be prepared in parallel with the preparation for elections provides an
unprecedented opportunity for the international community to influ-
ence constructively the management of Myanmar/Burma’s economic
challenges and opportunities over the coming decade.
During a transition period before elections, a number of other steps
could be taken by the multilateral organizations to help prepare the coun-
try for a new era of economic governance. One is to provide technical
assistance for upgrading statistical systems needed for policy analysis
and program management, and for adopting critically needed reforms
in exchange rate management and improvements in the banking sys-
tem, building on recommendations from IMF Article IV Consultations.
Another is to prepare building blocks for a future Poverty Reduction
Strategy Paper (PRSP) that would be the centerpiece for a multi-donor
support program for a new government. Any PRSP would be based on
the OECD/DAC Principles of Development Effectiveness in applying the
lessons of global experience to the Myanmar context, and would have
to be prepared in a collaborative way with the transitional and future
elected governments. UNDP, the World Bank and Asian Development
Bank would need to work out a division of labor and partnerships with a
core group of bilateral donors to undertake with the government a series
of activities that would lead to the preparation of the PRSP. These could
include updating of the Poverty Assessment prepared by the World Bank
in 1999 with more recent household survey data that would also enable
more decentralized assessments to help the formulation of policies at the
local as well as national levels of future government. Also useful would be
a Public Expenditure Review to examine future policy options in resource
allocation, and a review of external debt to examine how Myanmar/
Burma could use its growing balance of payments surpluses to overcome
arrears to the World Bank and Asian Development Bank as well as to
bilateral donors in order to clear the way for future large-scale economic
development assistance programs.
Long-Term Strategic National Interests
It is often noted with disappointment that Myanmar/Burma entered its
post-colonial era amid high expectations that it would take its place in
the community of nations and realize its considerable potential for eco-
nomic development, but the story did not turn out that way. Myanmar/
Burma was an early proponent of the new international order esta-
blished after World War II, joining the United Nations, International
49
 Monetary Fund and World Bank under the view that membership in
international organizations would serve to protect the interests of smal-
ler states from hegemonic actions of powerful ones, a position which
was quite understandable given its brutal victimization during the
war. What was not appreciated at the time was how much Myanmar/
Burma’s ability to pursue its own long-term strategic interests would be
overshadowed by internal conflicts, mismanagement, and anti-foreign
sentiment in the military leadership.
In the debates over Myanmar/Burma policy in recent decades, there
has in fact been little discussion of what exactly the country’s long-term
strategic interests are. To some extent, these seem to be taken for gran-
ted, and the debates have focused on alternative visions and policies
about how to achieve specific objectives that are articulated differently
by various stakeholders. To a large extent, the purpose of a national
Constitution building process is precisely to articulate and debate those
long-term national goals and interests and to define the governance
framework that would help secure them. The absence in Myanmar/
Burma of such an open discussion in the framing of the principles for
the Constitution now tabled for referendum is one major reason why its
legitimacy is being questioned inside and outside the country.
One potentially productive strategy for future UN dialogue and
mediation efforts would be to focus on the articulation and rationale for
these long-term strategic interests and how the international commu-
nity can support the country in its efforts to pursue them. This is one
way that issues surrounding relations with China, India and Thailand,
for example, could be discussed neutrally in relation to issues pertinent
to relations with ASEAN and with the US and Europe. To the extent that
such conversations might yield understandings of common ground,
they could build confidence for pursuing cooperation and receptivity
to international support. Such a macro framework enabled by a focus
on long-term strategic national interests may in fact be essential for
the UN to be able to move beyond a mediation orientation to a broad-
based role in facilitating coordinated changes in the political, security
and economic arenas. It may also be essential for more convergence of
understanding and policy towards Myanmar/Burma within the interna-
tional community at large.
Policy Choices for Future Multilateral Engagement
There are ample reasons, indeed a compelling need, to re-think future
policies for UN and other multilateral engagement with Myanmar/
Burma. In the very short-term, the priority will be on the internatio-
Future Policy Options for Multilateral Engagement with Myanmar/Burma
50
nal response to cyclone Nagris and its impact on both the victims on
the delta area and the economy more generally. Beyond this, another
short-term priority will be for the UN, either in a Security Council reso-
lution or through the Secretary General’s Special Assistant, to address
government’s handling of the referendum on the new Constitution so
that a process for moving forward is determined that is accepted as
legitimate enough for the international community to be willing to be
supportive. If the referendum succeeds in gaining general acceptance
of the new Constitution, then the international community will need
to adjust the mandate of the Special Advisor and consider other forms
of multilateral engagement that will align with the Constitutional pro-
cess to address institutional and policy changes that will be necessary
as this process unfolds. If the referendum fails to gain general public
acceptance of the new Constitution, then continuing and expanding a
mediation role for the Special Advisor should be considered to bring the
Constitutional process back on track in a way that would be considered
legitimate internally and externally.
Beyond the short-term issues of the response to the cyclone and
acceptability of the referendum on the Constitution, the basic choice
for the international community is whether to: (a) realign, amplify and
diversify multilateral engagement; (b) maintain the status quo with mi-
nor adjustments in the mandate of the Special Advisor and expectations
for the Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator functions, along with
efforts to address challenges in delivering humanitarian support; or (c)
curtail the mandate and activities of the Special Advisor pending further
ratcheting-up of sanctions against Myanmar/Burma by like-minded
countries, and with or without the support of the Security Council,
while seeking at the same time to increase and realign humanitarian
assistance to offset negative effects of sanctions on the people.
Despite pro-sanctions sentiments that are strongly held by many in
the overseas Burmese community and prevalent in the US and Europe,
most of Asia seems determined to remain engaged and to support the
seven step process for democracy in Myanmar/Burma, with minimal
involvement in trying to influence the internal political affairs of the
country. Thailand, China and India have all made it clear they will conti-
nue to pursue their own economic interests in relations with Myanmar,
which effectively undermines the economic sanctions policies of the
US and Europe. It is quite possible that the recently imposed “smart”
sanctions by the US that target firms and individuals with close asso-
ciation with senior military leaders and their families will have some
impact on the fortunes of the military elite. But this is more likely to be
an irritant than a death blow to the regime. Thus the option of UN re-
51
 trenchment and disengagement seems not to be a realistic one, despite
the anger and disgust felt towards the Myanmar/Burma government in
many quarters.
Maintaining the status quo is also not a choice that is widely suppor-
ted at the present moment. Whether pro-sanctions or pro-engagement,
the supporters of UN involvement believe that the status quo is not
working and that UN influence has been regressing.
Thus, logic in assessing the present political realities in the interna-
tional community, as well as in evaluating factors internal to the coun-
try that should be considered for effective multilateral involvement,
points towards a strategy of realigning future multilateral engagement,
amplifying its impact, and diversifying the areas for international invol-
vement.
It is important in designing a new policy for multilateral engage-
ment with Myanmar/Burma that this be based on pragmatism, not
ideology (Guo and Alvin, 2007). Any new policy should also reflect the
principles for good international engagement in fragile states drafted
by OECD in 2005 and adopted in 2007. Among these principles, ones
that are particularly important for new policies for Myanmar/Burma
include:
• Take context as the starting point.
• Ensure all activities do no harm.
• Focus on state-building as the central objective.
• Recognize the links between the political, security, and deve-
lopment objectives.
• Promote non-discrimination as a basis for inclusive and stable
societies.
• Align with local priorities in different ways in different con-
texts.
• Agree on practical coordination mechanisms between interna-
tional actors.
• Avoid pockets of exclusion.
The International Crisis Group (ICG) in its report “Burma/Myanmar:
After the Crackdown” issued in January 2008, provided a number of de-
tailed recommendations directed to the international community, UN
Secretary-General, regional countries, and western countries (including
Japan). While these were formulated prior to the announcement of the
Constitutional referendum and timetable for elections, they do reflect
these principles of realignment, amplification and diversification. Whi-
le many of these proposals are well-founded and worth pursuing, there
Future Policy Options for Multilateral Engagement with Myanmar/Burma
52
is a need to integrate into the thinking about possible future policy
options, deeper understandings of both the historical context and the
present realities on the ground, as well as how to relate to the Constitu-
tional process that is now moving ahead.
Recommendations
1. The time has come for a fundamental realignment of UN promotion
of national reconciliation and democracy from mediating between the
military leadership and the NLD leadership with the focus on dialogue
with Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, to support for the democratic transition
to a new Constitution in the context of historical realties and long-term
national interests.8 This has multiple dimensions and should involve
not only the UN, but also ASEAN and the international financial in-
stitutions. In such realignment, an important role for the Secretary
General’s Special Assistant would be to perform a mediating role in
promoting dialogue between those major political figures that emerge
through the election process and Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, even if she is
barred from running for office herself9. The political challenge is to find
a way to give her a voice and influence in national discussions of ideals,
aspirations, and standards for governance. As an icon of democratic
principles, she can potentially achieve more long-lasting influence than
as an administrative leader. Equally important will be to find a way to
broach issues related to military reform in the democratic transition.
This is an area where other Asian countries which have experienced
these transitions could take a lead, and where direct military to military
dialogue might be beneficial.
2. There should be a high priority and concerted effort to address
economic policy and management issues as part of the strategy for sup-
porting the democratic transition in addition to dealing with the after-
math and consequences of cyclone Nagris. The chances of success will
be much greater if political and institutional reform can be accompa-
nied by economic growth that improves the lives of the large majority of
the population. This logic should be an integral part of the UN Special
Advisor’s dialogue with all parties. Now is the time to seek major, not
incremental, change in economic policy, starting with a collaborative
study of the economic management implications of implementing a
new Constitution, and organizing collaborative activities for other buil-
ding blocks that could pave the way for a Poverty Reduction Strategy
Paper and future robust multi-donor development assistance program.
A coordinated multilateral effort should be organized to support this
agenda with lead roles for the international financial institutions and
53
 the development organizations of the UN, together with a core group of
bilateral donors. This should be a partner-led process following OECD/
DAC best practice principles starting with the transitional government
and later with the elected government.
Along with this is the need to recognize that decades of international
policies to deny and circumvent the government have contributed to
the present situation in which technical and administrative capacities
are very weak. Also, policy analysis and decision-making processes sty-
mied by bureaucratic fear and the command mentality of the military
leadership need to be modernized as the government is civilianized. To
support these, technical assistance and education and training should
be given high priority by the international community, and coordinated
programs should be developed to build future capabilities both among
government officials and through the universities. An important di-
mension of capacity building should be to work out arrangements
under which talented and experienced overseas Myanmar/Burmese
can be repatriated so they may contribute to national development as
participants in the democratic transition. Expanding opportunities for
students to access overseas education, and tapping their future poten-
tial should also be accorded high priority.
3. Recognizing the scale of the humanitarian needs in the wake
of cyclone Nagris as well as the complexities of the challenges in the
ethnic minority traditional homeland areas, a new UN Humanitarian
Coordinator should be given a prominent role and a multi-faceted man-
date to facilitate international engagement with the diverse local level
situations and issues in different parts of the country, as well as with the
multiplicity of cross-border issues. The donor community should signi-
ficantly expand resources for this agenda. Humanitarian work should
be managed separately from but coordinated with political, human
rights and economic reform dialogue and preparations for longer-term
development activities.
4. The Human Rights Rapporteur should continue to monitor and
report on human rights issues and advocate ways to address them. This
should be independent of management of other UN mandates, but also
be an integral part of the dialogue between the government and major
domestic stakeholders with the international community on how best
to respond to these issues. As international access and involvement in
local level issues increases, it should be expected that the human rights
agenda will become more diverse and locally contextual and less natio-
nal in scope.
5. Overall coherence of multilateral engagement with Myanmar/
Burma during the democratic transition should be provided through a
Future Policy Options for Multilateral Engagement with Myanmar/Burma
54
high level consultation group. This group should meet on an occasio-
nal basis to review progress in all the main theaters of engagement in
relation to the objectives of the transitional and elected governments,
viewpoints of other major stakeholders, and OECD principles for good
international engagement.
May 18, 2008
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Babson, Bradley O. (2005) “Macroeconomic Policy Dialogue with Myanmar: Challenges
and Opportunities.” Presentation at European Commission Burma Day 2005 Confe-
rence. http://burmalibrary.org/docs3/Burma_Day-BradBabson.doc.
Callahan, Mary P. (2003) Making Enemies: War and State Building in Burma. Cornell
University Press. Ithaca and London.
Callahan, Mary P. (2007). Political Authority in Burma’s Ethnic Minority States: Devolution,
Occupation, and Coexistence. East-West Center Washington. Washington DC.
Clapp, Priscilla P. (2007) Building Democracy in Burma. Working Paper-02. United States
Institute for Peace. Washington DC.
Guo, Xiaolin, and Alvin, John. (2007) Engaging with the Issue of Myanmar: A New Perspec-
tive. Policy Paper. Institute for Security and Development Policy. Stockholm.
International Crisis Group. (2008). Burma/Myanmar After the Crackdown. Asia Report
Number 144. Brussels.
OECD. (2007) Principles for Good International Engagement in Fragile States.
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/43/48/38293448.pdf.
Steinberg, David I. (2001). Burma: The State of Myanmar. Georgetown University Press.
Washington DC.
Steinberg, David I. (2006). Turmoil in Burma: Contested Legitimacies in Myanmar. East-
bridge. Norwalk, CT.
Thant Myint-U. (2006). The River of Lost Footsteps: Histories of Burma. Farrar, Strauss, and
Giroux. New York.
Notes
1 The term “Myanmar/Burma” has been adopted for this paper because it embodies a
fundamental tension within the international community and how it relates to this coun-
try. The UN and other international agencies together with ASEAN, China and Japan all
use the officially adopted name of Myanmar in references to this country. Most Western
governments and expatriate groups use Burma, not wishing to accord legitimacy to the
military government that rejected the outcome of the elections in 1990.
2A good description of the frustrations felt by all sides was given by Ibrahim Gambari in
an interview with the Irrawaddy News Magazine on April 4. 2008.
3 Thant Myint-U in an interview with Reuters Life!, March 5, 2008.
4 Some international NGOs and overseas religious groups have sought to develop rela-
55
 tionships and dialogue with religious groups and leaders on these issues, but these are
very low key and outside the frameworks for official international community engage-
ment.
5From Principles and Practics of Good Humanitarian Donorship, adopted in Stockholm
June 2003.
6
7
Babson (2005) presentation to European Commission Burma Day 2005 Conference.
From the statement issued by the UN Department of Public Information on the Special
Advisor’s report of the Security Council on March 18, 2008, SC/9278.
8In an interview with the Irrawaddy News Magazine on April 4, 2008 Ibrahim Gambari
made clear that this is the direction that he believes UN dialogue should be taking.
9 Initial assessments of the draft Constitution suggest while she could not serve as Pre-
sident she would be eligible to run for a seat in the national Parliament unless disbarred
for some specific reason.
Future Policy Options for Multilateral Engagement with Myanmar/Burma
56
Promoting Political
Freedoms in Burma:
International Policy Options
Brahma Chellaney
The politicization of international assistance at a time when Burma’s
food bowl, the Irrawaddy Delta, was devastated by a major cyclone in
May 2008 helped underscore the plight of ordinary Burmese. Indeed,
the month of May began with U.S. President George W. Bush announc-
ing yet more sanctions against Burma. Less than 36 hours later, Cyclone
Nargis, with winds up to 190 kmph, left a vast trail of death and destruc-
tion in Burma. Tragedy, then, has come to symbolize Burma in the year
marking its 60th anniversary as an independent nation.
Such is the politics of food aid that Western governments and out-
side relief agencies insisted on the right to deliver assistance directly
to the homeless and hungry in Burma following the cyclone. But the
regime there, fearful that such deliveries might be intended to incite a
popular uprising immediately before a new Constitution was to be put
to vote, blocked the large-scale entry of foreign aid workers. Calls for
forcible humanitarian intervention by French Foreign Minister Bernard
Kouchner and others made the junta’s hackles rise.
The regime postponed the Constitutional referendum in the cy-
clone-racked areas until May 24, 2008, but held the balloting on sched-
ule elsewhere on May 10. The referendum was part of a touted seven-
step “roadmap to democracy.” With the military ensconced in power
for 46 long years, few believe the junta will hand over power to civilians
after promised elections in two years’ time. It took the military more
than 14 years just to draft a new Constitution,1 which grants wide-rang-
ing powers and prerogatives to the military, including 25 percent of the
seats in the federal and provincial legislatures.
While slapping more sanctions on Burma, President Bush denoun-
ced the Constitutional process as fatally flawed. The latest sanctions were
targeted at state-owned companies that produce timber, pearls and preci-
ous gem — firms that are, in Bush’s words, “major sources of funds that
prop up the junta.”2 The United States earlier had imposed sanctions on
companies controlled by private individuals in the airline and hotel busi-
nesses in an effort to smother foreign tourism flow to Burma.
57
 On the one hand, impoverished Burma is economically vulnerable
and thus seemingly susceptible to outside pressure. On the other hand,
Burma has proven to be a complex and exceedingly difficult case for the
outside world to deal with.
However, the issue of the role that external actors might play in
promoting democratic transition is not limited to Burma. Autocratic
rule abounds in the world, including the world around Burma. Interna-
tional principles and policies deemed appropriate to help bring about
democratic transition in Burma should ideally be such that they permit
application in other settings, if the promotion of democracy is not to be
seen as a political tool to target bad autocracies while shielding those
good autocracies perceived to serve one’s own self-interest.
Yet the temptation to look at Burma in isolation, as if it uniquely
exists in a tight compartment, has been so overpowering that the coun-
try has been held to special standards and subjected to unrelenting
demands that are rarely invoked against stronger, more-entrenched
autocracies that still flout near-universal human-rights norms. These
other autocracies, unlike Burma, actually pose a challenge to the liberal
international order. But such selective targeting may be one reason why
international efforts to demilitarize Burma’s polity have been a signal
failure. It is helpful to look at Burma in a larger regional and Asian
context.
Today, a qualitative reordering of power in Asia is challenging stra-
tegic stability and reshaping major equations. A new Great Game is
underway, centered on building new alliances, ensuring power equi-
librium, gaining greater market access, and securing a larger share of
energy and mineral resources. From war-games on the high seas to the
establishment of exploratory enterprises like the Shanghai Coopera-
tion Organization and the Quadrilateral Initiative, the ongoing deve-
lopments are a reminder of that high-stakes game. With the center of
gravity in international relations clearly moving toward the Asia-Pacific,
this Great Game could indeed determine the future world order.
Asia has almost 60 percent of the world’s population spread across a
43.6 million-square-kilometer area. Geographically, Asia comprises 48
separate nations, including 72 percent of the Russian Federation and 97
percent of Turkey, although in popular perception it seems to comprise
only the area from the Japanese archipelago to the Indian subcontinent.
Asia encompasses very different and distinct areas — from the sub-arc-
tic, mineral-rich Siberian plains to the subtropical Indonesian archipe-
lago; and from oil-rich desert lands to fertile river valleys.
Asia is also very diverse. It has countries with the highest and lowest
population densities in the world – Singapore and Mongolia, respec-
Promoting Political Freedoms in Burma: International Policy Options
58
tively. It has some of the wealthiest states in the world, like Japan and
Singapore, and also some of the poorest, such as Burma, North Korea
and Afghanistan. It has tiny Brunei, Bhutan and the Maldives and de-
mographic titans like China, India and Indonesia. The smallest country
in Asia in terms of population, the Maldives, also happens to be the
flattest state in the world. In sharp contrast to the low-lying states like
the Maldives, the Philippines and Bangladesh that are threatened by the
potential rise of ocean levels due to global warming, Asia has mountai-
nous nations like Nepal, Afghanistan and Kyrgyzstan.
Parts of continental Asia are extraordinarily resource-rich. The de-
sert lands of West Asia, the barren wastes of Central Asia, the Russian
shelf in Asia and the Burma’s Bay of Bengal coast together hold nearly
60 per cent of the world’s proven oil and gas reserves. Burma, rich in na-
tural resources, sits on potentially vast quantities of natural gas. There
are vast coal reserves in China and the Russian Far East. Siberia holds
ores of almost all economically valuable metals, including some of the
world’s largest deposits of nickel, gold, lead, molybdenum, diamonds,
silver and zinc. The belt running down from the Malay Peninsula to
Indonesia contains huge deposits of tin.
Asia, however, is largely a water-stressed continent. Large parts of
Asia depend on monsoon precipitation and on the glacially sourced
water reserves of the Himalayas and Tibetan highlands, the riverhead
of Asia’s waters. Climate change will have a significant impact on the
availability and flow of water resources in Asia and thus become an
important factor in the national-security calculus of several states, in-
cluding the world’s two most populous countries — China and India.
The geopolitical importance of the Tibetan plateau, whose forcible ab-
sorption in 1950 brought the new Chinese state to the borders of India,
can be seen from the fact that most of the great Asian rivers originate
there. If the demand for water in Asia continues to grow at the current
rate, the interstate and intrastate disputes over water resources could
potentially turn into conflicts in the years ahead.
Another area of sharpening Asian geopolitics is energy. Competition
over oil and gas resources, driven by rapid economic growth in Asia,
indeed constitutes one key dimension of the emerging Great Game.
The ongoing global shifts in economic power are manifest from the
changes occurring in the energy and materials sectors, with the growth
in demand moving from the developed to the developing world, princi-
pally Asia. Energy prices are going to stay high and volatile for the fore-
seeable future, given these shifts and the soaring demand in countries
like China and India, which together are projected to double their oil
demand between 2003 and 2020.
59
 Despite the total consumption of energy in the Asia-Pacific having
grown by 70 percent between 1992 and 2005, per capita energy
consumption is still relatively low by international standards: 749 kg of
oil equivalent in 2005, compared with the global average of 1,071 kgoe.
Not only will per capita consumption grow sharply in Asia, “on the
supply side, Asia’s strong demand environment for energy and basic
materials, coupled with its low labor costs, means that the region will
increasingly become a global producer of aluminum, chemicals, paper,
and steel.”3
Slaking the tremendous thirst of the fast-growing Asian economies
and meeting the huge demands of the old economic giants in the West
are at the core of the great energy dilemma facing the world in the 21st
century. Finding an energy “fix” has become imperative if the Asian
and other emerging economies are to continue to grow impressively
and if the prosperous countries are to head off a slump. Such a “fix”
would have to be rooted in three essential elements: low-cost, prefera-
bly, renewable alternatives to fossil fuels; greater energy efficiency; and
minimizing or eliminating greenhouse-gas emissions. The ongoing
structural shifts in global energy markets carry important long-term
political and economic implications, besides challenging the stability
of these markets.
Employing their large oil and gas resources, energy-rich countries
have positioned themselves as key players in the Asian Great Game.
Russia, for example, has used its oil and gas exports to revive its for-
tunes, succeeding in becoming an important geopolitical player again.
But for its huge oil and gas wealth, Iran would not have been able to
play its nuclear card in defiance of the United Nations Security Council
resolutions. In a more modest way, Burma has been able to use gas
deals with Thailand and China to earn hard cash in the face of tighte-
ning international sanctions. External players like the United States,
the European Union and Turkey have sought to influence the pipeline
politics in Asia. The United States has not only strengthened its mili-
tary arrangements in West Asia, but also set up new bases or strategic
relationships stretching from the oil-rich Caspian Sea basin to Southe-
ast Asia. In this larger picture, southern Asia (of which Burma is a part)
is a strategic gateway between the Gulf and the Far East, and between
Central Asia and the Indian Ocean rim.
In the coming years, the voracious appetite for energy supplies in
Asia is going to make the geopolitics murkier. The present geopolitical
maneuvering is an indicator of that. What is striking is that the new
flurry of alliance formation or partnerships in Asia is being led by Asia’s
rising powers, not by the United States, which has policed Asia since
Promoting Political Freedoms in Burma: International Policy Options
60
the end of World War II. In this larger context, Asian cooperation and
security will be very much influenced by the equations between and
among the major players. The need to secure stable energy supplies will
drive the major players in Asia to increasingly integrate their energy
policy with foreign policy, as they consciously promote diplomatic stra-
tegies geared toward seizing energy-related opportunities overseas.
Energy-driven competition should not be allowed to aggravate inter-
state rivalries in Asia. Mercantilist efforts to assert control over oil and
natural gas supplies and transport routes certainly risk fuelling ten-
sions. Given the lack of regional institutions in Asia to avert or manage
conflict, the sharpening energy geopolitics makes the need for Asian
energy cooperation more pressing. A challenge for states in Asia is to
manage their energy needs through more efficient transport and con-
sumption and more cooperative import policies. Multinational coopera-
tion on the security of sea-lanes is essential to avert strategic friction in
Asia. Where maritime claims overlap, the answer to any such dispute
cannot be unilateral drilling or production by one side. Disputes over
what are legitimate zones of energy exploration in open seas need to be
managed through an agreed code of conduct.
Multilateral energy cooperation in Asia indeed can pave the way
for establishing a common Asian market and distribution network for
petroleum products, with an Asian benchmark crude oil (similar to
Europe’s Brent blend) to serve as a pricing yardstick for other types of
crude. Multilateral cooperation can also help to both regulate the com-
petition to buy foreign energy assets and to hedge risks in the event of
any supply disruption, whether politically induced or accidental, like a
major refinery fire. And just as Europe wants Russia to open its energy
industry to European investment to create a two-way relationship, the
major oil-and-gas exporters and the major Asian importers should in-
vest in each other’s energy infrastructure.
It is against the larger Asian landscape that one should examine Bur-
ma because no country or sub-region can be tightly compartmentalized
and seen in isolation. Energy-rich states almost everywhere tend to have
non-democratic governments, many of them repressive autocracies. In
that sense, Burma is not an exception.
Even though it has significant gas reserves that are coveted by its
neighbors, a sanctions-hit Burma has not reaped the energy dividends
that most other autocratically ruled energy-rich states have. Also, it is
nobody’s case that Burma’s curtailment of basic rights is worse than
Saudi Arabia’s.
While it is easy to criticize Thailand for boosting the Burmese junta’s
revenues through gas imports and to condemn China for signing a 30-
61
 year gas deal with Burma, it should be remembered that no democracy
has compunction in buying oil from Saudi Arabia, even though such
purchases help fatten the House of Saud, which played a lead role in
fanning the spread of Islamist ideology in the world. It bankrolled jihad
as part of its aggressive export of the medieval theology of Wahhabism,
named after the revivalist movement founded by Muhammad Ibn’Abd
al-Wahhab in 1744.
Burma’s resources and vantage location
Burma is a significant state in size and strategic importance. Bordered
by Bangladesh, China, India, Laos and Thailand and by the Andaman
Sea and the Bay of Bengal, Burma comprises an area of 678,000 square
kilometers, making it the country with the largest landmass in the In-
dochina belt. It currently has a population of nearly 58 million, with a
large and capable workforce.
Few can overlook Burma’s strategic location. It forms the strategic
nucleus between India, China and Southeast Asia. In other words,
Burma is where Asia’s main regions converge — South Asia, Southeast
Asia and East Asia.
Projects to establish an ‘Asian Highway Network’ and a ‘Trans-Asian
Railway’ have only underlined Burma’s strategic-bridge role. It is a
country that geographically bridges Asia’s major economies. In the Asi-
an highway project, Burma will help connect five important countries
– India, China, Bangladesh, Laos, and Thailand. The Asian Develop-
ment Bank has been negotiating a cross-border transport agreement
among the six Mekong River-linked countries – China, Thailand, Laos,
Cambodia, Vietnam and Burma.
Burma’s bounteous natural resources include natural gas, precious
metals and gems, high-quality tropical hardwoods, and marine fish-
eries. Given that profile and position, Burma can hardly be ignored.
With major rivers and bountiful rainfall, Burma has fertile soil.
But for recurrent flooding and cyclones, shortages of fertilizers
and pesticides, and general mismanagement by the military-run
government, its agricultural output could be much higher. Indeed,
agriculture, including fisheries, forestry, livestock, rice and sugarcane,
made up almost 57 percent of Burma’s GDP in 2005.4 In the past
decade, Burma has emerged as a major exporter to India, for instance,
of lentils, which — rich in protein — are an integral part of the diet of
vegetarians. India has the world’s highest concentration of vegetarians.
Last year, Burma supplied around one million tons of lentils, or half of
India’s total imports, according to official data.
Promoting Political Freedoms in Burma: International Policy Options
62
Burma is a significant producer of antimonial lead, copper matte, nick-
el speiss, and precious gemstones. Much of the copper exports go to Japan.
It also produces barite, carbonate rocks, chromite, clays, coal (lignite), cop-
per, feldspar, gold, gypsum, lead, natural gas, nickel, silver, tin, tungsten
and zinc. Among processed mineral products, Burma produces polished
precious gemstones, refined gold, refined lead, petroleum products and
crude steel. Minerals, however, constitute a tiny fraction of its GDP.
With its exports totaling $3.1 billion and imports adding up to $3.5
billion in 2005, Burma’s main trading partners are its neighbors – Thai-
land, China, India, Singapore and Malaysia. In merchandise trade,
Thailand ranks No. 1. But if the opaque arms trade (for which no reli-
able figures are available) and services are included, China is perhaps
Burma’s largest trading partner.
Through sanctions and officially encouraged disengagement,
Burma has become marginal to the foreign-policy interests of the West,
thus reinforcing the Western approach emphasizing high-minded
principles over strategic considerations, and isolation over engagement.
Today, the West has little financial stake left in Burma. About 95 percent
of Burma’s trade in fiscal 2007-08 was with other Asian countries. The
West also doesn’t have to live with the consequences of its actions.
Burma’s neighbors, however, will not escape the effects of an unstable
Burma. The imperatives of proximity thus dictate a different policy
logic. That has spurred criticism that Asia is helping Burma beat
sanctions.5
Rich in natural gas, Burma – according to one estimate by
Alexander’s Gas & Oil Connections (a site for the gas, oil and affiliated
industry) – has recoverable onshore and offshore reserves of 2.46 tril-
lion cubic meters. But with greater foreign investment in exploration,
more rich gas deposits could be discovered, especially in Burma’s off-
shore areas in the Bay of Bengal.
In January 2008, the state-owned China National Petroleum Corp
(CNPC) signed production-sharing contracts with the Burmese Ministry
of Energy covering deep-sea blocks off Burma’s western Rakhine coast.
CNPC is about to begin construction of a trans-Burma pipeline to take
the gas from the Shwe field in Rakhine to China’s Yunnan province and
beyond. Burma is already exporting natural gas worth $1.2 billion a year
to neighboring Thailand from the Gulf of Martaban.
Daewoo International, the South Korean company, is the largest
investor in the Shwe gas site. Two Indian energy firms, ONGC Videsh
Ltd. and Gas Authority of India Ltd. (GAIL), own a minority stake in
that Burmese field, A-1, and in the adjacent A-3 block. This Indo-Korean
consortium of Daewoo, ONGC Videsh and GAIL had earlier discovered
63
 additional gas deposits in the Shwe site, and consequently revised the
Block A1’s total gas estimates to 566 billion cubic meters.
Burma, however, took India unawares by signing an accord with
CNPC to export gas to China from the A-1 and A-3 fields over a 30-year
period. To New Delhi’s acute embarrassment, Burma first disclosed its
intent to sell the gas to China no sooner than India had announced an
agreement-in-principle with Beijing to jointly cooperate on securing
energy resources overseas, so as to prevent the Sino-Indian competition
from continuing to drive up the international price of such assets in
third countries.
In recent years, Burma has stepped up piped gas exports to Thailand
from its two offshore fields in the Gulf of Martaban — Yadana and
Yetagun. But the new rich gas finds in the Bay of Bengal will help
generate far more revenue for Burma than the current gas flow from
the Gulf of Martaban. According to provisional data, gas exports to
Thailand from the Gulf of Martaban fields were estimated to be worth
$1.2 billion in fiscal 2007-08 that ended March 31. But because the
official exchange rate pegs the kyat, Burma’s currency, to an artificially
low rate of 6 to 1 against the U.S. dollar (when the black-market rate is
in the vicinity of nearly 1,000 kyat to a dollar), the gas-export earnings
are much underreported in the public accounts in kyat — nearly 200
times below the unofficial exchange rate.6
France’s Total S.A. (with a 31.24 percent holding) is the main ope-
rator at the Yadana gasfield, and its other partners are Chevron Corp.
of USA (with a 28.26 percent stake), Thailand’s PTT Exploration and
Production Public Company Limited (25.5 percent), and the state-run
Myanmar Oil and Gas Enterprise (MOGE) (15 percent).
In the Yetagun gasfield, the main operator is Malaysia’s Petronas
(40.91 percent), with MOGE (20.45 percent) and Thailand’s PTTEP and
Japan’s Nippon Oil Exploration (19.32 percent each) as its partners. Gas
imports from Burma are critical to Thailand’s power generation, with
one-fifth of Bangkok’s electricity supply coming from that source.
Interestingly, the United States, while prohibiting new investment
by American citizens or entities, has protected the business interests
of Chevron Corp., which acquired a stake in the Yadana gas project in
Burma when it bought Unocal Corp. in 2005. Because Unocal’s invest-
ment in the project predated the imposition of U.S. sanctions, Chevron
has used a grandfather clause to stay put in Burma — one of the few
large Western companies left there.
On the gas front, Burma has shown that interstate pipeline politics
can be played not only by strong states but also by weak states. The junta
in Burma has deftly played pipeline politics to keep the veto-empowered
Promoting Political Freedoms in Burma: International Policy Options
64
China on its side at the United Nations Security Council. Since the early
1990s, the junta has relied on China’s veto power to shield itself from
international intervention. It was China that helped beat back an early
2007 U.S.-led attempt to impose a Security Council diktat on the junta
to improve its human-rights record.7
The junta then proceeded to thank Beijing for torpedoing that sanc-
tions move by withdrawing the status of India’s GAIL as the “preferen-
tial buyer” on the A-1 and A-3 blocks, and signing production-sharing
contracts with China’s CNPC instead. For India, this was a discom-
forting diplomatic setback for two reasons: (i) it had sought to sweeten
the deal both with a US$20 million “soft credit” and by proposing to
construct a power plant in Burma; and (ii) the A-1 and A-3 are partly
owned by two Indian state-run companies.8
Burma also has some onshore and offshore oilfields, with reserves
estimated to be 3.2 billion barrels of recoverable crude oil. It produced
8.133 million barrels of crude oil in 2005, compared with 7.160 mil-
lion barrels in 2004.9 At least three oil companies from neighboring
countries, including India’s privately owned Essar, are presently explo-
ring for additional oil finds in Burma by conducting feasibility studies
involving collection and analysis of geologic and seismic data.
Foreign investment in Burma’s energy sector, however, has not been
too significant compared to the sector’s actual potential. Had Burma
not been an isolated, sanctions-hit country, the picture would have been
different, with international oil majors seeking exploration and produc-
tion rights there. Sanctions have actually prevented Burma (like Iran)
from accessing liquefaction technology to become a major exporter
of liquefied natural gas (LNG). That has left Burma largely with one
choice: to export natural gas by pipeline. And to whom can it sell natural
gas by pipeline? Naturally, to its immediate neighbors, as it is currently
doing to Thailand and is going to do to China once the new pipeline is
complete. India till date has failed to secure a single production-sharing
contract to buy Burmese gas.
Burma’s vantage location has also added its energy-related impor-
tance in a different way — at least for China. In addition to importing
Burmese gas, China is setting up an energy corridor through Burma in-
volving an oil pipeline to transship crude oil it imports from the Middle
East and Africa. In other words, Burma is both a source of energy as
well as a transshipment route for China. China presently is finalizing
technical details for the construction of the oil pipeline, which — run-
ning the length of Burma — will go at least up to Chongqing, a new
province carved out of Sichuan, according to one report.10
This energy pipeline is part of a strategic corridor — the Irrawaddy
65
 Corridor — that China is setting up to link its southwestern provinces
with the Bay of Bengal and the Indian Ocean through Burma. The cor-
ridor establishes road, river, rail and energy links from China’s Yunnan
and Chongqing provinces to Burma’s Chinese-built harbors at Kyauky-
pu and Thilawa. Along with Beijing’s onshore and offshore strategic
assets in Burma, this corridor signifies an enlarging Chinese footprint
in that country.
The energy pipeline and strategic corridor through Burma need to
be seen in the context of the other Chinese moves and actions in south-
ern Asia that have far-reaching strategic implications for India, Japan,
the United States, Australia and other players in the Indian Ocean
rim region. Besides the intent to transfer Gulf and African oil for its
consumption by cutting the transportation distance and minimizing
its exposure to U.S.-policed sea-lanes, China has important strategic
objectives in mind in fashioning new transportation routes.11 A fourfold
Chinese strategy is currently being implemented:
1. The north-south strategic trail that the Irrawaddy Corridor
represents, granting China access to the Bay of Bengal and the
Indian Ocean.
2. A second strategic corridor in a north-south axis being fashio-
ned in southern Asia is the trans-Karakoram corridor stretching
from western China down to Pakistan’s new, Chinese-built
Gwadar port, at the entrance to the Strait of Hormuz, through
which 40 percent of the world’s oil supply passes. Opened in
the spring of 2007, the deepwater port at Gwadar represents
China’s first strategic foothold in the Arabian Sea. China’s plan
is to make Gwadar a major hub transporting Gulf and African
oil by pipeline to the Chinese heartland via Xinjiang. Such pi-
ped oil would not only cut freight costs and supply time but also
lower China’s reliance on shipping lanes through the Malacca
and Taiwan Straits. Pakistan has already signed a memoran-
dum of understanding with Beijing for “studies to build the
energy corridor to China.”
3. China is shoring up an east-west strategic corridor in Tibet
across India’s northern frontiers, as illustrated by the $6.2 bil-
lion China-Tibet railway from Gormu to Lhasa that opened in
July 2006. Beijing is now extending the Tibetan railway to the
Nepalese capital of Katmandu and also to two other points: the
tri-junction of the India-Bhutan-Tibet frontiers (in the Chumbi
Valley) and the intersection of the India-Burma-Tibet borders.
4. China’s incremental efforts to build a “string of pearls” along
Promoting Political Freedoms in Burma: International Policy Options
66
the Indian Ocean rim symbolize Beijing’s desire for a fourth
strategic corridor. It seeks to assemble this “string of pearls”
— a term first used in a report for the Pentagon by U.S. defense
contractor Booz Allen Hamilton — through forward listening
posts, naval-access agreements and Chinese-built harbors stret-
ching from Pakistan and Sri Lanka to Bangladesh and Burma.
The Chinese interest in the Indian Ocean rim now extends to
the Seychelles.
For China, Burma is a critical entryway to the Bay of Bengal and the
Indian Ocean. Chinese strategic positioning in Burma also needs to
be seen against the backdrop of Burma overlooking vital sea lanes of
communication through the Strait of Malacca. Not unsurprisingly,
the Irrawaddy Corridor has brought Chinese security personnel to
Burmese sites close both to India’s eastern strategic assets and to
the Strait of Malacca. With the Irrawaddy Corridor stretching to the
Bay of Bengal, Chinese security agencies have positioned person-
nel at several Burmese coastal points, including the Chinese-built
harbors.
These security agencies already operate electronic-intelligence
and maritime-reconnaissance facilities on the two Coco Islands
in the Bay of Bengal. India transferred the Coco Islands to Burma
in the 1950s, and Burma then leased the islands to China in 1994.
Today, despite denials by the Burmese junta, there is documented
evidence, including satellite imagery, showing that China operates a
signals intelligence (SIGINT) collection facility from the Great Coco
Island.
The Irrawaddy Corridor holds important strategic implications for
several players in the Indian Ocean rim region. Such transportation and
strategic links, for example, give China leeway to strategically meddle
in India’s restive northeast, including the state of Arunachal Pradesh,
which China claims to be Chinese territory. Operating in India’s north-
east through the plains of Burma (which was part of the British Indian
empire) is much easier than having to operate across the mighty Hi-
malayas.12 It is no wonder that during World War II, both the Allied
and the Axis powers classified Burma as the “back door to India.” The
potential for Chinese strategic interference has to be viewed against the
background that the tribal insurgencies in India’s northeast were all
instigated by Maoist China, which trained and armed these rebels partly
by exploiting the Burma route. Today, India has an 850-kilometer-long
porous border with Burma, with insurgents operating on both sides
with the help of shared ethnicity.13
67
 Understanding international options
Promotion of democracy in Burma is a justifiable goal because that
ethnically fractious country cannot indefinitely be held together by
brute force. The empowerment of its masses is imperative to create a
grassroots stake in Burma’s unity and territorial integrity. Genuine par-
ticipatory processes are also necessary to promote ethnic reconciliation
in a country internally scarred from long years of sectarian strife.
Yet, even among those who share this goal, one sees an interesting,
even if nuanced, split: Europeans and Americans tend to emphasize
the primacy of principles over strategic considerations, while Asians
seem to favor engagement and a softer approach. To be sure, there is
no common Asian approach. Differences over Burma are subtle yet
eye-catching among the Asian players, with some states (like India and
Japan) gently pushing the junta toward political reconciliation and de-
mocratic opening, and some others (such as China) viewing democracy
advocacy by the West as national-interest promotion by other means.
Still, the imperatives of proximity impel states in the neighborhood not
to rely on an approach centered on penal action against and the isola-
tion of Burma. Similarly, the U.S. and the European Union have far
from a common approach. The U.S., under President George W. Bush,
has moved to a sanctions-only approach toward Burma, while the EU,
despite widening its own sanctions since last year, is keen to keep open
channels of dialogue and humanitarian assistance.
Distance from Burma has been a crucial factor in determining major
players’ approach toward that country. The greater a state’s geographical
distance from Burma, the more ready for action it has been on Burma.
And the shorter a state’s distance from Burma, the greater the caution
and tact in its policy.
Burma’s present problems (and impoverishment) can be traced back
to the politically cataclysmic events of 1962, when the military under
General Ne Win ousted an elected government and thereafter sought to
introduce autarky by cutting off the country from the rest of the world.
If Burma has gone from being Asia’s rice bowl to becoming a virtual
pauper state, the blame has to fall on the 1962 coup and what it introdu-
ced. Ne Win, a devotee of Marx and Stalin, banned most external trade
and investment, nationalized companies, halted all foreign projects and
tourism, and kicked out expatriates engaged in business. Yet the West,
not unhappy that the military had ousted a founding leader of the non-
alignment movement, Prime Minister U Nu, imposed no sanctions on
Burma. Over the subsequent years, Ne Win fashioned a virtual one-
man dictatorship under his authority.
Promoting Political Freedoms in Burma: International Policy Options
68
More than a quarter-century later, even the bloodbath of 1998 that
left several thousand student-led demonstrators dead or injured did
not invite Western sanctions. That bloodbath coincided with the nume-
rology-dedicated Ne Win’s public announcement of retirement on the
‘most auspicious’ day of August 8, 1988 (8.8.88). Time will tell whether
China, also addicted to the power of number 8, is courting trouble 20
years later by launching the Beijing Olympics on 8.8.08 at 8.08 am. In
Burma, for the democratic opposition, 8.8.88 symbolized the launch of
the democracy movement. Its 20th anniversary thus will be commemo-
rated on the same day the Beijing Olympics kick off with an opening
ceremony that some world leaders are threatening to boycott over the
brutal repression in Tibet.
In fact, the events of 1988 triggered a stronger response from India
and Japan than from the West. India, with missionary zeal, began cut-
ting off all contact with the junta in the post-1988 period and started
giving sanctuary to Burmese dissidents. Such righteous activism,
heightened by the junta’s subsequent July 1989 detention of Burmese
opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi, who has had close ties with India
since her student days,14 however, cost India dear. By the mid-1990s,
China had strategically penetrated Burma, opening a new flank against
India. The sobering lessons from a decade of foreign-policy activism
on Burma post-1988 has helped instill greater geopolitical activism in
India’s approach in recent years.
Japan, for its part, suspended its Overseas Development Assistance
to Burma, following the 1988 developments. And when in 1992 Japan
adopted an ODA charter espousing human rights and democracy, that
provision was first invoked against Burma to slash ODA. Since then,
Japanese ODA has been limited largely to humanitarian and technical
assistance. While Japanese ODA to Burma had averaged $154.8 million
a year during the period 1978-88, it has fallen to an average of $36.7
million a year between 1996 and 2005, according to official Japanese
figures. With China eclipsing Japan as the largest aid provider, Tokyo
has seen its traditional influence in Burma wane.
The military has been in power in Burma for 46 long years.15 But the
Western penal approach toward Burma began shaping up only in the
1990s. In fact, it was not until this decade that Burma became a major
target of U.S. sanctions, reflected in the congressional passage of the
2003 Burma Freedom and Democracy Act and the enforcement of seve-
ral subsequent punitive executive orders dating up to May 1, 2008.16
Some U.S. measures put in place against the junta before 2003 in-
cluded a ban on new investment and an American veto on any proposed
loan or assistance by international financial institutions. That ban on
69
 new U.S. investments was imposed as far back as 1997 — the same
year the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) admitted
Burma as a member. The Clinton administration could take that deci-
sion in 1997 because at that time the United States had minimal trade
with Burma and a total investment of only $225 million.17 Apart from
Burma’s opium produce having a bearing on U.S. counternarcotics
policy, that country was not a serious foreign-policy concern in Wash-
ington.
Indeed, until the advent of the Bush administration, Burma was not
among the key targets of sanctions, with the broadest U.S. sanctions be-
ing directed at countries identified as supporting terrorism: Cuba, Iran,
Libya, North Korea, Syria and Sudan. In a September 1998 report to
the U.S. House of Representatives, for example, the U.S. International
Trade Commission (USITC) had identified 142 provisions in 42 federal
laws applying unilateral economic sanctions against some countries.
Some of the provisions were directed against Burma, but that country
wasn’t among the key U.S. targets.18
Even though there was considerable evidence throughout the 1990s
that the unilateral sanctions approach introduced by the Clinton ad-
ministration wasn’t helping to loosen the military’s grip on Burma,19
the U.S. considerably broadened its penal actions in this decade under
Bush. The bilateral and multilateral measures mandated by the 2003
Burma Freedom and Democracy Act20 have led to the U.S. imposition
of a ban on all imports from that country, combined with an array of
other sanctions. However, as the State Department has admitted, the
U.S. “import ban implemented in 2003 would be far more effective if
countries importing Burma’s high-value exports (such as natural gas
and timber) … would join us in our actions.”21
While a number of nations have slapped sanctions on Burma, espe-
cially after the brutal way the September 2007 monk-led protests were
suppressed, the blunt fact is that no nation thus far has emulated the
extent to which United States has gone in imposing penal actions. In
fact, the history of U.S. sanctions against Burma since 1997 has follo-
wed a now-familiar pattern in U.S. policy — first imposing an array of
unilateral sanctions against a pariah regime, then discovering that the
sanctions aren’t working and, therefore, turning to allies and partners
to join in the penal campaign, and finally threatening sanctions against
firms from third countries if those nations refuse to toe the U.S. line.
As far as the Burma-related international sanctions are concerned,
their history underscores the manner the penal approach got shaped
not by a cause — bringing an end to the military rule — but by the poli-
tical travails of an iconic personality, Aung San Suu Kyi, the daughter of
Promoting Political Freedoms in Burma: International Policy Options
70
Burma’s founding father, Aung San, the Japanese-trained commander
of the Burmese Independence Army. Suu Kyi, having been accidentally
thrown into the vortex of national politics in autumn 1988,22 has helped
inspire and mold the Western punitive approach toward Burma.
The junta’s detention of her from July 1989 onward and its refusal
to honor the people’s verdict in the May 1990 national elections brought
Suu Kyi to the center of world attention, with she receiving several inter-
national awards in quick succession — the Rafto Human Rights Prize
in October 1990; the European Parliament’s Sakharov Human Rights
Prize in July 1991; and the Nobel Peace Prize in October 1991. A ma-
jor trigger in galvanizing international opinion was clearly the junta’s
brazen refusal to cede power despite the May 1990 national elections,
which gave the detained Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy
(NLD) party 59 percent of the votes but 82 percent of the seats in Par-
liament. By keeping her in detention for nearly 13 of the past 19 years,
the junta has itself contributed to building Suu Kyi as an international
symbol of the Burmese struggle for political freedoms.
The personality-shaped nature of the sanctions approach can also be
explained by the fact that before Suu Kyi, there was no unifying figure
to challenge the military’s domination in all spheres of the state and to
lead a national movement for the restoration of democracy. The Nobel
prize greatly increased her international profile and domestic clout.
Western aid cutoffs and other penal actions thus began only in the pe-
riod after the junta refused to honor the results of the 1990 elections.
How a personality can help shape the sanctions approach was
further underlined by the way Suu Kyi’s personal rapport with U.S. Se-
cretary of State Madeleine Albright helped spur President Bill Clinton
to reluctantly impose a ban in 1997 on new American investments to
develop Burma’s resources. That ban was slapped even though interna-
tional pressure, and the Clinton administration’s own intervention, had
made the junta to release Suu Kyi in July 1995 after six years in house
detention.
Not only has the sanctions approach been personality-driven, but
also a personality hue has been put even on the internal struggle in Bur-
ma. That struggle has been portrayed, simplistically, as a battle between
Aung San Suu Kyi and the junta’s reclusive chairman, General Than
Shwe, a fight between good and evil, and a tussle between the forces of
freedom and the forces of ruthlessness. While such a portrayal is useful
to draw international attention to a remote country that is peripheral
to the interests of all except its neighbors, it helps obscure the complex
and multifaceted realities on the ground.
Despite Suu Kyi’s central role in shining a constant international
71
 spotlight for 19 years on the military’s repressive and illegitimate rule,
the grim reality is that years of tightening sanctions against Burma
haven’t helped loosen the military’s vise on polity and society. If anything,
the sanctions have only worsened the plight of ordinary Burmese. Far
from the people gaining political freedoms, an again-detained Suu
Kyi’s personal freedom has remained an outstanding issue. While
the ordinary Burmese have been the main losers, the international
approach has proven a strategic boon for China, creating much-desired
space for it to expand its interests in and leverage over Burma. That has
happened largely at the expense of the interests of democratic states,
which, in any event, have continued to pursue varying, and at times
conflicting, policies on Burma. Against this background, what should
be a realistic, yet productive, approach toward Burma?
Burma now ranks as one of the world’s most isolated and sanctioned
nations — a situation unlikely to be changed by the Constitutional
process and other steps in the junta-touted “roadmap to democracy,”
unless the international community under the U.S. leadership adopts a
fresh approach toward that country.
There has been a proliferation in recent years of indexes developed
by research institutions that seek to rank countries in terms of their
comparative vulnerabilities and weaknesses, including state failure,
repression, corruption and disparities. What is striking about Burma is
that it ranks in all the indexes as among the most corrupt and dysfunc-
tional states. And yet its state machinery seems strong enough to wage
unrelenting political repression and persecution of ethnic minorities.
The annual Failed States Index (FSI) prepared by the independent,
Washington-based group, The Fund for Peace, for example, employs
12 social, economic, political and military indicators to rank 177 states
in order of their vulnerability to violent internal conflict and societal
deterioration. It is based on the capacities of core state institutions to
mitigate adverse trends promoting state instability. The 2007 index
ranks Burma among the top 20 unstable states prone to violent conflict
and societal dysfunction.23 Sudan tops the rankings as the state most
at risk of failure. But four states in southern Asia figure in the top 20
dysfunctional states: Afghanistan at No. 8, Pakistan (No. 12), Burma
(No. 14) and Bangladesh (No. 16). That shows that symptoms of state
failure are acute in this part of the world.
Similarly, the Brookings Institution’s new Index of State Weakness
in the Developing World ranks Burma as the 17th weakest state among
the 141 countries it assessed, with Somalia, at the No. 1 position, sym-
bolizing an utterly failed state and the Slovak Republic (at the top of
Promoting Political Freedoms in Burma: International Policy Options
72
the ladder, No. 141) representing a successful democracy.24 Burma
was identified as one of five critically weak states outside sub-Saharan
Africa.
In the World Press Freedom Index, 25 Burma ranks No. 163 in the
167-nation list. Without freedom of expression, no process of democ-
ratization can begin. Burma’s leaders are not just autocrats; like other
repressive rulers in Asia, they believe in the indispensability and virtues
of autocracy.
They have used the threat of Balkanization to justify their strangle-
hold on politics. The military sees itself as the only institution that can
keep Burma united. Preventing the splintering of the country, however,
has come at a heavy price. It was the military’s autarkic policies and
gross economic mismanagement post-1962 that spurred widespread
poverty and the flight of capital from the country.
According to Transparency International, Burma and Somalia are
on par as the most corrupt countries in the world.26 The Berlin-based
Transparency International, as part of its annual survey of corruption
(which it defines as the abuse of public office for private gain), publishes
an index of countries ranked from the least corrupt to the most corrupt,
on a scale of 10 to 0, with 10 representing no corruption and 0 signifying
total sleaze and bribery. Its 2007 Corruption Perceptions Index brings
out the growing problem of corruption in Asia. Among the most corrupt
states in the index was Burma’s neighbor, Bangladesh. That the poorest
states of Asia like Bangladesh and Burma are also the most corrupt only
shows that corruption is both a cause of poverty as well as a hindrance to
the amelioration of the conditions of the impoverished people.
The key point arising from the various indexes is that Burma is a
pretty dysfunctional state with corroding institutions and an oversi-
zed military that dominates all spheres of national activity. Since the
September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks in the United States, it has been
increasingly recognized that the threats to international peace and se-
curity now emanate more and more from the world’s weakest states.
Tellingly, two of the world’s critically weak states, North Korea and Pa-
kistan, are members of the nuclear club. It has become routine for the
major players and the United Nations to reiterate their commitment to
pull critically weak nations back from the precipice of state failure.
It is that argument – to stabilize a failing state – that the Bush ad-
ministration has applied to pour some $11 billion as aid since 9/11
into terror-exporting Pakistan, ranked No. 33 in the Brookings’ Index of
State Weakness in the Developing World. Reinforcing that argument, it
is now considering throwing its weight behind Senator Joseph Biden’s
73
 call for a $2.5 billion package of additional nonmilitary aid to improve
the lives of citizens in a country where the military has dominated all
walks of life almost since Pakistan’s creation in 1947.
Can a different logic or argument be applied to Burma, one of the
world’s weakest and most dysfunctional states that potentially poses
a serious transnational security threat unless steps are taken to help
stabilize its economy? Or should the stabilization of a failing state only
begin when that country actually starts posing — like Pakistan — a th-
reat to international security?
It is obvious that the international responses to separate cases of
failing states need not be cut from the same cloth because every nation’s
situation tends to be different from the others. Still, the undeniable fact
is that Burma represents a case of grave state corrosion, with internatio-
nal sanctions having had the effect, however unintended, to lower the
living standards of ordinary Burmese.
Another question relates to the extent to which sanctions should be
employed? Should punitive actions preclude engagement? Without the
Bush administration engaging Pyongyang, to give just one example,
would it have been possible to achieve the progress, however tentative
it might seem at this stage, on the North Korean nuclear program? It is
nobody’s case that Burma is worse than North Korea.
Sanctions by themselves do not usually promote political freedoms
and indeed, by ignoring humanitarian concerns, may help a regime to
instill a sense of victimhood and shore up domestic support. Nor can
just engagement be the answer. The notion that democracy is sure to
follow if a country is integrated with the global economy has been dis-
proved by China. The more economic and military power China has
accumulated, the more sophisticated it has become in repressing at
home, including through electronic surveillance and intimidation.
If freedom is to bloom in more countries, it is imperative to fashion
a more principled, coherent, forward-looking international approach
that objectively calibrates sanctions and engagement, and allows out-
side actors to actively influence developments within.
So what are the international options?
Despite its predatory military elite continuing to monopolize power,
Burma does exhibit severe state weaknesses. Those vulnerabilities
make continued international sanctions against it attractive, in order
that its military is compelled to return to the barracks. Yet, years of sanc-
tions have helped underscore the limits of securing significant results
through punitive pressures alone.
Promoting Political Freedoms in Burma: International Policy Options
74
Options still available to the international community will become
clearer if we clinically assess our successes and failures vis-à-vis Burma
thus far.
•Have economic disengagement from Burma and other puni-
tive actions helped improve human rights in Burma?
•Has outside role helped, directly or indirectly, to improve
the living conditions of the ordinary Burmese or to loosen the
military’s political grip?
•By targeting vital sectors of the Burmese economy, to what
extent have international sanctions helping choke the flow of
funds to the military?
•What objective is served when disengagement blocks the flow
of liberal ideas as well as investment and technology to improve
working conditions?
•As shown in China, doesn’t foreign investment help build pri-
vate institutions, boost employment and wages, aid civil-society
development and exert a pro-reforms influence on a regime?
•Has the sanctions approach helped increase or decrease exter-
nal influence over the Burmese regime?
•Given the waves of sanctions in recent years, what additional
room is left to step up pressure on a recalcitrant junta? Have
most cards already been played out?
•Does the current approach centered on the primacy of sanc-
tions provide the junta a convenient scapegoat for its own gross
mismanagement of the economy?
•By isolating Burma and forcing its regime to turn increasingly
for succor to more-entrenched autocracies, are we promoting a
regional power balance or imbalance?
•To what extent will a weaker, more dysfunctional Burma pose
transnational security threats or cause difficulties in internatio-
nal counternarcotics and counterterrorist efforts?
In addition to our options being shaped by our answers to the aforesaid
questions, there is also one larger issue that needs to be factored in.
International options on Burma not only need to be realistic, but also
be based on principles and positions valid for promotion of a transition
to democracy in other autocratic settings.
What role outsiders can play to help democracy take root remains a
difficult issue internationally. Yet that issue looms large in relation to
75
 Asia. Unlike Europe where democracy has become the norm, only 16 of
Asia’s 39 countries surveyed by Freedom House are really free.27
As shown by the World Press Freedom Index by the Paris-based
international rights group, Reporters Without Borders, a number of
Asian countries are among the worst suppressors of freedom. In the
167-nation list, North Korea ranked at the very bottom, Burma 163rd,
China 159th, Vietnam 158th, Laos and Uzbekistan 155th, Bangladesh
151st, Pakistan 150th, Singapore 140th and the Philippines 139th.28
Bringing in comparative assessments will also help sculpt down-
to-earth international options. Let’s look at one revealing comparative
picture. Until the September 2007 protests in Rangoon and other Bur-
mese cities and the March 2008 Tibetan uprising, Burma and China
had been free of any major pro-freedom protests for about two decades.
The previous major pro-freedom demonstrations occurred in Burma in
1988, and in China in 1989.
In 2007, in a two-month period, fuel price increases were announ-
ced first in Burma and then in China. The junta’s announcement on
August 15, 2007, to double the price of gasoline, diesel fuel and com-
pressed gas hit the ordinary Burmese hard by forcing up the price of
public transport and triggering a knock-on effect on staples such as
rice and cooking oil. That triggered protests, which became bigger by
the day, with monks gradually joining in from early September and the
demonstrations acquiring increasingly a political color as an expres-
sion of the grassroots anger against military rule. So, it was the rise in
energy prices that paradoxically triggered the biggest protests since the
1988 uprising in an energy-rich country.29 By contrast, the fuel price in-
creases in China — announced just eight weeks after Burma — sparked
only a few sporadic incidents of violence, with one person killed in Hai-
nan Island, but spurring no pro-freedom protests.
Why fuel price increases triggered mass protests in one state but
not in the other owes a lot to the fact that China had transformed itself
radically in the past two decades since the Tiananmen Square massacre,
while Burma remains isolated, impoverished and battered by sanctions.
The post-Tiananmen international trade sanctions against China did
not last long on the argument that they were hurting ordinary Chinese
and that engagement was a better way to bring about political change.
That was the correct approach. Had an approach pivoted on widening
punitive actions been pursued, would China have emerged to the same
degree as a dynamic economy that today serves as a growth locomotive
for the world? Through its economic transformation, China has made
its political modernization inescapable, although no one can predict
when and in what form that would happen.
Promoting Political Freedoms in Burma: International Policy Options
76
The same principle, however, was never applied to impoverished
Burma, creating an unhealthy impression that promotion of freedom
has become a diplomatic instrument to target not the world’s biggest
autocracies but weak, unpopular, isolated states.30 Sanctions against a
jihad-bankrolling Saudi Arabia or a Tibet-repressing China would bring
economic pain in the form of higher oil prices or job losses. So “it is the
small or economically vulnerable kids on the global bloc, like Burma
and Cuba … that will continue to be the targets of sanctions,” even if
“innocent civilians living in those countries” suffer.31
While the military has ruled Burma for 46 years, the Chinese Com-
munist Party has monopolized power for 59 years. Neither model is
sustainable. The longest any autocratic system has survived in modern
history was 74 years in the Soviet Union. At issue, though, is the role the
free world can play in promoting a democratic transition in such states.
This issue has again been highlighted in comparative terms by the
contrasting international responses to the monk-led freedom protests
in Tibet and Burma. In fact, there are striking similarities between Tibet
and Burma – both are strategically located, endowed with rich natural
resources, suffering under long-standing repressive rule, resisting hard
power with soft power, and facing an influx of Han settlers. Yet the in-
ternational responses to the brutal crackdowns on monk-led protests in
Tibet and Burma have been a study in contrast.
When the Burmese crackdown on peaceful protestors in Rangoon
last September left at least 31 people dead – according to a UN special
rapporteur’s report32 – it ignited international indignation and a fresh
wave of U.S.-led sanctions. More than seven months later, the tepid
global response to China’s ongoing harsh crackdown in Tibet has raised
the question whether that country has accumulated such international
power as to escape even censure over actions that are more repressive
and wide-ranging than what Burma witnessed.33 Despite growing in-
ternational appeals to Beijing to respect Tibetans’ human rights and
cultural identity and begin true dialogue with the Dalai Lama, there has
been no call for any penal action, however mild, against China.
When the Burmese generals cracked down on monks and their
pro-democracy supporters, the outside world watched vivid images of
brutality, thanks to citizen reporters using the Internet. The photograph
of a Japanese videographer fatally shot on a Rangoon street was flashed
across the world; it is a picture that defined the events of that month
when police used baton charges and tear gas on monks and fellow pro-
testers and then opened fire. On the worst day of violence – September
27, 2007 – authorities admitted nine deaths while unofficial figures
were higher.
77
 In contrast, China employs tens of thousands of cyberpolice to
censor Web sites, patrol cybercafes, monitor text and video messages
from cellular phones, and hunt down Internet activists. As a result, the
outside world has yet to see a single haunting image of the Chinese use
of brute force against Tibetans. The only images released by Beijing are
those that seek to show Tibetans in bad light, as engaged in arson and
other attacks.
The powerful Internet poses a bigger threat to repressive governme-
nts than pro-democracy demonstrations on the streets, if such protests
are allowed at all. Seeking to fight fire with fire, some authoritarian
regimes have clamped down on the Internet, closing blogger sites and
employing sophisticated filtering software to block Web sites that carry
references to ‘subversive’ words. Such regimes have proven that a coun-
try can blend control, coercion and patronage to stymie the politically
liberalizing elements of market forces, especially when the state still
has a hold over large parts of the economy.
The important parallels between Burma and Tibet begin with the
fact that Burma’s majority citizens – the ethnic Burmans – are of Ti-
betan stock. But the Han demographic invasion of the Tibetan plateau
is spilling over into Burma, with the Chinese presence conspicuous in
Mandalay city and the areas to the northeast. Because of the growing
Chinese commercial interests in Burma, the September 2007 street
protests indeed had an underlying anti-Chinese tenor.
It is significant that the resistance against repressive rule in both
Tibet and Burma is led by iconic Nobel laureates, one living in exile in
India and the other under house detention for long in Rangoon. The
Dalai Lama and Aung San Suu Kyi received the Nobel peace prize in
quick succession for the same reason: for leading a non-violent struggle,
in the tradition of Mahatma Gandhi. Each, a symbol of soft power, has
built such moral authority as to command wide international respect
and influence.
It has been announced that President Bush would soon sign leg-
islation conferring Congress’s highest civilian honor to Suu Kyi, just
months after he had personally presented the same prize – the Con-
gressional Gold Medal – to the Dalai Lama. Suu Kyi, in fact, married
a scholar in Tibetan and Himalayan studies, Michael Aris. With Aris,
a Briton, Suu Kyi edited a book on Tibetan studies in honor of Hugh
Richardson, an expert on Tibetan Buddhism.34
Yet another parallel is that heavy repression has failed to break the
resistance to autocratic rule in both Tibet and Burma. If anything, gro-
wing authoritarianism has begun to backfire, as the popular revolts
in Tibet and Burma have highlighted. More than half a century after
Promoting Political Freedoms in Burma: International Policy Options
78
Tibet’s annexation, the Tibetan struggle stands out as one of the longest
and most-powerful resistance movements in modern world history.
The latest Tibetan revolt, significantly, coincided with the Chinese le-
gislature re-electing as president Hu Jintao, who as Tibet’s martial-law
administrator suppressed the last major Tibetan uprising in 1989.
Similarly, despite detaining Suu Kyi for nearly 13 of the past 19 years, the
Burmese junta has failed to muzzle the grassroots democracy movement,
as last September’s bloody events showed. Democracy offers the only path
to bringing enduring stability to ethnically troubled Burma. Indeed, ethnic
warfare there began no sooner than General Aung San had persuaded the
smaller nationalities to join the union.
The importance of Tibet and Burma also comes from their strate-
gic location and rich natural resources. The Tibetan plateau makes up
one-fourth of China’s landmass. Annexation has given Beijing access
to that region’s immense mineral wealth and water resources. Tibet’s
vast glaciers and high altitude have endowed it with the world’s greatest
river systems. Most of Asia’s major rivers originate in the Tibetan pla-
teau and their waters are a lifeline to 47 percent of the global population
living in South and Southeast Asia and China.
The key difference between Tibet and Burma is that the repression
in the former is by an occupying power. Months after the 1949 com-
munist takeover in Beijing, China’s People’s Liberation Army entered
what was effectively a sovereign nation in full control of its own affairs.
Instead of granting the promised autonomy to Tibetans, Beijing has ac-
tually done the opposite: It has broken up Tibet as it existed before the
annexation and sought to reduce Tibetans to a minority in the truncated
Tibet through the state-supported relocation of millions of Han Chinese.
It has gerrymandered Tibet by making Amdo (the present Dalai Lama’s
birthplace) as the Qinghai province and merging eastern Kham into its
provinces of Sichuan, Yunnan and Gansu.
The contrasting international responses to the repression in Burma
and Tibet highlight an inconvenient truth: the principle that engagement
is better than punitive action to help change state behavior is applied just
to the powerful autocratic countries, while sanctions are a favored tool to
try and tame the weak. While animpoverished Burma reels under tighte-
ning sanctions, a booming China openly mocks the Universal Declara-
tion of Human Rights. The fact is that the more you punish the weak
renegade states, the more the big autocracies tend to gain commercially
and strategically. With its ability to provide political protection through
its UN veto power, Beijing, in recent years, has signed tens of billions of
dollars worth of energy and arms contracts with pariah regimes – from
Burma and Iran to Sudan and Venezuela.
79
 As resource-rich Burma remains mired in abject poverty under a
brutal military regime that refuses to loosen its political grip despite
widening international sanctions, it has become necessary to fashion
a forward-looking international approach that allows outside actors, far
from shutting themselves off from Burma, to seek to influence develop-
ments within. The present disjointed international approach (if it can
be called an “approach”) underscores the need both for greater multila-
teral coordination on Burma and for engagement aimed at increasing
external influence within Burma.
Today, under the cumulative weight of sanctions, Burma is coming
full circle: Its 74-year-old junta head, the delusional Senior General
Than Shwe, has amassed powers to run a virtual one-man dictatorship
in Ne Win-style. Also, in the period since the free world began imple-
menting boycotts, trade bans, aid cutoffs and other sanctions, it has
seen its leverage over Burma erode. The situation thus calls for a more
calibrated approach that entails refining the sanctions tool to achieve
better-targeted sanctions and to create space to influence developments
through engagement. Even as it has become fashionable to talk about
better-targeted sanctions, the sanctions instrument, in reality, has be-
come blunter against Burma.
Sanctions were intended to help the people of Burma, yet today it is
the ordinary people that bear the brunt of the sanctions. The stepped-up
punitive actions in the face of a deteriorating humanitarian situation are
holding the Burmese people “economic hostage,” as Burmese author Ma
Thanegi told Stanley A. Weiss in an interview.35
As far back as 2003, then U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State
Matthew Daley had warned in congressional testimony that many fe-
male garment workers made jobless by sanctions were being driven
into prostitution. Yet, in its 2004 report to Congress, the State Depart-
ment actually boasted that U.S. actions had shut down more than 100
garment factories in the previous year alone, with “an estimated loss of
around 50,000 to 60,000 jobs.”36 In the international effort to help build
democracy in Burma — believe it or not — the big losers have been
those on whose behalf the free world supposedly has been fighting.
While refining the sanctions approach to help spare the Burmese,
international pressure must not be eased against the junta. But for in-
ternational pressure, the junta would not have unveiled a timetable for
a supposed transition to democracy. Earlier, it was due to mounting ex-
ternal pressure that it moved Suu Kyi from prison to house detention in
September 2003 and then freed seven of the NLD’s most senior leaders.
More recently, such pressure also explains why the junta facilitated UN
special envoy Ibrahim Gambari’s three visits to Burma in six months,
Promoting Political Freedoms in Burma: International Policy Options
80
permitting him to meet with Suu Kyi, and also allowed? Paulo Sérgio
Pinheiro, a special rapporteur to the United Nations Human Rights
Council, to come to Rangoon and investigate the September 2007 vio-
lence, including the number of casualties and detentions.
Yet, if there is to be progress on the “roadmap to democracy,” the
military cannot be excluded from engagement. As visiting Singapore Se-
nior Minister Goh Chok Tong said in Washington in April 9, 2008: “On
Myanmar, I told the President (Bush) that while the army is the problem,
the army has to be part of the solution. Without the army playing a part in
solving problems in Myanmar, there will be no solution.”37
Building democracy in Burma is vital not only to end repression and
to empower the masses, but also to facilitate ethnic conciliation and in-
tegration in a much divided society that has been at war with itself since
its independence in 1948. There is, therefore, a need to build greater
unity and coordination among the major democracies on a pragmatic
Burma strategy. A good idea would be to build a concert of democra-
cies working together on Burma, serving as a bridge between the U.S.,
European and Asian positions and fashioning greater coordination of
policy actions.
Without a structured and more progressive international approach,
Burma will stay on its present deplorable path, with the military
continuing to call the shots. As one analyst states, “economic sanctions
on Myanmar may feel right, but they have helped produce the wrong
results. Encouraging Western investment, trade and tourism may feel
wrong, but maybe — just maybe — could produce better results. That
might be politically incorrect, but at least it wouldn’t be politically
futile.”38 In an era of a supposed global village, why deny the citizens of
Burma the right to enjoy the benefits of globalization and free trade? A
more dysfunctional Burma is not in the interests of anyone.
The priority should be to carve out more international space in
Burma, rather than shut down whatever space that might be left
there. International pressure without constructive engagement and
civil-society development will not bring enduring results. To avert a
humanitarian catastrophe in Burma, the same international standards
that are applicable to autocratic and no-less-ruthless regimes in
neighboring states must also apply to Burma — engage, don’t isolate.
Notes
1 After the failed 1993-1996 National Convention to draft a new Constitution, the junta
did nothing until international pressure intensified during 2003–04. It then issued
invitations to a National Convention starting in May 2004 to take up the drafting of the
81
 Constitution where the earlier convention had left off. But the democratic opposition did
not participate in that convention.
2
President Bush’s statement of May 1, 2008, stated: “Today, I’ve issued a new executive
order that instructs the Treasury Department to freeze the assets of Burmese state-owned
companies that are major sources of funds that prop up the junta.”
3Ivo J. H. Bozon, Warren J. Campbell, and Mats Lindstrand, “Global Trends in Energy,”
The McKinsey Quarterly, Number 1 (2007), p. 48.
4 International Monetary Fund, 2006.
5See, for example, Alan Sipress, “Asia Keeps Burmese Industry Humming: Trade, Both
Legal and Illegal, Blunts Effect of U.S. Economic Sanctions,” Washington Post, January
7, 2005, p. A11.
6Sean Turnell, “The Rape of Burma: Where Did the Wealth Go,” Japan Times, May 2,
2008.
7On January 12, 2007, China and Russia torpedoed a United Nations Security Council
(UNSC) draft resolution tabled by the United States and Britain that called on the
Burmese regime to halt military attacks against ethnic minorities, release Aung San Suu
Kyi and other political prisoners, and promote a democratic transition.
8 The actual holding in the two blocks is: Daewoo International (60 percent), ONGC
Videsh (20 percent), GAIL (10 percent) and Korea Gas Corporation (10 percent). This
Indo-Korean consortium is currently engaged in a new exploration drilling program in
Block A3.
9 Yolanda Fong-Sam, “The Mineral Industry of Burma,” in 2005 Minerals Yearbook
(Washington, DC: U.S. Geological Survey, 2006).
10 International Energy, at: http://en.in-en.com
11John W. Garver, “Development of China’s Overland Transportation Links with Central,
South-West and South Asia,” China Quarterly, No. 185 (March 2006), pages 1–22.
12Mohan Malik, “China’s Peaceful Ruse: Beijing Tightens Its Noose Round India’s
Neck,” Force, December 10, 2005.
13Martin Smith, Burma: Insurgency and the Politics of Ethnicity (London: Zed Books,
1999).
14Suu Kyi accompanied her mother, Ma Khin Kyi, to India in 1960 when she was
appointed Burma’s ambassador there. Suu Kyi studied at a high school in New Delhi
and then at the undergraduate Lady Shri Ram College, also in New Delhi. Then, in the
mid-1980s, Suu Kyi and her British husband, Michael Aris, were fellows at the Indian
Institute of Advanced Studies at Simla.
15In September 1988, following Ne Win’s resignation, the military’s State Law and Order
Restoration Council (SLORC) formally took power. SLORC was officially rechristened
the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) in November 1997.
16 The 2003 Burma Freedom and Democracy Act prohibits the importation into the
United States of any article that is a product of Burma until the president determines
and certifies to Congress that Burma has taken certain democratic and counternarcot-
ics actions. The Act directs the secretary of the treasury to direct any U.S. financial
institution holding funds of the Burmese regime or the assets of individuals who hold
senior positions in the regime to freeze them. It also requires that the executive seek to
persuade international financial institutions to oppose any extension of a loan or finan-
cial or technical assistance to Burma until the requirements of the Act have been met.
Promoting Political Freedoms in Burma: International Policy Options
82
Burma’s neighbors are to be persuaded to “restrict financial resources” to Burma and
Burmese companies. And, finally, the Act authorizes the president to assist Burmese
democracy activists.
17The May 20, 1997, executive order issued by President Bill Clinton banned most new
U.S. investment in the “economic development of resources in Burma.” Steven Erlanger,
“Clinton Approves New U.S. Sanctions against Burmese,” New York Times, April 22,
1997.
18United States Information Service (USIS) Washington File, “USITC Report on
Unilateral U.S. Trade Sanctions,” September 11, 1998.
19 See, for example, Leon T. Hadar, U.S. Sanctions Against Burma: A Failure on All Fronts,
Trade Policy Analysis Paper No. 1 (Washington, DC: Cato Institute, 1998). It argued:
“U.S. policy toward Burma is an irresponsible moral posturing. Supporters of sanctions
want to feel good that they are doing something to improve political and economic
conditions in Burma by forcing someone else--American businesses, the ASEAN
nations, and the Burmese people--to bear the costs. The result will be reduced access
of the Burmese people to American products, people, and ideas; worsening economic
conditions; and potential political and regional instability. It is indeed ironic that some
members of America’s cosmopolitan knowledge class, who are the main beneficiaries of
the process of economic globalization, are supporting policies that run contrary to free
trade and open markets and deny the Burmese people the ability to enjoy the fruits of
the global economy.”
20To be sure, the 2003 Burma Freedom and Democracy Act flowed from years of mount-
ing congressional pressure on the executive branch to take a tougher approach toward
that country. After the junta refused to honor the results of the 1990 polls, the U.S. Con-
gress passed the Customs and Trade Act enabling the president to impose sanctions on
Burma — an authority then-President George H.W. Bush declined to exercise. In 1993,
the U.S. Senate, seeking to force the release of Aung San Suu Kyi, passed a nonbinding
resolution calling on the president to work for a UN embargo against Burma. In 1995,
Sen. Mitch McConnell introduced the Free Burma Act. Another similar legislation, with
a name akin to the subsequent 2003 law, the Burma Freedom and Democracy Act, was
introduced in 1996 by Rep. Dana Rohrabacher.
Department of State, Report on U.S. Trade Sanctions Against Burma, Congressionally
21
mandated report submitted to Congress on April 28, 2004.
22Suu Kyi was in Rangoon to take care of her stroke-stricken mother when Burma was
battered by the cataclysmic events of August 1998.By August 26, 1998, she had plunged
herself into politics, addressing her first public meeting outside the Shwedagon Pagoda
that called for a democratically elected government. And less than a month later, she
formed her National League for Democracy (NLD) party on September 24, 1998.
23The Failed States Index 2006 of The Fund for Peace is available at: http://
www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=3865
It is also available at: www.ForeignPolicy.com
24Susan E. Rice and Stewart Patrick, Index of State Weakness in the Developing World
(Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2008).
25
World Press Freedom Index by Reporters Without Borders at: http://www.rsf.org/
rubrique.php3?id_rubrique=554
26 Transparency International, Corruption Perceptions Index 2007, available at: http:
//www.transparency.org
83
 Freedom House, Freedom in the World (Washington, DC: Freedom House, 2006).
Can the International
27

28
World Press Freedom Index by Reporters Without Borders at: http://www.rsf.org/
rubrique.php3?id_rubrique=554
29 Even the 1988 protests were triggered by an economic decision of the government
– the 1987 action devaluing the currency that wiped out many people’s savings. Like
in 2007, the 1988 demonstrations began among students before gradually spreading to
monks and the public, culminating in the national uprising on August 8, 1988, when
hundreds of thousands of people marched to demand a change of government. At least
3,000 people were believed killed when troops opened fire on protesters on that day.
30In Jimmy Carter’s words, “A counterproductive Washington policy in recent years has
been to boycott and punish political factions or governments that refuse to accept United
States mandates.” Jimmy Carter, “Pariah Diplomacy,” New York Times, April 28, 2008.
31 Hadar, U.S. Sanctions Against Burma.
32 After his investigations in Burma into the September 2007 violence, Paulo Sérgio
Pinheiro, a special rapporteur to the United Nations Human Rights Council, released a
report in Geneva which said that at least 31 people were killed in the protests in Rangoon
— twice the death toll the regime had reported — and that 500 to 1,000 people were
still being detained for involvement in the protests. The report also said that 74 people
were listed as missing in the aftermath of the clashes. In addition, it reported that 1,150
political prisoners held before the September 2007 protests had not been released.
33The Tibetan government-in-exile said April 29, 2008, that at least 203 people, most of
them Tibetans, had thus far died in the Chinese crackdowns in Tibet. But China’s official
death toll – 22 – is almost 10 times lower.
34 Michael Aris and Aung San Suu Kyi (eds.), Tibetan Studies in Honour of Hugh
Richardson (New Delhi: Vikas, 1979).
35Interview published on website, New Mandala, at: http://rspas.anu.edu.au/rmap/
newmandala
Department of State, Report on U.S. Trade Sanctions Against Burma, Congressionally
36
mandated report submitted to Congress on April 28, 2004.
37 AFP, April 9, 2008.
38Stanley A. Weiss, “Burma: Are Sanctions the Answer?” International Herald Tribune,
February 8, 2008
Community Help Prevent
Conflict in Burma/Myanmar?
Timo Kivimäki
Individual rights and democracy have been the focal point of the in-
ternational community’s Burma/Myanmar agenda. Authoritarianism
and the lack of these rights is a major problem contributing to political
violence in the country. However, collective rights of ethnic groups have
not received much attention, apart from the international demand for
tripartite talks between the government, the democracy movement, and
ethnic groups in Burma/Myanmar. Yet most of the warfare in the coun-
try has been, at least somehow, related to ethnic rights.
This chapter investigates cases of international conflict prevention
in Burma/Myanmar and international attempts to influence a stubborn
military government to respond to the needs of its population. The
idea is to introduce comparative evidence that has not been sufficiently
utilized in the relatively speculative literature on Burma/Myanmar
conflicts. The cases used in this study are taken from international ex-
periences of conflict resolution and democratization as well as cases of
international governmental economic and political pressure.1 However,
before reviewing international strategies, one needs a diagnosis of the
situation and patterns of conflict in the Burma/Myanmar. The structure
of the chapter is based on the idea of moving from problems to solu-
tions. After an overview of the problems, this article proceeds to giving
an overview of the types of solutions that have been globally successful
in the kind of conflict problems to be found in Burma/Myanmar. From
there, the argument continues to the analysis of how the international
community could contribute to creation of more successful solutions.
The investigation of solutions in general is focused on what kinds of
structures and capacities are needed for stable peace in a country like
Burma/Myanmar. The this section of the chapter specifically focuses on
the role of the international community and how it looks at recipes for
efficient pressure and seeks to find recipes for the persuasion of the My-
anmar government to the compromises that optimal solutions require.

