EN BANC

G.R. No. 101083 July 30, 1993

JUAN ANTONIO, ANNA ROSARIO and JOSE ALFONSO, all
surnamed OPOSA, minors, and represented by their parents
ANTONIO and RIZALINA OPOSA, ROBERTA NICOLE SADIUA,
minor, represented by her parents CALVIN and ROBERTA
SADIUA, CARLO, AMANDA SALUD and PATRISHA, all
surnamed FLORES, minors and represented by their parents
ENRICO and NIDA FLORES, GIANINA DITA R. FORTUN, minor,
represented by her parents SIGRID and DOLORES FORTUN,
GEORGE II and MA. CONCEPCION, all surnamed MISA, minors
and represented by their parents GEORGE and MYRA MISA,
BENJAMIN ALAN V. PESIGAN, minor, represented by his
parents ANTONIO and ALICE PESIGAN, JOVIE MARIE ALFARO,
minor, represented by her parents JOSE and MARIA VIOLETA
ALFARO, MARIA CONCEPCION T. CASTRO, minor, represented
by her parents FREDENIL and JANE CASTRO, JOHANNA
DESAMPARADO,
minor, represented by her parents JOSE and ANGELA
DESAMPRADO, CARLO JOAQUIN T. NARVASA, minor,
represented by his parents GREGORIO II and CRISTINE
CHARITY NARVASA, MA. MARGARITA, JESUS IGNACIO, MA.
ANGELA and MARIE GABRIELLE, all surnamed SAENZ, minors,
represented by their parents ROBERTO and AURORA SAENZ,
KRISTINE, MARY ELLEN, MAY, GOLDA MARTHE and DAVID
IAN, all surnamed KING, minors, represented by their parents
MARIO and HAYDEE KING, DAVID, FRANCISCO and THERESE
VICTORIA, all surnamed ENDRIGA, minors, represented by their
parents BALTAZAR and TERESITA ENDRIGA, JOSE MA. and
REGINA MA., all surnamed ABAYA, minors, represented by their
parents ANTONIO and MARICA ABAYA, MARILIN, MARIO, JR.
and MARIETTE, all surnamed CARDAMA, minors, represented
by their parents MARIO and LINA CARDAMA, CLARISSA, ANN
MARIE, NAGEL, and IMEE LYN, all surnamed OPOSA, minors
and represented by their parents RICARDO and MARISSA
OPOSA, PHILIP JOSEPH, STEPHEN JOHN and ISAIAH JAMES,
all surnamed QUIPIT, minors, represented by their parents
JOSE MAX and VILMI QUIPIT, BUGHAW CIELO, CRISANTO,
ANNA, DANIEL and FRANCISCO, all surnamed BIBAL, minors,
represented by their parents FRANCISCO, JR. and MILAGROS
BIBAL, and THE PHILIPPINE ECOLOGICAL NETWORK,
INC., petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR., in his
capacity as the Secretary of the Department of Environment
and Natural Resources, and THE HONORABLE ERIBERTO U.
ROSARIO, Presiding Judge of the RTC, Makati, Branch
66, respondents.
Oposa Law Office for petitioners.
The Solicitor General for respondents.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

In a broader sense, this petition bears upon the right of Filipinos to a
balanced and healthful ecology which the petitioners dramatically
associate with the twin concepts of "inter-generational responsibility"
and "inter-generational justice." Specifically, it touches on the issue
of whether the said petitioners have a cause of action to "prevent the
misappropriation or impairment" of Philippine rainforests and "arrest
the unabated hemorrhage of the country's vital life support systems
and continued rape of Mother Earth."
The controversy has its genesis in Civil Case No. 90-77 which was
filed before Branch 66 (Makati, Metro Manila) of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), National Capital Judicial Region. The principal plaintiffs
therein, now the principal petitioners, are all minors duly represented
and joined by their respective parents. Impleaded as an additional
plaintiff is the Philippine Ecological Network, Inc. (PENI), a domestic,
non-stock and non-profit corporation organized for the purpose
of, inter alia, engaging in concerted action geared for the protection

of our environment and natural resources. The original defendant

was the Honorable Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., then Secretary of the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). His
substitution in this petition by the new Secretary, the Honorable
Angel C. Alcala, was subsequently ordered upon proper motion by
the petitioners. 1 The complaint 2 was instituted as a taxpayers' class
suit 3 and alleges that the plaintiffs "are all citizens of the Republic of
the Philippines, taxpayers, and entitled to the full benefit, use and
enjoyment of the natural resource treasure that is the country's virgin
tropical forests." The same was filed for themselves and others who
are equally concerned about the preservation of said resource but
are "so numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all before the
Court." The minors further asseverate that they "represent their
generation as well as generations yet unborn." 4 Consequently, it is
prayed for that judgment be rendered:
. . . ordering defendant, his agents,
representatives and other persons acting in his
behalf to
(1) Cancel all existing
agreements in the country;

timber

license

(2) Cease and desist from receiving, accepting,

processing, renewing or approving new timber
license agreements.
and granting the plaintiffs ". . . such other reliefs just and equitable
under the premises." 5
The complaint starts off with the general averments that the
Philippine archipelago of 7,100 islands has a land area of thirty
million (30,000,000) hectares and is endowed with rich, lush and
verdant rainforests in which varied, rare and unique species of flora
and fauna may be found; these rainforests contain a genetic,
biological and chemical pool which is irreplaceable; they are also the
habitat of indigenous Philippine cultures which have existed,
endured and flourished since time immemorial; scientific evidence
reveals that in order to maintain a balanced and healthful ecology,
the country's land area should be utilized on the basis of a ratio of
fifty-four per cent (54%) for forest cover and forty-six per cent (46%)
for agricultural, residential, industrial, commercial and other uses;
the distortion and disturbance of this balance as a consequence of
deforestation have resulted in a host of environmental tragedies,
such as (a) water shortages resulting from drying up of the water
table, otherwise known as the "aquifer," as well as of rivers, brooks
and streams, (b) salinization of the water table as a result of the
intrusion therein of salt water, incontrovertible examples of which
may be found in the island of Cebu and the Municipality of Bacoor,
Cavite, (c) massive erosion and the consequential loss of soil fertility
and agricultural productivity, with the volume of soil eroded
estimated at one billion (1,000,000,000) cubic meters per annum
approximately the size of the entire island of Catanduanes, (d) the
endangering and extinction of the country's unique, rare and varied
flora and fauna, (e) the disturbance and dislocation of cultural
communities, including the disappearance of the Filipino's
indigenous cultures, (f) the siltation of rivers and seabeds and
consequential destruction of corals and other aquatic life leading to a
critical reduction in marine resource productivity, (g) recurrent spells
of drought as is presently experienced by the entire country, (h)
increasing velocity of typhoon winds which result from the absence
of windbreakers, (i) the floodings of lowlands and agricultural plains
arising from the absence of the absorbent mechanism of forests, (j)
the siltation and shortening of the lifespan of multi-billion peso dams
constructed and operated for the purpose of supplying water for
domestic uses, irrigation and the generation of electric power, and
(k) the reduction of the earth's capacity to process carbon dioxide
gases which has led to perplexing and catastrophic climatic changes
such as the phenomenon of global warming, otherwise known as the
"greenhouse effect."
Plaintiffs further assert that the adverse and detrimental
consequences of continued and deforestation are so capable of
unquestionable demonstration that the same may be submitted as a
matter of judicial notice. This notwithstanding, they expressed their
intention to present expert witnesses as well as documentary,
photographic and film evidence in the course of the trial.
As their cause of action, they specifically allege that:

CAUSE OF ACTION
7. Plaintiffs replead by reference the foregoing
allegations.
8. Twenty-five (25) years ago, the Philippines
had some sixteen (16) million hectares of
rainforests constituting roughly 53% of the
country's land mass.
9. Satellite images taken in 1987 reveal that
there remained no more than 1.2 million
hectares of said rainforests or four per cent
(4.0%) of the country's land area.
10. More recent surveys reveal that a mere
850,000 hectares of virgin old-growth rainforests
are left, barely 2.8% of the entire land mass of
the Philippine archipelago and about 3.0 million
hectares of immature and uneconomical
secondary growth forests.
11. Public records reveal that the defendant's,
predecessors have granted timber license
agreements ('TLA's') to various corporations to
cut the aggregate area of 3.89 million hectares
for commercial logging purposes.
A copy of the TLA holders and the
corresponding areas covered is hereto attached
as Annex "A".
12.
At
the
present
rate
of
deforestation, i.e. about 200,000 hectares per
annum or 25 hectares per hour nighttime,
Saturdays, Sundays and holidays included
the Philippines will be bereft of forest resources
after the end of this ensuing decade, if not
earlier.
13.
The
adverse
effects,
disastrous
consequences, serious injury and irreparable
damage of this continued trend of deforestation
to the plaintiff minor's generation and to
generations yet unborn are evident and
incontrovertible. As a matter of fact, the
environmental
damages
enumerated
in
paragraph 6 hereof are already being felt,
experienced and suffered by the generation of
plaintiff adults.
14. The continued allowance by defendant of
TLA holders to cut and deforest the remaining
forest stands will work great damage and
irreparable injury to plaintiffs especially
plaintiff minors and their successors who may
never see, use, benefit from and enjoy this rare
and unique natural resource treasure.
This
act
of
defendant
constitutes
a
misappropriation and/or impairment of the
natural resource property he holds in trust for
the benefit of plaintiff minors and succeeding
generations.
15. Plaintiffs have a clear and constitutional right
to a balanced and healthful ecology and are
entitled to protection by the State in its capacity
as the parens patriae.
16. Plaintiff have exhausted all administrative
remedies with the defendant's office. On March
2, 1990, plaintiffs served upon defendant a final
demand to cancel all logging permits in the
country.

A copy of the plaintiffs' letter dated March 1,

1990 is hereto attached as Annex "B".
17. Defendant, however, fails and refuses to
cancel the existing TLA's to the continuing
serious damage and extreme prejudice of
plaintiffs.
18. The continued failure and refusal by
defendant to cancel the TLA's is an act violative
of the rights of plaintiffs, especially plaintiff
minors who may be left with a country that is
desertified (sic), bare, barren and devoid of the
wonderful flora, fauna and indigenous cultures
which the Philippines had been abundantly
blessed with.
19. Defendant's refusal to cancel the
aforementioned TLA's is manifestly contrary to
the public policy enunciated in the Philippine
Environmental Policy which, in pertinent part,
states that it is the policy of the State
(a) to create, develop, maintain and improve
conditions under which man and nature can
thrive in productive and enjoyable harmony with
each other;
(b) to fulfill the social, economic and other
requirements of present and future generations
of Filipinos and;
(c) to ensure the attainment of an environmental
quality that is conductive to a life of dignity and
well-being. (P.D. 1151, 6 June 1977)
20. Furthermore, defendant's continued refusal
to cancel the aforementioned TLA's is
contradictory to the Constitutional policy of the
State to
a. effect "a more equitable distribution of
opportunities, income and wealth" and "make
full and efficient use of natural resources (sic)."
(Section 1, Article XII of the Constitution);
b. "protect the nation's marine wealth." (Section
2, ibid);
c. "conserve and promote the nation's cultural
heritage and resources (sic)" (Section 14, Article
XIV,id.);
d. "protect and advance the right of the people
to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord
with the rhythm and harmony of nature."
(Section 16, Article II, id.)
21. Finally, defendant's act is contrary to the
highest law of humankind the natural law
and violative of plaintiffs' right to selfpreservation and perpetuation.
22. There is no other plain, speedy and
adequate remedy in law other than the instant
action to arrest the unabated hemorrhage of the
country's vital life support systems and
continued rape of Mother Earth. 6
On 22 June 1990, the original defendant, Secretary Factoran, Jr.,
filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint based on two (2) grounds,
namely: (1) the plaintiffs have no cause of action against him and (2)
the issue raised by the plaintiffs is a political question which properly
pertains to the legislative or executive branches of Government. In
their 12 July 1990 Opposition to the Motion, the petitioners maintain
that (1) the complaint shows a clear and unmistakable cause of

action, (2) the motion is dilatory and (3) the action presents a
justiciable question as it involves the defendant's abuse of
discretion.
On 18 July 1991, respondent Judge issued an order granting the
aforementioned motion to dismiss. 7 In the said order, not only was
the defendant's claim that the complaint states no cause of action
against him and that it raises a political question sustained, the
respondent Judge further ruled that the granting of the relief prayed
for would result in the impairment of contracts which is prohibited by
the fundamental law of the land.
Plaintiffs thus filed the instant special civil action for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court and ask this Court to rescind
and set aside the dismissal order on the ground that the respondent
Judge gravely abused his discretion in dismissing the action. Again,
the parents of the plaintiffs-minors not only represent their children,
but have also joined the latter in this case. 8
On 14 May 1992, We resolved to give due course to the petition and
required the parties to submit their respective Memoranda after the
Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a Comment in behalf of
the respondents and the petitioners filed a reply thereto.
Petitioners contend that the complaint clearly and unmistakably
states a cause of action as it contains sufficient allegations
concerning their right to a sound environment based on Articles 19,
20 and 21 of the Civil Code (Human Relations), Section 4 of
Executive Order (E.O.) No. 192 creating the DENR, Section 3 of
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1151 (Philippine Environmental
Policy), Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution recognizing the
right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology, the concept
of generational genocide in Criminal Law and the concept of man's
inalienable right to self-preservation and self-perpetuation embodied
in natural law. Petitioners likewise rely on the respondent's
correlative obligation per Section 4 of E.O. No. 192, to safeguard the
people's right to a healthful environment.
It is further claimed that the issue of the respondent Secretary's
alleged grave abuse of discretion in granting Timber License
Agreements (TLAs) to cover more areas for logging than what is
available involves a judicial question.
Anent the invocation by the respondent Judge of the Constitution's
non-impairment clause, petitioners maintain that the same does not
apply in this case because TLAs are not contracts. They likewise
submit that even if TLAs may be considered protected by the said
clause, it is well settled that they may still be revoked by the State
when the public interest so requires.
On the other hand, the respondents aver that the petitioners failed to
allege in their complaint a specific legal right violated by the
respondent Secretary for which any relief is provided by law. They
see nothing in the complaint but vague and nebulous allegations
concerning an "environmental right" which supposedly entitles the
petitioners to the "protection by the state in its capacity as parens
patriae." Such allegations, according to them, do not reveal a valid
cause of action. They then reiterate the theory that the question of
whether logging should be permitted in the country is a political
question which should be properly addressed to the executive or
legislative branches of Government. They therefore assert that the
petitioners' resources is not to file an action to court, but to lobby
before Congress for the passage of a bill that would ban logging
totally.
As to the matter of the cancellation of the TLAs, respondents submit
that the same cannot be done by the State without due process of
law. Once issued, a TLA remains effective for a certain period of time
usually for twenty-five (25) years. During its effectivity, the same
can neither be revised nor cancelled unless the holder has been
found, after due notice and hearing, to have violated the terms of the
agreement or other forestry laws and regulations. Petitioners'
proposition to have all the TLAs indiscriminately cancelled without
the requisite hearing would be violative of the requirements of due
process.
Before going any further, We must first focus on some procedural
matters. Petitioners instituted Civil Case No. 90-777 as a class suit.

The original defendant and the present respondents did not take
issue with this matter. Nevertheless, We hereby rule that the said
civil case is indeed a class suit. The subject matter of the complaint
is of common and general interest not just to several, but to all
citizens of the Philippines. Consequently, since the parties are so
numerous, it, becomes impracticable, if not totally impossible, to
bring all of them before the court. We likewise declare that the
plaintiffs therein are numerous and representative enough to ensure
the full protection of all concerned interests. Hence, all the requisites
for the filing of a valid class suit under Section 12, Rule 3 of the
Revised Rules of Court are present both in the said civil case and in
the instant petition, the latter being but an incident to the former.
This case, however, has a special and novel element. Petitioners
minors assert that they represent their generation as well as
generations yet unborn. We find no difficulty in ruling that they can,
for themselves, for others of their generation and for the succeeding
generations, file a class suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of the
succeeding generations can only be based on the concept of
intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and
healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right, as hereinafter
expounded,
considers
the "rhythm and harmony of nature." Nature means the created
world in its entirety. 9 Such rhythm and harmony indispensably
include, inter alia, the judicious disposition, utilization, management,
renewal and conservation of the country's forest, mineral, land,
waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas and other natural
resources to the end that their exploration, development and
utilization be equitably accessible to the present as well as future
generations. 10 Needless to say, every generation has a
responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and harmony for
the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little
differently, the minors' assertion of their right to a sound environment
constitutes, at the same time, the performance of their obligation to
ensure the protection of that right for the generations to come.
The locus standi of the petitioners having thus been addressed, We
shall now proceed to the merits of the petition.
After a careful perusal of the complaint in question and a meticulous
consideration and evaluation of the issues raised and arguments
adduced by the parties, We do not hesitate to find for the petitioners
and rule against the respondent Judge's challenged order for having
been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction. The pertinent portions of the said order reads as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
After a careful and circumspect evaluation of the
Complaint, the Court cannot help but agree with
the defendant. For although we believe that
plaintiffs have but the noblest of all intentions, it
(sic) fell short of alleging, with sufficient
definiteness, a specific legal right they are
seeking to enforce and protect, or a specific
legal wrong they are seeking to prevent and
redress (Sec. 1, Rule 2, RRC). Furthermore, the
Court notes that the Complaint is replete with
vague assumptions and vague conclusions
based on unverified data. In fine, plaintiffs fail to
state a cause of action in its Complaint against
the herein defendant.
Furthermore, the Court firmly believes that the
matter before it, being impressed with political
color and involving a matter of public policy, may
not be taken cognizance of by this Court without
doing violence to the sacred principle of
"Separation of Powers" of the three (3) co-equal
branches of the Government.
The Court is likewise of the impression that it
cannot, no matter how we stretch our
jurisdiction, grant the reliefs prayed for by the
plaintiffs, i.e., to cancel all existing timber
license agreements in the country and to cease
and
desist
from
receiving,
accepting,
processing, renewing or approving new timber
license agreements. For to do otherwise would

amount to "impairment of contracts" abhored

(sic) by the fundamental law. 11

The said right implies, among many other things, the judicious
management and conservation of the country's forests.

We do not agree with the trial court's conclusions that the plaintiffs
failed to allege with sufficient definiteness a specific legal right
involved or a specific legal wrong committed, and that the complaint
is replete with vague assumptions and conclusions based on
unverified data. A reading of the complaint itself belies these
conclusions.

Without such forests, the ecological or environmental

balance would be irreversiby disrupted.

The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal right the

right to a balanced and healthful ecology which, for the first time in
our nation's constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated in the
fundamental law. Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution
explicitly provides:
Sec. 16. The State shall protect and advance
the right of the people to a balanced and
healthful ecology in accord with the rhythm and
harmony of nature.
This right unites with the right to health which is
provided for in the preceding section of the
same article:
Sec. 15. The State shall protect and promote
the right to health of the people and instill health
consciousness among them.
While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found
under the Declaration of Principles and State Policies and not under
the Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it is less important than any
of the civil and political rights enumerated in the latter. Such a right
belongs to a different category of rights altogether for it concerns
nothing less than self-preservation and self-perpetuation aptly
and fittingly stressed by the petitioners the advancement of which
may even be said to predate all governments and constitutions. As a
matter of fact, these basic rights need not even be written in the
Constitution for they are assumed to exist from the inception of
humankind. If they are now explicitly mentioned in the fundamental
charter, it is because of the well-founded fear of its framers that
unless the rights to a balanced and healthful ecology and to health
are mandated as state policies by the Constitution itself, thereby
highlighting their continuing importance and imposing upon the state
a solemn obligation to preserve the first and protect and advance the
second, the day would not be too far when all else would be lost not
only for the present generation, but also for those to come
generations which stand to inherit nothing but parched earth
incapable of sustaining life.