Promoting Political Freedoms in Burma: International Policy Options

84 85
 What is the Problem? However, while the share of conflicts and battle deaths has been
rising, the absolute number of battle deaths of Burma/Myanmar has
Patterns of Conflict in Burma/Myanmar been declining. The pacification of Southeast Asia has made it difficult
Burma/Myanmar has a long history of conflict. To put its conflict for the rebel side to get hold of weapons and ammunition. In absence
problem into a regional perspective, one can compare the country’s of regional conflict spots it is not possible for Burma/Myanmar militias
conflicts with those in the other regional countries. This comparison2 to cooperate with other rebel organizations in arms smuggling and
shows that over 40% of Southeast Asian conflicts take place in Burma/ production. This has contributed to the draining of opportunities of
Myanmar. Since 1988 almost 30% of conflict casualties of Southeast rebellion also in Burma/Myanmar. Furthermore, littoral countries have
Asia take place in Burma/Myanmar: discouraged in many ways the conflict activities of rebels.3

Table 1: Number of Burmese conflicts in comparison Battle Deaths in Burma/Myanmar

to other ASEAN states
3500

Conflict Years
3000

Brunei (before independence 3

2500
Burma/Myanmar 236
2000
Cambodia 44
1500
Indonesia 44
Laos 27 1000

Malaysia 24 500

Philippines 94 0

1948
1950
1952
1954
1956
1958
1960
1962
1964
1966
1968
1970
1972
1974
1976
1978
1980
1982
1984
Burma's Battle Deaths as % of Southeast Asia's Battle

1986
1988
1990
1992
1994
1996

1998

2000

2002

2004
Deaths
80%
If one looks at the groups that challenge militarily the government,
70%
one can easily see that violence in Burma/Myanmar is primarily about
60% democracy vs. authoritarianism and about ethnic rights. Battle deaths
50% seem to peak in Burma/Myanmar whenever the government has back-
tracked from its conciliatory policies. Whenever hopes of ethnic and
40%
democratic movements are frustrated, and the government has resto-
30%
red its stricter centralist and/or military order, the number of casualties
20% increases. After independence, this happened as the government back-
10% tracked from its commitments to relative ethnic autonomy. The casualty
0%
peak of the beginning of the 1960s could be attributed to the strengthe-
ning of the military’s position and the eventual military takeover in
1948
1950
1952
1954
1956
1958
1960
1962
1964
1966

1961. The rising expectations for democracy and ending of the military
1968
1970
1972
1974
1976
1978
1980
1982
1984
1986
1988

rule, instead of the government backtracking from its promises, could

1990
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
2002
2004

have contributed to the rise of conflict activities in the latter half of the

Can the International Community Help Prevent Conflict in Burma/Myanmar?

86 87
 1980s, while the frustration of these hopes and the strong suppression
of the opposition in 1988, and the frustration of the hope of an elected
government help explain the peaks in 1988 and after 1990.
In general, the pattern in Burma/Myanmar conforms to the general
pattern of violence in authoritarian countries: instability and violence is
most probable when the government backtracks from its own commit-
ments and starts restoring its stricter centralist authoritarian rule.4 This
suggests that the international community, rather than just demanding
for new compromises, should focus on building (and expanding) the
government’s own commitments to progress and preventing the go-
vernment from backtracking from its promises.
The number of casualties of democide5 in Burma/Myanmar has not
been estimated reliably. Yet already the counter-insurgency policies of
the 1960s, based on cutting the rebellious villages from food, money,
intelligence and recruits (the four cuts policy of the Burmese military),
suggest that democidal practices against ethnic groups are nothing new
for the Burmese military. Globally, the number of casualties of demo-
cide is about 6 times the number of casualties of war.6 During the cold
war, the ratio in the world rose to about 1:10.7 Regionally, the ratio is
highest in East Asia, where 6 out of 10 world’s most genocidal regimes
are located. Democide per population ratios are also higher in East Asia
than elsewhere. 8 Thus, it is highly likely that repression and democide
represent the gravest element of violence also in Burma/Myanmar right
now, especially after the government has managed to suppress most of
the open conflict situations, and as the country experiences instability
and demonstrations against the government.
Inability and unwillingness to tackle humanitarian disaster, and
allow international help in the task, especially in rebellious areas, and
areas which are considered opposed to the government, adds to the
number of indirect casualties. The denial of access to international
humanitarian organizations at the aftermath of the recent cyclone is
an extreme example of a practice that has been going on in peripheral
areas of the country for decades.
What Kind of Solutions
are Needed for Stable Peace?
It seems clear from the analysis of the pattern of conflict in Burma/
Myanmar that the main issues that the international community
should help solve are related to ethnic rights and democracy. On the one
hand, finding solutions to these issues requires solutions that tackle
Can the International Community Help Prevent Conflict in Burma/Myanmar?
88
the conflict structures. On the other, it requires simply parties to yield
towards the positions and interests of their opponents. From the point
of the international community this means pushing the government
towards compromises, rather than pushing the opposition: much of the
international community would rather like to see compromises towards
democracy and respect of ethnic minority rights, rather than towards
authoritarianism and centralism. Thus when thinking of solutions we
must consider both structural objectives that can transform conflict
structures, and ways to persuade the parties. This section will mainly
look into the former while the following section on the international
community will look into the pressure element.
Macro Structures
The two conflict issues, democracy and ethnic rights, are interlinked,
but still both need to be tackled before peace can be expected. Aut-
horitarianism in Burma/Myanmar has traditionally been justified by
referring to the country’s ethnic diversity, and to the resulting inherent
danger of war and insecurity. The British colonialists used it before the
independence on Burma,9 and since this was such a useful rationaliza-
tion for the autocrat, the Burmese military rulers could not resist the
temptation to use it either. The takeover by the military was rationalized
by the need to safeguard national unity10 and still the current govern-
ment refers to the need of strong “leadership role” of the military in
order to keep the country of more than 100 ethnic groups united and
peaceful.11
The authoritarian justification linking authoritarianism to ethnic
conflict is flawed because of three reasons. First, ethnically diverse
countries are not necessarily any more prone to conflict than other
societies.12 Thus, there is no ground for emphasizing the security di-
mension in the Burmese society.
Secondly, military leaders are, in general, and in Burma/Myanmar
case specifically, much less capable of preventing separatist wars than
democratic leaders. In general, the risk of being killed in a war is redu-
ced by more than one half, if instead of a military ruler; one’s country is
ruled by an elected government.13 The benefits of democracy in conflict
prevention are most expressed in ethnically diverse societies.14
Thirdly, authoritarian internal security policies are often more dead-
ly than the wars they try to prevent. Quantitative studies on democide
show, on the one hand, that authoritarianism is the main predictor of
democidal violence. On the other, they show that democide kills many
times more people than wars.15 Thus the medicine of military security
89
 policies is not needed, because there is no disease, because the medi-
cine does not cure the disease, and because the medicine causes side-
effects far more severe than the imagined disease.
The perception of the international community has been that it is
the conflict of individual freedom and democracy that overshadows
Burma/Myanmar. Bad authoritarian regime is often seen as the reason
also for ethnic conflict. To some extent this perception has been suppor-
ted both by comparative empirical evidence and by the fighting ethnic
groups who feel most threatened by the strong role of the military of the
central government. In interviews with seven of the armed opposition
groups, mostly with their leaders, this became most clear: the principles
that most groups resent most in the government constitution, were the
introductory principle of the “military’s leadership role”, the right of the
military to nominate key ministers, the stipulations on the presidential
eligibility criteria related to the requirement that president has to have
an “understanding on national defence”, and the stipulations that give
too much power for the military in the declaration of emergency and in
the exercise of the emergency powers.16 Pushing the country towards
greater civilian role in politics would thus go a long way both to demo-
cratize the country and to help meet the ethnic concerns.
However, ethnic concerns and democratic concerns are not identical.
After decades of de facto independence within ceasefire arrangements,
some ethnic militias are well accustomed to their own authoritarian
rule, and would not like their powers to be diminished by regional
democratization. Furthermore, competition between bigger and smal-
ler ethnic groups has often resulted in conflicts that have nothing to
do with the authoritarian center. Finally, Burma/Myanmar has plenty
of experience of ethnic conflict within a democratic context: ethnic
conflict persisted also during the democratic decade of the 1950s. The
number of casualties went down gradually, but started rising already in
1961 before the military coup of the 1962.17 Thus, the issue of collective
ethnic rights cannot be reduced to democratic rights: also democratic
countries have ethnic grievances some of which cannot be tackled in a
normal political process.
Ethnic conflict can persist in democracies especially when there is
discrimination that is practiced against potentially rebellious ethnic
minorities. This is one of the main causes of ethnic conflict, according
to comparative evidence18 Discrimination and prosecution of rebellious
ethnic minorities is nothing new in Burma/Myanmar. The four cuts
insurgency strategy revealed already that front lines have often been
identified ethnically and regionally. Martin Smith, one of the main
authorities of Burma/Myanmar ethnic war, has concluded that “For the
Can the International Community Help Prevent Conflict in Burma/Myanmar?
90
Tatmadaw [Burmese military] in the Four Cuts campaign, there is no
such thing as an innocent or neutral villager. Every community must
fight, flee, or join the Tatmadaw.”19 While the current discrimination
and ethnic politics are clearly related to the practices of the military,
there is no reason to believe that democratization would automatically
destroy the seeds of ethnic discrimination and conflict. On the contrary,
any political solution in Burma/Myanmar will have to guarantee also
equality and freedom from discrimination by the majority ethnicity
against ethnic minorities, in addition to introducing the basic responsi-
veness of the government towards the needs of the people. Simple
centralist democracy will not bring stable peace to Burma/Myanmar.
This seems to be generally true for ethnically divided societies like
Burma/Myanmar where centralism seems to be correlated with intra-
state conflict.20 Again the mentality of the Myanmar military (and most
of their counterparts in the developing world) against decentralization
and federalism is an authoritarian obstacle to a lasting peace.
Furthermore, Burma/Myanmar has the problem of bipolarity in its
ethnic structure. This makes it more prone to ethnic conflict even if
the country was democratic.21 In Burma/Myanmar the dominance of
the Burman ethnicity with more that 60% majority position makes the
country conflict prone. This bipolarity (majority against all the minori-
ties) is easily introduced between ethnic Burmans and the other ethnici-
ties. As is the case in almost all similar countries where about half of the
population are from one ethnic group, such as Indonesia (Javanese),
Pakistan (Punjabis), Fiji (Fijians), Boznia-Herzegovina (Boznians)
Brazil (whites) East Timor (Tetum speakers), Afghanistan (Pashtuns),
Rwanda before the genocide (Hutus), minorities in Burma/Myanmar
easily see the state as serving merely the interests of the majority group.
This setting increases the risk in Burma/Myanmar of conflict, and it
contributes to the ethnic structure of politics, which, again makes stable
democracy difficult.22 Also indigenous conflict resolution mechanisms
are difficult to create as such mechanisms are easily seen as ethnically
biased.
Political systems based on simple majority rule that do not acknow-
ledge the need to protect the channels of expression and influence of
the ethnic minorities do not tend to produce ethnic stability in bipola-
rized countries like Burma/Myanmar.23 Political structures that offer
autonomy in regional and ethnic issues to local or ethnic administra-
tions have a much better prospect. Here the opportunities are many.
In Indonesia and in Belgium, regional autonomy is complemented
with cultural roles of ethnic groups. While in Belgium this is written
in the constitution, in Indonesia, the practice is based on the division
91
 of authority between positive law and customary law, and the practice nic groups have a non-territorial ethnic representation, could be more
varies from province to province. In the FCDCC constitution ethnic suitable as an alternative or a supplement to the suggested models. In
autonomy is solved by forming the regional states so that they mirror this respect, for example the Belgian model could be interesting as a
the historical ethnic lines. In the government constitution, this is done comparison to the one envisioned to Burma/Myanmar.
with the exception of the area of the majority ethnic group, which is
divided into 7 divisions (=states). Furthermore, guarantees are needed Human Capacities, and Micro-Governance
for the influence of diverse groups in national politics in order to avoid
In addition to structures that tackle the problems of ethnic rights and
the mounting ethnic pressures. Arend Lijphart, for example, points to
responsiveness of the government, there has to be capacity to act within
several optional ways of doing this by guaranteeing power sharing in
those structures. Ethnic and democratic grievances cannot be satisfied,
national affairs: “broad representation in the executive has been achie-
and centralist authoritarian violence cannot be prevented, even in a con-
ved by a constitutional requirement that it be composed of equal num-
text of better political structures, if the mentalities of the rulers do not
bers of the two major ethno-linguistic groups (Belgium); by granting all
change and the capacity of governance does not improve. It has often
parties with a minimum of 5 percent of the legislative seats the right
been suggested that capacity for better governance cannot be built be-
to be represented in the cabinet (South Africa, 1994–99); by the equal
fore the political structure is democratic and responsive. Empirical evi-
representation of the two main parties in the cabinet and an alternation
dence does not, however, support this claim. If one looks at indicators
between the two parties in the presidency (Colombia, 1958–64); and by
of stability of governance, and indicators of human rights sensitivity
permanently earmarking the presidency for one group and the prime
of governance and compares them to indicators of macro structures of
ministership for another (Lebanon).”24
the polity one can see, on the basis of global evidence since 1800, that
Political mechanisms of guaranteeing ethnic influence are especi-
democratic structures are not a pre-requirement for the development of
ally important for countries like Burma/Myanmar which do not have
capacity to govern. Macro-structures and governance capacity are both
a long tradition in democracy.25 Thus in addition to pushing the go-
needed for stable peace, but neither has to come first before the other
vernment to greater responsiveness towards popular pressures about
can be developed; the international community can try to work on both
individual and group rights, the international community should help
simultaneously.28 Experience shows that the focus should be on building
the government and the opposition develop the country’s constitutional
the ingredients for durable peaceful change, rather than being focused
model towards a direction that guarantees ethnic voice and a degree
on project level progress.29 In authoritarian settings, building institu-
of regional and ethnic autonomy. Whether that means regional federa-
tions that are needed for governance and participation is challenging
lism as exemplified by the Myanmar government constitution, ethnic
but necessary. In situations such as that facing Burma/Myanmar is,
federalism as exemplified by the opposition constitution by the Federal
programs to build capacity for forms of media, and competence for
Constitution Drafting and Coordination Committee (FCDCC), a conso-
the organization of political party institutions, labour organizations,
ciational model of power sharing between communities26 or something
and interest groups would be useful.30 Furthermore, of course, media
else,27 is less important, as long as the key concerns of the ethnic groups
support and the support of media infrastructure can contribute to the
are somehow met.
reduction of violent repression if it manages to build in at least some
It would make sense for the international community to offer as-
kind of transparency in an authoritarian country.31
sistance in the process of finding model for Burma/Myanmar: it would
The ability to design and modify constitutions and knowledge of
be good if the variety of alternatives were better known for the stakehol-
the constitutional opportunities would also support the process of
ders. It seems, for example, that commitment to the best known models
democratization and conflict resolution as has been discussed above.32
of federalism has affected the fact that ethnic representation has been
How much external assistance can be given to these elements of
sought, both by the government constitution and the FCDCC constitu-
democratization depend partly on the level of trust and distrust of the
tion drafters from a system based on states. However, if ethnic groups
government towards foreigners or specific countries and donors, but
do not live in geographical areas that could be easily defined, ethnic
also on the effectiveness of incentives and pressures that persuade the
interests cannot be guaranteed by a system based on states in a federal
government to allow help in the build-up of democratic capacity.33
upper house. A model, where in addition to regional representation eth-

Can the International Community Help Prevent Conflict in Burma/Myanmar?

92 93
 The third wave of democratization, from 1974-1990, proved the
importance of religious organizations, their independence of the state and
their contacts within the democratizing society and with actors outside
the country. Wherever the Catholic church was sufficiently independent
and well connected inside the countries' networks of pro-democracy
groups and donors who were pushing the countries towards democracy,
it could play a constructive role in persuading the elite to compromise.
This was mainly done by using extra-political arguments against violence.
Those religious arguments were felt legitimate by both conflicting
parties within the elites and among the democracy movements.34 This
experience could also offer lessons to Burma/Myanmar, where Buddhist
monks are challenging the legitimacy of the authoritarian government.
Buddhist norms against violence should be used especially to weaken the
legitimacy of authoritarianism within the elite.
Economic Capacity and Micro Governance
In addition to structures and skills, governance that transforms the
roots of conflict requires economic capacity. The buildup of econo-
mic capacity is a tricky issue, though, since it can negatively affect the
pressure international community exerts to the military rulers to push
them to compromises with democracy groups and ethnic minorities.
Furthermore, if the international community empowers a repressive
government, there is a risk that the government becomes more power-
ful in its repression. Yet, poverty negatively affects Burma/Myanmar’s
conflict potential and at some stage the international community needs
to tackle this, so that a durable peace can emerge. All other things being
equal, one can calculate, on the basis of comparative evidence, that if
Burma/Myanmar’s per capita income could be doubled, its conflict risk
could be halved, whereas if its per capita income halves its conflict risk
would be doubled. At the level of Burma/Myanmar’s economic deve-
lopment, one percent of growth in income would reduce the probability
of war by one percent.35 Poverty has to be won in Burma/Myanmar in
ways that utilize broader economic participation. An economic strategy
based on the revenue of natural resources will not help peace. This is
because dependence of the economy on natural resources is a curse
rather than a blessing for an instable country. It gives an incentive for
armed groups to fight for political power,36 and makes democratiza-
tion more difficult.37 Thus the long-term strategy of transformation of
Burma/Myanmar’s economic conflict structures has to manage to pro-
duce economic growth and diversify the economy and make economic
growth more inclusive.
Can the International Community Help Prevent Conflict in Burma/Myanmar?
94
How Can the International Community
Be Part of the Solutions?
We now have a picture of what, on the basis of experiences from other
processes of conflict resolution, should be done to help work for a dura-
ble peace in Burma/Myanmar. But of course the problem for the inter-
national community is that the international community does not rule
Burma/Myanmar; the military does. In order to change structures of
political governance, even in order to build capacity for governance, the
international community will have to use its power to persuade the go-
vernment to compromises that help the pacification of the country. The
fundamental issues of democracy and ethnic minority rights are issues
where the government has its partisan interests and a partisan agenda.
Thus it is unlikely to be willing to do too far reaching compromises. Ex-
perience on how the international community has previously managed
and failed to push governments towards democratic compromises and
respect for ethnic and human rights can, therefore, shed some light on
the ways to make an international strategy successful.
Can the Government be Defeated?
Theoretically the government could be defeated by three alternative
ways. One could crush the government militarily or defeat it poli-
tically by strengthening the opposition’s power vis-à-vis it. Thirdly,
since the government needs some basic economic means of gover-
nance, depriving it these means could also defeat it as a functioning
government.
Military scenario
The experience of international community’s ability to destabilize aut-
horitarian regimes is surprisingly impressive. If one looks at the 116
cases of international sanctions before 1990, one can see that 80% of
sanctions succeed if the objective of the sanctions is to destabilize the
target government, and if the target already is distressed.38 If we look
at the most spectacular cases of democratization, the record of inter-
national pressure is equally impressive. Polity IV data39 gives data on
the level of democracy in each country since 1800. If one looks at year-
by-year change of this overall indicator of democracy, one can pinpoint
the radical positive changes towards democracy. Seven out of the ten
most spectacular changes were at least partly caused by international
manipulation of the military power balance in the country. In the case
of Latvia 1991, Estonia 1991, Lithuania 1991, Bulgaria 1990, Czecho-
95
 slovakia 1990, the reason was the ending of Soviet military presence,
while in Panama 1989, Argentina 1983, Greece 1926, Lesotho 1993, and
Haiti 1994 – all among 23 most spectacular cases of democratization
– democratization was helped by international intervention or military
humiliation of the authoritarian government. Against expectations, the
role of international manipulation of military pressure is equally strong
in many of the more gradual democratization processes. If one looks
at processes where the government has not in five years taken a single
step towards authoritarianism, away from democracy (indicated by an
increased annual authoritarianism indicator, or a reduced democracy
indicator), and produced a good 5-year progress in democratization, se-
ven out of the ten best (8 out of 11) processes were “assisted militarily”
from the outside.
The experiences of manipulation of military capacity have, howe-
ver, taken place in contexts that are substantially different from those
in Burma/Myanmar. The occupation and the ending of occupation in
the Baltic countries as well as the military pressure on Haiti were all
in contexts where the target of military manipulation was a nearby
country with very little military power compared to the occupier. In
Eastern Europe the occupation required an exceptionally bloody war,
and once the occupation and military dominance was in place it was
only the military superiority of the Soviet Union that kept the authori-
tarian systems of Eastern Europe going. The effect of regime change
in the dominant neighbor of Lesotho was relatively similar to that of
East Europe. The case of Greece in the 1920s was also very different
in terms of power politics. It was the united world community in the
League of Nations that was behind the coercion and military humilia-
tion of the authoritarian regime that contributed to change. Military
humiliation was also part of the explanation of the downfall of the
military regime of Argentina in 1983, but there the domestic factors
were more pronounced.
Needless to say that these contexts were very different than that in
Burma/Myanmar, which has a mighty army, terrain that is very difficult
for any military offender, and distance from all the powers who are
most eager to see change in the country. Furthermore, littoral countries,
including the powerful China, have interests in Burma/Myanmar very
different from those of the West, and therefore, any military involve-
ment in the country by the West would risk a war with China.40 Direct
military “occupation” of Burma/Myanmar looks then neither possible
nor desirable. Even military humiliation would probably be possible
only for China, which again has its own strategic reasons not to break
ties with Burma/Myanmar.
Can the International Community Help Prevent Conflict in Burma/Myanmar?
96
Political Scenario
The military regime could be defeated by supporting the domestic for-
ces that could then take over. This has been the formula for success in
many Latin American countries. The sudden ending of the US support
for the authoritarian regimes due to President Jimmy Carter’s human
rights campaign, and due to President Ronald Reagan’s and George
Bush Snr.’s campaign against drug trade (and in the case of Uruguay
1985, US support was withdrawn because of a dispute over Exclusive
Economic Zones), tilted the balance of power in favor of the opposition
groups, and defeated the authoritarian governments. However, while in
Latin America (and in Syria 1954), the opposition had its political and
military strength, in some countries nearly matching the capacity of
the government, in Burma Myanmar, the government has 10-15 times
more troops than the rebels. Furthermore, majority of the rebel troops
are in a ceasefire with the government and fear some of the other rebel
factions as much or more than the government. Furthermore, the room
for organization of political action against the government is very limi-
ted in Burma/Myanmar, making it very difficult for the opposition to
defeat the government.
The power balance that has previously defeated authoritarian go-
vernments has in most of the spectacular success cases been much
more even, even though estimates are difficult to make. Yet, obviously,
the East European oppositions did not have any military power, and yet
they won over the government. Also some of the Latin American regi-
mes were equally unrestrained in suppressing their opposition. Uru-
guay, for example, had world’s greatest number of political detainees
in the beginning of the year that it democratized. Yet the democratic
opposition won with the help of a divided military. But in all these cases
the government yielded to compromises or was divided (as in the case
of most of Latin American cases and Syria 1954) rather being simply
defeated.
It would be possible that the Myanmar government could be di-
vided, and part of the military would start supporting the democratic
opposition or the ethnic minorities. However, bringing division into
the military could also be dangerous: the only clear way to the “Soma-
lianization” of Burma/Myanmar, in addition to the total collapse of the
economy, would be the fragmentation of the army. With army factions
fighting each other we could bring the silent and low intensity level
conflict with scarce resources for fighting into the level of open warfare,
with abundantly equipped conflicting parties. This would obviously not
be desirable. Thus the political avenue, á la Latin America seems also
not feasible and not desirable.
97
 While the power political element of the democratization of former
European communist states was a mechanism of democratization, we
cannot emulate in the Burmese context, there was another element of
the transition that could be more relevant. While the power-base of the
local communist elites was naturally weakened by the weakening and
collapse of the Soviet Union, and while this was a major element in the
explanation of the democratization processes, the military balance still
stood in favor of them against the people at the time they yielded to fun-
damental changes. Once the process of democratization had started in
some parts of the communist world, there was a sense of inevitability of
democratic change. This opened the floodgates of democracy. However,
that element of East European democratization required an element of
persuasion: the government was not defeated, but persuaded, and this
is strategically very different
Economic scenario
Economic “Somalianization” of Burma/Myanmar would constitute a
defeat to the government. The lack of economic means for governance
would create a situation where no-one was in control, or where gover-
nance was reduced to regional war-lord administration. Since this is so
obviously a strategy that would involve a lot of suffering, it remains a
theoretical one. The third wave of democratization (1974-1990) involved
cases where economic crises helped persuade the government to give
up its control and give power to the opposition. According to Samuel
Huntington,41 economic trouble was a major factor explaining the suc-
cess of this wave. However, again, the economic trouble did not defeat
these governments; it only persuaded them to give up power. It is time
to go to that difference and look at strategies to persuade, rather than
strategies to defeat Burma/Myanmar government.
Can the Government Be Persuaded?
If the international community tries to make the government more ad-
herent to the grievances of the opposition by defeating the regime and
replacing it with another, it needs to push the government all the way.
In that strategy, there is no room for positive signals or rewards. Howe-
ver, a strategy that aims at persuasion needs to create a maximal cont-
rast between reactions to stubbornness and reactions to compromise.
Stubbornness has to be deterred, and punished, while compromise has
to be rewarded. As it seems the odds for the strategy to defeat are not
very good. Thus, it seems that the international community would need
to opt for persuasion rather than defeating the government.
Can the International Community Help Prevent Conflict in Burma/Myanmar?
98
When the government starts yielding to the pressure of democratic
forces, the process seems to have a special logic. Often it is coupled with
the perception of inevitability of democratization. In some countries
the radicalization of the civil society convinced some members of the
government to the inevitability of democracy in the country. In some
others, the element of international pressure was also important for the
emergence of the conviction of inevitability of democracy. As a result
of this conviction, individual officials started calculating their career
moves and decided that it was wise to start building their “democratic
credentials.” These credentials were useful for the rescuing of ones po-
sition when the country became democratic. Officials felt that they had
to jump into the bandwagon of democracy in order to survive politically.
The more people did this, the more attractive this choice became. What
happens on the macro level when individuals start jumping into the
bandwagon of democracy is not really controllable, and can surprise the
people who made the first moves towards democracy. Very often though,
the process does serve the first movers, and those moving decisively will
be able to control the process. In Indonesia the current president is the
first cabinet minister to turn against the authoritarianism of President
Suharto. Also in the Philippines the first military man to go against
Marcos’ authoritarianism, General Fidel Ramos, was the country’s
president within ten years from the democratization. The same, where
first elite members that turn against authoritarianism inherit power
in a democratic setting, has happened in many other countries with
different variations, including many east European countries, such as
Poland and Russia, let alone Latin America. The bandwagon of demo-
cracy could have been in motion in Burma/Myanmar during the time
of Prime Minister Khin Nyunt. While the elite were not seriously divi-
ded, scholars could identify the emergence of a third way, an approach
that pushed the government towards democracy, even from the inside
of the military.
The bandwagon process to democracy is precarious, though, since
the fear of political future will often disappear when authoritarian mea-
sures create a much more immediate danger of survival. The bandwa-
gon to democracy was moving in Burma/Myanmar in 2003, as it was
moving also in China of 1989, or in Indonesia in 1965, but it stopped,
once the government cracked down on the ones who were going too far.
Thus it is quite essential that the international support for processes of
democratization focuses more on keeping government’s committed to
democratic reforms than on pushing them to new measures of demo-
cratization. According to conflict literature, this can be done by maxi-
mally publicizing the commitments of the leaders in a positive context,
99
 by interpreting statements as commitments and by rewarding political the threat of sanctions is not credible43: the target will not yield if it
compromise.42 expects the sender to yield and end sanctions. Looking at the history of
While demonstrations and civil disobedience can be internal rea- 130 sanctions after the First World War, until year 2000, we can, for ex-
sons for the government to conclude that the situation is impossible ample, see that sanctions were rarely imposed by weaker senders (who
and democratization inevitable, international community can persuade could possibly suffer more from the sanctions) on stronger targets (who
the authoritarian rule by means of sanctions and conditionality. would probably suffer less). When they were, they were never fully suc-
Experience since the First World War suggests that sanctions can be cessful.44
successful in persuading the government if: If the target does not get help from other countries, sanctions will hit
the target harder and this will increase the likelihood of success.45 This
• Sanctions manage to threaten the core interests of the autho-
is especially true if the target cannot substitute the supply of important
ritarian leadership.
import goods with goods from countries outside the sanctions regime.46
• The effect of sanctions is not reduced by nations outside the
This, of course is not the case for Burma/Myanmar, which gets many
sanctions regime that can offer the denied values. Circumven-
of the import goods from China, Russia, ASEAN and India. This wea-
tion of sanctions is a problem.
kens the power of sanctions considerably, but not totally. While many
• Sanctions are short and decisive so that the regime cannot,
products are available from the Burma’s Dark Knights, many Western
over time work out strategies to compensate the denied values
high technology products that the Myanmar elite would like to have are
or direct the costs to the people or the opposition.
not available.
• Sanctions are strictly targeted against the regime (financial
If the target of sanctions is an authoritarian country like Burma/
rather than comprehensive trade sanctions), rather than against
Myanmar, with elite that has amassed overseas assets, hitting these
the nation or the people. This is in order to avoid unnecessary
assets has generally been a good strategy of creating pressure.47
cost and in order to deny the regime the opportunity to success-
Furthermore, financial sanctions tend to manage to hit authoritarian
fully frame sanctions as an issue of nationalism.
regimes better than many other types of sanctions.48 In the same vein,
• Sanctions should be conditional to target government’s be-
Olsson,49 finds restrictions to aid, investment, finance and technology
havior rather its identity. If the target of sanctions feel that pu-
especially useful in pressuring authoritarian regimes. In the case of
nishment would be forthcoming regardless of what the target
Western sanctions against Burma/Myanmar, technological and finan-
government does, sanctions will fail. Sanctions that are sent by
cial sanctions could be the element of Western sanctions package that
enemies normally fail, too, because they are framed as hostility,
is most effective, as Western technology or capital is not easy to com-
while sanctions sent by allies often succeed.
pensate for by resorting to the less developed and less capital intensive
• When sanction strategy maximizes the incentive for compro-
economies of Burma/Myanmar’s allies. Export restrictions of senders
mise for the target of sanctions. This can be done by combining
in military hardware are mainly motivated by the unwillingness of
punishment of authoritarian action and by rewarding democra-
the West to participate in violent practices of Myanmar government,
tic compromise.
but they, too hit a well selected target. The hurt is felt by much of the
• When compromises of the target of sanctions are made easier
military.
by avoiding nationalistic sensitivities, offering face saving for-
Symbolic sanctions hitting the elite, such as travel restrictions,
mulas for the target government, and by avoiding power politi-
sports ban of an elite sport have been reported to have a significant
cal framing in sanctions: sanctions in a context of a power battle
influence on elite population, making it more likely that strong elite
(where yielding would be a defeat) do not succeed to persuade
develops progressive factions.50
the target of sanctions.
Trade sanctions that are not restricted to state-owned companies of
The fact that sanctions must be costly to a stubborn government seems the target countries can increase the price of the sanctions to the target
natural. This is also supported by empirical evidence. However, the country. However, unrestricted trade sanctions mainly hit people rather
cost for the target should be considered together with the costs for the than the elite, and thereby they can actually play against the power of
sender. If the target feels that the sender suffers more from sanctions, the pro-democracy coalitions, which are more dependent on the sup-

Can the International Community Help Prevent Conflict in Burma/Myanmar?

100 101
 port of large constituencies of the target country.51 In addition to this,
all-out trade sanctions go against European objectives of protecting the Totally successful allies neutral Enemies Total
people of Burma/Myanmar. The contribution of sanctions to suffering cases, or total failures
of ordinary people is often greater than believed. Often it compares to Successful cases 10 4 2 16
the suffering of people in wars.52 This suffering can help the governme-
Unsuccessful cases 5 9 18 32
nt use sanctions for its own legitimacy by channeling the popular dissa-
tisfaction against the international community; the source of sanctions. Total 15 10 16 41
This does not make sanctions less costly for the target, but it makes the
target more determined, as people are more prepared to accept costs for
The impact of hostility is very pronounced also in sanctions that
the sake of the nation.53 Thus the selective strategy of European sanc-
specifically aim at coercing democratic compromise.
tions in Burma/Myanmar seems to be supported by empirical evidence
more than the American all-out sanctions strategy. If we look at cases
where the government has managed to mobilize nationalism against Cases realted to Human Allies Neutal Enemies Total
international sanctions, we can easily see that they have not been very Rights and Democratization
successful: Totally successful cases 2 0 0 2
Modestly Sucessful cases 4 2 1 7
Successful Unsuccessful
Modestly Unsuccessful cases 6 1 0 7
cases cases
Totally unsuccessful cases 0 6 4 10
Nationalism 13 % of all cases 87%
became where nationalism Total 12 9 5 26
a major issue became a major issue

Nationalism 54% 46%
did not become
a major issue
While the duration of sanctions could be seen increasing the costs
for the target, long sanctions tend to offer the target opportunities of
substituting restrictions with domestic production and supply from
countries outside the sanction regime. Furthermore, if sanctions are
not effective in a few years, the government often finds ways to transfer
the costs of sanctions to the people or to the opposition54. Thus it seems
that the long duration of sanctions in Burma/Myanmar has reduced the
likelihood of success.
Also if sanctions are seen as a sign of hostility they loose their power.
This is because of the logic of persuasion, which requires that sanctions
are conditional to the behavior of the targets of sanctions. If the target
feels that it is being punished out of hostility, regardless of what it does,
sanctions do not add to the incentive to make compromises.
If sanctions become a matter of power battle between enemies,
they will succeed only if the senders can totally defeat their enemies
with sanctions.55 Otherwise they tend to fail totally: compromising to
an enemy, means loosing ones face. A good example of this is the track
record of sanctions across the divide of the global power play during the
cold war. Of eight cases of sanctions over the iron curtain, seven were
total failures, while one was a moderate failure. As defeating the target
of sanctions is not possible in Burma/Myanmar, the international
community should try to avoid making persuasion a matter of power
battle. Instead, the international community should try to work for face
saving formulas for the Myanmar government. For this, it would be
important that the international community collaborated with Burma/
Myanmar’s allies: in order to avoid Western sanctions becoming
a “punishment from an enemy”, they should be coordinated with
policies of nations friendly to Burma/Myanmar. If Myanmar’s allies
can support some of the European objectives in Burma/Myanmar, this
could have a positive effect: according to evidence of the previous cases
of sanctions.
When the target of pressure tries to marginalize the influence of

Can the International Community Help Prevent Conflict in Burma/Myanmar?

102 103
 enemy coercion, it often does that by building an identitive barrier
between the target and sender of pressure. When the South African
apartheid government tried to marginalize pressure from the African
National Congress (ANC) and its international allies, it did so by
associating the movement with communism and secular immorality.
While doing this it also linked its own identity to the block of anti-
communist countries, to free trade and to the community of Christians.
This made the government very vulnerable to pressure from its anti-
communist and Christian allies. Once these forces, important to
the identity of the Apartheid government, turned their backs, and
the country was left to trade only with socialist countries, it was very
difficult for the government to legitimize its rule to its own white
supporters. The government’s discursive shield against the ANC and
supporters of racial equality dropped, and members of the government,
as individuals, became exposed to democratic criticism of their roles
as officials of a racist government. More and more people from the
government itself started pressuring the government to reforms until
the prime minister himself decided to open secret negotiations with
the ANC.
Similarly, when the authoritarian governments of Bolivia, Argentina,
and Uruguay tried to marginalize pressure from President Jimmy
Carter’s “idealist regime,” they also made themselves more vulnerable
to the pressure of President Ronald Reagan’s “realist administration.”
When the USA continued to criticize these countries (no longer only
due to democracy problems, though) after the ending of Carter’s
pressure, the elites soon became ready for compromises. Also the
marginalization of the West in Burma/Myanmar, by using arguments
related to neo-colonialism, domination, etc. and by building on Asian
exceptionalism, has made the country more vulnerable to criticism
fellow Asians, especially China, who is often seen as the leading critic
of Western moralist domination. This is clear from the interviews
among government officials conducted for this article. Southeast Asian
criticism and the Chinese behind the scenes persuasion is difficult to
counter for the military government, since their discursive strategy of
marginalizing criticism has been based on the nationalist anti-Western
rhetoric.
Compromising can also be expensive if compromises required are
too fundamental. According to Hufbauer et al. (1990 op. cit.), senders
of sanctions should be realistic with their demands; otherwise the
probability of success in sanctions becomes low. Yet it is natural that
cosmetic changes in Burma/Myanmar will not change the situation of
its people. What could be done to avoid demanding too much would
Can the International Community Help Prevent Conflict in Burma/Myanmar?
104
be to frame the demands in a way that avoids offending the country’s
sensitive nationalism: compromises by the junta should not be made
a matter of victory to the West. Instead, they should be framed as part
of governments own plan. This could be done by trying to study the
positive elements of the government’s own roadmap for democracy,
and the constitution and encouraging reform that could be based on
the progressive elements of government’s own program. The optimal
situation would be if the process that the government calls the roadmap
or Seven Steps to Democracy, which already facilitates some openness
towards ethnic groups and the exiled and detained democratic
opposition (the government has openly declared that it will negotiate
with anyone who wants), could be encouraged to open further. This
way it could effectively be some kind of tripartite negotiation on the
constitution and its interpretation and implementation. If tripartite
negotiation could be introduced without discrediting the merits of the
progressive elements of government’s own strategy, the compromises
that should be encouraged and pressured from the government would
not be felt as too costly.
Finally, after an assessment of how pressure for compromises can
be made more successful, one also needs to remember that in addition
to pressure, the Myanmar government also needs encouragement and
rewards for the compromises it makes. If the international community
only uses its stick and never the carrot, it cannot maximize the incentive
for compromise. The “stick only” approach can work for the hopeless
task of defeating the Myanmar government, but it cannot aid the more
realistic process of making democratization inevitable for individuals in
the Myanmar leadership.
Conclusions
The conflict of Burma/Myanmar is complex, and contributing to so-
lutions requires politically difficult strategies and a flexible approach.
On the one hand, the international community should not believe that
it can solve one of the two main problems without tackling the other:
democracy cannot guarantee ethnic rights, and ethnic harmony does
not guarantee democracy. Yet both objectives need to be reached before
a durable solution to the conflicts in Burma/Myanmar can be found.
In its efforts to find solutions for the country, the international com-
munity needs to address both the conflict structures and to persuade
the Myanmar government to compromise on issues relating to demo-
cracy and ethnic rights. In some cases, it is natural to assume that the
opposition can also be persuaded to compromise, especially if this does
105
 not jeopardize the final objective of a democratic and ethnically har-
monious peace. Tackling conflict structures is possible already before a
change in polity.
International experience suggests several lessons on how to push
the conflicting parties to compromise. However, the hostility and ani-
mosity that international pressure and sanctions generates has made
it difficult to implement these lessons. Is this article pointed out in
the introduction, conflict casualties peak whenever the government
backtracks from its progressive commitments. It has also been shown
how democratization processes in countries in which the government
cannot simply be defeated often proceed with small steps taken by the
authoritarian government towards democracy. From these small steps,
and in combination with international and internal pressure, a sense
of the inevitability of democracy may follow, and members of govern-
ment then begin to jump on the bandwagon of democracy in pursuit
of personal gain. This is the process that the international community
can and should support. However, if animosity and hostility prevent
the international community from recognizing progress when it is
made, then it will not be possible for the international community to
attempt to prevent the government in question from backtracking from
the process. For example, when the Myanmar government introduced
a constitution and called for a referendum on it, the international com-
munity should have reacted positively, which would then have allowed
it to react negatively to the subsequent watering down of the process
by the introduction of pre-voting processes that failed to guarantee the
anonymity and secrecy of the ballot. While recognizing the weaknes-
ses of the government constitution draft, the international community
should also try to cling to the progressive elements within it and push
for an implementation of those elements. At the same time the inter-
national community could try to push for negotiation with democratic
and ethnic opposition on those parts of the government constitution
that are unhelpful for the transformation of Burma/Myanmar’s conflict
structures. This would require cool-headedness and flexibility, however.
In order to foster a more rational strategy, we must learn to avoid the
kind of emotional politics that prevent a more pragmatic strategy. The
international community has to be focused on the questions of what
will help Burma/Myanmar in the long term. By acting rationally instead
of emotionally, while still keeping sight at the needs of the Burmese, the
international community could be able to pursue a much more effective
strategy. The international community should be able to contribute to
the resolution and/or transformation of Burma/Myanmar conflicts.
Can the International Community Help Prevent Conflict in Burma/Myanmar?
106
Notes
1
The cases of international pressure selected for this study are the 116 post-World War I
sanction cases reviewed in Hufbauer Schott & Eliot 1990 + the 12 cases of UN mandated
sanctions in the 1990s (based on the review of Cortright, Wagler & Lopez 2000) and 2
unilateral cases + EU sanctions in 10 ACP countries in the 2000. Altogether the number
of cases studied for this study is thus 140. The cases of democratization utilize the data
on polity development of all countries from 1800 until 2003. However, a more thorough
qualitative investigation has focused on the 20 most spectacular cases of democratiza-
tion.
2
The comparison is based on the data Uppsala and PRIO Conflict Datasets. UCDP/PRIO
Conflict Dataset, see Lacina, Bethany & Nils Petter Gleditsch, 2005. 'Monitoring Trends
in Global Combat: A New Dataset of Battle Deaths', European Journal of Population
21(2–3): 145–166; Harbom, Lotta & Peter Wallensteen, 2007. 'Armed Conflict,
1989–2006', Journal of Peace Research 44(5): 623–634; Harbom, Lotta & Peter Wal-
lensteen, 2005. ‘Armed Conflict and Its International Dimensions, 1946–2004’, Journal
of Peace Research 42(5): 623–635. The threshold for conflict is 25 casualties. It is likely
that the Uppsala/PRIO data fails to reveal the accurate numbers of casualties for various
years of the conflict in Burma/Myanmar. Estimates can also be too conservative or too
high on average, while it could be that some of the changes in year-to-year casualty levels
has been estimated incorrectly. However, in absence of alternative data that could be
used for year-to-year comparisons, and comparisons with other countries, this dataset,
that has strictly enforced, unified methodological tools for the assessment of casualties
for each year and each country has been taken as best estimate that comparative work
has to be based.
3
This assessment is based on interviews in March 2008, among 7 fighting groups
4
Gleditsch, Kristian S. & Michael D. Ward. 2002. “Peace and War in Time and Space:
The Role of Democratization,” International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 44, 1-29.
5
In addition to direct killings by the government, the concept of democide covers cases
in which death is caused by intentional or knowingly reckless and depraved disregard for
life (thus constituting practical intent).
6
Rummel, Rudolph 1994. Death by Government. Transaction Publishers, New Bruns-
wick.
7
Kivimäki, Timo 2003. “The Era of Terrorism: The Global Context of Terrorism and
Counter-Terrorism”, in Timo Kivimäki, ed., Development Cooperation as an Instrument
In the Prevention of Terrorism. Copenhagen: Danish Foreign Ministry Publications.
Calculation is based on data provided by Rummel, Ibid.
8
Kivimäki, Timo 2005. “The EU and Asian Security: Introduction”, in Timo Kivimäki &
Jørgen Delman, eds, The Security Situation In Asia: Changing Regional Security Struc-
ture? Report to the Danish Foreign Ministry. Copenhagen: NIAS Press.
9
Taylor, Robert H.2005. “Pathways to the Present", p. 7, in Kyaw, Yin Hlaing, Robert H.
Taylor & Tin Maung Maung Than (Eds.) Beyond Politics to Societal Imperatives. ISEAS,
Singapore.
10
Christina Fink 2001. Living Silence: Burma under Military Rule. White Lotus/
University Press Ltd./Zed Books: Bangkok/Dhaka/London/New York, p. 29.
11
Briefing by the Minister of Information, of the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung study group,
Yangoon, October 2006.
107
 12
According to Collier, it is the bipolar societies that are at greatest risk of war, not the di-
verse societies. See, Collier, Paul (2000). Ethnicity, Politics and Economic Performance.
Economics and Politics, November, 12(3), 225-45.
13
Rummel, Rudolph J. 1995. "Democracies ARE less Warlike Than Other Regimes",
European Journal of International Relations 1, 457-79.
. Rummel, Rudolph J.1997. "Is Collective Violence Correlated with Social Pluralism",
14
Journal of Peace Research, vol 34, no. 2, 1997, 163-175.
Rummel, Rudolph J. 1994. Death by Government. Transaction Publishers, New Brus-
15
wick, NJ.
Discussions and interviews by the author in Mae Sot, Chiang Mai and Rangoon,
16
March 2008
17
Partly this could have been a result of military’s increasing role, but still, it happened
in a democratic context.
18
Gurr, Ted Robert 1993. Minorities at Risk. Washington DC.: United States Institute
of Peace Press; Gurr, Ted Robert 1994. “Peoples Against States: Ethnopolitical Conflict
and the Changing World-System (1994 Presidential Address)”, International Studies
Quarterly, Vol. 38, No. 3.
19
Smith, Martin 1999. Burma: Insurgency and the Politics of Ethnicity. London: Zed
Books, pp. 259-60.
20
Gurr, Ted Robert and Mark Irving Lichbach 1979. “Forecasting Domestic Political
Conflict,” in J. David Singer and Michael Wallace, eds, To Auger Well: Early Warning
Indicators in World Politics, 153-93. Beverly Hills: Sage Publications.
21
Collier, Paul 2000. Ethnicity, Politics and Economic Performance. Economics and Po-
litics, November, 12(3), 225-45; for supporting evidence on the peacefulness of heteroge-
neous societies, see Fearon, James D. and David D. Laitin 2003. “Ethnicity, Insurgency,
and Civil War”, American Political Science Review, Vol. 97 (February).
22
For the difficulties of democracy and peace in countries where politics is structured
along ethnic lines, see Zartman, I. William 2005. Collapsed States: The Disintegration
and Restoration of Legitimate Authority. Boulder, Co: Lynne Rienner Publishers.
23
Welsh, David 1993. “Domestic Politics and Ethnic Conflict,” in Michael E. Brown, ed.,
Ethnic Conflict and International Security, 43-60. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
24
Lijphart Arend 2004. “Constitutional Design for Divided Societies”, Journal of Demo-
cracy, Vol. 15, No. 2., p. 99.
25
McGarry, John and Brendan O’Leary 2006. “Consociational Theory: Northern Ireland’s
Conflict, and Its Agreement 2 – What Critics of Consociation Can Learn from Northern
Ireland”, Government and Opposition, Vol. 41, No. 2, 249-277.
26
Lijphart, Arend 1977. Democracy in Plural Societies. New Haven: Yale University
Press; Dahl, Robert A. 1971. Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition. New Haven: Yale
University Press; Rabushka, Alvin & Kenneth A. Shepsle 2004. Politics in Plural Socie-
ties Columbus, Ohio: Merrill.
27
Ian O’Flynn advocates a system of deliberative democracy that aims at promoting
principled decision-making which involves stakeholders regardless of their ethnic origin
(regional people in regional issues, ethnic Pa-o in issues that affect ethnic Pa-o, national
leaders in issues involving the whole nation). See, O’Flynn, Ian 2006. Deliberative De-
mocracy and Divided Societies. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
28
I have elsewhere shown this by calculating the correlations between governance and
Can the International Community Help Prevent Conflict in Burma/Myanmar?
108
year-by-year development of political macro-structure, and between political macro-
structure and year-by-year development of governance. Neither of the relationship was
correlated, regardless of the indicator selected, proving that neither governance capacity,
nor the political macro structure can be seen as a requirement for the other. Calcula-
tion was based on Polity IV data from Marshall Mark & Keith Jaggers 2006. Polity IV
Project: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2004. Available at http:
//www.cidcm.umd.edu/polity/data/showFiles.asp
See Timo Kivimäki 2007. “European Policies vis-à-vis the ‘Burma/Myanmar Issue’: An
Analysis of Arguments for Two Main Strategy Alternatives” Dialogue + Cooperation
1/2007
29
Brown, Keith 2006. Transacting Transition: The Micropolitics of Democracy Assis-
tance in the Former Yugoslavia. Bloomfield CT: Kumarian Press Inc.
30
Carothers, Thomas 2007. “The ‘Sequencing’ Fallacy”, Journal of Democracy, Vol. 18,
No. 1 (January), 12-27.; Zeeuw, Jeroen de 2005. “Projects Do Not Create Institutions”,
Democratization, Vol. 12, No. 4 (August). Krishna Kumar 2006. Promoting Independent
Media: Strategies for Democratic Assistance. Boulder, CO and London: Lynne Rienner
Publishers.
31
Rummel 1994, ibid.
Dauderstädt, Michael and Arne Schildberg 2006. Dead Ends of Transition. Frankfurt/
32
New York: Campus Verlag..
33
Kumar 2006, ibid..
Philpott, Daniel 2004. “Christianity and Democracy: The Catholic Wave”, Journal of
34
Democracy, Vol. 15, No. 2 (April), 32-46.
35
This is based on statistical evidence by Collier and Hoeffler, in Collier, Paul & Anke
Hoeffler 2002. Aid, Policy and Peace. Reducing the Risks of Civil Conflict. Center for
African Economic Studies, Oxford University. Working Paper Series. Available at
http://econpapers.repec.org/article/tafdefpea/v_3A13_3Ay_3A2002_3Ai_3A6_3Ap_
3A435-450.htm>.
Collier, Paul & Anke Hoeffler 2000. Greed and Grievance in Civil War. World Bank
36
Development Research Group. Available at <http://www-wds.worldbank.org/servlet/
WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2000/06/17/000094946_00060205420011/Rendered/
PDF/multi_page.pdf>.
37
Acemoglu, Daron James A. Robinson 2006 Economic Origins of Dictatorship and
Democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
38
Dashti-Gibson, Jaleh, Patricia Davis & Benjamin Radcliff 1997. “On the Determinants
of the Success of Economic Sanctions: An Empirical Analysis”, American Journal of
Political Science, Vol. 41, No. 2, April, 608-618.
39
Marshall Mark & Keith Jaggers 2006. Polity IV Project: Political Regime Characteris-
tics and Transitions, 1800-2004. Available at http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/polity/data/
showFiles.asp
40
Ian Storey identifies the scenario where Burma/Myanmar is in a civil war as one of the
least unlikely scenarios where a war between the UYS and China could break up. See, Sto-
rey, Ian 2007. The United States and ASEAN-China Relations: All Quiet on the Southeast
Asian Front. Washington DC: Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College.
Huntington, Samuel P. 1991. Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century. Nor-
41
man: University of Oklahoma Press..
109
 42
Staw, B.M., The Escalation of Commitment To a Course of Action, Academy of Man-
agement Review, 1981, 6 (4), 577-587; Mitchell, C.R., Gestures of Conciliation, Basing-
stoke: MacMillan, 2000; Salancik, G.R, Commitment and the Control of Organizational
Political Developments
Behavior and Belief, in New Directions in Organizational Behavior, eds. Staw B.M and
Salancik G.R. (Illinois: St Clair Press, 1977. in Burma and India’s
Strategic Interests
43
This element of the logic of the Nash’s and Harsanyi’s bargaining game is well elabora-
ted in Thomas C. Schelling’s classical book, Stategy of Conflict (London, 1963).
44
Canada managed to impose several sanctions on targets stronger than or equally
strong as itself. However, in each case Canada represented a moral sender community
(of Non-Proliferation Treaty supporters, for example), that was stronger than the target.
Baladas Ghoshal
At the same time, the Soviet Union tried to take on the West in the Berlin Blockade and
failed miserably, as did Australia, when imposing sanctions on France, after France’s
nuclear testing in the Pacific Atolls. In the latter case, however, the intention of sanctions Introduction
was probably more demonstrative. As a moral punishment, one could say that Austra-
lia managed to reach her objectives, as France’s wine industry was severely affected by Between engagement and isolation, Burma, now known as Myanmar,
sanctions. is in a state of decline with an abysmal record in the political, economic
45
Hufbauer, Gary C., Jeffrey J. Schott and Kimberly A. Elliot 1990. Economic Sanctions and social spheres, which has had grave implications for the future
Reconsidered. History and Current Policy. 2nd ed. Washington DC: Institute for Interna- of its people and for the country itself, once the richest and now the
tional Economics, 82-85.
poorest country in Southeast Asia. The abandoned former campuses
Drury, Cooper 1998. “Revisiting Economic Sanctions Reconsidered”, Journal of Peace
46
of Yangon and Mandalay universities, at one time leading institutions
Research, Vol. 35, No. 4. (July), 497-509.
of higher learning in Asia, which produced distinguished Myanmarese
47
Morgen, T. Clifton, and Valerie L. Schwebach 1997. Economic Sanctions as an Instru-
ment of Foreign Policy: The Role of Domestic Politics," Presented at the annual meeting
from all walks of life, typically symbolize the state of things in Myanmar
of the APSA, Washington DC. today. A country rich in natural resources and intellect has degenerated
48
Dashti-Gibson, Jaleh, Patricia Davis & Benjamin Radcliff 1997. “On the Determi- into an economically poor and intellectually mediocre country through
nants of the Success of Economic Sanctions: An Empirical Analysis”, American Journal misrule and ill-conceived social engineering. The ruling junta has de-
of Political Science, Vol. 41, No. 2, April, 608-618; Hufbauer, Schott & Elliot 1997, ibid. vised an ingenious way of retaining their power and control over Bur-
Olsson, Richard Steward 1979. “Economic Coercion in World Politics" World Politics,
49 mese society. The university campuses have all been moved away from
Vol. 31, No. 4. (Jul.), 471-494. the cities to the outskirts, dispersed so that no effective mobilization
50
Sanctions restricting the participation of the South African national cricket team, for of students and teachers can take place against the regime. Teachers
example, have been found effective. and students have been forced to double as security agents, reporting
51
Lektzian, David & Mark Souva 2007. “An Institutional Theory of Sanctions Onset and any activities detrimental to the interests of the regime to their bosses
Success”, Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 51, No. 6 (December), 848-871. in Tatmadaw. It is not just a strategy of divide and rule, but also one of
Mueller, John and Karl Mueller 1999. “Sanctions of Mass Destruction”, Foreign Affairs,
52
dispersing and debilitating civil society, the vitality of which is a must
May/June.
for democratic political development. The development of a healthy ci-
53
Baer, Georg: 1973.Sanctions and security: The League of Nations and the Italian-Ethio- vil society has been viewed as an anathema to the junta’s role in politics
pian War" International Organization XXVII, Spring; Pape, Robert A. 1997. Why econo-
mic sanctions do not work. International Security 22 (2): 90–136.; Olsen 1979, op.cit. 479. and society in Burma.
54
Hufbauer, Gary Clyde, Kimberly Ann Elliott, Tess Cyrus and Elizabeth Winston
Indeed there has been a proliferation of higher educational institu-
1997. “US Economic Sanctions: Their Impact on Trade, Jobs, and Wages”, Peter- tions in Burma in recent years to meet growing demand, but their qua-
son Institute Working Paper. Available at http://www.iie.com/publications/wp/ lity is embarrassingly poor and they lack an intellectual environment as
wp.cfm?ResearchID=149; Miyagawa, Makio 1992. Do Economic Sanctions Work? New well as any forum for discussing questions of nation-building, somet-
Yor:, St. Martin Press. hing that both the universities of Rangoon and Mandalay were known
55
This was the case in UN sanctions against Khmer Rouge in 1992 and onwards until for. The destruction of the old university structures, a lack of academic
the demise of Khmer Rouge. job opportunities, and a stifled intellectual life in the country have led
to a massive exodus of talent from the country. Burma’s main econo-

Can the International Community Help Prevent Conflict in Burma/Myanmar?

110 111
 mic elite and entrepreneurs were already hounded out of Burma in the
1960s when Gen. Ne Win staged a coup took that overthrew the elected
civilian government in power and initiated a process of ill-conceived na-
tionalization based as part of the dubious “Burmese way to Socialism”
programme. The economic impact of such measures and the resultant
brain drain were disastrous for the country. As time passed and the
Burmese regime proceeded with its social and political engineering
programme, a claustrophobic political culture of fear developed that
deprived Burmese citizens of any political space for debate and dissent
and prompted most intellectuals and other elites to leave the country in
droves. Intellectuals do not want to rot in an atmosphere that offers no
scope for innovation or creativity. The Tatmadaw seeks loyalty, submis-
sion and deference and has frequently resorted to violence to extract
support from Burmese citizens whom they regard as their subjects
with no obligation for their well being. Fear and the absence of oppor-
tunities have reached such a great extent today that all young people in
Myanmar with a choice want to leave the country to re-settle in places
where they are able to receive greater opportunities and more freedom,
unconstrained by the watchful eye of the junta.
For those who cannot leave the country, some make good by joining
the Tatmadaw, which, given its privileged position, undoubtedly offers
the best opportunities and perks available in Burma. Others join the
Monastery, seeking solace in religion or social prestige and other incen-
tives. Those who choose to adopt Buddhism as a career often do so not
only for social prestige and the respect that Monks enjoy in a predomi-
nantly Buddhist country, but also for financial reasons, since donations
collected by the monks are shared primarily with dependent family
members who expect their grown children to support them. As a result,
there is almost an equal number of monks and soldiers (approximately
400,000 to 500,000) in the country. The respect that monks enjoy in
Burmese society, even among members of the armed forces, as well as
their sheer number and their participation in the 2007 August protest
movement against the military junta obviously offered a glimmer of
hope to democratic forces both within the country and in exile. Osten-
sibly against rising food and fuel prices, the 2007 protests undoubtedly
revealed the political exasperation of a long-suffering populace, which
emerged in large numbers to support the monks as the protests gained
momentum and became a nationwide uprising. The monks, too, sho-
wed tremendous courage in standing up to the military junta in protest
of the junta’s failure to provide basic necessities for the people and
asking it to step down and allow democracy to return. While the junta
was obviously surprised by the spontaneous uprising of the monks and
Political Developments in Burma and India’s Strategic Interests
112
the popular support that this uprising generated, as evidenced from
the junta’s initial hesitation to respond to the protests in characteristic
style, the junta soon decided to suppress the uprising with brutal force.
They did so, too, with a fair amount of ease, as the international com-
munity watched aghast while the regime brutally suppressed not only
protesting citizens, but also the monks, who were generally revered by
all in Buddhist societies.
Widespread grievances against the military junta notwithstanding,
the situation on the ground in Burma belies any hope for political
change in Burma in the near future. The junta suppressed the August
07 Monk uprising with such brute force that the event acted as a deter-
rent to any prospective opposition to the regime. The Monks have been
silenced by the imposition of all kinds of restrictions on their move-
ments and activities and by their isolation from the mainstream. The
fact that the junta alone possesses violent means and is ready to use
them against unarmed civilians at the slightest is itself a powerful factor
against any dissent in the immediate future. By all accounts, the army
regime is now more entrenched in power than ever before. Even the
recent Cyclone Nargis that devastated the country, killing almost 80,000
people and leaving many more homeless in the Irrawaddy delta has not
been able to weaken its stranglehold on power. On the other hand, the
politicization of humanitarian relief to cyclone victims by making it a
condition that the relief be distributed only through aid workers, com-
bined with the West’s imposition of further sanctions and its insistence
on democratic change, and the parallel refusal by the Burmese to budge
meaningfully from their xenophobic nationalist position, has conso-
lidated the junta’s hold on power even further and complicated the
process of rapprochement between the regime and the outside world.
In the hours of Burma’s gravest disaster, all parties to the ongoing con-
flict in Burma should have encouraged dialogue and communication
among opposing parties in the name of rehabilitating the victims and
their families and rebuilding the country.
While historical parallels are always misleading, one nonetheless
recalls the case of Aceh during the 2004 tsunami, when insurgent for-
ces, one of the key catalysts for peace, initiated a ceasefire in a move
that made the Indonesian military more willing to permit aid into the
country. In Burma, opposition parties as well as the Western countries
authoring sanctions should also have attempted to refrain from poin-
ting fingers at the junta, concentrating instead on finding ways to coo-
perate with the junta in order to provide relief to the hapless victims of
the cyclone. When the tsunami hit Aceh in December 2004, a window
for dialogue and communication among opposing parties opened up
113
 and became one of the key catalysts for peace. In the case of Aceh, no
one began by blaming the Indonesian military for past failures or for
the atrocities they committed in dealing with a genuine problem of alie-
nation of its people from the central authority in Jakarta. Instead, the
international community joined hands with the government in power
to provide aid to the tsunami victims. In Burma, despite loud calls from
many Western powers for global engagement with humanitarian relief
efforts, no such political shift has taken place. A similar magnanimous
gesture from the West, like the Aceh relief operation, in Burma might
not only have softened the attitude of the junta toward outsiders and
lessened its suspicion of Western aid workers, but also exposed the
junta’s vulnerabilities and questioned its ability to deliver in the face of
such disasters. This, in turn, would have exposed its claim to be the only
viable force in the country capable of ruling the country and delivering
goods to the people. One of the most important contributory factors in
the declining political role of the Indonesian military was its inability to
deal with the economic crisis of 1997–98, when, for the first time since
the Soeharto government assumed power, the myth of the armed forces
as the only omnipotent force in the country unravelled, and the people
came to realize that the feet of the armed forces were made of clay and
that the armed forces could be challenged. The objective conditions
in Burma and the character of the Burmese Tatmadaw, however, are
different from Indonesia because of its international exposure as well
as Indonesia’s experience with a national economy that is integrated
with the global and regional economy. This experience shows why the
Burmese junta needs to be brought out of its isolation, integrated with
the regional economy and using it as a catalyst for change in Burma.
Rather than continuing with the status quo and destroying all possibili-
ties for a rapprochement between the West and the junta, thee slightest
movement in the direction of political change in the country in the near
future is a welcome development.
Prospects for Political Change
Let us now first look at the ground realities in Burma and assess the
factors that normally accounts for fall of military and authoritarian re-
gimes in other countries of Asia. First, the greatest asset the junta has
vis-à-vis its opponents is its complete control over the means of violence
to intimidate and instil fear in people to political passivity; second, its
success in emasculating opposition leadership through a systematic
campaign of misinformation and debilitating the civil society through
its curb on the universities and other sectors of the society. The junta's
Political Developments in Burma and India’s Strategic Interests
114
ability to stay in power is partly due to the failure of its opponents to
form a solid coalition with a long-term, common strategy. In the recent
protests more than 100,000 people were drawn onto the streets of the
country's cities, but the protests lost steam after the authorities took ac-
tion. Anti-junta activists inside and outside the country failed to capita-
lize on the momentum of the protests or prolong and push the monks'
initiative further and channel it into major national and international
movements. At the same time the emergence of new leadership from
the student community were stifled by its brutal suppression of civil so-
ciety and students’ politics. Any social and political movements require
certain amount of success in its initial stage to build up further mo-
mentum and its base within the society. Without any initial and credible
gain in the objectives of the movement, people’s enthusiasm for social
and political activism seems to die out and however might be the cause
it is difficult to sustain it over a period of time. The military machine in
its more than four decades of rule has seen to it that all movements are
nipped in the mud with such a show of force that could act as a deter-
rent to crystallization of any future grievances against the regime.
With Aung San Suu Kyi, the country's democratically elected leader
who has never held power, in detention for almost 16 years that recently
was extended further by another year at least for the time being, the
anti-junta movement lacks a uniting leader, although she continues to
be a symbolic rallying point. Aung San Suu Kyi has charisma but she
remains under house arrest from where she can not take any active role
in the organization of dissent, and nearly the entire, original leadership
of the NLD is either dead, in prison or has simply given up all political
activity. Most young NLD activists have been imprisoned, cowed into
submission, or have fled the country. Only a handful of elderly spo-
kespersons remain, and none of them has the strength and charisma
to carry the party forward. That serves the interests of the junta, since
the new-look NLD would appear to the outside world not to be a viable
alternative. The ethnic-based desire for independence further compli-
cates the national movement, with these ethnic groups having their
own military wings that resist the central government. From a domestic
perspective, unless the national democratic movement can reconcile its
goals with the ethnic uprising's leaders and people’s aspirations, it is
unlikely that their campaign against the junta will find success in the
near future. Neither there is any hope for the international and a large
Burmese-in exile community’s attempt to bring about a freer and more
democratic Burma through sanctions and tourist boycotts. They have
not only failed to nudge the regime to any prospective change, but in
fact have only pushed it toward even harsher dictatorship and isola-
115
 tion, cocooned in their xenophobic nationalism arising out of a deep
suspicion of the West and anything foreign. It has also given enough
justification from the junta’s own perspective to brand any opposition
to it not emanating from within the country but as foreign-inspired and
instigation from outside and from the enemies of the Burmese state.
The Xenophobic Tatmadaw
Another important and unique feature of the military regime in Myan-
mar is the nature and character of its socialization process that made
it different from other military regimes that enjoyed power in other
Southeast Asian countries like Thailand and Indonesia. The Burmese
military not only took over political power in 1962 when they overthrew
the civilian government of U Nu, but also took complete control over
the economic life of the country. Unlike in Indonesia and Thailand
where the military got involved in businesses as they consolidated
their political control in course of time, in Burma the take-over was
simultaneous. Branded the “Burmese Way to Socialism,” this meant
that almost all private property was confiscated and handed over to a
number of military-run state corporations. The old mercantile elite,
which to a large extent were of ethnic Indian and Chinese origin, left
the country, and so did many of Burma’s intellectuals. Prior to the 1962
coup, Burma had had one of the highest living standards in Southeast
Asia, and a fairly well-educated population. But thereafter the military
became the only elite with very little formal education. Another im-
portant difference between the Burmese military and the militaries of
Indonesia and Thailand is that whereas the latter wanted to integrate
their countries’ economies with the outside world and took the help of
technocrats and the international economic institution to achieve faster
economic growth and development, the former was deeply suspicious
of the outside world and therefore isolated itself to be happy with a
pseudo-socialist model of development stifling the growth of a middle
class capable of acting as catalyst to change.
Bertil Lintner, a leading expert on Myanmar, has pointed out in a
recent paper: “The Burmese military establishment also developed into
a state-within-a-state, a society where army personnel, their families
and dependents enjoy a position far more privileged than their counter-
parts ever had in, for instance, Thailand and Indonesia. There are few
major enterprises which are not directly or indirectly controlled by the
military, or by businessmen affiliated with the military, like the power-
ful, 43-year-old tycoon Tay Za, who is close to junta leader Gen. Than
Shwe and his family. His Htoo Trading Company was one of two main
Political Developments in Burma and India’s Strategic Interests
116
contractors that built Burma’s new administrative capital, Naypyidaw.
The other was the Asia World Group, which is headed by Tun Myint
Naing, or Steven Law, the son of Lo Hsing-han, who in the 1970s was
branded by U.S. authorities as the king of opium in Burma’s sector
of the Golden Triangle.”1 The Tatmadaw is also much better equipped
than at any time in Myanmar’s modern history, mainly due to massive
procurement of arms from China. The latest expansion comes at a time
when the ruling military has managed to strike cease-fire agreements
with most of the country’s rebel groups, so, during the past decade,
there has been very little fighting in Myanmar’s traditionally volatile
frontier areas.
Those who wished for change in Myanmar with the recent monk
uprising perhaps forgot that “people’s power” is not enough to bring
about downfall of a dictatorial military junta. It needs to be supple-
mented by other objective conditions -- split within a regime, economic
collapse and withdrawal of support from the benefactors of the regime.
None of those factors are present in Myanmar today to trigger a collapse
of the junta. While there are rumours about a rift between Gen. Than
Shwe and Gen. Maung Aye, the latter believed to be unhappy about
the brutal manner in which the monks’ agitation have been put down,
there is no major crack within the regime. On the other hand, there are
enough indications to show that the Junta is united in its resolve to stay
in power, as there are too many vested interests at stake. Apart from the
fear of losing the privileged position the army enjoys in Burma today,
there are other factors at work to go against any change and the mainte-
nance of status quo. The top general Than Shwe and many other com-
bat-hardened army chiefs had felt during 2002 and 2004 when they were
negotiating with the NLD and the ethnic insurgence generating some
hope of some understanding, there were too many risks involved in any
compromise with the democratic groups. The memory of 1988, when
the country had come so close to revolution, the fear of retribution,
was still fresh in their minds. There was a measure of suspicion about
the motives of the West who had focussed all their energies on Aung
San Suu Kyi, ignoring all other developments in the country, including
some element of opening up of the economy and cease-fires with the
insurgent groups. To quote Thant Myint-U from his book The River of
Lost Footsteps: “There was also an impression that the outside world
was out to get them no matter what. When the talks with the NLD and
ethnic insurgents were still progressing, Washington had imposed new
debilitating sanctions. Many felt that turning inward again was safer,
more secure. There were venal motives as well, but the deeper source of
today’s conservatism is the content of too many in the officer corps with
117
 what they see, who admire the military state and military-led society, or
at least who could not easily dream up anything much better.”2
Second, economic collapse can also trigger change in a military or
authoritarian regime. One may be tempted to draw a parallel with In-
donesia in Myanmar where the current unrest was also sparked by the
rising fuel and food prices and the resultant hardships of the people.
Price rises and economic hardships have not led to the same kind of
economic depravation in the Myanmar to make the ordinary people
rise in revolt. Koichi Fujita, professor at Kyoto University’s Centre for
Southeast Asian Studies, has compiled an interesting report on the
standard of living in Myanmar in which he suggests that even though
consumer spending by the upper 20 percent of Myanmar’s households
is about four times the comparable amount spent by the lowest 20 per-
cent., there is almost no difference between the two groups in terms
of the ratio of food expenses, the income gap mostly reflects in the dif-
ferences in the choice of foods, the rich only eating better in terms of
quality of food. As the country’s infrastructure, such as electricity, tap
water and housing, are quite inadequate, poorer sections do not buy
TVs, refrigerators and other household electrical appliances because
electricity is supplied to less than 20 percent of the country’s farming
villages. The rise in the fuel prices in August may have made the food
prices dearer and possibly even scarce, it did not lead to starvation of
a significant section of people, which alone could have triggered a po-
pular revolt. Subsistence existence was enough to keep the bulk of the
population in Myanmar away from the risks of challenging the junta,
despite their strong support and empathy with the Monks in last year’s
so-called orange revolution.
Third, military regimes have collapsed when their international pro-
moters and benefactors have withdrawn their support. Both Marcos and
Soeharto were at one time darlings of the United States for their critical
role in promoting the Western strategic objectives in Southeast Asia
during the Cold War, but as they outlived their usefulness and made a
mess of their polity and economy through misrule they fell from favour
and became a major source of embarrassment. The same was true
about General Ershad in Bangladesh in late 1980s when he was asked
to step down favour of a civilian regime. Other than the support they
derived from their benefactor, the United States and the West, their
economies were linked with the outside world and thus vulnerable to its
pressure. This is not the case with Myanmar whose isolation, a function
of a policy of sanctions and boycotts besides its own internal dynamics,
makes the country least subject to pressure, particularly from the West.
The Myanmar junta derives its sustenance from the crucial support it
Political Developments in Burma and India’s Strategic Interests
118
receives from China for whom Myanmar is vitally important for its pro-
jection of military power in its southward movement into the Indian
Ocean. The main beneficiary of political and strategic developments in
Myanmar is China, upon whose military and financial support Myan-
mar depends. Now India is also friendly with the Myanmar junta for
its own national interests -- curbing insurgency in the Northeast India
in cooperation with the Myanmar army and competing with China in
securing energy concessions and certain other strategic goals.
Any transition to democracy is always difficult. Burma’s transition
will be especially difficult. This is a country that has already been at civil
war for sixty years and where that civil war is not yet concluded, where
there are hundreds of different ethnic and linguistic groups, many in-
habiting remote mountain areas, where poverty is endemic and where a
humanitarian crisis is looming, where there are hundreds of thousands
of people displaced by the fighting and tens of thousands more who are
refugees; and where there is a resilient narcotics industry and where
some of the richest businessmen (always the most likely to be influen-
tial in a democracy) are tied to the drugs trade. Added to these are two
especially difficult factors, legacies of Burmese history. The first is what
Thant Myint-U calls, the long history of failed state building and the
lack of a long-term vision in terms of the nature of the future state.3 In
the case of the first, he argues that the 19th century kings Mindon and
Thibaw attempted to remake traditional institutions and create new
ones to deal with the fast changing world, but these initiatives in the
end went nowhere because of the steady approach of British imperia-
lism. The traditional order collapsed entirely. The British Raj then tried
to transplant familiar institutions – a civil service, a judiciary, a profes-
sional police force and army, and eventually an elected legislature – but
these remained largely alien institutions, unwedded to local society, and
the abrupt end of colonial rule meant that they did not long survive the
British withdrawal. Any institution requires time and nurturing to take
root. There was some attempt in the U Nu days to fashion a democratic
state, but these efforts were crippled from the start by the civil war, the
Chinese invasions of the 1950s and the consequent steady growth of
General Ne Win’s military machine, which further decimated whatever
remained of the civil society in Burma. Arguably, if the army would not
have staged a coup in 1962, U Nu’s popularly elected government even
while it faced demand from the Shans and other ethnic communities
for autonomy could have possibly evolved certain mechanisms like a fe-
deral structure to mitigate some of their grievances vis-à-vis the central
authority dominated by the Burmans, the majority community.
U Nu’s problems did not arise just from the army, which did not give
119
 him any chance to try the autonomy plan for that would have deprived
them of their special role in the political system crafted by its wily leader
Ne Win, but also from his own party, the APPFL (Anti Fascist people’s
Freedom League) badly split around the time, a process in which Ne
Win and his cohorts also played contributory role in driving wedge
within the civilian political elite. From the early 1950s the army was
already stepping into a huge institutional vacuum, left behind by the
collapse of old royal structures, incomplete or ineffective colonial state
building, years of war, and then a sudden colonial withdrawal. And this
military machine was slowly but surely came under the control of just
one man, General Ne Win. Now after the army captured power in 1962,
it spread its tentacles everywhere emasculating all other institutions.
Today the military machine is all there is, with only the shadow of other
institutions remaining. So the problem in Burma is not simply getting
the military out of the business of government. It is also creating the
state institutions from the scratch that can replace the military state that
exists. And the military state exists not just in governance and adminis-
tration, but has entrenched itself in the economy of the country having
large stakes in its continuance. Civil bureaucracy is completely domina-
ted by the military that is imbued with a civic and political culture that
does not allow any democratic decision-making. To restore democracy
in Burma, it will require not only creation of political institutions but
also overhauling the existing bureaucracy and establishing new ones
with values, norms, rules as well as an orientation appropriate to a sys-
tem that enshrines civilian supremacy over the military in the adminis-
tration and decision-making system.
The second factor is more in the realm of ideas. The collapse of the
royal institutions led to the fast disappearance of many earlier notions
of kingship and the relationship between government and society,
including an entire tradition of learning, subtle and complex, based
on centuries of court and monastic scholarship. In its place a militant
nationalism came forward, merging at different times with different
visions of the future. There is also a strong utopian streak, going back
to the Student Union days of the 1930s, “a proclivity for absurd deba-
tes, on communism, socialism, and democracy, endless conversations
about diverse constitutional models and long-term political schemes,
which never see the light of the day,” to quote Thant Myint-U again,
“What is altogether missing is a history of pragmatic and rigorous po-
licy debate, on economics, finance, health care, or education as well as a
more imaginative and empathetic discussion of minority rights, rights
and shared in modern Burmese society.”4 Shorn of institutions and vi-
sions of new Burma based on the ground realities in the country, any
Political Developments in Burma and India’s Strategic Interests
120
political change even with a new civilian government will be meaning-
less, for the army would still be there, lurking in the wings and waiting
to overturn everything through a coup as it was in 1962.
There are no easy solutions to the intractable problems in Burma
and any particular one that will create democracy overnight or even
in several years. Burma does not have the professional and socio-po-
litical expertise to handle the vacuum that has been created through
the destruction of civil society by long years of military rule. A civilian
government without a broad political framework of inter-ethnic un-
derstanding will hardly be equipped to deal with the situation. It will
take decades to build various institutions – social, political, economic,
education and professional. Only a multifaceted path of institution buil-
ding, social change and economic development can lift Burma from a
long history of ills. And this can begin with breaking down Burma’s
isolation, reviving connections with the outside world, bringing in new
ideas, providing fresh air to a stale political environment and, in the
process, changing long-festering mentalities. Twenty years of Western
sanctions haven't worked. Neither has 20 years of “constructive enga-
gement” by Burma's neighbours. It is time to try something else. Ins-
tead of balking under pressure, West’s policy of boycott and sanctions
against the regime has only hardened the regime’s attitude toward both
the democratic movement and its leader, Aung San Suu Kyi. The new
missionary zeal in the U.S. approach, reflected in the 2003 Burma Free-
dom and Democracy Act banning all imports from that country and
several subsequent punitive executive orders, has occurred because of
the White House president's wife. Laura Bush's Burma fixation has put
the policy establishment in a bind: The more the United States seeks to
punish the regime, the more it undercuts its ability to promote political
reforms in Burma, and the more its actions threaten to disrupt the lives
of ordinary Burmese.5
Possibly, if Burma were less isolated and economically integrated
with the outside world and if it were coupled with a desire by the go-
vernment for greater economic reform, a rebuilding of state institu-
tions and a slow opening up of space for civil society in a gradual and
incremental fashion, then perhaps the conditions for political change
would emerge over the next decade or two. This may not be particularly
encouraging to those like Aung san Suu Kyi and thousands of political
activists, who had grown impatient with a system that is increasingly
becoming unbearable politically and economically, and sacrificed so
much to see at least some results in their own life time. However, given
the objective reality in the country and the junta’s dogged determina-
tion to stay in power defying both domestic opposition and internatio-
121
 nal pressure through sanctions, bargaining for gradual and incremen-
tal change over a period of time, rather than gaining nothing could be
a realistic option. There is no guarantee as yet that such an option will
succeed and that Burma will slowly move from authoritarianism to
democracy and that its brutal grip over the society will be relaxed once
the international community decides to do business and lift sanctions
to attract appropriate and reciprocal gestures from the junta. But it is
an approach which is worth trying given the fact that sanctions and in-
ternational pressure has not brought about desired results of crippling
the regime. Rather than sticking to a position that has not yielded any
results, it is worthwhile to look for outside the box solution through a
system of incentives to hope for incremental and gradual change. If no
movement is seen from such an approach within a period, then there
is always the scope for reverting to the sanctions regime all over again.
But the ice needs to be broken and the West can take a major initiative
in this process with India, China and ASEAN acting as interlocutors.
Sanctions together with international isolation will further undermine
institutions of government; a new generation will grow up less edu-
cated and in worse health; another addition to the list of failed states,
without any prospect of democratic change and with the military no
longer holding things together; a return to anarchy and the conditions
of 1948, only this time with more guns, more people and strong confi-
dent neighbour unlikely to idly stand by.
Sanctions and isolation can work only with a regime that is eager
for maintaining interactions with the outside world. The military junta
in Burma would rather prefer to keep the international community at
arms length, and the attitude of the international community gives it
further justification for isolation and repression. Thant Myint-U is elo-
quent in making the penultimate point in his study of the intractable
problems in his country: “What is sometimes hard to perceive from
the outside is just how damaging forty years of isolation – in particular
from the West and the international scene – has been to those trapped
inside. Trade with China and a few other (still developing) economies is
no substitute for renewed contacts with people and places around the
world. It is this isolation that has kept Burma in poverty, isolation that
fuels a negative, almost xenophobic nationalism; isolation that makes
the Burmese army see everything as a zero-sum game and any change
and any change as filled with peril; isolation that has made any conclu-
sion to the war so elusive, hardening differences; isolation that weake-
ned institutions – the ones on which any transition to democracy would
depend – to the point of collapse. Without isolation, the status quo will
be impossible to sustain. This is not to say that the problem will disap-
Political Developments in Burma and India’s Strategic Interests
122
pear overnight, but rather that solutions, so elusive today, will become
more apparent and easier to reach.”6 In isolation the army will simply
and quite confidently push forward its agenda, as it has done recently
– pushing in May this year a military-dominated constitution through a
guided referendum at a time when the country passed through natural
calamity, to be followed by elections in 2010 – and claiming legitimacy
from its sham outcome.
The constitutional draft the army prepared bans anyone who enjoyed
the rights and privileges of a foreign citizen from holding public office.
This would keep Suu Kyi out of government because her late husband,
Michael Aris, was a Briton and their two sons are British. Suu Kyi, who
is currently under house arrest and whose term has been extended by
another year, has been in detention without trial for more than 12 of
the past 18 years. The proposed charter allots 25 percent of the seats in
both houses of Parliament to the military. It empowers the president
to transfer legislative, executive and judicial powers to the military's
commander in chief for a year if a state of emergency arises. It also
stipulates that no amendments to the charter can be made without
the consent of more than 75 percent of lawmakers, making changes
unlikely unless supported by military representatives in Parliament. The
proposed charter also would protect junta members from prosecution
for any acts carried out as part of their official duties. Suu Kyi’s NLD
which was not included in the drafting process, together with ‘88
Generation Students group and the All Burma Monks’ Alliance, which
were instrumental in organizing mass pro-democracy protests last year
had obviously rejected the draft. Suu Kyi’s party tried to reassure voters
that a “no” vote did not violate a law issued by the junta that said anyone
who distributed leaflets or made speeches against the referendum could
be imprisoned for three years. Despite all those opposition, the junta
ensured that referendum passed through smoothly in its favour. Burma
has been without a constitution since 1988, when the current junta took
power and scrapped the previous charter after violently quashing mass
pro-democracy demonstrations.
Thinking Out of the Box
As the Western sanctions in the past have not been able cripple the regi-
me and international communities pleading for political reconciliation
had fallen on deaf ears, the world was calling on India and China to use
their leverage to make the junta to see reason. However, neither China
nor India has so far shown any inclination to abandon their pragmatic
strategic engagement with the regime for moral principles. The UN Se-
123
 cretary General’s envoy to Myanmar, Ibrahim Gambari, despite his best
efforts to establish a reasonable relationship with all the key players in
Burma and abroad, has also not brought back any good news out of his
recent missions. That however does not make his efforts to coordinate
the diplomatic efforts less important. Indeed, he must continue with
his efforts on political reform and national reconciliation between the
government, the democratic opposition under Aung San Suu Kyi, and
the ethnic groups to pursue one channel of opening up of Burma. This
will require sustained, low-profile mediation efforts by retaining the
confidence of the generals and refrain from too open and public denun-
ciations of their human rights record and other failings for the simple
reason of keeping the dialogue on board.
Gambari’s diplomatic and meditation efforts need to be
complemented by informal regional talks for maintaining the second
channel of communication with the Burmese junta. For years, ASEAN
had pursued a policy of constructive engagement with the Burmese in
the hope of nudging it to bring political reforms, and had taken heat for
their defence of Burma, that seriously damaged ASEAN’s relationship
with the West. Now is the time for them to call in their favours with the
regime, particularly at a time when it has an activist Secretary General
in the person of Surin Pitsuan, who in the past was in favour of even
abandoning the organization’s policy of non-interference in the internal
affairs of a fellow member. Other than ASEAN as a group, Indonesia,
the largest country in ASEAN and one with a record of military’s dual
function role that turned out to be dysfunctional over a period of time,
is particularly well-placed to take a lead. It is keen to show progressive
leadership, and it carries weight in the region and in Burma. Indonesia’s
recent transition to democracy accompanied by gradual reduction of
the military’s political role, and its experience in dealing with separatist
conflict has obvious relevance for Burma. Indonesia has become a
different sort of model—of the transition from military to civilian rule,
of openness and pluralism. It should use the influence it has in ASEAN
both to promote these virtues, and to turn it into a club that enforces
some minimum standards of decency on its members. Regional talks
on Burma, based on the prospect of its reintegration into the region,
should address the need for long-term stability, democratic reforms,
and transparent economic policy. Without joining the generals in their
paranoia, the participants will need to reassure them that Burma’s
stability and territorial integrity are not threatened.
As we have noted earlier, military rule has also caused most formal
and informal institutions to wither. Even many in the democratic op-
position accept that progress will require close cooperation with the
Political Developments in Burma and India’s Strategic Interests
124
army. The junta’s so-called road map to democracy, though wholly
inadequate, could be viewed as an initial offer for discussion, but need
to be broadened by the inclusion of NLD and other political groups that
the junta has barred in their road-map. It is here India, as the largest
democracy in the world and experienced in nation-building in a multi-
cultural and multi-racial society, must use its influence with the junta
to make their constitution as broad-based as possible and can also help
in the process of drafting it. Minister Jairam Ramesh’s comment at an
international pledging conference in Yangon on May 25. Organised by
the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the United
Nations that India “salute(s) the people and the Government of
Myanmar for their resilience and fortitude in facing [the] devastation”7
caused by Cyclone Nargis, at a time when the junta suspects a game
plan of engineering its downfall in the wake of the disaster behind the
West’s demand for entry to its aid workers, will surely endear India in
the eyes of the regime that might offer some leverage in its back-room
diplomacy to seek change in Burma. Change will require compromises,
and will be slow at best.
Integration of Burma’s economy with its neighbours – India, China,
Thailand, and Indo-China countries of the Mekong region is a neces-
sary condition for economic interdependence and breaking Burma’s
isolation. The success of Burma’s transitions to democracy hinges to
a large extent on viable economic development that can create a gro-
wing middle class, which can then seek greater reform and political
change in the country. This has happened in the case of Indonesia,
Thailand, Taiwan and South Korea in the last decade. Growing econo-
mic interdependence has also changed the pattern of economy in the
Mekong region, comprising, Thailand, Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia.
From 2002 to 2006, Vietnam registered an annual average economic
growth rate of 7.8 percent, Cambodia 10 percent and Laos 6.5 percent.
As these figures show, countries in the Mekong sub region are de-
epening their economic interdependence with the help of economic
and infrastructure development. In this open regional network of
mutual reliance, Thailand and Vietnam are emerging as hubs with
network of economic and trade interactions with China, Japan, the
United States and other ASEAN member countries. The economic
interdependence has also helped these countries to fashion new
kind of relations in their diplomacy with the countries of the region.
Thailand’s and Vietnam’s ties with China are growing side by side
with their integration with ASEAN and maintaining strong diplomatic
connections with Japan and the United States. The need is to adopt
a long-term strategy aimed at further integrating Myanmar into the
125
 regional network of interdependence.8 To realize such a goal, assis-
tance should be extended for human resource development and the
construction of the Asian Highway by extending the north-east and
east-west corridors from Bangkok to India via Myanmar, measures
that will in the long run facilitate socioeconomic and political change
in Myanmar.
To nudge the regime toward reform and change, China, India and
ASEAN must act in concert offering certain incentives to the junta in
return for their readiness for political reconciliation, in the same way
as North Korea was persuaded to give up its nuclear program.9 India,
China and ASEAN have already been taking an active role in the relief
of the recent cyclone victims in Burma with the consent of the junta,
which is less suspicious of these three than any country from the West.
It is in this context India’s role in Burma assumes significance. India
can mull the idea of hosting Seven-Party talks involving China, ASEAN,
Japan, USA, EU and Myanmar. As first step, Myanmar should be urged
to free Aung San Suu Kyi immediately in return for lifting of economic
sanctions, followed by the beginning of political reconciliation based on
a framework whereby the interests of the people and their democratic
aspirations need to be matched and reconciled with the legitimate con-
cern of the armed forces. The West need to be magnanimous, if not to
the regime but to the suffering people of Burma in their hour of crisis,
in lifting the economic sanction they have imposed over the years that
affects essentially the ordinary people than the regime. Lifting of econo-
mic sanctions for a limited period could be tried to persuade the regime
to give some matching concessions in the form of release of all political
prisoners. There is need for concessions from Suu Kyi’s side as well.
She can possibly do what Ramos Horta of Timor Leste once suggested
- dissociate herself from the NLD and emerge as a non-partisan leader,
a mediator and a facilitator in the progress toward democracy -- Nelson
Mandela of Myanmar. It is a difficult job but worth trying to break the
deadlock.
Politics of Cyclone Relief
More than seven weeks have passed since Cyclone Nargis Swept th-
rough the Irrawaddy Delta in southern Burma leaving a trail of flat-
tened villages and broken lives and arousing international sympathy
that turned to anguish as the military government obstructed aid. Ho-
wever, according to a report in New York Times, published in the third
week of May 200810, doctors and aid workers returning from remote
areas of delta offered a less pessimistic picture of the human cost of
Political Developments in Burma and India’s Strategic Interests
126
the delay in reaching survivors. The doctors have not seen any signs
of starvation or outbreaks of disease. According to the doctors, while
the estimated loss of lives due to the catastrophe might have been
130,000, the number of lives lost specially because of the junta’s
slow response to it appears to have been smaller than expected.
They continue to criticize the government’s secretive posture and
obsession with security, its restrictions on foreign aid experts and
the weeks of dawdling that left bloated bodies befouling waterways
and survivors marooned with little food. But the specific character of
the cyclone, the hardiness of villagers and aid from private citizens
helped prevent further death and sickness. Most of the people killed
by the cyclone drowned. But those who survived were not likely to
need urgent medical attention. “We saw very few serious injuries,”
to quote Frank Smithuis, manager of the substantial mission of Doc-
tors without Borders in Myanmar, “You were dead or you were in OK
shape.”11 The cyclone swept away bamboo huts throughout the delta;
in the hardest hit villages, it left almost no traces of habitation. That
appears to be the primary reason villagers were able to stay alive for
weeks without aid. As they waited, the survivors, most of whom were
fishermen and farmers, lived off the coconuts, rotten rice and fish.12
Relief workers and doctors believe that the debate over access for
foreigners and the refusal; of the government to allow in military he-
licopters and ships from the US, France and Britain overshadowed a
substantial relief operation carried out mainly by Burmese citizens
and monks. Even the highest ranking American diplomat in Burma,
Shari Villarosa, admitted: “The Burmese people are used to getting
nothing. . . .I’m not getting the sense that there have been a lot of
deaths as a result of the delay.”
Indeed, the junta’s cavalier response to the catastrophe has been
rightly criticised for throwing roadblocks in the way of an international
relief effort, by slowing the logistics of getting emergency supplies to an
estimated 2.4 million needy victims of the cyclone and for reluctantly
granting visas to foreign relief experts keen to enter the country and the
areas hardest hit by the storm. But keeping in mind junta’s suspicion
toward the West for its agenda of ‘regime change’ one can explain its
reluctance to forfeit its right to be the main regulator of relief efforts of
all external aid, particularly the one’s coming from the Western sources
and agencies dominated by them. The regime’s obduracy is also con-
ditioned by its fear that the foreign aid workers might use their relief
efforts to destabilize the regime. UN Secretary-General Ban Ki Moon’s
personal visit to Rangoon together with the efforts of ASEAN’s new Se-
cretary General Surin Pitsuan yielded some positive results and brought
127
 pressure on the junta to relax their restrictions on the entry of relief
workers, particularly from the countries that are not friendly toward it.
"We will warmly welcome any assistance and aid which are provided
with genuine good will from any country or organisation providing that
there are no strings attached, nor politicisation involved," Thein Sein
told the conference that was organized in Rangoon under the auspices
of the United Nations and the ASEAN in the last week of May. While
about two dozen planes from Asian countries and the United Nations
have been allowed to land in the capital, Rangoon, during the past few
weeks, the junta has denied visas to many relief workers, insisting
that it will distribute all the aid itself, it has impounded much of the
supplies at the airport. The United States has been granted permission
to land a single planeload of supplies -- and that only 10 days after the
cyclone struck.
India is believed to be the first donor to have succeeded in off-
loading relief supplies by sea at the Yangon port. And, the Myanmar
junta did not say `no.' Indeed, Myanmar Foreign Minister U Nyan
Win (not to be confused for the NLD Spokesman by the same name)
was present at the Yangon airport to welcome the arrival of two of
India's AN-32 aircraft laden with relief supplies such medicines as
also shelter-related and roofing materials. India airlifted more supp-
lies thereafter too. China is also understood to have had no difficulty
in sending in relief supplies to Burma at this time. And, all this hap-
pened, when Western aid agencies were reporting a stand-off with
the SPDC over permissions to send in supplies by air and, no less
importantly, “expert” foreign aid workers. The purpose here is not to
condone the Burmese junta for its tactics to deny any credit to the out-
side agencies by restricting their entry into the affected regions and
take frontline position in relief operations and thereby earn all the lau-
rels for itself and show to the people their sincerity and earnestness
for their well being. If the West and the outside agencies would have
played ball with the junta, it would have found no ground to justify to
the people of Burma its lack of credibility and also its lack of expertise
in handling such massive aid and rehabilitation measures. The pe-
ople themselves would have found out the hollowness of the regime’s
claim to handle the crisis alone, and exposed its vulnerabilities. In the
stand off between the junta and the outside relief agencies, the junta
won a partial victory in protecting the sovereignty of the country and
its position as the only legitimate agency to handle its own problems.
By being magnanimous, the West could have turned this into their
own victory by exposing the regime’s hypocrisy about its concern for
the people.
Political Developments in Burma and India’s Strategic Interests
128
Possible Role for India in the Political Change in Burma
Arguably India can play a positive role in the political development
of Burma by integrating its economy with that country and break its
isolation from the region. India’s position on Burma has shifted from
its initial total support to the democratic movement in the country, pro-
viding shelters to its leaders in exile, to one of doing business with the
military junta to derive certain strategic benefits to counter the strategic
depth China, India’s major rival in Asia, has achieved over the years by
providing necessary support to an isolated regime that was desperate
for its survival against the odds imposed by Western sanction. While
India’s current policy appears to all observers as tilted more towards the
Burmese junta, in reality since the August 2007 uprising it is pursuing
a more nuanced policy through its backdoor diplomacy and genteel
persuasion to bring about its integration with the economy of its north-
eastern part that borders Burma, and nudging the junta to a possible
reconciliation with the opposition. These efforts have not yet brought
any visible results, except that India was believed to have facilitated UN
envoy Ibrahim Gambari’s second visit to Rangoon to meet Burmese
generals. While India is handicapped by the complexity of Burma’s in-
ternal development as well as limited resources at its disposal vis-à-vis
other players in Burma, India must play a much greater pro-active role
given its moral claim as the world’s largest democracy in the world and
a country that can act as a mediator between the junta and the West
in the future process of political reconciliation and development in
Burma.
Burma is important in India's foreign for at least three, if not more,
important reasons. First, it’s strategic importance as a bridge between
India and Southeast Asia. Myanmar is the only country in Southeast
Asia that has land and maritime borders with Southeast Asia, an impor-
tant route for trade and commerce, particularly with India's northeast
states. The latest thrust in India's Look East Policy is to link India's
Northeast with Southeast Asia to restore old historical relations bet-
ween the two regions, and also build land connectivity between India
and Thailand, Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam through Myanmar for pro-
motion of trade and commerce. This could be achieved by the revival
of the old silk route used for trade and commerce between India and
China. If infrastructure and the security situation in India's Northe-
ast could be improved, the closer interaction between the two regions
will bring enormous economic benefits to both India's Northeast and
Myanmar as they are natural partners for sub-regional cooperation for
economic development and prosperity for the people of the area. Aro-
129
 und 1993 India began to re-evaluate its strategy due to concerns that
its policies had achieved little except to push Burma closer to Beijing,
which obviously has no interest in promoting democracy in the country.
Closeness to Beijing has also helped the junta to withstand the pres-
sure from the international community and ensured its survival. India,
therefore, initiated a dramatic policy shift aimed at improving relations
with Myanmar’s generals, as it was also becoming clear that the pro-
democracy movement would not achieve power within the foreseeable
future. At that time Myanmar’s military government had effectively
cowed Suu Kyi’s National League for Democracy (NLD) party into sub-
mission that the exiled community seemed to have little or no impact
on political developments inside the country- even as some of them
actually stayed in the personal residence of George Fernandes, defence
minister from 1998 through 2004.
To improve closer relations and connectivity with Myanmar, India
in recent years has taken up a number of road and port construction
projects. It has constructed the 160-km Tamu-Kalewa-Kalemyo road
in Myanmar from Manipur border. It is also assisting in the proposed
trilateral highway project to connect Moreh in Manipur to Mae Sot in
Thailand via Bagan in Myanmar. The Indian government in January
2008 committed US$120 million to rebuild Myanmar’s western Sittwe
port and construct road and water links through the facility, which
will connect Myanmar’s western Arakan State to India’s northeastern
state of Mizoram. The build-transfer- use Kaladan Multi-Modal Tran-
sit Transport Project comes on top of a previous $27 million invest-
ment to improve the 160-kilometer road from Mizoram to Kalewa, in
Myanmar’s Sagaing division, northeast of Sittwe. Final agreement for
the Sittwe project, which has been under consideration for more than
six years and will take nearly three years to complete, was finally signed
during a visit in April this year of high-level officials from Myanmar to
India. India’s Kaladan multi-modal transit transport facility is aimed
at improving linkage between Indian ports on the eastern seaboard
and Sittwe port in Myanmar. This would enable transportation by river
transport and road to Mizoram providing an alternate route for trans-
port of goods to northeast India. A proposal to build a rail link from
Jiribaum in Assam to Hanoi in Vietnam through Myanmar is also on
the cards.
India undoubtedly is in a disadvantaged position compared to China
in improving its connectivity with Myanmar, as Most of Myanmar’s
mountain ranges and major river systems run north south. This ma-
kes construction of road communication and movement from India’s
east to Myanmar against the grain of the country difficult. At the same
Political Developments in Burma and India’s Strategic Interests
130
time it facilitates easier movement from the Chinese border in the
northeast, and provides for natural flow of traffic. The Chinese have
used this favourable terrain configuration to build road from the Chi-
nese border to Mandalay in the heart of Myanmar and onward to the
coast. As Myanmar provides the shortest access from Mainland China
to India’s eastern borders these developments have special strategic
significance. India’s north-eastern states bordering Myanmar are not as
well developed as Yunan province of China bordering Myanmar in the
northeast. China has found it useful to link the development of Yunan
region jointly with Myanmar and Laos. Thus the two-way border trade
and commerce is qualitatively and quantitatively better with China than
with India.
India’s trade with Myanmar is growing at a fast clip. It is fourth
largest trading partner with its investment reaching $35.08 million last
year. In 2006–2007, India-Myanmar trade was estimated at $733.59
million falling short of the target of $ one billion. (In 2004–2005,
China-Myanmar trade was $1.145 billion as against India’s figure of
$ 341.40 million in 2004–05). India is taking steps such as extending
airlines; land and sea routes to strengthen trade links with Myanmar.
It is also cooperating with Myanmar in areas like agriculture,
telecommunications, and oil and gas sectors etc. The principal exports
from Myanmar to India include rice, maize, pulses, beans, sesame,
seeds, fish, and prawns, timber, plywood and raw rubber, base metals
and castor seeds. In return, India exports machinery and industrial
equipment, dairy products, textiles, pharmaceutical products and
consumer goods. In February 2007 Sanjay Budhia, vice president of
the Indian Chamber of commerce and Industries, said in a speech in
Kolkata that India and Myanmar “have set a US$ 1 billion trade target
in 2006-07 up from US$ 557 million in 2004-05.”13
In January 2008, India’s foreign minister Pranab Mukherjee became
the first senior leader from a major democracy to visit Myanmar’s
new capital, Naypuitaw, where the junta moved its administrative
offices in November 2005. Even in the midst of recent tumultuous
anti-government demonstrations in Myanmar, when soldiers fired
on protesters, senior officials from the ONGC led by Petroleum
and natural Gas Minister Murli Deora, flew to Naypyitaw to sign an
agreement to explore for gas in three new blocks in the Bay of Bengal
off Myanmar’s southwestern Arakan coast.14 Myanmar, for its part,
appears to play the two countries off against each other. India was
reportedly disappointed by Myanmar’s decision last August to give
the nod to Chinese state-owned PetroChina for highly coveted gas
concessions in the large Shwe fields off the coast of Myanmar’s Arakan
131
 State. China edged out South Korea’s Daewoo International and India’s
two state energy companies, which are currently developing the field.
The Shwe gas field reserves are estimated to be worth between $37
billion and $52 billion, with the SPDC scheduled to receive $12 billion
and $17 billion over a 20-year period. Meanwhile, on December 12
2007, a Memorandum of Understanding was signed to set up a center
for the sharing of information technology skills in the old Myanmar
capital of Yangon. The agreement to set up the India-Myanmar Center
for the Enhancement of Information Technology Skills (IMCEITS) was
signed by deputy foreign minister Kyaw Thu during the first official
visit to India of a Myanmar official since the crackdown.
India became much more proactive after Gen. Maung Aye, the sec-
ond most powerful man in the Burmese junta, visited India in early
April 2008, and the country signed a major agreement with Burma ac-
cording to which it has agreed to build a multimillion-dollar (euro) sea-
port and transportation system in Myanmar as India presses ahead with
investment. The project envisions the construction of the earlier men-
tioned multi-modal Kaladan transport corridor, which will allow port
access to northeastern states, bypassing Bangladesh. It includes the up-
grading of the Sittwe port and the Kaladan waterway as well as the con-
struction of a road from Setpyitpy in (Kaletwa) to the India-Myanmar
border at a cost of 5.3 billion rupees. This project will greatly enhance
connections between Myanmar and India, in particular with India’s
northeast region. The transportation system will give India greater ac-
cess to Burma’s oil and gas reserves, which India needs to fuel its rapid
economic growth. This alternative route is crucial in view of the long
distance involved and the severe pressure exerted on the extant Siliguri
Corridor. In addition, it offers an alternative route given Bangladesh’s
continued reluctance to provide India with transit rights through its
territory to the Northeast. The project would link Kolkata-to-Sittwe-to-
Kaleutuwa-to-Myanmar Border (in Mizroam). Besides development of
a 225-km waterway, the project envisages the construction of two roads,
namely NHI54 to the India-Burma border and Kaleutwa to Boaorder,
stretching 117 km and 52 km respectively. Since the proposed route
would save both time and shorten the transport distance of goods, the
costs are likely to go down and the availability of goods to increase in the
region.15 The project is also likely to promote economic development
and greatly reduce insurgency in the area. It also includes the Northeast
in a web of connectivity with South East Asia, and as such, represents a
strategic project of immense geopolitical importance to India.
Assistance to Burma/Myanmar by International Financial
Institutions (IFIs)— the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund
Political Developments in Burma and India’s Strategic Interests
132
(IMF) and the Asian Development Bank (ADB)—was suspended in
1988 following the suppression of the Burmese democracy movement.
UNDP assistance was limited in the early 1990s to humanitarian
assistance at the grassroots level. In practical terms, only the USA
has the power to authorize the resumption of IFI assistance to
Burma. However, India has a definite stake in resuming international
assistance to Burma as one way of ending Burmese isolation, and funds
from the IFIs would enable India to build the transport infrastructure
in Burma/Myanmar (including the Asian Highway) necessary to
create an effective Asian regional economic zone. Such a zone could
be established more quickly Such a zone could be established more
quickly with IFI (International Financial Institutions) funds and the
highways would most likely be of higher quality than locally-funded
roads. This would bring more trade and investment to India, especially
its Northeast region, a development that might help stabilize the area.
The accelerated construction of the Asian Highway and other transport
links might encourage Bangladesh to open her borders to free transit.
Internationally-funded transport infrastructure, training of Burmese
civilian administrators, improvement of Burma’s economic and legal
institutions, and a likely increase in direct foreign investment could all
lead to a more economically stable Burma capable of purchasing Indian
goods, which would help restore Burma’s balance of trade with India.
Better energy and transport infrastructure would reduce the costs of
extraction of Burma’s mineral exports. The training programmes that
would doubtless be part of IFI assistance would increase administrative
expertise in Burma/Myanmar, leading to a more stable and prosperous
economy, in part through increased foreign investment. The increase in
prosperity likely to accompany a more stable economy and a more stable
political situation might also reduce the flow of migrants from Burma to
India. A Burma connected through trade, investment and other linkages
firstly with the Mekong Region through the East-West and North-South
corridors and secondly with India though its Northeast region is bound
to become integrated into regional networks of interdependence. Such
integration will bring Burma economic prosperity and development, as
it did Burma’s Southeast Asian neighbours. Only this kind of scenario
makes it possible to envision political change and a transition to
democracy in Burma.
At present, however, these are little more than necessary foundation
stones for a comprehensive Burma policy. To construct such a policy,
Indian officials need to think outside the box. Trading links can be
pursued not just through natural resources, but also through small-
scale cross-border commerce that helps to enrich marginalized and
133