Conformably with the enunciated right to a balanced and healthful

ecology and the right to health, as well as the other related
provisions of the Constitution concerning the conservation,
development
and
utilization
of
the
country's
natural
resources, 13 then President Corazon C. Aquino promulgated on 10
June 1987 E.O. No. 192, 14 Section 4 of which expressly mandates
that the Department of Environment and Natural Resources "shall be
the primary government agency responsible for the conservation,
management, development and proper use of the country's
environment and natural resources, specifically forest and grazing
lands, mineral, resources, including those in reservation and
watershed areas, and lands of the public domain, as well as the
licensing and regulation of all natural resources as may be provided
for by law in order to ensure equitable sharing of the benefits derived
therefrom for the welfare of the present and future generations of
Filipinos." Section 3 thereof makes the following statement of policy:
Sec. 3. Declaration of Policy. It is hereby
declared the policy of the State to ensure the
sustainable use, development, management,
renewal, and conservation of the country's
forest, mineral, land, off-shore areas and other
natural resources, including the protection and
enhancement of the quality of the environment,
and equitable access of the different segments
of the population to the development and the
use of the country's natural resources, not only
for the present generation but for future
generations as well. It is also the policy of the
state to recognize and apply a true value
system including social and environmental cost
implications relative to their utilization,
development and conservation of our natural
resources.
This policy declaration is substantially re-stated it Title XIV, Book IV
of the Administrative Code of 1987, 15specifically in Section 1 thereof
which reads:

MR. VILLACORTA:

Sec. 1. Declaration of Policy. (1) The State

shall ensure, for the benefit of the Filipino
people, the full exploration and development as
well as the judicious disposition, utilization,
management, renewal and conservation of the
country's forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries,
wildlife, off-shore areas and other natural
resources, consistent with the necessity of
maintaining a sound ecological balance and
protecting and enhancing the quality of the
environment and the objective of making the
exploration, development and utilization of such
natural resources equitably accessible to the
different segments of the present as well as
future generations.

Does this section mandate

the
State
to
provide
sanctions against all forms
of pollution air, water and
noise pollution?

(2) The State shall likewise recognize and apply

a true value system that takes into account
social and environmental cost implications
relative to the utilization, development and
conservation of our natural resources.

The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the

correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment. During the
debates on this right in one of the plenary sessions of the 1986
Constitutional Commission, the following exchange transpired
between Commissioner Wilfrido Villacorta and Commissioner Adolfo
Azcuna who sponsored the section in question:

MR. AZCUNA:
Yes, Madam President. The
right to healthful (sic)
environment
necessarily
carries with it the correlative
duty of not impairing the
same
and,
therefore,
sanctions may be provided
for
impairment
of
environmental balance. 12

The above provision stresses "the necessity of maintaining a sound

ecological balance and protecting and enhancing the quality of the
environment." Section 2 of the same Title, on the other hand,
specifically speaks of the mandate of the DENR; however, it makes
particular reference to the fact of the agency's being subject to law
and higher authority. Said section provides:
Sec. 2. Mandate. (1) The Department of
Environment and Natural Resources shall be
primarily responsible for the implementation of
the foregoing policy.

(2) It shall, subject to law and higher authority,

be in charge of carrying out the State's
constitutional mandate to control and supervise
the exploration, development, utilization, and
conservation of the country's natural resources.
Both E.O. NO. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 have set
the objectives which will serve as the bases for policy formulation,
and have defined the powers and functions of the DENR.
It may, however, be recalled that even before the ratification of the
1987 Constitution, specific statutes already paid special attention to
the "environmental right" of the present and future generations. On 6
June 1977, P.D. No. 1151 (Philippine Environmental Policy) and P.D.
No. 1152 (Philippine Environment Code) were issued. The former
"declared a continuing policy of the State (a) to create, develop,
maintain and improve conditions under which man and nature can
thrive in productive and enjoyable harmony with each other, (b) to
fulfill the social, economic and other requirements of present and
future generations of Filipinos, and (c) to insure the attainment of an
environmental quality that is conducive to a life of dignity and wellbeing." 16 As its goal, it speaks of the "responsibilities of each
generation as trustee and guardian of the environment for
succeeding generations." 17 The latter statute, on the other hand,
gave flesh to the said policy.
Thus, the right of the petitioners (and all those they represent) to a
balanced and healthful ecology is as clear as the DENR's duty
under its mandate and by virtue of its powers and functions under
E.O. No. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 to protect and
advance the said right.
A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the corelative
duty or obligation to respect or protect the same gives rise to a
cause of action. Petitioners maintain that the granting of the TLAs,
which they claim was done with grave abuse of discretion, violated
their right to a balanced and healthful ecology; hence, the full
protection thereof requires that no further TLAs should be renewed
or granted.
A cause of action is defined as:
. . . an act or omission of one party in violation
of the legal right or rights of the other; and its
essential elements are legal right of the plaintiff,
correlative obligation of the defendant, and act
or omission of the defendant in violation of said
legal right. 18
It is settled in this jurisdiction that in a motion to dismiss based on
the ground that the complaint fails to state a cause of action, 19 the
question submitted to the court for resolution involves the sufficiency
of the facts alleged in the complaint itself. No other matter should be
considered; furthermore, the truth of falsity of the said allegations is
beside the point for the truth thereof is deemed hypothetically
admitted. The only issue to be resolved in such a case is: admitting
such alleged facts to be true, may the court render a valid judgment
in accordance with the prayer in the complaint? 20 InMilitante vs.
Edrosolano, 21 this Court laid down the rule that the judiciary should
"exercise the utmost care and circumspection in passing upon a
motion to dismiss on the ground of the absence thereof [cause of
action] lest, by its failure to manifest a correct appreciation of the
facts alleged and deemed hypothetically admitted, what the law
grants or recognizes is effectively nullified. If that happens, there is a
blot on the legal order. The law itself stands in disrepute."
After careful examination of the petitioners' complaint, We find the
statements under the introductory affirmative allegations, as well as
the specific averments under the sub-heading CAUSE OF ACTION,
to be adequate enough to show, prima facie, the claimed violation of
their rights. On the basis thereof, they may thus be granted, wholly
or partly, the reliefs prayed for. It bears stressing, however, that
insofar as the cancellation of the TLAs is concerned, there is the
need to implead, as party defendants, the grantees thereof for they
are indispensable parties.
The foregoing considered, Civil Case No. 90-777 be said to raise a
political question. Policy formulation or determination by the

executive or legislative branches of Government is not squarely put

in issue. What is principally involved is the enforcement of a
right vis-a-vis policies already formulated and expressed in
legislation. It must, nonetheless, be emphasized that the political
question doctrine is no longer, the insurmountable obstacle to the
exercise of judicial power or the impenetrable shield that protects
executive and legislative actions from judicial inquiry or review. The
second paragraph of section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution states
that:
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of
justice to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not
there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government.
Commenting on this provision in his book, Philippine Political
Law, 22 Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz, a distinguished member of this
Court, says:
The first part of the authority represents the
traditional concept of judicial power, involving
the settlement of conflicting rights as conferred
as law. The second part of the authority
represents a broadening of judicial power to
enable the courts of justice to review what was
before forbidden territory, to wit, the discretion of
the political departments of the government.
As worded, the new provision vests in the
judiciary, and particularly the Supreme Court,
the power to rule upon even the wisdom of the
decisions of the executive and the legislature
and to declare their acts invalid for lack or
excess of jurisdiction because tainted with grave
abuse of discretion. The catch, of course, is the
meaning of "grave abuse of discretion," which is
a very elastic phrase that can expand or
contract according to the disposition of the
judiciary.
In Daza vs. Singson, 23 Mr. Justice Cruz, now speaking for this
Court, noted:
In the case now before us, the jurisdictional
objection becomes even less tenable and
decisive. The reason is that, even if we were to
assume that the issue presented before us was
political in nature, we would still not be
precluded from revolving it under the expanded
jurisdiction conferred upon us that now covers,
in proper cases, even the political question.
Article VII, Section 1, of the Constitution clearly
provides: . . .
The last ground invoked by the trial court in dismissing the complaint
is the non-impairment of contracts clause found in the Constitution.
The court a quo declared that:
The Court is likewise of the impression that it
cannot, no matter how we stretch our
jurisdiction, grant the reliefs prayed for by the
plaintiffs, i.e., to cancel all existing timber
license agreements in the country and to cease
and
desist
from
receiving,
accepting,
processing, renewing or approving new timber
license agreements. For to do otherwise would
amount to "impairment of contracts" abhored
(sic) by the fundamental law. 24
We are not persuaded at all; on the contrary, We are amazed, if not
shocked, by such a sweeping pronouncement. In the first place, the
respondent Secretary did not, for obvious reasons, even invoke in
his motion to dismiss the non-impairment clause. If he had done so,
he would have acted with utmost infidelity to the Government by

providing undue and unwarranted benefits and advantages to the

timber license holders because he would have forever bound the
Government to strictly respect the said licenses according to their
terms and conditions regardless of changes in policy and the
demands of public interest and welfare. He was aware that as
correctly pointed out by the petitioners, into every timber license
must be read Section 20 of the Forestry Reform Code (P.D. No. 705)
which provides:

actually been passed mandating cancellations or modifications, the

same cannot still be stigmatized as a violation of the non-impairment
clause. This is because by its very nature and purpose, such as law
could have only been passed in the exercise of the police power of
the state for the purpose of advancing the right of the people to a
balanced and healthful ecology, promoting their health and
enhancing the general welfare. In Abe vs. Foster Wheeler
Corp. 28 this Court stated:

. . . Provided, That when the national interest so

requires, the President may amend, modify,
replace or rescind any contract, concession,
permit, licenses or any other form of privilege
granted herein . . .

The freedom of contract, under our system of

government, is not meant to be absolute. The
same is understood to be subject to reasonable
legislative regulation aimed at the promotion of
public health, moral, safety and welfare. In other
words, the constitutional guaranty of nonimpairment of obligations of contract is limited
by the exercise of the police power of the State,
in the interest of public health, safety, moral and
general welfare.

Needless to say, all licenses may thus be revoked or

rescinded by executive action. It is not a contract, property
or a property right protested by the due process clause of
the Constitution. In Tan vs. Director of Forestry, 25 this
Court held:
. . . A timber license is an instrument by which
the State regulates the utilization and
disposition of forest resources to the end that
public welfare is promoted. A timber license is
not a contract within the purview of the due
process clause; it is only a license or privilege,
which can be validly withdrawn whenever
dictated by public interest or public welfare as in
this case.
A license is merely a permit or privilege to do
what otherwise would be unlawful, and is not a
contract between the authority, federal, state, or
municipal, granting it and the person to whom it
is granted; neither is it property or a property
right, nor does it create a vested right; nor is it
taxation (37 C.J. 168). Thus, this Court held that
the granting of license does not create
irrevocable rights, neither is it property or
property rights (People vs. Ong Tin, 54 O.G.
7576).
We reiterated this pronouncement in Felipe Ysmael, Jr. & Co., Inc.
vs. Deputy Executive Secretary: 26
. . . Timber licenses, permits and license
agreements are the principal instruments by
which the State regulates the utilization and
disposition of forest resources to the end that
public welfare is promoted. And it can hardly be
gainsaid that they merely evidence a privilege
granted by the State to qualified entities, and do
not vest in the latter a permanent or irrevocable
right to the particular concession area and the
forest products therein. They may be validly
amended, modified, replaced or rescinded by
the Chief Executive when national interests so
require. Thus, they are not deemed contracts
within the purview of the due process of law
clause [See Sections 3(ee) and 20 of Pres.
Decree No. 705, as amended. Also, Tan v.
Director of Forestry, G.R. No. L-24548, October
27, 1983, 125 SCRA 302].

The reason for this is emphatically set forth in Nebia vs. New
York, 29 quoted in Philippine American Life Insurance Co. vs. Auditor
General, 30 to wit:
Under our form of government the use of
property and the making of contracts are
normally matters of private and not of public
concern. The general rule is that both shall be
free of governmental interference. But neither
property rights nor contract rights are absolute;
for government cannot exist if the citizen may at
will use his property to the detriment of his
fellows, or exercise his freedom of contract to
work them harm. Equally fundamental with the
private right is that of the public to regulate it in
the common interest.
In short, the non-impairment clause must yield to the police power of
the state. 31
Finally, it is difficult to imagine, as the trial court did, how the nonimpairment clause could apply with respect to the prayer to enjoin
the respondent Secretary from receiving, accepting, processing,
renewing or approving new timber licenses for, save in cases
of renewal, no contract would have as of yet existed in the other
instances. Moreover, with respect to renewal, the holder is not
entitled to it as a matter of right.
WHEREFORE, being impressed with merit, the instant Petition is
hereby GRANTED, and the challenged Order of respondent Judge
of 18 July 1991 dismissing Civil Case No. 90-777 is hereby set
aside. The petitioners may therefore amend their complaint to
implead as defendants the holders or grantees of the questioned
timber license agreements.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Cruz, Padilla, Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Regalado, Romero, Nocon,
Bellosillo, Melo and Quiason, JJ., concur.
Narvasa, C.J., Puno and Vitug, JJ., took no part.

Since timber licenses are not contracts, the non-impairment clause,

which reads:
Sec. 10. No law impairing, the obligation of
contracts shall be passed. 27
cannot be invoked.
In the second place, even if it is to be assumed that the same are
contracts, the instant case does not involve a law or even an
executive issuance declaring the cancellation or modification of
existing timber licenses. Hence, the non-impairment clause cannot
as yet be invoked. Nevertheless, granting further that a law has

Separate Opinions

FELICIANO, J., concurring

I join in the result reached by my distinguished brother in the Court,

Davide, Jr., J., in this case which, to my mind, is one of the most
important cases decided by this Court in the last few years. The
seminal principles laid down in this decision are likely to influence
profoundly the direction and course of the protection and
management of the environment, which of course embraces the
utilization of all the natural resources in the territorial base of our
polity. I have therefore sought to clarify, basically to myself, what the
Court appears to be saying.

(ii) wild life;

The Court explicitly states that petitioners have the locus

standi necessary to sustain the bringing and, maintenance of this
suit (Decision, pp. 11-12). Locus standi is not a function of
petitioners' claim that their suit is properly regarded as a class suit. I
understand locus standi to refer to the legal interest which a plaintiff
must have in the subject matter of the suit. Because of the very
broadness of the concept of "class" here involved membership in
this "class" appears to embrace everyone living in the country
whether
now
or
in
the
future it appears to me that everyone who may be expected to
benefit from the course of action petitioners seek to require public
respondents to take, is vested with the necessary locus standi. The
Court may be seen therefore to be recognizing a beneficiaries' right
of action in the field of environmental protection, as against both the
public administrative agency directly concerned and the private
persons or entities operating in the field or sector of activity involved.
Whether such beneficiaries' right of action may be found under any
and all circumstances, or whether some failure to act, in the first
instance, on the part of the governmental agency concerned must
be shown ("prior exhaustion of administrative remedies"), is not
discussed in the decision and presumably is left for future
determination in an appropriate case.

(vi) conservation and utilization of surface and

ground water

The Court has also declared that the complaint has alleged and
focused upon "one specific fundamental legal right the right to a
balanced and healthful ecology" (Decision, p. 14). There is no
question that "the right to a balanced and healthful ecology" is
"fundamental" and that, accordingly, it has been "constitutionalized."
But although it is fundamental in character, I suggest, with very great
respect, that it cannot be characterized as "specific," without doing
excessive violence to language. It is in fact very difficult to fashion
language more comprehensive in scope and generalized in
character than a right to "a balanced and healthful ecology." The list
of particular claims which can be subsumed under this rubic appears
to be entirely open-ended: prevention and control of emission of
toxic fumes and smoke from factories and motor vehicles; of
discharge of oil, chemical effluents, garbage and raw sewage into
rivers, inland and coastal waters by vessels, oil rigs, factories, mines
and whole communities; of dumping of organic and inorganic wastes
on open land, streets and thoroughfares; failure to rehabilitate land
after strip-mining or open-pit mining; kaingin or slash-and-burn
farming; destruction of fisheries, coral reefs and other living sea
resources through the use of dynamite or cyanide and other
chemicals; contamination of ground water resources; loss of certain
species of fauna and flora; and so on. The other statements pointed
out by the Court: Section 3, Executive Order No. 192 dated 10 June
1987; Section 1, Title XIV, Book IV of the 1987 Administrative Code;
and P.D. No. 1151, dated 6 June 1977 all appear to be
formulations of policy, as general and abstract as the constitutional
statements of basic policy in Article II, Section 16 ("the right to a
balanced and healthful ecology") and 15 ("the right to health").
P.D. No. 1152, also dated 6 June 1977, entitled "The Philippine
Environment Code," is, upon the other hand, a compendious
collection of more "specific environment management policies" and
"environment quality standards" (fourth "Whereas" clause,
Preamble) relating to an extremely wide range of topics:

(iii) forestry and soil conservation;

(iv) flood control and natural calamities;
(v) energy development;

(vii) mineral resources

Two (2) points are worth making in this connection. Firstly, neither
petitioners nor the Court has identified the particular provision or
provisions (if any) of the Philippine Environment Code which give
rise to a specific legal right which petitioners are seeking to enforce.
Secondly, the Philippine Environment Code identifies with notable
care the particular government agency charged with the formulation
and implementation of guidelines and programs dealing with each of
the headings and sub-headings mentioned above. The Philippine
Environment Code does not, in other words, appear to contemplate
action on the part of private persons who are beneficiaries of
implementation of that Code.
As a matter of logic, by finding petitioners' cause of action as
anchored on a legal right comprised in the constitutional statements
above noted, the Court is in effect saying that Section 15 (and
Section 16) of Article II of the Constitution are self-executing and
judicially enforceable even in their present form. The implications of
this doctrine will have to be explored in future cases; those
implications are too large and far-reaching in nature even to be
hinted at here.
My suggestion is simply that petitioners must, before the trial court,
show a more specific legal right a right cast in language of a
significantly lower order of generality than Article II (15) of the
Constitution that is or may be violated by the actions, or failures
to act, imputed to the public respondent by petitioners so that the
trial court can validly render judgment granting all or part of the relief
prayed for. To my mind, the Court should be understood as simply
saying that such a more specific legal right or rights may well exist in
our corpus of law, considering the general policy principles found in
the Constitution and the existence of the Philippine Environment
Code, and that the trial court should have given petitioners an
effective opportunity so to demonstrate, instead of aborting the
proceedings on a motion to dismiss.
It seems to me important that the legal right which is an essential
component of a cause of action be a specific, operable legal right,
rather than a constitutional or statutory policy, for at least two (2)
reasons. One is that unless the legal right claimed to have been
violated or disregarded is given specification in operational terms,
defendants may well be unable to defend themselves intelligently
and effectively; in other words, there are due process dimensions to
this matter.
The second is a broader-gauge consideration where a specific
violation of law or applicable regulation is not alleged or proved,
petitioners can be expected to fall back on the expanded conception
of judicial power in the second paragraph of Section 1 of Article VIII
of the Constitution which reads:
Section 1. . . .