impoverished parts of both Burma and India. Currently, however,
such trade is constrained by restrictive travel regulations informed
by security concerns rather than development perspectives. Cultural
diplomacy is another important area that should rise up the agenda.
Historical bonds between the two states are extensive, formed notably
by religious links, trading ties and a common experience of the British
Raj. Only 60 years ago, India’s first Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru
and Burma’s first Premier U Nu were good friends and often consulted
each other on international issues. Just 20 years ago, Prime Minister
Rajiv Gandhi was a personal friend of democracy icon Aung San Suu
Kyi. However, several decades of xenophobic rejection by successive
Burmese generals mean that New Delhi must now work hard to
re-establish friendly relations. Education is also key. The shambolic
state of teaching and learning in Burma means that the country is
in desperate need of outside help to train future generations. While a
small number of American, British and Australian schools now operate
inside the country, they cannot meet the need for affordable education.
Indian schools, which have been successfully opened in many parts of
the world, have a crucial role to play.
The Burma problem runs deep and will not be solved in a matter of
months or even years. To build a platform for long-term engagement
with its strategic neighbour, India’s foreign policy elite needs to be
more creative. By taking its Burma policy beyond military and natural
resource issues, New Delhi can both enhance its security leverage, and
recapture a relationship that was once close. Engagement on a broad
front can pay multiple dividends. Promoting this policy shift is also
in the interests of the wider world that desperately wants to facilitate
long-term change inside Burma. Indeed, if India were able to gain the
confidence of military leaders in Burma through multiple strands of en-
gagement, it could start to promote multilateral talks bringing ASEAN,
China and Japan from Asia together with the EU and US from outside
to engage in talks with the Burmese junta and, ultimately, leading op-
position forces. In charting a new Burma policy for India, it has to be
acknowledged that greater engagement by New Delhi will not generate
immediate political reform. However, it will mean that when fresh cri-
ses create new opportunities for mediation, India will be better placed
to step up to the plate.
Notes
1
Bertil Lintner, “The Staying Power of the Burmese Military Regime.” See this volume
2
. Thant Myint – U, The River of Lost Footsteps: Histories of Burma (Faber and Faber, New
York, 2006). p.341.
Political Developments in Burma and India’s Strategic Interests
134
3
Ibid, pp. 345–6
4
Ibid.
5
While prohibiting new investment by American citizens or enti-
ties, Washington has protected the business interests of Chevron Corp.,
which acquired a stake in the Yadana natural-gas export project in
Burma when it bought Unocal Corporation in 2005. Because Unocal’s investment in the
project, in which France’s Total SA holds the biggest stake, predated the imposition of
U.S. sanctions, Chevron has used a grandfather clause to stay put in Burma – one of the
few large Western companies left there. See, Brahma Chellaney, “Burma sanctions don’t
Work, Japan Times. Accessible at: http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/eo20080314bc
html.
6
Ibid. p.347.
7
Quoted in P.S. Suryanarayana, Myanmar’s cyclone crisis and India’s
aid,” The Hindu, 30 may 2008. India is the only country to have so salu-
ted the Myanmarese authorities, and New Delhi was conspicuous among the
first parties that sent relief supplies. In fact, it is believed that Indian Navy
ships were the first to offload seaborne aid supplies at the Yangon port. But New Delhi
fights shy of claiming credit for such a `humanitarian first.’ India, China, and Thailand
rushed to provide unconditional aid as soon as it was possible, responses that went over
well with the Burmese junta.
8
For outlining a long-term new strategy, see also Takashi Shiraishi, “Approach Myanmar
with long-term initiatives,” The Yomiuri Shimbun (Tokyo), 10 February 2008. Accessible
at: http://www.yomiuri. co.jp/dy/ world/20080210TD Y08001.htm
9
Offering incentives does help to pull regimes out of isolation and promote more inter-
national understanding, e.g., North Korea, which has recently handed over a long-awai-
ted account of its nuclear programme to China as part of the arrangement of Six-Party
talks offering North Korea diplomatic and economic incentives to disarm., an initiative
launched by China. The declaration, which is six months overdue, is expected to detail
North Korea’s plutonium production efforts. The United States was initially very reluc-
tant to deal with North Korea due to its extreme cynicism about the regime’s intentions.
US President George W. Bush cautiously welcomed the move, but said the US still had
”serious concerns” about Pyongyang. He said he was notifying Congress of his intent
to take the communist state off a US list of state terrorism sponsors in 45 days - if the
declaration was complete. International Herald Tribune, 27 June 2008.
10
Quoted in Times of India, 25 may 2008.
11
Ibid.
12
Ibid.
13
The Telegraph (Kolkata), 26 February 2007.
14
See, Bertil Lintner, “India Stands by Myanmar status quo,” Asia Times, 14 November
2007.
15
For details on these projects, see Times of India, 3 April 2008.
135
 For Closer China – U.S.
Collaboration on Myanmar
Xiayun Ni

The Myanmar issue flared up once again in 2007. Viewing the outbursts
of massive anti-government demonstrations there ever seen since 1988,
Washington highlighted it, with President George W. Bush and other
government leaders repeatedly condemning the Yangon (also Rangoon)
military regime. It used the United Nations as a platform for exerting
pressure and asked surrounding countries, China in particular, to use
its leverage in bringing the ruling Junta into line.
Instead, on January 12, 2007, China and Russia jointly vetoed the
U.S.-British-sponsored draft resolution on Myanmar at the UN Security
Council, thus turning the matter into a point of discord between Beijing
and Washington. Under these circumstances, a proper handling of the
question will surely benefit sustained expansion of bilateral ties. In-
deed, this has turned out to be another task facing Chinese diplomacy
after the Korean nuclear crisis and the Darfur issue in Sudan.

Background
Located in the western part of Indo-chine, neighboring two big powers
as China and India, Burma has the largest land territory among the
Southeast Asian countries. It occupies an extremely important strategic
geopolitical position, not only because it is the only land route way lin-
king Southeast and South Asia, but also because it has a pretty long sea
shore, which once served as one of the main seaports for China toward
into the Indian Ocean. Along with its abundant storage of natural re-
sources, Burma has been long regarded as “a bridge connecting regio-
nal cooperation.” Constantly highlighting Burma’s unique geopolitical
occupation, international powers are more and more getting involved
into this country today, especially after it joining the ASEAN; its strate-
gic importance is even more stressed, and gaming over it is even fiercer.
Thus Burma’s political life becomes an international one – the “Burma
Issue” was officially listed into the agenda of UN Security Council in
September 2006, being argued around an international table. Over a
vote on a draft bill of Burma Issue this January 16, jointly proposed by
the US and British, both China and Russia cast their negative ballots.

136 137
 Consequently, the Burma Issue, 20 years after its first up show, turned
out to be another conflicting point between the US and China.
The Myanmar issue can be traced to the September 18, 1988 harsh
suppression of pro-democracy demonstrations. In the name of the State
Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) the military junta inherited
the regime from aged General Newen, the long time (1962-1987) army
chief two months earlier after nationwide unrest beginning in March.
In 1992, the military renamed itself as State Peace and Development
Council (SPDC) in a bid to placate critics. Under dual pressure from
domestic opposition and international condemnation, the Junta was
forced into holding multi-party elections to accommodate demands for
reform. Led by Aung San Suu Kyi, daughter of national independence
hero Aung San and the 1991 Nobel Peace Prizewinner, the major oppo-
sition party, the National League for Democracy (NLD), won 87 percent
of the seats of the National Assembly.
But the military regime refused to hand over power by placing Aung
San Suu Kyi under house arrest and splitting up the opposition. This
sparked strong resentment from Western countries and set in motion a
succession of economic sanctions and political pressure, thus turning
the crisis into a confrontation between the junta and external Western
forces.
The problem has also turned into an international issue ever since.
In May 2003, bloody conflicts broke out between NLD supporters and
government loyalists, leading to the house arrest of Suu Kyi for the third
time and resultant tougher U.S. sanctions.
The year 2006 saw deterioration of the political crisis. Defying strong
Western opposition, the military regime extended another year the de-
tention term for Suu Kyi and NLD vice chairman Ting Oo and outlawed
four anti-government groups in exile including the All Burma Student
Democratic Front as terrorist organizations.
Under pressure from ASEAN, the junta gave up rotating chairmanship
of the sub-regional organization for 2006. The UN Security Council had
twice held hearings on Myanmar since 2005 and decided to adopt the is-
sue on its formal agenda, thus making it possible for any member to raise
the matter at any time, thereby driving the military regime into an unpre-
cedented harsh international environment. However, on January 12, 2007,
China and Russia double vetoed a US-UK cosponsored draft resolution,
calling Myanmar a threat to regional peace. But things did not end here.
Since September 2007, the military junta raised by a big margin fuel
oil prices, touching off once again anti-government demonstrations led
by Buddhist monks in major cities, the largest scale ever seen in two de-
cades. Their harsh suppression triggered political turmoil. The Myan-
For Closer China – U.S. Collaboration on Myanmar
138
mar issue once again flared up. Though the situation has been brought
under control, the future of the Myanmar issue still merits attention
due to the interaction of a number of external and internal factors.
U.S. Interests in Burma
The essential reason for the U.S. not to leave Burma alone is that the
U.S. and its western allies regard it as being of strategic importance to
their international interests. I will explore the geopolitical, military and
energy transportation aspects of this view.
Geopolitically, because Burma is so close to China and India,
it could easily cut off the land connection between China and the
ASEAN countries, and could play a key role in restraining India’s move
towards the South China Sea and Southeast Asia. At the same time
Burma serves as the only land route connecting Southeast Asia and
south Asia, and it also guards the gateway to the Strait of Malacca, the
crucial channel linking the Indian and Pacific oceans. For its two giant
neighbors, China and India, Burma performs an even more important
function. For China, it is the strategic passage for its strategies both in
the Asia Pacific and the India Ocean, and for India, it is the important
bridge to the ASEAN countries.
Because the Vietnam War dragged the U.S. into that country for
two presidential administrations, Burma – regarded as an uncompleted
section in the arc surrounding China – was left undisturbed by the U.S.
during the Cold War. However, soon after the end of the Cold War, the
U.S. began to intervene. Under the pretext of developing democracy
and protecting civil rights in Burma (together with the imposition of
political restrictions and economic blockades from the west) the U.S.
is putting heavy pressure on the present military regime to turn power
over to U.S.-friendly political groups, such as the Democratic Union, led
by Aung San Suu Kyi. But that is not all the U.S. wants. Its plan is to see
a pro-U.S. Burmese government and a strategic network of Southeast
Asian states favored by the U.S. which will restrain the upward rise of
China and protect U.S. interests in the region.
Burma matters a lot to the U.S. militarily. According to some U.S.
strategists, it is possible that Burma could act as one of China’s seaports
or naval bases. The U.S. also seriously considers that Burma could be-
come a future key stalwart in its encircling chain around China. Much
has been discussed within the U.S. about China’s use of military power
to ensure control of strategic passages, yet most of which have no proof
or evidence. As early as the end of the 1990s, a classified report from
the U.S. Southern Command asserted, amongst its other statements,
139
 that China was attempting to make use of trading ports and facilities all
over the world in order to construct strategic toll-gates. An interior U.S.
Defense Department report entitled “Energy Future in Asia” exposed
in early 2005,1 listed six “pearls” on its “string of pearls” strategy, with
Burma’s Sittwe Port as one the pearls. “China has developed close ties to
the military regime in Rangoon and turned a nation wary of China into
a “satellite” of Beijing close to the Strait of Malacca, through which 80%
of China’s imported oil passes. China is building naval bases in Burma
and has electronic intelligence gathering facilities on islands in the Bay
of Bengal and near the Strait of Malacca. Beijing also supplied Burma
with “billions of dollars in military assistance to support a de facto mi-
litary alliance,” the report said.2 Another article, in the Washington Ti-
mes of March 24, 2007, commented that “China is modernizing at least
six naval bases in Myanmar, using the Burmese government’s name for
its country. This could support Chinese submarine operations in the
region as part of Beijing’s string of pearls’ strategy of clinching regional
defense and security agreements to secure its mounting fuel require-
ments and enhance its military profile in the Indian Ocean region.”3
As far as energy is concerned, Burma has the richest natural resour-
ces in Indochina and is especially abundant in minerals, timber, oil and
gas. Today, Burma ranks as the world’s 10th biggest exporter of gas.
Because of long-term economic sanctions imposed by the U.S., there
has been little progress in bilateral economic relations. What worries
the U.S. most is that China might get rid of the oil embargo imposed
by the U.S. by means of getting Burma under control. The U.S. regards
Burma as occupying a very important position in China’s overseas ener-
getic strategy map. The U.S. government believes that both China and
Burma are planning an oil pipeline between the two countries to avoid
the oil transportation channels via the Strait of Malacca. Once China
has Burma under control, not only could the oil pipeline run straight
from Burma into China, but it would also be possible for oil tankers to
reach Burma directly through the Persian Gulf, thus avoiding the long
route around the Strait of Malacca and the South China Sea. This would
be an enormous saving in oil expenses for China. Furthermore, China
could take advantage of its position to put pressure on all the Southeast
Asian countries, as well as on Japan and Taiwan.
U.S. Pressure on Burma
The United Nations is still a main stage for U.S. activity. It can be seen
that most actions taken by the U.S. are within the framework of the
UN as a means of persuading its allies as well as ASEAN members to
For Closer China – U.S. Collaboration on Myanmar
140
impose intense political pressure and strict economic sanctions against
Burma.
This intense pressure started as early as 1990, when the U.S. began
to criticize Burma for its democracy and human rights conditions.
These included suppression of democratic groups, detention of politi-
cal prisoners, impeding of the democratic process, as well as its drug
problems. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice labeled Burma one of six
“outposts of tyranny” in her confirmation hearings on January 18, 2005,
and the following December the U.S. took its first concrete step against
Burma within the UN by successfully forcing the Security Council for
the first time into a formal discussion on the Burma issue.4
Soon after the Burmese government announced a year-long exten-
sion of the house arrest of Aung San Suu Kyi, the leader of an anti-go-
vernment party, the U.S. renewed its efforts to force the UN Security
Council into passing a draft resolution against Burma. The U.S. added
new charges this time, accusing Burma of planning to obtain a nuclear
weapon, as well as abuse of political prisoners, mass requisitioning of
labor, and use of armed forces to move native populations, and it urged
the UN to impose severe penalties on Burma. Two reports on human
rights and kidnapping were released in March and June 2006, severely
criticizing the Burmese government for its human rights and demo-
cracy conditions.5 The draft resolution on the Burma issue proposed
by the U.S. in January 2007criticized Burma for its appalling domestic
human rights record, AIDS and drugs conditions, all of which pose a
threat to regional security, and it urged Burma to take action to make
improvements, in case of even worse consequences. In the March 6
2007 Human Rights Report, the U.S. criticized Burma once again for its
worsening human rights situation, and its weakness in stopping drug
exports due to the government’s failing to crack down on smuggling.
The latest statistics showed that total opium output in Burma in 2006
increased by 2 percent. Burma is believed to be the world second-lar-
gest producer of opium after Afghanistan with up to 65% of opium
exporting to the U.S.
U.S. economic sanctions against Burma began in 1997 and included
banning arms sales, revoking Burmese favorite tariff status, opposing
multilateral loans, prohibiting American investments, and rejecting
Burmese senior officials’ visa applications. The Burmese Freedom
and Democracy Act and Washington’s embargo against Burma in 2003
made things even worse. Burmese imports were banned, Burmese go-
vernmental assets in the U.S. were frozen, Burmese high-ranking offi-
cials were refused entry, investment, loans and technical aids to Burma
prohibited, all of these sanctions imposed with the intention of forcing
141
 the Burmese military administration to improve democracy situation
and eventually hand over power. Pressure from the U.S. was boosted in
2004, when the overall embargo against Burma was extended.
The U.S. has made the UN and ASEAN its playground. Squeezing
the Burma issue onto the UN Security Council agenda has
internationalized it. Two reporting meetings of the Security Council
on the Burma issue were held in 2005, one was an updated report on
the Burma issue close-door meeting, introduced by John R. Bolton, the
ambassador to the UN at that time. Since 2006, the U.S. has taken great
pains to persuade the Security Council to discuss the Burma issue.
Despite internal differences, the Security Council added the issue to its
agenda, and this was followed by another vote on the issue on January
12, 2007. The U.S. has also tried to persuade ASEAN to put pressure on
Burma. The U.S. regards the Burma issue as a test of ASEAN countries,
claiming that the issue is a key factor for ASEAN to reveal its position
to the U.S. as regards understanding of values. Rice’s refusal to attend
the 2005 ARF hosted by Laos was a way for the U.S. to show its regret at
ASEAN’s attitude to the Burma issue. Rice attended the 2006 Malaysia
ARF in order to discuss “Burma’s lack of democracy and the progress
of its national reconciliation,” announced in a State Department
statement right before her flight. A Heritage foundation report issued
on March 20, 2007 pointed out, “The best the U.S. can do is to keep it on
the international agenda, build on ASEAN’s doubts, and bring pressure
to bear where and when possible. In the meantime, the U.S. needs to
be creative in finding ways around Burma to engage ASEAN fully. The
U.S. cannot afford to allow developments in Burma to drive the broader
U.S.– ASEAN relationship.”6
Pressure from the U.S. has caused disagreement over the Burma
issue within ASEAN. Aside from Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, which
publicly oppose a hard-line policy against Burma, Singapore, Malaysia,
and Thailand agreed on criticizing Burma severely. Dato’ Seri Syed
Hamid Albar, the Foreign Minister of Malaysia, even suggests a new
“let it go” policy, which would leave the Burma problem to be solved by
the UN, a view shared by Singapore. Persuaded by the other members
of ASEAN, Burma gave up the hosting country qualification in 2006.
Furthermore, the U.S. is attempting to make India a balancing power
against China in Burma. Both Burma and India have a fast-developing re-
lationship, with frequent mutual visits by high-ranking officials, growing
military cooperation, and an increase in bilateral business and trade. An
article that appeared in The Washington Times on March 24, 2007 said
that India was providing the Burmese military government with weapons
to balance China’s increasing influence in Burma. As Shaikh Azizur Rah-
For Closer China – U.S. Collaboration on Myanmar
142
man, Chairman of Pacific Forum in the Center of U.S. Strategy and In-
ternational Study, pointed out: “If the democratization of Burma is to be
supported, India should keep itself engaged with Burma, trying to reduce
the Chinese influence as much as possible. Gambari was telling New
Delhi that although the Western world namely, the US and the European
Union- was in favor of taking a tougher line on Myanmar, including the
imposition of new financial sanctions, it was also amenable to India ta-
king a soft approach. It is apparently believed that India s influence could
help to check and balance Myanmar s key ally China. 7 I’m sure many
in the U.S. administration have mixed feelings about this report. On the
other hand, no one wants to see Burma become a Chinese client state, so
India provides useful balance in this regard”8
Disagreements between China and the U.S.
Disagreements between China and the U.S. over the Burma issue lasted
for years. From the time that the U.S.-favored government was overtur-
ned by the present military administration, there has been no let up in the
U.S. sanctions, support of anti-government groups, or even dispatch of
special troops. Three aspects of the disagreements are discussed below.
Conflicting interests occur. While the U.S. hopes for a Burmese ad-
ministration favoring the west headed by Aung San Suu Kyi, Burma’s
next door neighbor, China, welcomes a more stable Burma. According
to China, a politically reformed, stable, democratic and conciliatory
Burma not only guarantees the security and stability of the border pro-
vinces, but also ensures the development of bilateral trading coopera-
tion, making full use of Burmese energy and natural resources and its
shortcut to the India Ocean.
The Sino-Burma oil pipelines under construction and the ongoing Iran-
Pakistan-India-Burma-China natural gas pipe plan will reduce China’s en-
ergy reliance on the Strait of Malacca. China’s three largest oil enterprises,
SINOPEC (China Petroleum & Chemical Corporation), CNPC (China
National Petroleum Corporation) and CNOOC (China National Offshore
Oil Corporation) have already completed projects in Burma. The Sino-Bur-
mese oil exploration project reports that there is much oil to be exploited
in the Bohai Sea. As far as the U.S. is concerned, it wants to ensure that
Burma would adopts Western democracy and value concepts, and beco-
mes part of the U.S.-led economic structure and trading system.
China and the U.S. judge the Burma threat differently. According
to China, the Burmese domestic situation is not harmful to regional or
international peace and security. Burma has no explicit plan to develop
weapons of mass destruction such as nuclear and biochemical weapons,
143
 nor does it have the ambition to invade neighboring states. Burma is
not yet a threat. But in the view of the U.S. government, Burma is a time
bomb posing a threat to the region. Robert B. Zoellick, former Deputy
Secretary of State referred to Burma as a cancer when he was attending
the 2006 ARF hosted by Vietnam.9 And Assistant Secretary of State Eric
John said that because Burma kept silent on international requests to
free political prisoners and cease armed attacks on minorities, it is al-
ready a threat to international and regional peace and security, and the
UN Security Council should have at least discussed the matter.
China acknowledges that Burmese society faces many serious chal-
lenges, such as refugees, neglect of children, HIV Aids, human rights
and drugs problems, and supports the idea that Burma respond more
actively to address international concerns more constructively and flexi-
bly. “The Burma issue is essentially a domestic one, a common sense
shared by all its neighbor countries, all ASEAN members, and most
of the states in the Asia-Pacific Ocean region,” said Wang Guangya,
China’s permanent representative to the UN, when he gave his expla-
natory speech before the vote on the Burma issue on January 12, 2007.
Problems could only be solved gradually in accordance to Burma’s
internal progress and improvement, but not by external force. It is
possible for world powers to jointly tear down the military administra-
tion, but there is a possibility for Burma to be dragged into a civil war
when there is no other political group strong enough to take its place.
With majority populations and more than a hundred languages, Burma
might suddenly become “another Yugoslavia, with a situation several ti-
mes worse,”10 pointed out Wang Jingrong, ASEAN’s General Secretary.
In contrast to China, the U.S. believes that Burma’s problems today
could not come to an end through the efforts of its military administra-
tion alone, with state power still dominated by the military, Aung San
Suu Kyi remaining under house arrest, and human rights and drug
smuggling getting worse. Believing that the National Assembly Con-
stitution of Burma might keep some of the Burmese political groups
permanently out of the political process, the U.S. will not just stand by,
leaving Burma heading for a wrong direction. The situation can be im-
proved only by joint international forces, as shown by all the U.S. efforts
in the UN and ASEAN.
U.S. Expectations from China
Though from time to time U.S. policymakers criticize China’s Burma
policy, they welcome a supportive and cooperative China on the issue.
Firstly, the U.S. regards China as an influential and forceful go-
For Closer China – U.S. Collaboration on Myanmar
144
between between the U.S. and Burma. The U.S. regards China as the
key to the Burma issue, and Burma’s most supportive and influential
power. The U.S. expects China to urge Burma to continue with its poli-
tical reform. Because there is no official channel for exchange of ideas
between the U.S. and Burma the U.S. is hoping for a Beijing- or Ran-
goon-based communication channel.
On March 21, 2007, Assistant Secretary of State Eric John spelled
out the U.S. wish to have some kind of contact with Burma. He made
it clear that direct talks would be the next step if both sides were ready,
and he also hoped that U.S. concerns could be delivered directly to
Chairman Than Shwe. The U.S. is considering the practicalities of
doing this. As regards Burma’s political reform, the U.S. is expecting
China to join it in pushing Burma to take the first step. The following
views have been expressed by various U.S. commentators: “If Wash-
ington wants a democratic future for the Burmese, it must find some
way of persuading China to police its southern neighborhood. The U.S.
cannot do so directly.”11 “The Chinese were told that certain standards
of behavior will be key to the U.S.-Sino relationship, and one test will be
how China deals with governments with unsavory reputations.”12 “The
U.S. has no intention to challenge China’s influences in Southeast Asia.
The only thing the U.S. concern is the political issue of Burma, and the
U.S. hopes to cooperate with China and to change Burma together.”13
Secondly, the U.S. wishes China to support the UN’s draft resolution
on the Burma issue. The U.S. expressed its concern that joint voting by
China and Russia against the draft resolution might send Burma the
wrong message. According to the U.S., there are to be other similar
proposals, on which China is expected to be supportive or at least keep
silent. Burmese political analyst Win Min pointed out that “the U.S. is
trying to kick the ball to China.” As for human rights, China is expected
to be fully aware of the seriousness of the Burma issue, and to make ef-
forts to promote an improvement in the situation. U.S. First Lady Laura
Bush appealed for joint efforts by China and the U.S. to improve the
human rights records of the Burmese military administration during
her speech at the ceremony of the Core Group on Burmese Women in
the Senate House on May 23, 2007. She pointed out that as a neighbor
of Burma, China should be concerned about the human rights situa-
tion next door. China should also pay attention to drug smuggling and
public health within Burma, and their impacts on Southeast Asia and
the rest of the world as well.14
China is expected to act as a partner in cutting off aid and in efforts
to curb drugs. In the view of U.S. policymakers, China holds the key to
the resolution of the Burma crisis, and they suspect that China supp-
145
 lies the Burmese military with most of its modern weapons, though
smaller quantities of arms arrive from Singapore.15 China is Burma’s
largest trading partner and serves as an intermediate transit port for
Burmese opium and heroin, 60–70 percent of its total export first ente-
ring China’s Yunnan Province and then transported to Thailand, South
Asia and the rest of Southeast Asia. The U.S. expects China to come up
with a concrete plan to deal with this.
Perspective and Consequences
Although the Burma issue has existed for nearly 20 years, China and
the U.S. have kept their differences over the issue under control. The
above analyses may lead to the clear conclusion that in the short term
the conflict between China and the U.S. over the Burma issue is unli-
kely to explode.
Burma is not the most strategic concern for the U.S. at present,
with the problems of the Middle East, North Korea and Afghanistan
attracting too much of its resources. It would not be wise for the U.S. to
have another flash point in its bilateral relations with China at present.
Steady progress and much cooperation in many situations with China
are preferable. Evidence of this can be seen in the U.S. moderate reac-
tion which stresses the importance of Sino-U.S. cooperation over the
Burma issue, rather than its rather tough reaction to China and Russia
voting jointly against its proposal. The U.S. does not want to see Burma
becoming a trigger in its relations to China, and hopes to see a stable
and cooperative China. The U.S. did not display outrage at the joint re-
jection of its proposal, stressing the importance of cooperation between
China and the U.S. on the Burma issue. The U.S. is striving for a more
realistic Burma policy, not insisting on changing the Burmese military
administration and to some degree accepting its existence in Burmese
political life. In an interview with the Financial Times, Eric John, De-
puty Assistant Secretary of State for Asian affairs, said Washington
was not seeking a change of regime. “There seems to be unjustified
paranoia in the leadership about what it is the rest of the world wants, it
is not a policy of economic strangulation. The generals are going to be
part of the solution.”16
However, negative factors will continue to exist for quite a long time
to come. The U.S. will not alter the basic tone of its Burma policy, the
Burma issue will continue to be mentioned and its democracy and hu-
man rights situations will be criticized. It will be an excuse for the U.S.
to put pressure on China’s foreign policy. Arguments between China
and the U.S. will continue over the Burma issue in the UN.
For Closer China – U.S. Collaboration on Myanmar
146
In the long term, however, there is still the possibility that the Burma
issue could trigger a Sino-U.S. conflict.
Firstly, there is a possibility of an increase in U.S. interference in
Burma. With the rapid rise of China and as the relationship between
China and ASEAN countries becomes closer, the U.S. will regard China
as the biggest threat in its relations with countries in the region. To con-
tain China’s future development, the U.S. is very likely to become more
involved in countries around China, with Burma being the most impor-
tant state, serving as China’s gateway to the Indian Ocean. The major
measures the U.S. will take to achieve its aims in the region will be to
continue to exert pressure, increase the embargo and even overturn the
current Burmese administration.
Secondly, the future of Burma’s domestic situation is complex and
uncertain and there is little cause for optimism for Burmese political
reform. The planned reform agenda includes a draft constitution
based on principles decided by National Assembly Constitution, a
nationwide vote to pass the new Constitution, and holding parliamen-
tary elections in accordance to the Constitution. The military adminis-
tration has announced that the Constitution should be completed by
2008 or 2009. The Associated Press quoted a government statement
announced on the official television on February 9, 2008 as saying,
The government announced its plan for the referendum the first time
the junta has set any date for a step in its earlier-announced roadmap
to democracy. General elections are supposed to follow in 2010.17
The Democracy roadmap of the ruling military projects a national
referendum on the new constitution in May 2008. The referendum
represents the fourth step in the ruling junta s seven-step roadmap
to democracy, which was first broached in 2003. However, there has
emerged a major divergence of opinion on the reform and a power
struggle within the Burmese authority, that includes the three top
generals in the State Peace and Development Council, Than Shwe,
Maung Aye, Thura Shwe Mann. Maung Aye has categorically rejected
part of the reform plan proposed by Than Shwe. A senior official in
the Burmese military has revealed that the reform plan, which has
been argued over for the past year, is unlikely to come to fruition
owing to internal disagreements.18
Moreover, the administration has never given up its effort to get rid
the NLD influences of Burmese political and social life. While the military
dominates the government, the NLD is heading towards collapse, weak
leadership, disorganization, and diminishing influence in both political
and social life. Unwillingly and slowly carrying out of the “Democratic
Road Map” could do nothing good with the military administration trying
147
 to keep NLD out of process of the constitution making. The intention,
without saying, is to ensure the military control from behind the curtain.
It is not clear that whether the military would permit NLD to take part in
the national election. Western analysts point to the possibility of setting
some obstacles in the constitution to block Aung San Suu Kyi’s road to
power, for instance disqualifying candidates with a foreign spouse (Suu
Kyi was married to a Westerner) to run for presidency.
Thirdly, international power games over Burma will increase the
complexities of the situation there. Taking advantage of its geopolitical
position and its natural resources, Burma has striven to obtain closer
bilateral relations with China, India and Russia. Relations with India and
Russia are particularly remarkable both in speed and level. Both Russia
and India have high-level exchanges, growing military cooperation,
and increasing trade. The Asia Times reported that India, in the face of
Western criticism, continues to economically engage Myanmar's ruling
generals, providing the junta a much-needed investment lifeline at a
time when the US and European Union have imposed new punitive
sanctions against the rights-abusing regime. The India government
committed US$120 million to rebuild Myanmar s western Sittwe
port and construct road and water links through the facility, which
will connect Myanmar s western Arakan State to India s northeastern
state of Mizoram.19 Burma is importing weapons from Russia, who has
embarked on a plan to export a nuclear reactor to Burma. Under the
new agreement, Russia’s atomic energy agency Rosatom will build a
nuclear-research center, including a 10-megawatt light-water nuclear
reactor with low-enriched uranium consisting of less than 20 percent
uranium-235.20 Burma is also maintaining its traditional trade and
business with Thailand and Singapore. In 2006, Burma reported record-
high foreign investment of $6 billion, mostly from a single hydropower
project backed by Thailand, now the largest investor.21
Thus a delicate external environment is emerging for Burma in the
future. As for China, U.S. pressure may decrease since China, the U.S.,
Russia and India all share the same views on Burmese democracy and
human rights issues. China needs to meet the challenge that the U.S.
and India might jointly intervene in Burma to diminish China’s influ-
ence in Burma as far as possible.
Policy Suggestions
Mishandling the Myanmar issue would adversely affect China-US, Chi-
na-Myanmar and US-Myanmar relations. Beijing and Washington may
beneficially take an advantage from the successful bilateral coordina-
For Closer China – U.S. Collaboration on Myanmar
148
tion in handling the North Korean nuclear crisis so as to turn Myanmar
from a possible point of friction into a new field of collaboration.
We should strive to make the U.S. better understand China’s My-
anmar policy. Unlike the nuclear situations in North Korea and Iran,
Myanmar is an internal issue that does not pose any substantial threat
to regional peace. Also, the situation in Myanmar is not as serious as it
is in Darfur. Moreover, the military regime has shown flexibility in car-
rying out political reforms.
Ample facts have shown that external pressure and sanctions do not
work. The coercion-intensive approach favored by Washington has only
served to reinforce the siege mentality of Burma’s military leadership
and undermine the positive influence that the international community
has through critical engagement. The United States should acknow-
ledge that merely reinforcing its strategy of isolation and the existing
regime of sanctions will not achieve the results it desires. Instead, these
moves have only widened the schism between Washington and the
ASEAN countries.
Instead, China has played a constructive role in persuading the
military regime to properly handle domestic problems, accept UN
mediations, pursue dialogue with the opposition and carry out steady
reforms. Even so, U.S. government officials and the media are still
dissatisfied and trying to bring pressure to bear on China. They have
clearly exaggerated China’s influence on Myanmar’s military junta,
where hard liners are clearly in ascendancy. According to Green and
Mitchell, Beijing s engagement with the SPDC has been essential to the
regime s survival. China has provided it with moral and financial sup-
port – including funds and materiel to pay off Burmese military elites
– thus increasing its leverage at home and abroad.22
Common sense shows that China and America need to broaden the
scope of their collaboration and promote an exchange of opinions on My-
anmar through existing channels of dialogue. They also need to enhance
contact with Myanmar in order to explore the feasibility of establishing
a tripartite engagement channel. China and the US should, moreover,
enhance their cooperation around relief efforts and reconstruction in
Myanmar following the devastation of cyclone Nargis. China tried to
nudge the Burmese leadership to waive its visa policies, ease restrictions
on the import of humanitarian supplies and allow the US relief team into
the country. According to a report in the Washington Post, Secretary of
State Condoleezza Rice spoke on May 8 with Chinese Foreign Minister
Yang Jiechi and Indian Foreign Minister Pranab Mukherjee, urging both
governments to use their influence to persuade the Burmese leadership
to open up its country to relief specialists. President Bush, in turn, plans
149
 to call Chinese President Hu Jintao to seek his help in pressing the Bur-
mese government to accept more disaster assistance.23
We need to improve coordination within the UN Security Council
and other related institutions. After the January 12, 2007 co-sponsored
resolution on Myanmar, the United States and Britain may do the same
once again. In fact, on October 5, 2007, a new U.S.-U.K.-crafted draft
statement condemning Myanmar circulated between America, Britain
and France in the Security Council. Though the statement was not le-
gally binding on Myanmar, America is still pushing for such a resolu-
tion in the Security Council.
Frankly, America needs to consult with China on this matter. In ad-
dition, efforts should be made to exchange views with Russia, India and
the ASEAN countries in order to find a satisfactory settlement to the
Myanmar issue that takes into broad consideration all of the interests
of the parties concerned.
We should explore the possibility of China-U.S.-Myanmar tripartite
collaboration, starting from such easy items as a joint ban on narcotics.
The narcotics trade, human trafficking, and HIV/AIDS are all spreading
through Southeast Asia, thanks in part to Burmese drug traffickers who
regularly distribute heroin with HIV-tainted needles in China, India,
and Thailand. Since Myanmar is a major source of opium and heroin
smuggling (according to the U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration,
Burma accounts for 80% percent of all heroin produced in Southeast
Asia), the three sides have common interests in banning these drugs,
which can serve as a base for expanding cooperation in other related
areas. Both U.S. Chevron and Chinese Oil are engaged in oil exploita-
tion in Myanmar. It is advisable for the two sides to strengthen their
coordination so as to avoid fierce competition.
We should explore collaboration on Myanmar in the form of a five-
party model or four-party mechanism. The international community is
examining a variety of feasible options for solving the Myanmar issue.
American scholars have raised the possibility of a five-party model or
four-party mechanism with six-party talks on the Korean nuclear crisis
in mind. They proposed a U.S.-sponsored meeting of America, ASEAN,
China, India and Japan for working out a roadmap for solving the My-
anmar issue, or a so-called five-party model. The five partners should
develop a road map with concrete goalposts that lays out both the bene-
fits that the SPDC would enjoy if it pursued true political reform and
national reconciliation and the costs it would suffer if it continued to be
intransigent. The road map should present the SPDC with an interna-
tional consensus on how Burma s situation affects international stability
and the common principles on which the international community will
judge progress in the country. 24Advocating the four-party mechanism,
some scholars suggested the participation of America, China, ASEAN
and India for working out a feasible formula. Since conditions are still
premature for such a formal mechanism, the four parties may benefici-
ally start from a double track model, with academic meetings serving as
a second channel. Admittedly, these ideas have yet to be accepted by the
parties concerned. Yet they nonetheless offer a line of thinking about
how to resolve the Myanmar issue. China and America may explore col-
laboration along similar lines.
Notes
1
Booz Allen Hamilton, “Energy Futures in Asia, The Washington Times, Jan.18, 2007.
2
Billl Gertz, “China Builds up Strategic Sea Lanes, ” The Washington Times, Jan.18,
2005.
3
Shaikh Azizur Rahman, “India Seen Arming Burma to Counter Chinese,”The Wash-
ington Times, Mar. 24, 2007.
4
http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2005/40991.htm.
5
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2006/78768.htm.
6
Walter Lohman, “Guidelines for U.S. Policy in Southeast Asia.” Backgrounder No.2017,
by the Heritage Foundation, Mar.20,2007.
7
Jyoti Malhotra, “UN as India, Myanmar Matchmaker”, Asia Times, Feb7, 2008.
8
Shaikh Azizur Rahman, “India Seen Arming Burma to Counter Chinese,” The Wash-
ington Times, Mar. 24, 2007.
9
http://www.burmanet.org/news/2005/07/29/agence-france-presse-asia-says -engage-
ment-of-myanmar-more-effective-than-isolation/.
10
Li Chenyang, “Rice Pressures Asian While the U.S. Thinking Regime Change in
Burma,” The Global Times, July 28, 2007.
11
Robert I. Rotberg, “The Road to Burma May Run Through China,” The Christian Sci-
ence Monitor, Oct. 2, 2004.
12
Glenn Kessler, “U.S. Sees Burma as ‘Test Case’ in Southeast Asia,” The Washington
Post, Dec.28,2005.
13
http://www.singtaonet.com/global/world/t20060523_219216.html.
14
http://usinfo.state.gov/xarchives/display.html?p=washfile-english&y=2007&m =May
&x=20070524152104mlenuhret0.7033808.
15
Robert I. Rotberg, “The Road to Burma May Run Through China,” the Christian Sci-
ence Monitor, Oct. 2, 2004.
16
Andy Bounds, “U.S. Wants China to Push for Reforms in Burma,” The Financial
Times, Feb.12,2007.
17
“Myanmar to Jail Referendum Disrupters”, The Associated Press, February 27,2008.

For Closer China – U.S. Collaboration on Myanmar

150 151
 18
Larry Jagan, “The Generals Fall Out in Myanmar,” The Asia Times, Jan.31, 2007.
19
Brian McCartan, “Myanmar deal right neighborly of India,” The Asia Times, Jan.11,
2008.
20
21
Larry Jagan, “ Myanmar Drop a Nuclear ‘Bombshell,’” The Asia Times, May24, 2007.
Stanley A. Weiss “Myanmar’s Neighbors Hold the Key,”The International Herald Tri-
bune, March 7, 2007.
22
Michael Green and Derek Mitchell, “Asia’s Forgotten Crisis-A New Approach to
Burma,” Foreign Affairs, November/December, 2007.
23
Glenn Kessler and Dan Eggen, “Bush Plans Call to Chinese Leader Over Burma's
Stance on Aid”, the Washington Post, May 10, 2008.
24
Michael Green and Derek Mitchell, “Asia’s Forgotten Crisis-A New Approach to
Burma,” Foreign Affairs, November/December 2007.
For Closer China – U.S. Collaboration on Myanmar
152
China’s Manifold Interests in
Burma: Resources, Markets
and Strategic Location
Ian Storey
It is a truism that countries which share borders cannot afford to be
disinterested in each other’s affairs. The People’s Republic of China
(PRC) and Burma share a frontier that is 1,300 miles in length – the
longest between China and any other country in Southeast Asia – and
this contiguity explains Beijing’s long-standing interests in its southern
neighbour since 1949, and vice versa of course. Over the past sixty years
the PRC’s interests in Burma have evolved and been prioritized diffe-
rently. But since 1988, when the friendless, fearful and cash-strapped
Burmese military regime turned to Beijing for succour, China’s inte-
rests have expanded and intensified. Over the past two decades China
and Burma have become quasi-allies; China’s relationship with Burma
is the closest to any Southeast Asian country since North Vietnam in
the 1950s.
China has clearly accrued enormous benefits from this asymmetrical,
but still symbiotic, relationship. For China, the economic benefits
have been front and centre in its policy towards Burma. The PRC has
gained privileged access to Burma’s vast store of natural resources,
vital ingredients in the country’s breakneck economic expansion and
hence Great Power aspirations. Burma’s off-shore oil and gas deposits
in particular have helped China enhance its overall energy security
situation. Going across the border in the other direction, cheap, low-
quality Chinese manufactured goods have flooded the Burmese market,
while large numbers of businessmen – some estimate millions - from
Yunnan province and elsewhere have set up shop in Burma in search
of business and investment opportunities. Burmese ports, upgraded
by Chinese companies, have given China’s underdeveloped and
landlocked southwest provinces an outlet to the sea, and hence access
to larger overseas markets. Burma also represents an important, if often
embarrassing, friend inside the Association of Southeast Asian Nations
(ASEAN), the premier regional organization and driver of several
larger Asia-Pacific multilateral forums which Beijing has utilized to
further its regional agenda. Burma also occupies an important strategic
location at the junction of East, South and Southeast Asia, and access
153
 arrangements to Burmese naval facilities may one day allow the
People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) to project power into the Indian
Ocean and northern approaches of the Straits of Malacca, one of the
world’s most important trade arteries. In short, alliance with Burma has
been an essential component of Beijing’s Southeast Asia policy, and the
country’s importance to China should not be underestimated.
Burma’s regime, though not the vast majority of its impoverished
population, has also benefited handsomely from the tightening
relationship. China’s has acted as the regime’s primary supplier of
weaponry since 1988, providing it with the wherewithal to consolidate
power, crack down on internal dissent and intimidate ethnic armies
along the country’s periphery. Soft loans and financial grants from
China have helped keep the economy afloat during lean times, and
enabled the regime to circumvent international, mainly Western,
imposed sanctions. Most importantly for the paranoid generals,
China’s veto at the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) gives the
junta a diplomatic shield to deflect international condemnation and,
in the worst case but frankly unlikely scenario, the ultimate insurance
policy against an East Timor-style multinational intervention force.
The focus of this chapter, however, is not on the benefits the Burmese
generals have derived from their close association with China, but the
development of Beijing’s manifold interests in its Southeast Asian
neighbour since 1988 and why the Chinese government has such a
strongly vested interest in the survival of one of Asia’s most brutal
regimes.
The Political Dimension of China-Burma Relations
Since its establishment on 1 October 1949, one of the PRC’s enduring
foreign policy imperatives has been to foster friendly, even pliant, re-
gimes along its borders and periphery. This imperative was especially
pressing for the Chinese government during the first few decades of
the Cold War when it feared US military intervention through the
Korean Peninsula or the Indochinese countries on its southern flank
– hence Beijing’s massive support for Pyongyang in the Korean War
(1950-1953) and for Hanoi during the First and Second Indochinese
Wars (1946-1954 and 1964-1975 respectively). Although Burma has a
longer and more porous border with China than either North Korea or
Vietnam, it was never the main focus of attention for Beijing during
the Cold War. On independence Burma’s government of U Nu adop-
ted a policy of neutrality and non-alignment and was friendly – some
would argue excessively deferential – to the Chinese Communist Party
China’s Manifold Interests in Burma: Resources, Markets and Strategic Location
154
(CCP).1 Unlike Pyongyang and Hanoi, Rangoon was not an ally of the
PRC – but crucially nor was it an enemy.
The presence of two divisions of Nationalist Chinese (Kuomintang,
KMT) troops on the Burmese side of the border, armed and supplied
by America’s Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the virulently anti-
communist Thai military, however, did pose a serious security concern
for China after 1949. Because of cordial relations with Rangoon,
however, Beijing refrained from launching a massive “mopping up”
operation across the border, though the PLA did launch repeated small-
scale incursions. The issue was more or less resolved in the mid-1950s
with the repatriation of most KMT forces from Burma to Taiwan. A
border treaty and mutual non-aggression pact in 1960 helped defuse
any remaining tensions along the frontier and provided a solid basis for
Sino-Burmese political relations.
Nevertheless, China was always ready to interfere in the internal
affairs of its southern neighbour should Rangoon adopt policies
inimical to Chinese interests; the mechanism for applying pressure
on the government was the Burmese Communist Party (BCP) which
the CCP had established close ideological links with even before 1949.
Thus when U Nu’s successor, General Ne Win, who had seized power
in a military coup in 1962, nationalized Chinese banks and closed
down Chinese language papers, refused to condemn US military action
in Vietnam in 1964 and prevented Red Guards based at the Chinese
Embassy in Rangoon from distributing Maoist propaganda in 1967
leading to violent anti-Chinese demonstrations, China responded by
ratcheting up support for the BCP, enabling it to conduct a major and
prolonged offensive against government forces until the early 1970s.
A complete breakdown in relations was avoided, however, and not
wishing to push Burma into either the US or Soviet camps, Beijing
normalized relations with Rangoon in 1971.
In 1978 Premier Deng Xiaoping took the momentous decision to
set China down the path of economic reform. Thereafter, the Chinese
government began to look more seriously at the potential economic
synergies between with Burma. However, it was the domestic politi-
cal turbulence in both countries during 1988-1989 which served as the
catalyst for the Sino-Burmese alignment. Violent crackdowns against
anti-government demonstrators in Rangoon in August-September
1988 and in Beijing in June 1989 resulted in disapprobation from the
international community; their pariah status pushed the two countries
closer together. But the alignment was asymmetric from the very begin-
ning: while the Burmese junta, the State Law and Order Restoration
Council (SLORC), depended on China for its survival, the same could
155
 not be said of Beijing. In any case China’s growing importance in the
global market and on the world stage ensured its pariah status was only
fleeting. Nevertheless, Beijing saw in the ruthless suppression of pro-
democracy protestors in Burma an opportunity to expand its economic
and strategic interests in mainland Southeast Asia. As a result, Sino-
Burmese political ties blossomed after 1988-1989. At the rhetorical
level the two governments repudiated Western criticism of their hu-
man rights records, rejecting it as blatant interference in their internal
affairs. More importantly for China, however, close political ties with
Burma enabled it to advance its economic agenda in the resource-rich
country.
Despite the bonhomie expressed during frequent, high-level
leadership exchanges, from the mid-1990s the SLORC endeavoured to
lessen its dependence on the PRC and create more diplomatic room for
manoeuver by expanding the country’s repertoire of foreign relations.
Burma’s accession to ASEAN in 1997 was a key element in this policy,
improved relations with India after 2000 another. A desire to wean
Burma away from China was undoubtedly a factor in both ASEAN’s
decision to admit Burma into its ranks and in New Delhi’s move to
repair relations with its eastern neighbour. China remained, however,
Burma’s principal diplomatic ally and economic partner throughout the
1990s.
Domestic developments in Burma during the first decade of the
twenty-first century deepened the regime’s – now called the State Peace
and Development Council (SPDC) – dependence on the PRC. Increased
dependence started with the May 2003 Depanyin Incident, when pro-
SPDC militias attacked National League for Democracy (NLD) leader
and Nobel peace prize winner Aung San Suu Kyi’s entourage. Suu Kyi
was placed under house arrest and a major crackdown on the NLD
followed. In the wake of the Depanyin Incident, the United States and
European Union (EU) tightened sanctions against Burma, while Japan
and Australia suspended humanitarian aid. In an attempt to assuage
international condemnation, Prime Minister Khin Nyunt, the reputed
architect of Sino-Burmese relations, unveiled a seven-step “roadmap
to democracy” which, the SPDC argued, would lead to the framing
of a new constitution and democratic elections but was, in reality, a
transparent attempt to remove the NLD from the electoral process and
calcify the military’s political primacy.
The “reform” process was thrown into disarray, however, after Khin
Nyunt’s ouster in October 2004. SPDC Chairman Senior General Than
Shwe’s visit to India a few weeks later fueled speculation that Rangoon
had made a decisive shift away from Burma in favour of India. But
China’s Manifold Interests in Burma: Resources, Markets and Strategic Location
156
such speculation was misplaced: rather than weaken the Sino-Burmese
nexus the Depanyin Incident and downfall of Khin Nyunt actually
strengthened bilateral ties. The tightening of international sanctions in
particular helped raise China’s economic profile in Burma. Meanwhile,
Rangoon looked increasingly isolated. Exasperated by the SPDC’s failu-
re to advance the political reform process, even incrementally, some of
Burma’s fellow ASEAN members became more vocal in their criticism
of the generals. And fearing Burma’s chairmanship of the Association
would strain corporate relations with its dialogue partners, particularly
America and the EU, in July 2005 the core members of ASEAN pressu-
rized Rangoon into relinquishing the rotating chairmanship in favour
of the Philippines.
Pressure mounted on the SPDC throughout 2006, mainly from
Washington. The Bush administration had labelled Burma an “outpost
of tyranny” and a threat to international peace and security because of
the junta’s widespread and egregious human rights abuses, refugee
outflows into neighbouring countries, the manufacture of illegal
narcotics inside Burma and the spread of communicable diseases from
the country such as HIV/AIDS, bird flu and malaria. Matters came to
ahead in January 2007 when the United States and United Kingdom
jointly tabled a resolution at the UNSC calling on the Burmese
government to cease military operations against ethnic minorities,
release all political prisoners, including Suu Kyi, and engage in political
dialogue leading to genuine democratic transition. The PRC moved
quickly to defend its Southeast Asian ally: on 12 January, together with
Russia, it used its veto to defeat the proposal. China’s wielding of the
veto was precisely the kind of insurance Burma’s generals had been
paying premiums on since 1988.
The PRC justified its veto on the grounds that the concerns raised
by American and British diplomats at the UN were Burma’s internal
affairs, and in any case did not pose a threat to international peace and
security. Nevertheless, China’s actions at the UN should not be inter-
preted as approval of the political status quo – quite the contrary in fact.
Over the past two decades the PRC had invested considerable capital,
both financial and political, in Burma and in return expected the SPDC
to provide a stable polity in exchange so that it could reap long-term re-
turns on those investments. Beijing recognized, of course, that political
stasis and deteriorating socio-economic conditions would help incubate
instability - instability that would put China’s investments at risk. As a
consequence the Chinese leadership had indicated its support for Khin
Nyunt’s “roadmap for democracy” because it was seen as the only hope
of giving the SPDC a veneer of legitimacy. Thus, when Kin Nyunt made
157
 his last visit to the PRC in mid-2004, Premier Wen Jiabao conceded that
while the political process was Burma’s internal affair, nevertheless the
Chinese government hoped that the SPDC would accelerate “political
settlements of existing disputes and move towards democratic progress
so as to enhance stability and peaceful development.” 2 Wen reiterated
this message to Prime Minister Soe Win during a one-on-one meeting
at the China-ASEAN Summit in Nanning in November 2006.3 Speaking
earlier in the year, a senior US State Department official had revealed
that China had privately expressed concern to Washington regarding
the stalled political process in Burma.4 Prodding from Beijing, both in
public and behind the scenes, seems to have had the desired effect, for
in June 2007 acting Prime Minister Thein Sein informed the Chinese
government that the National Convention, the body tasked with fram-
ing a new constitution that had been suspended since May 2005, would
resume in July.5
China seems not only to have been troubled by the failure to advance
the political process in Burma, but also by the rapid deterioration of
US-Burma relations during the second Bush administration. A less
confrontational relationship between the junta and the White House
might, Beijing reasoned, assuage the junta’s paranoia and result in
more moderate policies (in the immediate aftermath of the terrorist
attacks of September 11, 2001, US-Burma relations had warmed
slightly, resulting in the release from house arrest of Suu Kyi). Thus
in an effort to bring the two sides closer together, China brokered a
meeting between US and Burmese diplomats in Beijing in June 2007.6
The PRC’s fears that domestic instability in Burma was brewing
proved prescient. In mid-August 2007, anti-government protests
erupted in response to the SPDC’s decision to slash fuel subsidies. By
late September the number of protestors had swelled to over 50,000
people in Rangoon, including a large number of monks. Finally, on
26 September the inevitable occurred, and the Burmese armed forces
launched a violent crackdown, killing an unknown number of protesters
and detaining several thousand.
Initially, when the protests began, China elected to remain silent. It
was not until 13 September, when the protests were well underway, that
the Chinese government reiterated its hope that Burma would “push
forward a democracy process that is appropriate to the country” and
“restore internal stability as soon as possible, properly handle issues
and actively promote national reconciliation.” 7 When the crackdown
began, Beijing merely called on all parties to “exercise restraint.” 8 In
contrast, a statement by ASEAN foreign ministers expressed revulsion
at the crackdown. When the United States and some European coun-
China’s Manifold Interests in Burma: Resources, Markets and Strategic Location
158
tries tried to push through a UN resolution condemning the Burmese
government, China blocked the attempt, declaring that such a move
would “not be useful” as the protests were an internal affair and did not
affect regional stability or international peace.9 Instead, China threw its
support behind the UN Special Envoy, Ibrahim Gambari, in an effort
to promote dialogue between Suu Kyi and the generals. Gambari later
admitted that China had been “helpful” in arranging his visit during
the height of the crisis, diplomatic speak, perhaps, for putting pressure
on the SPDC.10 Following Gambari’s mission to Burma, during which
he met with Suu Kyi and the generals separately, China declared itself
satisfied with the results of his trip.11 After Gambari’s briefing to the
UN, Chinese diplomats once again went into bat for their Burmese al-
lies, softening the tone of a UNSC statement which “strongly deplored”
the use of force against unarmed demonstrators instead of the original
“condemn”.12 China also made plain its “resolute opposition” to the
imposition of UN sanctions, hardly surprising given the damage such
measures would have taken on China’s considerable investments in
Burma.13
Throughout the so-called “Saffron Revolution,” the PRC had come
under pressure from the United States, Australia and several ASEAN
countries to use its influence to rein in the generals.14 Such calls verged
on the naïve for two reasons. First, the extent of Beijing’s influence over
the junta was almost certainly exaggerated; although the SPDC would
have taken note of China’s advice, ultimately the generals, and in par-
ticular Than Shwe, make decisions based on their own self-interests,
not Beijing’s. Second, it is manifestly not in China’s interests to see
regime change in Burma and the political uncertainties and foreign
policy outlook associated with a transfer of power to opposition groups.
A continuation of SPDC rule, preferably in civilian garb, is seen by
China as the best way to protect and advance its interests in Burma. The
following sections identify and examine the extent of China’s interests
in Burma.
Trade, Aid and Energy Interests
China did not have large commercial interests in Burma during the
Cold War period, despite the country’s geographical contiguity and
abundant natural resources. China was largely self-sufficient in terms
of fossil fuels and other resources and in any case Burma was not a very
attractive economic partner after the military coup of 1962: Ne Win’s
autarkic polices, known as the Burmese Way to Socialism, drove the
nation’s economy to the brink of bankruptcy, and economic distress
159
 was a major catalyst of the anti-government demonstrations in 1988. Nevertheless, according to figures from the International Monetary
Chinese economic and technical aid to Burma during the Cold War was Fund (IMF) the value of Sino-Burmese trade has increased from $171
intended to buttress political relations rather than facilitate Sino-Bur- million in 1990 to $677 million in 2000 and $1.56 billion in 2006 (see
mese economic links per se. Table 1). Given off the books transactions along the border though, the
The introduction of economic reforms in China in 1978, however, true amount is likely to be many times higher.
led to an expansion of two-way trade, primarily along the border. But
what particularly attracted China’s economic planners to their southern Table 1. Burma’s Trade with China, 1990–2006
neighbour was its geographical position and long coastline. In the (Millions of US$)
early stages of China’s reform process the focus had been on attracting
foreign investment – mainly from overseas Chinese in Hong Kong Year Export to PRC Imports fromPRC Total Trade
and Taiwan – to the special economic zones in Guangdong and Fujian
provinces. Long term, however, economic planners looked to develop 1990 33 138 171
the landlocked southwest provinces particularly Yunnan and Sichuan. 1991 96 315 411
Transportation costs from these inland provinces to ports along the 1992 119 285 404
eastern seaboard were prohibitive; a cheaper and more efficient 1993 150 357 507
alternative was to move Chinese goods by road and rail through
1994 130 406 536
Burma for shipment to overseas markets, a developmental strategy
first outlined in the Beijing Review in the mid-1980s.15 But it was not 1995 136 680 816
until the Sino-Burmese alignment of 1988-1989 that the PRC had the 1996 125 573 698
political leverage in Rangoon to translate these plans into reality. 1997 67 627 694
To realize Burma’s economic potential the PRC has provided the 1998 56 586 642
regime with considerable developmental assistance in the form of
1999 92.25 477.21 539.46
grant aid, concessional loans and debt relief since 1988. Grants and
concessional loans have most often been used to procure equipment 2000 113.47 546.03 677.5
and machinery from the PRC, and to upgrade the country’s dilapidated 2001 121.99 547.26 669.25
infrastructure, particularly the decrepit transportation network of 2002 124.47 797.34 921.81
roads, rail and rivers.16 In the 1990s, for instance, Chinese financial 2003 154.10 998.75 1,152.85
aid was used to upgrade existing routes between Burma and China
2004 187.68 1,029.24 1,216.92
(including the Burma Road of World War II fame) and new routes were
laid between Yunnan province and Burma’s northern states. 2005 249.49 1,028.40 1,277.89
The volume of bilateral trade has expanded considerably since 1988, 2006 229.70 1,327.95 1,557.65
with border trade accounting for the lion’s share. Burma’s exports to
the PRC have consisted largely of raw materials and commodities: Source: Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook (Washington D.C.: International
lumber, agricultural and fishery products, livestock and gemstones and Monetary Fund, various issues 1990–2007)
precious metals (including jade and gold). Chinese exports to Burma
have been composed mainly of cheap manufactures and foodstuffs.17 What the IMF figures do reveal is that the balance of trade since 1990
Statistics purporting to show the value of bilateral trade are notoriously has continually been in China’s favour. Burma’s accumulated trade
unreliable due to a variety of factors not least of which are pervasive deficit with its northern neighbour was nearly $4 billion in the period
corruption, misreporting and the huge volume of illegal transactions 2000-2005. Burma’s underdeveloped domestic manufacturing industry
which are conducted along the poorly regulated and porous frontier. For has found it very difficult to compete with China’s.
instance, Global Witness, an environmental NGO, estimates that 95 per Another important facet of the Sino-Burmese economic nexus that
cent of Burma’s total timber exports are illegally exported to Yunnan.18