(a) air quality management;

(b) water quality management;
(c) land use management;
(d) natural resources
conservation embracing:

management

(i) fisheries and aquatic resources;

and

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of

justice to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not
there
has
been
agrave
abuse
of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government. (Emphasis
supplied)

When substantive standards as general as "the right to a

balanced and healthy ecology" and "the right to health"
are combined with remedial standards as broad ranging
as "a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction," the result will be, it is respectfully
submitted, to propel courts into the uncharted ocean of
social and economic policy making. At least in respect of
the vast area of environmental protection and
management, our courts have no claim to special
technical competence and experience and professional
qualification. Where no specific, operable norms and
standards are shown to exist, then the policy making
departments the legislative and executive departments
must be given a real and effective opportunity to
fashion and promulgate those norms and standards, and
to implement them before the courts should intervene.
My learned brother Davide, Jr., J., rightly insists that the timber
companies, whose concession agreements or TLA's petitioners
demand public respondents should cancel, must be impleaded in the
proceedings below. It might be asked that, if petitioners' entitlement
to the relief demanded is not dependent upon proof of breach by the
timber companies of one or more of the specific terms and
conditions of their concession agreements (and this, petitioners
implicitly assume), what will those companies litigate about? The
answer I suggest is that they may seek to dispute the existence of
the specific legal right petitioners should allege, as well as the reality
of the claimed factual nexus between petitioners' specific legal rights
and the claimed wrongful acts or failures to act of public respondent
administrative
agency. They may
also
controvert
the
appropriateness of the remedy or remedies demanded by
petitioners, under all the circumstances which exist.
I vote to grant the Petition for Certiorari because the protection of the
environment, including the forest cover of our territory, is of extreme
importance for the country. The doctrines set out in the Court's
decision issued today should, however, be subjected to closer
examination.

The Court has also declared that the complaint has alleged and
focused upon "one specific fundamental legal right the right to a
balanced and healthful ecology" (Decision, p. 14). There is no
question that "the right to a balanced and healthful ecology" is
"fundamental" and that, accordingly, it has been "constitutionalized."
But although it is fundamental in character, I suggest, with very great
respect, that it cannot be characterized as "specific," without doing
excessive violence to language. It is in fact very difficult to fashion
language more comprehensive in scope and generalized in
character than a right to "a balanced and healthful ecology." The list
of particular claims which can be subsumed under this rubic appears
to be entirely open-ended: prevention and control of emission of
toxic fumes and smoke from factories and motor vehicles; of
discharge of oil, chemical effluents, garbage and raw sewage into
rivers, inland and coastal waters by vessels, oil rigs, factories, mines
and whole communities; of dumping of organic and inorganic wastes
on open land, streets and thoroughfares; failure to rehabilitate land
after strip-mining or open-pit mining; kaingin or slash-and-burn
farming; destruction of fisheries, coral reefs and other living sea
resources through the use of dynamite or cyanide and other
chemicals; contamination of ground water resources; loss of certain
species of fauna and flora; and so on. The other statements pointed
out by the Court: Section 3, Executive Order No. 192 dated 10 June
1987; Section 1, Title XIV, Book IV of the 1987 Administrative Code;
and P.D. No. 1151, dated 6 June 1977 all appear to be
formulations of policy, as general and abstract as the constitutional
statements of basic policy in Article II, Section 16 ("the right to a
balanced and healthful ecology") and 15 ("the right to health").
P.D. No. 1152, also dated 6 June 1977, entitled "The Philippine
Environment Code," is, upon the other hand, a compendious
collection of more "specific environment management policies" and
"environment quality standards" (fourth "Whereas" clause,
Preamble) relating to an extremely wide range of topics:
(a) air quality management;
(b) water quality management;
(c) land use management;
(d) natural resources
conservation embracing:

management

and

# Separate Opinions
(i) fisheries and aquatic resources;
FELICIANO, J., concurring
(ii) wild life;
I join in the result reached by my distinguished brother in the Court,
Davide, Jr., J., in this case which, to my mind, is one of the most
important cases decided by this Court in the last few years. The
seminal principles laid down in this decision are likely to influence
profoundly the direction and course of the protection and
management of the environment, which of course embraces the
utilization of all the natural resources in the territorial base of our
polity. I have therefore sought to clarify, basically to myself, what the
Court appears to be saying.
The Court explicitly states that petitioners have the locus
standi necessary to sustain the bringing and, maintenance of this
suit (Decision, pp. 11-12). Locus standi is not a function of
petitioners' claim that their suit is properly regarded as a class suit. I
understand locus standi to refer to the legal interest which a plaintiff
must have in the subject matter of the suit. Because of the very
broadness of the concept of "class" here involved membership in
this "class" appears to embrace everyone living in the country
whether
now
or
in
the
future it appears to me that everyone who may be expected to
benefit from the course of action petitioners seek to require public
respondents to take, is vested with the necessary locus standi. The
Court may be seen therefore to be recognizing a beneficiaries' right
of action in the field of environmental protection, as against both the
public administrative agency directly concerned and the private
persons or entities operating in the field or sector of activity involved.
Whether such beneficiaries' right of action may be found under any
and all circumstances, or whether some failure to act, in the first
instance, on the part of the governmental agency concerned must
be shown ("prior exhaustion of administrative remedies"), is not
discussed in the decision and presumably is left for future
determination in an appropriate case.

(iii) forestry and soil conservation;

(iv) flood control and natural calamities;
(v) energy development;
(vi) conservation and utilization of surface and
ground water
(vii) mineral resources
Two (2) points are worth making in this connection. Firstly, neither
petitioners nor the Court has identified the particular provision or
provisions (if any) of the Philippine Environment Code which give
rise to a specific legal right which petitioners are seeking to enforce.
Secondly, the Philippine Environment Code identifies with notable
care the particular government agency charged with the formulation
and implementation of guidelines and programs dealing with each of
the headings and sub-headings mentioned above. The Philippine
Environment Code does not, in other words, appear to contemplate
action on the part of private persons who are beneficiaries of
implementation of that Code.
As a matter of logic, by finding petitioners' cause of action as
anchored on a legal right comprised in the constitutional statements
above noted, the Court is in effect saying that Section 15 (and
Section 16) of Article II of the Constitution are self-executing and
judicially enforceable even in their present form. The implications of

this doctrine will have to be explored in future cases; those

implications are too large and far-reaching in nature even to be
hinted at here.
My suggestion is simply that petitioners must, before the trial court,
show a more specific legal right a right cast in language of a
significantly lower order of generality than Article II (15) of the
Constitution that is or may be violated by the actions, or failures
to act, imputed to the public respondent by petitioners so that the
trial court can validly render judgment granting all or part of the relief
prayed for. To my mind, the Court should be understood as simply
saying that such a more specific legal right or rights may well exist in
our corpus of law, considering the general policy principles found in
the Constitution and the existence of the Philippine Environment
Code, and that the trial court should have given petitioners an
effective opportunity so to demonstrate, instead of aborting the
proceedings on a motion to dismiss.
It seems to me important that the legal right which is an essential
component of a cause of action be a specific, operable legal right,
rather than a constitutional or statutory policy, for at least two (2)
reasons. One is that unless the legal right claimed to have been
violated or disregarded is given specification in operational terms,
defendants may well be unable to defend themselves intelligently
and effectively; in other words, there are due process dimensions to
this matter.
The second is a broader-gauge consideration where a specific
violation of law or applicable regulation is not alleged or proved,
petitioners can be expected to fall back on the expanded conception
of judicial power in the second paragraph of Section 1 of Article VIII
of the Constitution which reads:
Section 1. . . .
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of
justice to settle actual controversies involving
rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not
there
has
been
agrave
abuse
of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government. (Emphasis
supplied)
When substantive standards as general as "the right to a
balanced and healthy ecology" and "the right to health"
are combined with remedial standards as broad ranging
as "a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction," the result will be, it is respectfully
submitted, to propel courts into the uncharted ocean of
social and economic policy making. At least in respect of
the vast area of environmental protection and
management, our courts have no claim to special
technical competence and experience and professional
qualification. Where no specific, operable norms and
standards are shown to exist, then the policy making
departments the legislative and executive departments
must be given a real and effective opportunity to
fashion and promulgate those norms and standards, and
to implement them before the courts should intervene.
My learned brother Davide, Jr., J., rightly insists that the timber
companies, whose concession agreements or TLA's petitioners
demand public respondents should cancel, must be impleaded in the
proceedings below. It might be asked that, if petitioners' entitlement
to the relief demanded is not dependent upon proof of breach by the
timber companies of one or more of the specific terms and
conditions of their concession agreements (and this, petitioners
implicitly assume), what will those companies litigate about? The
answer I suggest is that they may seek to dispute the existence of
the specific legal right petitioners should allege, as well as the reality
of the claimed factual nexus between petitioners' specific legal rights
and the claimed wrongful acts or failures to act of public respondent
administrative
agency. They may
also
controvert
the
appropriateness of the remedy or remedies demanded by
petitioners, under all the circumstances which exist.

I vote to grant the Petition for Certiorari because the protection of the
environment, including the forest cover of our territory, is of extreme
importance for the country. The doctrines set out in the Court's
decision issued today should, however, be subjected to closer
examination.

No. T-50.668 (M) to Mariano to guarantee compliance with

the Kasunduan.

[G.R. No. 144934. January 15, 2004]

ADELFA S. RIVERA, CYNTHIA S. RIVERA, and JOSE S.
RIVERA, petitioners, vs. FIDELA DEL ROSARIO
(deceased and substituted by her co-respondents),
and her children, OSCAR, ROSITA, VIOLETA,
ENRIQUE JR., CARLOS, JUANITO and ELOISA, all
surnamed DEL ROSARIO,respondents.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari of the Court of
Appeals decision[1], dated November 29, 1999, in CA-G.R. CV No.
60552, which affirmed the judgment [2] of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 17, in Civil Case No. 151-M93. The RTC granted respondents complaint for nullity of contract of
sale and annulment of the transfer certificates of title issued in favor
of petitioners.
The facts, as found by the Court of Appeals, are as follows:
Respondents Fidela (now deceased), Oscar, Rosita, Violeta,
Enrique Jr., Carlos, Juanito and Eloisa, all surnamed Del Rosario,
were the registered owners of Lot No. 1083-C, a parcel of land
situated at Lolomboy, Bulacan. This lot spanned an area of 15,029
square meters and was covered by TCT No. T-50.668 (M) registered
in the Registry of Deeds of Bulacan.
On May 16, 1983, Oscar, Rosita, Violeta, Enrique Jr., Juanito,
and Eloisa, executed a Special Power of Attorney[3] in favor of their
mother and co-respondent, Fidela, authorizing her to sell, lease,
mortgage, transfer and convey their rights over Lot No. 1083-C.
[4]
Subsequently, Fidela borrowed P250,000 from Mariano Rivera in
the early part of 1987. To secure the loan, she and Mariano Rivera
agreed to execute a deed of real estate mortgage and an agreement
to sell the land. Consequently, on March 9, 1987, Mariano went to
his lawyer, Atty. Efren Barangan, to have three documents drafted:
the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage[5], a Kasunduan (Agreement to
Sell)[6], and a Deed of Absolute Sale.[7]
The Kasunduan provided that the children of Mariano Rivera,
herein petitioners Adelfa, Cynthia and Jose, would purchase Lot No.
1083-C for a consideration of P2,141,622.50. This purchase price
was to be paid in three installments: P250,000 upon the signing of
the Kasunduan, P750,000 on August 31, 1987, and P1,141,622.50
on December 31, 1987.[8] It also provided that the Deed of Absolute
Sale would be executed only after the second installment is paid and
a postdated check for the last installment is deposited with Fidela.
[9]
As previously stated, however, Mariano had already caused the
drafting of the Deed of Absolute Sale. But unlike the Kasunduan, the
said deed stipulated a purchase price of only P601,160, and covered
a certain Lot No. 1083-A in addition to Lot No. 1083-C.[10] This deed,
as well as the Kasunduan and the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage[11],
was signed by Marianos children, petitioners Adelfa, Cynthia and
Jose, as buyers and mortgagees, on March 9, 1987.[12]
The following day, Mariano Rivera returned to the office of Atty.
Barangan, bringing with him the signed documents. He also brought
with him Fidela and her son Oscar del Rosario, so that the latter two
may sign the mortgage and the Kasunduan there.
Although Fidela intended to sign only the Kasunduan and the
Real Estate Mortgage, she inadvertently affixed her signature on all
the three documents in the office of Atty. Barangan on the said day,
March 10, 1987. Mariano then gave Fidela the amount
of P250,000. On October 30, 1987, he also gave Fidela a check
for P200,000. In the ensuing months, also, Mariano gave Oscar del
Rosario several amounts totaling P67,800 upon the latters demand
for the payment of the balance despite Oscars lack of authority to
receive payments under theKasunduan.[13] While Mariano was
making payments to Oscar, Fidela entrusted the owners copy of TCT

When Mariano unreasonably refused to return the TCT,[14] one

of the respondents, Carlos del Rosario, caused the annotation on
TCT No. T-50.668 (M) of an Affidavit of Loss of the owners duplicate
copy of the title on September 7, 1992. This annotation was offset,
however, when Mariano registered the Deed of Absolute Sale on
October 13, 1992, and afterwards caused the annotation of an
Affidavit of Recovery of Title on October 14, 1992. Thus, TCT No. T50.668 (M) was cancelled, and in its place was issued TCT No.
158443 (M) in the name of petitioners Adelfa, Cynthia and Jose
Rivera.[15]
Meanwhile, the Riveras, representing themselves to be the
new owners of Lot No. 1083-C, were also negotiating with the
tenant, Feliciano Nieto, to rid the land of the latters tenurial
right. When Nieto refused to relinquish his tenurial right over 9,000
sq. m. of the land, the Riveras offered to give 4,500 sq. m. in
exchange for the surrender. Nieto could not resist and he
accepted. Subdivision Plan No. Psd-031404-052505 was then made
on August 12, 1992. Later, it was inscribed on TCT No. 158443 (M),
and Lot No. 1083-C was divided into Lots 1083 C-1 and 1083 C-2.[16]
To document their agreement with Feliciano Nieto, the Riveras
executed a Kasulatan sa Pagtatakwil ng Karapatan sa Pagmamayari ng Bahagi ng Isang Lagay na Lupa (Written Abdication of Rights
over a Portion of a Parcel of Land)[17] on November 16, 1992. Four
days later, they registered the document with the Registry of
Deeds. Two titles were then issued: TCT No. T-161784 (M) in the
name of Nieto, for 4,500 sq. m. of land, and TCT No. T-161785 (M)
in the name of petitioners Adelfa, Cynthia and Jose Rivera, over the
remaining 10,529 sq. m. of land.[18]
On February 18, 1993, respondents filed a complaint [19] in the
Regional Trial Court of Malolos, asking that the Kasunduan be
rescinded for failure of the Riveras to comply with its conditions, with
damages. They also sought the annulment of the Deed of Absolute
Sale on the ground of fraud, the cancellation of TCT No. T-161784
(M) and TCT No. T-161785 (M), and the reconveyance to them of
the entire property with TCT No. T-50.668 (M) restored.[20]
Respondents claimed that Fidela never intended to enter into
a deed of sale at the time of its execution and that she signed the
said deed on the mistaken belief that she was merely signing copies
of the Kasunduan. According to respondents, the position where
Fidelas name was typed and where she was supposed to sign her
name in the Kasunduan was roughly in the same location where it
was typed in the Deed of Absolute Sale. They argued that given
Fidelas advanced age (she was then around 72 at the time) [21] and
the fact that the documents were stacked one on top of the other at
the time of signing, Fidela could have easily and mistakenly
presumed that she was merely signing additional copies of
the Kasunduan.[22] They also alleged that petitioners acquired
possession of the TCT through fraud and machination.
In their defense, petitioners denied the allegations and averred
that the Deed of Absolute Sale was validly entered into by both
parties. According to petitioners, Fidela del Rosario mortgaged Lot
No. 1083-C to their predecessor in interest, Mariano Rivera, on
March 9, 1987. But on the following day Fidela decided to sell the lot
to petitioners for P2,161,622.50. When Mariano agreed (on the
condition that Lot No. 1083-C will be delivered free from all liens and
encumbrances), the Kasunduan was consequently drawn up and
signed. After that, however, Fidela informed Mariano of the
existence of Feliciano Nietos tenancy right over the lot to the extent
of 9,000 sq. m. When Mariano continued to want the land, albeit on
a much lower price of only P601,160, as he had still to deal with
Feliciano Nieto, the parties drafted the Deed of Absolute Sale on
March 10, 1987, to supersede the Kasunduan.
Petitioners likewise argued that respondents cause of action
had been barred by laches or estoppel since more than four years
has lapsed from the time the parties executed the Deed of Absolute
Sale on March 10, 1987, to the time respondents instituted their
complaint on February 18, 1993.

Petitioners also filed a counterclaim asking for moral and

exemplary damages and the payment of attorneys fees and costs of
suit.
After trial, the RTC ruled in favor of respondents:
WHEREFORE, in the light of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby
rendered:
1. Declaring the Deed of Absolute Sale dated March 10,
1987 as null and void;
2. Annulling TCT No. T-158443 (M) and TCT No. T161785 (M) both in the names of Adelfa,
Cynthia and Jose, all surnamed Rivera;
3. Declaring the plaintiffs to be the legitimate owners of
the land covered by TCT No. T-161785 (M) and
ordering defendant Adelfa, Cynthia, and Jose,
all surnamed Rivera, to reconvey the same to
the plaintiffs;
4. Ordering the Register of Deeds of Bulacan to cancel
TCT No. T-161785 (M) and to issue in its place
a new certificate of title in the name of the
plaintiffs as their names appear in TCT No. T50.668;
5. Declaring TCT No. T-161784 (M) in the name of
Feliciano Nieto as valid;
6. Ordering the defendant Riveras to pay the plaintiffs
solidarily the following amounts:
a) P191,246.98 as balance for the 4,500 squaremeter portion given to defendant
Feliciano Nieto

On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the trial courts judgment

was modified as follows:
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED
with the MODIFICATION that the Deed of Absolute Sale dated
March 10, 1987 is declared null and void only insofar as Lot No.
1083-C is concerned, but valid insofar as it conveyed Lot No. 1083A, that TCT No. 158443 (M) is valid insofar as Lot No. 1083-A is
concerned and should not be annulled, and increasing the amount to
be paid by the defendants-appellants to the plaintiffs-appellees for
the 4,500 square meters of land given to Feliciano Nieto
to P323,617.50.
Costs against the defendants-appellants.
SO ORDERED.[28]
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, this
petition.
While this petition was pending, respondent Fidela del Rosario
died. She was substituted by her children, herein respondents.
In this petition, petitioners rely on the following grounds:
I
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED A
SERIOUS, GRAVE AND REVERSIBLE ERROR IN
AWARDING LOT 1083-A IN FAVOR OF THE PETITIONERS AND
FELICIANO NIETO WHICH IS ADMITTEDLY A PART AND
PORTION OF THE EXISTING NORTH LUZON EXPRESSWAY AND
AS SUCH ACTED WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF ITS
JURISDICTION, OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF JUDICIAL
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION.
II

b) P200,000.00 as moral damages

c) P50,000.00 as exemplary damages
d) P50,000.00 as attorneys fees
e) costs of the suit.
7. Dismissing the counterclaim of the defendant Riveras;
8. Dismissing the counterclaim and the crossclaim of
defendant Feliciano Nieto.
SO ORDERED.[23]
The trial court ruled that Fidelas signature in the Deed of
Absolute Sale was genuine, but found that Fidela never intended to
sign the said deed. Noting the peculiar differences between
the Kasunduan and the Deed of Absolute Sale, the trial court
concluded that the Riveras were guilty of fraud in securing the
execution of the deed and its registration in the Registry of Deeds.
[24]
This notwithstanding, the trial court sustained the validity of TCT
No. T-161784 (M) in the name of Feliciano Nieto since there was no
fraud proven on Nietos part. The trial court found him to have relied
in good faith on the representations of ownership of Mariano
Rivera. Thus, Nietos rights, according to the trial court, were akin to
those of an innocent purchaser for value.[25]
On the foregoing, the trial court rescinded the Kasunduan but
ruled that the P450,000 paid by petitioners be retained by
respondents as payment for the 4,500 sq. m. portion of Lot No.
1083-C that petitioners gave to Nieto.[26] The trial court likewise
ordered petitioners to pay P191,246.98 as balance for the price of
the land given to Nieto, P200,000 as moral damages,P50,000 as
exemplary damages, P50,000 as attorneys fees, and the costs of
suit.[27]