China’s Manifold Interests in Burma: Resources, Markets and Strategic Location

160 161
 is not visible in the official figures is the business activities of PRC
nationals in Burma. Illegal Chinese immigration from Yunnan and
elsewhere has been a perennial problem in bilateral relations even
during the Cold War, but since 1988 the trend has greatly accelerated.19
As no official census has been taken in Burma since 1983 it is difficult
to gauge with any accuracy the number of PRC citizens residing in
Burma. The problem is compounded by the fact that Chinese citizens,
intent on doing business in Burma, often enter the country on tourist
visas and then purchase the identity cards of deceased Burmese citizens
on the black market.20 This method allows Chinese not only to remain
in Burma indefinitely but also to circumvent laws on foreign ownership
of businesses including hotels, shops, restaurants and hotels. The
presence of Chinese nationals is reported to be particularly heavy in
Upper Burma (so much so that the area is sometimes jokingly referred
to as “Lower Yunnan”) and one estimate puts the number of Chinese
in Mandalay at 200,000, accounting for one-fifth of the population.21
According to another source, the total number of Chinese citizens in
Burma could be as high as 2 million.22
Despite burgeoning economic ties, it should be stressed that China
is not Burma’s only trade partner, nor perhaps even the most important.
While many Western companies have refused, or are barred from
doing business in Burma because of the SPDC’s human rights record,
companies from Thailand, Singapore, Malaysia and India have shown no
moral qualms about doing business with the military regime. In 2005,
Thailand was Burma’s number one trade partner ($2.4 billion) followed
by the PRC ($1.28 billion), Singapore ($754), India ($570) and Malaysia
($392).23 Thailand took pole position because it is a major buyer of natural
gas from Burma; it is estimated that in 2006, Burmese exports of natural
gas to Thailand were worth $2 billion.24 In 2005 Thailand accounted for
63 per cent of Burma’s total trade, China only 33 per cent.25 However, this
situation could well be reversed within the next few years as China ramps
up imports of Burmese energy resources.
After 2000, the Chinese leadership continued to dole out ever larger
quantities of developmental assistance to the SPDC. For example,
during President Jiang Zemin’s state visit to Burma in December 2001,
the first ever by a Chinese head of state, $800 million was pledged; when
General Than Shwe returned the visit in January 2003 a further $200
million was committed, plus partial debt relief on earlier loans.26 The
bulk of this developmental aid has been committed to a few strategic
sectors: manufacturing concerns, mining and extraction industries
and power generation. The latter has exerted a particularly strong pull
on PRC investment for four reasons. First, Burma sits on significant
China’s Manifold Interests in Burma: Resources, Markets and Strategic Location
162
reserves of hydrocarbons. According to the state-owned Mynama Oil
and Gas Enterprise (MOGE), proven recoverable reserves of oil and gas,
both on-shore and off-shore, amount to 3.2 billion barrels and 510 cubic
meters respectively.27 Second, Burma’s oil and gas fields are located
relatively close to the PRC and energy resources can be imported by ship
or through proposed pipelines. Third, the strong political relationship
between the SPDC and the Chinese government gives Beijing’s state-
owned oil companies a competitive advantage over foreign rivals when
it comes to signing exploration or exploitation contracts. Fourth, access
to Burma’s oil and gas helps reduce China’s dependence on the Middle
East. For the SPDC there are obvious benefits as well: energy contracts
with Chinese companies helps circumvent Western sanctions and fills
the generals’ coffers with much needed foreign currency.
Virtually all of China’s state-owned energy companies have entered
into commercial agreements with MOGE, either to explore for oil and
gas, purchase reserves already identified or upgrade existing oilfields.
Since 2000, major contracts have included:
• December 2001: China National Petroleum Corporation
(CNPC) invested in the on-shore Pyay oilfield to boost
production.28
• September 2004: China Petroleum and Chemical Company
(SINOPEC) and MOGE signed a production sharing
agreement to exploit oil in an on-shore field near
Kyaukyphu.29
• December 2004: China National Offshore Oil Corporation
(CNOOC) signed an exploration agreement covering off-
shore blocks off Rakhine State;30
• January 2007: CNPC signed production sharing agreements
with MOGE covering three crude oil and natural gas
exploration projects off the Rakhine coast.31
• March 2007: PetroChina secured sole purchasing rights to
an estimated at 6 trillion cubic feet of recoverable gas in the
Shwe off-shore field. The announcement came as a major
blow to India, which had proposed piping the gas to its
northeastern states, and was widely interpreted as a gift to
China for using its veto at the UNSC earlier in the year.32
Burmese oil and gas bought up by Chinese companies will likely be
transported to the PRC via two proposed pipelines financed by loans
from China. In April 2007, the SPDC gave the green light for a 2,380 km
gas pipeline to Kunming.33 A second pipeline for crude oil is expected to
follow with an oil refinery to be based in Kunming.34 The two pipelines
163
 should reduce China’s dependence on energy shipments through the
Straits of Malacca.
In addition to oil and gas, hydroelectric power generation has also
become a magnet for Chinese aid and investment in Burma. The
SPDC has identified hydroelectric power as an important source of
domestic energy, as well as a lucrative foreign currency earner, and
plans exist for the construction of 30 hydroelectric power plants.
China has become a major player in this sector for a number of
reasons. First, the rate of return on hydroelectric power projects in
Burma is very good. Second, the electricity generated can be exported
to China’s southwest provinces and beyond. Third, hydropower plants
can power mining concerns, many of which themselves have been
the target of PRC investment. Fourth, Chinese companies benefit
through the export of engineering equipment and expertise to Burma.
Fifth, Chinese consumers can enjoy the benefits of electricity without
paying the high social and environmental costs which the Burmese
suffer.
After the Sino-Burmese alignment was forged in the late 1980s, Chi-
na invested in a number of small hydropower projects in Burma. Since
2000, however, the scale of Chinese-invested projects has increased.
These large projects have been centered on two areas – the Salween River
and the Irrawaddy River. Chinese companies have invested heavily in
three hydropower projects along the Salween: Shweli 1, 2 and 3 designed
to generate 600 Megawatts (MW), 460 MW and 360 MW respectively.
Construction of Shweli 1 began in 2002, and agreement on the other two
plants was reached in April 2007.35 Along the Irrawaddy, China Power
Investment Corporation will finance and construct the Myitsone Dam,
China’s first build-operate-transfer project in Burma, plus six more large
hydroprojects upstream which will have a combined generating capacity
of 13,360 MW.36
These projects and others like them which have attracted foreign,
mainly Thai, investment have been heavily criticized by NGOs on
environmental, social and political grounds. Environmentally the hy-
dropower projects are predicted to upset the rivers’ delicate ecological
balance, and negatively impact fisheries, food plain farming and river
bank cultivation. Social disruptions, based on earlier dam projects, are
likely to include land confiscation, forced labour, population displace-
ment, and human rights abuses, the sexual exploitation of women and
spread of HIV/AIDS through the presence of Burmese troops sent to
guard construction sites and the completed facilities. NGOs have also
accused the SPDC of using the dams as a pretext to expand its military
presence in areas controlled by ethnic army ceasefire groups.37
China’s Manifold Interests in Burma: Resources, Markets and Strategic Location
164
China’s Military and Strategic Interests in Burma
One of the central pillars of the Sino-Burmese alliance has been mili-
tary cooperation. Over the past two decades the Chinese government
has furnished the Burmese regime with a formidable array of military
equipment. This aid has helped bind the two countries closer together
and enabled the junta to consolidate power. The robust Sino-Burmese
defence relationship has provided China with opportunities to advance
its strategic interests in both South and Southeast Asia.
In the aftermath of the 1988 crackdown, the SLORC’s desire to
strengthen internal security and prevent further anti-government pro-
tests from threatening regime survival meant that military-security as-
sistance from the PRC was an immediate priority. The first in a series of
military assistance agreements between Burma and China was signed
in October 1989 during a visit to Beijing by SLORC Vice Chairman Gen-
eral Than Shwe and then head of the intelligence service, Lieutenant
General Khin Nyunt. Further defence agreements were inked in 1991,
1992, 1994 and 1996, with perhaps others remaining secret. Under
these agreements China has provided the Burmese armed forces, the
Tatmadaw, with an estimated $2 billion of equipment, including over
5,000 military vehicles, 200 main and light battle tanks, 300 armoured
personnel carriers, 100 artillery pieces, tens of thousands of rifles, small
arms and mortars plus ammunition, 56 F-7 fighter bombers, 50 close
air support ground attack fighters, training and transport aircraft, heli-
copters and 30 naval vessels.38 The agreements have also covered the
training of Burmese military personnel, undertaken in both Burma and
China. With hard currency in short supply during the 1990s, the junta
paid for the military equipment through barter trade and with Chinese
concessional loans. According to Tatmadaw expert Andrew Selth, mili-
tary aid from the PRC has transformed the Burmese military from a
“small, weak counter-insurgency force” into a “powerful defence force
capable of major conventional operations.” 39
Arms transfers from the PRC to Burma have continued into the
twenty-first century. However, in keeping with the junta’s attempts to
lessen its dependence on its northern neighbour, some diversification
of arms acquisitions has occurred, principally from Russia and India.
In 2001 Rangoon surprised Beijing by signing a deal with Moscow to
purchase 10 MiG-29 fighter jets. The deal was signed in the wake of
tensions between Thailand and Burma during 2000-2001 which saw
the Thai and Burmese militaries trading artillery fire along the border
and the Thai air force deploying F-16 fighter jets in a show of strength.
Further Russian acquisitions were agreed to in 2006, including more
165
 MiG-29s and air defence systems for the new administrative capital of
Naypyidaw.40 In 2006 India agreed to transfer an unspecified number
of tanks, armoured personnel carriers, artillery pieces, helicopters and
maritime surveillance aircraft to Burma as part of its overall policy of
improving relations with the SPDC so as to off-set PRC influence, gain
access to the country’s energy resources and secure the junta’s support
for coordinated military operations against insurgents operating
in India’s northeast states.41 After the Saffron Revolution, however,
New Delhi suspended all further arms sales to the Burmese regime.
Moreover, despite its diversification efforts, the PRC remains Burma’s
number one armourer.
Close relations with Rangoon have also provided the PRC with
useful strategic advantages. As Selth has noted, Burma’s strategic
value to China lies in its geographical location: at the junction of three
subregions, East, South and Southeast Asia.42 Alliance with Burma
helps secure China’s border, the East Asian element of the triad. But
the most important geostrategic advantages for China are to be found
in South and Southeast Asia.
Burma shares a long border with India, China’s long-term
Asian rival, notwithstanding recent improvements in the bilateral
relationship. Since the early 1960s China has forged a close relationship
with Pakistan, the country which absorbs a lot of New Delhi’s political
and military energies; Burma provides Beijing with an additional
“pressure point” on India’s eastern border. The Sino-Burmese alliance
has been of great concern to strategic thinkers in India since the late
1980s. Burma also provides an important vantage point to monitor
New Delhi’s military activities in the Bay of Bengal, Andaman Sea and
wider Indian Ocean. China’s role in monitoring such activities has
been subject to a great deal of rumour and speculation over the past two
decades. Military agreements between the two countries signed in the
early 1990s were alleged to have given China permission to establish
signals intelligence (SIGINT) listening stations on Great Coco Island
and at several other locations along the Burmese coast.43 The alleged
purpose of these facilities was to eavesdrop on India’s ballistic missile
tests conducted at the Defence Research and Development Laboratory in
Hyderabad and to monitor the activities of the Indian Navy at Port Blair
in the Andaman Islands.44 Both Rangoon and Beijing always denied
the reports, and there was speculation that the Indian armed forces had
played up the issue for budgetary reasons. In mid-2005, however, in a
surprise announcement, the Chief of Naval Staff of the Indian Navy,
Admiral Arun Prakash, said he believed the Burmese government
when it said China was not involved in SIGINT activities on Coco
China’s Manifold Interests in Burma: Resources, Markets and Strategic Location
166
Island.45 Prakash’s comments were made at a time of warming political
and military ties between New Delhi and Rangoon, and may have been
made for political purposes. Senior Indian naval officers have told the
author, however, that the armed forces have plenty of evidence to prove
China’s SIGINT activities at Burmese military facilities.46 Because of
the closed nature of Burmese society and acute sensitivities associated
with national security issues, it is difficult to determine the full extent
of China’s intelligence activities in Burma.
China’s long-term strategic interests in Burma have also aroused
controversy. Reports in the 1990s suggested that the PRC had financed
the upgrade of Burmese naval facilities on Ramree Island, Hainggyi
Island, Zadetkyi Island and Monkey Point Naval Base. These reports
generated speculation that China might one day establish look to es-
tablish a semi-permanent naval presence in Burma to protect its sea
lines of communication (SLOCs) which stretch from the Middle East
and Africa to China, and pass through the Indian Ocean and Straits of
Malacca in Southeast Asia. Strategic thinkers in the PRC recognize the
nexus between China’s continued economic development and in the
need for uninterrupted energy supplies. Because the Chinese Navy is
currently incapable of protecting the country’s SLOCs, there is concern
that during times of crisis these vital lifelines could be constrained or
even severed by China’s opponents. Emblematic of these concerns over
SLOC security is the Straits of Malacca, the 550-mile long waterway
separating Indonesia and Malaysia, and the shortest route between the
Indian and Pacific oceans. Chinese security analysts view the Straits
as a serious strategic vulnerability because two-thirds of the country’s
energy imports pass through it and “certain major powers” (a codeword
for the United States and its allies) can exercise control over it – a situa-
tion dubbed China’s “Malacca dilemma.” 47
The Chinese government has adopted a number of strategies to
enhance its energy security situation, including continued reliance
on coal, increasing nuclear power generation capacity, improving
energy efficiency and greater utilization of renewable energy resources.
However, such programmes will take decades to bear fruit and in any
case it will be virtually impossible for China to become totally self-
sufficient in energy resources. As a consequence, China’s dependence
on imported energy resources has become a permanent reality.
Burma could play a role in mitigating China’s so-called “Malacca
dilemma” in two ways. First, as noted earlier, the construction of oil
and gas pipelines from Burma to the PRC, which were reportedly given
the green late in April 2007, would reduce China’s dependence on the
Strait as vessels would be able to off-load their cargoes of crude oil at
167
 Burmese ports instead of making the long journey to China’s eastern
seaboard. Second, it has been suggested that China could improve its
SLOC security by stationing PLAN warships at Burmese naval facilities.
This latter strategy was first outlined by a US defence consultancy firm
and dubbed China’s “string of pearls.” In it, China would establish a
naval presence at ports in Burma, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and
Cambodia.48 The strategic logic of the “string of pearls” notion is open
to debate. The ports noted above are a long way from China’s SLOCs.
China’s involvement in the upgrade of Burmese port facilities has been
on a commercial basis, with no evidence of direct PLA involvement.
Moreover, a Chinese naval presence along the Burmese coast might
be counterproductive as it would raise India’s hackles and might push
New Delhi into a closer military relationship with the United States.
The ASEAN states would also find this development unsettling, as it
would raise the unwelcome prospect of one of its members being at
the centre of Sino-Indian rivalry, much as Vietnam was during the era
of Sino-Soviet enmity in the 1970s and 1980s. Nevertheless, China’s
strategic planners tend to think long term, and it is possible that re-
furbished Burmese naval facilities have been designated as important
“place holders” in a larger global naval strategy.
Conclusions
Twenty years ago, against a backdrop of anti-government protests and
socio-economic dislocation, Burma’s military leaders launched an in-
cumbency coup. The new government, the SLORC, decided that in the
face of international censure and economic sanctions they had little op-
tion but to discard the country’s 40 year commitment to neutrality and
non-alignment in favour of tighter relations with the PRC. Since then,
the story of Sino-Burmese relations has been one of deepening depen-
dence, despite the junta’s somewhat successful attempts to diversify its
foreign and trade relations. China’s shielding of Burma at the UN on
two occasions in 2007 underscored just how dependent the generals
had become on China.
The Sino-Burmese alliance has clearly served both governments
well, but perhaps it is China that has made the most impressive gains.
The PRC gained an ally on its southern flank and a friendly voice
within ASEAN. The junta’s atrocious human rights record has from
time to time shone a light on Beijing’s support for the regime – most
recently during the “Saffron Revolution” – but economic interests have
far outweighed any embarrassment for China. The alliance has been
a boon to China’s policy of developing its southwestern provinces, as
China’s Manifold Interests in Burma: Resources, Markets and Strategic Location
168
goods produced in these landlocked areas now have an outlet to the sea
thanks to ports along the Burmese coast. Burma has become a veritable
treasure trove of natural resources for the PRC, with the grand prize
being almost unfettered access to the country’s substantial oil and gas
reserves.
The strategic benefits for China are more potential than real, but no
less important for being so. If the construction of pipelines to pump
oil and gas across Burma and into Yunnan province goes ahead, the
PRC’s “Malacca dilemma” will be partially – but only partially - miti-
gated. And in the future, the rotation of Chinese naval ships through
Burmese ports will enhance the PLA’s power projection capabilities in
both South and Southeast Asia, though Beijing will likely think twice
about such a move because of the negative diplomatic repercussions
that would undoubtedly follow.
In short, the scale of China’s interests in Burma means that Beijing
has a huge stake in the country’s stability. That stability requires an
end to political inertia in Burma, and forward momentum on political
reform, however limited and self-serving the “roadmap to democracy”
is. It does not mean, of course, that China supports regime change, for
there is absolutely no guarantee that a non-SPDC government would
protect and advance China’s interests – quite the reverse in fact. New
political arrangements in Burma could also lead to chaos on China’s
southern flank, with waves of refugees flowing into the country and the
resumption of violent ethnic separatism. Stability also requires the Bur-
mese authorities to prioritize economic development, as rising living
standards might yet mitigate popular dissatisfaction with the regime
and hence defuse further unrest. Yet China has been sorely disappoin-
ted with the junta’s gross mismanagement of the economy and rising
poverty levels. Beijing is particularly anxious about the widening income
disparities between ordinary Burmese and China’s economic migrants
in the north of the country who are enriching themselves at the expense
of local people. A popular backlash against PRC nationals would pose
a major security headache for the Chinese authorities. And xenophobic
outbursts are not without precedent in Burma’s recent history.
The PRC must have been heartened that the 2007 Saffron Revolu-
tion was snuffed out quickly and with relatively little loss of life, and
that the junta seems to be firmly back in charge. But the Chinese lead-
ership must also be worried that the abortive revolution has introduced
an unwelcome element of uncertainty into the political dynamics and
economic prospects of its Southeast Asian ally. The bloody crackdown
against the country’s deeply revered monks may have engendered splits
within the armed forces, and these divisions could widen over time,
169
 21
David I. Steinberg, Burma: The State of Myanmar (Washington D.C.: Georgetown Uni-
possibly leading to an internal coup, dialogue with the opposition and
versity Press, 2001), p. 228.
perhaps even political transition. Future anti-government demonstra- 22
Comments made to author by Professor David Steinberg, October 2007.
tions cannot be ruled out, either. Such developments would not, in 23
Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook (Washington D.C.: International Monetary Fund,
China’s view, bode well for stability and the safety of its considerable
2006)
economic interests and continuation of political influence. 24
Thomas Fuller, “Region’s energy needs enable Myanmar junta”, International Herald
Tribune, 1 October 2007.
Notes 25
Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook (Washington D.C.: International Monetary Fund,
2006)
1
William C. Johnstone, Burma’s Foreign Policy: A Study in Neutralism (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 1963), p. 276.
26
“Jiang seals $780 million Myanmar support”, South China Morning Post, 14 December
2001 and “China throws Burma a financial lifeline”, Financial Times, 17 January 2003.
2
“Chinese premier, Myanmar PM hold talks”, People’s Daily, 13 July 2004.
27
Cited in Maung, “Sino-Myanmar Economic Relations Since 1988”, op. cit., p. 15.
3
“China to maintain non-interference policy on ties with Myanmar”, PLA Daily, 1 No-
vember 2006.
28
“Jiang seals $780 million Myanmar support”, South China Morning Post, 14 December
2001.
4
Remarks by Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and Pacific Affairs, Eric
John, Harvard Asia Center, Cambridge, 17 February 2006, US State Department.
29
Tin Maung Maung Than, “Myanmar’s Energy Sector”, op. cit., pp. 263-266.
5
“China’s satellite”, The Irrawaddy, 7 June 2007.
30
Maung, “Sino-Myanmar Economic Relations Since 1988”, op. cit., p. 15.
6
“Myanmar, US hold rare talks in China over Aung San Suu Kyi”, Channelnewsasia
31
“MOGE inks oil, gas exploration deal with CNPC”, Myanmar Digest, 17 January 2007.
(Singapore), 29 June 2007. 32
See “Myanmar says no to gas exports to India, prefers China”, Press Trust of India, 21
7
State Councilor Tang Jiaxuan Meets with Special Envoy of SPDC Chairman of Myan- March 2007; and “The Good, Bad and Ugly of China’s Shwe Gas Deal”, The Irrawaddy,
mar, PRC Foreign Ministry, 13 September 2007. 12 December 2007.
33
8
“China makes contingency plans for junta’s fall”, International Herald Tribune, 26 Sep- “Construction of China-Myanmar oil pipeline is expected to start this year”, People’s
tember 2007. Daily, 22 April 2007.
34
9
Ibid. “Kunming favourable for Sino-Burma pipeline oil refinery”, Interfax China, 1 February
2007.
10
“China ‘helpful’ in Myanmar crisis: UN envoy”, Channelnewsasia.com, 18 October
35
2007. “Myanmar, China sign new hydropower deal”, Agence France Presse, 10 April 2007.
36
11
“China backhands Burma over UN envoy”, Bangkok Post, 5 October 2007. “China to build Myanmar hydropower plants”, Shanghai Daily, 10 May 2007.
37
12
“China leads move to soften UN text on Myanmar”, Channelnewsasia.com, 9 October George McLeod, “Atrocity before the deluge”, Bangkok Post, 8 July 2007; “China’s
2007. dams in Burma cause for concern, say activists”, Bangkok Post, 4 December 2007; also
see the NGO reports, Palaung Youth Network Group, “Under the Boot: The Burma
13
“China opposes sanctions against Myanmar”, Xinhua News Agency, 9 October 2007.
Army Clears Way for Chinese Dams on the Shweli River” (3 December 2007) http:
14
See, for instance, “Bush appeals to China to pressure Myanmar”, Reuters, 27 Septem- //salweenwatch.org/downlaods/UndertheBootEnglish.pdf; and Kachin Development
ber 2007 and “Thai PM urges India, China to help end Myanmar crisis”, Agence France Network Group, “Damming the Irrawaddy”(22 October 2007) http://www.aksyu.com/
Presse, 27 September 2007. 2007/AKSYU-Books/Damming-the-Irrawaddy-eng.pdf
15
Pan Qi, “Opening the Southwest: an expert opinion”, Beijing Review, 2 September 38
Andrew Selth, Burma’s Armed Forces: Power Without Glory (Norwalk, CT: East Bridge,
1985. 2002), pp. 169, 193, 213–214, 219.
16
Maung Aung Myoe. “Sino-Myanmar Economic Relations Since 1988”, Asia Research 39
Andrew Selth, “Burma and Superpower Rivalries in the Asia-Pacific”, Naval War
Institute Working Paper No. 86 (April 2007), Singapore, pp. 19-20. College Review, Vol. LV, No. 2 (Spring 2002), p. 56.
17
Ibid., p. 12. 40
“Russia to supply wide range of arms to Myanmar”, Press Trust of India, 4 April
18
Cited in Khun Sam, “Where money grows on trees”, The Irrawaddy, 1 August 2007. 2006.
41
19
As early as 1952 a British writer bemoaned the fact that illegal immigration from “India begins supplying Myanmar military hardware”, IANS, 4 October 2006.
China was turning Mandalay and Bhama into “Chinese cities”. See Hinton, China’s 42
Selth, “Burma and Superpower Rivalries”, op. cit., p. 43.
Relations with Burma, op. cit., p. 48. 43
Desmond Ball, Burma’s Military Secrets: Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) from the Second
20
See Mya Maung, “On the Road to Mandalay: A case study of the Sinonization of Upper World War to Civil War and Cyber Warfare (Bangkok: White Lotus Press, 1998), p. 220.
Burma”, Asian Survey, Vol. XXXIV, No. 5, May 1994; and Michael Vatikiotis, “Catching “Chinese puzzle over Burma SIGINT base”, Jane’s Defence Weekly, 29 January 1994.
the wave”, Far Eastern Economic Review, 16 February 1995.

China’s Manifold Interests in Burma: Resources, Markets and Strategic Location

170 171
 44
See Selth, Burma’s Armed Forces, op. cit., p. 119; “Snooping Around”, Far Eastern
Economic Review, 4 August 1994, and “Sino-Burmese pact”, Far Eastern Economic Review,
30 January 1997.
Comparing ASEAN Countries’
45

46
“India says no China defence posts on Myanmar Island”, Reuters, 24 August 2005.
Author discussions with senior Indian naval officers, New Delhi, February 2006 and
Efforts to Influence Political
Sydney, February 2008.
47
Ian Storey, “China’s ‘Malacca Dilemma’”, China Brief, Vol. 6 (Issue 8), 12 April 2006.
Developments in Myanmar:
Towards a New Regional Approach?
48
Bill Gertz, “China builds up strategic sea lanes”, Washington Times, 18 January 2005.

Jürgen Haacke
Introduction
On 9 February 2008 Myanmar’s ruling State Peace and Development
Council (SPDC, formerly the State Peace and Order Restoration Coun-
cil, SLORC) announced that it would hold a referendum on the final
draft of the country’s new constitution in May 2008. It also indicated
that there would be multi-party elections in 2010. In reaction to this sur-
prise announcement, the UN Special Adviser on Myanmar, Professor
Ibrahim Gambari, who assists the United Nations Secretary General
(UNSG) in the exercise of his good offices role in line with the mandate
given by the UN General Assembly (UNGA), travelled to Myanmar for
the third time since the suppression of peaceful protests in the autumn
of 2007 to urge the military leadership to fully incorporate the political
opposition in the country’s political process before the referendum. The
regime informed Ibrahim Gambari that the military would implement
its roadmap to democracy as planned and thus disregard calls to inclu-
de Aung San Suu Kyi (ASSK) and the National League for Democracy
(NLD) in re-drafting the constitution. Indeed, Information Minister
Brigadier-General Kyaw Hsan made it entirely clear that those who fai-
led to participate in the National Convention (NC) would nevertheless
have the possibility of participating in the referendum and subsequent
election.1
A week before the referendum, Cyclone Nargis struck Myanmar, cau-
sing massive devastation and loss of life, particularly in the Ayeyawady
(Irrawaddy) Delta.2 The ruling junta nevertheless proceeded with the
referendum in those areas not affected by the cyclone, and it was ostensi-
bly approved by 92% of those voting. In other areas, the referendum was
postponed until 24 May. According to the SPDC, 98.12% of eligible voters
ultimately cast their votes in the referendum, with 92.48% supporting the
draft constitution.3 There are few observers who believe that these results
were not manipulated. While the constitution, which will effectively leave

China’s Manifold Interests in Burma: Resources, Markets and Strategic Location

172 173
 real political power in the hands of the military commander in chief,
was ratified and promulgated, ASSK’s house arrest was extended to May
2009. These developments have raised a number of important questions?
What role have the countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Na-
tions (ASEAN) played in promoting political transition in Myanmar and
what approach can they still play in promoting national reconciliation in
Myanmar, either individually or collectively, both in the immediate future
and in the medium term? And has Cyclone Nargis added further impetus
to developing a new regional initiative?
ASEAN’s Declaratory Position on Myanmar:
Looking back
Prior to February 2008 the last major occasion at which the ASEAN
states explicitly formulated a collective position on Myanmar was their
14th Summit in November 2007. At the time, the then ASEAN Chair,
Singapore, released a robust statement whereby the military regime in
Naypyidaw was expected to fend for itself in dealing with the United
Nations and the wider international community, until the military
leadership again wanted ASEAN to be of assistance. Read out by
Singapore Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong and ostensibly supported
by eight fellow ASEAN leaders, the statement outlined their joint
expectation that Myanmar work with the UN in order to: (1) Open up
a meaningful dialogue with Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and the National
League for Democracy (NLD); (2) Make full use of the good offices of
the UN Secretary-General and Professor Gambari in this process; (3)
Lift restrictions on Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and release all political
detainees; (4) Work towards a peaceful transition to democracy; and
(5) Address the economic difficulties faced by the people of Myanmar.
ASEAN affirmed its readiness “to play a role whenever Myanmar wants
it to do so”, while stating that “[m]ost Leaders expressed the view that
Myanmar could not go back or stay put.”4
The immediate trigger for this unequivocal statement was the late
refusal by the top leadership of the ruling SPDC to allow the UN Spe-
cial Adviser on Myanmar to brief the leaders of the East Asia Summit
(EAS) on developments in the country.5 The statement signalled that
ASEAN was putting a stop to collective attempts to directly influence
Myanmar’s process of national reconciliation. Notably, these efforts
had been resumed only two months earlier in response to the SPDC’s
violent suppression of the monk-led September protests, following a
period of almost two years during which ASEAN had steadily refused to
defend Myanmar internationally.
Comparing ASEAN countries’ efforts to influence political developments in Myanmar
174
Sustained collective efforts by ASEAN to influence Myanmar’s politi-
cal developments had initially begun in reaction to the detention of ASSK
and members of her entourage at Depayin in late May 2003 after a bloody
clash with pro-government groups.6 This incident, which provoked wides-
pread international condemnation, prompted ASEAN to urge Myanmar
to “resume its efforts of national reconciliation and dialogue among
all parties concerned leading to a peaceful transition to democracy.”7
Ministers also looked forward to the early lifting of restrictions placed on
Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and other NLD members.
Responding in part to ASEAN’s diplomatic pressure, former Prime
Minister Khin Nyunt presented in August 2003 a roadmap to democracy,
and also introduced sufficient ambiguity about ASSK’s status to satisfy
Myanmar’s critics just before the October 2003 Bali Summit (ASSK
underwent medical treatment and was allowed to return to her house
in University Avenue) before affirming a new spell of house arrest. The-
reafter, however, the relationship between Myanmar and several ASEAN
countries deteriorated steadily as the SPDC’s wilful procrastination in
implementing the 2003 roadmap caused deep frustration. By April 2005
significant levels of concern and disappointment about the military’s re-
calcitrance led some ASEAN members to effectively talk Myanmar out of
assuming the grouping’s chairmanship for 2006/7. At the end of 2005,
the overwhelming consensus among ASEAN countries was that unless
Myanmar decided to be more constructive in the way in which it respon-
ded to their expectations, the grouping could no longer publicly defend
Myanmar. This position was articulated above all by the original ASEAN-
5: Thailand, Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines.
This withdrawal of diplomatic support represented a significant
turn-around. In preceding years ASEAN had resorted to “blunting the
attacks” on Myanmar in the ASEAN Regional Forum,8 and backed My-
anmar in its dispute with the International Labour Organization (ILO).
ASEAN had also supported Myanmar in the Third Committee of the
UN General Assembly and stood firm against the EU on the issue of
Myanmar’s participation in the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM); ASEAN
economic ministers even refused to take part in ASEM economic
ministers’ meeting in The Netherlands in September 2005 given The
Hague’s refusal to issue a visa to the Myanmar representative.
Combining their more critical stance with the necessary diploma-
tic accommodation, foreign ministers at the 2006 ASEAN ministe-
rial meeting (AMM) called “for the early release of those placed under
detention and for effective dialogue with all parties concerned”, while
acknowledging that “… Myanmar needs both time and political space
to deal with its many and complex challenges.” 9 Ministers added that
175
 ASEAN would remain constructively engaged as required. However,
the more the SPDC was perceived as undermining ASEAN’s reputa-
tion and credibility, the less inclined the grouping was to accommodate
Naypyidaw. Thus, when before the 2007 ASEAN Summit in Cebu (Phi-
lippines), just as the UNSC was about to vote on a draft resolution on
Myanmar co-sponsored by Washington and London, the late Myanmar
Prime Minister General Soe Win apparently asked ASEAN colleagues
to defend Myanmar against the accusation that the country posed a th-
reat to regional peace and security, the consensus was that if Myanmar
wanted to avoid the internationalisation of the issue, ASEAN should be
allowed a role in facilitating the country’s reconciliation process.10 In ad-
dition, then ASEAN Secretary-General Ong Keng Yong made clear that
there was no official ASEAN position.11 At the 2007 AMM, member sta-
tes even “expressed concern on the pace of the national reconciliation
process and urged Myanmar to show tangible progress that would lead
to a peaceful transition to democracy in the near future.” 12
The violent suppression of civil protests in September 2007 led to the
sharpest rebuke of Myanmar ever sanctioned by other ASEAN govern-
ments. This took the form of a statement issued by Singapore as ASEAN
Chair on the sidelines of the UNGA plenary in late September. In it mi-
nisters expressed their “revulsion ” over reports that the demonstrations
in Myanmar were being suppressed by violent force and that there had
been a number of fatalities.13 Ministers also called upon Myanmar to
resume its efforts at national reconciliation with all parties concerned,
and to work towards a peaceful transition to democracy, as well as for
the release of all political detainees, including Daw Aung San Suu Kyi.
Expressing full support for the good offices role of Ibrahim Gambari,
ministers moreover urged the Myanmar government to grant him full
access to all parties and to cooperate fully and work with him. As noted,
Singapore’s efforts to organize a briefing by the UNSG special advisor
to leaders of the 2007 East Asia Summit came to a halt when on the
eve of the Singapore Summit in November 2007 Myanmar’s prime mi-
nister strongly voiced strong objections on the grounds that Myanmar
could handle itself what was said to be a domestic issue. Faced with the
possibility of Myanmar walking out of the Summit, Singapore was then
obliged to cancel the Gambari briefing.
In the event, ASEAN’s apparent decision to end its efforts to promote
national reconciliation not only left the effectiveness of the grouping’s
stance on Myanmar hostage to the success of the good offices under-
taken by Gambari (at least temporarily), but also exposed intramural
discord within the organisation, clearly articulated by Indonesian Presi-
dent Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono at the informal pre-Summit meeting
Comparing ASEAN countries’ efforts to influence political developments in Myanmar
176
of ASEAN leaders.14 The divide was essentially between the original and
the newer member states over the Association’s respect for its own core
principles and norms.
Initiatives and National Perspectives on Myanmar
The consensus positions ASEAN has formulated on Myanmar have
glossed over significant differences among individual members over
whether and how to foster political reconciliation and change. As the
voting record by ASEAN states on draft resolutions on Myanmar’s hu-
man rights situation at the UN General Assembly (UNGA) shows, there
is a clear divide between the original ASEAN-6 and the Indochinese
countries. In the most recent UNGA vote on the situation in Myanmar
in late 2007, Brunei Darussalam, Indonesia, the Philippines, Singapore
and Thailand all abstained, while Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar and Viet-
nam voted against the revised draft resolution under consideration.
Cambodia was absent. That said, the original members do not neces-
sarily sing from exactly the same hymn sheet. To explore the state posi-
tions and approaches towards Myanmar in more detail, the paper will
first briefly summarise the most important diplomatic efforts towards
Myanmar initiated by the rotating ASEAN Chairs, and – where relevant
– other ASEAN countries, covering the time since the Depayin incident
in May 2003. It will then focus in more detail on members’ different
perspectives on Myanmar.
Different ASEAN Chairs, Different Initiatives
Since the Depayin incident, which happened under Cambodia’s watch
as ASEAN Chairman, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, the Philippines, and
Singapore have held the Chairmanship. Having assumed the chairman-
ship in June 2003, Jakarta relied on a combination of public and private
diplomacy to induce the junta to comply with the demands formulated
by the ASEAN foreign ministers’ meeting that month. Its efforts were
both in response to the international opprobrium unleashed by the de-
tention of ASSK and concerns that developments in Myanmar might
derail the Bali Summit, which was to be organised in October 2003. The
tactful and quiet diplomacy conducted by former Indonesian foreign
minister Ali Alatas days before the Bali Summit seems to have been
crucial to achieve the abovementioned last-minute face-saving solution
on the issue of Suu Kyi’s detention.
With Indonesia’s focus on Myanmar slipping somewhat after the
Bali Summit, Bangkok sought to lead the multilateral diplomatic enga-
177
 gement of the SPDC. Having had put forward the idea for a roadmap of
national reconciliation- albeit in very different form than the one adop-
ted by Myanmar in that Thailand had suggested a quick release of ASSK
as a confidence building measure – the Thai government succeeded in
late 2003 in establishing a new platform bringing together regional and
extra-regional states in a dialogue with the junta, dubbed the “Bangkok
process”. In the event, however, the government of Thaksin Shinawatra
was unable to persuade Yangon to politically invest much in this kind
of multilateral conference diplomacy. Only one gathering materialized;
plans for a second meeting in April 2004 officially fell victim to the
SPDC’s need to concentrate on the re-launch of the National Conven-
tion, which was first started in 1993 but had been on ice since 1996, as
the first step of the SPDC’s roadmap. The subsequent political demise
of Premier Khin Nyunt towards the end of 2004 deprived Thailand of a
key interlocutor within the regime.
This following two years spanned the chairmanships of Laos (2004/
5) and Malaysia (2005/6). Having neither the political will to persuade
nor the required diplomatic capacity and clout to oblige Myanmar to
pay heed to ASEAN’s stated collective position (e.g. to release ASSK
and other political detainees and to begin an inclusive political dialo-
gue), Laos did not pursue any particular initiative towards Yangon. The
Chairman’s statement issued by Vientiane at the 2004 ASEAN Summit
makes no reference to Myanmar. On the important question of whether
Myanmar would assume the ASEAN chair in July 2006, it was left to
other member states to influence the SPDC, but no clearly distinct voice
from within ASEAN emerged, nor was there any sustained new diplo-
matic initiative except a combined successful effort to make Yangon
temporarily give up the chairmanship.
Malaysia – as the incoming ASEAN chair - pursued a more critical
and proactive stance towards Myanmar than had Laos or even Indonesia.
Trying to coax the military regime into complying with the grouping’s
stated position, Malaysia secured in the 2005 Summit statement an invi-
tation by Myanmar to the Foreign Minister of Malaysia in his capacity as
Chairman of the ASEAN Standing Committee to visit Myanmar “to learn
first-hand of the progress.”15 Whether the Senior General had actually
issued or agreed to such an invitation was not entirely clear. In the event,
Myanmar’s leadership played hardball with Malaysia’s foreign minister,
Syed Hamid Albar, by delaying his visit, not accepting his coming as
ASEAN Chair, and denying him requested talks with ASSK and Than
Shwe. This development not only saw Malaysia’s top diplomat “burned”
by the regime; it also greatly stifled any remaining enthusiasm in Kuala
Lumpur to develop further initiatives during its ASEAN chairmanship.
Comparing ASEAN countries’ efforts to influence political developments in Myanmar
178
The Philippines, which stepped in to replace Myanmar as ASEAN
Chair in the summer of 2006, decided to let its foreign minister pay an
early ministerial visit to Naypyidaw to push the regime to make con-
cessions on the core issues raised by ASEAN. The visit produced no
concrete positive outcome, not least because the two capitals disagreed
in particular about the need to release ASSK. The bilateral relationship
had previously also taken a decisive knock because Manila had been the
first and only ASEAN country to anger Naypyidaw by offering support
for the involvement of the UNSC in late 2005 in order to bring about
national reconciliation in Myanmar. The double veto of the January
2007 UNSC draft resolution confirmed Naypyidaw’s confidence in Rus-
sia and China to provide diplomatic protection, while Manila under the
circumstances had little choice but to put a brave face on the matter for
the remainder of its chairmanship.
In contrast, Singapore’s chairmanship of ASEAN (2007/8) has been
largely shaped by events unfolding in Myanmar. Its leaders impres-
sed the international community by their capacity to rally all ASEAN
neighbours to unambiguously condemn Myanmar’s military junta for
its use of violence to suppress the street protests of September 2007.
To promote political reconciliation in Myanmar, Singapore’s diploma-
tic efforts then aimed to reinforce support for the good offices role of
the UNSG and Ibrahim Gambari. To this end, Prime Minister Lee also
invited Prof Gambari to brief East Asian leaders on Myanmar at the
Singapore Summit in November 2007. As noted, however, the event
was cancelled shortly before the Summit. In May 2008, Singapore or-
ganised a special ASEAN foreign ministers meeting to deal with the
humanitarian situation in the aftermath of Cyclone Nargis.
The Perspectives of the ASEAN States
ASEAN’s internal differences on Myanmar are put into greater relief by
examining individual country perspectives. They are largely shaped by
four factors: (1) varying levels of commitment to promote democracy and
human rights; (2) different views held by state elites about how ASEAN
members should respond to international pressure over Myanmar’s po-
litical impasse; (3) varying levels of pressure placed on governments by
public opinion and party politics; and (4) a range of economic interests
and security considerations. Two further factors also impinge on the My-
anmar approach adopted by particular ASEAN countries: political “brui-
sing” experienced at the hands of Myanmar, and assessments regarding
the junta’s willingness to embrace political change. The relative impor-
tance of these factors varies considerably from country to country.
179
 From Singapore’s perspective, Myanmar’s way of responding to con-
cerns about its domestic developments has for some time been a thorn in
ASEAN’s relations with key dialogue partners and the city-state’s attempts
to focus fellow members on advancing regional economic integration in
Southeast Asia. Singapore leaders have also been exasperated over the
glacial pace with which the SPDC has implemented its own roadmap, in
part because this has exposed the city state and the region to increasing
Western pressure to do more to influence Myanmar’s top leadership.
Significantly, Singapore’s leaders have not deemed it a prudent in-
vestment of their time and reputation to invest heavily into personal
diplomacy at the highest level to influence Naypyidaw, presumably
because they have not held out much hope to persuade the SPDC to
do what Western countries demand. Noting how the strident nationa-
lism and recalcitrance of the ruling generals has been reinforced by
the West’s verbal attacks and its punitive policies towards Myanmar,
Singapore has spoken out against ASEAN countries imposing retalia-
tory measures against Myanmar, especially economic sanctions. Singa-
pore sees sanctions as an ineffective means to sway the military regime
as long as Myanmar maintains trading ties with China and India in
particular; Singapore also wants to prevent the ASEAN countries from
pushing Myanmar more deeply into Chinese arms. Appreciating that
Myanmar has considerable geopolitical significance given its location at
the crossroads of South and Southeast Asia and the wider East Asia, a
related fear is that weaker ties between Myanmar and the other ASEAN
countries could cause a situation in which China and India engage in a
destabilising competitive struggle for influence in the country.16
Wider stability concerns also come into play. In the aftermath of
the September protests, Minister Mentor Lee Kuan Yew referred to an
unstable Myanmar as a “time bomb”.17 Noting the economic mismana-
gement of the ruling military junta in the absence of political reconcilia-
tion, Singapore in the wake of the September protests agreed with the
proposition that Myanmar could not be allowed to simply return to the
status quo ante. However, Singapore has not been keen to see ASEAN
saddle the primary responsibility for achieving political reconciliation
and transition in Myanmar. Regarding China and also India as best pla-
ced to exert influence on the SPDC, Singapore responded to Myanmar’s
domestic crisis by seeking to involve Asia’s major powers in a concerted
regional approach towards Naypyidaw. Singapore’s push for the Gam-
bari briefing at the 2007 East Asia Summit, and hence the role of the
UN, was sold in Beijing and New Delhi with reference to their potential
image gains given persistent international criticisms of the backing ex-
tended by China and India to the ruling military regime.
Comparing ASEAN countries’ efforts to influence political developments in Myanmar
180
There have been questions why Singapore does not more forcefully
exercise its assumed leverage over Myanmar, which is considered to
derive from its position as one of Myanmar’s main trading partners
and investors as well as provider of banking services to the regime.
Notably, the chairman of the ASEAN Inter-Parliamentary Myanmar
Caucus, Djoko Susilo, has squarely pointed the finger at what he con-
sidered to be Singapore’s continued blind support for the regime. As
he argued, “It is time for the Singapore government and businessmen
to use their conscience and moral obligation to stop aiding the junta.
Act now or more people will be killed, raped and tortured by the junta
which is assisted and kept in power by all the investments and financial
facilities provided by Singapore.” 18 For its part, the Singapore govern-
ment has said it would abide by all UN sanctions (though these remain
only hypothetical); it has however refused to be drawn over how much
money from Myanmar has flowed into Singapore, and what the level
of Singapore’s investment is in Myanmar.19 Indeed, Lee Kuan Yew has
sought to pour cold water over claims that the city-state has leverage
over Myanmar, arguing that “[t]he members of ASEAN who could influ-
ence them [SPDC leaders] will be Thailand and beyond [that] China and
India. The rest of us-we are a kind of background muzak [music].” 20
Thailand
Under former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, Bangkok embarked
on a more pragmatic policy towards Yangon than had been the norm
under the second Democrat-led government of Chuan Leekpai (1997-
2001). This involved (1) severely curtailing territorial space previously
available to regime adversaries, including the ethnic minorities; (2) con-
solidating and strengthening economic links with Myanmar, especially
investment in the areas of hydropower and natural gas exploration; (3)
abstaining from trenchant criticisms of the incumbent junta, while
treating as security issues the cross-border flow of narcotics and refu-
gees; and (4) offering to support UN efforts to engage the SPDC. Thai
officials have essentially been of two minds about Myanmar. On the
one hand, Myanmar has been considered as the source of transnational
challenges and threats. On the other hand, Thai officials appreciate that
Bangkok’s diplomatic leeway vis-à-vis Myanmar is circumscribed by the
reality of Thailand’s dependency on its neighbour’s natural gas, timber,
and labour.
After Thaksin’s removal by a coup in September 2006, Thailand’s
diplomatic pro-activeness in relation to Myanmar ground to a halt. The
interim military leadership appreciated that unlike previous govern-
181
 ments it was not endowed with sufficient moral authority to publicly
lecture its counterpart in Myanmar on democratization. Instead, it fo-
cused on stabilizing the relationship with Naypyidaw, not least by buil-
ding confidence with senior Myanmar leaders, promoting stability on
the border, and addressing transnational security issues. For instance,
shortly after the UNSC rejected the US/UK sponsored draft resolution
on Myanmar in January 2007, Thai supreme commander Boonsrang
Niempradit visited Myanmar to discuss counter-narcotics cooperation.
Reacting to the anti-SPDC protests in September 2007, some support
emerged within Thai policy-making circles for establishing the ASEAN
Troika or initiating a multilateral diplomatic dialogue similar to the Six-
Party talks (which was apparently considered a possible way to revive
in effect the “Bangkok Process”).21 However, beyond the support given
to the good offices role of the UN Secretary General, no initiative was
visibly pursued as Thailand prepared to return to democratic rule.
The incoming elected government under Prime Minister Samak
Sundaravej has signalled broad continuity in Thai-Myanmar relations,
continuity with the Thaksin years. When travelling to Naypyidaw for
a routine introductory visit, Samak suggested that Western views of
Myanmar were too critical. The agenda he discussed with Myanmar
apparently excluded the country’s internal affairs, human rights and
conflict with ethnic minorities. Instead, economic issues are said to
have dominated. The pattern was repeated when Myanmar’s Prime Mi-
nister Thein Sein visited Bangkok at the end of April 2008.22 Bangkok
clearly wants a larger bite of Myanmar’s natural gas reserves. Furthe-
ring the country’s economic interests, the Thai government is moreover
committed to help improve Myanmar’s road infrastructure, including
the development of a deep-sea port at Dawei. Thai Foreign Minister
Noppodon Pattama has also confirmed that Thailand would pursue
the Tasang dam project on the Salween River, reportedly a US$ 6bn
hydropower project. Notably, the pursuit of Thai economic interests has
taken place despite significant disenchantment with Myanmar among
Thailand-based civil society and human rights activists.
The Philippines
The Philippines has routinely expressed grave concern over the situation
of human rights in Myanmar and the treatment of Aung San Suu Kyi, as
well as the perceived failure of the SPDC to comply with its roadmap to
democracy. Foreign secretaries Blas Ople (2002–3), Delia Domingo-Al-
bert (2003–4) and Alberto Romulo (August 2004–present) have all been
more or less fervent critics of Myanmar. In 2005, Manila put forward
Comparing ASEAN countries’ efforts to influence political developments in Myanmar
182
four demands: (1) full implementation of the roadmap; (2) safe and
early release of ASSK; (3) full participation of the NLD in political life,
especially in drafting the constitution; and (4) return of the UN Special
Envoy (then Razali Ismail).23 The fate of Suu Kyi remains the overriding
issue for Manila in its bilateral ties with Naypyidaw; reflecting in part
the low level of economic interaction between the two countries. On the
sidelines of the January 2007 Cebu Summit the Philippine President
privately told Premier Soe Win that ASSK’s house arrest must not be
extended any more. At the subsequent ASEAN Summit in November
2007, President Arroyo insisted that ASSK “must be released now”.24
Having apparently been hesitant to sign the ASEAN Charter because
of the political stalemate in Myanmar, the Philippine President even
suggested there would be a link between her country’s ratification of the
Charter and political progress in Myanmar, particularly as regards the
release of ASSK. The underlying reasoning, as advised by the President,
was that by signing the ASEAN Charter, Myanmar had committed itself
to democratic reforms that involved releasing the Nobel Prize laureate.
She again linked the release of ASSK to the Charter’s ratification by
Congress at the January 2008 World Economic Forum.25
While this focus on values builds on ASEAN’s collective position and
appears to reflect deeply rooted conceptions of identity, external as well
as domestic political pressures and political vulnerability also provide
important stimuli. Manila has nothing to gain by resisting US pressure
on Myanmar. Not least in view of the President’s limited political legi-
timacy, domestic criticisms of Myanmar are ignored at a potential cost.
One of the most vocal critics of Myanmar has been Senate Minority
Leader Aquilino Nene Q. Pimentel, Jr. (PDP-Laban), who has also been
vice chairman of the ASEAN Parliamentary Caucus on Myanmar.26 That
said, Myanmar has been a target of criticism across the political divide
in Philippine congressional politics.
Vietnam
While there is no deep historical friendship between the two countries,
Vietnam has offered Myanmar ample diplomatic support in a range
of regional and international settings. Pointing to Vietnam’s own ex-
perience of having been subjected to international sanctions, Hanoi
has consistently articulated its opposition to punitive measures being
imposed against Myanmar. Instead, Hanoi has wished for the active
and effective implementation of the roadmap to democracy set out by
Khin Nyunt in 2003. In its official rhetoric Hanoi has moreover emp-
hasized the importance of stability in Myanmar, both as a prerequisite
183
 of the country’s economic reform as well as for regional stability and
development. The methodical diplomacy pursued by Hanoi as Chair of
the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) in 2004 helped broker a deal whereby
Myanmar participated at the ASEM Summit organised by Vietnam that
year.
In line with other ASEAN countries, Hanoi has expressed support
for the good offices role of the UNSG and his Special Advisor. However,
it would seem that this support has been qualified by the emphasis
placed on the respect for Myanmar’s independence and sovereignty.
Unlike other ASEAN states, Vietnam has also not been specifically
concerned with the credibility of Myanmar’s political process. Indeed,
Hanoi for instance simply welcomed the announcement of the referen-
dum and the multiparty elections as positive progress.27 Vietnamese
reluctance to unambiguously endorse demands for political transition
in Myanmar are believed to be linked to concerns about the incumbent
regime’s own political future as well as ASEAN’s role in amplifying
external pressure. The depth of Hanoi’s reluctance to see members
interfere in the domestic politics of Myanmar was highlighted when
the Vietnamese Communist leadership made clear its objections to the
scheduled Gambari briefing at the EAS in November 2007.
Malaysia
Kuala Lumpur played a key role in pushing Myanmar’s admission into
ASEAN in 1997 and put a protective cloak around the SPDC in the early
years of Myanmar’s membership on the understanding that the gene-
rals would usher in reforms. To help promote political reconciliation
in the context of continued diplomatic support for Myanmar at the UN
and the International Labour Organization (ILO), Kuala Lumpur put
forward Tan Sri Razali Ismail, Malaysia Permanent Representative at
the UN in New York, for the role as UNSG Special Envoy on Myanmar,
a post he assumed in 2000. This move coincided with the decision of
SPDC Secretary-1 Khin Nyunt to invest his and the junta’s political ca-
pital by pursuing a limited political opening. In the event, however, the
SPDC soon found Khin Nyunt’s approach go unrewarded by Western
powers, even after ASSK’s release from house arrest in July 2002. The
subsequent deterioration of the political situation in Myanmar in 2003
in turn caused consternation in Kuala Lumpur, and when Myanmar de-
fied ASEAN’s expectations regarding the early release from detention of
ASSK, Dr Mahathir issued the starkest warning of all Southeast Asian
leaders, threatening Yangon with possible expulsion from ASEAN as a
last resort. However, this was an empty threat and the SPDC knew it.
Comparing ASEAN countries’ efforts to influence political developments in Myanmar
184
In continuity with the policy of his predecessor, Prime Minister
Abdullah Badawi has not been prepared to underwrite the political sta-
lemate in Myanmar. As noted, both he and Syed Hamid Albar used the
opportunity of the 11th ASEAN Summit to suggest that Myanmar could
no longer count on the grouping to defend the SPDC in the absence
even of progress with respect to its own roadmap. However, given the
political bruising endured at the hands of the SPDC, Syed Hamid con-
cluded that “Myanmar does not want us to stand with them…[and]…it
is best that it is handled by the UN.” 28 Unlike Manila, Kuala Lumpur
has nevertheless favoured not UNSC action but a meaningful good of-
fices role of the UNSG. Indeed, Malaysia has not regarded Myanmar as
posing a threat to international or regional peace and security. Signifi-
cantly, despite suggesting that there was no more need for ASEAN to
be actively involved,29 Malaysian policy makers have not set aside the
idea that ASEAN could play a role in bringing about peaceful political
change in Myanmar if Naypyidaw was willing.
To some extent, current Myanmar policy also reflects societal values
and domestic political pressures. It is perhaps no accident that the ASEAN
Inter-Parliamentary Myanmar Caucus, which probably comprises the
most important and influential group of Myanmar critics in Southeast
Asia, was founded in Malaysia.30 The Member of Parliament for Kota
Bharu, Datuk Zaid Ibrahim, who is also member of the United Malays
National Organisation (UMNO), was AIPMC–President from 2004-8;
even now he remains on the AIPMC Steering Committee. How his new
position as Minister in the Prime Minister’s Department entrusted with
judicial reform, and the (re-) appointment of Datuk Seri Utama Dr. Rais
as Foreign Minister, both with effect from March 2008,31 will impact on
the government’s policy towards Myanmar is as yet unclear.
Meanwhile, Myanmar has also become an issue in Malaysian party
politics. The defiance of Myanmar’s military rulers is a factor, as is
the considerable number of Myanmar citizens seeking refuge and/or
work in Malaysia. For instance, Lim Kit Siang of the Democratic Ac-
tion Party (DAP) who also serves on the AIPMC Steering Committee,
severely criticised Syed Hamid in October 2007 for allegedly undoing
the “revulsion” statement of the ASEAN Foreign Ministers.32 He also
demanded that Myanmar’s suspension and expulsion from ASEAN
must remain options. Myanmar has also been an issue for YB Datin Sri
Wan Azizah Wan Ismail, who has headed the opposition Parti Keadilan
Rakyat/KeADILan (the People’s Justice Party). Wan Azizah is now the
Vice-President of AIPMC; her husband, Anwar Ibrahim, who has been
considered likely to re-assume public office in Malaysia’s politics in due
course on the back of the opposition’s huge electoral gains in the March
185
 2008 poll and may yet re-emerge in government, has also been a fervent to the Human Rights Council as an appropriate forum to take the junta
advocate of transparent and accountable government. The opposition’s to task. Also, the September 2007 violence was conspicuously interpre-
commitment to human rights improvements in Myanmar and the ted as resulting from a lack of democratization/flawed democratization
country’s democratization, as well as their interest in investigating the process.34 Still reacting to the junta’s suppression of the September
role of Petronas in Myanmar, will ensure that the UMNO-led govern- 2007 protests, Wirajuda suggested Naypyidaw embark on a transitional
ment remains under pressure on these issues. These factors are likely period of five years to allow the military leadership to gain confidence in
to severely limit the scope for engaging the SPDC in uncritical ways. the transition process (that would involve a power-sharing arrangement
between the military and civilian leaders), and then to have elections.35
Indonesia In November 2007, Indonesia’s defence minister, Dr Juwono Sudarso-
no, argued that forcing Myanmar to hold elections would not reduce the
Myanmar’s relationship with Indonesia builds on a shared rhetoric of
role of the military, which he still regarded as “the unifying force” that
historical friendship and support. Significantly, Indonesian policy-ma-
covered “most of the levers of power, political, economic and also cul-
kers and officials also see important parallels with respect to the politi-
tural.” 36 At the same time, however, Ali Alatas suggested again that the
cal history of the two countries. On the basis of Indonesia’s successful
Tatmadaw should play a power-sharing role in the transition and gra-
transition from authoritarianism to democracy in the late 1990s, Jakarta
dually get out of the picture, as happened in Indonesia.37 In response
has reiterated that Myanmar will be able to undergo a similar political
to the junta’s announcement that the constitutional referendum would
transition. Indeed, President Yudhoyono has identified the sharing of
be organised in May 2008, Hassan Wirajuda maintained that the draft
Indonesia’s own experience of political transition as a key reference
constitution should be revised to accommodate the interests of ethnic
point for Myanmar’s generals as the ‘soft power approach’ to bringing
groups and the Bamar political opposition and that including ASSK was
democracy to Myanmar. This approach, pursued in the absence of sig-
critical to the political process being credible and acceptable.
nificant bilateral economic ties, is welcomed both by grassroots organi-
With ASEAN’s reputation at stake over Myanmar, and as a long-time
zations as well as Parliament, although both tend to be more critical of
advocate of “regional solutions to regional problems”, Jakarta seems to
Naypyidaw than is the government. To achieve the lifting of restrictions
have been interested in doing more at the sub-regional level to influ-
imposed on ASSK and political detainees, as well as a meaningful pro-
ence the SPDC. It has however found it difficult to extend the conven-
cess of national reconciliation, and actual political change in Myanmar,
tional political limits circumscribing ASEAN cooperation. For instance,
Indonesia has relied in particular on three diplomatic routes: (1) bila-
following the September protests, ideas about invoking the ASEAN
teralism; (2) ASEAN; (3) and the UN. More recently, Jakarta has also
Troika mechanism were put forward, potentially involving Indonesia,
encouraged regional powers to deal with Myanmar, particularly China.
Singapore and the Philippines. The obstacles to its establishment have
At the bilateral level, Jakarta has resorted to a significant amount of
proved significant, however. Countries such as Singapore are wary
quiet diplomacy, involving the President, cabinet ministers, and former
about the likely unevenness of decisions that is bound to result from
foreign minister Ali Alatas. Indonesia has also publicly recognized the
the Troika’s agreed rotational membership. At the same time, mutual
sensitivities of the SPDC and acknowledged the regime’s anxieties
suspicions prevent members from reconsidering the ad-hoc nature of
concerning Myanmar’s territorial integrity and stability. The purpose
the Troika and from embracing the notion of more continuous repre-
has been to build trust and to reassure the generals because, as foreign
sentation. Indonesia has in declaratory terms nevertheless remained
minister Hassan Wirayuda argued, the core impediment to political
in favour of ASEAN playing a larger role in influencing the SPDC. As
change is a “sense of insecurity on the part of the military junta about
foreign minister Wirajuda said, “[Myanmar] being a member of the
their future in democratic Myanmar.” 33 Significantly, however, Indone-
ASEAN family, we see the importance of ASEAN or Indonesia, at least,
sia has also not found the SPDC to be easily swayed. The espousal of de-
to engage Myanmar so we can ensure the process that they are now
mocratic values and its frustration with the junta has thus seen Jakarta
undertaking…could result in a solution that is also acceptable to the
launch into public criticism of the SPDC when deemed justified and
international community.” 38 This would also suggest that for Jakarta
necessary. For instance, while abstaining on the UNSC vote on the situ-
ASEAN in principle remains a more appropriate forum to address ‘re-
ation in Myanmar in January 2007, Indonesia had no qualms pointing
gional problems’ than other regional dialogue settings, including the

Comparing ASEAN countries’ efforts to influence political developments in Myanmar