RESPONDENTS FAILED TO PAY THE CORRECT DOCKET,

FILING AND OTHER LAWFUL FEES WITH THE OFFICE OF THE
CLERK OF COURT OF THE COURT A QUO (RTC, MALOLOS,
BULACAN) AT THE TIME OF THE FILING OF THE ORIGINAL
COMPLAINT IN 1993 PURSUANT TO THE SIOL[29] DOCTRINE.
III
[THE] TRIAL COURT AWARDED RELIEFS NOT SPECIFICALLY
PRAYED FOR IN THE AMENDED COMPLAINT WITHOUT
REQUIRING THE PAYMENT OF THE CORRECT DOCKET, FILING
AND OTHER LAWFUL FEES.
IV
THE COURT A QUO HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER THE
RESPONDENTS CAUSE OF ACTION AND OVER
THE RES CONSIDERING THAT FELICIANO NIETO IS AN
AGRICULTURAL TENANT OF THE RICELAND IN QUESTION.
V
RESPONDENTS[] MAIN CAUSE OF ACTION [IS] FOR
RESCISSION OF CONTRACT WHICH IS SUBSIDIARY IN
NATURE[,] AND ANNULMENT OF SALE[,] BOTH OF WHICH HAVE
ALREADY PRESCRIBED UNDER ARTICLES 1389 AND 1391 OF
THE CIVIL CODE.[30]
Petitioners assignment of errors may be reduced into three
issues: (1) Did the trial court acquire jurisdiction over the case,
despite an alleged deficiency in the amount of filing fees paid by
respondents and despite the fact that an agricultural tenant is
involved in the case? (2) Did the Court of Appeals correctly rule that
the Deed of Absolute Sale is valid insofar as Lot 1083-A is

concerned? (3) Is the respondents cause of action barred by

prescription?
On the first issue, petitioners contend that jurisdiction was not
validly acquired because the filing fees respondents paid was
only P1,554.45 when the relief sought was reconveyance of land
that was worth P2,141,622.50 under the Kasunduan. They contend
that respondents should have paid filing fees amounting
to P12,183.70. In support of their argument, petitioners invoke the
doctrine in Sun Insurance Office, Ltd., (SIOL) v. Asuncion [31] and
attach a certification[32] from the Clerk of Court of the RTC of Quezon
City.
Respondents counter that it is beyond dispute that they paid
the correct amount of docket fees when they filed the complaint. If
the assessment was inadequate, they could not be faulted because
the clerk of court made no notice of demand or reassessment,
respondents argue. Respondents also add that since petitioners
failed to contest the alleged underpayment of docket fees in the
lower court, they cannot raise the same on appeal.[33]
We rule in favor of respondents. Jurisdiction was validly
acquired over the complaint. In Sun Insurance Office, Ltd., (SIOL) v.
Asuncion,[34] this Court ruled that the filing of the complaint or
appropriate initiatory pleading and the payment of the prescribed
docket fee vest a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject matter
or nature of the action. If the amount of docket fees paid is
insufficient considering the amount of the claim, the clerk of court of
the lower court involved or his duly authorized deputy has the
responsibility of making a deficiency assessment.The party filing the
case will be required to pay the deficiency, but jurisdiction is not
automatically lost.
Here it is beyond dispute that respondents paid the full amount
of docket fees as assessed by the Clerk of Court of the Regional
Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 17, where they filed the
complaint. If petitioners believed that the assessment was incorrect,
they should have questioned it before the trial court. Instead,
petitioners belatedly question the alleged underpayment of docket
fees through this petition, attempting to support their position with
the opinion and certification of the Clerk of Court of another judicial
region. Needless to state, such certification has no bearing on the
instant case.
Petitioners also contend that the trial court does not have
jurisdiction over the case because it involves an agricultural
tenant. They insist that by virtue of Presidential Decree Nos. 316
and 1038,[35] it is the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication
Board (DARAB) that has jurisdiction.[36]
Petitioners contention lacks merit. The DARAB has exclusive
original jurisdiction over cases involving the rights and obligations of
persons engaged in the management, cultivation and use of all
agricultural lands covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform
Law.[37] However, the cause of action in this case is primarily against
the petitioners, as indispensable parties, for rescission of
the Kasunduan and nullification of the Deed of Sale and the TCTs
issued because of them. Feliciano Nieto was impleaded merely as a
necessary party, stemming from whatever rights he may have
acquired by virtue of the agreement between him and the Riveras
and the corresponding TCT issued. Hence, it is the regular judicial
courts that have jurisdiction over the case.
On the second issue, contrary to the ruling of the Court of
Appeals that the Deed of Absolute Sale is void only insofar as it
covers Lot No. 1083-C, we find that the said deed is void in its
entirety. Noteworthy is that during the oral arguments before the
Court of Appeals, both petitioners and respondents admitted that Lot
No. 1083-A had been expropriated by the government long before
the Deed of Absolute Sale was entered into.[38] Whats more, this
case involves only Lot No. 1083-C. It never involved Lot 1083A. Thus, the Court of Appeals had no jurisdiction to adjudicate on Lot
1083-A, as it was never touched upon in the pleadings or made the
subject of evidence at trial.[39]
As to the third issue, petitioners cite Articles 1383,
1389[41] and 1391[42] of the New Civil Code. They submit that the
complaint for rescission of the Kasunduan should have been
dismissed, for respondents failure to prove that there was no other
[40]

legal means available to obtain reparation other than to file a case

for rescission, as required by Article 1383. Moreover, petitioners
contend that even assuming respondents had satisfied this
requirement, prescription had already set in, the complaint having
been filed in 1992 or five years after the execution of the Deed of
Absolute Sale in March 10, 1987.
Respondents counter that Article 1383 of the New Civil Code
applies only to rescissible contracts enumerated under Article 1381
of the same Code, while the cause of action in this case is for
rescission of a reciprocal obligation, to which Article 1191 [43] of the
Code applies. They assert that their cause of action had not
prescribed because the four-year prescriptive period is counted from
the date of discovery of the fraud, which, in this case, was only in
1992.
Rescission of reciprocal obligations under Article 1191 of the
New Civil Code should be distinguished from rescission of contracts
under Article 1383 of the same Code. Both presuppose contracts
validly entered into as well as subsisting, and both require mutual
restitution when proper, nevertheless they are not entirely identical.
[44]

In countless times there has been confusion between

rescission under Articles 1381 and 1191 of the Civil Code. Through
this case we again emphasize that rescission of reciprocal
obligations under Article 1191 is different from rescissible contracts
under Chapter 6 of the law on contracts under the Civil Code.
[45]
While Article 1191 uses the term rescission, the original term used
in Article 1124 of the old Civil Code, from which Article 1191 was
based, was resolution.[46] Resolution is a principal action that is
based on breach of a party, while rescission under Article 1383 is a
subsidiary action limited to cases of rescission for lesion under
Article 1381 of the New Civil Code,[47] which expressly enumerates
the following rescissible contracts:
ART. 1381. The following contracts are
rescissible:
(1) Those which are entered into by guardians whenever
the wards whom they represent suffer lesion by
more than one-fourth of the value of the things
which are the object thereof;
(2) Those agreed upon in representation of absentees, if
the latter suffer the lesion stated in the
preceding number;
(3) Those undertaken in fraud of creditors when the
latter cannot in any other manner collect the
claims due them;
(4) Those which refer to things under litigation if they
have been entered into by the defendant without
the knowledge and approval of the litigants or of
competent judicial authority;
(5) All other contracts specially declared by law to be
subject to rescission.
Obviously, the Kasunduan does not fall under any of those situations
mentioned in Article 1381. Consequently, Article 1383 is
inapplicable. Hence, we rule in favor of the respondents.
May the contract entered into between the parties, however,
be rescinded based on Article 1191?
A careful reading of the Kasunduan reveals that it is in the
nature of a contract to sell, as distinguished from a contract of
sale. In a contract of sale, the title to the property passes to the
vendee upon the delivery of the thing sold; while in a contract to sell,
ownership is, by agreement, reserved in the vendor and is not to
pass to the vendee until full payment of the purchase price. [48] In a
contract to sell, the payment of the purchase price is a positive
suspensive condition,[49] the failure of which is not a breach, casual
or serious, but a situation that prevents the obligation of the vendor
to convey title from acquiring an obligatory force.[50]