186 187
 East Asia Summit. That said, Indonesia has emphasized the important
role that China and India play with respect to Myanmar by pointing
out that no regional initiative towards Myanmar would succeed without
their active and full support. At the 2007 Singapore Summit, China and
Indonesia agreed jointly to rely on diplomacy to encourage reconcilia-
tion, democracy and development in Myanmar.39
Indonesia has strongly supported the good offices role of the UNSG
to promote political reconciliation. This support was unambiguously
communicated to Naypyidaw after the September protests, promp-
ting Senior General Than Shwe to assure President Yudhoyono that
Myanmar would work with the UN Special Adviser.40 By comparison
with other members, Jakarta has not been enthusiastic about pushing
regime transition through the UN Security Council, however, despite
some parliamentary pressure. When holding the Council Presidency in
November 2007 and having to navigate, on the one hand, between the
positions of those countries that were deeply sceptical about whether
the outcomes attained by Gambari during his visit to Myanmar in early
November met the objectives of the UNSC Presidential Statement of
11 October 2007 and, on the other hand, those which regarded the
Gambari mission as a success, Indonesia sought to bridge the divide
by favouring the release of a press rather than a presidential statement
on Myanmar. 41
As this broad overview shows, there has been considerable varia-
tion in the perspective of ASEAN states towards Myanmar. Singapore
and Thailand, while critical of Myanmar, have basically adopted a
pragmatic attitude vis-à-vis Naypyidaw, punctuated by bouts of frus-
tration over the cross-border implications of Myanmar’s politics.
Apart from disappointment or outrage at the SPDC’s stubbornness
the Philippines, Malaysia and Indonesia approaches are heavily influ-
enced by a combination of democratic values and domestic political
considerations, which points to the growing significance of pluralist
constraints on their respective foreign policy towards Myanmar. Of
those members examined here, Vietnam remains the most fervent ex-
ponent of the traditional understandings associated with the ‘ASEAN
way’. Not surprisingly, therefore, ASEAN countries find it relatively
straightforward to agree on their collective support for the UNSG
good offices role but not much else. Also, it is ultimately down to
individual members to develop new national or regional initiatives
towards Myanmar. In this regard, Indonesian officials and policy-
makers seem the most interested, not least because ASEAN reliance
on the UN has not yielded the expected results. The question is what
these initiatives might involve.
Comparing ASEAN countries’ efforts to influence political developments in Myanmar
188
Towards a New Regional Approach?
While Indonesia, like other ASEAN countries, will continue to support
the good offices role of the UNSG, there are questions about whether
the present mandate, which derives its authority from the UNGA, is
best suited to promote political reconciliation and change in Myan-
mar. It is certainly unclear how Professor Gambari would continue to
try to facilitate political reconciliation given the junta’s criticisms of
how he has executed the good offices role to date. First, the ruling jun-
ta has publicly doubted the UNSG Special Adviser’s impartiality and
accused Gambari of taking instructions from the big powers. Pointing
to Gambari’s release of a statement by ASSK during a stopover in
Singapore in November 2007, Myanmar’s Information Minister also
accused Gambari of a breach of trust and of being biased in favour of
ASSK. Indeed, Brigadier-General Kyaw Hsan has even suggested that
Gambari might himself have written the letter in advance of a Novem-
ber meeting with ASSK. According to the minister, the statement “was
dangerous to the degree of hurting the prevailing peace and stability
of the nation in addition to harming the already-achieved national
unity.” 42 Secondly, the Myanmar government already complained to
Gambari in November 2007 that his mission had yielded little for the
military junta and that it was subjected to an unprecedented UNSC
Presidential Statement, more sanctions by the US, EU and Australia,
as well as criticisms put forward by former UN Resident Coordinator
Charles Petrie.43 In other words, the regime suggested that it saw no
real incentives to respond to UN exhortations. Third, the junta sternly
rejected Gambari’s proposal for mediating between the regime and
the political opposition as interference in the country’s internal affairs.
The junta also for the most part denied the Special Adviser’s requests
to meet with representatives of the ethnic minorities. Fourth, the re-
gime objected to Gambari conducting extensive visits to the region
discussing Myanmar.44 Indeed, BG Kyaw Hsan publicly reprimanded
Gambari for going “beyond his mandate” by touring the region in an
ostensible effort to force political reform in Myanmar. In short, Prof
Gambari has encountered problems that raise questions about what
the good offices role of the UN can achieve.45 Of course, Gambari has
nevertheless indicated that he wishes to pursue issues raised during
his previous trip to Myanmar: the human rights situation, progress on
timebound dialogue between the government and ASSK; the referen-
dum and electoral process, economic and humanitarian issues, and
a regularised process of engagement.46 Some ASEAN members also
continue to be part of the Group of Friends of the UNSG on Myanmar
189
 that was formed in December 2007. This forum has also yet to prove
that it can play a significant role.47 In terms of its composition it is too
unwieldy to offer any prospect of a political breakthrough in Myanmar
along the lines advocated by the junta’s many critics, largely because
there is no real meeting of minds among participants. More impor-
tantly, Myanmar is not even included. No clear outcomes have been
reported following its second meeting in February 2008. Indonesia’s
foreign ministry announced in late February that it might host the
third meeting of the Group of Friends, but - not surprisingly - regio-
nal processes have been considered to be potentially more effective in
dealing with Myanmar.
Possible New Diplomatic Avenues
From the perspective of most Western capitals Indonesia has probably
played the most helpful part among the ASEAN members in terms
of promoting Myanmar’s democratization. However, as Jakarta has
also not been able to extract significant political concessions from
Naypyidaw, the question is whether there remains any prospect for a
new regional approach that ASEAN or Indonesia could lead and that
would aim to influence the SPDC to take substantive steps to promote
political reconciliation in the run-up to the 2010 elections. Two ideas
about regional diplomatic settings have emerged. One is for ASEAN to
pursue with Myanmar a multilateral dialogue taking broadly the format
of the Six-Party talks. Another is for ASEAN or Indonesia to engage the
military regime and other stakeholders in Myanmar’s future in a setting
structured along the lines of the Jakarta Informal Meetings. As the fol-
lowing will show, the prospects for both avenues are at best uncertain.
Within policy-making and academic circles inside and outside
Southeast Asia there have been several permutations of the idea of esta-
blishing a forum akin to the Six Party talks on North Korea in which to
facilitate Myanmar’s national reconciliation. These include the sugges-
tions to either involve the P5, plus Norway, Japan, Singapore (as ASEAN
Chairman);48 or to anchor the group in East Asia, involving ASEAN,
China, India, and Japan.49 As these variations of the proposal indicate,
there are questions about whether Western countries should be directly
involved, in part because they are generally considered to demand rapid
regime change at the expense of the military rather than the facilita-
tion of national reconciliation. However, what the respective proposals
share in common is the assessment that the involvement of China is
crucial. ASEAN countries tend to stress that China in particular and
India are the only countries able to influence Naypyidaw. Seen in this
Comparing ASEAN countries’ efforts to influence political developments in Myanmar
190
light, Singapore’s efforts to support the Gabari briefing at the EAS also
represented an attempt to identify one possible venue for a future broad
regional dialogue, even though the primary immediate motive at the
time seemed focused on avoiding the junta’s procrastination on the
implementation of its roadmap.
However, as events in November 2007 showed, Myanmar’s top lead-
ership has no interest in seeing what it regards as its domestic affairs
discussed either at the EAS or even within ASEAN. China may also
no longer want to support this kind of idea. Having been themselves
subjected to severe criticism over Tibet which in turn stimulated strong
nationalist outrage, Chinese leaders may now feel less inclined to go
out of their way to enhance their international image and simply act
in accordance with its so-called responsibilities as a stakeholder in
international society. Pushing the generals in Naypyidaw too much
on political reconciliation outside the existing frameworks in the face
of the generals’ presumed obstructionism might also be considered
incompatible with Beijing’s economic agenda.50 Beyond the import of
natural gas, China’s apparent decision to establish an oil refining base
in Yunnan for instance signals a growing interest in seeing Myanmar in
future become a major transit country for oil shipments.51
The second approach mooted as worthy of further investigation has
been a process modelled on the Jakarta Informal Meetings organised by
Indonesia in the late 1980s.52 Important backing for convening a JIM-
equivalent has come from the International Crisis Group. In addition,
analysts such as Michael Vatikiotis have suggested that ASEAN’s quiet
diplomacy during the Cambodia conflict was much more successful
than ASEAN’s contemporary megaphone diplomacy.53 Above all, the
attraction of JIM-like talks would lie in bringing together the parties to
the political conflict, and their regional backers, and to do so informally.
In Cambodia’s case, the JIM represented the first occasion after years of
fighting at which the four competing political forces in Cambodia came
together to discuss power sharing and the international supervision of
the Vietnamese troop withdrawal. Notably, the first JIM was divided
into two stages to accommodate remaining sensitivities: only after the
meeting of the Cambodian parties to the conflict were they joined by
Vietnam, Laos and the then ASEAN countries in regional multi-party
talks.54
Modelling a diplomatic setting to further political transition in My-
anmar on the JIM poses several issues. How did the JIM come about?
To what extent is the contemporary situation in Myanmar different
from that concerning Cambodia at the time? Then the Cambodian fac-
tions began to come under increasing pressure to do their bit to draw
191
 the Third Indochina conflict to a close. Vietnam and the Soviet Union
sought to reduce the financial burden and political cost linked to sus-
taining Vietnam’s military intervention and to concentrate on their own
economic reconstruction. China too stood increasingly ready to strike
a deal with the other four veto states of the UNSC at the expense of the
Khmer Rouge. By comparison, Myanmar’s neighbours are today not in
the same position to press the regime to make concession on issues it
takes to be non-negotiable. Secondly, the Vietnamese-backed People’s
Republic of Kampuchea faced stiff military opposition from the Khmer
Rouge and the non-communist opposition. By contrast, Myanmar’s
military government – at significant human cost- has imposed ever
more military control over the country (despite remaining problems
of reach that stem from ceasefires). Third, in the Cambodian case,
four major parties vied for power. In Myanmar, the lines of conflict are
drawn among the Bamar majority, and between the Bamar majority
and a considerable number of ethnic nationalities.55 This complicates
the organisation of any informal multilateral process, not least because
the SPDC has been unequivocal in its rejection of outside parties beco-
ming involved in its dealings with the ethnic nationalities. Fourth, JIM
I/II was designed but failed to make headway on the question of power
sharing and the proposed UN peacekeeping. In Myanmar, however, the
question of power sharing has been addressed (for what it’s worth) by
the referendum of May 2008. In other words, the basic conditions that
led the Cambodian parties down the path of JIM I/II are not present
in the Myanmar case. Despite some interest among Indonesian policy
advisers in reviving the Jakarta Informal Meetings, it is thus not sur-
prising that foreign policy advisers temporarily concluded that “…what
kind of role Indonesia should take is not yet well defined.” 56 If a diplo-
matic process building on JIM is revived, it is likely to be different from
the original both in process and purpose.
The release from house arrest of ASSK in advance of the 2010 elec-
tions will probably remain a key objective for ASEAN countries, not
least because her detention was extended for another year in late May
2008. By comparison, ASEAN will likely regard the idea of mediating
between the SPDC and the ethnic nationalities to be off-limits (unless
a dramatic shift in Southeast Asia’s security culture occurs). The Asso-
ciation may be tempted to create the conditions for ASSSK to assume
representative or ministerial office in future. To be sure, it is uncertain
what substantive demands beyond Suu Kyi’s release ASEAN might
push for in advance of the 2010 elections. The fact that her two sons are
British citizens does not necessarily pose an obstacle to her assuming
a political role. Rather, the question is whether the regime would again
Comparing ASEAN countries’ efforts to influence political developments in Myanmar
192
frustrate this by construing a case according to which her alleged conti-
nued allegiance to Britain prevents her candidature. Such a case might
be made by the regime on the basis of her not recanting her presumed
support for sanctions imposed on Myanmar. That said, Daw Suu Kyi
has not clarified her own thinking on this issue.
The practical difficulties encountered in laying even the groundwork
for political reconciliation between the current leadership and ASSK of
course remain enormous, as highlighted by developments following the
September protests. In early October 2007, Senior General Than Shwe
spelled out the terms for a personal meeting with the NLD General
Secretary. His preconditions were that ASSK abandon confrontation, re-
tract her threat of ‘utter devastation’ and end her support for sanctions.57
ASSK responded with a media statement released by Ibrahim Gambari,
which apparently was not shared with the junta before its release. The
statement expressed the expectation that the phase of preliminary con-
sultations then begun with Labour Minister Aung Kyi as liaison minister
would lead to “a meaningful and timebound dialogue with the SPDC
leadership’ as soon as possible.”58 These consultations have produced
no significant breakthrough. She had added that she was committed to
pursue the path of dialogue constructively and invited the government
and all relevant parties to join her in this spirit. Despite the positive tone,
to the junta Suu Kyi’s message probably appeared as a refusal to comply
with the leadership’s demands, particularly as regards sanctions, and an
indication of her likely continued unwillingness to cede political ground.
Indeed, her invitation that the government join her for a dialogue was
presumably interpreted as bordering on the condescending because she
was thereby suggesting that she was morally superior to the generals.
The decision by the NLD to appeal for a “no” vote in the constitutional re-
ferendum has likely also been taken as a sign of continued intransigence.
That said the regime probably appreciates that it has lost much of its
limited legitimacy as a consequence of the suppression of the monk-led
protests in September and the evidently inadequate assistance rendered
to survivors of Cyclone Nargis. The question thus is whether Cyclone
Nargis will prompt ASEAN countries to make an extra effort to push for
political reconciliation in Myanmar, notwithstanding the ratification and
promulgation of the regime’s new constitution.
The Impact of Cyclone Nargis
Dealing with the devastating humanitarian impact of Cyclone Nargis
has for some time obviously taken precedence over direct efforts to fos-
ter political change in Myanmar. UN estimates suggested that about 2.4
193
 million people were severely affected, with relief operations in the first
weeks following the cyclone apparently reaching only a quarter of those
homeless and in need. Particular concerns of the UN and internatio-
nal relief agencies have focused on a possible second large-scale wave
of deaths arising among other factors from the lack of clean drinking
water, water-borne diseases, and malnutrition. Notwithstanding these
concerns, Myanmar’s military leadership initially denied international
relief workers access to the delta and in this context also rejected the use
of American, French and British military assets located off the coast.
The difficulties encountered by UN agencies, various governments and
relief organisations in providing assistance to those hit by the cyclone
briefly prompted an international debate about external intervention in
line with the responsibility-to-protect principle, which was not really ta-
ken up in Southeast Asia however. However, gradual improvements in
access offered in response to the urging of ASEAN and visiting UNSG
Ban Ki-Moon in the run-up to an international pledging conference
took much of the wind out of the sails of this particular idea. Two days
prior to the pledging conference, Than Shwe finally informed Ban Ki-
Moon that all foreign disaster-relief experts would be given access to the
hard hit delta. At the conference, which was co-chaired by the secretary-
generals of the UN and ASEAN, organised in Yangon and involved 51
countries as well as 24 UN agencies and international non-governme-
ntal organizations, the SPDC reaffirmed that it would welcome inter-
national assistance “with no strings attached”. Naypyidaw even pressed
for US$11 billion in aid for reconstruction, while the UN was looking
for approximately US$100-120 million to meet its Flash Appeal target
with a view to offering immediate assistance to 1.5 million survivors for
three months. Ultimately less than US$50 million of new funds was
pledged to the Flash Appeal.59 Some of this money was made conditio-
nal - due to the lack of trust between the Myanmar government and do-
nor countries and the continued lack of an independent comprehensive
assessment by expert relief workers.
Cyclone Nargis may well prove another turning point for how
ASEAN engages Myanmar, at least in the near to medium-term. First,
after ASEAN secured a leading role in coordinating the relief effort
(next to the UN), thanks in large measure to the hands-on approach
by ASEAN Secretary-General Surin Pitsuwan, members again seemed
to be in broad agreement that the grouping should develop a collective
role vis-à-vis Myanmar. Second, Myanmar’s obvious need for recons-
truction and economic assistance as well as capacity building more
generally provides ASEAN and the UN with the opportunity to explore
with greater vigour how the longer-term humanitarian prospects for
Comparing ASEAN countries’ efforts to influence political developments in Myanmar
194
Myanmar might be improved. After all, a chronic emergency is said to
have gripped the entire country for some time.60 At present, Myanmar
receives very limited assistance per capita, much less than Laos or Cam-
bodia. Third, the thinking about how to promote political change in My-
anmar even after the ratification and promulgation of the referendum
may gather pace. Indonesian academics and advisers have apparently
already put to President Yudhoyono a plan entitled the Jakarta Initiative
on Myanmar (JIM) that would promote political change in Myanmar by
appointing a special envoy, presumably Ali Alatas, forming a dialogue
group that would include China and India and offering the military le-
adership political and security assurances in return for progress in rela-
tion to national reconciliation and democratization.61 How this agenda
– if adopted by the President- would be pursued in practice, not least
given the political antagonism between the Myanmar regime and its
many detractors, remains to be seen.
Conclusion
Underneath the veneer of the ASEAN consensus position that has prevai-
led on Myanmar for some years, member countries have been seriously
divided. While the Philippines, Malaysia and Indonesia in particular have
called in recent years for political reform in Myanmar, the newer ASEAN
members have demonstrated little enthusiasm for obliging the SPDC to
embrace a political transition that does not conform to Naypyidaw’s road-
map. The intramural differences regarding Myanmar stem from several
factors, not least the extent to which incumbent regimes are concerned
about their own security and political survival. In addition, Thailand, Ma-
laysia, and Singapore have all found themselves “burned” by the junta, as
their diplomatic initiatives and efforts set in motion shock waves that lost
all momentum in the face of the political-security imperatives of gene-
rals. The pressure exerted by domestic and wider regional networks and
audiences has nevertheless led ASEAN countries to remain critical of the
SPDC. Indonesia arguably remains one of the most committed to achie-
ving political change in Myanmar and on the basis of its own historical
trajectory seems one of the best placed ASEAN countries to indirectly
shape Myanmar’s transition.
There remain competing ideas about what new diplomatic fram-
ework would more effectively facilitate political reconciliation in Myan-
mar. As ASEAN’s intramural diplomacy has yielded virtually no conces-
sions by Naypyidaw of the calibre that the Western countries demand,
most ideas for an alternative forum have focused on involving China
and India and reviving informal diplomacy. As this paper has shown,
195
 however, the implementation of such processes will require considera-
ble thought. Moreover, in the still politically charged atmosphere before
the Olympic Games, it cannot be assumed that China will be publicly
supportive of such proposals if Naypyidaw is not.
Above all, Cyclone Nargis has prompted governments critical of
Myanmar to offer humanitarian assistance, but they and the SPDC
essentially remain at loggerheads. Whether the cyclone will do for
political reconciliation in Myanmar what the Asian tsunami did to
reach a political settlement for Aceh remains to be seen. Meanwhile,
ASEAN’s incoming Secretary General has been eager to demonstrate
the association’s relevance in responding to the more immediate huma-
nitarian challenges posed by this natural disaster. While politics were
claimed not to have influenced humanitarian assistance provided to
Myanmar, the longer-term issue of reconstruction and more substan-
tial development assistance is inextricably linked to political transi-
tion. Apart from Indonesia’s likely new diplomatic initiative, the task
of leading ASEAN’s engagement of Myanmar will fall to Bangkok as
Thailand will assume the ASEAN Chairmanship at the end of July 2008
and retain it for a full 18 months, assuming ratification of the ASEAN
Charter is completed by the time of the 2008 Summit. This will give
Bangkok more time than any other member state has ever had as chair
to make an impression on the SPDC. Judging from the outcome of
past Thai efforts to influence Myanmar, however, expectations should
be kept in check. Myanmar’s leaders seem averse to making political
concessions vis-à-vis Thailand.
If the SPDC continues to keep ASSK under house arrest, calls for
her release and those of other political detainees are likely not only to
resume, but also to increase in both number and volume during the
early months of the Thai chairmanship, in part because many believe
that the Philippine Congress will not be inclined to ratify the ASEAN
Charter without substantial concessions by Myanmar’s military lead-
ers. However, for now, it seems likely that policy-makers in Manila will
reconsider their stance. By the time promised multiparty elections take
place in Myanmar in 2010, the junta may have followed Indonesia’s
lead. If not, it will find Vietnam in the ASEAN Chair. Paradoxically, dea-
ling with Hanoi rather than Bangkok or Jakarta may prove far easier for
the SPDC, especially since the Vietnamese and Myanmar leaderships
have a similar perspective on issues of external pressure by major po-
wers, the importance of political stability, and the continued relevance
of pristine interpretations of the principles associated with the so-called
ASEAN way. Only time will tell.
Comparing ASEAN countries’ efforts to influence political developments in Myanmar
196
Notes
1
SPDC Spoke Authoritative Team meets Special Adviser to UN Secretary General, New
Light of Myanmar, 8 March 2008, p.9
2
According to official figures, more than 78,000 people perished, with a further 56,000
missing. UN estimates are that 2.5 million people were affected.
3
See New Light of Myanmar, 30 May 2008, p.1
4
ASEAN Chairman’s statement on Myanmar, 20 November 2007, http://
www.aseansec.org/21057.htm
5
For a more detailed discussion of the proposed EAS briefing, see Jürgen Haacke,
‘ASEAN and the Situation in Myanmar/Burma’, in Xiaolin Guo, ed., Myanmar/Burma:
Challenges and Perspectives, Stockholm: Institute for Security & Development Policy,
2008, pp. 131-58, also available online http://www.isdp.eu/file/publications/books/08/
myanmarburma
6
Jürgen Haacke, Myanmar’s Foreign Policy: Domestic Influences and International Implica-
tions (London: Routledge for IISS, 2006), Ch.3
7
Joint Communique of the 36th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, Phnom Penh, 16-17 June
2003, http://www.aseansec.org/14833.htm
8
Rodolfo C. Severino, Southeast Asia in Search of an ASEAN Community: Insights
from the former ASEAN Secretary-General (Singapore: ISEAS, 2006), p.193
9
Joint Communique of the 39th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, Kuala Lumpur, 25 July
2006, http://www.aseansec.org/18561.htm
10
Aung Zaw, “A House on Fire”, The Irrawaddy, 15 January 2007, http://aungzaw.com/
article_show.php?id=251
11
Manny Mogato, “ASEAN declines to defend Myanmar at U.N.”, The Washington Post,
11 January 2007, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/01/11/
AR2007011100336.html
12
Joint Communique of the 40th ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, Manila, 30 July 2007, http:
//www.aseansec.org/20764.htm
Statement by ASEAN Chair, Singapore’s Minister for Foreign Affairs George Yeo in
13
New York, 27 September 2007, www.mfa.gov.sg
14
“Southeast Asian Summit opens with Myanmar row ”, Forbes.com, 20 November
2007, http://www.forbes.com/afxnewslimited/feeds/afx/2007/11/20/afx4357164.html
Chairman’s Statement of the 11th ASEAN Summit, Kuala Lumpur, 12 December 2005,
15
www.aseansec.org/18039.htm, para.34
16
Transcript of Reply by Minister for Foreign Affairs George Yeo to questions on ASEAN
and Myanmar in Parliament on 22 October 2007, www.mfa.gov.sg
17
“Lee Kuan Yew: Myanmar crisis destabilizes ASEAN region ”, Radio Singapore
International, 6 October 2007, http://www.ntu.edu.sg/corpcomms2/news/RSIonline_
071006_MinisterialForum.pdf
18
Djoko Susilo, “Singapore and Myanmar junta ”, Jakarta Post, 3 March 2008. His criti-
cisms focused on four issues in particular: access to Singapore medial and educational
facilities in return for money; Temasek’s alleged substantial investments in Myanmar;
refuge provided to owner Lo Hsin Han; and the export of technological and military
equipment to the military junta.
197
 19
Transcript of Reply by Minister for Foreign Affairs George Yeo to questions on ASEAN
and Myanmar in Parliament on 22 October 2007, www.mfa.gov.sg
20
Quoted in “S’pore’s Lee criticises Myanmar military rulers ”, Reuters (India), 8 January
2008, http://in.reuters.com/article/southAsiaNews/idINIndia-31287320080108
21
Supalak G Khundee and Piyanart Srivalo, “PM suggests 6-Party Talks ”, The Nation,
16 October 2007, www.nationmultimedia.com/2007/10/16/headlines/headlines_
30052579.php
22
The Nation, Editorial: Human Rights Issue not on Samak’s Agenda, 1 May 2008, ttp:
//www.nationmultimedia.com/2008/05/01/opinion/opinion_30071980.php
23
Alberto Romulo, “On the Issue of Myanmar ”, Statement, 21 November 2005, http:
//www.dfa.gov.ph/archive/speech/romulo/myanma.htm
24
Martin Abbugao, “Myanmar faces calls for Suu Kyi release at Asia summit ”, Agence
France Press, 21 November 2007.
25
“President renews call on Myanmar to return to the path of democracy ”, Of-
fice of the President, Republic of the Philippines, released 26 January 2008, http:
//www.news.ops.gov.ph/archives2008/jan26.htm
26
Interestingly, Senator Pimentel has also been at the forefront of arguing in favour
for the Federal Republic of Philippines to replace the current unitary system of govern-
ment.
27
Vietnamese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Nation supports UN role, respects My-
anmar sovereignty ”, 18 March 2008, http://www.mofa.gov.vn/en/nr040807104143/
nr040807105001/ns080320094634/view
28
Syed Hamid Albar, ‘It is not possible to defend Myanmar’, Asian Wall Street Journal,
24 July 2006, www.burmanet.org/news/2006/07/24/asian-wall-street-journal-it-is-not-
possible-to-defend-myanmar-syed-hamid-albar
29
Michael Vatikiotis, “ASEAN key to Myanmar change”, Asia Times, 23 October 2007,
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/IJ24Ae01.html
30
For details of the activities of AIPMC, see http://www.aseanmp.org/. On the general
influence of parliaments in Southeast Asia, see Jürgen Rüland, Clemens Jürgenmezer,
Michael H. Nelson and Patrick Ziegenhain, Parliaments and Political Change in Southe-
ast Asia: Comparative Study of India, Indonesia, the Philippines, South Korea and Thai-
land, Singapore: ISEAS, 2005.
Foreign Minister Datuk Seri Dr Rais Yatim had previously held the post of Foreign
31
Minister from 1986–1987.
32
Lim Kit Siang, http://blog.limkitsiang.com/2007/10/17/never-suspend-myanmar-
from-asean-hamids-statement-most-deplorable-and-reprehensible/
33
Quoted in “Myanmar must defend itself if brought to UN Security Council: Indone-
sia”, Agence France Press, 23 August 2006, http://www.newagebd.com/2006/aug/24/
inat.html
34
“Indonesia unsatisfied with Myanmar’s excuse ”, Antara News, 29 September 2007,
http://www.antara.co.id/en/arc/2007/9/29/indonesia-unsatisfied-with-myanmars-ex-
cuse/
35
Hassan Wirajuda, Speech to Chicago Council on Global Affairs, 2 October 2007;
“Myanmar junta should be offered shared rule: Indonesia FM’, Antara News, 3 October
Comparing ASEAN countries’ efforts to influence political developments in Myanmar
198
2007, http://www.antara.co.id/en/arc/2007/10/3/myanmar-junta-should-be-offered-
shared-rule-indonesia-fm/
36
Haslinda Amin and Arijit Ghosh, “Sudarsono says elections in Myanmar wouldn’t
reduce army’s role ”, Bloomberg, 15 November 2007
Quoted in Haslinda Amin and Arijit Ghosh, “Sudarsono says elections in Myanmar
37
wouldn’t reduce army’s role ”, Bloomberg, 15 November 2007
38
Quoted in “Indonesia wants Suu Kyi in Myanmar democracy process ”, AFP, 27
February 2008, http://afp.google.com/article/ALeqM5i4bJGpmQoMCbj9BEz3KmrGP
GMR0A
39
“RI, China agree Myanmar crisis cannot be solved through pressures ”, Antara, 21
November 2007, http://www.antara.co.id/en/arc/2007/11/21/ri-china-agree-myanmar-
crisis-cannot-be-solved-through-pressures/
40
“Myanmar junta reassures SBY on cooperation ”, The Jakarta Post, 18 October 2007
41
Security Council SC/9171, Security Council Press Statement on Myanmar, 15 Novem-
ber 2007, www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2007/sc9171.doc.htm
42
SPDC Spoke Authoritative Team meets Special Adviser to UN Secretary General, New
Light of Myanmar, 8 March 2008, p.9
Statement of the United Nations Country Team in Myanmar on the Occasion of the
43
UN Day, Yangon, 24 October 2007.
44
Transcript of the Spokes Authoritative Team of SPDC, New Light of Myanmar, 6 No-
vember 2007
45
Aung Zaw, “Gambari’s Mission is Dead in the Water ”, The Irrawaddy, 20 February
2008, http://aungzaw.com/article_show.php?id=291
46
For Gambari’s assessment, see “I do not see an alternative to dialogue ”, The Irrawaddy,
4 April 2008, http://www.irrawaddy.org/interview_show.php?art_id=11280
47
The Group of Friends is a consultative forum for developing a shared approach in sup-
port of the implementation of the UNSG good offices mandate. It comprises Australia,
China, France, India, Japan, Norway, Russia, Slovenia (as the EU Presidency), United
Kingdom, United States, Indonesia, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam.
48
Michael Green and Derek Mitchell, “Asia’s Forgotten Crisis: A New Approach to
Burma ”, Foreign Affairs, November/December 2007, pp.155-158.
49
Michael Vatikiotis, “ASEAN key to Myanmar change ”, Asia Times, 23 October 2007,
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/IJ24Ae01.html
See Bertil Lintner, “China no sure bet on Myanmar ”, Asia Times, 8 November 2007,
50
www.atimes.com/atimes/Southeast_Asia/IK08Ae01.html
51
Elaine Kurtenbach, “China’s CNPC and Yunnan sign Burma-related Pipeline Agre-
ement ”, The Irrawaddy, 3 December 2007, http://www.irrawaddy.org/article.php?art_
id=9495
C.P.F. Luhulima, “Forty Years of ASEAN-what to do with Myanmar ”, Jakarta Post, 16
52
November 2007.
53
Michael Vatikiotis, “ASEAN megaphone diplomacy strong words, yet no action’, The
Jakarta Post, 26 November 2007.
54
See Sorpong Peou, Conflict Neutralization in the Cambodia War: From Battlefield to
Ballot-Box (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University Press, 1997), Ch.1
199
 55
Martin Smith, State of Strife: The Dynamics of Ethnic Conflict in Burma, Washington,
D.C. East-West Center, 2007; also see Mary P. Callahan, Political Authority in Burma’s
Ethnic Minority States: Devolution, Occupation, and Coexistence, Washington, D.C.: East-
West Center, 2007.
56
Rizal Sukma, ‘Time to act on Myanmar democratization’, Jakarta Post, 4 March 2008
Government of the Union of Myamar, Announcement No.1/2007, 4 Octo-
57
ber 2007, reprinted in The New Light of Myanmar, 5 October 2007, pp.1, 8; http:
//myanmargeneva.org/NLM2007/eng/10oct/n071005.pdf. For a useful overview of
government viewpoints on ASSK’s alleged provocations, see http://mission.itu.ch/
MISSIONS/Myanmar/mofa/Article%20_English.pdf
58
The full text is available at http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2007/11/08/asia/AS-GEN-
Singapore-Myanmar-UN-Text.php
59
By 26 May a total of US$132.7 million had been committed to relief operations, with
a further US$100.2 million pledged. United Nations, Office for the Coordination of
Humanitarian Affairs, Cyclone Nargis: Myanmar, OCHA Situation Report No. 21, 26
May 2008
Mark Duffield, “On the Edge of No Man’s Land: Chronic Emergency in Myanmar ”,
60
Working Paper, Centre for Governance and International Affairs, University of Bristol,
No.1/2008
61
Greg Sheridan, “Jakarta proposes to use cyclone in push for radical change in Burma ”,
The Australian, 2 June 2008, http://www.burmanet.org/news/2008/06/02/the-australi-
an-jakarta-proposes-to-use-cyclone-in-push-for-radical-change-in-burma-greg-sheridan/
Comparing ASEAN countries’ efforts to influence political developments in Myanmar
200
Neither Constructive
nor Engaging: The Debacle
of ASEAN’s Burmese Policy
Pavin Chachavalpongpun
Two recent political phenomena in Burma have severely challenged the
credibility of ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) in its ma-
nagement of the grave situation in this country. The brutal crackdown on
street protesters in September 2007, killing at least 31 people according to
the United Nations, and the abrupt announcement of the constitutional
referendum in May this year as well as the proposal of general elections
in 2010 without the participation of the National League for Democracy
(NLD) and its leader, Aung San Suu Kyi, proved that Burma remains
unrestrained in its management of domestic affairs after all these years,
even when ASEAN—to which Burma belongs—has incessantly called
for peaceful political solutions and an inclusive democratisation process.
The Burmese political crisis has struck at ASEAN’s most critical moment,
with the launch of its charter last November and the ratification due to take
place during the ASEAN Summit in Bangkok later this year. Will ASEAN
countries be bold enough to punish this recalcitrant member if its political
violence persists? While ASEAN is re-evaluating its mandate for bringing
about an acceptable solution to Burma’s political stalemate, the global com-
munity is also keeping a watchful eye on the role of Thailand, Burma’s
immediate neighbour, to see whether the new government under the le-
adership of Samak Sundaravej will work closely with ASEAN toward such
an objective or continue to legitimise the despotic regime of Burma. This
paper examines ASEAN’s perspective on the recent political developments
in Burma, the failure of its past and present policies, and Thailand’s posi-
tion in the Burmese political makeover. It also discusses available policy
alternatives and options for ASEAN and Thailand vis-à-vis Burma.
The Failure of ASEAN’s Burmese Policy
In 1992, the Thai-initiated “Constructive Engagement” policy was
conceived with the blessing of ASEAN. It was designed to help Burma
achieve a more rapid transition toward internationally acceptable beha-
viour and norms not only in international relations but also in tackling
201
 national economic and political issues.1 The implementation of the con-
structive engagement policy was in fact an implicit preparation for the
admission of Burma into ASEAN in 1997. ASEAN members at the time
rushed to endorse Burmese membership because they believed that
including Burma into the organisation would complement ASEAN’s
geopolitical strategy of counterbalancing the growing influence of
China on Southeast Asia. More naively, ASEAN was convinced that,
once admitted into the grouping, Burma would naturally undertake the
necessary reforms and adopt ASEAN’s values, standards and practices.2
ASEAN was wrong. This rationale of gradually acclimatising Burma
into the regional stream, despite its obvious flaws, continues to form
the foundation of ASEAN’s approach to the Burmese leadership even
as the international community continues to impose heavy sanctions
against the unruly regime.
In the decade following its admission into ASEAN, Burmese leaders
have continued to fortify their power position at the expense of national
democratisation efforts and at the expense of ASEAN credibility. The
growing strength of this power position further exacerbated the human
rights situation in Burma, ranging from the endless extension of im-
prisonment of opposition figures to the use of violence against certain
ethnic minorities and the recent suppression of pro-democracy activists
on the streets of Rangoon. The Burmese junta’s newfound confidence
is also reflected in its blunt rejection of ASEAN involvement in the Bur-
mese political reconciliation process and its refusal to accept the UN’s
offer to provide observers for May’s constitutional referendum and
elections in 2010.3 Today, ASEAN’s view of Burma is closely tied to two
contrasting realities. On the one hand, Burma represents a necessary
strategic partner for ASEAN as a whole and for individual members in
the context of mutual economic interests. On the other hand, Burma is
likely to become a dead weight capable of scuttling ASEAN’s long-term
interests. ASEAN’s inability to weigh interests against disadvantages
in its relations with Burma stems largely from its lack of a clear vision
about how it sees Burma’s place within the organisation.
The Wrong Path of ASEAN
The assessment of ASEAN’s Burmese policy should begin where it
has failed, especially in bringing Burma into the modern era. Burma’s
ruling junta made numerous promises to the organisation prior to
membership, but it has continuously defied regional and international
pressure to change its political course. A number of factors explain
ASEAN’s failure to introduce change in Burma. First, ASEAN lacked a
Neither Constructive Nor Engaging: The Debacle of ASEAN’s Burmese Policy
202
viable strategy, or the collective will, to make good on its policy promi-
ses towards Burma.4 The absence of a unified policy not only diminis-
hed the influence of ASEAN on the political transformation process in
Burma, but also undermined ASEAN’s relevance as an effective organi-
sation and spoiled its attempts to build a genuine regional community.
For example, while Singapore was passing judgment on the Burmese
government for not engaging United Nations special envoy Ibrahim
Gambari more substantially in order to strive towards a real political
solution, Thailand was overtly criticising the Western nations for being
too harsh and prejudiced against the Burmese regime.5 Inconsistency
towards Burma on the part of ASEAN’s individual members has allo-
wed the ruling junta to treat international criticism and sanctions with
contempt. It has also weakened ASEAN’s institutional leverage, leaving
it incapable of making a considerable impact on the Burmese regime.
Second, the seemingly sacred principles of non-interference in the
internal affairs of member states and consensus-based decisions have
long shielded the Burmese junta from outside pressure. Non-interfe-
rence was quickly normalised upon the establishment of ASEAN in
1967, precisely because each member had no intention of surrendering
its sovereignty, even when sovereignty conflicted with the concept of
regionalism. More importantly, the principle of non-interference was
employed to evade international questions regarding the legitimacy of
ASEAN member governments at a time when authoritarianism, mo-
ney politics, human rights violations, and periodic coup d’états were
rampant in the region. Today, Burma is walking down this very same
route in taking advantage of the non-interference principle to cloak the
odious regime at home as well as to obstruct internal democratisation
by isolating Suu Kyi and forcing the NLD to capitulate to the govern-
ment.6 Although ASEAN has attempted to curtail the importance of the
non-interference principle in recent years, it is still far from abando-
ning it for the sake of a more transparent and accountable organisa-
tion. While the ASEAN Charter was in the final process of ratification,
it was revealed that a provision for sanctions against “badly behaved”
members was not included, and suspension and expulsion were also
out of the question7, again based on ASEAN’s strict adherence to the
non-interference principle.
Third, ASEAN members have drawn on the regional body in order to
bolster national interests, which is legitimate. However, some members
have skilfully exploited ASEAN for their own ends, thus weakening the
dividing line between the good of the greater whole and the narrow in-
terests of individual members. There has been a very fine line between
the interests of the association and those of its individual members.
203
 This is not immediately obvious from the statistics. These do show, ho-
wever, that whereas Burma was of marginal interest to its neighbours
in the past, the transformation of the country into the region’s leading
exporter of oil and natural gas has meant that ASEAN members have
developed economic interests there at the same time as they have begun
to compete with each other as well as with bigger powers like China, In-
dia and Russia for Burma’s valuable natural assets. Some members of
ASEAN obviously let economic interests dictate their foreign relations
with Burma to the point of putting aside contentious political issues in
that country in order to please the Burmese leadership. Thailand, cur-
rently the most significant importer of Burmese gas, remained silent
during the crackdown on street demonstrations in Rangoon last year.
Noppadon Pattama, new Thai Foreign Minister, said during his first
press briefing in February 2008 that democracy and human rights were
domestic issues internal to Burma and that he would maintain a policy
of non-interference regarding the junta-ruled country. He further said,
“If working through an ASEAN framework can help Burma’s demo-
cracy flourish, we will do it, but we are not the headmaster who can tell
Burma to do this and that.”8 Noppadon is the former personal lawyer
of Thaksin Shinawatra, former Prime Minister of Thailand. Thaksin,
ousted from power by a military coup in September 2006, is known
to have a variety of businesses in Burma, most notably in the telecom
industry. Thus far, the push to satisfy the economic interests of certain
members of ASEAN has totally eclipsed the real issues in Burma. In
the Thai case, short-term economic interests in Burma not only deeply
complicate their bilateral relations, but also generate a considerable im-
pact on Burma’s politics. By maintaining ASEAN’s policy of non-inter-
ference, Thailand’s long-term interests in Burma are not jeopardised.
Otherwise, the problems arising from Burma could become a burden
for Thailand, its immediate neighbour. .
Fourth, ASEAN’s move to acknowledge the necessity of the tat-
madaw, or the military, and its involvement in the political transition
in Burma proved flawed. This acknowledgment only legitimised the
military’s political ambitions, since it could now consider itself an
indispensable factor in the Burmese political development process.
Following the suppression of pro-democracy protesters in Rangoon,
ASEAN leaders came to the conclusion that Burma, having been ruled
by the tatmadaw for so long, had lost most of the institutions deemed
fundamental for national development. ASEAN members argued, the-
refore, that the Burmese military institution had to be nurtured and
sustained so that political transition could be accomplished. Prime Mi-
Neither Constructive Nor Engaging: The Debacle of ASEAN’s Burmese Policy
204
nister Lee Hsien Loong of Singapore said that regime change was not
the best thing for Burma. “ASEAN countries would have to work with
the Burmese military, which is the only institution capable of ruling
Burma,” he stressed. Singapore’s Foreign Minister George Yeo also
said in Parliament that removing Burma from ASEAN would result in
a “Balkanisation” of the region.9
The reality, however, is that the military in Burma is dispensable,
while little attention has been paid to the able men in the Burmese bu-
reaucracy. These civil servants have been a driving force behind major
administrative works, involving infrastructure, transportation, educa-
tion as well as foreign policy. ASEAN’s support for a political role for the
tatmadaw has to a certain extent actually perpetuated the militarisation
of politics in Burma and thus crippled the chance of the NLD to partici-
pate in the upcoming elections. The Burmese government appointed a
commission whose members consist of its own cronies and loyalists to
be in charge of the drafting of the new constitution. Obviously, one of
the main points in the constitution is to guarantee the political role of
the military. Nyan Win, spokesman of the NLD, said, “No one has seen
the final version of the proposed constitution. This one-sided proposal
means that the military junta will continue its rule in Burma.”10 ASEAN
has, consciously or otherwise, made the concept of the tatmadaw indis-
pensable to the achievement of Burmese political solidarity.
Fifth, ASEAN initially perceived the Burma problem as largely a
regional issue requiring a regional solution. But as ASEAN paid more
attention to overcoming other obstacles to its expanding influence, the
Burmese political impasse remained a lesser priority. Burma, in the
meantime, let ASEAN know of its preference to the United Nations’
approach in search of its political change. This is because the Burmese
junta saw the interest in compromising with the UN, as well as using
to UN to water down the level of international sanctions against its
regime. This therefore explains why Burma allowed UN special envoy
Gambari into the country to hold talks with its top leaders as well as
with Suu Kyi. This explains why Burma allowed UN special envoy Gam-
bari into the country to hold talks with its top leaders as well as with Suu
Kyi. Still, even when the junta seemed to support the UN approach, it
clearly prescribed the scope of the role that the UN would be allowed
to play. One good example of this was Burma’s outright rejection of the
creation of the “Core Group,” also endorsed by Gambari, to facilitate a
reconciliation process in the country. The proposed Core Group would
have been comprised of permanent members of the UN Security Coun-
cil—the US, Britain, France, Russia and China—together with India,
Japan, Norway and Singapore (as chair of the ASEAN Standing Com-
205
 mittee). Burma voiced its concerns over the “real agendas” of certain
members of the Core Group, particularly the US. China was also un-
happy with this idea, since it feared that it would lose influence. China
subsequently pushed to see the problem solved regionally.
Burma’s embrace of the UN approach, no matter how superficial, has
devastatingly belittled ASEAN efforts on the Burmese issue. Ultimately,
Burma is a member of ASEAN. What has happened in this country,
from an ASEAN perspective, should be addressed in the regional con-
text, and existing regional mechanisms, such as the ASEAN Troika,
should have been exercised long ago to solve the Burmese impasse.11
ASEAN’s ignorance regarding Burma stems from the way it perceives
itself as a modern-day organisation. Kyaw Yin Hlaing of the National
University of Singapore has argued that ASEAN is a Cold War type of
organisation incapable of dealing with certain issues, not because it
does not want to, but because it lacks a proper mechanism to deal with
the issues playing out in Burma. He also emphasised that ASEAN has
been making a big fuss about Burma mainly because Western countries
have been pressuring the organisation to come up with a viable strategy
on Burma. If Western countries stopped putting pressure on ASEAN, it
would probably do nothing to solve the Burma problem.12
ASEAN’s Response to the Saffron Revolution
When the violence committed by the Burmese army against monks and
pro-democracy activists broke out in September 2007, ASEAN mem-
bers first put on a brave face in collectively condemning the junta’s
suppression of its own people. Singapore’s prime minister made seve-
ral telephone calls on 27 September 2007 to ASEAN leaders, stressing
that the unfolding of the confrontation in Burma would have implica-
tions for ASEAN and the whole region. For this reason, ASEAN could
not credibly remain silent or uninvolved in this matter.13 Singapore’s
Foreign Minister George Yeo, attending the UN General Assembly in
New York at the time, also consulted with his ASEAN counterparts on
a coordinated ASEAN response. This effort would initially seem to
suggest a serious departure from ASEAN’s usually taciturn position re-
garding the situation in Burma. But critics argued that ASEAN leaders
initially assumed the role of “tough guys” merely due to intense pres-
sure from the global community, which viewed the crackdown on street
protesters as the most violent abuse of the Burmese people since 1988.
Singapore’s efforts to resolve the Burmese conflict were not so much
the result of a shift in the country’s position towards Burma, but most
likely an attempt to safeguard its credibility as ASEAN chair.
Neither Constructive Nor Engaging: The Debacle of ASEAN’s Burmese Policy
206
This led to the release of the “Statement by ASEAN Chair” on 27 Sep-
tember 2007, endorsed by Singapore’s foreign minister, which contained
remarkably strong language in its reproach of the Burmese regime. It
says, “They (the ASEAN Foreign Ministers) were appalled to receive re-
ports of automatic weapons being used and demanded that the Myanmar
government immediately desist from the use of violence against demon-
strators. They expressed their revulsion to Myanmar Foreign Minister
Nyan Win over reports that the demonstrations in Myanmar are being
suppressed by violent force and that there has been a number of fatali-
ties.”14 In the same statement, ASEAN proffered its full support for the
decision of the UN Secretary-General to dispatch Gambari to Burma, sig-
nalling ASEAN’s own powerlessness in having any kind of influence on
the junta. When the Singaporean media suggested that ASEAN should
send its own mission, possibly composed of Thailand (Burma’s closest
neighbour), Singapore (ASEAN’s Chair) and perhaps Malaysia and Laos,
whose governments enjoy good relations with Rangoon, to plead against
Burma’s use of force, the Burmese junta immediately rejected the idea,
claiming that it was a breach of ASEAN’s non-interference principle.15
Following the release of the ASEAN Statement, Foreign Minister
Yeo gave a series of interviews to the international media, admitting
that with very little leverage over internal developments in Burma,
ASEAN possessed only the soft weapon of “moral influence” in the
Burma case.16 The term “moral influence,” which was never clearly
defined, has since been repeated in many political speeches and exploi-
ted to defend ASEAN’s crippled stance regarding Burma. In fact, as an
analyst said, the ASEAN Statement was merely a face saving measure
without muscle and bite.17 It failed to initiate any tangible measures,
despite its many sensational statements, including the reference to
Burma as a regional “time-bomb” by Lee Kuan Yew, Singapore’s Mi-
nister Mentor,18 and a provocative article by Barry Desker, Singapore’s
former ambassador and Director of S Rajaratnam School of Internatio-
nal Studies, which suggested a suspension of Burma’s membership in
ASEAN.19 As Singapore carried on in its its role as ASEAN Chair, other
ASEAN members were less energetic about increasing the level of pres-
sure on Burma. Thailand, under the military government of Surayud
Chulanont, only criticised the Burmese regime from the viewpoint
of a fellow Buddhist, while attempting to avoid engaging in Burma’s
political muddle precisely because the Thai government was trapped
in its own political conflicts. Besides, Thailand perceived the import of
Burmese gas as more vital than saving the lives of Burmese monks and
activists, a stance that seemed to fit well with the public view on protec-
ting Thailand’s so-called national interests.
207
 It is obvious that the course of action that ASEAN decided on – sup-
porting the efforts of Gambari, convincing the regime ensconced in
Naypyidaw to negotiate with Suu Kyi and the NLD, and cooperating
with China and India20– – is little different from yesteryear’s approach.
It is a newly repackaged “Constructive Engagement” which has failed
miserably for decades. ASEAN viewed this course of action as not only
the best, but perhaps also the only option open to the region.21 ASEAN
leaders assumed that ASEAN’s continued engagement with Burma
would help prevent this member state from breaking apart, not an un-
likely prospect given the fact that Burma is a multi-ethnic society. If the
military regime were to collapse precipitously, Burma might descend
into civil war, and China, India and Thailand would likely be drawn
into the ensuing maelstrom, since Burma’s restive ethnic minorities
live mostly along the country’s borders. As Foreign Minister Yeo stated,
“The last thing we want is a Yugoslavia or an Iraqi situation on our
doorstep.”22 Therefore, ASEAN strongly rejected international sanc-
tions and economic embargoes as well as a regime change in Burma.
Of course, ASEAN’s description of Burma as being the next possible
Yugoslavia or Iraq directly contradicts its previous view of Burma as a
non-threatening state. ASEAN has long refuted the argument raised
by the West and human rights groups that Burma has been a threat to
regional and international security. They argue that a “threat” does not
necessarily mean a military threat in the traditional sense, but could
mean the spread of infectious diseases, human trafficking, narcotic pro-
duction and commercialisation, and forced labour. Rodolfo Severino,
former ASEAN Secretary-General, said that ASEAN rejected the notion
of Burma as a threat to regional security, because Burma’s immediate
neighbours, including some ASEAN members and China, have never
perceived Burma this way.23 These countries have instead competed
fiercely with each other for Burma’s attention. There seems to be, then,
significant contradiction in ASEAN’s perception on Burma. Despite
this fact, ASEAN continues to claim that Burma is part of the ASEAN
family, even as its continued defence of the Burmese regime undermi-
nes its own influence over that regime.
On the part of Burma, the lack of interest in taking advantage of the
many ASEAN forums to explain its domestic situation to the outside
world was evident. In fact, Burma openly expressed its mistrust of
ASEAN, particularly following the release of the ASEAN Statement. It
was reported that Than Shwe was infuriated by Singapore for labelling
the junta’s behaviour as repulsive. In ASEAN’s official gatherings, the
Burmese representatives continued to rigidly uphold the state’s policy
rather than engaging in frank discussions on the real situation with
Neither Constructive Nor Engaging: The Debacle of ASEAN’s Burmese Policy
208
other members. During the ASEAN Defence Senior Officials’ Meeting
(ADSOM) held in Singapore from 17-19 October 2007, Maj-Gen Aye
Myint, Deputy Defence Minister, debriefed his counterparts about
what had happened in his country while condemning Western media
for distorting the facts. He also denounced Thailand’s The Nation and
Bangkok Post for following in the footsteps of the Western media in
printing distorted news about Burma. Aye Myint went on to defend his
government by emphasising that violence was never used against the
protesters, and that ASEAN’s non-interference principle must be strict-
ly upheld to prevent any further complications that might be caused by
foreign involvement.24 Burma’s lingering suspicion of ASEAN was very
much evident during the ASEAN Summit Meeting in November 2007,
which revealed the failure of Singapore’s chairmanship and ASEAN’s
ability to respond to the Burma crisis, and blemished the inaugural
launch of the long-awaited ASEAN Charter.
Face-Slapping Diplomacy
One week before the ASEAN Summit Meeting, Singapore sent Zainal
Abidin Rasheed, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, to Naypyidaw
from 13-14 November 2007, reportedly to brief Burmese leaders on
preparations for the Meeting. Little was revealed to the public about
how Singapore was in fact trying to convince the junta to accept its plan
to invite Gambari, who had just returned from Burma after a series of
discussions with parties involved following the crackdown, to appear
before the East Asian Summit (EAS), which was to be held back-to-back
with the ASEAN Summit Meeting. The objective was for Gambari to
update EAS members—the ASEAN members plus China, Japan, South
Korea, India, Australia and New Zealand—on the political situation in
Burma. For Singapore as ASEAN Chair, the purpose was not only to
redeem the credibility and the involvement of ASEAN in the Burmese
reconciliation process, but also to convince non-ASEAN players, par-
ticularly China and India, to lend their support to ASEAN efforts at
political change in Burma. Singapore’s diplomatic effort was also to lo-
cate ASEAN at the centre of the Burma issue. Initially, Burmese Prime
Minister Thien Sien and Foreign Minister Nyan Win reportedly went
along with Singapore’s proposal of inviting Gambari to speak at the
EAS before they consulted with Than Shwe.
Burma, of course, changed its mind soon after Thien Sien arrived
at the Summit Meeting, just as Gambari was on a plane bound for
Singapore. The Burmese junta, embedded in its mistrust of ASEAN,
realised that it would inevitably become a target of collective criticism,
209
 and that it did not need to explain itself on what had taken place in its
own backyard. China was thought to back up Burma’s decision since
Beijing wanted to keep the Burma issue strictly in the Southeast Asian
context. The Burmese premier angrily responded to the media that if
members of the EAS wished to know about his country’s political situa-
tion, it would be Burma’s own responsibility to provide such informa-
tion, not Gambari. Months of ASEAN’s diplomatic manoeuvring fell
short in the face of the global community, which had insisted all along
in pursuing further sanctions against the Burmese regime. Prime Mi-
nister Lee of Singapore was forced to admit ASEAN’s shortcoming in
bringing the Burma crisis into the EAS. He declared, in front of other
ASEAN leaders, that ASEAN would from now on let Burma handle its
own affairs, but stand ready if the country needed assistance—a posi-
tion that did not seem to surprise anyone. ASEAN’s failure had a lot to
do with its lack of a sense of urgency to toughen the stance on Burma,
and a collective power and common position that would be compelling
enough to deal with the stubborn regime. While Singapore teamed up
with Gambari in introducing the Burma problem to the EAS, Thailand
came up with a new proposal of “North Korean-styled six-party talks” to
tackle the issue. Not only has the failure represented a major barrier in
ASEAN’s external relations, particularly with Europe and the US, but it
has also been a destabilising factor in the group’s mission of commu-
nity building by the year 2015.
The constitutional referendum in May will pose another test to
ASEAN’s mandate of achieving political change in Burma. So far, the
prospect of success seems slim. ASEAN continues to pay lip service to
the junta by calling for an inclusive political process, which means es-
sentially the participation of the NLD and Suu Kyi, and yet no concrete
actions have been taken. ASEAN is also lacking in its understanding of
the real political condition in Burma, particularly when it relentlessly
urges the junta to open the political door to Suu Kyi and her party. The
reality is that the inclusion of Suu Kyi and the NLD is unlikely to occur,
since the Burmese government has already set a political course that
does not include Suu Kyi. This explains why the international commu-
nity reacted to Burma's announcement of a referendum and elections
with such indifference. Some ASEAN members rushed to congratulate
the country, regarding its decision as “a positive political development.”
Surin Pitsuwan, ASEAN Secretary-General, said he saw some merit in
the regime’s announcement. “It has to begin somewhere and now it
has a clear, definite beginning. I think it is a development in the right
direction,” Surin said.25 The other reality, however, is that the junta's un-
expected referendum signifies an attempt to delay the political transi-
Neither Constructive Nor Engaging: The Debacle of ASEAN’s Burmese Policy
210
tion rather than to speed up the democratisation process even when
the dates of the referendum and elections have been fixed. The regime
has been using the new political timeline to prolong its hold over the
country, spinning an empty promise that the country's military era is
coming to an end. The decision to announce early elections was also
linked to international politics. Burma has made great efforts to soften
international sanctions imposed upon it, especially after its crackdown
on street protesters. In the past few months, Western powers have cal-
led for harsher sanctions against cronies and supporters of the military
regime. Economic sanctions, which were long a cause of severe hard-
ship for the Burmese people, are now beginning to be felt by the top
echelons in the military regime.
Despite international protest, the Burmese leaders are determined
to follow their own political track without Suu Kyi. Even Gambari, who
just returned to Burma for his third visit in March 2008, was blamed by
the junta for being biased toward Suu Kyi when he demanded that the
political process in Burma be inclusive. “Sadly, Gambari went beyond
his mandate. Hence, the majority of people are criticising his action as
a biased act. We are concerned that his task of offering impartial advice
may be undermined,” said Kyaw Hsan, Burma’s Information Minis-
ter.26 In response to such statements, the opposition has rallied for a
no-vote against the upcoming public referendum among in Burma, and
many fear a possible mass protest that could provoke another brutal
crackdown. One question remains eminent: can ASEAN do anything
to change Burma’s political course and to prevent another vicious supp-
ression of the Burmese people should demonstrations erupt during the
referendum?
The Cyclone Nargis Disaster
Burma, particularly in the Irrawaddy Delta, was badly hit by Cyclone
Nargis on 3 May 2007, just one week before the constitutional referen-
dum. According to the government’s release, there are 28,458 dead and
33,416 persons still missing (as of 10 May 2008). However, independent
estimates have put the death toll at more than 100,000. One estimate
by an international agency suggested a death count as high as approx-
imately 600,000 people. Meanwhile, the United Nations estimates that
between 1.5 and 2 million people have been severely affected by the
cyclone.27
The devastating effects of the Cyclone Nargis were, of course, made
worse by the Burmese government’s refusal to open its doors to foreign
aid, especially aid from the West. Wary of the politics attached to the
211
 aid handed out by anti-junta Western governments, the junta chose to
deal with the task of disaster relief in isolation, and only later accepted
limited help from neighbouring countries. ASEAN was once again too
slow to respond to the crisis in Burma. It took the organisation almost
three weeks before it could come up with a package of initiatives in the
aftermath of the cyclone. ASEAN Chief Surin admitted that such criti-
cism was valid. He said, “I do not have any defence for that. But I think
the international community also realises we have a lot of sensitivities
to work around, to the point where all international agencies have come
to accept the fact that if it has to be an ASEAN-led vehicle or structure
or architecture, they would be happy and willing to work with us and
rally behind us.”28
At the beginning, some ASEAN members provided financial as-
sistance and relief goods to Burma on an individual basis instead of
addressing the catastrophe as a single, united organisation. But they
were criticised for being less generous in their assistance to the victims
of Nargis. According to David Fullbrook, “Thailand should surely be in
the donor vanguard. Its elites have courted vast investments in Burma
during the past decade especially in the import of Burmese gas. But
government cash and the state-owned energy giant PTT’s donations
total less than US$2 million; the Bank of Thailand holds reserves of
approximately US$50 billion. Indonesia, which benefited tremendously
from global charity when the tsunami struck in 2004, has given US$1
million and blocked a Security Council resolution against Burma. Sing-
apore helps the junta with trade and banking, and is a playground for
the children of the Burmese elite. The super-rich island offered a mere
US$200,000.”29 Rodolfo Severino, former ASEAN Secretary-General,
perceived that uncoordinated assistance from certain ASEAN mem-
bers has been delivered relatively smoothly to Burma not only because
Burma is a member of the organisation, but also because such assis-
tance comes without a political agenda and threats.30 Such statement,
however, only shows that Burma is always one step ahead of ASEAN,
putting itself in a position of relevancy without sacrificing too much of
anything.
On 19 May 2008, Singapore played host to an ASEAN emergency
meeting in order to search for a further step in an attempt to persuade
the Burmese military to allow foreign assistance. Burmese Foreign Mi-
nister Nyan Win agreed to let ASEAN lead an international aid effort
through the establishment of a mechanism that would facilitate aid
from all over the world to flow into the country. But as always, Burma
has prescribed a limited role of ASEAN by emphasising that aid given
through the organisation must not be politicised and that foreign relief
Neither Constructive Nor Engaging: The Debacle of ASEAN’s Burmese Policy
212
workers would not be given “uncontrolled” access. ASEAN, in despera-
tion to prove its effectiveness and credibility, has had to deal with great
difficulties with Burma’s stubborn regime as well as pressure from
international community at the same time.
The Cyclone Nargis brings to the attention ASEAN’s struggle to
address issues that require special engagement with its sovereign
members such as human rights and natural disaster. It is also a rema-
inder to ASEAN members that they should immediately implement
or ratify a number of agreements, including the 2005 Agreement on
Disaster Management and Emergency Response and the 2002 ASEAN
Agreement on Transboundary Haze Pollution.31 Indeed, Surin has ur-
ged ASEAN members to recognise the importance of ratifying those
documents which would oblige them to assist one another in times of
natural disaster and provide for the protection of people from any cata-
strophic impact.
ASEAN has always been perceived as playing second fiddle to Bur-
ma, mainly because it lacks a clear leader capable of guiding ASEAN
policies and activities, especially in difficult times. If ASEAN had been
under strong leadership, the problems in Burma, including the Nargis
disaster, might not have become such a thorny issue. An ASEAN leader
could have first rallied support from his fellow members and come up
with an integrated stance on how to assist Burma in dealing with the
disaster, as well as to strengthen a sense of trust so that the generals in
Naypyidaw would be comfortable enough to work with ASEAN. Such
a leader might also have been able to convince other ASEAN countries
that it is in their interests to help those suffering from all forms of cala-
mity anywhere in the region, even when individual member countries
themselves are not directly affected by these events. Time has changed
so much since the end of the Cold War and so have the circumstances
that regions face today. New kinds of problems have emerged in the
ASEAN region. Some of them are non-traditional and transcend natio-
nal boundaries. A regional leadership vacuum in ASEAN has not only
left these challenging problems unresolved, but such a vacuum has the
potential to turn an already much criticised ASEAN into a completely
irrelevant entity.
The Thai Role in the Burmese Impasse
Thailand is probably the most important player within ASEAN on the
Burma due to its intricate relations with the Burmese regime and the
burdens it has had to bear as a result of internal conflicts in Burma.
Singapore’s Minister Mentor Lee Kuan Yew once said, “The members
213
 of ASEAN who could influence them (the Burmese generals) will be
Thailand and beyond (that) China and India. The rest of us—we are
kind of background Muzak (music).”32
Relations between Thailand and Burma have been erratic over the
years, depending on the changing notions of national interests especial-
ly on the Thai part. At its lowest, the relationship is usually held hostage
by the bitter historical memory in which Ayutthaya, Siam’s old capital,
was invaded and ransacked by the Burmese army in 1767. This inimical
past has consistently been exploited as a vicious political tool of the mo-
dern-day elites in order to satisfy their political legitimacy through the
manipulation of nationalism. In the meantime, however, the new breed
of Thai leaders who are more interested in business than historical past,
choose to adopt a more friendly policy toward Burma. Some take advan-
tage of the official policy to augment their personal interests in Burma,
with the consent of the Burmese generals who are eager to do business
in order to sustain their own regime. The fluctuation in the Thai policy
towards Burma, from being an antagonistic neighbour to a business
partner, has been evident for a decade since the Democrat Party took
power in 1997 to the present day of the People’s Power Party (PPP)-led
government. In 1997, the Chuan Leekpai government closely tied his
foreign policy toward Rangoon with the need to defend democracy.
This was when “Constructive Engagement” was redefined to become
more direct in dealing with Burma. Renamed “Flexible Engagement,”
the policy was reformulated to allow Burma’s neighbours to raise con-
cerns over the situation in the country. But ASEAN quickly rebuffed
the content of this new policy, charging it of breaking the norm of non-
interference. The Chuan government may have won a trophy from the
democratic world, but it found itself on the outs with both Burma and
ASEAN.33
Amicable relations between Thailand and Burma returned during the
Thaksin-led government from 2001-2006, and have lasted into the cur-
rent era of PPP rule. Economic interests, not promotion of democracy,
have been a determining factor in bilateral relations. On the legitimate
front, Burma represents a myriad of economic interests for Thailand,
ranging from natural gas (Thailand today is the biggest single buyer
of Burmese gas, which makes up about 50% of the country’s supply34),
teak, gems and precious stones, marine products, as well as low-wage
Burmese labour.35 Behind the scenes, Thai leaders have been preoc-
cupied with shoring up their own interests, both in the form of power
and money, in their relations with the junta. Leaders’ self-interests have
resulted in the Thai policy of piggy-backing the Burmese regime even
as the latter was accused of committing human rights violations and
Neither Constructive Nor Engaging: The Debacle of ASEAN’s Burmese Policy
214
continued to challenge ASEAN’s credibility and reputation. Thaksin’s
foreign policy was heavily criticised by the West for lacking morality,
and therefore contributing to a worsening situation in Burma.
The economic benefits that resulted from Thailand’s forgiving ap-
proach toward Burma were evident. In 2005, Thailand was Burma’s
top trading partner, with total bilateral trade revenues amounting to
US$2.5 billion, an increase of 27.2% from the previous year. Currently,
Thai private businesses have invested in 56 projects in Burma—total-
ling more than US$1.3 billion, or equivalent to 17.28% of Burma’s total
foreign direct investment.36 On top of this, Thailand’s exports to Burma
amount to around US$1.26 billion annually. The total border trade
stood at US$2.2 billion in 2005. Thaksin himself also owns businesses
in Burma. His company, Shin Corp, the third largest satellite operator
in Asia, concluded a deal in 2003 with Bagan Cybertech, and internet
service provider of Ye Naing Win, who is the son of former Prime Mi-
nister Khin Nyunt. Prior to the conclusion of the deal, Thaksin invited
Burma to participate in the Economic Cooperation Strategy (ECS), later
renamed ACMECS (Ayeyawady-Chao Phraya-Mekong Economic Coo-
peration Strategy), in which Thailand offered Burma generous finan-
cial assistance worth US$45 million. At the same time, Human Rights
Watch reported that the Thaksin regime continued to clean up Burmese
refugees living along Thailand’s border.37 The Irrawaddy reported that
this raised concerns about Bangkok’s ability to act as an honest broker
in the Burmese political standoff and also questioned Thaksin’s conflict
of interests. The Bangkok process, hosted by the Thaksin government
in 2003, ostensibly to advance democracy in Burma, failed to take off
and came to an end when the Burmese representative failed to turn up
at a planned second session in April 2004.38
It was reported that Thaksin was also involved in setting up high
technology communications networks in Burma as part of the IPSTAR
project, a US$350 million telecom broadband satellite. This project was
linked with the controversial EXIM Bank’s four billion baht loan to the
Myanmar Foreign Trade Bank in 2004 for road construction and in-
frastructure developments in Burma. Thailand’s EXIM Bank provided
financial support to Thai investors and exporters under the procure-
ment contracts granted by the Burmese government. Thaksin’s telecom
empire was suspected of gaining the most from the EXIM Bank’s loan
to Burma. After Thaksin was toppled in a military coup, the Surayud
government appointed the Assets Examination Committee to look into
whether the loan was made to benefit politically connected companies,
as well as the decision of the Board of Investment of Thailand that
granted Shin Satellite an eight-year tax holiday on revenues from the
215
 IPSTAR project.39 The Thaksin period saw Thailand, in particular Thai
leaders, prioritise economic benefits to be gained from Burma above
other considerations, and even above ASEAN’s official stance of urging
political change in the country. Thai scholar, Thitinan Pongsudhirak,
characterises Thaksin’s Burmese policy as a policy of accommodation
and appeasement, at times bordering on flattery. It rendered “Construc-
tive Engagement” completely elastic in accordance with the preferen-
ces of the Burmese junta. He stressed, “Whatever the Burmese junta
wants, the Thaksin government seems willing to comply.”40 This bu-
siness-oriented policy not only enriched the self-isolating regime with
profits from the sale of its natural resources, but also legitimised those
in power in Burma, which has in turn further alienated Suu Kyi and the
NLD and therefore delayed the process of political reconciliation.
Thai foreign policy during the military government (September
2006-February 2008) was rather dormant for a number of reasons. It
was preoccupied with a mission to heal the sharply divisive society
brought about by the ongoing battle between pro-Thaksin and the roya-
list forces. Moreover, Thailand had to explain its actions to the West—
its motives behind the power seizure and its intention to return to
democracy. In regards to Thailand’s relations with Burma, the military
government repeatedly claimed that it lacked moral authority to preach
to Burmese counterparts to respect democracy. It was simply satisfied
with the status quo, which seemed to be met favourably by the Burmese
leaders. Even then, Thai-Burmese economic activities remained vibrant
since Thailand continued to rely on energy imports from Burma.
The current government of Prime Minister Samak, a self-confes-
sed nominee of Thaksin, does not hide its admiration for the Burmese
regime and is clearly pleased with the return of his country’s amicable
policy toward Burma. Samak paid a one-day visit to Naypyidaw on 14
March 2008 as part of his introductory tour of ASEAN countries as a
new leader of Thailand. While in Naypyidaw, Samak made public his
Burmese policy based on two principles. First, Thailand opposes Wes-
tern sanctions on Burma, and prefers peaceful negotiations since these
could lead to positive developments. Moreover, Thailand is prepared to
help the Burmese military government hold a referendum on a new
Constitution in May. Second, Thailand hopes to strengthen bilateral
economic relations with Burma, especially in the area of production
and exploitation of natural gas and hydropower projects.41 On a less
publicised note, his visit failed to pressurise Burma to expedite its road-
map to democracy. Samak has recently been discouraged in this, since
Burma and India shook hands over the signing of an agreement on a
transport project that would develop a sea route between Kolkata and
Neither Constructive Nor Engaging: The Debacle of ASEAN’s Burmese Policy
216
Sitwe for the shipping of energy products, an outcome of the visit to In-
dia of Burma’s Vice-Senior General Maung Aye from 3-7 April 2008.42
In the end, Thailand’s domestic politics and the push to meet the
self-interests of its elites have had a powerful role in dictating the
country’s foreign policy toward Burma. Past and present governments
have shown their willingness to achieve such objectives at ASEAN’s ex-
pense, defying the West on Burma’s behalf, and ignoring the frustrated
calls from the Burmese opposition for democratic change. Thailand’s
self-serving policy has in many ways contributed to ASEAN’s lack of
credibility, despite its many desperate attempts to be seen by the inter-
national community as a serious, capable and credible regional entity.
Policy Options and Alternatives
The Burma problem has persisted so long, and the hurdle ahead—the
May referendum—seems so critical that it could turn ASEAN’s credi-
bility to rubble and shatter the much publicised ASEAN Charter before
its ratification by the end of the year. If ASEAN is serious about rein-
venting itself as a recognised regional body, it must therefore pursue a
number of new policies and exercise some muscle if the organisation
wishes to salvage its reputation:
§ It is suggested that ASEAN needs to begin a process of rigo-
rous and coordinated commitment not only for the benefit of the
Burmese people, but also for the sake of peace and stability in
the region. In order to achieve common advantage, the ASEAN
member countries will therefore have to find some middle
ground from which to take a multilateral approach. ASEAN
members need to reassess their historical commitment to the
policy of non-interference. The organisation will also have to
convince the world that sanction policies against Burma must go
hand-in-hand with various forms of engagement. It will be ne-
cessary to coordinate all kinds of dealings towards the common
goals of persistent reform, reconciliation and democratisation in
Burma. To achieve success, ASEAN members will need to make
a mutual concerted effort.43
§ What ASEAN could do at this point is to widen the diploma-
tic scope of its engagement with Burma. ASEAN should make
Burma less of a regional problem and more of an East Asian one.
This would help to create immense pressure on the Burmese re-
gime. ASEAN could begin by building dialogues with China and
India about the deteriorating situation in Burma through exis-
217
 ting frameworks like the EAS. The two Asian giants are known to
be Burma’s close friends, particularly since the implementation
of heavy international sanctions by Western nations. The most
difficult task for ASEAN will be to convince China and India of
the necessity of putting human rights before strategic interests.
“ASEAN may remind them of the danger of their selfish pursuit
of strategic goals in Burma that will put them on par with an
energy-driven policy of the US in the Middle East during the past
few decades,” said Michael Vatikiotis, visiting research fellow
at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies.44 The challenge for
ASEAN is to refrain from competing with China in order to win
over Burma, either for organisational purposes or in the interests
of individual members.
§ It is time for ASEAN and the world to rethink Burma policy,
particularly in regards to international sanctions. Since there
have been so many conflicting approaches, Burma has success-
fully utilised its weaknesses and problems as a tool to divide its
neighbours and other great powers and hit at their soft spots.
These countries urgently need a common approach to bring
about changes in Burma. Such a process would require some
“give” on the part of each state, and with the right mix of stick
and carrot, there could be progress in Burma. It is obvious that
non-interference and total sanctions against Burma have not
worked during the past 16 years. On the contrary, they have ge-
nerated counterproductive results such as the extension of Suu
Kyi’s house arrest and the continuing imprisonment of Burmese
political activists. The sanctions also failed partly because the
countries involved were far too tactical and distracted by great
power politics and other economic interests. A reassessment of
this approach towards Burma is crucial, since it would be foo-
lish to continue a course of action that has so clearly proven to
be ineffective. First and foremost, one has to reject a simplistic
"black and white" treatment of sanctions, where non-support for
sanctions is equated with support for the junta.45
On an ending note, it has become obvious that the US and Europe,
in freezing their relations with Burma, have inadvertently deprived
themselves of the chance to influence political developments in Burma.
Since Burma remains an ASEAN member, the organisation has a legi-
timate opportunity to raise its concerns about political developments
in one of its member countries. Such a role could prove powerful for
ASEAN in its dealings with Burma, if the rest of the ASEAN members
Neither Constructive Nor Engaging: The Debacle of ASEAN’s Burmese Policy
218
work together with ASEAN’s other partners and with all of the Burmese
parties involved – the government, the opposition and the Burmese pe-
ople – for the true promotion of genuine democracy in this Southeast
Asian nation.
Annex 1
Statement by ASEAN Chair
Singapore's Minister for Foreign Affairs George Yeo
New York, 27 September 2007
The ASEAN Foreign Ministers had a full and frank discussion on the si-
tuation in Myanmar at their Informal Meeting this morning in the UN
and agreed for the Chair to issue this Statement. They were appalled to
receive reports of automatic weapons being used and demanded that
the Myanmar government immediately desist from the use of violence
against demonstrators. They expressed their revulsion to Myanmar
Foreign Minister Nyan Win over reports that the demonstrations in
Myanmar are being suppressed by violent force and that there has been
a number of fatalities. They strongly urged Myanmar to exercise utmost
restraint and seek a political solution. They called upon Myanmar to
resume its efforts at national reconciliation with all parties concerned,
and work towards a peaceful transition to democracy. The Ministers
called for the release of all political detainees including Daw Aung San
Suu Kyi.
The ASEAN Foreign Ministers expressed their concern to Minister
Nyan Win that the developments in Myanmar had a serious impact on
the reputation and credibility of ASEAN. They noted that Singapore’s
Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong has spoken to his ASEAN counter-
parts over the past day, and will be writing to Senior General Than
Shwe.
The ASEAN Foreign Ministers gave their full support to the decision
of UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon to send Special Envoy Ibrahim
Gambari to Myanmar. They welcomed FM Nyan Win’s assurance that a
visa would be issued to Mr Gambari in Singapore. They asked the My-
anmar government to cooperate fully and work with him. Mr Gambari’s
role as a neutral interlocutor among all the parties can help defuse the
dangerous situation. The Ministers urged the Myanmar government to
grant him full access to all parties in Myanmar, as they had done in the
past.
219

Notes
1Mya Than, Myanmar in ASEAN: Regional Cooperation Experience, Singapore: Institute
of Southeast Asian Studies, 2005, p.109
2 Surapong Jayanama, Thailand, ASEAN and the Burma Problems: Eight Long Years of
Disgrace, unpublished article, April 2005. Surapong also added that ASEAN wanted to
send the right signal to the international community that by admitting Burma, ASEAN
intended not to kowtow to outside pressure or interference, or more specifically to Wes-
tern domination. Surapong is former Thai ambassador to Vietnam, Portugal, Greece,
Germany and South Africa.
3“Yangon Missed Chance to Engage UN Envoy: Singapore,” The Straits Times, 15 March
2008.
4Pavin Chachavalpongpun, “The ASEAN Dilemma,” in The Irrawaddy, Vol.15, No.8,
August 2007, p.36.
5 “Westerners too Critical of Myanmar, Says Samak,” The Straits Times, 17 March 2008.
6 Pavin Chachavalpongpun, A Plastic Nation: The Curse of Thainess in Thai-Burmese Rela-
tions, Lamham, Boulder, New York, Toronto, Oxford: The University Press of America,
2005, p.139.
7Tin Maung Maung Than, “Charter for ASEAN: Boon or Bane?,” in The Irrawaddy,
Vol.15, No. 8, August 2007, p.39.
8 Mungpi, “Will Thailand Gain from Lack of Democracy and Human Rights in Burma,”
in Mizzimi News, 8 February 2008, at http://www.mizzima.com/MizzimaNews/News/
2008/Feb/23-Feb-2008.html.
9Akshay Kothari, “The Tragedy of Burma,” in The Singapore Law Review, 9 December
2007, at http://www.singaporelawreview.org/2007/12/the-tragedy-of-burma/
10Quoted in Pavin Chachavalpongpun, “Little Hope in Burmese Junta’s Democratic
Bluster,” in The Nation, 12 February 2008.
11 In several private conversations with Dr Surin Pitsuwan, ASEAN Secretary-General
(in-waiting at the time), December 2007. Also see, Pavin Chachavalpongpun, “The My-
anmar Problem: Internationalisation or Regionalisation?,” in OpinionAsia, 30 October
2007, at http://www.opinionasia.org/TheMyanmarProblemInternationalisationorRegio-
nalisation.
12Kyaw Yin Hlaing, Alliances and the Problems of Burma/Myanmar Policy: The United
States, Japan, Thailand, Australia and the European Union, Asian Voices Seminar Series
Transcript, Sasakawa Peace Foundation, Washington DC, USA, 3 November 2006. Kyaw
delivered this talk together with other 6 panellists, including Michael Green, Peter
Christian Hauswedell, Pavin Chachavalpongpun, Andrew Selth, David Steinberg and
Tsumori Shigeru.
13“MFA Spokesman’s Comments on PM Lee Hsien loong’s Calls to ASEAN Leaders on
the Myanmar Issue,” MFA Press Release, 27 September 2007.
14 See Annex 1.
15Suresh Kumar and Martin Stuart-Fox, “Why ASEAN is the Only Hope,” in Today, 27
September 2007.
16 “A Test of Cohesion,” The Straits Times, 2 October 2007.
Neither Constructive Nor Engaging: The Debacle of ASEAN’s Burmese Policy
220
17Zin Linn, Burma: ASEAN should not go against the UN,” Asian Tribune, 5 December
2007, at http://www.asiantribune.com/index.php?q=node/8574.
18 “Keep Pressure on Myanmar,” The Straits Times, 10 October 2007.
19 Barry Desker, “Suspend Myanmar from ASEAN,” The Straits Times, 4 October 2007.
20 George Yeo, Singaporean Foreign Minister paid unofficial visits to China and Japan
from 25-27 October 2007 in an attempt to win support from the two countries to push
for a political change in Burma. He also visited India at the beginning of November 2007
to achieve the same objective.
21Janadas Devan, “Wedged Between a Rock and a Hard Place,” The Straits Times, 26
October 2007.
22 Ibid.
23In an interview with Rodolfo Severino, former ASEAN Secretary-General and cur-
rently a Senior Research Fellow at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore,
31 October 2007.
24In an interview with Maj-Gen Aye Myint, Deputy Defence Minister, Singapore, 18
October 2007.
25 Aung Zaw, “Burma’s Referendum Ambush,” The Irrawaddy, 13 February 2008.
26 “Myanmar Rebuffs Gambari’s Reform Call,” The Straits Times, 9 March 2008.
27Nyi Nyi Kyaw, “The Myanmar Nargis Aftermath: A Disaster in Governance,” in RSIS
Commentaries, No.60/2008, 16 May 2008, p.1.
28“We Were too Slow, Admitted ASEAN Chief,” in The New Zealand Herald, 21 May
2008.
29 David Fullbrook, “Burma Praying in the Rain,” Newstatesman, 15 May 2008.
30Rodolfo Severino, “Lessons in Offering Neighbourly Aid,” The Straits Times, 15 May
2008.
31Achara Ashayagachat, “ASEAN Struggles to Help Burma,” Bangkok Post, 21 May
2008.
32 The Irrawaddy, Vol.16, No.2, February 2008, p.5.
33Chachavalpongpun, A Plastic Nation: The Curse of Thainess in Thai-Burmese Relations,
Chapter 6.
34Through concessions granted to the PTT Exploration and Production Co Ltd (PTTEP)
in the Yadana and Yetagun fields in the Bay of Bengal, Thailand is at present importing
about 9 billion standard cubic feet a day, and wishes to buy an additional 100 million
cubic feet of gas per day to match its rising domestic demand.
35N Ganesan, “Myanmar’s Foreign Relations: Reaching out to the World,” in Myanmar:
Beyond Politics to Societal Imperatives, edited by Kyaw Yin Hlaing, Robert H Taylor, and
Tin Maung Maung Than, Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2005, pp.46-
47.
36 Source from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Thailand, http://www.mfa.go.th
Thailand: Burmese Democracy Activists Targeted by Thai Government, Human Right
37
Watch, Press Release, 29 March 2005
38Aung Zaw, “Thaksin’s Burma Blunder,” The Irrawaddy, 6 March 2006, at http://
www.irrawaddy.org/aviewer.asp?a=5516&z=157
221
 See, “Bt4-bn Burma Loan Fine: EXIM,” The Nation, 4 October 2006; and “EXIM Bank
39
Details Loan Status,” The Bangkok Post, 4 October 2006.
40Thitinan Pongsudhirak, “A Win-Win-Win Proposition for Thaksin,” The Irrawaddy,
August 2005.
41 See, “Thailand Opposes Sanctions against Myanmar,” and “Westerners too Critical
of Myanmar, Says Samak,” in The Straits Times, 15 March 2008 and 17 March 2008
respectively.
42P Jayaram, “India to Develop Transport Project in Myanmar,” The Straits Times, 4 April
2008.
43 Zin Linn, “Burma: ASEAN should not go against the UN.”
44 Quoted in Pavin Chachavalpongpun, “The ASEAN Dilemma.”
45Pavin Chachavalpongpun, “World Needs to Rethink Burma Policy,” The Nation, 14
November 2006.
Neither Constructive Nor Engaging: The Debacle of ASEAN’s Burmese Policy
222
The Staying Power
of the Burmese Military Regime
Bertil Lintner
The Enigma of Military Power in Burma
Between 1962 and 1974, there were 64 military takeovers throughout
the world, most of them entailing the overthrow of civilian governme-
nts. Only two of these takeover military governments remain today: Li-
bya, where Col. Mohammar Khadaffy seized power in 1969, and Burma,
where the military overthrew the democratically elected government of
Prime Minister U Nu in 1962 and has been in power under various
guises ever since.
The survival of successive military regimes in Burma is one of the
enigmas of Southeast Asian politics. The key to this puzzle is the under-
standing that Burma in no “ordinary” military dictatorship, and it can-
not be compared to Thailand, Indonesia, Bangladesh, Pakistan or other
countries in the region that have also had spells of military rule.
When the army first seized power in Burma in 1962, it not only took
control over the government, but it also assumed control over Burma’s
economic institutions. Branded the “Burmese Way to Socialism,” the
takeover meant that almost all private property was confiscated and
handed over to a number of military-run state corporations. The old
mercantile elite, largely of Indian and Chinese ethnic origin, left the
country, and so did many of Burma’s intellectuals. Prior to the 1962
coup, Burma had had one of the highest living standards in Southeast
Asia and a fairly well-educated population. After the coup, the military
subsequently became Burma’s new and only elite.
The Burmese military establishment also developed into a state-
within-a-state, a society in which army personnel, their families and
dependents enjoy a position far more privileged than their counterparts
ever had in, for instance, Thailand and Indonesia. In both of these
countries, some degree of pluralism has always been accepted, even
during the darkest years of military dictatorship.
The Burmese Way to Socialism was abolished after the 1988 upris-
ing, perhaps in an attempt to appease the international community,
which had condemned the carnage in Rangoon. However, this may
also have occurred because the military realized that they could make
223
 more money in a free-market economy. For example, private enterprise
and foreign investment were permitted after the bloody events of 1988,
when at least 3,000 protesters were gunned down, but, in essence, the
Burmese Way to Capitalism remains a military-dominated economy.
There are few major enterprises that are not directly or indirectly
controlled by the military or by businessmen affiliated with the military,
such as the powerful 44-year-old tycoon Tay Za, who is close to junta
leader Gen. Than Shwe and his family. His Htoo Trading Company
was one of two main contractors that built Burma’s new administra-
tive capital, Naypyidaw. The other was the Asia World Group, which is
headed by Tun Myint Naing, or Steven Law, the son of Lo Hsing-han,
who, in the 1970s, was branded by US authorities as the King of Opium
in Burma’s sector of the Golden Triangle. The military’s own company,
the Union of Myanmar Economic Holdings (UMEH) controls or su-
pervises all vital economic activity, and the money goes directly into the
pockets of the generals, not the government which, in April 2008, was
quite clearly bankrupt. The fiscal year, when all debts have to be settled,
normally ends on March 31. Thus year, it has been extended to June
because it is unable to pay its bills to private contractors.
In Burma, there are special schools and hospitals for the military
and their dependents. They live in secluded, subsidized housing and
shop for goods that are not available in ordinary stores. An army pass
assured the holder of a seat on a train or an airplane, and a policeman
would never dare to report him or her for violating traffic rules. The
military’s only civilian support base is the Union Solidarity and Devel-
opment Association, USDA, which was formed in 1992. It claims to
have 21 million members, but that is mainly because membership is
compulsory for civil servants and ordinary citizens are forced to join.
Like the Burma Socialist Program Party (BSPP) which ruled Burma
until the 1988 uprising, it is a colossus on feet of clay, which, in the
wake of current events, is likely to collapse, as the BSPP did nineteen
years ago.
But nothing is going to change fundamentally as long as the military
remains united, and there have so far been no credible reports of splits
within the military. Given the abuse of power, their privileges and the
atrocities they have committed, the Burmese military has everything to
lose and nothing to gain from allowing more openness and transparen-
cy, and they have shown on numerous occasions that they are prepared
to gun down their own people to protect their absolute hold on power.
Foreign-based opposition groups – and foreign governments as
well – like to talk about “dialogue” and “national reconciliation,” but
these are no more than popular buzzwords with little relevance inside
The Staying Power of the Burmese Military regime
224
Burma, where the military talks to no one but itself. A Rangoon-based
Western diplomat once put it to me quite bluntly: “They fear that if they
don’t hang together, they’ll hang separately.”
The fear of retribution is so strong that when, after the 1990 general
election – which the National League for Democracy (NLD) won with
a landslide – Kyi Maung, the acting head of the party, said in an inter-
view with the now defunct Hong Kong magazine Asiaweek that, “Here
in Burma we do not need any Nuremberg trials,” he was promptly ar-
rested.1 The very mention of Nuremberg scared the generals.
The fact that the military remains in power reflects the failure of
both the “softer” approach of Burma’s neighbours and partners in the
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) – and economic and
political pressures from the West, which include trade sanctions and
travel bans to Europe for the ruling generals and their associates.
A younger generation of army officers, who see the need to negotiate
with the pro-democracy movement, is probably the only hope. For now,
however, no one is aware of any “young Turks” lurking in the wings. If
change is going to come to Burma, however, it will be because of action
taken by such younger army officers rather than the demonstrations of
monks or students. Such protests can, at the most, influence sections
of the army to realize that there is no future in supporting the present
regime. Still, only time will tell if this is going to happen.
Burma’s Military Intelligence Apparatus:
The Main Pillar of the State
The rise of military power in Burma began shortly after independence
from Britain on 4 January 1948. Communist as well as ethnic rebel
armies rose in rebellion against Rangoon, and, in the northeast, rem-
nants of Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalist Chinese forces retreated across
the border after being defeated by Mao Zedong’s communists. At inde-
pendence, the Burmese army was only 15,000 strong, plus militias. But
by 1955, because of the civil war, the ranks of the army had increased to
40,000, and it was already involved in businesses such as shipping, ban-
king and publishing. When the emerging state-within-a-state gobbled
up the state in 1962, there were 104,200 men in all three services. These
numbers rose to 140,000 in 1976, 160,000 in 1985, and, at the time of
the 1988 uprising, 180,000 in the army and nearly 200,000 in all three
services.
Today, the strength of the three services is estimated at 400,000, and
they are much better equipped than at any time in modern Burma’s
225
 history, mainly due to massive procurement of arms from China, and,
more recently, North Korea. The latest expansion comes at a time when
the ruling military has managed to strike cease-fire agreements with
most of the country’s rebel groups, so, during the past decade, there has
been very little fighting in Burma’s traditionally volatile frontier areas.
The enemy now is the population at large.
The rise of the Burmese army as a political and economic force be-
gan under Gen. Ne Win, Commander-in-Chief from 1949 to 1972, and
mastermind behind the 1962 coup. He resigned as president in 1981,
but remained chairman of the BSPP until 1988. He died in 2002, and
left behind a legacy of repression and dictatorial rule, which the Bur-
mese military has been unable – and unwilling – to relinquish.
Ne Win also built up one of Asia’s most ruthless as well as efficient
secret police forces, the Military Intelligence Service (MIS), which was
known throughout Burma down to the lowliest non-English speaking
peasant as “MI” (em-eye). Even if executions of political opponents was
the exception rather than the rule, anyone suspected of having contacts
with opponents of the regime was likely to be arrested and tortured
while in jail. The MIS also had its own prison and torture centre, the
infamous Yay Kyi Aing (“Clearwater Pond”) near Rangoon’s Mingala-
don airport.
The MIS kept a watchful eye not only on the country’s ordinary citi-
zens, but especially on army officers with liberal ideas – which apart
from rotations, corruption and institutionalized brutality contributed
to the remarkable cohesiveness of Burma’s armed forces – and on the
many politicized Burmese exiles living in Britain, West Germany, Thai-
land, Australia and the USA. Among the Burmese community abroad,
no one was ever sure who was an informer or not; for many years, mu-
tual suspicion neutralized them as a political force.
The origin of MIS and its methods can be traced back to the Japanese
occupation of Burma 1942–45. Before the Japanese invasion in 1942,
Japan trained, armed and equipped Aung San Suu Kyi’s father Aung
San’s legendary “Thirty Comrades,” who became the core of the Burma
Independence Army and of whom Ne Win also a member. Burma was
granted nominal independence in 1942. But, as Seekins emphasize, be-
cause of Tokyo’s policy self-sufficiency in its occupied Asian territories,
the large numbers of Japanese soldiers in Burma – 300,000 – essentially
lived off the land. The Japanese secret police, the Kempetai, conducted
a reign of terror, which was so harsh that even the head of the pro-Japa-
nese puppet government, Dr. Ba Maw, had to intercede with the highest
military commanders to curb the worst excesses. In the end, Aung San
The Staying Power of the Burmese Military regime
226
and his Burmese nationalists turned against the Japanese, and allied
themselves with Britain, the former colonial power, on 27 March 1945
– a date that is still celebrated officially as Armed Forces Day.
Donald Seekins, a professor of Southeast Asian Studies ay Meio Uni-
versity in Okinawa, argues that Japan behind a number of other, more
unsavory legacies, including brutal counter-insurgency tactics: “There
are more than superficial resemblances between the Tatmadaw’s [the
Burmese military] ‘Four Cuts’ policy against ethnic minority rebels
(to…deprive rebels of recruits, funding, supplies and information) and
the Japanese army’s sanko seisaku or ‘three all’ policy in China (‘kill all;
burn all; destroy all’).”2
It is no coincidence that Ne Win – the architect of the Four Cuts pol-
icy – was trained by the Kempetai and other sections of Japan’s security
forces, as were many of the ministers who later served in his post 1962
BSPP governments. Among them were Maung Maung Kha, Burma’s
prime minister from 1877–1988, and Dr. Maung Maung, president for
a few weeks in 1988.
Lt. Col. James McAndrew states in his study of Burma’s military in-
telligence apparatus: “Chosen for both ‘guerrilla tactics and clandestine
activities’ ad ‘special’ leadership training was the future dictator and
longtime strongman, Ne Win. Significantly, this cirriculum included
intelligence training provided by Kempetai, the brutal Japanese Military
Police and counterintelligence organization. Being selected for training
by the Kempetai is more than noteworthy in hindsight, and it must be
viewed as an important early demonstration to Ne Win that maintain-
ing coercive intelligence and counterintelligence organizations were
essential to maintaining authoritarian rule.”3
Ne Win’s intelligence chief for many years was his devoted subor-
dinate Brig.-Gen. Tin U – not to be confused with NLD Chairman Tin
U, a retired general and former army chief. “MI” Tin U was trained by
the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) on the Pacific island of Saipan in
the 1950s and, by 1961, he had become Ne Win’s aide-de camp and was
almost regarded as Ne Win’s adopted son. At the time, Rodney Tasker
characterized Tin U in the Far Eastern Economic Review: “He and his
MIS colleagues were men of the world compared with other more short-
sighted, dogmatic figures in the Burmese leadership. They were able to
travel abroad, talk freely to foreigners and generally look beyond the rigid
confines of the corrupt regime…although known to be ruthless, he built
up a reputation as a gregarious, open-minded, charismatic figure – a di-
rect contrast to some of his mole-like colleagues in the leadership.”4
But then, in May 1983, the Burmese government suddenly, and to-
227
 tally unexpectedly, announced that Tin U had been “permitted to resign”
along with the Home and Religious Affairs minister and also a former
intelligence chief, Col. Bo Ni. They had been purged ostensibly because
their wives were corrupt – a charge that could be brought against any
army officer in Burma. Tin U and Bo NI were subsequently jailed – and
the entire MIS apparatus purged as well.
The reason behind the move, however, remained a matter for con-
jecture. It was suggested at the time that the urbane MIS people had
become too powerful for comfort and almost managed to establish
another state-within-a-state – which threatened Ne Win’s inner circle of
hand-picked, less-than-intelligent yes-men.
Whatever the reason behind the purge, it had immediate effects on
the security situation in the country. On 9 October 1983, 21 people,
including four visiting South Korean cabinet ministers, were killed in
a powerful explosion in Rangoon. Three North Korean military officers
were behind the atrocity. One of them was killed in a shoot-out with
Burmese security forces, while the other two were captured alive. One
of the bombers remain in Rangoon’s Insein Jail while the other was
executed in 1985.
Observers at the time believe that the incident would never have
taken place if Tin U had still been in charge; it clearly indicated that the
military intelligence apparatus was no longer what is used to be. A new
intelligence chief, Khin Nyunt, was appointed in 1984. His Directorate
of the Defence Services Intelligence (DDSI) soon became almost as ef-
ficient as the old outfit. Khin Nyunt in many ways also resembled Tin
U; he was fairly young, relatively bright and he could be exceedingly
ruthless whenever this was considered expedient by the old strongman,
Ne Win.
Table: Names used by Burma’s military intelligence:
Name Dates
Military Intelligence Service (MIS) Late 1940s–late 1960s
Directorate of the Defence
Services Intelligence (DDSI) Late-1960s–2001
Office of the Chief of Military
Intelligence (OCMI) 2001–2004
Office of the Chief of Military
Affairs Security (OCMAS) 2004–present
Source: Lt. Col. James McAndrew, op. cit.
The Staying Power of the Burmese Military regime
228
The 1988 Uprising and its Aftermath
Less than four years after Khin Nyunt began rebuilding Burma’s shatte-
red military intelligence apparatus, Burma faced the largest civil unrest
in its history. Across the country, millions of people marched against
the BSPP regime and for a return to the democracy that the country
had enjoyed prior to the 1962 coup. Any regime anywhere would have
collapsed under the pressure of an entire population rising up against
tyranny. Such was not the case with Burma’s military-dominated re-
gime, however. Thousands of people were gunned down in the streets
of Rangoon and elsewhere as the military stepped in, not to overthrow
the government but to shore up a regime overwhelmed with popular
protest.
However, abandonment of the Burmese Way to Socialism was not
the only outcome of the events of August and September 1988; the old
one-party system under the BSPP was abolished, and several opposition
figures were allowed to set up their own political parties. The most pow-
erful of them was the National League for Democracy (NLD), headed by
former army chief Tin U and Aung San Suu Kyi.
At the same time, the DDSI was expanded. Nine new units were
established by 1991, bringing the total to 23. MI also operated 19 deten-
tion centers, seven of them of Rangoon, of which Yay Kyi Aing was the
most notorious. Undercover DDSI agents covered every movement of
the NLD’s leaders and other opponents of the regime. When, in July
1989, the opposition proved to be too strong for comfort for the regime,
the DDSI launched a massive crackdown on all pro-democracy forces.
Aung San Suu Kyi and Tin U were placed under house arrest while
scores of others were detained in Insein Jail, Yay Kyi Aing and other
detention centers.
With almost all prominent pro-democracy leaders in jail or under
house arrest, the junta that had been formed in September 1988, the
State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC), probably thought
it was safe to hold the elections that it had promised after crushing the
demonstrations the year before. On 27 May 1990, elections were held
– and the NLD won a landslide victory, capturing 392 of the seats in
the 485-seat National Assembly. The military-backed National Unity
Party (NUP, formerly the BSPP) managed to secure only 10 seats. The
rest went to various ethnically-based pro-democracy parties, which
were loosely allied with the NLD but still wanted to emphasize their
ethnic identities, such as the Shan Nationalities League for Democracy
(SNLD).
The popularly assembly was never convened, however. Instead, a
229
 700-strong Constituent Assembly – of whom only about 100 had been
elected in 1990 and the rest hand-picked by the military authorities
– was formed to draft a new constitution for the country.
This was a complete reversal of the promises the SLORC had made
before the election. On 31 May 1989 – a year before the election – the
SLORC had even promulgated a “Pyithu Hluttaw Election law”, which
was published in the state-run newspaper the Working People’s Daily
on 1 June. A Pyithu Hluttaw in Burmese is a “people’s assembly,” i.e. a
parliament. According to the 1974 Constitution, “The Pyithu Hluttaw
is the highest Organ of state power. It exercises the sovereign powers of
the State on behalf of the people.” The Pyithu Hluttaw that was elected
in 1990 had the same number of seats as the one that was abolished in
1988. The only difference was that several political parties, not only one
as before, could contest those seats.
Drafting a constitution was not a major issue before the election,
even if SLORC’s then chairman, Gen. Saw Maung, on a couple of occa-
sions had mentioned the need for a new charter. But he had also said:
“We have spoken on the matter of State power. As soon as the election is
held, form a government according to law and then take power. An elec-
tion has to be held to bring forth a government. That is our responsibil-
ity. But the actual work of forming a legal government after the election
is not the duty of the Tatmadaw [the armed forces]. We are saying it very
clearly and candidly right now.”5
He had also lashed out against the pro-democracy movement for
raising the issue of a constitution before the people went to the polls.
In a speech on 10 May – two weeks prior to the election – he stated: “A
dignitary who once was an Attorney-General talked about the impor-
tance of the constitution. As our current aim is to hold the election as
scheduled we cannot as yet concern ourselves with the constitution as
mentioned by that person. Furthermore, it is not our concern. A new
constitution can be drafted. An old constitution can also be used after
some amendments.”6
“That person” was former Attorney-General U Hla Aung, who was
close to the NLD and, at the time, researching constitutional issues for
the pro-democracy movement. I met him in Rangoon in May 1989,
and he was quite dismayed at the reluctance of the military to discuss
the constitution. I also met Col. Ye Htut of the SLORC’s information
committee, who told me that “as soon as the elections are over, we will
return to the barracks.” When I asked him what the military would do
if the NLD won, and he replied: “Then we will hand over power to them
and return to the barracks.”
The problem, of course, was that they had not expected the NLD to
The Staying Power of the Burmese Military regime
230
win, so the rules had to be changed. That a constituent assembly, not a
parliament, had been elected was first stated by then intelligence chief
Khin Nyunt in a speech on 27 July, 1989 – two months after the election.
A constituent assembly in Burmese is not a Pyithu Hluttaw but a thaing
pyi pyu hluttaw, as in the Myanma naing-ngan thaing pyi pyu hluttaw,
which drafted Burma’s first, 1947, constitution. That term was never
used before the May 1990 election.
In the end, the elected assembly turned out to be not even a thaing
pyi pyu hluttaw. About 100 of the 485 MPs elect were to sit in a “Nation-
al Convention” together with 600 other, non-elected representatives who
had been hand-picked by the military. No Burmese citizen expected that
to happen when they went to the polls in May 1990.
Today, 18 years after the election, Aung San Suu Kyi and Tin U re-
main under house arrest, and nearly the entire, original leadership of
the NLD is either dead, in prison or have simply given up all political
activity. Most young NLD activists have been imprisoned, cowed into
submission, or have fled the country. Only a handful of elderly spokes-
persons remain, and none of them have the strength and charisma to
carry the party forward. That serves the interests of the junta, since the
“new-look” NLD would appear to the outside world not to be a viable
alternative.
The Rise of the Union Solidarity
Development Association, USDA
With Suu Kyi under house arrest, and the NLD reduced to a gathering of
geriatrics, it appears that the organized struggle for democracy has been
effectively strangled. Meanwhile, Than Shwe and the State Peace and
Development Council (the new name of the junta since November 1997)
continued to strengthen their new mass organization and main pillar of
support, the Union Solidarity and Development Association, the USDA
Apart from its “Three National Causes” – “the non-disintegration of
the Union, non-disintegration of national solidarity and perpetuation of
sovereignty” – the USDA has also articulated in its own inimitable phra-
seology a “Four-Point People’s Desire: “oppose those relying on external
elements, acting as stooges or holding negative views; oppose those try-
ing to jeopardize the stability of the State and progress of the nation; op-
pose foreign nations interfering in internal affairs of the State; and crush
all internal and external destructive elements as the common enemy.”7
The USDA became the vehicle for the SPDC’s recreation of civil soci-
ety while suppressing all other alternative possibilities, especially in areas
231
 inhabited by ethnic minorities. It established offices at national, district,
township and about one in four ward or village levels.8 By 1997, the USDA
claimed to have 7.51 million members, which rose to 10 million in 1998,
and 22.8 million in 2005, or nearly half the population of Burma.9 Now,
its mass rallies are attended by up to 100,000 people, all proclaiming their
allegiance to the new “State of Myanmar,” and the National Convention
which is supposed to draw up the country’s new constitution.
In recent years, the USDA has also assumed a paramilitary role in
society. Official media has described it as “a reserve force for national
defense,” which has trained “2,395 new generation air youths and 2,614
new generation naval youths.”10 And Than Shwe himself, the senior
patron of the USDA, had stressed already in 1996 at an “Executive Ad-
vanced Management Course” organized by the USDA:
The trainees constitute not only the hard core force of the USDA,
but also the sole national force which will always join hands with
the tatmadaw [armed forces] to serve national and public interests.
Hence…they should be morally and physically strong with sharp
national defence qualities. Therefore…the trainees will be taught
military parade, military tactics, and the use of weapons.11
Basic military training has become part of the USDA’s policy of mass
mobilization, and it has also formed its own militia forces, especially in
ethnic minority areas. These have taken on names such as “the Anti-
Foreign Invasion Force,” “the State Defense Force,” and “the People’s
Strength Organization.” As early as 1997, army chief and deputy SPDC
chairman, Gen. Maung Aye, referred to the USDA as an “auxiliary
national defense force,” thus acknowledging its security role in the
country.12
With the sacking of intelligence chief Khin Nyunt in 2004 (see be-
low) and purging of all his associates, the USDA has also assumed an
intelligence function. According to a report on the USDA compiled by
the Thailand-based Network for Democracy and Development:
The SPDC has met with USDA central executive committee
members and other loyal members to train them as intelligence
officers, forming intelligence teams in each township. One intel-
ligence team in Mon State adopted responsibilities which included
watching the NLD as well as other members of the opposition. All
information collected was expected to be reported directly to the
USDA general headquarters.13
The same report stated that, in December 2005, a USDA meeting was
held in which members were instructed to “watch all army and police
The Staying Power of the Burmese Military regime
232
forces including staffs from various departments within the township”
and report to the headquarters.14 In other words, USDA members are
being used not only to watch the opposition, but to monitor the actions
of the regime’s other institutions.
Consequently, according to Dutch Burma expert Gustaaf Houtman,
a culture of violence and intimidation has come to surround this new,
mighty mass organization, which is “designed in particular to frighten
and deter NLD members, their supporters and residents in their neigh-
borhood. With an active USDA the regime hopes that NLD political
activity will be curtailed, once NLD visitors or NLD elements are known
to automatically attract USDA ‘volunteers’ intent on wreaking havoc to
disrupt proceedings.”15
While Suu Kyi was still able to give interviews to foreign reporters,
she told American journalists Leslie Kean and Dennis Bernstein:
The USDA is increasingly becoming a branch of the local au-
thorities. On Burmese New Year’s Day [1997] the USDA people
were sent over to my house to physically break up the NLD…a
fish-releasing ceremony. In another incident, members of the
USDA, most of them students, were instructed to throw toma-
toes at me at the anniversary of the death of Burma’s first demo-
cratic prime minister [U Nu]…Sadly many students are mem-
bers of the USDA because they’re forced to be, partly through
threats. In some schools, they are threatened that if they don’t
become a member of the USDA, they willnot be allowed to take
their examination, or they will not be given good grades. I re-
ceived a letter from a teacher who said that in her school those
who want to go to their classes reserved for the best students
have become members of the USDA, so students must join for
their own survival.16
And, Suu Kyi warned, the USDA was not to be dismissed as just an-
other farcical invention by the junta:
The world community must realize that the USDA is not an in-
nocent social-welfare organization, as it claims to be, but an or-
ganization being used by the authorities as a gang of thugs. Their
operations resemble those of the Nazi Brown Shirts. The [ junta]
sent people from a so-called welfare organization to beat up people
taking part in a non-violent, religious ceremony. I must say that
that amounts to something very, very close to what the Brown
Shirts used to do in Germany.17
Suu Kyi herself became the target of USDA violence in Depayin in
233
 May 2003, which also led to a renewed spell of house arrest. But given
the coercion involved in recruiting members for the USDA, it is ques-
tionable whether its foundations are any stronger than the erstwhile
BSPP. The difference is that the USDA, unlike the BSPP, is not the
only legally permitted political organization in the country. One of the
stated objectives of the USDA, which was outlined in a secret docu-
ment in 2004, is “narrowing and eliminating the activities of opposi-
tion forces…[and to] diminish and ruin the opposition parties’ capacity
economically.”18
Unlike the BSPP, the USDA has also carved out a role for itself in
the Burmese economy, enabling the SPDC to control and manipulate
the new, ostensibly free-market oriented economy that was introduced
after the upheavals of 1988. The USDA’s main business front is the
Myangonmyint Company, and it also controls the local gem market
and the military-run investment firm Myanmar Economic Holdings. In
1995, the USDA obtained control over the Panlong Yadana and Thein-
gyi markets in Rangoon, and it runs bus and train lines and car rental
services, it collects taxes and is involved in housing and real estate, fish-
ing, paddy cultivation, rice milling, transportation of cement and con-
struction materials, supply of water, and it imports cars, motorcycles
and spare parts into the country free of tariffs.19
Furthermore, the USDA has reached out to parties and organiza-
tions in other parts of Asia, claiming to represent “the people of Myan-
mar.” In 2000, the Communist Party of China – China being a close
ally of the SPDC – invited Gen. Win Myint to Beijing not in his role as
one of the top generals in the junta, but in his capacity as USDA vice
president. Four years later, the Chinese communists invited 84 political
parties, including the USDA, from thirty-five countries to the “Third All
Asian Parties Forum” held in Beijing. Members of the USDA have par-
ticipated in an International Youth Development Exchange Program in
Tokyo, and in January 2006 representatives of the organization attended
the Third Asia Pacific Regional Cuba Solidarity Conference in India.
And when Malaysian foreign minister Syed Hamid Albar visited Burma
in March 2006 as an envoy for the Association of Southeast Asian Na-
tions, Asean, he met with officials from the USDA, but not with anyone
from the NLD or other opposition parties.20
In Burma today, it is almost impossible for any citizen to survive and
prosper without being a member of the USDA. But the SPDC’s and
USDA’s emphasis is given to the youth in “what it may regard as a long-
term approach to ensuring its continuing role into the next generation,”
to quote US Burma expert David Steinberg, who also stresses that the
USDA will remain important “only insofar as the military have an active
The Staying Power of the Burmese Military regime
234
role in governance. After all, the youth movements of the BSPP were
ephemeral as well.”21
Asia Times Online commented in June 2006:
The reality is that the popularity of Suu Kyi – and the National
League for Democracy she founded – still widely outpaces the
ruling junta’s, whose illegitimate rule has run the economy into
the ground and placed the country’s democratic hopes behind
bars. Across the country, Suu Kyi is affectionately referred to
simply as “the Lady.”22
But the military, supported by the USDA, is likely to remain in power
for the foreseeable future, and there is precious little Suu Kyi, despite
her popularity, can do about it from her home on Rangoon’s University
Avenue, cut off as she is from her supporters and isolated from the rest
of the world. But she has nevertheless remained a symbol of defiance
and moral strength, and as such attracted sympathy and support not
only inside Burma but from all over the world.
Burma after the Fall of General Khin Nyunt
27 March, Burma’s Armed Forces Day, is meant to commemorate the day
in 1945 when the Burmese nationalists, led by Aung San, shifted sides,
joined the Allied powers and took up arms against their former patron
and benefactor, the Imperial Japanese Army. It used to be a day when
army units marched down the streets of Rangoon chanting martial ant-
hems and being garlanded by crowds of cheering well-wishers. After the
1988 massacres, however, military parades were held in secluded areas,
away from a now potentially outraged public, but still in Rangoon.
Then came Armed Forces Day 2006, and it was celebrated in an
entirely different manner. Forgotten was the anti-fascist struggle in the
past – and, even more importantly, the 61st Armed Forces Day was held
at a vast, new parade ground in the new capital Naypyidaw near the old
town of Pyinmana, which it is gradually absorbing. Only foreign de-
fense attachés, not civilian diplomats, were invited, and they witnessed
an amazing spectacle in the new “Capital of a King” – King Than Shwe,
the leader of the ruling State Law and Development Council, SPDC,
and Burma’s new undisputed strongman following a series of unex-
pected purges in late 2004. The military intelligence chief at the time,
Khin Nyunt, who was also prime minister, was ousted and arrested,
along with up to 3,500 intelligence personnel countrywide, including
some 300 senior officers.23
235
 Khin Nyunt’s fall from grace followed the death of his mentor, Gen.
Ne Win, in December 2002. The old general had been placed under
house arrest earlier that year, allegedly because of the corrupt behavior
of his daughter, Sanda Win, her husband Aye Zaw Win — and the cou-
ple’s three unruly grandsons, who had terrorized private businessmen
in Rangoon with demands for bribes and “protection money.” But few
doubted that the move against Ne Win and his family came as prepara-
tion for the post-Ne Win era; to make sure that Khin Nyunt’s influence
would be limited. The dictator, who had ruled with an iron fist for sev-
eral decades, was cremated near his home in Rangoon. The funeral was
attended by a handful of family members and about 20 plainclothes
military officers, none especially high-ranking.
Khin Nyunt’s ouster was not, as some reports in the foreign media
at the time suggested, a power struggle between the “pragmatic” intel-
ligence chief and “hardliners” around Gen. Than Shwe and his deputy,
Gen. Maung Aye. According to the press reports, Khin Nyunt favored
a dialogue with long detained Suu Kyi and those opposed to it. Khin
Nyunt had, after all, met her when she was under house arrest. Khin
Nyunt may also have been smoother in his dealings with foreigners, but
his dreaded military intelligence service, the DDSI, was the junta’s pri-
mary instrument of repression against Suu Kyi’s pro-democracy move-
ment. During the August-September 1988 uprising, he had carried out
Ne Win’s orders, cracked down on the protesters, and had student activ-
ists imprisoned, tortured and even killed.
A more plausible explanation for the purge was that Khin Nyunt and
his DDSI had accumulated significant wealth through involvement in
a wide range of commercial enterprises. They were building up a state
within a state — like the old “MI” Tin U had done in the 1970s — and
not sharing their riches with the rest of the military elite. And Than
Shwe did not want to have any potential rivals around him; Khin Nyunt
clearly had political ambitions. He was a man not to be trusted.
Immediately following the ousting of Khin Nyunt, his latest intel-
ligence outfit, the Office of the Chief of Military Intelligence (OCMI),
was dissolved and an entirely new organization established: the Office
of the Chief of Military Affairs Security (OCMAS), which was placed
under more direct military control. Details of the new military intelli-
gence apparatus remain sketchy, but it is not believed to be as efficient
as its predecessors. Some observers even argue that the regime’s in-
ability to prevent the emergence of a massive anti-regime movement in
September 2007 would not have been possible, if Khin Nyunt and his
men had remained in charge of security.
Bu that as it may, but Burmese military politics has always been
The Staying Power of the Burmese Military regime
236
murky, full of infighting and rivalries. As soon as one particular officer
has become too rich and powerful, he is ousted. The only exceptions
are Ne Win, who ruled from 1962 to 1988, and the present junta leader,
Than Shwe, who has made himself almost the monarch of the coun-
try.
And Than Shwe’s path forward – and, indeed, his vision for his coun-
try – became clear on 27 March 2006 in Naypyidaw. Addressing a crowd
of 12,000 soldiers, he said: “Our Tatmadaw [armed forces] should be a
worthy heir to the traditions of the capable tatmadaws established by
noble kings Anawratha, Bayinnaung and Alaungpaya.”24 None of them
had fought the Imperial Japanese Army, but Anawratha had in 1044 AD
founded the First Burmese Empire and established a new capital at the
temple city of Pagan on the banks of the Irrawaddy River, southwest of
today’s Mandalay. He conquered Thaton, the capital of the Mon – major
rivals of the Burmans for control of the central plains – and expanded
his empire down to the Andaman Sea.
Bayinnaung was Burma’s most celebrated warrior king. He reigned
from 1551 to 1581 and conquered territories north of Pagan, parts of the
Shan plateau in the east, and pushed as far east as Chiang Mai in today’s
northern Thailand and Vientiane in Laos. He was the most prominent
ruler of the Second Burmese Empire and ruled from Pegu in the central
plains.
Alaungpaya reigned in the 18th century and was the first king of
the Konbaung Dynasty, or the third and last of the Burmese Empires.
Alaungpaya also fought the Mon, and his successor, Hsinbyushin,
sacked the Thai capital of Ayutthaya in 1767, a deed for which the
Thais have never forgiven the Burmese. But the Konbaung kings were
defeated by the British in the three Anglo-Burmese wars of 1824-1826,
and 1885, and the country became a British colony. In 1885, Thibaw, the
last king of Burma, was led away by the British in front of a mourning
and wailing crowd who had come to take farewell of the last monarch
of an independent Burmese state. He was sent, with his once-power-
ful wife, Supayalat, and their children into exile in Ratanagiri in India,
where he died in 1916.
On the Naypyidaw parade ground stand newly erected larger-than-
life statues of the three warrior kings, whom Than Shwe sees as his role
models – and he has also formed not only a new capital but a new Bur-
mese state, the State of Myanmar, a unitary state which is fundamen-
tally different in nature from Aung San’s concept of “unity in diversity”,
federalism and some kind of parliamentary democracy. In “Myanmar”
everybody is a “Myanmar”, and subjects of the new King in Nay Pyi
Daw. There are no portraits of Aung San in Naypyidaw.
237
 Some have argued that moving the country’s capital was nothing
unusual in an international context. Many countries have established
purpose-built capitals away from major population centers, like Aus-
tralia did when its government moved to the new city of Canberra in
1927 – halfway between Sydney and Melbourne – or when, in the 1960s,
Brazil built Brasilia, a new futuristic capital in the middle of the jungle
far away from Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo. In more recent times, 1999,
Nigeria moved its capital to Abuja, a minor central town, from Lagos.
In 1983, the small village of Yamoussoukro in central Ivory Coast was
made the new capital, replacing Abidjan, one of West Africa’s most bus-
tling cities and commercial centers. Yamoussoukro had been chosen
for only one reason: it was the home village of Félix Houphouët-Boigny,
the then dictator of the Ivory Coast. Millions of dollars were spent on
transforming Yamoussoukro into a new city, but it soon became the
butt of jokes.
But Naypyidaw is no joke, nor is it comparable to Canberra or
Brasilia. The construction of Burma’s new capital was carried out in
secret, and government officials were given only very short notice that
they had to move. In November 2005, the Thailand-based Irrawad-
day magazine reported: “Diplomats, UN agencies and observers in
Rangoon were dumb-founded to see hundreds of Chinese-made army
trucks carrying officials, civilians and office supplies head north out of
the capital. Neighboring countries, Rangoon’s diplomatic community
and UN offices wanted to know how they were going to keep in touch
with Burma’s new centre of government. ‘Don’t worry,’ they were told.
‘You can reach us by fax’.”25
According to one eyewitness:
The area around Naypyidaw was depopulated in order to seal the
huge compound off from the outside world. Entire villages disap-
peared from the map, their inhabitants driven off land their fami-
lies had farmed for centuries. Hundreds – perhaps thousands
– joined Burma’s abused army of “internally displaced persons.”
Able-bodied villagers, however, were “enlisted” to help build the
new capital.26
Apart from the parade ground with statues of the Three Kings,
Naypyidaw, now has a brand-new airstrip, a hospital, hotels – some
reputedly 5-star-ones – military mansions and a new command centre,
government offices, and bunkers. Trucks that carried bricks, timber and
cement to Naypyidaw bore the logos of Burma’s biggest construction
companies, Htoo Trading and Asia World.27 But in May 2006, intel-
ligence agencies in Thailand intercepted a message from Naypyidaw
The Staying Power of the Burmese Military regime
238
confirming the arrival of a group of North Korean tunneling experts at
the site. Nawpyidaw is at the foothills of Burma’s eastern mountains,
and it was becoming clear that the most sensitive military installations
in the new capital would be relocated underground.28
The junta’s apparent fear of a preemptive US invasion by sea or
air strikes was seen by some at the time as a major motivation for the
junta’s decision to move the capital to what they perceived to be a safer,
central mountainous location away from the coast. After all, the US gov-
ernment had publicly linked Burma together with other rogue regimes
and referred to it as an “outpost of tyranny.”29
The Irrawaddy gave a more plausible explanation. The Burmese
generals are less worried about a US invasion than they are an attack by
their own people: “Rangoon has never been a safe place for the paranoid
generals. In 1989, when opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi mobilized
the people in the streets again, the regime declared Rangoon a war zone
and assigned army officers and soldiers to deal with demonstrators.”30
Demonstrations, or any form of protest, are much less likely to take
place in heavily-fortified and secluded Naypyidaw, which also remains
off-limits to most outsiders. It represented a safe place from where the
country could be ruled without interference from “internal and external
destructive elements,” which is what the junta calls its domestic and
foreign critics and opponents.
Military research centers, a new airport as well as luxury private
mansions for army officers, and especially family members who do not
want to live in dreary Naypyidaw, have also been built in Pyin Oo Lwin,
more commonly known as Maymyo, a former British hill station east of
Mandalay, where the air is fresher than and the scenery greener than in
the dusty, grey central plains around Pyinmana.
At Naypyidaw, Than Shwe has founded his own royal city and found-
ed the Fourth Burmese Empire in the spirit of Anawratha, Bayinnaung
and Alaungpaya. This is a far cry from the promises the junta gave
when it assumed power on September 18, 1988: “The Defense Forces
have no desire to hold on to power for a prolonged period.”31 Elections
would be held and power handed over to the party that would win those
elections. As “proof” of the temporary nature, the junta appointed only
a small, nine-member caretaker cabinet.
Nearly twenty years later, the military is not only in power, but Than
Shwe and his generals have reinvented the notion of what kind of state
Burma is, or should be. And in this new State, there is no place for
Aung San Suu Kyi or the National League for Democracy, the NLD.
They belong to Rangoon and the past; Than Shwe, the military — and
Naypyidaw — symbolize for them the future of the New Royal State
239
 of Myanmar. The Armed Forces Day celebrations in 2006 were the
ultimate proof of the military’s desire to rule the country the way they
believe is right, and to decide the destiny of its people.
The creation of a new national concept for Burma began when, on
27 May 1989, the official name of the country was changed to “Myan-
mar.” “Burma”, for reasons which are historically absolutely incorrect,
was termed a “colonial name,” and therefore had to be abandoned. But
historical accuracy was not an issue for the generals. A Cultural Revolu-
tion had begun, and a military-appointed commission was appointed to
rewrite Burmese history to suit the new power-holders.
It was not only the country that was given a new, official name
(although it has always been myanma naingngan or bama pyi in Bur-
mese) and Rangoon became “Yangon”; even more offensive were name
changes in the ethnic minority areas, especially in Shan State. Pang
Tara, Kengtung, Lai-Hka, Hsenwi and Hsipaw – place names that have
a meaning in Shan – have been renamed Pindaya, Kyaington, Laycha,
Theinli and Thibaw, which sound Burmese but have no meaning in any
language.32
Houtman calls this development the “Myanmafication of Burma,”
which he describes as a move away from the original idea of a federa-
tion – agreed by Aung San and the leaders of the ethnic minorities at
the Panglong conference in February 1947 – to the new “Myanmar”
identity propagated by the junta.33
Whither Burma?
Given the odds she is up against, there is precious little pro-democracy
leader Suu Kyi can do during her occasional meetings with UN officials
– her only appearance outside her compound in Rangoon – other than
merely to appeal to the international community to put pressure on the
SPDC to be less repressive. Thus far, this has clearly not helped much
either.
A host of UN envoys have visited Burma over the past two decades.
The first “independent expert” the UN sent to the country to “study”
violations of human rights was Sadako Ogata, a Japanese professor who
later went on to become the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees. The report she submitted to the UN’s Commission of Hu-
man Rights on 27 December 1990 was unusually bland. General elec-
tions had been held in May, resulting in a landslide victory for Aung San
Suu Kyi’s party, the National League for Democracy (NLD), and Ogata
concluded in her report that “it is not in dispute that it will be the task of
the elected representatives of the Pyithu Hluttaw (National Assembly)
The Staying Power of the Burmese Military regime
240
to draft a new constitution, on the basis of which a new government
will be formed. At present, however…it is not clear when the Hluttaw
will be convened for that purpose.” The Hluttaw was, of course, never
convened.
Then, in 1992, the UN appointed another Japanese academic, Yozo
Yokota “special rapporteur on the situation of human rights” in Burma
– a step higher than an “independent expert.” He compiled some critical
reports, but resigned in 1996, according to a statement by a UN spokes-
man at the time, “because of planned career changes in Tokyo” as well
as “frustration at the lack of logistical support from human rights staff
in Geneva”, where the Human Rights Commission is based. His suc-
cessor Rajsoomer Lallah, a former chief justice of Mauritius, was not
even allowed by the Burmese government to visit the country during
the four years as he served as special human rights rapporteur. Accord-
ing to Jose Diaz, then spokesman for the UN Commission for Human
Rights, Lallah had “expressed frustration…with the little change that he
has seen in the country he follows.”
Lallah was succeeded by Paulo Pinheiro, a Brazilian law expert,
who, in the beginning was quite upbeat about his work. He believed he
was free to talk to political prisoners without interference from the au-
thorities, but his rather positive reports were severely criticized by NLD
spokesman U Lwin. However, Pinheiro changed his tune completely
– when, in March 2003, he discovered a microphone beneath the table
at which he was interviewing a prisoner in Yangon’s infamous Insein
Jail. He immediately left the country in disgust, and was not allowed
back until now. In the meantime, he has become a vocal critic of the
Burmese regime.
Then there were the special envoys, sent not by the UN:s Human
Rights Commission but by the Secretary General. Peruvian diplomat
Alvar De Soto made six fruitless visits to Burma between February 1995
and October 1999. He was succeeded in 2000 by Razali Ismail, a Malay-
sian diplomat, who also began his mission by believing that he could
persuade the Burmese generals to be more cooperative with the opposi-
tion inside the country and the international community. In November
2001, Razali said he was “hopeful that some significant progress could
be made in the near future”. The following year, he was instrumental
in securing the release from house arrest of Aung San Suu Kyi, which
prompted him to say: “I am delighted for her and the country…we have
to give them time. Don’t expect things to happen immediately. I think
there is a commitment on the part of the military to make the transi-
tion” (to civilian rule).34
But nothing did change, and, in May 2003, Aung San Suu Kyi was
241
 locked up again after government thugs had attacked her and her en-
tourage at Depayin, when she was nearly killed and put back under
house arrest.
Razali quit his post in January 2006 after being refused entry to
Burma for nearly two years. By then, it had also become clear that his
mission to Burma had not been entirely altruistic. Apart from being a
Malaysian government civil servant, he is also in private business as
the chairman and thirty percent stockowner of IRIS Technologies, a
company that, during one of his visits, managed to secure a contract
with the Burmese government for high-tech passports with biometric
features. A conflict of interest? Not according to the UN, which came to
his rescue by saying that his kind of part-time contract with the world
organization did not “carry any restrictions on business activities.”
Because of the lack of transparency and accountability, and the ab-
sence of any investigative and critical media, Burma provides, in fact,
plenty of opportunities for corruption and private business deals even
for some UN officials and diplomats who are based there, such as the
smuggling of antiques in diplomatic and UN bags, and the sale of duty
free goods on the black market.
Razali’s successor as special envoy, the Nigerian diplomat Ibrahim
Gambari, seems to continue the tradition of upbeat UN officials who, in
the end, achieve nothing of any importance for the people of Myanmar.
Kyaw Zwa Moe, a Burmese writer with the Chiang Mai-based publica-
tion Irrawaddy, wrote in a recent article that Burma “now is a diplomatic
graveyard.” When the smoke has cleared, it is always business as usual
in Burma – and yet another UN envoy or rapporteur may come, full of
optimism at first, then frustrated at the lack of progress. At any rate,
they can become richer because of striking lucrative business deals.
Gambari should be held under even closer scrutiny than his pre-
decessors in the UN system. He has a long record of cooperating with
various military dictatorships in Nigeria, and, speaking to the UN on
4 December 1995, he defended the execution of Ken Saro-Wiva, a re-
nowned Nigerian author, television producer, and environmentalist
who had been hanged on 10 November along with eight other leaders
of the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP). The
NGO had been leading a non-violent campaign against environmental
damage associated with the operations of several multinational oil com-
panies. According to Gambari, Ken Saro-Wiva had been executed in “ac-
cordance with the law” and further stated that “the law and the violation
of human rights must be differentiated.” 35
The other approach, the policy of “constructive engagement” pur-
sued by Burma’s partners in the Association of Southeast Asian Na-
The Staying Power of the Burmese Military regime
242
tions, or Asean, has proven equally fruitless. Burma was admitted into
Asean in July 1997, but has snubbed its partners by going back on
promises of political reforms, and, in the process, become a burden for
the bloc and an obstacle in its relations with the United States and the
European Union.
Change would have to come from within the only institution that
really matters in the country: its armed forces. Min Zaw Oo, a Burmese
researcher, has analysed various possible scenarios, which could lead
to state failure in Burma, and, therefore, political change by voluntary
means, or a UN intervention which would lead to such change.36
According to the first scenario, socio-economic erosions could lead to
another uprising, similar to that of 1988 – or September 2007. “If there
is another uprising in Burma, the most pivotal change will depend
on how the military responds to the crisis.” A popular uprising could
divide the armed forces, but that could also lead to Burma’s breaking
up into different sectors controlled by different factions of the army or,
in plain speak, civil war.
The second of Min Zaw Oo’s scenarios is no uprising but infighting
within the armed forces. The purge of Khin Nyunt and his intelligence
faction in 2004 showed that there are serious divisions even within the
military establishment. Khin Nyunt’s fall from grace did not lead to se-
rious infighting, but rivalry between Than Shwe and his deputy, Gen.
Maung Aye, could well be such a catalyst for change. But it would most
certainly be bloody, and could also lead to civil war. In May 2005, a series
of near-simultaneous explosions rocked shopping centers and super-
markets in Rangoon, wounding more than a dozen people. The authori-
ties were quick to blame the blasts on “Thai-based terrorists,” but these
would hardly have the means to infiltrate the then capital. More likely,
it could have been the work of disgruntled, former MI officers who had
been purged along with Khin Nyunt, or the junta itself, which needed
an excuse to crack down on real or imaginary opponents to its rule.37
Despite rigid military rule and control, Burma is far from a stable coun-
try. Chaos and internecine strife could easily break out any time.
The third scenario is “the emergence of a reformist faction in the
military that decides to cooperate with the civilian opposition to foster
a political transition while the other significant forces resist any change
in the status quo.” But, as Min Zaw Oo also points out, the civilian op-
position does not have adequate capacity to fill the power vacuum that
such a split in the military would produce, and to form, alone, a new
government. And any state failure in Burma would have regional reper-
cussions as its neighbors would be affected by an even bigger flow of
refugees, drugs and weapons than is the case today.
243
 State failure could also encourage the insurgents, who now have
cease-fire agreements with the government, to go their own ways, per-
haps even declare independence from Naypyidaw. A Yugoslavia-style
scenario is not unthinkable, and would also have disastrous conse-
quences for the region. Politicians and statesmen in the region would
rather see Suu Kyi focus on these problems rather than a “revolution
of the spirit,” and mixing politics with Buddhist practices and concepts
such as vipassana and metta, as she has increasingly been doing over
the past decade.
Suu Kyi may be a heroine in the West, but realpolitik dominates
the thinking of Burma’s immediate neighbors. After the 1988 uprising,
India almost openly supported the pro-democracy movement, partly
because of then prime minister Rajiv Gandhi’s old friendship with
Suu Kyi. But as the influence of India’s traditional rivals, China and
Pakistan, grew in Burma – and it was becoming obvious that the pro-
democracy movement was not going to assume power anytime soon
– New Delhi began to improve ties with the junta.
In February 2001, Jaswant Singh, then India’s foreign minister, visit-
ed Burma to discuss avenues for closer cooperation. This was preceded
by two visits to India by SPDC vice chairman Gen. Maung Aye in 2000
and followed by the first-ever visit to Burma by an Indian president. In
March 2006, Abdul Kalam paid a four-day visit to Rangoon and high-
lighted the importance India placed on promoting closer connections
with Burma.
While India had been cultivating ties with the pro-democracy move-
ment, China had become an important ally of the Burmese govern-
ment. This began already when on 6 August 1988 the two countries
signed a bilateral border-trade agreement. By then the days of Mao Ze-
dong’s support to the CPB was well and truly over, and Deng Xiaoping’s
pragmatism was guiding Chinese foreign policy. This agreement was
the first of its kind that hitherto isolated Burma had entered into with
a neighbor. It was especially significant because it was signed at a time
when Burma was in turmoil: two days later, the countrywide uprising
broke out.
But the Chinese, renowned for their ability to plan far ahead, had
expressed their intentions, almost unnoticed, in an article in the official
weekly Beijing Review as early as 2 September 1985. Titled “Opening
to the Southwest: An Expert Opinion,” the article, which was written
by the former vice-minister of communications, Pan Qi, outlined the
possibilities of finding an outlet for trade from China’s landlocked
provinces of Yunnan, Sichuan and Guizhou, through Burma, to the
Indian Ocean. It mentioned the Burmese railheads of Myitkyina and
The Staying Power of the Burmese Military regime
244
Lashio in the north and northeast, and the Irrawaddy River as possible
conduits for the export of goods from those provinces – but omitted that
all relevant border areas, at that time, were not under Burmese central
government control.
All that changed when the rank and file of the insurgent Communist
Party of Burma rose in mutiny in March-April 1989 and drove the old
Maoist leadership into exile in China. The once powerful CPB split up
into four different, regional armies based on ethnic lines. But instead of
continuing to fight, they reached cease-fire agreements with the govern-
ment. Soon, other Chinese-border based insurgents followed suit. The
Sino-Burmese border was open for trade.
By late 1991, Chinese experts were assisting in a series of infrastruc-
ture projects to spruce up Burma’s poorly maintained roads and rail-
ways. Border trade was booming – and China emerged as Burma’s most
important source of military hardware. Additional military equipment
was provided by Pakistan, which also has helped Burma modernize its
defense industries. The total value of Chinese arms deliveries to Burma
is not known, but intelligence sources estimate it to be about US$1.4
billion. Deliveries include fighter, ground attack and transport aircraft,
tanks and armored personnel carriers, naval vessels, a variety of towed
and self-propelled artillery, surface-to-air missiles, trucks and infantry
equipment.
India, feeling that Chinese allies – Pakistan and Burma – were clos-
ing in on it in the west as well as the east, and wary of China’s grow-
ing influence in Burma, dropped its support for the pro-democracy
movement and began to woe the country away from its new backers in
Beijing. Democracy and human rights were not part of the equation.
Consequently, neither China nor India – Burma’s two most powerful
neighbors – would like to see another round of upheavals in Burma.
Dealing with the “devil you know,” the present government, is far easier
than banking on a democratic administration which may or may not
assume power sometime in the future.
In other words, Burma’s future looks bleak. Its neighbors do not
want to rock the status quo at the same time as the military is showing
no signs of being interested in any kind of national reconciliation, or
even talks with the pro-democracy movement. If there indeed is a re-
form-minded faction within the armed forces, as Min Zaw Oo suggests,
it must be keeping an extremely low profile. On the other hand, Suu Kyi
and the NLD have proven unable to bring the democratic movement
any nearer its stated goals. Nor has it tried to reach out to any elements
of the armed forces, or explain its policies to Burma’s neighbors.
But time is running out for Burma. Economically, it is a total wreck,
245
 and it remains socially backwards. Since 1988, universities and colleges
have been closed more than they have been open, and thousands of the
country’s brightest talents have left the country to look for a brighter
future abroad. More than 100,000 people from the Karen, Mon and
Karenni minorities live in squalid refugee camps in Thailand. Drug
abuse is rampant, especially in the border areas, and the HIV epidemic
is out of control, probably more severe than in any Southeast Asian
country.
According to the World Health Organization, WHO, an estimated
one in 29 adults in Burma is living with HIV infections and some
48,000 died from AIDS in the year 2000 alone. Malaria causes even
more deaths, with over 700,000 cases reported in 2004. Dengue fever,
tuberculosis and other diseases are also widespread, and little is done
about it. While the Burmese government is spending most of its budget
on the military, only $22,000 was spent on a national AIDS control pro-
gram in 2004. Burma allocates in total only 3 % of its budget to health
and 8% to education, while the military gets at least 50%.38
Until recently, the largest chunk of disease control came from inter-
national donors – but, in August 2005, the Global Fund to Fight AIDS,
the largest funder in Burma for HIV/AIDS control, withdrew because
of new restrictions laid down by the military government, which made
it impossible for foreign health workers to operate in the country.39
Arguing that Burma’s health crisis and unsettled political situation
pose a threat to regional security, the United States began to push for
bringing the Burma issue before the UN’s Security Council — which
could be a way forward – but met with stiff resistance against such a
move from permanent members China and Russia. Japan, which is not
a permanent member but sits on the Security Council, has also argued
that the UN should not intervene in what is considered “an internal
Burmese affair” with no relevance to regional security. More precisely,
Japan – like India – does not want to antagonize the Burmese govern-
ment, which they believe would drive it even further into the hand of
the Chinese.
In September 2006, the Security Council finally agreed to a “discuss”
the Burma issue, but it is unlikely that any resolution will be passed, or
firm action taken against the generals in Rangoon. The political stalemate
is thus likely to continue for the foreseeable future. Burma is a country
where everything seems to have gone wrong, and little can be done about
it. Suu Kyi may be “Asia’s Mandela,” but, as one observer commented
wryly, she may also be as old as he was before she experiences freedom
again. The situation in Burma seems hopeless with the SPDC firmly en-
trenched in power and the NLD paralyzed as a political movement.
The Staying Power of the Burmese Military regime
246
The only real hope lies with the emerging “88 Generation,” i.e. peo-
ple who were young and idealistic activist during the 1988 uprising and
now have become a bit older, wiser and more experienced. The most
prominent among them is Min Ko Naing, a prominent student leader
who was arrested in March 1989 – and released only in November 2005,
after nearly 16 years in solitary confinement. In 1988 he was a 26-year
old zoology student addressing crowds of tens of thousands in Ran-
goon. When he was released he was 42, and he looked old and haggard
– but his fighting spirit had not been quelled. “The people of Burma
must have the courage to say no to injustice and yes to the truth,” he
said at a meeting of the newly formed “88-Generation Students’ Group”
in Rangoon in August 2006. “They must also work to correct their own
wrongdoing that hurts society.”
Many countries in Asia have certain “generations” that fought for
democracy, and sacrificed much of their lives for it. In South Korea,
the term “386 generation” was coined in the 1990s to describe those
who then were in their thirties, attended university and fought for de-
mocracy in the 1980s, and were born in the 1960s. Today many of them
are university lecturers, lawyers, newspaper columnists, and some and
even been government ministers. They are a new liberal elite that is
admired by the public at large because of their past sacrifices.
In Thailand, people speak of the “1970s generation,” men and
women who took to the streets in October 1973 and managed to force
that country’s then military government, led by Field Marshal Thanom
Kittikachorn, into exile. Three years later, Thanom and some of his as-
sociates returned to Thailand – which caused a new wave of student-led
protests. These, however, were crushed by the military, and thousands
of students, teachers and labor activists took to the jungle where they
joined the insurgent Communist Party of Thailand. But they were hard-
ly communists, and, before long, fell out with the diehard CPT leader-
ship. Following a general amnesty in 1980, almost all of them returned
to Bangkok and other cities, where they too became prominent political
and literary figures. To have been with the CPT in the jungle in the
1970s bears no stigma; on the contrary, they are respected because they
endured hardships and continued to fight for what they believed in.
Burma now has its “88 generation,” and it is coming of age. They
are not only meeting in teashops, many have become journalists and
writers. Burma’s has five daily newspapers which are published by the
government, but — contrary to what is generally assumed in the out-
side world — the majority of the country’s journals and magazines are
privately owned, although publishing licenses are more easily obtained
by those with strong connections to the government.
247
 Still, Burma today has nearly 400 newspapers, journals and maga-
zines, and the number is growing steadily – in November 2005 the gov-
ernment issued 15 new publishing licenses. These publications may
operate under some of the most restrictive laws and regulations in the
world, but they are nevertheless becoming bolder and more outspoken
in their reporting. In fact, the media in Burma has become one of the
few dynamic sectors in a society that remains mostly stagnant.
Local journalists and editors often state that their main motivation
for getting into the profession is “public service” and a desire “to do
something for the country”. Many are interested in politics and develop-
ment, and find that journalism – despite all the constraints placed upon
journalists – is one of the few professions that allows them to play a role
in current events in a constructive fashion. Many took part in the 1988
uprising and remain faithful to their democratic ideals.
If any political or social force is going to play an important role in
Burma’s future and carry the country’s unfinished renaissance forward,
it is not the increasingly geriatric NLD, but men and women of this new
88 generation. The government soon realized their political potential
– and reacted in its own inimitable way. On 27 September 2006 it was
learned that Min Ko Naing had been arrested along two other former
political prisoners, Ko Ko Gyi and Ko Htay Kywe. Each had spent 15
years in the Burmese military’s notorious prisons, but they had not
given up hope for a better future for Burma.
Their arrest turned out to be counterproductive, because the 88 gen-
eration is a generation, not a political party. On 2 October, their com-
rades who had not been jailed started an unprecedented, nation-wide
signature campaign. People put their names under demands for free-
dom for Burma’s political prisoners and they could also in a few words
express their grievances and desires. When the campaign ended on 23
October, 535,580 signatures had been collected all over the country. The
results were sent to the UN headquarters in New York.
At the same time, the 88 generation urged citizens across the coun-
try to participate in a “Multiple Religious Prayer” to be held in Buddhist
and Hindu temples, Christian Churches and Muslim Mosques. People
flocked to the holy sites, dressed in white, the symbol of the sacrifices of
Burma’s many martyrs. The government was no doubt taken aback by
this massive, but entirely peaceful, expression of dissent. A few more
people were arrested, but then there were no more repressive measures.
The generals were busy building their new Royal Capital, Naypyidaw.
The 88 generation now is a force to be reckoned with, although it has
no proper leadership or organization. They, in fact, see Aung San Suu
Kyi as their leader: “She is the one person that can bring about reconcili-
The Staying Power of the Burmese Military regime
248
ation and lead us into a new, democratic future,” one of the activists told
the foreign reporter who interviewed them in September 2005.
In January 2007, Min Ko Kaing and those who had been arrested in
September 2006, were released, just as the 88 Generation launched yet
another audacious campaign dubbed “Open Heart.” It entailed a letter-
writing campaign encouraging Burmese citizens across the country to
write about their everyday complaints and grievances with military rule.
When the month-long campaign ended in February, nearly 25,000 let-
ters had been sent to Than Shwe.
Given the SPDC’s strict restrictions on freedom of association and
assembly, the 88 Generation may not morph into a full-blown political
movement any time soon. But therein lies, perhaps, the nascent move-
ment’s strength: the military has shown that it is easy to squash a politi-
cal party and detain its leaders, but it will be considerably more difficult
to crush an entire generation.
Recognizing the threat posed to the regime by the 88 Generation,
most of its leaders – including Min Ko Naing – were arrested as soon as
people began marching in the streets in August 2007 to protest against
rising fuel prices. The monks carried on the movement and turned in
into a massive manifestation against the regime. But that movement
was crushed as well – further underscoring the argument that nothing
will change as long as the military remains united.
Bibliography
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Warfare. Bangkok: White Lotus, 1998. 294p.
Callahan, Mary P. Making Enemies: War and State Building in Burma. Ithaca and Lon-
don: Cornell University Press, 2003. 268p.
Houtman, Gustaaf. Mental Culture in Burmese Crisis Politics: Aung San Suu Kyi and the
National League for Democracy. Tokyo: Tokyo University of Foreign Studies, 1999. 392p.
Lintner, Bertil. Outrage: Burma’s Struggle for Democracy. London and Bangkok: White
Lotus, 1990. 208p.
McAndrew, Lt.Col. James. From Combat to Karaoke: Burmese Military Intelligence 1948–
2006. Thesis from the National Defense Intelligence College, Washington DC, 2007.
178p.
Mya Maung. Totalitarianism in Burma: Prospects for Economic Development. New York:
Paragon House, 1992. 277p.
Seekins, Donald. Burma and Japan Since 1940: From ‘Co-Prosperity’ to ‘Quiet Dialogue’.
Copenhagen: NIAS Press, 2007. 181p.
Selth, Andrew. Burma’s Armed Forces: Power Without Glory. Norwalk: Eastbridge, 2002.
372p.
249
 25
Steinberg, David. Burma: The State of Myanmar. Washington: Georgetown University Aung Zaw,”Retreat to the Jungle,” Irrawaddy, December 2005. The move took place
Press, 2001. 342p. in November.
26
Taylor, Robert. The State in Burma. London: C. Hurst & Company, 1987. Edward Loxton, “Off-Limits — Asia’s Secret Capital,” Citylife (Chiang Mai), June,
Thant Myint-U. The River of Lost Footsteps: Histories of Burma. New York: Farrar, Straus 2006.
27
and Giroux, 2006. 361p. Clive Parker, “A Tale of Two Cities,” Irrawaddy online August 24, 2006.
28
Bertil Lintner, “Myanmar and North Korea share a tunnel vision,” Asia Times online,
19 July 2006.
Notes 29
Ibid.
1
“We’ll Play Fair,” Interview/Kyi Maung, Asiaweek, 13 July 1990. 30
Aung Zaw, op. cit.
2
Donald Seekins, Burma and Japan Since 1940: From Co-Prosperity’ to ‘Quiet Dialogue’. 31
Burmese Broadcasting Service monitored by BBC, FE/0265 i, 24 September 1988.
Copenhagen: NIAS Press, 2007, p. 14 and 23. 32
Interview with Harn Yawnghwe, the son of Burma’s first president, Sao Shwe Thaike
3
Lt. Col. James McAndrew, From Combat to Karaoke: Burmese Military Intelligence 1948– (who was a Shan), Bertil Lintner, “Cultural Revolution,” Far Eastern Economic Review, 18
2006, Washington: National Defense Intelligence College, 2007, p. 27. November 1999.
4 33
Rodney Tasker, “Ne Win’s No Win Situation,” Far Eastern Economic Review, 7 July Houtman, op. cit., p. 55ff.
1983. 34
See “UN in Myanmar: A History of Failed Efforts,” International Herald Tribune, 4
5
SLORC Chairman’s Addresses, Rangoon: Government Printing, 1990, p. 323. November 2007.
6 35
Working People’s Daily, 11 May 1990. UN Press Release GA/SHC/3348 and http://elendureports.com/index.php?option=com_
7
The White Shirts: How USDA Will Become the New Face of Burma’s Dictatorship, Mae Sot content&task=view&id=31&Itemid=29
and Mae Sariang: Network for Democracy and Development, May 2006, p. 18. 36
Min Zaw Oo, “When the Sky Collapses: Strategic Simulation of State Failure in Burma
8
Gustaaf Houtman, Mental Culture in Burmese Crisis Politics: Aung San Suu Kyi and and Its Consequences,” 20 April 2006.
the National League for Democracy. Tokyo: Tokyo University of Foreign Studies, 1999, p. 37
Associated Press and the BBC, 7 May 2005.
117. 38
Threat to Peace: A Call for the UN Security Council to Act in Burma, Washington: DLA
9
White Shirts, pp. 18-19. Piper Rudnick Gray Cary, 20 September 2005.
10 39
Houtman, op. cit., p. 118. Min Zaw Oo, op. cit.
11
Burmese radio recorded by FBIS, 16 May 1996.
12
White Shirts, p. 53.
13
Ibid., p. 55.
14
Ibid., p. 56.
15
Houtman, op. cit., p. 118.
16
“Aung San Suu Kyi: The Progressive Interview.” With Leslie Kean and Dennis Bern-
stein, BurmaNet News, March 1997, quoted in Houtman, op. cit., p. 199.
17
Ibid.
18
White Shirts, p. 35.
19
Ibid., p. 26, and David Steinberg, “The Union Solidarity and Development Organisa-
tion,” Burma Debate, Jan/Feb 1997.
20
White Shirts, pp. 69-72.
21
Burma Debate, Jan/Feb 1997.
22
Larry Jagan, “Another Unhappy Birthday in Myanmar,” Asia Times Online, June 20,
2006.
23
Bertil Lintner, “Myanmar Payback Time,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, April 20, 2005.
24
Irrawaddy, April 2006. I have changed the spelling of the names of the kings to the
standard form of Romanisation.

The Staying Power of the Burmese Military regime

250 251
 The Challenge of Ethnicity
to Nation Building
Xiaolin Guo

Shortly after the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) had entered Kunming,
the government seat of Yunnan province, in early 1950, a major political
transformation got under way. The central component of that transfor-
mation was to establish local-level governments in the ethnic minority
populated areas across this historical Chinese frontier. In the summer
of 1951, a provincial Institute for Ethnic Minorities was inaugurated
in Kunming. Its location was in what until recently had been, under
the auspices of the former governor Long Yun (r. 1928–1945), a school
set up for the privileged children – to be precise, the heirs of Yunnan’s
native chieftains.1 The mandate of the Yunnan Institute for Ethnic Mi-
norities now operating under the auspices of the new government was
to train ethnic cadres in preparation for an up-coming land reform. The
first enrollment of ethnic minority students numbered 685, between
the ages of 14 and 51, representing over 40 ethnic groups,2 a majority
of whom came from the “frontier areas”. 3 Whether themselves former
slaves or slave owners, commoners or native chieftains, most of the stu-
dents enrolled in the cadre training program identified themselves only
with the local communities from which they came, having only the fain-
test idea about being Chinese (i.e. citizens of the Middle Kingdom),4 to
the bafflement of their instructors who were themselves communist
revolutionaries, many from outside the province.5
This was the situation in China’s southwestern province of Yunnan,
shortly after the founding of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). The
anecdote cited in the beginning of the paper highlights the challenge
posed by ethnicity to nation building, an experience shared by PRC and
its southwestern neighbor, the Union of Myanmar, despite their diffe-
rences in political system and many other aspects.
Yunnan – its name standing for “South of the Clouds" historically
the Nanzhao Kingdom succeeded by Dali, became a Chinese province
already in the thirteenth century, following the Mongol conquest of
the Southern Song dynasty (1127–1279). For centuries that followed,
however, the Chinese state apparatus and concurrent garrison
deployment exerted only limited influence on the social structure
and way of life across this rugged terrain. The historical frontier thus

252 253
 persisted, as local powers remained vested in the hands of native
chieftains who acted as the real masters of the local societies, despite
repeated attempts by the court to integrate the southwestern frontier.6
The ethnic diversity of Yunnan in the early 1950s was mirrored in the
names registered for official nationality identification, a total of 260 (out
of 400 in all of China).7 As part of the social transformation, the five
million ethnic minority population in Yunnan at the time was identified
as representing different phases of social development – from “late
primitive communal society and slavery society to feudal suzerain
system and landlord economy" on the basis of existing primary modes
of production.8 Such diversity of local societies and uneven economic
conditions constituted a major challenge to the PRC nation building
effort that had a distinctly socialist flavor.
The ethnic landscape in Yunnan then was, by no means, significantly
different from the one across the border in modern Myanmar.9 The
term paukphaw (“brotherhood") that arguably characterizes the
traditional relationship between China and Myanmar – connotes
shared kinship and religions between peoples of common origin living
on both sides of the national border. The Shan in Myanmar are related
to the Dai residing on the Chinese side of the border. The Kachin are
of the same stock as the Jingpo in Yunnan. On both sides of the border
reside the Lisu, Wa, Lahu and Bulang, who share identical names. In
history, the residents of the Myanmar frontier states had similarly been
the subjects of native chieftains. Ethnicity, however, posed a far greater
challenge to the Union of Burma in its nation building efforts than it
did to PRC leaders in the 1950s, because in the case of the former, the
frontier areas had been far more loosely administered by the central
state institutionally prior to independence from British rule in 1948.
This paper seeks to address the problem of ethnic conflict that has,
in part, contributed to prolonged military rule in Myanmar. It elabo-
rates on the complexity of the ethnic landscape and how it interacts
with national politics, with emphasis on the legacy of British rule and
subsequent government policies toward ethnic minorities in the wake
of independence. The analysis of the post-colonial government policies
toward ethnic minorities and impact on nation building is focused on
three periods: 1948–1961, 1962–1988, and 1989–2007, characterized by
alienation, confrontation, and reconciliation, respectively. The analysis
draws a line at the recent national referendum on the draft constitu-
tion in Myanmar. Throughout this paper, ethnic conflict and problems
revolving around it all point to a missing step of nation building in post-
independence Myanmar. It is a matter of great concern, and requires
national reconciliation that involves not only the Burman-dominated
The Challenge of Ethnicity to Nation Building
254
political opposition whose search for democracy strikes a chord with
the West and has managed to win unyielding support from Western go-
vernments in the past twenty years, but also the various ethnic groups
that have fought, quite separately, for their existence – social, economic,
and political – or many decades now. The paper ends with some reflec-
tions on ethnicity in relation to nation building in a broader context.
Alienation, 1948–1961
Out of the total population of approximately 55-56 million in Myanmar
today, about one third is composed of ethnic minorities (i.e. outside
the category of the Bamar, or Burman, that constitute the majority of
the country’s population and gave the country its name Burma). These
ethnically diverse populations speak over 100 languages, and are widely
distributed across seven states on the periphery, mainly on the western
and eastern sides of “Burma proper” that is, in turn, divided into seven
administrative divisions.10 This geographically demarcated administra-
tive set-up has its roots in the colonial era when British Burma included
“areas that had never been part of royal administration” and the British
implemented “a cheap and easy policy to rule these areas separately
from Burma proper.” 11 The political reform in the 1920s led to the im-
plementation in “Burma proper” of parliamentary rule (comprising of a
diarchy constitution, general elections and Legislative Council), where-
as the periphery (or the so-called “Excluded Areas”) remained under
the direct rule of the governor.12 In the latter case, hereditary headmen
exerted real control on local affairs. Separate rule and a contrast bet-
ween “Burma proper” and the frontier areas due to asymmetrical social
and economic development was the legacy that the post-colonial Union
of Burma had to deal with in its long struggle for integration, both ter-
ritorial and political.
The frontier areas were of serious concern to the nation’s founder,
Aung San, who realized on the eve of independence that winning the
support of ethnic leaders was crucial for any successful independence
settlement that was to include “the early unification of the Frontier Ar-
eas with the Government of Burma.”13 The historical Panglong meeting,
convened on February 9-12, 1947 between Aung San and frontier repre-
sentatives, granted the Shan (constituting the second largest population
in Myanmar, next to the Burman) together with other hill-tract leaders
local autonomy and a share of decision-making power, in addition to a
promise of economic assistance, in exchange for their support to make
territorial integration of the Union of Burma viable.14 The constitution
adopted a few months later that year duly recognized the special status
255
 of the frontier areas within the Union, and accorded to the local leaders
the right to withdrawal from the Union after an initial ten-year period,
although the special provision in effect applied only to the Shan and
Kayah. The Union’s first constitution seemingly presented a united
front between the state maker and ethnic leaders who were the de facto
rulers of the country’s vast peripheral region. It was a necessary step at
the time to achieve independence, but without effective mechanisms to
deal with the rights of all ethnic minorities and the simultaneous devel-
opment in the frontier areas for them to be further integrated into the
Union, the special provisions to woo the ethnic leaders only sowed the
seeds of trouble that would come to afflict the country.
The post-independent government faced insurgencies on all fronts.
Following the revolts by the Red Flag communists (Stalinist) and the
Rakhine/Arankan (mujahideen Islamic), the most formidable insur-
gency was led by the Communist Party of Burma (CPB) that had split
from the Anti-Fascist People’s Freedom League (a political party assem-
bled during World War II to rally all pro-independence forces). Among
the armed forces mobilized by the government to fight the insurgents
were the Kayin (Karen) Rifles and Kachin Rifles.15 Kayin amounts to
the second largest ethnic minority population in Myanmar, next to the
Shan, and a fairly large proportion of the Kayin population is Christian.
Their special relationship with the British colonialists seemed to be ac-
countable for the deep and enduring antagonism of the Kayin, not only
to the post-colonial government but also the Burman people at large.16
Having successfully driven the CPB out of its base, the Kayin fighters
began to have second thoughts about supporting the government. To
the Kayin demand of independence, the government retaliated with
force. Further destabilizing the government, the Kachin echoed the
Kayin demand for independence and joined the ethnic rebellion.17
The Shan may have had their local autonomy endorsed by the consti-
tution, but their leaders had since independence not been happy about
their privileges being encroached upon by the government and their
local interests undermined. Tension began with the heavy presence of
the government troops in the Shan territories following the invasion by
defeated Chinese nationalist troops from the east in the 1950s.18 Power
struggles within the government, meanwhile, seriously estranged the
Shan leaders who had been offered posts in the cabinet by Aung San
prior to independence. The last straw seemed to be the “anti-feudal-
ist campaign” aimed at removing the privileges of, and containing the
power of, the Shan leaders in the frontier areas under their control. In
the summer of 1961, the Shan leaders who had a constitutional right
to secede from the Union pushed for a federal movement as a solution
The Challenge of Ethnicity to Nation Building
256
to the undesirable situation where they found themselves in the first
decade after independence.19 The then Prime Minister U Nu is said to
have been “not unsympathetic” and convened a Nationalities Seminar
in Yangon in March 1962.20 The outcome of that meeting was a military
coup by General Ne Win who had been heading the caretaker govern-
ment since 1958. After arresting U Nu and the ethnic leaders who came
to the capital to negotiate terms with the government, the parliament
was dissolved, thus ending a decade of democratic rule in the country.
Political struggles within the government aside, ethnic revolts in
that particular period, which exacerbated the U Nu government’s cri-
sis, deserve special attention and analysis. The problems themselves
were essentially ramifications of the government policy toward ethnic
minorities in the program of nation building, compounded by a prevail-
ing social environment alienating the ethnic minorities in the process
of political integration. While de-feudalization may indeed be seen as
constituting a step of nation building, without trained civil servants
available to perform the necessary administrative tasks, the frontier
areas remained largely ungoverned rather than integrated.21 The failure
to train civil servants among the ethnic minorities who speak languages
different from that of the majority Burman, and who possess different
life styles, amounted to the first obstacle to nation building. A further
failure was the neglect of economic development in the frontier region,
as the national economic planning of the central government essen-
tially excluded the areas populated by ethnic minorities. It is said that
between 1948 and 1962, economic disparity between “Burma proper”
and the frontier areas grew rather than shrank.22 Last but not least was
the policy of assimilation pursued by U Nu, which, to put it mildly,
sought to downplay cultural differences. The proposal put forward by
U Nu to amend the constitution to designate Buddhism the national
religion, in particular, disaffected ethnic minorities, and was directly
responsible for the Kachin rallying under the banner of the Kachin
Independent Army, and perhaps indirectly for the flaring up of social
riots such as attacks on Mosques by Buddhists which ended in blood-
shed.23 The prevalence of Burman chauvinism in society at large only
aggravated the situation further. As noted by a foreign observer in the
1950s, “There are many Burmese politicians, puffed-up and narrow, to
whom the only real citizen is a Burmese Buddhist, and whose approach
to every frontier problem is harsh and exclusive.”24
To sum up, ethnicity constituted a major challenge to the Union
of Burma in the early years of independence. The democratic system
practiced in the country by holding parliamentary elections, however,
gravely failed to win the backing of the ethnic minorities in the frontier
257
 areas in the political process of nation building. The situation contin-
ued to deteriorate under military rule that sought to solve the problem
of political integration by resorting to force and brutality.
Confrontation, 1962–1988
As a state actor, Ne Win sought total control of society. If one includes
the period of caretaker government (1958–1961), Ne Win’s rule of the
country in effect lasted for a total of three decades. While military and
civilian style of rule may be starkly contrasted, one should bear in mind
that the military had been present on the scene of national politics even
while the government was headed by a civilian and democratically elec-
ted politician. Insurgencies by CBP and ethnic minorities in the 1950s
were suppressed by the government, in cooperation with the military
leaders. Back in his days of heading the caretaker government, Ne Win
had already moved forward with de-feudalizing the Shan and Kayah sta-
tes, and getting rid of the seats reserved for the native chieftains in the
parliament.25 Throughout his tenure as head of state, Ne Win’s priority
was to achieve political integration and maintain order. But the strategy
he resorted to only yielded cycles of violence and prolonged instability
in the country.
The trademark of Ne Win's rule was the Burmese Way to Socialism.
It sought to achieve nationalization of the economy on the one hand,
and unification of the country on the other. As far as policy toward
the frontier areas and ethnic minorities was concerned, Ne Win
differed from U Nu. As a military strategist, instead of an idealist, Ne
Win regarded political integration as paramount, while making no
particular efforts in pursuit of cultural assimilation. National unity,
in his language, equated merely to absolute loyalty toward the Union
of Burma and unconditional submission by the local powers to the
central state. By the promulgation of the Protection of National Unity
Law in 1964, the government annulled the rights previously granted
to the ethnic minority leaders in the 1947 constitution, with respect
to self-government, autonomous legislation, and secession. The
1974 constitution, though it designated separate states for the Chin,
Mon, and Rakhine respectively, further undercut the local autonomy
of the ethnic leaders in the frontier areas.26 Notwithstanding all
these uncompromising political measures, Ne Win adopted a less
antagonistic approach to cultural practices – abolishing the bill to
designate Buddhism the national religion previously advocated by
U Nu, and appearing instead to act as a state sponsor of alternative
religious practices.27
The Challenge of Ethnicity to Nation Building
258
Despite his seemingly accommodationist approach to ethnic
minorities in terms of cultural practices, compared to his predecessor,
Ne Win's peace making with anti-government forces of all sorts
– of which ethnic minorities constituted a major component – did not
proceed very far. Immediately after the military took power, Ne Win
sought to appease various opposition forces, urging them to cooperate
with the government in order to achieve national unity. But neither his
talks with the CPB nor negotiations with ethnic minority leaders yielded
any results. Without any alternative strategies, the solution left to him
was all-out war with the ethnic armed forces, in addition to the CPB of
several factions, which lasted for over two decades. By the early 1970s,
there had been two-dozen ethnic armed forces fighting the government
across half of the country's territory. No less than an estimated third of
the government expenditure was exhausted on military campaigns.28
All were anti-government, but each one of the resistance forces
fought only for its own interests. After the CBP was banished by the
government, its high-ranking officers went to China for training (in
political theory and military strategy); among them was Ba Thein Tin
who was to succeed Than Tun as party leader in the mid 1970s. The
ideological rift between the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the
Burman Socialist Program Party (BSPP), and the later anti-Chinese
riots in Yangon, finally threw into the open the conflict between
China and Myanmar, with the CCP backing up the CPB by opening
a new front in northeast Myanmar close to the Chinese border.29 Fully
equipped by the PLA, the CPB Northeast Command recruited its rank
and file among the ethnic minorities on both sides of the border. This
is the reason some scholars have put the CPB-led insurgency into the
category of being an ethnic armed conflict.30 The intricacies of the force
alignment in this people's war served as an illustration of the customary
saying that blood is thicker than water. Yet, for many of the resistance
forces, loyalty to China or Myanmar hardly mattered; nor was ideology
a particular concern. Resistance in different outfits was simply a fight
for one's own existence, underpinned by grievances of all sorts. The
revolution failed in the end, largely due to relentless infighting within
the CPB and the final withdrawal of Chinese support in the 1980s.31
From a purely military point of view, Ne Win won the war against
the CBP after launching a ferocious campaign in Bago in the mid
1970s. His initiative to mend fences with Chinese leaders succeeded,
furthermore, in ending CCP support for the CPB. Yet, his government
maintained no real control of the country's vast borderlands. Struggling
for their survival financially, the CPB remnants entered the drug trade.
Their involvement led to a boom in the age-old drug production on
259
 the northeastern border, and stimulated competition for control over
resources among all other ethnic armed forces. A war of a different
nature thus continued. Each force, ethnic or communist, fought to
expand its own territory of control. Fierce competition for resources
fueled more strife, and continued to render the frontier areas
impenetrable to government forces.32 Political integration remained
elusive as ever, while prolonged conflict took a heavy toll on society.
As estimated, within the period of half a century after independence,
hundreds of thousands of people lost their lives, and as many as
two million suffered internal displacement, with poverty and infant
mortality rising and many infectious diseases growing rampant.33
Between the government and the resistance groups, the former
obviously had the advantage as far as military equipment and
manpower were concerned. But ruling by military means alone can
hardly solve a country's problems, including, most importantly, that of
political integration. What in the end failed to win the hearts and minds
of the people, crucial to national cohesion, was the government's failure
to tackle problems of an economic nature.
Aside from the prolonged conflict that severely drained the national
treasury, the Burmese Way to Socialism under the BSPP that pursued
a closed-door policy in due course served to bankrupt the country's
economy. Economic stagnation became evident in the 1970s. Inflation
and food shortages fomented political discontent and social unrest.
The new constitution in 1974 may appear to have secured military rule
by affirming the one-party system, but in the years that followed the
government failed in measures to turn the national economy around.
In 1987, the government applied to the United Nations for the status
of Least Developed Country, in order to lessen the burden of foreign
debts on the country. A year later, public protests erupted in Yangon and
other cities, ultimately causing the downfall of Ne Win. The democratic
movement that followed, however, did not put an end to military
rule. Instead, the determination of the military to continue ruling
the country became heightened. The rhetoric of a new generation of
military leaders seeking to exert total control was not so different from
when Ne Win staged his coup, that is, to maintain law and order, and
above all, national unity.
In summary, nearly three decades of rule under Ne Win saw
prolonged confrontation between ethnic minorities and the Burman
dominated government. It was, in essence, a continuation of strife
between the central state and the country's frontier areas, a colonial
legacy with which the new nation state has had to cope since its
independence in 1948. During the long decades of conflict, however,
The Challenge of Ethnicity to Nation Building
260
the military grew ingrained in the state bureaucracy, which secured
a foothold for the military leaders to cling to power in the decades to
come.
Reconciliation, 1989–2007
In today's international politics, a lack of appreciation of the socio-
political complexity characterizing the country often informs simplistic
perceptions of a standoff between the state (i.e. Tatmadaw) and society
(pro-democracy movement) as the root problem facing Myanmar. What
underlies this standoff is sometimes analyzed, if at all, only cursorily.
Staring one in the face, meanwhile, are two problems – ethnic and
economic – that have provided much of the momentum for the
political upheavals in the country during the past half a century. As
already mentioned, the situation that had given Ne Win grounds for his
seizure of power in 1962 was largely attributed to the perceived threat
to national unity, as the leaders of the frontier areas sought to negotiate
with the government about the terms of their autonomy. What brought
Ne Win down in 1988 – and subsequently triggered widespread unrest
in the country – was essentially the government's poor performance in
managing the national economy, in addition to the ethnic conflict that
had been simmering for too long. The cycle of conflict and violence
that the country of Myanmar has experienced in the past half century
has been ultimately fueled by what has been identified as “greed and
grievances ”, the nature of which is again economic and ethnic.34
The post-Ne Win government—first, the State Law and Order Res-
toration Council (SLORC) headed by General Saw Maung and later the
State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) under the command of
Senior-General Than Shwe—dismissed the result of the 1990 parlia-
ment elections that won the opposition NLD a majority of seats, on the
ground that the country’s stability came first. At the same time, how-
ever, the SLORC and its successor SPDC tactically adjusted its policy to
combine political appeasement with military suppression, while pursu-
ing what the government itself called national reconciliation and eco-
nomic development in the country. By tackling the ethnic and economic
problems together, the military consolidated its power and managed
to stabilize the country, in contrast to Ne Win’s rule in the previous
decades. One highly symbolic move in attempting to achieve national
reconciliation was the government decision to change the name of the
country in 1989, from the British Burma to the indigenous Myanmar
(duly endorsed by the United Nations) – the new name symbolically
inclusive of the Burman as well as all ethnic minorities.35 In the 1990
261
 elections, dozens of ethnic minority parties participated, and many of
them won seats in the parliament, with the Shan Nationalities League
for Democracy emerging as the second biggest winner next to the
NLD.
The government furthermore established special organs to tackle
economic development in the frontier areas and ethnic minorities work
in general. In 1993, it drew up a ten-year plan for economic develop-
ment in the borderlands with earmarked funds. The draft of Develop-
ment of Border Areas and National Races Law that same year formally
incorporated development in ethnic minority areas into the national
development strategy.36 In a parallel development, the military govern-
ment initiated the process of negotiating ceasefires with ethnic armed
forces. So far some two-dozen ethnic minority armed forces have
reached cease-fire agreements with the government. The economic
development in the borderlands together with ceasefire agreements
have contributed to some stability in the country; along with that de-
velopment, ethnic strife has notably subsided in these areas and what
used to be rampant opium production has been partially contained.
This achievement of stability, however tenuous, created the necessary
preconditions for the military government to implement the so-called
seven-point roadmap to democracy in the country.
The above development has led some to conclude that ethnic
relations in Myanmar today are enjoying their “best time" since 1948.37
Even so, one can hardly say that peace in the borderlands is already
in sight. The ceasefire agreements, first of all, do not presently entail
disarmament of the ethnic minorities, and therefore the armed forces
in their self-governed territories persist as potential threats to political
integration. Secondly, there is currently much discord between the
central government and ethnic leaders regarding the size of ethnic
armed forces that each frontier state may in the end retain and the
area that each ethnic group may control, in addition to the degree of
local autonomy to which each entity is entitled. Thirdly, a number of
ethnic armed forces – such as the Kayin/Karen National Union, the
Shan State Army-South, the Kayah/Karenni National Progress Party
and the Chin National Front – are yet to reach cease-fire agreements
with the government, while the cooperation in drug control between
the government and the Wa leaders is far from easy. Finally, the claim
of independence by the Shan Prince living in exile in Canada, albeit
largely rhetorical, adds further complications to the volatility of ethnic
relations in the borderlands.38
The Saffron Revolution in 2007 once again served as a reminder
of persisting problems of an economic nature. While such a “colo-
The Challenge of Ethnicity to Nation Building
262
red revolution ” may be associated by an audience in the West with
democratic changes unfolding in the states of the former Soviet Bloc,
the social unrest in Myanmar on this particular occasion was essentially
prompted by frustration over economic stagnation, to which a hike in
fuel prices provided a catalyst for an outburst of public discontent.
The events suggest that the legitimacy of the military government
is increasingly being tested by its economic performance, as the
population at large continues to struggle to make ends meet in day-to-
day life.39
Myanmar's economy in the past decade has benefited from its
cooperation with countries in the region, namely, ASEAN, China, and
India. China's on-going economic reform that started three decades
ago, decentralization of economic management, and the recent
development of China's western region, in particular, have stimulated
economic cooperation between Yunnan province and the Southeast
Asian countries, Myanmar included. Economic projects undertaken by
enterprises based in Yunnan largely involve infrastructure construction
and exploitation of natural resources. That aside, the Chinese
government has through Yunnan province supported efforts to eradicate
drug production on the Shan Plateau, by subsidizing cultivation of
alternative crops and trade in agricultural produce.40 Again, as in the
old days, the economic development in the borderlands has availed
itself of the existing kinship (paukphaw) on both sides of the border.
In a local context, the economic cooperation – that is often interpreted
in the West as China's communist regime supporting military rule in
Myanmar – is typically business conducted between neighbors, many
of whom are in a sense close relatives.
In economic development across the border, China's involvement is
motivated by its concern for national security; for that reason, China does
not, and will not, allow any third-party interference in Myanmar affairs.
This is a factor of grave importance influencing China's policy-making
vis-a-vis Myanmar, in contrast to the geographically distant West.41
China's cooperation is crucial for economic development in Myanmar's
borderlands, which, in turn, has implications for the country's political
stability as a whole. As noted by one long-time observer of Myanmar
affairs, “Chinese remains a commonly-spoken language in many
transSalween districts and the CPB's former “liberated zones ” are
administered by breakaway ethnic ceasefire forces, whose leaders
continue to maintain cross-border relations with Yunnan Province. ” 42
Even though the Chinese influence through cross-border economic
cooperation today has hardly any ideological bearing, ethnic proximity
can be politically disconcerting. This would have prompted the Chinese
263
 to make their policy known to exclude playing any role in the ethnic
insurgency across the border, or tolerating any influx of refugees except
during an emergency.43 Such public disposition does, in a way, suggest
that the paukphaw relationship has its political constraints, although
they may not be immediately discernible to outsiders.
Like Myanmar, one third of the population in Yunnan is composed
of ethnic minorities. The local-level autonomy currently granted to
ethnic leaders in the borderlands of Myanmar resembles in form the
administrative system adopted in Yunnan. To some, the existence
of “self-administered divisions ” and “self-administered districts ” as
prescribed by the new constitution of Myanmar for ethnic minorities
– in the highly centralized unitary state may constitute “an inherent
contradiction. ” 44 The PRC experience of nation building shows that
local-level autonomy in a centralized state is a workable solution to
political integration, and that balanced development is the key to
stability. Admittedly, however, the history of central-local relations in
China is very different from that in Myanmar. In this regard, Myanmar's
own conditions will have to determine an administrative system that
is able to accommodate political integration and ethnic diversity in a
modern nation state.
In short, decades of civil war in Myanmar show that neither the
government nor the ethnic minorities have emerged as clear winners.
The ceasefire agreements reached between the government and ethnic
armed forces so far suggest that a political solution is the only option
to achieve peace. The political development in the country and a lasting
peace must rest on economic development on the one hand, and the
safeguarding of ethnic minority rights on the other. A fulfillment of
these tasks requires political change; the change, however, cannot be
divorced from the indigenous conditions.
Constitution in Present Tense
The draft constitution of Myanmar that was ratified by the national ref-
erendum on May 10, 2008 is the third one since the country gained in-
dependence. The drafting of the constitution was a long-drawn-out pro-
cess that began in 1993 and was halted between 1996 and 2004, as the
result of the NLD’s withdrawal from the National Convention. Drafted
under military rule, the constitution is understandably controversial. It
manifestly enshrines, as a basic principle, the position of the Tatmadaw
in the political leadership of the country, with 25 per cent of the seats
in the parliament being reserved for the military and an endorsement
of the Commander-in-Chief of the Defense Services taking over and
The Challenge of Ethnicity to Nation Building
264
exercising state power in a state of emergency perceived as endanger-
ing the Union and national sovereignty. The draft constitution also
puts in place a parliament system, composed of two Hluttaws (Pyithu
and Amyotha), with representatives from all divisions and states, and
all (officially recognized) “national races" (the term employed by the
government). In addition to the existing seven states designated to the
Shan, Kachin, Kayah, Kayin, Mon, Chin, and Rakhine, respectively, the
constitution prescribes six additional self-administered divisions/zones
to be granted to the Wa, Kokang, Palaung, Pa-O, and Danu in the Shan
state and Naga (in Sagaing division).
The implementation of local-level (provincial and sub-provincial)
autonomy is crucial for political integration. It is a matter of rights on
the part of ethnic minorities and unity on the part of the central go-
vernment. The function of this dual system requires compromise from
both sides. Despite all the controversy surrounding it, that the draft
constitution was adopted by a national referendum and was not rejec-
ted outright by the ethnic leaders, would suggest that some concessions
had been made and certain agreements, however tenuous, had been
reached. By drawing up a constitution, the state is committed to helping
develop language, literature, fine arts, and culture of ethnic minorities
(“national races”); helping promote solidarity, mutual amity, and re-
spect and mutual help among ethnic minorities; and helping promote
socio-economic development including education, health, economy,
transport, and communications of less developed ethnic minorities.
Needless to say, future legislation and ultimately the result of the up-
coming elections will determine to what extent the local-level autonomy
is to be enjoyed and how these promises will be delivered.
On a macro-level, the constitution ratified may amount to one im-
portant step of political integration. Yet, issues of ethnic minorities will
continue to pose a serious challenge to the current military government
and a future democratically elected government (should the 2010 elec-
tions go ahead as promised). It would be naïve, first of all, to believe that
the cease-fire agreements between the ethnic leaders and the military
government are based on mutual trust rather than on tactics aimed at
short-term gains on both sides. The current government policy bearing
traces of cultural assimilation furthermore is cause for concern,45 as
it could potentially produce a backlash in society like during the rule
of U Nu in the 1950s. The most disconcerting issue is likely to be the
development of Burman nationalism toward ethnic minorities within
the Union and toward foreigners and foreign countries. It remains to
be seen how nationalism of all sorts (Burman and ethnic) will play out
in the continuing efforts to achieve national reconciliation in Myanmar.
265
 All in all, trust between governments (present and future) and various
interest groups will be crucial to any sustainable peace in the country.
The constitution may have been ratified, but national reconciliation will
have a long way to go. As it has been so perceptively put, “The fragility
of the relative peace along Myanmar’s frontier may become evident fol-
lowing the results of the referendum.”46
However controversial, the ratification of the draft constitution
marks a watershed in the country's history, by laying a foundation
for further political change in Myanmar. From confrontation to
reconciliation, there is evidence of modification in the policy pursued
by the government, despite the nature of its military rule. For the
foreseeable future, it is unlikely that the military will withdraw
voluntarily from national politics. On the other hand, sustaining its
rule of the country by absolute force can no longer be an option for the
incumbent government. Decades of civil war and prolonged conflict
have shown to the leaders of the country and the people of Myanmar
that political integration and lasting peace must be built on national
reconciliation and economic development. This realization itself is, for
the time being, of great significance.
Some Reflections
The year 2008 marks the 60th anniversary of Myanmar’s indepen-
dence. The country’s nation building has over the past decades been
continuous, yet far from complete. An alliance with ethnic minority
leaders had helped win the country’s independence while maintaining
its territorial integrity. Parliamentary rule and elections in the early
years of independence, however, did not solve the problems affecting
ethnic minority rights effectively, and this failure came to be exploited
by the military in justifying its toppling of the democratically elected
government. The authoritarian rule that followed resorted to extreme
measures in response to political dissent and ethnic conflict, resulting
in decades of civil war. The post-Ne Win military government is seen
to have adopted a more pragmatic approach to the country’s problems,
ethnic and economic. The initial achievement of cease-fires and eco-
nomic development in the borderlands in recent years has somewhat
helped stabilize the country. Nevertheless, a much needed lasting peace
is yet to be realized.
While military authoritarian rule has no doubt been the main factor
obstructing political progress in the country, ethnic conflict remains a
core problem that to a large extent makes political integration of the
country unattainable. Over the past twenty years, the Western politics
The Challenge of Ethnicity to Nation Building
266
of intervention has focused squarely on the magic word “democracy ”,
with politicians in the United States and Europe demanding resolutely
“democracy first! ” thus echoing the demands of the Myanmar political
opposition NLD on the military government to “hand over the power!”
A common variant of the cultural exoticism that contours Western views
of foreign countries has in the case of Myanmar become transfixed on
Aung San Suu Kyi and allowed her name to be, quite literally, the focal
point of policy-making in the West.47 That the international intervention
– political isolation and economic sanction – has so far not achieved its
intended goals suggests just how little the reality of the country has
been understood and how little it actually matters to policy-making in
the West.
This paper has outlined the challenge of ethnicity to nation building
in post-colonial Myanmar. While the country is unique in terms of its
socio-political, cultural, and economic conditions, there are some wider
implications worthy of further pondering, in regard to nation building
in such an ethnically diverse country. A dual system – local autonomy in
the presence of a highly centralized state – dating back to the thirteenth
century has provided modern China, as a nation state bequeathed
by the Republican Revolution in 1911, with a mechanism capable of
achieving territorial and political integration. Such a mechanism may
appear to contradict the Western concept of the nation state that has
been very much taken as a given when it comes to drawing boundaries
between peoples perceived as demonstrating ethnographic or linguistic
differences.48 Since the end of the Cold War, some Western governments
have grown increasingly keen on promoting nation-building projects in
different parts of the world. The invention of ethnographic boundaries
as the foundation of nation states by nineteenth-century anthropology
has duly served as a blunt tool in international intervention, which is
today motivated by political (as well as economic) agenda, thus replaying
a history of Europe that appears to have been deliberately, or selectively,
and in any case, quite conveniently, forgotten by many Europeans.49
In many parts of the world today, ethnicity acts as a force obstructing
nation building when the historical being comes into contact with the
modern concept of nation state. Many conflicts involve ethnicity, but
this is not to say that ethnic conflicts can be solved by simply drawing
boundaries between peoples who happen to speak different languages
or practice different religions. Behind every ethnic conflict, there is a
shared history and complexity of cultural contacts. It is the contempora-
ry perception of that history and such contacts that generates problems
for categorizations involving people. Like many kinds of boundaries,
ethnic ones constantly shift and remain negotiable, depending on a va-
267
 riety of circumstances, actors and inter-actors. Much of Europe recon-
ciled ethnicity with the nation state in its own way more than a century
ago at a time when Myanmar (then Burma) and many other parts of the
world were subject to European colonial rule. The situation in the post-
colonial world is very different to the order delimitated by the world po-
wers in the aftermath of World War II. Against the backdrop of today’s
highly ideologically charged international politics, ethnicity is an issue
particularly vexing to nation building efforts around the world.
The people of Myanmar have a history of their own as well as their
own understanding of their history. It should be up to them to decide
among themselves about the future of their country and what they
can benefit from it. This is what democracy is all about. The external
environment and its influence on the way ethnic conflict in a country
plays itself out, and impacts on nation building, is an interesting topic
of research, and certainly deserves more attention than it does now. It
is hardly a secret anymore that during the Cold War, world powers like
the U.S. and Britain all pursued policies of supporting various ethnic
insurgencies through military and financial means.50 The end of the
Cold War has created new grounds for political intervention exploiting,
similarly, ethnic conflict. It is not at all improbable, as some have so
insinuated, that regime change as attempted by some Western powers
may involve aiding some ethnic groups perceived to support the inter-
ests of the West, and similarly seeking to restrain those perceived not
to be on the right side, in which case, the current situation of narcotics
production and trafficking in the borderlands can well serve a conve-
nient pretext.51 The probability of involvement by external forces in
Myanmar is likely to be determined by how relevant such involvement
is going to be to the play of international politics with its constantly
shifting priorities.
The mounting criticism of the military government by Western
media and governments in the wake of Cyclone Nargis that devastated
the Ayeyarwady delta and the coastal Yangon serves to demonstrate
how a humanitarian effort, such as disaster relief, can be politicized
to serve ideological objectives.52 The natural disaster that struck a week
before the national referendum on the draft constitution provided a
unique angle for observing the play of international politics. Calls for a
postponement of the national referendum seemed to only reinforce the
generally negative attitude of Western governments toward the consti-
tution drafted under military rule. At the same time, the tardiness of the
military government in administering disaster relief in the aftermath
of the tropical storm shows just how weak the state of Myanmar is,
in terms of bureaucratic functions at all levels, and how detached
The Challenge of Ethnicity to Nation Building
268
the Tatmadaw is from the populace, in sharp contrast to the Chinese
experience of post-quake relief in Sichuan province during the same
period. The failure on the part of the military government to provide
rapid and effective disaster relief, once again, illustrates how pressing
nation building is for the people of Myanmar.
Notes
1
The local chieftainship was hereditary and endorsed by the state through a formal
appointment system originating in the Yuan dynasty (1271–1368). It was adopted and
reformed by the succeeding Ming and Qing governments. After the collapse of the Qing
dynasty in 1911, the provincial government of Yunnan continued to honor the old ar-
rangement in the frontier areas in the west, northwest, and southwest.
2
This was prior to the PRC official nationality identification. Yunnan province currently
has a population of 45 million, one third of which is composed of 25 officially identified ethnic
minorities.
3
This is a historical demarcation by the Qing government in its reform to the local
chiefdoms in the 18th century, which referred to the territory on the right bank of the Lan-
cang River (Mekong) in the southwest, and the territories on the right bank of the Nu River
(Salween) and north of Jinsha River (Yangtze) in the northwest. The PRC government in
effect adopted the same format when implementing land reform in the 1950s. See Xiao-
lin Guo, “Chinese Socialism and Local Nationalism in the Discourse of Development.”
Inner Asia (2008), 10: 131–152.
4
Chinese (Zhongguoren) is a concept that came into being in the nineteenth century.
Prior to that, the ancestors of today’s Chinese identified themselves with the emperor.
5
Wang Lianfang, Yunnan minzu gongzuo huiyi [Recollection of nationalities work in Yun-
nan]. (Kunming: Yunnan renmin chubanshe,1999), p. 185.
6
The most vigorous campaigns against the local chiefdoms in the southwest took place
during the Yongzheng reign (1723–735). See, John Herman, “Empire in the Southwest:
Early Qing Reforms to the Native Chieftain System.” The Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 56,
No. 1 (February 1997), pp. 47–74.
7
Fei Hsiao-tung, Towards People’s Anthropology (Beijing: New World Press, 1981), p. 64.
8
Yunnan minzu gongzuo sishinian [Forty years of nationalities work in Yunnan], 2 vols.
(Kunming: Yunnan minzu chubanshe, 1994), Vol. 1, p. 70.
9
The name of the country (except in historical context and direct quotes) and of places in
it appearing in the text are consistent with the current domestic use, as well as with the
use endorsed by the United Nations and accepted by the international postal service.
10
The seven peripheral states are the Shan, Kachin, Kayah, Kayin, Mon, Chin, and Rak-
hine. The seven administrative divisions are Sagaing, Mandalay, Magway, Bago, Yangon,
Ayeyarwady, and Tanintharyi.
11
Thant Myint-U, The River of Lost Footsteps: A Personal History of Burma (London: Faber
and Faber, 2007), p. 194.
12
Ibid., p. 206.
13
Hugh Tinker, “Burma’s Northeast Borderland Problems,” Pacific Affairs, Vol. 29, No.
4 (December 1956), p. 339.
269
 14
The Shan currently has a population of five million, half of which is concentrated in the Shan 38
For more on this topic, see Robert H. Taylor, “The Politics of Identity in Myanmar
state, and the rest is distributed across Kachin, Kayah, Kayin states, as well as in Sagaing. Revisited,” South East Asia Research Paper (No. 13, 3, 2005), pp. 261-86.
15
Thant Myint-U, The River of Lost Footsteps: A Personal History of Burma (2007), pp. 39
Kyaw Yin-Hlaing, “The State of the Pro-Democracy Movement in Authoritarian
259-61. Myanmar/Burma,” in Myanmar/Burma: Challenges and Perspectives, edited by Xiaolin
16
Li Chenyang, “Miandian de Kelun yu Kelunren fenli yundong” [The Kayin of Myanmar Guo (Stockholm: ISDP, 2008), pp. 69-105.
and their separatist movement], Shijie minzu (No. 1, 2004). 40
Some may, however, question the long-term effect of such development on the local
17
Thant Myint-U, The River of Lost Footsteps (2007), pp. 262–63. livelihood and environment.
41
18
Ibid., p. 287. For more on the Chinese position in the Myanmar issue, in contrast to that of the
19 West and ASEAN, see Xiaolin Guo, “The Myanmar/Burma Impasse and Practice of
The first president of independent Burma, Sao Shwe Thaike, a Shan, is said to have led
Intervention.” in Myanmar/Burma: Challenges and Perspectives, edited by Xiaolin Guo
the “Federal Movement” to amend the constitution (see Harn Yawnghwe, this volume).
(Stockholm: ISDP, 2008), pp. 9-33.
20
Thant Myint-U (2007), p. 289. 42
Martin Smith, “Ethnic Challenges and Border Politics in Myanmar/Burma” (2008),
21
This was the case in both the Shan and Kachin states. See Hugh Tinker, “Burma’s p. 43.
Northeast Borderland Problems” (1956), pp. 341-42, 43
Ibid.
22
Li Chenyang, “Miandian dulihou lijie zhengfu minzu zhengce de yanbian” [Develop- 44
Tin Maung Maung Than, cited in Martin Smith, State of Strife (2007), p. 51.
ment of ethnic minority policies in post-independence Myanmar] in Yazhou minzu lun-
45
tan, edited by Fang Tie and Xiao Xian (Kunming: Yunnan daxue chubanshe, 2003). Li Chenyang, “Miandian minzu wenti de xianzhuang jiqi fazhan qushi” [The current
23 state and future of ethnic problems in Myanmar], in Mianxiang 21 shijide dongnanya:
Ibid.
gaige yu fazhan [Southeast Asia at the turn of the twenty-first century: reform and deve-
24
Hugh Tinker, “Burma’s Northeast Borderland Problems” (1956), p. 346. lopment], edited by Chen Qiaozhi (Guanzhou: Jinan daxue chubanshe, 2000).
25
He Shengda and Li Chenyang, Miandian: Lieguozhi [Myanmar: A Guide to the States of 46
David Steinberg, this volume.
the World] (Beijing: Shehui kexue wenxian chubanshe, 2005), p. 117. 47
Laura Bush, for one, made it plainly straightforward that her interest in Burma
26
Li Chenyang, “Miandian dulihou lijie zhengfu minzu zhengce de yanbian” (2003). started “with an interest in Aung San Suu Kyi” (“First lady remarks on Cyclone
27
Ibid. in Burma, says U.S. will increase aid’” Washingtonpost.com, May 5, 2008. http:
28
He Shengda and Li Chenyang, Miandian (2005), p. 120. //www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/05/05/AR2008050501928_
29
pf.html Right after the announcement of U.S. aid to cyclone-struck Myanmar, President
The military aid from the CCP to the CPB is characterized as party-to-party. See Martin Bush signed a congressional legislation to award Aung San Suu Kyi the Congressional
Smith, “Ethnic Challenges and Border Politics in Myanmar/Burma,” in Myanmar/ Medal of Honor (Ibid.). For U.S. policy and Aung San Suu Kyi, see also Burma/Myanmar:
Burma: Challenges and Perspectives, edited by Xiaolin Guo (Stockholm: ISDP, 2008), p. After the Crackdown, Asia Report No. 144 (Yangon/Jakarta/Brussels: International Crisis
42. Group, January 31, 2008), pp. 13-14.
30
Li Chenyang, “Miandian dulihou lijie zhengfu minzu zhengce de yanbian” (2003). 48
Ernst Renan, “What Is a Nation?” http://www.cooper.edu/humanities/core/hss3/
31
See Xiaolin Guo, Towards Resolution: China in the Myanmar Issue (Uppsala: Central e_renan.html
Asian-Caucasus Institute, Silk Road Paper, March 2007). 49
For a reflective comment (prompted by international media coverage of the riots
32
See Martin Smith, State of Strife: The Dynamics of Ethnic Conflict in Burma (Washing- in Tibet in March 2008) on the record of how ethnic relations have in the past and
ton D.C.: East-West Center and Singapore: ISEAS, 2007). present been handled in Western countries, see Floyd Rudmin, “The Hypocrisy and
33 Danger of Anti-China Demonstrations,” CommonDreams.org (April 14, 2008), http:
See Martin Smith, Burma (Myanmar): The Time for Change (Report for Minority
Rights Group International, May 2002). //www.commondreams.org/archive/2008/04/14/8287/
34 50
See Martin Smith, State of Strife (2007). In the case of Myanmar, see David I. Steinberg, Burma: The State of Myanmar (Wash-
35 ington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2001).
The significance of the name change for the purpose of national reconciliation seems
51
to have eluded many politicians in the West, rejecting flatly the use of the name on the Li Chenyang, “Miandian de Kelun yu Kelunren fenli yundong” (No. 1, 2004).
ground that it was a choice made by the military government. 52
After Cyclone Nargis: The Politics of Humanitarian Relief” (May 7, 2008) http://
36
Li Chenyang, “Miandian dulihou lijie zhengfu minzu zhengce de yanbian” (2003). networkmyanmar.org/images//nb.pdf
37
Li Chenyang and Chen Yin, “Yingxiang Miandian minzhuhua jincheng de zhuyao
zhengzhi shili” [Main political forces influencing democratization in Myanmar], unpu-
blished paper (2004), p. 11.

The Challenge of Ethnicity to Nation Building

270 271
 Multi-Party Talks on Burma:
Overseeing a Transition
from Military Rule
Harn Yawnghwe

Burma – The Problem

Scholars have attributed the cause of the problems in Burma to various
factors – social, economic, constitutional and political. While these are
all valid to varying degrees, I would like to suggest that an additional
factor that has perhaps not been studied adequately is the different
concepts of national or ethnic identity held by the Burma Army and the
rest of the population.
Several books have been written about the politics of ethnic nationa-
lisms from the point of view of the minorities or ethnic nationalities1.
But I have not seen scholarly studies on the politics of ethnic nationa-
lism from the point of view of the Burma Army or the majority Burman.
Usually, the Burma Army is portrayed as a neutral modernizing force2
or as a nation-building institution3.
The majority Burman make up about 60 percent of the population
and live in the lowlands which make up about 40 percent of the land.
The remaining population lives in the highlands in the seven ethnic sta-
tes – Arakan, Chin, Kachin, Shan, Kareni, Karen and Mon - bordering
Bangladesh, India, China, Laos and Thailand.
The Arakan, Mon and Shan kingdoms pre-dated the Burman king-
doms by several centuries. Arakan kings were said to have ruled in wes-
tern Burma from 2666 BC. They certainly ruled from 146 AD until 1785
AD, when the Arakan kingdom was conquered by the Burman king
- Alaung-paya. Burman religion, script and culture are derived from the
Arakan and Mon.
Mon-Khmer kingdoms also flourished in southeast Asia before the
advent of the Burmans and Thais. Mon kings ruled lower Burma from
825 AD until Honsawadi was conquered in 1757 AD by the Burmans.
Modern day Thai and Burman culture have been greatly influenced by
the Mon. Cambodia can be said to be a modern Mon nation.
Shan or Tai kings were said to have ruled the upper reaches of the

272 273
 Irrawaddy from 754 AD until 1253 AD. Shan/Tai kings also ruled in
lowland Burma from 1287 AD in Ava, Pegu/Bago, and Toungoo. Not
being united as a single nation, Shan rulers were either independent
or paid tribute to the Chinese, Burman or Thai emperor/kings. At
the time of the British annexation of Burma, the various Shan prin-
cipalities were recognized as British Protectorate States and did not
become part of British India. Laos and Thailand can be said to be
modern Shan nations. In fact, Siam and Shan and Thai and Tai are
synonymous.
The first Burman kingdom or empire was founded at Pagan by
A-naw-ratha in 1044 AD. The second was founded at Pegu/Bago by
Tabin-shwe-hti in 1539 AD. Tabin-shwe-hti’s brother, King Bayin-
naung expanded the Burman empire by conquering Thailand (1569
AD) and some of the Shan states. He is a major hero of the cur-
rent regime in Burma. The third Burman empire was founded by
Alaung-paya at Ava in 1752 AD. In common lore, General Ne Win’s
rule was the fourth Burman empire, and the current military regime
is the fifth.
According to this mindset, the Burman empires were interrupted by
the British in the 19th century. The British divided up the Burman em-
pire into the various ethnic states which today are causing a problem be-
cause these states now refuse to acknowledge Burman suzerainty over
them. It is, therefore, the duty of all Burman patriots to re-establish the
Burman empire to its former glory. This may sound strange in the 21st
century but the underlying concept may go a long way towards explain-
ing some of the seemingly inexplicable strategies of the Burma Army
such as the exclusion of ethnic nationalities in the higher ranks of the
military and in the political process; the near-genocidal suppression of
ethnic insurgencies; etc.
From the point of view of the ethnic nationalities, their kingdoms
were also interrupted by the advent of the British. But this interruption
was beneficial. It especially enabled the Shan/Tai and Karenni to rebuild
their nations. While the Arakan and Mon were not able to re-establish
their kingdoms, their histories and their status as distinct entities were
recognized. The Chin, Kachin, and Karen who did not have kingdoms
and prior to the British colonization had little to do with the Burmans,
gained recognition through their service in the British armed forces.
This was especially true during the Second World War.
This may also be another factor in the “Burman – ethnic nationa-
lities ” conflict. The ethnic nationalities remained loyal to Britain and
fought the Japanese Imperial Army in the jungles behind the front
lines. Burman nationalists, however, actively assisted the Japanese war
Multi-Party Talks on Burma:Overseeing a Transition from Military Rule
274
effort in order to drive the British out. War-time atrocities further fueled
a Burman-Karen conflict.
After the war, in February 1947, Aung San (father of Aung San Suu
Kyi) attended the 2nd Panglong Conference convened by the Supreme
Council of the United Hill Peoples (SCOUHP). As a Member of the
Executive Council of the British Governor of Burma, Aung San came
to the Conference to persuade the gathered Chin, Kachin and Shan
leaders to agree to join the ‘Frontier Areas’ to ‘Ministerial Burma’ and
together seek early independence from Britain. The Aung San-Atlee
Agreement, reached earlier in London in January 1947, had stipulated
that the peoples of the Frontier Areas be consulted about their future.
The 1947 Panglong Agreement became the basis for the new Repu-
blic of the Union of Burma. The Frontier Areas Committee of Enquiry
to determine ‘the best method of associating the Frontier peoples with
the working out of the new constitution for Burma’ reported in April
1947 that:
“The importance of the Agreement lies not only in the fact that
it settles the form of association during the interim period, but
also in its enunciation of certain principles, notably that the
frontier peoples should be entitled to fundamental democratic
rights, that they should have the right to full autonomy in the
internal sphere, and that they should be entitled to receive a me-
asure of assistance from revenues of Ministerial Burma, which
are relevant to decision of the ultimate form of association.”
Since then, all Burmese constitutions from 1947 (amended to allow for
the creation of the Arakan, Mon and Karen States), to Ne Win’s Burme-
se Socialist Programme Party constitution of 1974, to the SPDC’s 1993
proposed military constitution, recognized these ethnic states:
1. Arakan State (Akyab, Kyaukpyu and Sandoway Districts of
Ministerial Burma)
2. Chin State (Chin Hills and the Arakan Hill Tracts of the Fron-
tier Areas)
3. Kachin State (Myitkyina and Bhamo Districts of the Frontier
Areas)
4. Karen State (Salween District of the Frontier Areas, and eas-
tern Toungoo, parts of Thaton and Amherst Districts of Minis-
terial Burma)
5. Kayah State (Karenni States - Frontier Areas)
275
 6. Mon State (parts of the Thaton and Amherst Districts of Mi- Democracy versus Military Rule
nisterial Burma)
Added to this already difficult situation is the tendency internationally
7. Shan State (Federated Shan States including Northern and
to oversimplify the struggle in Burma as a struggle between good and
Southern Shan States, the Kachin Hill Tracts of Northern Hsen-
evil, a struggle between the forces of democracy and totalitarianism, a
wi and Mongmit States, Kokang, and Northern and Southern
struggle between peaceful Buddhist monks and warmongering soldi-
Wa States - Frontier Areas).
ers, a struggle between Daw Aung San Suu Kyi, a helpless heroine and
Senior-General Than Shwe, an all-powerful king. They make very good
The following Frontier Areas were incorporated into Ministerial Bur-
copy for the media.
ma:
But if we keep to this mindset, there can be no compromises, no
a) Naga Hills District (including Somra Tract and the Thaungdut dialogue, no national reconciliation, and no political solution. In this
and Singkaling Hkamti Shan States) scenario, someone has to win and someone has to lose. There cannot
b) Upper Chindwin District (Homalin Sub-division and Tamu be a win-win solution. While this could be very emotionally satisfying if
township) the forces of evil were to lose, the reality is that if we push for this sce-
nario of winners and losers, the likely winners will be the military, not
While each state is named after the major ethnic group residing in the
the democracy advocates or the ethnic nationalities.
state, it is recognized that each state is multi-ethnic as is ‘Burma Proper’
It is also ironic that while Daw Aung San Suu Kyi herself has called
or ‘Ministerial Burma’. The basis for the states is historical rather than
for dialogue and advocates a non-violent Gandhian struggle against
racial.
oppression, the rhetoric in the democracy camp especially amongst the
From the point of view of the ethnic nationalities then, the basis for
diaspora is one of violent regime change. The frustration with the two-
national unity should be the 1947 Panglong Agreement where equal
decade old political deadlock and the specific needs of modern media
partners agreed to voluntarily join their territories together to form a
may have added to this sense of confrontation rather than compromise.
new democratic nation.
The underlying desire is to punish the generals, not to find a practical
The Burma Army’s motto of “One blood, one voice, and one com-
solution. This in turn has led to call for more sanctions, which I would
mand” to promote national unity troubles the ethnic nationalities.
also like to touch upon briefly later.
Atrocities committed by the Burma Army in the ethnic states since in-
I just want to mention here that simply bringing democracy to
dependence in 1948 have also raised the question of whether the Burma
Burma will not solve our problems. Apart from the issue of ethnic iden-
Army is not an invading army of a rejuvenated Burman empire. Ethnic
tity mentioned earlier, it must be remembered that the problems with
nationalists, therefore, see their struggle for self-determination not as
the ethnic nationalities started in the democratic period of Burma’s
an insurgency but as a war of national survival.
history.
These conflicting concepts of nation building may add to the ge-
After Burma became independent in 1948, the Communist Party of
nuine fear in the region that removing the iron grip of the Burmese
Burma denounced it because independence had not been achieved th-
military will open up a Pandora ’s Box of separatist ethnic movements.
rough a people’s revolution. The Communist Party went underground
But the situation in Burma is not sustainable and sooner or later, these
and Aung San’s private army, the People’s Volunteer Organization (vete-
issues will have to be addressed. The National Reconciliation Program-
rans from the war), the paramilitary Union Military Police, Special Po-
me managed by the Euro-Burma Office has made significant headway
lice Reservists, and Burman units of the Burma Army mutinied. Only
in trying to resolve these issues amongst the ethnic nationalities, but
the 4th Burma Rifles remained loyal. The ethnic army units – notably
the international community has yet to recognize let alone address
the Chin and Kachin Rifles – rallied behind the government and saved
these problems. I have touched on this matter only to illustrate that the
the day. This was the first major challenge for Prime Minister U Nu of
problems in Burma are deep-rooted and complex. They will not yield to
the newly independent nation.
easy solutions and greater efforts will be needed if we want democracy
The second major challenge was the Karen uprising in 1949. The
in Burma.
Karen who served with distinction during the Second World War had

Multi-Party Talks on Burma:Overseeing a Transition from Military Rule

276 277
 been promised a state of their own. But negotiations with U Nu broke
down and a massacre of Karen civilians triggered an uprising. The
Commander-in-Chief of the Burma Army who was a Karen was repla-
ced by Ne Win, who had commanded the 4th Burma Rifles. This was
the beginning of the process of the Burmanization of the Burma Army.
Other challenges included the Karenni’s non-acceptance of the Union
of Burma. In 1887, Karenni sovereignty had been recognized by the
British and since they had not participated in the Panglong Conference,
Karenni leaders fought to break away from the Union.
The next major challenge was the “Kuomingtang ” invasion of Shan
State. Retreating from Mao-Tse-Tung’s Red Army, Chinese nationalist
troops backed by the Central Intelligence Agency made Shan State
their base from which to invade China. They were finally pushed out
of Burma into Thailand in the early 1960’s with the help of the Chinese
People’s Liberation Army. But in trying to assert Burmese sovereignty,
Burma Army troops operating in Shan State committed atrocities
against the civilian population. This led to widespread dissatisfaction
and a call for Shan State to exercise its constitutional right to secede
from the Union of Burma. Shan leaders led by Sao Shwe Thaike, the
first president of independent Burma, formed the “Federal Movement”
and instead tried to amend the constitution.
In 1962, U Nu accepted this proposal. But General Ne Win, claiming
that a federal system of government would break up the country, seized
power.
Therefore, if we want the Burma Army to return to the barracks, the
constitutional arrangement with the ethnic nationalities has to be sett-
led. In this context, it would seem sensible to endorse the 1994 United
Nations General Assembly resolution that called for a “Tripartite Dialo-
gue ” – the military, democracy advocates, and the ethnic nationalities
– in order to solve Burma’s problems and build a sustainable democracy
in Burma.
Sanctions versus Engagement
In addition to the simplified “democracy versus military rule” solution,
the policy debate on Burma always focuses on sanctions and engage-
ment and whether either option works. The problem is that no one in
these debates bothers to define what we want to achieve through either
sanctions or engagements.
What is the strategic objective of either applying sanctions or en-
gaging with the generals? Is our goal the overthrow of these generals,
punishing them, or bringing about change in Burma? Without a com-
Multi-Party Talks on Burma:Overseeing a Transition from Military Rule
278
mon goal, the proponents of both sanctions and engagement can claim
success for their own self-defined goals.
In the sanctions debate, the main focus is on democracy and human
rights. The concept is that the Burmese military should be punished
and pressured to enter into a dialogue with the opposition.
On the engagement side, the focus is on the economy. The concept
is that there is no democracy in Burma because its economy is not
developed. It is said that engagement and trade with the generals will
develop the economy and entice the generals to reform. Or alternately,
a more affluent and a larger middle-class will influence the generals to
change.
If we define our goal as punishing the generals, the sanctions have
worked while engagement has not. If we define our goal as pressuring
the generals to enter into a dialogue with the opposition, neither has
worked. If we define our goal as bringing about change in Burma, again
neither policy has worked.
I have myself been very active in calling for sanctions. My first ob-
jective was to raise the profile of Burma and get the international com-
munity committed to the idea that it has a moral obligation to act. In
this sense, I believe the sanctions policy has been very successful, and I
believe that the international community is now very aware of the situa-
tion in Burma and is committed to finding a solution.
The second objective was symbolic. I wanted sanctions imposed so
that the generals will know that their behaviour is not acceptable, and
that they need to change. I also wanted the people of Burma to know that
they are not alone. The world does care about what is happening in their
country and is concerned. Again, I believe that this objective has been
met, although the generals are not convinced that they need to change.
The third objective was to pressure the generals into having a dialo-
gue with the opposition and bringing about change. This objective has
not been met.
It has failed for several reasons. One is the fact that the sanctions
have not been multilateral and Burma’s neighbours in particular have
helped to negate the effects of the sanctions. The other factor is that the-
re is no real political will within the international community to bring
about change in Burma. Burma is not high on any nation’s priorities.
Burma has been isolated for so long that it has no impact on the global
scene. For most countries, Burma is an abnormality that should either
be exploited or dealt with but it does not make much of a difference
one way or the other. There are a few exceptions, such as the Nordic
countries which have been trying to make a real difference, but in gene-
ral, there is no will to invest political capital in Burma.
279
 Burma is an embarrassment for the Association of South East Asian
Nations (ASEAN) but it can continue to function without doing anyth-
ing drastic.
Access to the Indian Ocean and regional stability are strategic issues
for China but there are more pressing issues. The same can be said of
India’s containment of China policy and its energy security concerns.
Yes, the European Union has renewed its Common Position. But do
the generals in Naypyitaw care? What more can the European Union
do?
President George Bush has also issued another Executive Order but
what do these actually amount to other than being symbolic and of good
publicity value? Will the USA jeopardize its trade relations with China
in order to bring about political change in Burma?
The United Nations Security Council has recently issued another
statement on Burma. But what will the Security Council do if the Bur-
mese generals continue to ignore the UN Secretary-General’s “good
offices ” mandate? Will the Security Council be able to adopt a binding
resolution on Burma? Even if China were for some reason, such as the
Olympics, able to agree to a resolution, will Russia agree? It is extremely
unlikely that both nations will refrain from using their veto. But even if
both nations agree and the UN Security Council passes a binding reso-
lution, what will the UN do if the generals refuse to comply?
Will the UN send in troops to make the Burmese generals comply?
Given the experience in Iraq and Afghanistan, I do not think the in-
ternational community is prepared at this time to do much more in
Burma.
But the third reason why we have not been successful in bringing
about change in Burma is probably related to the fact that Burma is a
“critically weak state ” which is not capable of changing on its own.
Weak States
A recent Brookings Institution analysis4 and a University of Maryland
study5 suggest that Burma is a “critically weak state ” that requires a dif-
ferent approach than the strategies that have been applied.
For a number of years now, Burma has been identified by various
governments like the UK and institutions like the OECD/ World Bank
as a “fragile” state or a country on its way to becoming a “failed” state.
“Weak” states are defined by the Brookings Institution as countries
lacking the capacity and/or will to foster an environment conducive to:
1. Sustainable and equitable economic growth
Multi-Party Talks on Burma:Overseeing a Transition from Military Rule
280
2. Establish and maintain legitimate, transparent, and accoun-
table political institutions
3. Secure their population from violent conflict and to control
their territory
4. Meet the basic human needs of their population
In this context, Burma is a ‘critically weak’ state in the bottom 20 percent
of the 141 countries surveyed. Burma’s overall ranking is number 17 with
a score of 4.16. The lowest score is 0.52 and highest score is 9.41.
What is interesting about this analysis is that Burma is in the com-
pany of mostly Sub-Saharan African countries like Burundi number 5,
Chad number 16, Congo (Dem Republic number 3 and Republic num-
ber 20) Eritrea number 14, Ethiopia number 19, Sierra Leone number
13, Somalia number 1, Sudan number 6, and Zimbabwe number 8.
It is interesting because when we talk about Burma, most people com-
pare it to South Africa number 110, or former Eastern European countries
– Czech Republic, Slovak Republic number 141, Hungary number 140,
or Poland number 135, or to other Asian countries that have undergone a
transition (weak states) – Cambodia number 34, East Timor number 43,
Indonesia number 77, and the Philippines number 58.
But from the analysis, Burma has more in common with Sub-Saha-
ran African countries than with Asia except for Afghanistan number
2 and North Korea number 15. If this is true, this means that policies
that may have worked in South Africa, Eastern Europe, or even in other
Asian countries will not work in Burma. It also means that transition in
Burma is not likely to follow the Eastern European model. The question
then is, what will work in Burma?
The key definition of a “weak ” state is that it is incapable or unwil-
ling to fulfill its responsibilities as a government. In other words, there
is a disconnect between the rulers and the ruled. This explains why
neither sanctions nor engagement with the SPDC have yielded the
desired results. Sanction may hurt the population and the regime, but
the regime is able to find ways to evade the sanctions, and after a time
nullify the pressure that it faces. But the people have no such options
and their conditions deteriorate further, which is the case in Burma and
in “critically weak ” states. The Burmese regime will also engage econo-
mically up to a point. But it will not endanger its power base and it will
not provide a climate for sustainable and equitable economic growth.
This means that, if the international community wants to bring
about change in Burma, a rather drastic new strategy – or a drastic
reinterpretation of the existing policies – may be needed. In spite of the
unacceptability of the SPDC’s undemocratic policies, the international
281
 community may have no choice but to engage the military – not to trade
and promote economic relations, but to prevent Burma from deteriora-
ting further and becoming a ”failed” state like Somalia number 1, Af-
ghanistan number 2, or the Democratic Republic of Congo number 3.
Therefore, a longer-term strategy to bring democracy to Burma ins-
tead of an immediate transition may need to be considered.
Preventing Burma from becoming a “failed ” state should serve to
unite both the “sanctions ” and the “engagement ” camps. The instability
from Burma becoming a “failed ” state would serve neither the cause of
democracy nor the cause of economic development. Both camps should
cooperate and coordinate their efforts and jointly engage the Burmese
regime to address the structural weaknesses in Burma’s economy, is-
sues of good governance, human security and the government’s ability
to meet the basic human needs of its population.
What then should the international community do?
The Burmese Military
Unfortunately, the only real political actors in Burma are the generals.
Burma’s survival and future are priorities for them. They have in the
past five decades, and will in the foreseeable future, set the political
agenda. The democratic opposition and the ethnic nationalities are
important political actors too. But to date, they have not been able to
counter-balance the military.
Again unfortunately, the generals do not intend to give up power.
They feel the pressure to change. But if possible, they will only concede
minor points to ease the pressure and continue with their basic Road
Map to ensure that the military has a leading role in Burma’s political
future. The generals do not want to speak to anybody. They have a plan
and they are confident they can carry it out.
In this context, the regime in February 2008 announced a referen-
dum for its new constitution on 10 May 2008, and general elections in
2010. Preparations are underway to ensure that the people vote “Yes ”.
This is happening in spite of the fact that a cyclone hit Burma in early
May causing possibly up to 60,000 deaths.
Reactions from the Burmese democracy movement to the military’s
plans for a referendum and elections are predictably negative. Scepti-
cism about the referendum and elections being “free and fair ” are wi-
despread. Most Burmese are of the opinion that the military is planning
to win the referendum at all costs. They believe that the generals would
not have call for a referendum unless it had found a way to determine
the outcome. The fact that an election date has been set is also seen as
Multi-Party Talks on Burma:Overseeing a Transition from Military Rule
282
an indication that the military has already decided the outcome of the
referendum.
The National League for Democracy and other political parties that
have been excluded from the constitutional process are calling for a
“No ” vote for the referendum. They will also likely reject the new elec-
tions as fraudulent. At stake are:
a) The results of the 1990 general elections;
b) The political future/exclusion of the Daw Aung San Suu Kyi,
the NLD, the United Nationalities League for Democracy / Uni-
ted Nationalities Association and others including the National
Coalition Government of the Union of Burma and National
Council of the Union of Burma, whose mandates derived from
the election results;
c) The legitimizing of military rule.
The ethnic armies with ceasefire agreements – United Wa State Army,
Kachin Independence Army, Shan State Army, New Mon State Party,
etc. – will not be able to influence the outcome of the referendum. They
will also likely participate in the new elections as political parties. A
crucial question is whether they can participate in the elections without
giving up their arms? Most groups are not happy with the military’s
constitution and do not want to give up their arms until a satisfactory
constitutional arrangement is made. This will be a major issue to re-
solve in the next two years leading to the elections.
Most ethnic armies that do not have a ceasefire agreement – Karen
National Union, Shan State Army (South), Karenni National Progress
Party, Chin National Front, etc. – will side with the NLD and other po-
litical parties if they continue to be excluded by the Burmese military.
But if the generals make overtures and offer them comparable terms
to those given to the ethnic armies with ceasefire agreements, some
groups might participate in the military’s Road Map process. To date,
the military has not done so and this means that even after the elections
in 2010, these ethnic insurgencies will continue to be a problem.
But whatever the motivation or game plan, it is clear that the gene-
rals –
1. Are preparing for a change in the governance;
2. Are preparing for a change in leadership;
3. Have set a time-table for the change in governance.
The dilemma is that by rejecting the military’s plans because they are
not perfect or not in accordance with what we want, we may be pro-
longing the dictatorship. By opposing the National Convention in 1993,
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 have we not prolonged military rule by 14 years? General Ne Win’s one-
party rule by the Burmese Socialist Programme Party was imposed in
1974. It collapsed 14 years later in 1988. Could a similar fate not await
the SPDC’s new game plan?
In 1990, most of us in exile rejected the call for elections and called
for a boycott. We had to reverse our stand when the NLD unexpectedly
won 82 percent of the seats. Should we this time also call for a boycott or
should we be preparing our people to contest the elections in 2010?
But if the opposition endorses the military’s Road Map, it would
mean that the 1990 election results are no longer valid. This in turn
would mean that Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and the 1990 election-winning
parties no longer have a mandate. Worse still, the new elections will
legitimize military rule.
According to the new constitution:
• Political prisoners like Daw Aung San Suu Kyi cannot contest
the elections;
• Basic human rights are not guaranteed;
• Power is concentrated in the President, who must have mili-
tary experience;
• There will be no independent judiciary;
• There will be no independent legislature;
• The President can decide the national budget;
• The Commander-in-Chief can seize power if he deems natio-
nal security is threatened;
• The Commander-in-Chief will appoint 25% of national legis-
lators;
• The Commander-in-Chief will appoint 33% of regional and
state legislators;
• The Commander-in-Chief will appoint the Minister of De-
fence who reports to him;
• The military will be independent of the new elected govern-
ment;
• Cannot be amended except with the approval of more than
75% of the representatives in both houses of Parliament, and
more than 50% approval of all eligible voters.
So it is clear that the new constitution will not lead to a democracy
– “disciplined ” or otherwise. So, the question, is why participate in the
elections?
Is this the end of the road then? Is this a win-win solution for the
military and a lose-lose solution for the democracy movement?
Multi-Party Talks on Burma:Overseeing a Transition from Military Rule
284
Options
Fortunately, the generals are not gods. They too have to die one day.
Senior-General Than Shwe is 75 years old and reportedly not in good
health. Therefore, we need to be prepared for a generational change.
Secondly, the results of the May 10th referendum, like the severity of
the cyclone, may be a surprise. The Senior-General and most Burmese
expect the generals to win. Vote manipulation is almost a foregone con-
clusion. But there are indications that the military as a whole was taken
by surprise by the Senior-General’s decision to hold the referendum in
May, so soon after the uprisings in September 2007. It is possible that
there is no master plan in place to ensure that the vote will be ‘Yes’.
It will likely depend on the zeal of each local commander and results
could be patchy.
Thirdly, even if the referendum produces the results that the mi-
litary wants, there is no guarantee that the military will be able to
maintain the absolute grip on power that it has managed to have up to
now. Some political space has to be opened up if the election process
is to have any credibility at all. Some opposition parties may be able
to win some of the seats out of the 75% non-appointed national seats
and 67% non-appointed regional and state seats. This could introduce
some level of limited debate as opposed to no debate today. In the
early days of the National Convention that was convened in 1993, the
opposition was able to use the controlled forum to air their disagre-
ement.
But even if the military appointed 25% of the national seats and
33% of the regional and state seats, and ex-military officers won all the
remaining seats, there could still be room for disagreement. During Ne
Win’s Burmese Socialist Programme Party era, the arrangement bet-
ween serving and ex-service officers worked well because the socialist
philosophy at that time frowned upon excessive wealth. The Burmese
military today espouses capitalism and uses their privileges as officers
to accrue wealth. Those officers who are required to doff their uniforms
to become “civilian ” elected representatives will lose their privileges
and immediately become poor. This could create another unexpected
dynamic within the ruling elite. Therefore, the situation may not be as
bleak as it seems on the surface.
In any case, it behooves the international community to be prepared
if an opportunity presents itself. What would a transition plan look like,
assuming the Burmese generals want to talk? And what role can the
international community play in such a transition plan?
285
 Framework for a Transition
Assuming that the generals want a transition and are willing to start a
dialogue, there will be two processes, one domestic and one internatio-
nal to support the domestic process.
On the domestic front, key objectives for the negotiation should
include:
1. A peaceful transition to democracy
2. Building peace and ensuring justice
3. Safeguarding the territorial integrity of Burma
4. Affirming Burma’s sovereignty
5. Making Burma a prosperous nation
6. No recrimination or fault finding
Ideally, participants in the dialogue and negotiations should include:
1. Members of the Burmese military:
Members of the State Peace and Development Council
Members of the War Office/Ministry of Defence
Regional Commanders
2. Democracy advocates –
Political parties that won in the 1990 elections.
(Rohingyas had a party that won several seats
in the 1990 elections).
Political parties that will participate/participated
in the 2010 elections
88 Generation students (in Burma, in prison and in exile).
Others political groups including exiles (NCGUB, NCUB, etc.).
3. Ethnic Nationalities:
Representatives of the seven ethnic states considered
‘legal’ by the military including ceasefire groups.
Representatives of the seven ethnic states considered ‘illegal’
by the military, mainly non-ceasefire groups and exiles.
They include Rohingyas and smaller nationalities.
4. Buddhist, Christian, Muslim and other religious leaders.
5. Others – Academics, businessmen, workers, etc.
Multi-Party Talks on Burma:Overseeing a Transition from Military Rule
286
But it must be kept in mind that –
A. No individual Burmese general, no matter how willing he is
to negotiate, can go against the collective will of the officer elite.
Therefore, any plan that directly infringes on the rights and po-
wers of the military will not work.
B. The Burmese military genuinely believes that it is the only
institution capable of safeguarding Burma’s sovereignty and
territorial integrity. Any plan must take into consideration the
military’s key role in Burma’s future. It must also not infringe
on Burma’s sovereignty or affect its territorial integrity.
C. Since its independence, Burma has remained neutral in
international big- power politics. Any plan must respect this
neutrality, or it will not work.
D. The Burmese military needs to be an active participant in any
international process. It is paranoid and tends to be suspicious
of any process especially if it is not in control. Without the con-
sent and participation of the military, there can be no national
reconciliation in Burma.
Given these key requirements, the current international mechanism
for bringing about change in Burma will not work, and the generals
will not talk. But if there were the political will, it would be possible to
engage the generals in a dialogue:
1. First, the international community would need to accept
the official name “Myanmar”. This is a major concession that
the democracy movement and the international community
will have to make. I have personally argued to retain “Burma”
based on the democratic principle that the people and not an
elite should decide on a country’s name. But if this is the price
we have to pay to get a dialogue going to bring about change in
Burma, we should pay it for the sake of the people. In addition,
it makes no real difference to a Burmese whether Burma or My-
anmar is used. In reality, they mean the same thing: Burma is
colloquial and Myanmar is the literary form.
2. It needs to be mutually agreed by the international commu-
nity and the people of Burma, especially the generals, that the
current situation in Burma is not beneficial to either the people
of Burma or the international community.
3. Instead of merely making demands for the generals to
change, the international community could approach the gene-
287
 rals to see how the concerns of the generals can be addressed as
we seek to bring about change together.
4. Instead of trying to impose external solutions, the internatio-
nal community needs to convince the generals that their advice
and suggestions could help Burma become a respected mem-
ber of the community. In this sense, the UN needs to find a way
to convert the UN Secretary-General’s “good offices ” mandate
into multi-party talks based on a combination of the “Six-Party
Talks on North Korea”6 and the “Quartet of International Medi-
ators for the Middle East”7 as outlined below.
5. The United Nation’s involvement is crucial because the pe-
ople of Burma (both the military and the opposition – democra-
cy advocates and ethnic armies) are more likely to accept a UN
solution rather than a Chinese solution or an ASEAN solution.
6. The UN Secretary-General’s “good offices ” process (Gambari)
is more acceptable to the military, China, India and Russia. The
advantage of the Gambari process is that it gives direct access
to the top decision-maker in the military which is crucial. The
disadvantage of this process is that it lacks an enforceable
mechanism, and needs back-up from the UN Security Council.
7. The UN Security Council process carries more weight but it
is not acceptable to China, India and Russia for several reasons
including:
The UN Security Council initiative is seen as a US-led attempt to inter-
fere in domestic matters using the excuse of violations of human rights
and democracy which cannot be denied in the case of Burma;
The perceived ultimate end result of UN Security Council involve-
ment is foreign troops in Burma. This is unacceptable to both India and
China.
This may change if the situation deteriorates further and the insta-
bility becomes untenable for China. One possible scenario – frustrated
Burmese turn on the visible perceived allies of the SPDC. In other
words, the mobs turn on Chinese businesses in Burma like the 1967-68
anti-Chinese riots. In such a case, China could either turn to the UN
Security Council or take matters into its own hands.
If the above conditions can be met, it must be made clear that the
goal of the multi-party talks is not to overthrow the military regime but
to help the people of Burma to reconcile their differences and to have a
peaceful transition.
Multi-Party Talks on Burma:Overseeing a Transition from Military Rule
288
Goals of Multi-Party Talks8:
• To affirm the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Union
of Myanmar;
• To assist in the process of national reconciliation in the Union
of Myanmar;
• To assist in the transition to democracy in the Union of Myan-
mar;
• To assist in the economic integration of the Union of Myan-
mar into regional and global markets.
Possible Participants in the Multi-Party Talks:
1. ASEAN - 3 seats (Thailand, Laos & ASEAN Chair)
2. China
3. European Union - 2 seats (Presidency & Commission)
4. Japan
5. Russian Federation
6. South Asia - 2 seats (India & Bangladesh)
7. Union of Myanmar
8. United Nations – 2 seats (S-G Representative and UN
Resident Coordinator)
9. United States of America
Possible Concrete Benefits from Multi-Party Talks:
• Coordination of increased humanitarian aid. This is particu-
larly relevant in light of the current crisis after the cyclone.
• Coordination of technical assistance by the Asian Develop-
ment Bank, the World Bank, International Monetary Fund,
Japan, China, India and others.
• Coordination of economic strategies in the region.
• Coordination of strategies to combat HIV-AIDS, infectious
diseases, drugs, human trafficking, environmental degrada-
tion, transnational crime, etc.
• Peaceful transition to a democracy.
Role of Burma’s Neighbours
India’s policy towards Burma is based on the strategic containment
of China, the security of its energy needs, and the insurgencies in the
northeast. But China is already the country with the most influence on
the Burmese generals. India cannot hope to balance China’s influence
289
 without quickly losing both its friends and credibility in the internatio-
nal community. No amount of goodwill gestures or the sale of arms at
friendship prices will tip the balance in favour of India. Its concern for
the security of its energy needs cannot also be addressed by cosying
up to the generals. They will sell energy from Burma to whoever they
believe will benefit them at any particular time. The only way India
could hope to secure its energy supply is if Burma were to change and
adopt open market policies. In such a case, its energy resource would
be sold to the highest bidder, and not for political considerations. The
economic development of Burma would also open up India’s northeast.
India has tried very hard by political means to resolve its problems in
the northeast. Much has been achieved but until the northeast develops
economically, the problems will remain. Therefore, the key to success
for India’s strategic concerns is a stable democratic and competent go-
vernment in Burma.
China’s Burma policy is based on economic development and stabi-
lity. Its eastern seaboard has developed by leaps and bounds. But there
is an imbalance with western and south-western China. To correct this
imbalance and develop the west, China needs access to the Indian
Ocean. In the 1990s China poured resources into Burma to encourage
the generals to open up a sea route for China’s Yunnan province. The
Burmese generals did not deliver. Another fact that worries China is
that the Chinese do not want their economic development to exceed
their neighbours by too great a rate and expose themselves as a prime
target for jealous competitors. They want the neighbourhood to develop
in tandem with them. Burma, however, is a black hole and it is drawing
unwanted attention to China by its wrong-headed policies. An emer-
ging strategy concern for China though is its energy security. As China
develops, its need for energy will increase dramatically. Most of China’s
oil supplies today come from the Middle East. These crucial supplies
reach China via a circuitous route through the Straits of Malacca. In any
confrontation with the USA, the Straits would become a choke point for
these vital supplies. An alternate strategic supply route through Burma
is gaining popularity.
The hinese have, therefore, already decided that the status quo in
Burma is not in their national interest. In spite of the veto in January
2007 at the UN Security Council, China is actively working with the UN
to help bring about change in Burma. It is not interfering in domestic
Burmese affairs but it is helping to create a climate where Burmese
stakeholders may solve the problem themselves.
Therefore, a Multi-Party Talk on Burma would benefit both India
and China.
Multi-Party Talks on Burma:Overseeing a Transition from Military Rule
290
Thailand’s policy towards Burma has been one of exploitation and
appeasement, and keeping the Burma Army at a distance. Faced with
an unpredictable and belligerent neighbour, Thailand has generally had
a buffer zone along its long undemarcated borders. But if both sout-
hwest China and northeast India were to open up with a democratic
and stable Burma, Thailand could benefit much more from these two
gigantic markets than merely exploiting Burma’s resources.
Bangladesh could also benefit more from a stable and open market
economy in Burma in terms of its food security. It would also benefit
from not having to periodically host Rohingya refugees and add a bur-
den to its already overloaded infrastructure.
Even Laos would benefit because it will have more access to markets
in the west. Its access to China to the north would also be enhanced.
Therefore, in conclusion, a Multi-Party Talk on Burma including the
Burmese military and Burma’s neighbours would benefit all concerned.
What is needed now is the political will - both domestic and internatio-
nal – to bring it about.
The alternative is to do nothing until the crisis can no longer be ig-
nored. The situation after the cyclone should be a lesson that we cannot
afford to wait.
Notes
1
”Burma in Revolt – Opium and Insurgency since 1948”, Bertil Lintner, 1999, Silkworm
Books, Chiang Mai, and ”Burma – Insurgency and the Politics of Ethnicity”, Martin
Smith, 1991, Zed Books, London, UK.
2
”Burmese Nationalists Movements 1940–1948”, 1989, Kiscadale Publications, Edin-
burgh, UK.
3
”Making Enemies – War and State Building in Burma”, Mary P Callahan, 2003, Cornell
University Press.
4
”Index of State Weakness in the Developing World”, Susan E Rica and Stewart Patrick,
2008, Brookings Institution, USA. www.brookings.edu
5
”Peace and Conflict 2008”, J Joseph Hewitt, Jonathan Wilkenfeld, and Ted Robert Gurr,
2008, Center for International Development and Crisis Management, University of
Maryland, USA. www.cidcm.umd.edu
6
”Six-Party Talks” - North Korea, South Korea, China, Japan, Russia & the USA.
7
“Quartet of International Mediators for the Middle East” – The UN, the EU, Russia &
the USA.
8 Attachment to letter of Saw Ba Thin Sein, Chairman, Ethnic Nationalities Council,
Union of Burma, to Ban Ki-Moon, United Nations General-Secretary, 24 September
2007 - “Multi-Party Talks”, Concept Paper.
291
 The Economic Development
of Burma and the Sanctions
against Burma – An Assessment
Michael von Hauff

Introduction
The sanctions by western countries against Burma are controversial.
The supporters of the sanctions argue that the military regime has
oppressed and exploited its own people and ignored human rights for
decades. As a result, the population has suffered material and social
impoverishment, which is unacceptable to the Western democracies.
Therefore, sanctions were imposed to punish the military junta. The
opponents claim that the sanctions are counter-productive; that the
sanctions have led only to a political blockade by the military regime
and the situation of the population has grown steadily worse. Only
targeted cooperation or assistance in specific areas such as health,
education, and research as well as cooperation with the few civil society
organizations can improve the living conditions of the population and
bring about a change in the despised policies. This paper provides a
brief examination of where Burma stands today in economic terms and
where the country’s real potential lie.
In the years following its independence in 1948, Burma/Myanmar
was one of the economically wealthiest countries in south-east Asia.
For many experts, the period between 1950 and 1962 was the “golden
age” of the post war era. “The eight-year ‘Pyidawtha’ Plan saw solid ac-
hievements in infrastructure, agriculture and industry, despite failing
to meet its ambitious targets because of the collapse in the price of rice
after the Korean War” (Kyi et. al 2000, p. 2). Then, in 1962, the “Bur-
mese Way of Socialism” began. This period has been analyzed and dif-
ferentiated in great detail, for example, by Perry (2007). In 1988, after 26
years of socialist rule, a military government came to power, known as
the “State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC).” This military
junta continues to govern the country to this day.
The military government initiated a process of transformation from
a planned economy to a market economy in the years after 1988; it has
not yet been possible to conclude this process. From a present perspec-

292 293
 tive, it occasionally even appears as though the transformation process
is still in its initial stages. First reforms and liberalization policies were
introduced after 1988, intended above all to ease inflows of foreign in-
vestment and capital into the country. However, many of the reforms
announced did not materialize, or have not been implemented rigo-
rously so far. For this reason, Burma is currently in a “double transition
from underdevelopment and from socialism (Andreff 1993, pp. 515).”
Rüland neatly sums up the initial situation: “It needs little foresight
to forecast that Burma/Myanmar’s transition is likely to take place under
highly adverse and difficult circumstances. Most likely it is a transition
paralleled by economic crises, at a low level of economic development
accompanied by spells of violence and ethnic fragmentation. The long
duration of authoritarian rule further complicates a smooth transition
as there is virtually no institutional base from which a new democratic
government can be built (Rüland 2002, p. 22).”
Irrespective of this appraisal, however, it must be said – and here a
remarkable contradiction becomes apparent – that Burma belongs to
those countries that are rich in natural resources. Compared with many
countries in the region, Burma has considerable deposits of minerals,
natural gas, and oil, a great potential for an economically profitable
timber industry, and large and fertile areas of land for agricultural use
(Perry 2007, p.13). Most economic experts agree, however, that the eco-
nomic potential for development has been insufficiently exploited in
Burma, at least in the past four decades. Compared in both absolute and
relative terms with other developing countries in the region, Burma has
revealed a tendency to stagnate. Many experts even speak of economic
and social regress as opposed to progress.
Although Burma is one of the richest countries in terms of raw ma-
terials, many indicators reveal, economically at least, that Burma is one
of the least developed countries in the region. As an example, let us look
at per capita income as an indicator of how Burma compares with other
countries in the region. While per capita income was more or less the
same in many countries in the region at the beginning of the 1950s, the
differences between them have increased enormously since that time.
This is especially true for Malaysia but also applies to Thailand. At the
other end of the spectrum, the per capita income of Burma first fell
below that of Indonesia during the mid 1980s and has been losing con-
siderable ground to the Philippines as well since that time. In 1998/99,
according to the World Bank classification, Burma’s per capita income
of 300 US$ made it one of the poorest developing countries (Least De-
veloped Countries – LDCs).
The question to be asked is why the military regime has been unable
The Economic Development of Burma and the Sanctions against Burma
294
to improve the standard of living. The next section first looks at what
is required to maintain power in a dictatorship. This is approached in
the context of a theoretical justification for the “political economy of
dictatorship.” Section three turns to the economic development and the
quality of life of the population under a military regime. In section four,
we will discuss and show evidence of the impact of sanctions on the
living conditions of the Burmese population.
The political economy of dictatorship
The political economy of dictatorship is discussed in economic terms
in the context of the “new political economy”. In very general terms,
the new political economy is concerned with the political decision ma-
king processes. Here, political action is similar to economic trade and
based on the maximization of individual utility. As with the purchase
of goods, the individual must choose between two or more alternatives.
In so doing, the person weighs the alternatives and then makes a deci-
sion. As a rule, individuals will choose the alternative that provides the
greatest utility.
Similar to the market for private goods, these same process delibe-
rations can be applied to the trade in political goods. The supply of poli-
tical goods is provided by the politicians, who receive financial support
and/or votes in exchange for their political goods from the consumers
(voters). Political goods can include educational facilities, health clinics,
roads and highways, as well as the provision of energy and drinking
water.
The political calculation in maximizing utility focuses especially on
offering those political goods that have the greatest demand and there-
fore, can be traded for votes. The number of votes is decisive for access
to or retention of political power, and consequently must be maximized.
The actions of the ruling party are legitimized in the transfer of rights
by the voters. The political economy in a democracy, in which political
decisions are taken based on the reaction of the population or a cer-
tain segment of the population, is different from that in a dictatorship
(Durth, Körner, Michaelowa 2002, p. 194).
In contrast to a democracy, there is no transfer of rights to the dicta-
tor; rather he appropriates them for himself. It is important to the de-
mocratically legitimized politicians to have the right of rule repeatedly
transferred. The dictator on the other hand must be shrewd enough
never to lose the right of rule once seized. In other words, he must
make sure that no one else has the desire or the ability to wrest power
away from him. The difference between democracy and dictatorship
295
 is poignantly phrased by Kirsch: In a democracy a politician must win
over the majority, whereas, in a dictatorship the ruler must win over all
those who might want to and could remove him from power. He must
effectively neutralize those who would overthrow him (Kirsch 2004, p.
379–380).
The international community is in agreement that the military re-
gime in Burma is a dictatorship. Therefore, Burma’s political regime is
discussed here in the context of the political economy of dictatorship.
The political economy of dictatorship has been defined by Tullock
(1987), Olson (1993 and 2000), McGuire/Olson (1996), as well as Guy
Kirsch (2004). The calculation of utility maximization by a dictator or a
group of dictators may be summed up as follows: What is the most ad-
vantageous way for the ruler to insure that power will not be wrested in
the future. However, the political economy of dictatorship cannot only
be viewed from the perspective of the ruler, but also through the eyes of
those persons affected.
According to Olson (1968), in his theory about the influence of
interest groups, it is very unlikely that a large number of individuals
will unite to fight against a measure that hurts them all in roughly
the same way. In such cases, each individual citizen has only a mini-
mal motivation to undertake action against the measure (specifically,
in this case, against the dictatorial regime). This also explains the
empirically backed observation that only in the rarest of cases does
a dictator fall victim to a popular uprising. In the case of a common
cause that could benefit all, it must be expected that each individual
will wait for the other to take the first step and, in this way, get a free
ride to the profits.
This explains why the maximization calculation of the dictator or the
dictatorial regime always aims at putting an equal burden on the largest
portion of the population and selectively preventing any incentive for
an overthrow. An opportunity exists when the living standard of the
population continuously improves across the board and the people are
content. However, this generally can only be partially successful. Conse-
quently, it is necessary to pursue parallel measures to keep threatening
individuals or small groups with especially strong interests in overthro-
wing the dictatorial regime in check (Dauth, Körner, Michaelowa 2002,
p. 195). In this respect, regimes normally rely on the use of a security
apparatus that is well trained and equipped with the appropriate infor-
mation, weapons and other instruments of power.
This allows us to explain the policy decisions made by a dictatorial
regime or a dictator. Economic development, but also allocation and
distribution decisions, which favor individual sectors like health, edu-
The Economic Development of Burma and the Sanctions against Burma
296
cation, and internal security, can now be understood in the context of
the preservation of power. This is also the topic of a widely respected
article by Josef Stieglitz written in 1996, in which he explains why seve-
ral of the authoritarian regimes in the Asian region were economically
very successful. In contrast, the rather more democratically oriented
regimes were much less successful, for example, India. As long as the
population is supplied with the respective public goods such as health
and education and poverty is avoided, many dictatorial regimes are
able to retain their hold on power. The situation is quite different for
these regimes when the population reaches a higher level of need and
demands other goods like participation, democratic elections, and the
right to organize.
In the final analysis it comes down to the question of who within
the country poses a threat to the dictator or a group of ruling dictators.
The literature at this point basically names three groups: the lower,
the middle and the upper classes. There is a consensus, that the lo-
wer ranks as a rule do not have strength or desire to turn against the
dictator. They are unable to muster the motivation or the funding to
cover the expenses of revolt. The upper class is also not normally the
one that turns against the dictator as groups are small in number and
these are the ones that profit most from the dictatorship. These are
the people who belong to the groups that are most closely associated
with the dictatorial regime proper. Most of the coup d’etats – based
on empirical knowledge – originate in the middle class. According to
the theory of collective action, it is the mid-level bureaucrats and/or
the groups of majors and colonels that, in contrast to the lower clas-
ses, already possess the major means to power, like information or
decision making authority, without belonging to the ruling group of
dictators. No one individual in these groups has the chance to topple
the regime. However, a group is sufficient, if not to topple, at least to
force change on the regime. To this extent, the middle ranks have an
important strategic role.
Section three introduces three propositions known in the new poli-
tical economy and typically followed by dictators or dictatorial regimes
in their goal to retain power that the military rulers in Burma have only
conditionally upheld. This leads to the conclusion that they themselves
are unsure of their hold on power or are willing to risk their maximiza-
tion of utility (preservation of power). If we assume, as already mentio-
ned above, that Burma was until the 1950s still relatively well developed
among the countries of the region with great potential for economic
growth, it must be said today that this country has undergone an econo-
mic regression, as is discussed in more detail in the next section.
297
 Burma’s economic development 7.7% (2001/02). The large fluctuation is also conspicuous in the cons-
truction sector with 4.0% in 2000/2001 and 60.5% in 2002/03.
A comprehensive analysis of the economic development and quality of To sum up, then, Burma presents relatively a high level of economic
life of the Burmese population is beyond the scope of this paper (for a growth in the 1990s, but this tended to decline in the years after 1994/
detailed discussion of the economic and social development in Burma 95, leveling off at a level of around 5% until 1998/99 and increased until
see v. Hauff 2007). The focus of this analysis therefore is on selected 2003/04 on more than 10%. On the whole, this roughly corresponds
major economic trends and the development of the living standards of with the development in East Asian developing countries. In this con-
the population. Consequently, it is possible to recognize developmental nection, it should also be pointed out that the Asian economic crisis of
trends and how they affect the lives of the population today. Finally, we 1997 had only a minor effect on economic growth in Burma, due to the
will conclude with a discussion of the relationship between the develop- extremely dominant status of the agricultural sector and Burma’s weak
ment of the quality of life for the people and the preservation of power links with the global economy. The only appreciable effect of the crisis
by the military regime. was a significant decrease in foreign investment. Several UN experts
(e.g., UNFPA) are of the opinion that the rate is actually much lower.
Overall economic trends The IMF estimates the current GDP per capita at 250 US$, which is
The following analysis of the development of the national economy lower than that of Cambodia, Bangladesh, Laos, and Vietnam (Bünte
gives special attention to the 1990s and the early years of the new mil- 2004, p. 374).
lennium. The conventional indicators will be used to analyze and assess
macro-economic trends. Over the long term, real gross domestic pro- Figure 1: Development of GDP from 1990 to 2005
duct (real GDP) shows a positive trend. While average GDP growth was (changes in %, in real terms)
4.7% in the 1970s, it fell back to 1.8% in the 1980s. In the 1990s, average Source: Asian Development Bank, Key Indicators 2007, p.136
GDP growth reached a relatively high level of 5.8% (World Bank 1999,
p. 10). Looking more closely at the 1990s, it is striking that the rate of Development of GDP
growth was initially very low, at 2.8% in 1990/91 and even -0.6 % in (Change in %)
1991/92. In 1992/93, there was then a huge jump to 9.7%, but this rate 16
declined reaching 4.6% by 1997/98.
13,8 13,8 13,6
Only in 2000/01 was there again a slight increase in growth rate to 14 13,2
13.7%, with a constant level of more than 11% for the years 2001/02- 12
12 11,3
2005/06. However, in this context, Set Aung identified a significant 10,9
problem with the calculation method: “GDP calculation in Myanmar 10
9,7
is reportedly quite complicated, dealing both with official and parallel
rates of exchange when converting some US$ dominated figures into 8 7,5
6,9
6,4
local currency which results in inflated and misleading figures. Hence 6 5,8
6
it is neither easy nor appropriate to dollarize GDP data from local cur- 4,6
rency directly into US$ currency (Set Aung 2006).” There is no satisfac- 4
2,8
tory answer to this problem.
There are also conspicuously large differences between the various 2
sectors of the economy. For example, the agricultural sector reported -0,6
0
large variations (11.1% in 2000/01 and 4.7% in 2003/04), while the ma-
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
nufacturing and processing sector reported a growth rate of 20% in the Nonetheless,
-2 we can only draw limited conclusions from the general
period from 2000/01 to 2005/06. The lowest growth was reported in the development of economic growth in Burma. In a country in which the
lumber industry with figures ranging between 3.2% (2000/2001) and agricultural sector is extremely dominant, the growth rates in that sec-

The Economic Development of Burma and the Sanctions against Burma

298 299
 tor are particularly relevant. Several of the more important features of extremely high inflation for many years. This had a particularly nega-
the agricultural sector are: the contribution of agricultural sector as a tive impact on the poorer population groups, as 70% of their income is
share of GDP is nearly 60%. What stands out is that of the 26 million spent for the purchase of food.
acres planted in 1995/1996; nearly 20 million of these were planted
with food crops whose yields have been stagnant or decreasing over the Figure 2: Consumer Price Index 1993/94 – 2005/2006
last decade. Only one in six acres had crops whose yields outpaced the
growth of population (Dapice 2003, p. 4). Over two thirds of all employ-
ed persons are working in agriculture endeavors, yet only one third of
the population works on farms larger than 3 acres. This explains the
widespread poverty that exists in the rural areas.
Much of the labor force in the rural regions owns no land. Accor-
ding to estimates by UNDP, 40% of the population does not own any
agriculturally productive land. They work for daily wages. Beyond this,
subsistence farming is common. Many of the small farmers face the
additional problem of a lack of access to the financial sector, i.e., they
are unable to obtain loans. Another problem, especially for the small
farmer, is the fact that the prices for agricultural products are set artifici-
ally low by the government in order to prevent civil unrest in the cities.
This in turn leads to low productivity, especially by the small farmers,
who are unable to purchase affordable farm equipment because of the
low incomes.
The system of government price controls below market value had a
political objective and should have lead to higher export earnings. The
negative consequences were known to the government. In April 2003, a
liberalization of the rice trade was attempted, whereby the price of rice
was allowed to float, i.e., the state monopoly was ended (Bünte 2004, p. Source: IMF 1999, p. 13, Asian Development Bank 2007, p. 303
275). However, the liberalization was short lived. In 2004, the govern-
ment ordered a ban on the export of rice to prevent a supply shortage However, it is difficult to assess the consequences of the high infla-
at home. This resulted in a sharp price decline, which had the effect of tion rate. First, and Burma is no exception here, lower income groups
raising the inflation rate. These few examples demonstrate the incon- (which form the clear majority in Burma) have suffered the most from
sistency or impulsiveness of the agricultural policy does not contribute the high inflation rate, while the owners of real capital belong to those
to a sustainable, positive expansion in this sector. who have benefited from it. With respect to rice, which is a particularly
One further significant macroeconomic indicator for the assessment important product, urban workers have lost out as a result of inflation,
of economic development is the inflation rate. One peculiar feature of while the rural population has benefited from inflation in this respect.
the way inflation is calculated in Burma is that, up until 2000, it was In this context, it can certainly not generally be concluded that high ra-
restricted to a measurement of the consumer price index for Yangon, tes of inflation exacerbate the impoverishment of the population. There
the capital. The market basket on which this was based originated from is still no doubt that people living on irregular income are particularly
1986, when the economy was still socialist in character. Up until the hard hit by inflation.
middle of 2000, no inflation rates were measured to show price deve- Here, too, a comparison between Burma and other countries in
lopments in the various provinces. Since 2000, the inflation rate – re- the region is interesting. As the following graph shows, the inflation
trospectively also for recent years – has been measured for the country rate has been significantly higher in Burma than in other East Asian
as a whole. If the available data is looked at in isolation, Burma has had countries since 1998.

The Economic Development of Burma and the Sanctions against Burma

300 301
 Figure 3: East Asia CPI-Inflation, 1994–2006 (in percent)
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0 developments in the private sector.
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
-10
Myanmar China, People’s Rep. of Hong Kong, China
Source: Asian Development Bank, Key Indicators 2006, p. 11
As concerns the development of employment and wages, the problem
is that there is no official measurement of the unemployment rate in
Burma. Let me illustrate this with an example. According to the official
data for 1997/98, the potential number of people in gainful employment
is 19.7 million out of a total population of 46.4 million. Of this potential
figure, 18.3 million are currently employed. However, this figure does
not include those unpaid family members who are also employed. In
this respect, the official unemployment figures do not stand up to much
scrutiny. The unemployment rate stated for 1992/93 was 5.3%, while
5.8% was stated for 1994/95 and 4.1% for 1997/98 and 1998/99. The
rate of increase in the number of people in employment rose slightly in
the 1990s. While this was 1.4% in 1988/89, it rose by 2.89% in 1992/93
and stood at roughly 2.1% in the second half of the 1990s (Asian De-
velopment Bank (Volume 2) 2001, p. 15). The official unemployment
data fails to consider the problem of underemployment. Also, sanctions
aggravate the problem of joblessness. For example, as a consequence
of the closure of foreign textile manufacturing plants in the past, hund-
reds – some experts say thousands – of textile workers lost their jobs. In
this context, the situation in the job market is much more strained than
the official unemployment data would indicate.
The Economic Development of Burma and the Sanctions against Burma
302
The development of income shows relatively large fluctuations, as
income in the agricultural sector depends to a great extent on when the
monsoon starts and how heavy it is. For incomes in other sectors, it is a
different story. At first glance, incomes in the public sector appear to be
relatively stable, although it is noticeable that they rose appreciably after
1988/89 in the course of liberalization. When the high rate of inflation
is considered, however, it has to be said that they rose by only 27.5% in
the period between 1988/89 and 2000. However, in April 2000, govern-
ment workers’ wages were increased fivefold, and other public-sector
workers also received significant wage increases. In increasing these
wages, the government was reacting to growing dissatisfaction among
public-sector employees, and in this way avoided potential political ten-
sion. As discussed in section two, this reaction is typical for a political
regime under a dictator. So far, no reliable data are available for income
2003 2004 2005 2006
As one would expect, the high wage increases in the public sector in
2000 did not help to reduce the large budget deficit of the government.
Mongolia Taipei, China
While the first half of the 1990s saw a dramatic increase in the budget
deficit to 8% of GDP, it dropped again to 5% by 1999/2000, 5,8% in
2001/02, 3,6% in 2002/03 and 4,9% in 2003/04 (Asian Development
Bank 2005, p. 321). The deficit declined to below 4% in 2005/06 but re-
mains high. “This is mainly due to several recent tax measures that are
consistent with the bank´s past advice. These include steps to improve
tax administration, reduce tax evasion, raise the exchange rate used to
value imports for tariff purposes, and, more recently, contributions
from SEEs” (IMF 2006, p. 6). What impact this will have on the budget
deficit remains to be seen.
One major reason for the continuing high level of public debt is the
constant fall in the share of state revenue in GDP, from 17% in 1981/82
to 7, 9% in 1992/93 to 6, 4% in 1995/96 and to 4, and 6% in 2003/04.
The budget deficit could thus only be reduced by drastically cutting
spending. Spending as a percentage of GDP fell quite considerably,
from 7.2% in 1998/99 to 4.9% in 1999/2000. However, in 2003/04, ex-
penditures again increased to 9.5% of GDP. Burma is the only country
in the region where the budget deficit is higher than the state revenue
(4.6%) as a percentage of GDP. Most of this spending is accounted for
by economic services, followed by “other services”, which also include
military spending. The share of the military in GDP is approximately
3.2%, although experts assume that this share is considerably higher if
the expansion and modernization of the army is considered. In other
words, the military budget is probably by far the largest item in the
Burma government budget. The last available data are from 1992/93,
303
 when the military budget took up 43.8% of the total government budget
(Asian Development Bank (Volume 2) 2001, p. 22).
By contrast, social spending fell from 1.8% in 1992/93 to less than
1% in 1999/2000. Finally, it should be mentioned that the deficits of
the state economic enterprises (SEE) have increased substantially since
the beginning of the 1990s. These deficits also present a great burden
for the government budget. I will return to this topic in more detail in
section 2.3 below. Greater stability in the value of money presupposes
more autonomy for the Central Bank of Burma (CBM). Officially, the
central bank is independent, and should therefore be able to control the
money supply. In fact, however, it is very much tied to the directions
the export of natural gas. Pipelines to India and China are in planning,
although no decisions have yet been made. The decision is still pending
whether liquification should take place in Burma for later export by sea
as liquid gas. What is remarkable in this discussion is that although
natural gas is already an important export product and will continue to
be one in the future, at the same time the energy supply in Burma is
entirely insufficient, which severely impacts the economic expansion.
Figure 4: Contribution of the three sectors to real GDP 1987–2005
100%

of the government, and therefore also obliged to print more money to 90%
30,1
cover the government’s high deficits. A reduction in this high budget 80%
32,9 32,2 33,1 32,5 35,1 35,4
deficit would also require a sustained increase in significant degree for
70%
the large budget deficit. 9,9
9,7 10,5 9,7 13
Before concluding, a brief introduction to the structure of the Bur- 60% 14,3 16,2 Service
mese economy is essential. This is the case, especially for the contri- 50% Industrie
butions of the three sectors: agriculture, manufacturing, and services. Agriculture
40%
Burma’s status as a least developed country (LDC) underlines one typi-
cal feature of its economic structure. One major characteristic of LDCs 30% 57,4 57,3 60 57,2 54,5 50,6 48,4
is their extremely one-sided economic structure. In Burma, the share of 20%
the industrial sector in GDP was only 9.2% in 2002/03, and the entire 10%
secondary sector revealed a share of 13.6%. While the industrial sector
0%
has been on a constant level of less than 10% ever since the end of the
1988 1990 1995 2000 2002 2003 2004
1980s, the share of the secondary sector as a whole has risen somewhat.
Figure 4 also shows that overall economic development depends very Source: Asian Development Bank, Key Indicators 2007, p. 301
significantly on the primary sector. Standing at 55, 3% in 1987, this
sector’s share increased relatively slightly reaching about 57% in 2000. In closing, it may be safely said that the overall economic situation is in
The tertiary sector also reveals a relatively stable share in GDP of 33%. a desolate state. Furthermore, it is evident that the overall economic si-
Seventy percent of the population is dependent on agriculture, tuation is well below the level that would be possible on the basis of the
which contributes over 50% and represents the most important sec- economic potential of the country: the military regime has not been able
tor of the economy. This illustrates low productivity and subsistence to exploit this great economic potential, i.e., it is incapable of planning
farming is widespread. However, a positive assessment can be made for positive economic growth. The question now is how the standard
for the rice production in 2004/05 which increased slightly to 24.5 mil- of living for the population specifically presents itself. Here again, this
lion tons (prior year 22.8m tons). A new ban on exports is intended to analysis examines a few selected developmental trends.
keep the price stabile for the public. The export of teak wood was also
higher in 2004/05 at 12.8m cubic feet which represents an increase of The standard of living
13% contrasted with the prior year. It is also assumed that a significant
amount of illegal exports are shipped to China (Stärk 2006, S. 379). A regional comparison with respect to social and economic development
The exploitation of natural resources like gold, copper, and iron is in East Asia provides the first indication of Burma’s ranking. What is
still to a large extent underdeveloped. There is also a great untapped po- striking about the region is the relatively large reduction in poverty and
tential of precious stones. This contrasts with a significant increase in positive development in living conditions (human development) from

The Economic Development of Burma and the Sanctions against Burma

304 305
 the mid-1970s to the mid-1990s. GDP per capita grew by an impressive The economic living standard of the population of Burma depends
average of 7.2% between 1985 and 1995 (World Bank 1999, p. 10). The on a number of factors. The following discussion focuses on a few
number of people living in poverty fell from three-fifths in 1975 to rough- of these determinants. An initial evaluation of socio-economic living
ly one-fifth in 1995. These altogether positive developments suffered a conditions can be found in the Human Development Index (HDI). A
severe setback as a result of the financial crisis at the end of the 1990s. We regional comparison shows that the HDI is higher in Burma than in
will have to wait and see how this develops in the long term. Cambodia or Laos because of Burma’s better performance in the life
At this point, the positive developments in Burma deserve to be men- expectancy and/or education index. Cambodia and Laos have a higher
tioned. Living standards have improved in Burma to the extent that life GDP index than Burma. In six original member ASEAN countries
expectancy has risen and the infant mortality rate has fallen. However, plus Vietnam, it can be seen that social development is well correlated
as shown in the following table, the standards of living in most other with overall economic performance (Thein, Nyo 1999, p. 395). In other
countries in the region have risen far higher and have shown greater words, the higher the GDP index, the higher the life expectancy and/or
improvement than in Burma over the past decades. Table 5 points out education index. In the period between 1992 and 2004, the HDI was not
that the childhood mortality rate is twice that of China and three times stable. It should be remembered here that the way in which the HDI is
that of Vietnam. This is further evidenced by the fact that in Burma/ calculated was modified after 1998, and the values for 1999 to 2004 are
Myanmar, according to data supplied by the World Bank at the end of not comparable to those for prior years.
the 1990s, malnutrition was seen in 39% of all children under the age
of 5 years and a third of these children were seriously undernourished Table 7: Human Development Index 1992–2005 for Burma
(World Bank 1999).
Year HDI Rank Life Education GDP Index* HDI
Table 6: Poverty and human development Expectancy
in Burma/Myanmar and East Asia Index*
1992 111 - - - 0,385a)
Life expectancy at Infant mortality Rate of economic 1993 123 - - - 0,390a)
birth growth
1994 132 0,54 0,7 0,12 0,457a)
(years) (per 1,000 live (period average %) 1996 133 0,55 0,71 0,09 0,451a)
births)
1997 131 0,56 0,71 0,16 0,475a)
1970 1993 2004 2005 1970 1993 2004 2005 1970-80 1981-90 1990- 1998 131 0,57 0,71 0,17 0,481a)
2004
1999 128 0,59 0,74 0,41 0,580b)
Myanmar 50 60 60,5 60,8 122 79 76 75 4,7 1,8 5,6
2000 125 0,59 0,75 0,41 0,585b)
East Asia 59 68 70,5 84 34 31 4,8 4,7 5,6 2001 131 0,53 0,72 0,39 0,549b)
China 62 69 71,6 72,5 85 31 30 23 7 9,2 8,5 2002 132 0,54 0,73 0,39 0,551b)
2003 129 0,59 0,76 0,39 0,578b)
Indonesia 48 63 66,8 69,7 104 56 31 28 7,9 6,4 2
2004 130 0,59 0,76 0,39 0,581b)
Lao PDR 40 51 54,7 63,2 145 95 82 62 10,5 3,7 2005 132 0,596 0,764 0,389 0,583b)
Malaysia 62 71 73,2 73,7 46 13 7 10 7,7 6 3,4 *calculated since 1994; a) old formula; b) new formula
Philippine 57 67 70,4 71 60 42 27 25 5,7 1,8 1,2 Source: UNDP, Human Development Report, 1992–2007
s

Thailand 58 69 70 69,6 74 36 23 18 7,3 7,9 2,8

The striking fact here is that Burma fell from 111th to 133rd place
between 1992 and 1996, and has remained on that level ever since. The
Vietnam 49 65 70,5 73,7 55 41 19 16 4,6 5,9 living standard is also illustrated by the proportion of the population
living below the poverty line and by the distribution of income. In
Source: UNDP, Human Development Report 2007

The Economic Development of Burma and the Sanctions against Burma

306 307
 this context, however, it should be emphasized that poverty is a very is extremely desperate (Clawson, Keller 1999). Men’s income average
controversial topic for the Burma government. is roughly 100-200 kyats, while women earn as little as 50-200 kyats or
This also explains why the government has no official poverty line. less. Regular work is the exception for these people, and many people
Various sources disclose a poverty rate of roughly 23% (International have to rely on casual or seasonal work.
Monetary Fund 1999, p. 30), while the UN estimates that over 50% of This explains why the living conditions of these poor people are ex-
the population is living below the poverty line. This presents a problem tremely critical. One further striking aspect is that poverty is distributed
when attempting to make international comparisons as the wide discre- extremely irregularly between the various regions. The greatest diffe-
pancy in the figures may lead to a distorted view. Nevertheless, the follo- rence in the Poverty Headcount Index is between Tanintharyi Division
wing table is provided in an effort to convey some basis for orientation. (8.1%) and rural areas of Chin State (42.1%). Here it has to be pointed
The following comparison looks at the rural, urban, and total poverty out that the index in urban Chin State is only 19% (and thus below the
rates in selected countries. national average). The percentage of people living in poverty in rural
areas is 47%. There are many reasons for this uneven distribution of
Table 8: Estimated poverty for rural and urban households
poor people in Burma. The concentration of people living in the poorer
(various years)
border regions is one of them.
National poverty line in % Distribution of poor The 1997 Household Income and Expenditure Survey allow a
number of conclusions to be drawn that go beyond the finding of
Country, year Rural Urban Total Rural Urban Total a 26, 6 % poverty rate. The World Bank, for example, assesses the
situation as follows: “Some 23 million people, or almost one in four
Myanmar, 2001 28,4 20,7 26,6 68,5 31,5 100 households, live below minimum subsistence levels. If those whose
levels of spending are not significantly above (10 percent) the mini-
China, 1998 4,6 2 4,6 82,1 17,9 100 mum subsistence level are included, the estimated poverty incidence
jumps to about one in three households” (World Bank 1999, p. 11).
Indonesia, 2002 21,1 14,5 18,2 96,9 3,1 100 If one also considers Burma had a very high level of inflation in the
1990s – in 1998/99, inflation was 49.1% – and this had a particularly
Laos, 1997 41 26,9 38,6 83,3 16,7 100 negative effect on the price of consumer goods, a further burden for
those living in poverty. According to many experts, the poverty rate is
Malaysia, 1999 12,4 3,4 7,5 75 25 100
closer to 50% or even higher.
Mongolia 32,6 39,4 35,6 33,3 66,7 100 An analysis of the distribution of income and property makes the
standard of living even clearer. As a rule, distribution of income is
Philippines, 2003 n.a. n.a. 30,4 n.a. n.a. 100 measured by the Gini coefficient. However, there are no reliable data
for Burma for this purpose. Nevertheless, at least some qualitative sta-
Thailand, 2002 12,6 4 9,8 87,3 12,7 100 tements can be made. It can be assumed there is no great imbalance in
income distribution in Burma. This is because of the largely homoge-
Vietnam, 2004 n.a. n.a. 19,4 n.a. n.a. 100 neous population. Burmese society “…is not sharply divided into diffe-
rent classes or castes with unequal access to property or unequal levels
Source: Asian Development Bank, Key Indicators, 2004-2006 of income (Kyi et al. 1999, p. 130).” In fact, the majority of the Burmese
population has such a low level of income that one cannot identify any
Compared with other countries in the region, Burma occupies a middle great differences among them.
position in the ranking, with a poverty rate of 26.6%. However, it should During the socialist phase, the distribution of real property was li-
not be forgotten that the situation of the poor differs from country to mited to a maximum of nine to ten acres per landowner, which resulted
country. Based on a poll of 300 households, for example, it can be sta- in a drastic leveling of ownership wealth. Similar “leveling tendencies”
ted for Burma that the situation of the poor in marginal urban areas were also manifested in the private sector, which is why only micro-en-

The Economic Development of Burma and the Sanctions against Burma

308 309
 terprises and small business are privately owned still today. If Burma’s
economy were to open up, however, this might result in greater inequa-
lity in income and property distribution in the future, unless the state
countered this development by some appropriate means. Currently, the
problem is rather that Burma has a very low average income level and
widespread poverty.
A country’s living standard is influenced by still other determinants.
Health status and education are particularly significant. Following the
reorientation toward a market economy in 1998, it is interesting to note
the highest goal formulated by the State Peace and Development Coun-
cil was in the social area: “To promote the health, fitness, and education
level of the nation as well as to conserve the cultural heritage and the
national character.” This objective was to be supported through the cre-
ation of a national health committee, which was to be directed from the
highest level of the office of the First Secretary of the SPDC. In order
to attain this goal, the government cooperated with international orga-
nizations like the WHO, UNICEF, UNDP, UNFPA, and approximately
20 international NGOs (Bünte 2005, p. 11). In spite of these efforts, the
health system in Burma/Myanmar still presents serious problems.
The health status is influenced to a great extent, by the quantitative
and qualitative dimensions of poverty and the resources of the health
system. An accessible and well equipped public health system is cruci-
ally important for the population of the poor. This is especially true for
women and children. There is adequate proof that children living in
poverty are very prone to disease and infection. Further, there are some
differences between the poor and non-poor in health status and access
to services (World Bank 1999, p. 24). Those living in poverty usually
have less access to healthcare facilities than those not living in poverty.
This is the case, as can be empirically proved, for Burma.
Another crucial factor contributing to the state of the people’s health
is their access to drinking water. The following facts should be consi-
dered: (a) Burma has ample water resources. There are four main river
systems covering most of the country. With seasonal variations, these
rivers provide the population with an adequate quantity and quality of
water. (b) Unlike other countries in the region, the relatively low level
of industrialization and low level of motorization of the population has
helped keep the country relatively free of any significant pollution up to
this point. In principle, this is true for the water supply.
It is therefore surprising that, according to official statistics, an aver-
age of only 67.2% of the population had access to safe drinking water in
2000. But here, too, there are huge regional differences. Yangon has the
highest proportion of people (90.2%) with access to safe drinking water.
The Economic Development of Burma and the Sanctions against Burma
310
Chin, by contrast, has the lowest proportion of people with such access
– only 44.5%. In this context, too, it becomes clear that the population
of border areas has the worst supply of drinking water.
Among other things, this results in a higher child mortality rate as
mentioned earlier. In 1997, Burma had a slightly higher infant mor-
tality rate (77 compared with the average of 68 per 1,000 live births)
and a significantly higher child mortality rate (113 compared with the
average of 77) than other Southeast Asian countries with comparable
per capita GDP (between US$ 323 and US$ 396). While infant mortality
fell slightly in the 1990s, child mortality increased (International Mo-
netary Fund 1999, p. 32). Widespread child malnutrition is named as a
significant factor. In 1997, an average of 39% of the children under five
in Burma was regarded as malnourished. However, there are great dif-
ferences here between different regions. The following table shows the
development patterns for public health in Burma. From this, it may be
concluded that living conditions in Burma are extremely poor. In princi-
ple, this should indicate a great level of dissatisfaction with the govern-
ment, i.e., the military regime. This is explored in the next section.
Conclusions: The divergence between the power cal-
culations of the military regime and the living condi-
tions of the Burmese people and the consequences
An analysis of the economic situation and the living conditions of the
Burmese people is limited by a lack of reliable statistical data. Often,
only estimates of the true problems can be determined. The most re-
cent census was conducted in 1983 and the last labor market study by
the ILO was in 1993. This situation, in essence, complicates any reliable
economic survey or political planning in Burma. Nevertheless, it is pos-
sible at least to identify trends. The discussion has shown a national
economic situation that, measured against the political potential and
the development of neighboring countries, is entirely unsatisfactory.
The economic and social living conditions of the population are,
correspondingly, equally poor. Many important business sectors, for ex-
ample, the fishing industry have experienced an economic ruin. There
is a great divergence between the living conditions of the population
and the power calculations of the military regime, as discussed in sec-
tion two. There is great dissatisfaction with the current situation by the
majority of the population. This is the reason why, over the past years,
many qualified workers have emigrated to other countries.
This teaches us that today’s theories of power preservation as prac-
311
 ticed by dictators or dictatorial regimes are still largely inadequate. The
empirical analysis of Burma clearly indicates that a hold on power can
also be created even when the population is brought to a materially and
politically totally inadequate living situation and many people are forced
to live on the brink of subsistence. A significant portion of the popula-
tion as well as the lower and middle ranks are busy just trying to survive
and are mainly lethargic.
Perhaps such preservation of power is dependent on certain religi-
ous contexts, but this aspect cannot be discussed in a qualified manner
within the scope of this paper. It is also not clear whether the military
regime has intentionally aspired to this strategy. All things aside, in the
case of Burma the fact is the population has been unable under the rule
of a dictatorial regime for the past 40 years – omitting the attempted
democratic elections at the end of the 1980s and the demonstrations
in the fall of 2007 – to free itself from this lethargy. This can be a rea-
listic expectation only if the regime, for example, were to open itself
to external pressure and allow change in the political structures and
the decision making processes. Perhaps another option – and this is
in contradiction to sanctions – would be to strengthen the middle class
through some form of international cooperation and in this way gain
influence on the political structure and decision making processes of
the military regime.
This analysis of the economic and social progress in Burma de-
monstrates in any case, that the political sanctions directed against
the dictatorial regime have not achieved any positive results. Quite
to the contrary, the case may be made that sanctions have served only
to strengthen the regime’s hold on power, isolating the regime to the
extent that it has refused every reform. As a consequence, the living
conditions in Burma have gotten even worse in the last few years, which
has obviously encouraged the lethargy more than it has reduced it (with
the exception of the peaceful demonstrations in September/October
2007). The quality of the education system has declined to the point that
it has become a burden to the country’s ability to compete in the long
term even if it were to be free. The lack of human capital is exacerbated
by the emigration of the qualified workers. Even if the country opens to
the outside world, the development of the institutions of a civil society
would have to be relearned in small steps.
In this case, the question is what alternatives are there to sanctions.
Burma teaches us that a dictatorial regime is anything but a homoge-
nous and consistent entity. Even in Burma there are representatives of
the regime with varying levels of willingness to introduce reforms. This
is especially true for the groups within the middle class. Therefore, it
The Economic Development of Burma and the Sanctions against Burma
312
is valid to take soundings now to find out where reforms should begin.
There are evidently several representatives at the ministerial level who
have recognized that the financial sector is in need of urgent reform.
But also the education sector, the health sector and labor markets
are in urgent need of reform or stimulation. There are some starting
points for cooperation that would raise the standard of living for the
population. Reforms could be implemented and could even signal the
initiation of a process of transformation by the military regime. For this
reason, a general conclusion may be stated: the sanctions have contri-
buted to lowering the standard of living for the population, while re-
forms offer a chance to improve the quality of life for population. What
the opportunities are and whether the military regime will accept them,
remains to be explored.
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Pazifik 2004/2005, Hamburg 2004, p. 371–378
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World Bank: Myanmar: An Economic and Social Assessment, Washington 1999

Introduction
Burma emerged as a promising, newly-independent country in 1948
after nearly one hundred years of British colonial rule. Many obser-
vers of the time lauded her rich natural resources, literate population,
educated technocrats and legal administrative systems inherited form
British colonial rule as key conditions for the country’s continued eco-
nomic development and growth. Burma’s people proudly called their
independent country “Golden Land” with reference to its rich natural
resources, while the rest of the world knew Burma as the ‘Rice Bowl of
Asia’– one of the world’s largest exporters of rice during the pre-World
War Two era. An initial wealth of resources did not help Burma very
much in the long run, however. After nearly sixty years of national
independence, today’s Burma is an unfulfilled golden land with an
empty rice bowl; a country in which fifty five million people now face
the prospect of a full-blown food security crisis in addition to other
humanitarian emergencies.
Why did resource-rich Burma become one of the world’s least-
developed countries in 1987, one still struggling to recover from eco-
nomic failures? Many have suggested that ‘gross mismanagement’ of
Burma’s rich natural resources and its resource-dependent economy
are the culprits behind this failure. However, resource dependence
is not a new phenomenon. Since the time of colonial occupation,
successive political regimes in Burma, including the British colonia-
lists, post-independent democrats, military-dominated socialists and

The Economic Development of Burma and the Sanctions against Burma

314 315
 today’s military capitalists, have all been dependent on the country’s
rich natural resources. In spite of such dependency, different politi-
cal regimes have produced different economic outcomes. When the
mode of economic decision-making process was broad-based and
democratic, Burma’s political regimes prior to 1962 chose export-
led strategies, which in turn resulted in high economic growth and
equitable developmental outcomes. In contrast, import-substitution
and self-reliant strategies under the socialist period of centralized-
planning process resulted in poor economic growth with negative
developmental effects to all income groups. Although more recent
strategies based on open-door economic policies have achieved faster
economic growth, the benefits of economic growth are unfairly dist-
ributed, leaving Burma’s vast population in deep poverty and forcing
previously better-off middle class families into relative poverty.
Different economic policies have influenced the international
community’s formation of policy towards Burma in different ways.
Post-independent democratic Burma was a rising star of the interna-
tional donor community, and its support of infrastructure building,
agricultural extension and industrial development in Burma could
have made the country into a “tiger economy” if the democratic re-
gime there had not been removed from power by a military coup in
1962. The continuation of international donor engagement under the
subsequent socialist regime proved less effective, since the policies
that the socialist regime promoted were meant for inward-looking,
self-reliant economy. The military regime that later came to power in
Burma in 1988 did open up the economy for foreign investment and
trade. However, the Western donor governments suspended almost
all overseas development assistance programs to Burma when the mi-
litary regime violently suppressed popular uprisings in 1988. In addi-
tion, the United States and the European Union imposed additional
economic sanctions against the Burmese regime for its continuing
repression of the opposition and its failure to stem human rights vio-
lations. Meanwhile, several Asian countries as well as Burma’s neigh-
bors ignored international calls for economic sanctions and adopted
the opposite strategy towards Burma, instead promoting trade and
investments inside the country.
This paper argues that a particular combination of resource de-
pendency and institutional deficit is the most significant source of
Burma’s current ills. The role of natural resources in Burma has
changed fundamentally since 1988, when the military regime then
in power declared an open door economic policy and consciously fol-
lowed particular strategies of natural resource development. At that
The Political Economy of Resource Curse in Burma
316
time, natural resources were not just economic resources aimed at
achieving development outcomes. They also became political resour-
ces aimed at maintaining regime stability. In this regard, this paper
aims to explainthe underlying political mechanisms as determinants
of developmental outcomes by arguingthat (1) direct sales of natural
resources helped resuscitate Burma’s weak regime in its earlier phase
from 1988-1992; (2) the joint extraction and exploitation of natural re-
sources motivated long-time armed opponents to sign ceasefire agre-
ements with the military regime from 1993 to 1996; (3) the in-flow of
foreign investments into Burma’s extractive sectors helped the mili-
tary regime to overcome significant political opposition in the country
and to consolidate its political control there from 1997 to 2002, and (4)
institutional, executive and other internal constraints of the military
regime led to the implementation of sub-optimaleconomic and deve-
lopment policies, setting the country into a deeper crisis.
By way of conclusion, this paper argues that Burma’s resource
curse is in essence a political problem with economic manifesta-
tions. Therefore, an examination of the underlying political mecha-
nisms at work in the area of economic decision making makes the
analysis of natural resource wealth and its impact on that country
more complete and persuasive. Indeed, such analyses are also
helpful when examining international policies toward Burma and
the implications of such policies. Burma’s resource curse has had
serious implications for both the incentive and disincentive policies
adopted by various foreign governments, regional associations, UN
organizations and international NGOs. Previous international poli-
cies focused on broad sanctions against Burma became ineffective
in the wake of the revenue windfalls generated by Burma’s natural
gas sales to neighboring countries. Instead, if this sanction regime
were instead fine tuned and focused on targeted financial sanctions,
these sanctions would be more effective in preventing the SPDC
from using such resources for maintaining the current regime. Li-
kewise, the old constructive engagement policies of the Association
of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) were incapable of bringing
about meaningful change in Burma when the regime continued to
ignore broad-based economic reforms in favor of capital-intensive
resource extraction activities. Recent efforts by ASEAN to persuade
the Burmese regime to undertake fundamental reforms in both the
economic and political arenas while gradually integrating Burma
into its regional cooperative mechanisms would seem to be a much
more promising strategy.
317

Historical Overview: Natural Resources
Management and Economic Policies in Burma
Contemporary literature on natural resources amply suggested that
various political regimes that have been dependent on natural resour-
ces for their income usually have negative economic consequences.
Likewise, Burma falls into a similar vicious cycle of many other re-
source-rich countries that are ‘cursed’ to make poor economic per-
formance. The Burmese economy declined from relatively a dynamic
one in 1950s to a least-developed country by 1987, further lagging
behind the vast sea of changes in the region throughout the 1990s and
reaching to the bottom in terms of per capita growth in Southeast Asia
at the beginning of new century.
An overview of Burmese economic history revealed several interes-
ting relationships between natural resource management and regime
maintenance. The relatively better economic performance found in
1950s was in fact due to U Nu regime’s active policy of agricultural
promotion. Rice sector was the main engine of growth, and affluent
farmers were the main constituency of election-winning coalitions
under robust parliamentary system. The economic decline under
socialist era from 1962-1988 was mainly due to autarkic policies that
choke off the rice sector from the gains of export-oriented growth po-
tentials. While the country’s main population of farmers became poor
and weak, the military regime could effectively maintain the socialist
order. However, the autocratic head of the socialist regime, General
Ne Win, also had peculiar obsession with nationalist zeal that he pre-
ferred to keep rich natural resources of the country away from foreign
interests.
Such policies of economic development and natural resource
management were abruptly changed in 1988. The incoming military
regime applied open door policy on natural resource sectors; however,
the agriculture sector remained effectively closed both domestically
and externally. In this period, liberalization of rice sector elsewhere in
the neighboring socialist economies experienced rapid growth by just
correcting market distortions and setting right economic incentives to
the farmers. The military regime failed to liberalize the sector, which
never recovered since 1988. The performance of rice sector continued
to deteriorate in late 1990s, as the regime neglected any serious libera-
lization efforts and failed to learn the lessons from its own successful
decontrol of beans and pulses and comparable experiences in China
and Vietnam. The demise of rice sector was perhaps accelerated by
the increasing flow of revenue from hard minerals and natural gas.
The Political Economy of Resource Curse in Burma
318
Graph 1. Shifting significance of natural resource exports--rice, teak and gas
80%
Crops
70%
Teak
60%
50% Gas
40%
30%
20%
10%
0%
1960 1980 1990 2000 2004
Source: Key Indicators, ADB, 2006, and various issues of Central Statistical Organization,
Mynmar Statistical Yearbook.
At this juncture, Burma experienced a whole range of “resource
curse” effects that incapacitated state of manufacturing sector, deferral of
agricultural liberalization and fundamental reforms, wasteful spending
on new capital and nuclear projects while neglecting public expenditures
of social services, and distortion of public finances. Meanwhile, humani-
tarian conditions including food security in the country was so alarming
that the United Nations came up with a rare criticism directed against the
regime on their ‘ill-informed and outdated socio-economic policies.’1
How did the current military regime end up in poor economic
performance even after receiving huge income from the country’s
rich resources? A careful examination of economic policy changes
in Burma showed that the massive sale of teak and fishery resources
delayed much needed reforms in 1990s, which then became almost
totally neglected when the regime began to enjoy gas bonanza after
2000. The regime introduced market reforms only partially to benefit
a few private sector firms that happen to be owned by or connected to
the military. It opened market access and invited foreign investments
only selectively to a few extractive sectors. In other words, misguided
economic policies, when they are combined with particular structural
conditions of resource dependency, created the “curse.” These policies
of state capture and partial reforms, which preceded the discovery of
natural gas reserves in offshore seas of Burma, brought the economic
difficulties into a deeper crisis when the regime began to receive booty
futures at the beginning of this century.
319
 The experience of Burma’s poor economic performance in the
context of natural resource boom in 1990s can also be contrasted with
high growth performance of Vietnam, another transitional economy in
her neighborhood with comparable socio-economic and political chal-
lenges. Like Burma, Vietnam also found oil and natural gas in 1990s to
earn substantial export revenue from its sales to Thailand. However, the
Vietnamese leadership shrewdly crafted a plan to utilize these resour-
ces to boost domestic economy. While the Burmese leaders preferred
quick return of cash from gas sale, the Vietnamese leadership opted
the construction of domestic pipeline from off-shore gas fields and
fertilizer plants to stimulate downstream growth within the country.
Such policies of natural resources combined with export liberalization
not only boosted Vietnam’s agricultural production in late 1990s but
also transformed the economy into an attractive manufacturing base
for the foreign investors. Meanwhile, the Burmese economy suffered
from haphazard attempts to liberalize the economy while the country’s
nascent manufacturing sector never developed due to serious shortage
of electricity and favorable export environment.
If misguided economic policies, not the richness of natural resour-
ces, accounted such misery in Burma, a question could be asked why
the regime continued to be misguided for so long. Why did the mili-
tary regime opt for sub-optimal economic policies when it had every
opportunity to correct them? Indeed, there are many policy options to
save such resource-dependent economy from the curse. While other
resource-rich economies use their endowments for long-term compa-
rative advantage, Burma fails to offset any of these negative effects from
resource boom. Yet to explain why does Burma experience slow growth
and leading to the resource curse, it is also important to explain why the
regime fails to take corrective action.
The key to these questions lies not in the conditions of resource
abundance and extractive economic policies but the particular political
configurations and processes that led to the adoption of such policies
in a particular structural context. A short answer is that rich natural
resources did not make a Burmese rentier state, but a military regime
that utilized these natural resources to maintain power led to a rentier
state in making. A detailed narrative is offered in this section to explain
how the political objectives of regime maintenance led to the choice
of particular resource development policies, which in turn generated
serious consequences of resource curse effects and poor economic per-
formance in Burma under the current military regime.
The Political Economy of Resource Curse in Burma
320
Evolving Process: Resource Dependency, Regime
Maintenance and International Policy Implications
Regime Survival and Fire Sales of Resources, 1989–1992
The 1988 popular uprisings marked one of the most important turning
points in Burma’s modern history. Although the military was able to
suppress the popular uprisings and imposed martial law on September
18, 1988, the military regime was barely surviving. The entire govern-
ment machinery collapsed as there were massive resignations from the
Burma Socialist Program Party, the military regime inherited very little
state resources to restore order. The title of the military regime, the
State Law and Order Restoration Council, itself signified the priority of
restoring order over peace and development. For the sake of immediate
survival, the SLORC did not try to revive the socialist-style mass politi-
cal party but expanded the armed forces to take a dual role in restoring
order and managing governance. In the process of such expansion, the
SLORC made three important decisions. First, the SLORC expanded
the armed forces from 180,000 troops at the time of 1988 to a sizable
force of 500,000 by the end of century. Second, it also modernized the
armed forces and improved its equipment, particularly on the outmo-
ded navy and air force. Third, instead of commanding and controlling
the state authority indirectly through a cadre party system or civilianiza-
tion of military bureaucrats, as previously done under the Burmese way
to socialism period, it decided to assign military officers directly on all
aspects of the executive, legislative, and judicial elements of state gover-
nance while they were still serving the armed forces.
Rapid expansion of force structure, military capability and dual
responsibilities put a heavy price on the regime. The implementation
of such plans took place under the circumstances of huge financial
constraints imposed by Burma’s traditional donors who suspended all
their bilateral and multilateral assistance in protests of brutal killings
in 1988. The massive breakdown of government functions during the
six-month-long mayhem also left the regime with no means to collect
taxes and other revenues. The entire economy contracted rapidly after
the combined effects of demonetization of the previous Socialist go-
vernment and the disruption of production and trade activities during
the uprisings, which in turn left the regime with very little resources
to stabilize the situation. The option to pacify the restless population
through economic incentives was simply non-existent, and therefore,
the regime simply used the armed forces to control the population by
repression. With few resources were available domestically or external-
321
 ly, the regime had no other options but to adopt open door policy and
allow foreign firms to exploit forest and fishery resources in exchange
for quick income.
Thailand, probably the most problematic neighbor in terms of se-
curity to the regime, also responded to open door policy favorably by
investing heavily inside Burma while acquiring concessions on logging,
fishing, extracting mineral resources and most importantly, buying na-
tural gas from the regime. Thai timber companies managed to take 17
concessions worth more than US$100 million while 8 fishing conces-
sions brought additional US$17.7 million by end of 1989.2 In addition
to the revenues raised from resource sales, the regime also received the
bonus of diplomatic assurances from these neighbors that they would
not allow any meaningful sanctuaries for the members of the exiled
opposition to organize counter-attack against the regime. The inflow of
over US$100 million dollar did resuscitate the regime from the brink of
state failure when it was most vulnerable under various pressures.
While Burma’s neighboring states were quick to respond to the
“open door” policy by flooding investments into the untapped sectors
of various natural resources in Burma, the Western governments conti-
nued to refrain from engaging with the regime. Although the regime’s
policy declarations committed liberal positions particularly in foreign
investment areas, the actual practice of reform process was rather
patchy. Traditional donor governments such as Japan and Germany,
which funded almost 80% of overseas development assistance to the
country prior to 1988, joined with other Western governments in criti-
cizing the regime’s human rights records than paying attention to the
regime’s economic agenda. There was not even technical assistance to
guide the government policies for natural resource management under
“open door” strategy. On the other hand, the regime’s military expan-
sion plans favored quick generation of revenues from resource sales,
leading to further ignorance of long-term structural adjustments in the
economy.
Meanwhile, the political deadlock between the regime and the main
opposition party, the National League for Democracy has deepened
when the regime refused to transfer power to the NLD that won the
1990 elections in a landslide victory. The junta’s chief, Senior General
Saw Maung, was abruptly retired by fellow officers when he became
burned out with martial laws and began to contemplate speedy transfer
of power to the NLD. General Than Shwe succeeded the chairmanship
of SLORC in early 1993 and began to implement the constitutional
convention, a plan put forward by the SLORC to defer the immediate
transfer of power to the NLD.
The Political Economy of Resource Curse in Burma
322
Regime Building and Booty Futures, 1993–1997
Facing powerful forces of urban dissidents, the military regime sought
ceasefire agreements with various armed groups in Northern Burma
since 1989. Among the armed groups, the Communist Party of Burma
(CPB) was the major threat against the regime because of not only
their military capabilities and good relationships with the neighboring
People’s Republic of China (PRC) but also their ideological affinity to
many dissident groups in urban centers where popular protests were
staged against the regime. The CPB was less keen on making peace
with the regime; however, it launched the most serious military cam-
paigns against the regime in early 1989 while providing material assis-
tance to some dissident groups in the urban areas. The Directorate of
Defense Service Intelligence under the leadership of SLORC’s secretary
(1) Brig Gen Khin Nyunt handled the CPB’s threats in both urban and
frontier areas and finally found an opportunity to broker a deal with Wa
and Kokang ethnic leaders under CPB in staging mutiny against their
party elders. The CPB collapsed in late 1989 when Wa, Kokang, Shan
and other ethnic factions threw their support behind the mutiny while
the Chinese authorities tacitly paved the way for the new groups to as-
sert power.
CPB quickly disintegrated into several ethnic factions and each faction
made separate ceasefire agreements with the military regime from 1990
onward. The regime rewarded these agreements with the concessions to
these groups to control the areas adjacent to the lucrative border trade
routes and to begin extracting precious gems and other minerals from the
areas in a large scale. As a result of ceasefire agreements, the government
troops were able to retreat temporarily from the frontlines to control the
urban centers, which was a more immediate threat to the regime.
The deal that achieved both the collapse of serious communist threat
and the pacification of highly capable ethnic armies provided a serious
lesson for the SLORC to handle the rest of the ethnic resistance forces
by offering economic incentives and development assistance to keep
them away from resorting to armed movements. SLORC secretary 1
Brigadier General Khin Nyunt extended ceasefire offers to other ethnic
resistance groups in eastern and southern Burma in order to neutralize
their armed threats. As a result, many more ethnic armies entered into
separate ceasefire agreements with the regime in mid 1990s, the num-
ber grew into a total of 17 groups by the end of the century. In return
the SPDC established administrative and security outposts in the hearts
of ethnic resistance areas through border area development program.
Although military superiority of Burmese armed forces could ex-
323
 plain relative stability of ceasefire agreements, it did not explain fully
about why any of the armed opponents in Northern Burma did not capi-
talize on a weak regime that was preoccupied with urban-based protest
movements. While the military regime openly acknowledged (and often
exaggerated) the communist threats from both military offensives in
the north and underground (UG) elements in the urban areas, a few
ethnic resistance groups aided the communists or the urban protesters
by launching their military campaigns against the regime. The regime
found out this disconnect between the urban opposition and rural eth-
nic rebellions, and tried to put a wedge by actively reaching out to all
other ethnic groups in mid-1990s and pacify them with ceasefire deals.
In that process, abundant supply of natural resources in ethnic areas,
which used to fuel conflicts between central government and dozens of
ethnic minorities before 1988, became a source of incentives for ceasefire
agreements. Obviously, the regime’s strategy of ceasefire agreements and
guaranteed access to extractive activities played a major role in stabilizing
these ceasefire agreements. From the perspectives of ethnic leaders, there
were many factors that influenced their ceasefire decisions, and among
them, war weariness, non-requirement of disarmament, changing
geopolitical situation and reduction of war-related abuses were critical
in addition to economic opportunities.3 From the regime’s perspective,
the real benefit was the shifting of their military resources from the fight
against rural guerillas to the control against urban dissidents.
Meanwhile, the regime’s policy of ceasefire agreements gained tacit
support from the neighboring countries that were also keen to promote
cessation of deadly conflicts in Burma’s border areas and resumption of
trade flows across the borders. Accordingly, the policies of supporting
anti-Rangoon elements in the name of communism or buffer zone
have been replaced by common commercial interests that sought to
extract Burma’s natural resources. Squeezed between relentless pres-
sures from both the military regime and the neighboring states, several
ethnic armed groups simply took the offer from Rangoon to become
subsidiary to cross-border activities of joint-extraction and production.
For instance, Kachin ceasefire groups got the concessions from the
regime to produce timber in Northern Burma to export to China while
Democratic Buddhist Karen Army (DKBA), a splinter group of Karen
resistance, supplied timber to Thai saw mills set up across the border.4
Minimal disruptions from armed conflicts under ceasefire agreements
allowed collusion and tacit cooperation between the SLORC, its troops
in the war zone, certain ethnic armed groups and business firms from
the neighboring countries to engage in various extractive activities
during the ceasefire period.
The Political Economy of Resource Curse in Burma
324
Another important cash crop, “poppy cultivation” also rose from
103,230 hectares in 1988 to 161,012 in 1991....the annual heroin pro-
duction skyrocketed from 68 tons to 185 tons” as the ceasefires in
Northern Burma could relieve many new laborers to the poppy fields.
The cessation of major battles provided an opportunity for Burma’s two
largest and most well-equipped ethnic armed groups, the United Wa
State Army and Mong Tai armies to engage in labor-intensive poppy
growing. The windfall of booming drug trade was quite substantial, and
both went on arms spree.5 As predicted that “diffuse resources (which
are scattered over a larger area and hence harder for any single group
to capture) far from the capital lead to “warlordism,” the areas control-
led by both the UWSA and MTA established de facto sovereignty with
economies built around the resource itself. By end of 1990s, the MTA
surrendered in en masse in exchange for their leader Khun Sa to refuge
in Burma’s capital, Rangoon. A more powerful UWSA did not exercise
that option, but it sought ceasefires with the SLORC since 1989, which
resulted in booming drug trade in the Wa region. Both ceasefires, ac-
cording to the U.S. government, “have had the practical effect of condo-
ning money laundering, as the government these groups to invest in
‘legitimate’ business as an alternative to trafficking.”6
The regime’s pacification schemes also worked well with its own
disgruntled group powerful regional commanders who commanded the
border regions. granting resource extraction activities in the ceasefire zo-
nes also helped local commanders from the government’s military units
to take their lion share from the whole range of production to trafficking
of natural resources. Joint extractions and sharing of booty futures not
only helped stabilize the ceasefire agreements, but also facilitated the
regime’s efforts to allocate rents to the rank-and-files and to maintain
the loyalty of regional commanders who really controlled the troops.
Timber, gems and other natural resources are lucrative spin-off for re-
gional commanders, who decide how much of these resources go out of
any region. Awarded with booty futures, the regime leaders sitting at the
capital can ensure that regional commanders who really controlled vast
areas of Burma’s peripheries with rich natural resources would provide
basic services of governance in these areas.7 By appointing, reshuffling
and demoting regional commanders, the regime gradually built a reward
system to maintain loyalty from the mid-level army commanders.
During this period, the western governments that have been pursu-
ing disincentive policies toward the military regime did not take an
active approach to the emerging conditions of joint exploration, extrac-
tion and production projects in Burma. Some were less prepared to
take a stronger stand against the seemingly positive developments such
325
 as ceasefire agreements and participation of ethnic groups in consti-
tutional discussions. A few governments made harsh condemnations
against the regime for its failure to honor the election results; however,
such public outcries were not followed up with substantive policy re-
sponses. More importantly, several governments took no stand against
their business firms investing in extractive sectors in Burma, which
replenished foreign reserves of the regime.
Meanwhile, the SLORC’s top leadership commanding from war
office in the capital also retained an edge against field commanders
by 1995. By then, the regime has received substantial foreign invest-
ment and export earnings into the central coffers. Foreign investment
commitment made in 1995 was amount to US$1.3 billion, exceeding
a combined total of the previous years since the open door policy was
announced. On the political front, the regime released Nobel Peace
Laureate Daw Aung San Suu Kyi from house arrest, showing its con-
fidence to deal with popular movement. By 1997, the regime had not
only survived the popular movement, it had also secured control over
the largest area of border regions for the first time and built substantial
economic base to support its control over the country’s entire territory
and populations. With full of confidence, the regime decided to shake
up its Council structure in November 1997, and also changed its title
from the one mainly oriented to law and order enforcement to a more
forward-looking one, the State Peace and Development Council.
Regime Consolidation and Gas Economy, 1997–2004
By 1997, SLORC has already controlled urban dissent through sheer
size of troop expansion and neutralized peripheral armed movements
partly through economic incentives in joint extraction schemes and
sharing of side payments from such schemes. The regime now focu-
sed on its internal consolidation. The urgent priority was to control
internal factions and frictions within the armed forces. Several factions
are divided along different fault lines: between war office officers and
field commanders; between the intelligence and combat units; between
graduates of different academies, and between generations. Such factio-
nalism posed dangers of military coup, and the top leaders are compel-
led to use side payments in rewarding most senior military leaders to
lucrative cabinet positions. As a result, the government of the SLORC
and SPDC grew exponentially in the last seventeen years. In 1988, the
SLORC established a cabinet including only seven ministers who took
charge of seventeen ministries. By the time of reconstituted SPDC in
1997, the number of ministers has grown to thirty seven ministers co-
The Political Economy of Resource Curse in Burma
326
vering thirty two ministries.8 The number of deputy ministers was also
increased dramatically in 1997, by about 50 percent to 35 within a year
or two.
The growth of ministries occurred, as commercially lucrative line
ministries are divided into smaller ministries, creating rental heavens
for individual ministers to set monopolistic rules and predatory poli-
cies. For instance, a single agriculture ministry was multiplied into four
ministries, each controlling lucrative resource sectors. In another ex-
ample, a single ministry of transport and communication has been divi-
ded into three miniseries such as transport, rail transport and telecom-
munication. The most interesting new ministry created in late 1990s
was the Ministry of Military Affairs, an addition to the separate Ministry
of Defense, which supposed to handle all the business and commercial
activities on behalf of the armed forces. The decision reflected that “the
corporate interests of the military establishment would be explicitly
taken into consideration at the government level beyond the (previous)
implicit representation under the ambit of the defense ministry.”
Since mid 1990s, the SLORC appointed a number of powerful re-
gional military commanders in the cabinet. Like Indonesia’s territorial
command structure, the regional commands within the Burmese ar-
med forces “wield considerable powers and have extensive extracurricu-
lar perquisites” since earlier times. When the military established mar-
tial laws and governed the country under the military administration,
the regional commanders usually chair the law and order restoration
councils at the state and division levels. When the SLORC was more
preoccupied with the restoration of ministerial functionaries and mana-
ging government finances at the central level, the regional commanders
took charge of the overall administrative functions at the local levels and
built power bases. The appointment of these powerful commanders in
the cabinet positions prevented them from becoming too powerful or
forming factions across the regions.10 To some ambitious commanders,
the appointments served as side-payments in exchange for surrender of
their positions as area commanders particularly in the lucrative regions
that put up black markets, border trade routes and illicit activities.
During this period, the United States imposed ban against new
investments in Burma while establishing visa restrictions against key
officials of the military regime. Although the European Union quickly
followed suit by imposing similar visa ban and arms embargo, all these
policies made no effort in stopping both US and European firms from
operating extractive industries in Burma. By early 2001, the gas pipe-
line constructed by the consortium of American firm Unocal, France’s
Total, Thailand’s PTTEP and Burma’s MOGE began to transport gas
327
 to Thailand, and revenue stream also increased steadily afterward. The
windfall of natural gas sale not only brought foreign exchange to the
regime, the prospects of more reserves in the offshore sites and weaker
bargaining power of the military regime drew more investments into
the sector and attracted additional revenues from new projects.
Moreover, revenue from oil and gas sector has a distinct impact on
the governance functions of the regime than the earlier windfalls from
other resources such as teak, gems and agricultural products. Natural
gas is a point-source type of resource that requires specialized foreign
firms to use capital and technology-intensive extractive methods to ex-
ploit them. In case of Burma, offshore location also helped the regime to
reduce any chance of looting at the production site or being threatened
by ethnic separatist movements who never had the naval facilities. The
revenue generated from the industry flew directly into the centralized
process where the regime’s top leaders redistributed among lower-ran-
king officers, soldiers and well-connected private sector firms through
budgetary allocations as well as business and trade licenses. With flows
of gas revenues increased, more power was consolidated in the hands
of the top leaders whose central task was simply distributing the rents
and guarding the status quo without really achieving any improvement
in the economic performance.
Regime Decay and Resource Curse?, 2004–present
Although the gas bonanza enhanced the power of the top leaders, it also
led to regime extravagance in terms of myopic and wasteful spending,
including the building of a new capital and the relocation of the entire
government to Nay-pyi-taw; the acquisition of a nuclear reactor and
other advanced technology; various public works on non-essential, mo-
numental projects, and repeated arms purchases—all costly endeavors
that do not promote development or alleviate the current sufferings of
the population. In the areas of public finance, the extractive capacity of
the government has become very weak, with every ministry was predis-
posed to disburse and spend the allocated budget than to consider cost
recovery or cost effectiveness in spending the budget. Since less taxa-
tion was collected from the public, the regime also felt less obligated to
spend and allocate more budgetary resources to social services. All of
these developments indicate that resource curse has already affected
the Burmese economy and its inhabitants.
Will the resource curse affect the regime internally? Huge expansion
of military into government on the basis of allocating resource rents
among military factional leaders may have enhanced regime stability;
The Political Economy of Resource Curse in Burma
328
however, it did not translate into state capacity in terms of policy stabi-
lity and coherence. First, there is no rationalization of addition of new
portfolios and the expansion of ministries, as new ministries were crea-
ted simply by either dividing up the existing ministries or upgrading
directorate and departmental offices into ministries. Second, there is
lack of good coordination to offset policy fragmentation resulted from
the increase in the number of ministries and ministers.
While there are divergent and often inconsistent instructions from
the SPDC and the ministries, the state intervention in various econo-
mic sectors has never decreased. This perhaps led to the practice of
uncoordinated government interventions, frequent use of decrees and
laws, and duplication of enforcement by various agencies. Many of
such laws and regulatory enforcements are done with the purpose of
setting and seeking rents, disintegrative consequences were visible in
the form of disruptive government functions. The resulting outcome is
worse than the metaphors used by Mancur Olson’s distinction between
stationary and roving bandits--the centralized and decentralized pat-
terns of rent-seeking.11 It appeared that the top leadership of the SPDC
ruled as stationary bandits, while the regional commanders acted as
roving bandits, leaving the citizens at the mercy of unpredictable and
costly interventions from the disorganized state hierarchy.
Although power was consolidated in the hands of top commanders
who controlled the centralized process of rent distribution, such pro-
cess did not guarantee to be efficient and effective. Like centralized
planning system that the previous military regime under Burmese way
to socialism had practiced, the rents distributed were often wasteful wit-
hout contributing toward building loyalty to the top leaders. The mas-
sive purge of military intelligence illustrated the inefficacy of building
loyalty within the ranks. The military intelligence was a favored military
unit with several thousands of its elite members who benefited the
lion share of rents generated through its dealing with ethnic ceasefire
groups in northern Burma as well as other illicit economic activities el-
sewhere. However, the whole apparatus was completely purged in 2004
when their leader General Khin Nyunt was removed.
Another inherent problem had to do with the nature of regime that
relied on the military as its sole constituent. Maintaining loyalty from the
military was an overriding objective for the regime even at the expense of
the general population. For instance, the regime increased the wages of
civil servants, the majority of which were in-service and retired military
personnel, for four to six folds in April 2006. The result was a three fold
increase of the government’s total wage bill, increasing from Kyat 77.8
billion in the estimated 2006 budget to Kyat 247.2 billion, causing infla-
329
 tionary pressures on the entire population. When the regime sought to
narrow the massive budget deficit of Kyat 600 billion by raising the fuel
prices, it instigated widespread resistance from the population, which
challenged the regime’s stability for the first time in nineteen years.
The centralized control over the rent allocation has another inherent
problem because it could easily create grievances within the lower ranks
even within the same patronage networks. Recent scandals disclosing
lavish living styles, deviant social fixtures and other luxury amenities
for the top leaders and their family members made the lower level parti-
cularly detested against perceived unfair distribution. At the same time,
the larger the size of the rent becomes, the greater the attractiveness of
the prize to grab by any challenger against the current leaders of the
regime, who were already viewed widely as illegitimate. This higher
threat of power feeds into this vicious cycle of rent-distribution along
patronage networks, which in turn tends to cause more factionalism
and disputes. In a way, rich natural resources that resuscitated, built
and consolidated the power of the regime has now cursed the leaders
and threatened the integrity of the underlying institution the regime
was built upon. Economic impact of resource curse is already proble-
matic; however, their political impact can be lethal to both the country
and the regime in power.
Conclusion
Like many other resource abundant countries, Burma is caught up in
a myriad of economic woes. Recent developments in the country are
clearly manifestations of resource curse, and one sees similar develop-
ments in other resource rich countries that have gone wrong. Although
natural resources helped the Burmese regime to survive popular dis-
content and uprisings, build coalitions with patronage constituents
as well as former armed opponents and consolidate its leadership in
the country, Burma’s natural resources have also been/become a main
source of tension within the armed forces entrusted with maintaining
the regime’s stability and its existence. Such internal erosion at a time of
heightened societal challenges suggests a recipe for the end of military
rule, and Burma may not be spared from the famous dictum that “the
armed forces as a government always undermine[d] and destroy[ed] the
armed forces as an institution.”12 Burma’s natural resources may prove
an accelerant in this process.
The question, then, is what set of international policies can accelerate
the change process in Burma. Previous international policies of broad
trade sanctions proved rather ineffective. Although such sanctions ini-
The Political Economy of Resource Curse in Burma
330
tially had some effect on the SPDC and their government-linked firms
in the first few yearsby affecting external revenues from textile exports
to the United States, these sanctions no longer hurt the regime. Indeed,
Burma’s regime has evaded the most damaging consequences by con-
centrating more on resource exploration and extraction activities, par-
ticularly after 2003, when the United States strengthened its sanction
regime to include a broad trade ban. In any case, the Burmese textile
sector is now facing a slow death under the weight of the WTO decision
to roll back textile quotas among developing countries, which will lead
to the relocation of textile firms and manufacture to cheaper, more effi-
cient and less politically sensitive destinations like China, Vietnam and
Bangladesh. The net effect of international sanctions and new WTO
rule, then, has been the slow death of the Burmese textile industry due
to a loss of the lucrative US market as well as higher transaction costs
in penetrating alternative markets. The long-term impact is rather ne-
gative, in other words, although most of the welfare effects in terms
of employment loss and income loss fell disproportionately on the fa-
mily members of the military personnel and lower echelons of SPDC
regime, which provided the pool of labor that both the regime-owned
enterprises as well as connected business firms favored to employ in
their factories.
Given negative welfare impacts of broad sanctions, the international
community has recently considered imposing ban on teak and forest
products that could seriously affect the SPDC’s income without hur-
ting the general population. The income from teak amounted to 10%
of the total export revenue Burma received in 2001. More significantly,
the military government-owned Myanmar Timber Enterprise was en-
titled to almost all of this income, since the government enjoys full
control over teak production and export. A few private firms may have
received logging licenses, but the SPDC controls the licensing process,
which redirects lucrative deals to firms owned by the government’s
friends and relatives, while generating rents for Burmese military of-
ficers who oversee security operations in selected forest areas. Since
the early 1990s, Burma’s logging industry has pursued less and less
sustainable methods of logging, instead relying on the increasing use
of heavy machines that log Burma’s forests in the most destructive of
ways. It means the industry employs very little manpower to produce
teak. In theory, banning teak import might hurt the generals as well
as put a break on the destructive logging practices in Burma. However,
the regime itself has nowadays limited the exploitation of Burma’s teak
forests after a number of serious environmental disasters as well as
international campaigns against Burmese forest management. In addi-
331
 tion, the complicated process of determining the origin of teak and teak
products with the Chinese intermediaries concealing the real identity of
Burmese teak exports also weakened the direct effects of Western ban
on forest products. Perhaps, engaging with the regime to promote their
own awareness of deforestation and to support their efforts in environ-
mental protection might be a better option in reality.
Like the international ban on teak imports, banning the import of
minerals from Burma can theoretically undermine the SPDC’s capacity
to generate income from the sale of minerals or exploration rights. In
Burma, the government owns all extractive industries under the Mi-
nistry of Mines, and foreign investments are encouraged in the form
of joint ventures with government firms. Most investments are capital
intensive, while generating negligible numbers of local jobs for the
Burmese. In addition, Burma lacks both upstream and downstream in-
dustries capable of utilizing raw materials extracted within the country.
For this reason, most extracted minerals are exported overseas. Since
Chinese firms have already become the main consumers of mineral
exports from Burma, however, this limits the impact that Western sanc-
tions on Burma’s mineral exports might have.
In light of such loopholes, targeted financial sanctions have become
a more effective tool against the SPDC and their state-owned enterprises
as well as those joint ventures and private firms owned by individuals
with connections to the regime. This instrument will seal the loophole
used by the SPDC and its business partners to evade the effects of the
comprehensive trade ban instituted by the US government in 2003. Alt-
hough this instrument may not entirely block trade financing and other
financial transactions between Burma and its neighboring countries, it
would significantly increase the transaction costs of all trade operations
controlled entirely by the military government in the form of trade li-
censes and permits.
In adopting a regime of targeted sanctions, it is also important that
Western governments pursue strategies that will alleviate the sufferings
of ordinary Burmese in the country. The economic structure of Burma
is largely agricultural and is more or less operating at subsistence and
regional levels. Although targeted sanction instruments will notdisrupt
economic functions of the agricultural sector, which generates nearly
sixty percent of Burma’s GDP and employs seventy five percent of the
country’s labor force, broad sanction instruments such as import ban
can have negative impacts on the agricultural sector. The international
community should consider fine tuning in this aspect.
Burma’s informal economy, estimated to be as large as its formal
economy, is by definition beyond the ownership of the state. In this
The Political Economy of Resource Curse in Burma
332
case, Burma’s informal economy is linked more to neighboring (mar-
ket) economies through traditional market exchange mechanisms such
as barter trade and cash payment than the official formal economy.
Targeted financial sanctions have no reach over these types of trans-
actions. Therefore, targeted financial sanctions should have only neg-
ligible effect on the free flow of trade across Burmese borders, which
benefits the private sector and ordinary people of Burma far more than
it does the country’s regime. In contrast, the formal economy of Burma
is more or less owned and controlled by the state. In addition, the mi-
litary-business conglomerates such as Union of Myanmar Economic
Holdings Ltd and Myanmar Economic Corporation as well as several
dozens of private firms organized by select friends and family members
of the SPDC own and operate most of the lucrative business and ma-
nufacturing firms in Burma. Targeted sanctions could be sharpened to
affect only those meant to be hurt.
If, on the other hand, Burma is able to develop a comprehensive
framework of natural resource management policy, the country may
be able to pursue successful sustainable development policies, which
would allow Burma to become a more responsible and active partner in
economic cooperation with her neighbors. Given the entrenched nature
of Burma’s regime and economy, both of which are heavily dependent
on the country’s natural resources, such a solution would prove to be
more than a mere technical fix. Resource curse in Burma has had de-
vastating economic effects on the country, but these are not caused by
economic policies alone. Although economic reforms may counteract
some of these effects, they cannot resolve the root causes of Burma’s
ills. Unless the underlying political processes that have been fostering
the country’s resource curse are addressed, the negative consequences
will remain serious challenges to the viability of Burma’s military re-
gime and the future of the country itself.
Notes
1 The confidential report, cited in Irrawaddy, also mentioned the lack of public expen-
ditures on much needed social services and other political factors as reasons for the fai-
lure. See Htet Aung. “UN coordinator’s report lists causes of Burma’s social problems,”
Irrawaddy, 29 Jun 2007, accessed at www.irrawaddy.org.
2 Far Eastern Economic Review. Asia 1990 Yearbook. Hong Kong: Far Eastern Economic
Review, 1990.
3 For more detailed assessment of the factors behind ceasefire agreements and the
contribution to relative stability of such agrements can be read in Zaw Oo and Win Min.
“Assessing Burma’s Ceasefire Accords,” Washington, D.C.: East West Center, 2007.
333
 4 Global Witness. A Conflict of Interests: London, UK, 2002.
5 Bangkok Post, “Ethnic rebels launch arms spree - Wa move to upgrade their potent
arsenal,” July 1, 2000
6 U.S. Department of State, International Narcotics Control Strategy Report, 1999.
Washington D.C., last assessed at www.state.gov.
7 Roger Mitton. ‘Who Rules on the Ground? The power of Myanmar’s area commanders
Asiaweek, September 3, 1999, Vol. 25, No. 35,
8 The portfolios such as the Office of the SPDC Chairman and the Office of the Prime
Minister (both portfolios served SPDC chairman and Prime Minister Senior General
Than Shwe) took two ministers each.
9 Than, Tin Maung Maung. “Myanmar: Preoccupation with Regime Survival, National
Unity, and Stability,” in M. Alagappa, eds. Asian Security Practice: Material and Ideatio-
nal Influences. Stanford, CA: Standford University Press.
10 Also see Bertil Lintner. “Army divisions: Reshuffle may spark dissent among senior
officers,” Far Eastern Economic Review. 23 April 1992.
11 Mancur Olson. “Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development,” American Political
Science Review. Vol. 87, No. 3, 1993.
12 Alfred Stepan. Rethinking Military Politics: Brazil and the Southern Cone. Princeton
University Press, 1988.
The Political Economy of Resource Curse in Burma
334
A Struggle for Democracy,
Equality and Federalism in
Burma: An Ethnic Perspective
Lian H. Sakhong*
Introduction
On 12 February 1947, the Union of Burma was founded at Panglong by
four former British colonies, namely the Chin, Kachin, Federated Shan
States and Burma Proper, all of which already had their own constitu-
tions. The British occupied these four colonies separately as independent
countries in different periods of time, and applied different administrati-
ve systems in accordance with the different constitutions that the colonial
power had promulgated for them. The British officially promulgated the
Chinland/Chinram Constitution, called the “Chin Hills Regulation,” in
1896, the “Kachin Hill Tribes Regulation” in 1895, the “1919 Act of Fede-
rated Shan States” in 1920, and the “1935 Burma Act” in 1937. The Chin
Hills Regulation of 1896 covered present Chin State in Burma, present
Mizoram State, Nagaland State, and part of Manipur and Meghalaya Sta-
tes in India. The 1935 Burma Act was applied to the area of pre-colonial
Myanmar/Burman Kingdom, which included the former Arakan and
Mon Kingdoms as well as delta areas of Karen country.
Since independence, the twelfth of February has been celebrated as
the Union Day of Burma. The observation of Union Day as an official
holiday in Burma implies the recognition of the distinctive national
identities of those who signed the Panglong Agreement and ratified the
treaty through the constitutional arrangement of 1947. It also implicitly
recognizes their political rights – the right to independence and to es-
tablish their own nation-state. The essence of the Panglong Agreement
was, and is, mutual recognition and respect, based on the principles of
political equality, self-determination and voluntary association.
However, Aung San, who had persuaded the Chin, Kachin, Shan
and other ethnic nationalities to join the Union, was assassinated
before Burma gained her independence. After his assassination, the
*Dr Sakhong could not attend the conference to present his paper
as he had to stay in SE-Asia after cyclone Nargis hit Myanmar/Burma on May 2
335
 1947 Union Constitution was rushed through to completion without
reflecting the spirit of Panglong. As a result, the country was plunged
into fifty years of civil war. Burma’s political crisis today is therefore not
merely an ideological confrontation between military dictatorship and
democracy, but also a constitutional problem. The ethnic nationalities
joined the Union as equal partners, preserving their rights of self-deter-
mination on the basis of the Panglong Agreement, but Burma’s consti-
tutions have failed to adhere to the spirit of that agreement.
In this paper, I shall argue that federalism is the only viable solution
to Burma’s current political crisis, including five long decades of civil
war. Federalism, therefore, is essential to the ultimate success of the de-
mocracy movement, to guarantee political equality for all nationalities,
the right of self-determination for all member states of the Union, and
democratic rights for all citizens of the Union.
Federalism: Theoretical Analysis
The term Federal is derived from the Latin words foedus and fides. Ac-
cording to S. R. Davis, the Latin word foedus is translated as “covenant”,
while its cognate fides means “faith” and “trust.” When we find in these
terms the idea of a “covenant, and synonymous ideas of promise, com-
mitment, undertaking, or obligation, vowing, plighting one’s word to a
course of conduct in relations to others, we come upon a vital bonding
device of civilization.” The idea of covenant involves “the idea of co-
operation, reciprocity, mutuality, and it implies the recognition of enti-
ties—whether it be persons, a people, or a divine being.”1
According to Daniel J. Elazar, the first example of a federal state with
the essential characteristic of the “idea of a contract, treaty, or alliance”
was the ancient Hebrew state, whose principles are mentioned in the
Bible.2 In modern times, the rise of federal political thought went hand
in hand with the emergence of a political-theological philosophy of fe-
deralism in 16th and early 17th century Renaissance Europe, when the
sovereignty of the modern nation-state appeared as a conceptual instru-
ment for the organization of power within the state.
Since the emergence of the modern nation-state, federalism has ge-
nerally been defined as an approach to government that divides public
powers not only horizontally, i.e. division of powers between legislative,
administrative and judiciary; but vertically, i.e. separation of powers
between two or more levels of government. In other words, federalism
is “a constitutional device which provides for a secure, i.e. constitutio-
nal, division of powers between central and ‘segmental’ authorities in
such a way that each is acknowledged to be the supreme authority in
A Struggle for Democracy, Equality and Federalism in Burma
336
specific areas of responsibility.”3 The basic essence of federalism, the-
refore, is “the notion of two or more orders of government combining
elements of ‘shared rule’ for some purposes and regional ‘self-rule’ for
the other.”4 As such, federalism is seen as a constitutionally established
balance between shared rule and self-rule: shared rule through com-
mon institutions, and regional self-rule through the governments of
the constituent units or states. The federal principles of self-rule and
shared rule, in turn, are based on “the objective of combining unity
and diversity: i.e. of accommodating, preserving and promoting distinct
identities within a larger political union.”5
In a genuine federal system, neither the federal nor state govern-
ments (or, the constituent units) are constitutionally subordinate to
the other, i.e. each has sovereign powers derived from the constitution
rather than from one another level of government, each is empowered
to deal with the citizens in the exercise of its legislative, executive and
taxing powers, and each is directly elected by its citizens. The structural
characteristics of a genuine federal system, at its full development, can
thus be generally defined as follows:
1. Two or more orders of government each acting directly on its
citizens, rather than indirectly through the other order;
2. A formal constitutional distribution of legislative and execu-
tive authority, and allocation of revenue resources between the
orders of government ensuring some areas of genuine auto-
nomy for each other;
3. Provision for the designated representation of distinct re-
gional or ethnic views within the federal policy-making institu-
tions, provided not only by a federal second chamber (i.e., what
used to be known in Burma as the Chamber of Nationalities or
the Upper House) composed of representatives of the state and
regional electorates, but also by state legislatures or governme-
nts;
4. A supreme written federal constitution, not unilaterally
amendable by one order of government, and therefore requi-
ring the consent not only of the federal legislature but also of
a significant portion of the constituent units or states, through
assent by their legislatures or by referendum of majorities;
5. Written constitutions for all member states of the union, or
constituent units, which are to be promulgated, exercised and
amended independently and unilaterally by each constituent
state for its own state, so long as such procedures are conducted
in accordance with the federal constitution;
337
 6. An umpire (in the form of a supreme court, or as in Switzer-
land provision for referendums) to rule on the interpretation
and valid application of the federal constitution;
7. Process and institutions to facilitate inter-governmental col-
laboration in those areas where governmental responsibilities
are shared or inevitably overlap.6
What basically distinguishes federations from decentralized unitary
systems, on the one hand, and from confederations, on the other, accor-
ding to Blindenbacher and Watts, is that “in unitary systems the govern-
ments of the constituent units ultimately derive their authority from
the central government, and in confederations the central institutions
ultimately derive their authority from the constituent units and consist
of delegates of constituent units.”7 In a federation, however, “each order
of government derives its authority, not from each order of government,
but from the constitution.”8
Federalism in the Burmese Context:
Lessons Learned from the 1947 Union Constitution
At the Panglong Conference in 1947, the Chin, Kachin, Shan and other
non-Burman nationalities were promised, as Silverstein observes, the
right to exercise political authority (in the form of administrative, ju-
dicial and legislative powers in their own autonomous national states)
and to preserve and protect their language, culture and religion, in ex-
change for voluntarily joining the Burmans in forming a political union
and giving their loyalty to a new state.9
On the basis of the Panglong Agreement, the Union Constitution
was framed. Aung San himself drafted the Union Constitution and
submitted it to the AFPFL convention held in May 1947, at the Jubilee
Hall in Rangoon. Aung San delivered a long speech at the convention
and explained the essence of the Panglong Agreement, which had the
aim of establishing a Federal Union. He also argued:
When we build our new Burma, shall we build it as a Union
or as a Unitary State? In my opinion it will not be feasible to
set up a Unitary State. We must set up a Union with properly
regulated provisions to safeguard the rights of the national
minorities.10
A Struggle for Democracy, Equality and Federalism in Burma
338
Aung San also insisted on the right of self-determination for ethnic na-
tionalities who signed the Panglong Agreement to found a new Federal
Union with so-called Burma Proper. He referred to his co-signatories,
the Chin, Kachin and Shan, as nations, or pyidaung in Burmese. He
said:
The right of self-determination means that a nation can arrange its
life according to its will. It has the right to arrange its life on the basis
of autonomy. It has the right to enter into federal relation with other
nations. It has the right to complete secession.11
Moreover, Aung San clarified the nature of ethnic and cultural mino-
rity rights and their implications, an issue which many of his contem-
poraries regarded as problematic:
What is it that particularly agitates a national minority? A minority is discon-
tented because it does not enjoy the right to use its native language. Permit it
to use its native language and this discontentment will pass of itself. A mino-
rity is discontented because it does not enjoy liberty of conscience etc. Give
it these liberties and it will cease to be discontented. Thus, national equality
in all forms (language, schools, etc.) is an essential element in the solution of
the national problem [or, ethnic conflict?].
A state law based on complete democracy in the country is required,
prohibiting all national privileges without exception and all kinds of
disabilities and restrictions on the rights of national minorities.12
On the basis of the principles of equality, the right of self-determi-
nation, and constitutional protection of ethnic and cultural minority
groups, Aung San drafted a new constitution for a new Union of Bur-
ma, which was duly approved by the AFPFL convention. According to
Aung San’s version of the constitution, the Union would be composed
of National States, or what he called “Union States,” such as the Chin,
Kachin, Karen, Karenni (Kayah), Mon, Myanmar (Burman), Rakhine
(Arakan) and Shan States. The “original idea,” as Dr Maung Maung
points out, “was that the Union States should have their own separate
constitutions, their own organs of state, viz. Parliament, Government
and Judiciary.”13
However, U Chan Htun reversed all these principles of the Fe-
deral Union after Aung San was assassinated. According to U Chan
Htun’s version of the Union Constitution, Burma Proper or the ethnic
Burman/Myanmar did not form their own separate National State; ins-
339
 tead they combined the power of the Burman/Myanmar National State
with the whole sovereign authority of the Union of Burma. Thus, while
one ethnic group, the Burman/Myanmar, controlled the sovereign po-
wer of the Union, that is, the legislative, judicial and administrative po-
wers of the Union of Burma, the other ethnic nationalities who formed
their own respective National States became almost like “vassal states”
of the ethnic Burman/Myanmar bloc. This constitutional arrangement
was totally unacceptable to the Chin, Kachin and Shan who signed the
Panglong Agreement on the basis of the principle of national equality,
and also to other nationalities.
Another serious flaw in the 1947 Constitution was the absence of state
constitutions for all the member states of the Union. In contrast to the
original agreement, according to which Aung San and Chin, Kachin and
Shan leaders intended to establish a separate state constitution for each
and every state, U Chan Htun’s version of the Union Constitution incor-
porated clauses covering all the affairs of the states. In this way, state af-
fairs became part and parcel of the Union Constitution, with no separate
constitutions for the Chin, Kachin, Shan and other ethnic nationalities.
Such a constitutional arrangement indicated that whatever powers the
governments of states enjoyed and exercised under the 1947 Constitution
were given to them by the central government, characteristic of a unitary
state system. In a unitary system, power lies in the hands of the central
government, and the powers of local governing or administrative units
derive from or are devolved to them by the central government.
What the Chin, Kachin, Shan and other ethnic nationalities envisio-
ned in Panglong was a federal system, in which the member or consti-
tuent states were the basic and founding units of the federation, and
whatever powers they exercised or possessed were not given to them
by the centre. The powers of the constituent states of a federation are,
in principle, derived from the peoples of the respective states, as is sta-
ted in most state constitutions in countries that are federal in form. In
theory, as Dr. Chao Tzang Yawnghwe observes,
A federation is formed when a number of states agree for some rea-
son to live and work together under one flag. And because there is an
agreement among founding states to band together as equal partners,
there arises a need for another level of government to handle matters
of common interest. Accordingly, this government – the federal or cen-
tral government – is given or vested with certain powers by the mem-
ber states. In a federation, therefore, it is the power of the federal or
central government that is derived from, or given to it, by the member
states. Thus, in federalism, the federal government is not a superior
A Struggle for Democracy, Equality and Federalism in Burma
340
government that holds all powers. Various and significant powers are
held by the member states, and these are clearly spelt out in the state
constitutions. In addition, some powers which are shared by all are gi-
ven to the federal government, and these too are spelt out, this time in
the federal constitution. In a federation, therefore, there are two levels
of powers as well as two levels of governments, which are intertwined,
yet separate. Hence, in a federal system there are two constitutions:
one is the federal constitution, and concurrently with it there exists
another set of constitutions, those of member states of the Union.14
U Chan Htun’s version of the 1947 Union Constitution of Burma
did not allow for the existence of separate constitutions for the founding
member states of the Union, namely, the Chin, Kachin, Shan and other
nationalities—including the Burman.
The third point that betrayed the Panglong Agreement and Aung San’s
policy of federalism was the way in which the Chamber of Nationalities
at the Union Assembly was structured. The original idea of the creation
of the Chamber of Nationalities was to safeguard not only the rights of
non-Burman ethnic nationalities, but also the symbolic and real equality
envisaged at the Panglong Conference. Thus, the intention was that each
ethnic national state should have the right to send equal numbers of re-
presentatives to the Chamber of Nationalities, no matter how big or small
their national state might be. But what happened under U Chan Htun’s
version of the Union Constitution was that, while all the non-Burman
nationalities had to send their tribal or local chiefs and princes to the
Chamber of Nationalities, it allowed Burma Proper to elect representati-
ves to the Chamber on the basis of its population. Thus, the Burman or
Myanmar from Burma Proper, who composed the majority in terms of
population, was given dominance in the Union Assembly.
In this way, the Union Assembly, according to U Chan Htun’s ver-
sion of the Union Constitution, was completely under the control of
the Burman or Myanmar ethnic nationality. Not only did the powerful
Chamber of Deputies (the lower house of the legislature) have the po-
wer to thwart the aspirations and interests of the non-Burman nationa-
lities, the Burmans even dominated the Chamber of Nationalities itself.
For that reason, the combined votes of the non-Burman nationalities
(even in the Chamber of Nationalities) were unable to halt the passage
of the “state religion bill” in which U Nu promulgated Buddhism as a
state religion in 1961. Thus, all the non-Burman nationalities viewed
the Union Constitution itself as an instrument for imposing a tyranny
of the majority and not as their protector, and it was this perception that
led Burma into fifty years of civil war.
341
 The Panglong Agreement was the most solemn agreement that the
Chin, Kachin and Shan had ever signed in their history, and therefore
it had to be protected as the covenant on which they built the Union to-
gether with the Burman and other ethnic nationalities. However, since
the agreement was betrayed or even broken by Burmese politicians af-
ter Aung San was assassinated, the Chin and other non-Burman ethnic
nationalities in the Union of Burma have had to redefine the covenant,
or Union Constitution, through which they have sought to build a pea-
ceful Union of Burma.
Nation-building and the Problem of Forced Assimilation
When the Chin, Kachin and Shan signed the Panglong Agreement in
1947, what they aimed to achieve was to “speed up” their own search
for freedom, together with the Burman and other nationalities, based
on the principles of equality, mutual trust and recognition; but not to
integrate their societies and their lands into Myanmar Buddhist society
and the Burman Kingdom. Thus, for them, the basic concept of inde-
pendence was independence without integration, that is, what political
scientists used to term “coming together”, or “together in difference.”
These phrases refer to a process by which nations come together in
order to form a modern nation-state in the form of a Federal Union, or
Pyi-daung-suh in Burmese, while maintaining the right of national self-
determination and the autonomous status of their nations.
Within this concept of “coming together,” it is important to differen-
tiate between “nation” and “state,” or what Hannah Arendt refers to as a
“secret conflict between state and nation.” According to Arendt,
[The nation] presents the “milieu” into which man is born, a closed
society to which one belongs by the right of birth; and a people beco-
mes a nation when it arrives at a historical consciousness of itself; as
such it is attached to the soil which is the product of past labour and
where history has left its traces. The state on the other hand is an open
society, ruling over territory where its power protects and makes law.
As a legal institution, the state knows only citizens no matter of what
nationality; its legal order is open to all who happen to live on its ter-
ritory.15
The state, far from being identical with the nation, is “the supreme
protector of a law which guarantees man his rights as man, his rights
as citizen and his rights as a national.”16 By signing the Panglong Agre-
ement, the Chin, Kachin and Shan had co-founded a Federal Union of
A Struggle for Democracy, Equality and Federalism in Burma
342
a multi-national state, which is an administrative and legal unit, but
they still wanted to keep their own respective nations, a concept which
according to Weber belongs to the sphere of values: culture, language,
religion, ethnicity, homeland, shared memories and history, a specific
sentiment of solidarity in the face of other groups or people. Thus, what
Aung San and the Chin, Kachin, and Shan leaders wanted to achieve at
Panglong was to build a Union through a state-building process, not to
create a nation through nation-building.
As mentioned above, the Burmese word for “Union” is “Pyi-daung-
shu,” which means “the coming together of different ‘nations’ and
‘national states.’”17 As the term indicates, the Pyi-daung-shu allows the
peaceful co-existing of different ethnic groups with different cultural
and religious backgrounds, i.e. different nations, within an adminis-
trative and legal unit of political union. It is, therefore, clear that state-
building is very different from nation-building, because in the building
of a multi-national state, there can be many nation-building processes
taking place at the same time for the different member nations.
In contrast to state-building, nation-building excludes from its
process other ethnic groups, cultures, religions and everything related
to multiculturalism and diversity. Thus, by accepting only one homo-
geneous set of cultural and religious values as its political values, the
very notion of nation-building can produce only a nation-state made
by a homogeneous people or nation that claims “pre-state unity based
on culture, history or religion.”18 As a result, a nation-state made by a
nation through the nation-building process cannot accommodate other
cultures, religions and ethnic groups. At best, as Saunders argues, “it
can tolerate non-integrated minorities as guests, but not as equal citi-
zens. The status of fully recognized citizen can be attained only by inte-
gration. Those who want to become citizens must change their cultural
identity.” Moreover, as Saunders explains:
If a cultural minority demands political recognition and identity, the
state must reject the claim. Because it is unable to accommodate a
fragmented political identity, it will ultimately come into conflict with
its minorities. Either the minorities must be integrated within the
majority culture, destroying their original cultural roots, or they must
be denied the opportunity to enhance their cultural identity through
political means. A fragmented political identity is rejected as a solu-
tion, because of is threat to the unity, homogeneity, and the roots of
state’s existence.19
343
 Aung San seemed to have a clear policy of state-building based on the
principles of equality and unity in diversity. He maintained that nation-
building in the form of “one race, one religion, and one language ha[s]
gone obsolete.”20 By inviting the Chin, Kachin, Shan and other ethnic
nationalities to form a new Union, Aung San’s policy of unity in diver-
sity transcended all different cultures and religions, rejecting them as
structural and functional factors to unite the country. By rejecting cul-
ture and religion as uniting factors of the country, he opted for a secular
state whose political values would be based not on cultural and religious
roots but on the equality of individual citizens and the right of self-
determination for member states of the Union. Aung San particularly
rejected religiously oriented ethno-nationalism, which mixed religion
with politics. He thus declared:
Religion is a matter of individual conscience, while politics is social sci-
ence. We must see to it that the individual enjoys his rights, including the
right to freedom of religious belief and worship. We must draw clear lines
between politics and religion because the two are not the same thing. If we
mix religion with politics, then we offend the spirit of religion itself.21
However, after Aung San was assassinated, U Nu reintroduced cultural
and religious values into political debate and abandoned Aung San’s
policy of unity in diversity together with the state/union-building pro-
cess. For U Nu, the only means to build a new nation was to revive the
pre-colonial cultural unity of Buda-bata Maynmar Lu-myo, which had
nothing to do with the Chin, Kachin, Shan and other ethnic nationali-
ties who joined the Union in order to speed up their own freedom.
Although Buddhism had been a powerful integrative force in traditional
Myanmar society, a modern multi-national state of the Union of Burma
with its multi-religious, multi-cultural, multi-ethnic plural society was a
very different country from that of the pre-colonial Myanmar Kingdom.
However, leaders like U Nu still believed that Buddhism could make a
significant contribution to some aspects of national integration. When
he became the Prime Minister of the newly independent Burma, U Nu
contradicted Aung San’s version of the Union Constitution, particularly the
clause that separated religion from politics, by declaring: “In the marrow
of my bones there is a belief that government should enter into the sphere
of religion.”22 In this way, U Nu’s government officially adopted Buddhism
as its state religion, as a means of national integration. By this means, an
attempt was made to achieve homogeneity by imposing religious and cul-
tural assimilation into the predominant group of Myanmar Buddhists. In
1953, the Ministry of Religious and Cultural Affairs was created to promote
A Struggle for Democracy, Equality and Federalism in Burma
344
the process of assimilation, and eventually it promulgated Buddhism as the
state religion of the Union of Burma in 1961.23
While U Nu opted for cultural and religious assimilation into Budd-
hism, or Buda-bata Myanmar-lumyo, as a means of integration, Gene-
ral Ne Win, who came to power through military coup in 1962, removed
the rights of the country’s religious and cultural minorities, including
all civil and basic human rights, as a means of creating a homogeneous
unitary state. Moreover, General Ne Win imposed his national langu-
age policy by declaring Myanmar-sa as the only official language in
the entire Union of Burma, which therefore was required to be used at
all levels of government and public functions, and also to be the only
medium of instruction at all levels of schools in the country—from pri-
mary to university levels. He not only imposed the Myanmar-sa as the
official language, but also suppressed the right to learn the other ethnic
national languages of the Union.
Nation-building, for both U Nu and Ne Win, was simply based on
the notion of “one race, one language and one religion”—that is to say,
the ethnicity of Myanmar-lumyo, the language of Myanmar-sa and the
state religion of Buddhism. Thus, what they wanted to achieve through
nation-building was to create a homogeneous nation of Myanmar
Naing-ngan, by drawing its political values from the cultural and religi-
ous values of Maynmar-sa and Buddhism. Although their approaches
to national integration were different, U Nu and Ne Win shared the goal
of creating a homogeneous people in the country. While U Nu opted for
cultural and religious assimilation into Buddhism as a means of inte-
gration, Ne Win used the national language policy of Myanmar-sa and
denied the rights of the country’s religious and cultural minorities as a
means of creating a homogeneous unitary state. U Nu and Ne Win thus
complemented each other, although their approaches in oppressing the
cultural and religious minorities were different in nature.
Supplementing U Nu’s policy of state religion and Ne Win’s national
language policy, the current military regime is opting for ethnicity as
a means of national integration, by imposing ethnic assimilation into
Myanmar-lumyo. The changing of the country name from Burma to
Myanmar, the name only of the ethnic Myanmar, in 1989 is a case in
point. When it implemented its policy of ethnic assimilation by force,
the present military junta applied various methods: killing people and
destroying the livelihood of ethnic minorities in fifty years of civil war,
using rape as a weapon of war against ethnic minorities, and religious
persecution as a means of destroying ethnic identity, especially of the
Chin, Kachin and Karen Christians. In this way, the successive govern-
345
 ments of the Union of Burma – from U Nu to Ne Win to Saw Maung
and Than Shwe – have carried out the nation-building process in terms
of “one race, one language, one religion,” that is – Myanmar-lunyo,
Myanmar-sa, Buddhism.
In the name of nation-building, the successive governments of the
Union of Burma have violated not only basic human rights and civic
rights but also all kind of collective rights. In the name of national
sovereignty the rights of self-determination for ethnic nationalities are
rejected; in the name of national integration the right to follow different
religions, to practice different cultures, and to speak different langu-
ages are deprived; and in the name of national assimilation the rights
to up-hold different identities and traditions are denied. In short, the
successive governments of the Union of Burma have been practicing
ethnic cleansing and cultural genocide for forty years.
State-making and Unity in Diversity:
An Option for the Future
As mentioned above, nation-building belongs to what social scientists
call “subjective values,” that is, culture, language, religion, ethnicity,
homeland, shared memories and history, etc., which differentiate one
group of people from another—values that cannot be shared objectively.
Thus, the nation-building process is impossible to implement in a mul-
ti-ethnic, multi-cultural, multi-religious plural society like the Union
of Burma. The only way to implement the nation-building process in
a plural society is to use coercive force to achieve assimilation, but that
approach will definitely result in confrontation and conflict, because
the very notion of nation-building is “hostile to multiculturalism and
diversity.”24 Unfortunately, this is exactly what has occurred in Burma
during the past fifty years.
In a plural society like the Union of Burma, the only good option
is federalism with a strong emphasis on decentralization and local au-
tonomy, in which the parallel processes of nation-building for all the
national states, i.e. member states of the union, and state-building for
the union as a multi-national state, can go hand in hand. Federalism by
definition is the division of power between the federal government and
state governments, which have their own separate constitutions. When
member states of the federal union are composed in terms of ethnicity
and historical homeland, each national state can implement its own
nation-building process within the territory of its homeland based on
its own culture, language, religion, ethnicity, shared memories, etc., by
A Struggle for Democracy, Equality and Federalism in Burma
346
making its own state constitution. Thus, while the purpose of writing a
state constitution is self-rule through a nation-building process allowing
for the preservation and promotion of distinct identities, the purpose of
making a federal constitution is shared-rule through a state-building
process aimed at the establishment of common institutions for mul-
ticulturalism and diversity. In a nutshell, while the drafting process of
the state constitution aims at implementing a nation-building process
for national states within the Union, the federal constitution aims at
completing the state-building process for the Union of Burma. In this
way, federalism can combine nation-building and state-building with
the objective of unity in diversity, thereby “accommodating, preserving
and promoting distinct identities within a larger political union.”25
Although the state constitution-making process through nation-buil-
ding can be a value-based subjective approach, the federal constitution-
making process through state-building is purely a matter of objective
value; for the federal constitution is “a legal institution, [which] knows
only citizens no matter of what nationality, and [whose] legal order is
open to all who happen to live on its territory.”26 As a legal institution,
federal constitution rules “over territory where its power protects and
makes law”, which guarantees “man his rights as man, his rights as
citizen and his rights as a national.”27 Thus, in a genuine federal sys-
tem, the federal constitution will never adopt cultural values as political
values, and it shall never promulgate a law that aims at the creation of a
homogeneous culture, which excludes other cultures.
Conclusion: Finding Equilibrium
between Nation-building and State-making
The question of constitution-making is usually focused on the structure
and function of the state and government—how the state should be
formed, how government should be organized, and how people should
be governed. In a multicultural plural society like Burma, such simple
questions concerned only with good governance are simply not enough.
We need to raise more controversial issues such as: Who should govern
whom? What majority or majorities should rule over what minorities?
Who should control the political power of the state, and with regards
to whom? Who should decide the procedure by which it is settled who
should govern whom?
As mentioned above, federalism is an approach to government
that divides public powers not only horizontally, but also vertically.
Federalism, therefore, has been viewed as a useful way of limiting go-
347
 vernmental power in order to secure good governance. In addition to
balancing self-rule and shared rule through constitutionally established
mechanisms, the recognition and participation of cultural and ethnic
minorities can also be achieved through:
• Emphasis on the political rather than the cultural base of
the nation-state;
• Separation of the state and religious or other socio-cultural
powers;
• Emphasis on human rights as protection of minority
rights;
• Emphasis on separation of powers, formally and infor-
mally;
• Executive power sharing;
• Multiparty system and proportional rule in elections of the
parliament;
• Decentralization and local autonomy, including bi-camera-
lism, as a means of vertical power sharing.
In today’s Burmese political context, the processes of federal consti-
tution and state constitutions drafting can be defined as finding a politi-
cal compromise between state-building and nation-building, which will
hopefully result in an institutional equilibrium. A political compromise
has to be found between a cultural majority having enough power to
define a majority regime on the one hand, and cultural minorities see-
king recognition within the constitutional framework and participation
in political decision-making on the other. The institutional equilibrium
is always a compromise between a majority regime and institutional
forms of minority protection and power sharing.
In the context of the legal system, an institutional equilibrium bet-
ween state-making and nation-building implies the concept of equality.
Thus, a multi-national state or a union that implements this fundamen-
tal principle must translate the concept of equality into effective collec-
tive rights. Although democracy is based on the principle of majority
rule, the majority should not abuse its democratic power by tyrannising
its minorities. Federalism can effectively control the tyranny of the ma-
jority through not only constitutionally mandated decentralization, but
also the equalisation of majority and minority before the law, which
recognizes the rights of a minority to be treated equally both as indivi-
duals and as communities.
The concept of equality implies both collective rights and individual
rights. The protection of the human rights of individuals prevents the
A Struggle for Democracy, Equality and Federalism in Burma
348
authorities of the state from discriminating against individuals who be-
longs to minorities, on the grounds of their language, religion, ethnicity
or race. The guarantee of human rights as individual rights according
to the law is different from that of tolerance. Tolerance also allows eve-
ryone to live within his or her community as a respected individual, free
from discrimination on the ground of ethnicity, religion or language.
However, those who are tolerated are not part of the governing people,
the “We” who form the state; for members of tolerated minorities, the
state is “their” state and “their” union, not “our” state or union. Diversity
might be respected, but not as a political value. Minorities are respected
because that is required by the universal values enshrined in the consti-
tution, as in the 1947 Constitution of the Union of Burma. But in such
a situation, diversity is neither a policy nor a goal of the state.
Fifty years of negative experiences of constitution-making and prac-
tice demonstrates that federalism is the only good option for the future
of Burma. In order for unity in diversity to become a political value of
the Union, state constitutions drafting for “self-rule” must engage in
nation-building; federal constitution drafting for “shared-rule” must
engage in state-building; and the constitutional structure as a whole
must seek equality between these two processes. Thus, the ultimate
goal of the democracy movement in Burma is to establish a genuine
Federal Union of Burma, which will guarantee democratic rights for
all citizens, political equality for all ethnic nationalities, and the right of
self-determination for all member state of the Union within the fram-
ework of a federal arrangement.
Notes
1
S. R. Davis, The Federal Principles: A Journey Through Time in Quest of a Meaning (Lon-
don: University of California Press, 1978), p. 3.
2
Daniel J. Elalzar, “Federalism,” in International Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences, Vol.
V (New York, 1968), pp. 361–2.
3
Alan Smith, ”Ethnic Conflict and Federalism: The Case of Burma,” in Gunther Bächler
(ed.), Federalism against Ethnicity? Institutional, Legal and Democratic Instruments to Pre-
vent Violent Minority Conflicts (Zurich: Verlag Ruegger, 1997), pp. 231-267.
4
Raoul Blindenbacher and Arnold Koller (eds.), Federalism in a Changing World (London
and Ithaca: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2003), p. 9
5
Ibid.
6
Cf. Blindenbacher and Watts (2003), p. 10
7
Ibid.
8
Ibid.
349
 9
Josef Silverstein, “Minority Problems in Burma Since 1962,” in Lehman (ed.), Military
Rule in Burma Since 1962 (Singapore, 1981), p. 51.
10
Aung San, Burma’s Challenge (Rangoon, 1947), reprinted in Josef Silverstein, The
List of Participants
Political Legacy of Aung San (New York: Cornell University Press, 1993), cited in Maung Mr. Bradley O. Babson
Maung, Burma’s Constitution (The Hague, 1959), p. 169.
11
Brunswick
Bogyoke Aung San’s Speeches, pp. 306–307. Also cited in The 1947 Constitution and the
Nationalities, Volume 11 (Rangoon University: University Historical Research Centre, Dr. Pavin Chachavalpongpun
1999), p. 60. Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore
12
Bogyoke Aung San’s Speeches, pp. 306–307.
13 Prof. Brahma Chellaney
U Maung Maung, Burmese Nationalist Movements, 1940–1948 (1989), p. 170.
14
Center for Policy Research, New Delhi
Chao Tzang Yawnghwe, “Burma: State Constitutions and the Challenges Facing the Ethnic
Nationalities,” in Yawnghwe and Sakhong (eds.), Federalism, State Constitutions and Self-determination Prof. Baladas Ghoshal
in Burma (Chiang Mai, UNLD Press, 2003), pp.99-110 Centre for Policy Research and Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies
15
Hannah Arendt, “The Nation,” cited by Ronald Beiner, “Arendt and Nationalism,” in Dana (IPCS), New Delhi
Villa (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Hannah Arendt (Cambridge University Press: 2000), pp.
44–56. Dr. Xiaolin Guo
16
Ronald Beiner, “Arendt and Nationalism,” in Dana Villa (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Institute for Security and Development Studies, Stockholm
Hannah Arendt (2000), p. 53. Dr Jürgen Haacke
17
Chao Tzang Yawnghwe ”State Constitutions, Federalism and Ethnic Self-determination,” in Department of International Relations
Yawnghwe and Sakhong (eds.) Federalism, State Constitutions and Self-determination in Burma (Chiang
London School of Economics & Political Science
Mai: UNLD Press, 2003), pp. 99-110
18
Cf. Saunders in Blindenbacher and Koller (2003), p. 199 Mr. Anders Hellner
19
Ibid., p. 201 Senior Advisor
20
Aung San’s speech entitled “Problems for Burma’s Freedom,” delivered on January 20, 1946, The Swedish Institute of International Affairs (SIIA), Stockholm
in Josef Silverstein (ed.), Political Legacy of Aung San (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press,
1993), p. 96.
Dr. Timo Kivimäki
21 The Nordic Institute of Asian Studies. Copenhagen
Aung San’s speech entitled “Problems for Burma’s Freedom,” delivered on January 20, 1946,
in Josef Silverstein (ed.), Political Legacy of Aung San (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, Dr. Johan Lagerkvist
1993), p. 96. The Swedish Institute of International Affairs (SIIA), Stockholm
22
Jerold Schector, The New Face of Buddha (1967), p. 106.
23
Cf. John F. Cady, A History of Modern Burma (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University
Mr. Bertil Lintner
Press, 1960), p. 638. Foreign Correspondent with the Swedish daily Svenska dagbladet,
24
Saunder (2003), ibid., p. 198 Chiang-mai
25
Ibid. Dr. Xiayun Ni
26
Ronald Beiner in Dana Villa (2000), op.cit., p. 53. China Institute of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR)
27
Ibid. Beijing
Dr. Zaw Oo
School of International Service
American University, Washington DC
Dr. Tomas Ries
The Swedish Institute of International Affairs (SIIA), Stockholm

A Struggle for Democracy, Equality and Federalism in Burma

350 351
 Dr. Lian Sakhong
H ow is one to understand the continuing political impasse between Burma/
Myanmar and the international community? And what are the options available
to the international community and multilateral and regional organizations to facilitate
General Secretary for the Ethnic Nationalities Council, (Union of Burma)
Senior research associate Stockholm University a break away from this situation?
Prof. David I. Steinberg These questions were central to the conference “Between Isolation and
Georgetown University, Washington DC Internationalization: the State of Burma,” convened at the Swedish Institute of
Dr. Gunnar Sjöstedt International Affairs (SIIA) on May 8 and 9, 2008. Leading researchers, diplomats,
The Swedish Institute of International Affairs (SIIA), Stockholm
experts and practitioners in the field gathered to discuss available policy options for
Dr. Ian Storey engaging the military junta in Burma, the role of Burma’s big neighbours (including
Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore
China, India, and the ASEAN countries), and future prospects for a democratic
Dr. Michael von Hauff
transition in Burma.
University of Kaiserslautern
Mr. Harn Yangwhe
Director of the Euro-Burma Office, Brussels

Utrikespolitiska Institutet/
Swedish Institute of International Affairs, SIIA
Address: Drottning Kristinas väg 37, Box 27035, 102 51 Stockholm
Telephone: 08-511 768 00
Telefax: 08-511 768 99
www.ui.se
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