Respondents in this case bound themselves to deliver a deed

of absolute sale and clean title covering Lot No. 1083-C after
petitioners have made the second installment. This promise to sell
was subject to the fulfillment of the suspensive condition that
petitioners pay P750,000 on August 31, 1987, and deposit a
postdated check for the third installment of P1,141,622.50.
[51]
Petitioners, however, failed to complete payment of the second
installment. The non-fulfillment of the condition rendered the contract
to sell ineffective and without force and effect. It must be stressed
that the breach contemplated in Article 1191 of the New Civil Code is
the obligors failure to comply with an obligation already extant, not a
failure of a condition to render binding that obligation. [52] Failure to
pay, in this instance, is not even a breach but an event that prevents
the vendors obligation to convey title from acquiring binding force.
[53]
Hence, the agreement of the parties in the instant case may be
set aside, but not because of a breach on the part of petitioners for
failure to complete payment of the second installment. Rather, their
failure to do so prevented the obligation of respondents to convey
title from acquiring an obligatory force.[54]
Coming now to the matter of prescription. Contrary to
petitioners assertion, we find that prescription has not yet set
in. Article 1391 states that the action for annulment of void contracts
shall be brought within four years. This period shall begin from the
time the fraud or mistake is discovered. Here, the fraud was
discovered in 1992 and the complaint filed in 1993. Thus, the case is
well within the prescriptive period.
On the matter of damages, the Court of Appeals awarded
respondents P323,617.50 as actual damages for the loss of the land
that was given to Nieto, P200,000 as moral damages,P50,000 as
exemplary damages, P50,000 as attorneys fees and the costs of
suit. Modifications are in order, however.
Moral damages may be recovered in cases where one willfully
causes injury to property, or in cases of breach of contract where the
other party acts fraudulently or in bad faith. [55]Exemplary damages
are imposed by way of example or correction for the public good,
[56]
when the party to a contract acts in a wanton, fraudulent,
oppressive or malevolent manner.[57]Attorneys fees are allowed when
exemplary damages are awarded and when the party to a suit is
compelled to incur expenses to protect his interest.[58]
While it has been sufficiently proven that the respondents are
entitled to damages, the actual amounts awarded by the lower court
must be reduced because damages are not intended for a litigants
enrichment, at the expense of the petitioners. [59] The purpose for the
award of damages other than actual damages would be served, in
this case, by reducing the amounts awarded.
Respondents were amply compensated through the award of
actual damages, which should be sustained. The other damages
awarded total P300,000, or almost equivalent to the amount of
actual damages. Practically this will double the amount of actual
damages awarded to respondents. To avoid breaching the doctrine
on enrichment, award for damages other than actual should be
reduced. Thus, the amount of moral damages should be set at
only P30,000, and the award of exemplary damages at
only P20,000. The award of attorneys fees should also be reduced
to P20,000, which under the circumstances of this case appears
justified and reasonable.
WHEREFORE, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals
is MODIFIED. The Deed of Absolute Sale in question is declared
NULL and VOID in its entirety. Petitioners are ORDERED to pay
respondents P323,617.50 as actual damages, P30,000.00 as moral
damages, P20,000.00 as exemplary damages and P20,000.00 as
attorneys fees. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.

On August 20, 1957, the Office of the President gave due course to
the applications to cover only 317 hectares at 63 hectares per heir
as per OCT No. P-4712 but awarded 399 hectares to 133 protesters
[led by Teodulo Tocao] at three (3) hectares each.
On September 17, 1981, the Ministry of Natural Resources issued
an Order implementing said decision (Annex N, Rollo, pp. 160-164).
However, the 133 petitioners listed in the said Order were not in
possession of the land allotted to them. So, they formed the Malalag
Land Petitioners Association, Inc. (The Association) headed by one
Cecilio R. Mangubat Sr.
On the other hand, those in possession of the land sought the
assistance of the Malalag Ventures Plantation Inc., in its
development into a viable banana production project to which the
corporation acceded.
Meanwhile, on November 12, 1987, the Supreme Court in Minister
of Natural Resources vs. Heirs of Orval Hughes, 155 SCRA 566,
sustained the OP decision and it became final and executory.
On December 12, 1991, the association, through its president Mr.
Mangubat, sent a letter to the management of Lapanday Group of
Companies, Inc. manifesting that they were no longer interested in
the government grant under the Order of the Ministry of Natural
Resources and offered to transfer and waive whatever interest they
have over the subject land for a monetary consideration (Annex O,
Rollo, p. 165).
THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 162109. January 21, 2005]

LAPANDAY AGRICULTURAL & DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION

(L.S. VENTURES, INC., ALREADY MERGED WITH
LAPANDAY AGRICULTURAL AND DEVELOPMENT
CORP.), petitioner, vs. MAXIMO ESTITA ET AL and/or
MEMBERS OF THE DAVAO DEL SUR FARMERS
ASSOCIATION (DASURFA), respondents.
DECISION

Mr. Mangubat was the first to relinquish his right for P54,000.00
(Annex P, Rollo, p. 166). The individual respondents allegedly
followed suit. He facilitated the relinquishment in the Office of the
Commission on the Settlement of Land Problems (COSLAP) (Annex
Q, Rollo, pp. 167-169).
It therefore came as a surprise when, on January 17, 1995, the
individual respondents filed [against Lapanday and/or L.S. Ventures,
Inc., the Heirs of Orval Hughes, the DENR/COSLAP and Cecilio
Mangubat, Sr.] the following cases: forcible entry, reinstatement,
nullification of affidavits of quitclaims, relinquishment, waiver and
any other documents on disposition of lands before the Provincial
Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (PARAD) of Digos, Davao, del
Sur. They alleged that since 1947, they had been the share tenantstillers, openly and continuously, of the late Orval Hughes and his
heirs and they remained as such on the 317 hectares land (Annexes
A & B, Rollo, pp. 40-72).

GARCIA, J.:
In this verified petition for review on certiorari,
petitioner Lapanday
Agricultural
&
Development
Corporation assails and seeks the annulment of the following
issuances of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 71230, to wit:
1. Decision dated September 3, 2003,[1] declaring as valid an
earlier decision dated January 17, 2001 of the Department of
Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) in DARAB Case No.
8117, which, in turn, affirmed with modification the resolution dated
October 20, 1997 of the DAR Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator
of Digos, Davao del Sur in a land dispute involving the vast
agricultural land of the late Orval Hughes at Malalag, Davao del Sur;
and
2. Resolution dated January 19, 2004,[2] denying petitioners
motion for reconsideration.
We lift from the decision under review and reproduce
hereunder the factual backdrop of the case, thus:
The instant petition involves a vast tract of an agricultural land with
an area of 716 hectares located at Malalag, Davao del Sur. On July
28, 1924, this land was leased by the Government to Orval Hughes
for a period of twenty-five (25) years under Lease Application No.
815 (E-172). The lease actually expired on May 25, 1952, it having
been extended for three (3) years. Orval Hughes died and was
survived by his five (5) heirs who then filed their Sales Application
Nos. V-11538, V-12992, V-13837, V-14586 and V- 15003 with the
Bureau of Lands. Teodulo Tocao, et al., filed a protest against the
sales application.

They further averred that on February 11, 1991, petitionercorporation, Hughes heirs and Cecilio Mangubat Sr., conspiring
together, misled them to receive P54,000.00 each as rentals on their
respective landholdings and deceived to sign receipts in English
which turned out to be affidavits of quitclaims in favor of the
petitioner (Annex E, PARAD Decision dated July 9, 1997, p. 3; Rollo,
p. 111).
Petitioner [Lapanday Agricultural & Development Corporation]
opposed said actions for being factually and legally baseless, there
being no entity by the name of Lapanday and L.S. Ventures Inc.
which has agricultural operation in Davao del Sur. The fact is that
said company had already merged with Lapanday Agricultural and
Development Corporation (Annexes C & M, Rollo, pp. 73-79 & 159,
respectively).
In a decision dated July 9, 1997, [3] the DAR Provincial Agrarian
Reform Adjudicator of Digos, Davao del Sur, Mardonio L. Edica,
rendered judgment in favor of the Malalag Ventures Plantation, Inc.
and declared the entire 716-hectare property as covered by the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program or CARP. More
specifically, the decision dispositively reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, a decision is hereby rendered
declaring that the entire 716 hectares shall be covered by CARP.
The portion planted to bananas by the Malalag Plantation Ventures
shall be governed by Sections 13 and 32 of Republic Act No. 6657 in
favor of Malalag Land Petitioner Association. The Operation Division
of the Provincial Agrarian Reform Office shall implement this
decision in accordance with existing guidelines, rules and
regulations.

The heirs of Orval Hughes are hereby ordered to reinstate the

Malalag Land Petitioners Association. Leasehold tenancy shall be
observed collectively, pending recommendation by the PARO
Operations Division, without prejudice to the outcome of the cases
still pending with the administrative agencies and the regular courts.

3. Declaring the nullity of the quitclaims allegedly executed by

petitioners.
The matter of placing the 317 hectares under CARP shall be
pursued in the proper forum which is the Office of the Honorable
DAR Secretary.

SO ORDERED.
This decision is immediately executory.
Upon motion for reconsideration, Provincial Agrarian Reform
Adjudicator Mardonio L. Edica, in a Resolution dated October 20,
1997,[4] modified his aforequoted decision of July 9, 1997 by
specifically directing Lapanday and/or L.S. Ventures, Inc. to turn
over the area involved for CARP coverage, and ordering the Hughes
heirs to reinstate the members of the Davao del Sur Farmers
Association (DASUFRA) as leasehold tenants of the subject land.
We quote the dispositive portion of the same Resolution:
WHEREFORE, the decision of 9 July 1997 is hereby modified to
read:
Declaring that the entire 716 hectares shall be covered by CARP.
The portion planted to bananas by the Malalag Plantation Ventures,
Inc. shall be governed by Sections 13 and 32 of Republic Act No.
6657 in favor of qualified members of the Malalag Land Petitioners
Association (MLPA), and the remaining portion shall be allotted to all
deserving and listed members of the Davao del Sur Farmers
Association (DASUFRA). The LAPANDAY, L.S. Ventures and/or the
Malalag Plantation Ventures, Inc. is hereby mandated to turn over
the area involved for CARP coverage. The Operations division of the
Provincial Agrarian Reform Office of Davao del Sur is likewise
mandated to implement this resolution in accordance with existing
guidelines, rules and regulations.
The heirs of Orval Hughes are hereby ordered to reinstate the
members of the DASUFRA. Leasehold tenancy shall be observed
collectively pending documentation of the area by the PARO
Operations Division regardless of the outcome of the cases still
pending with the administrative agencies and the regular courts.

SO ORDERED.
With their motion for reconsideration of the same decision
having been denied by DARAB in its Resolution of March 15, 2002,
Lapanday and/or L.S. Ventures, Inc., this time under the
name Lapanday Agricultural & Development Corporation (the
herein petitioner), elevated the case to the Court of Appeals via a
petition for review, thereat docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 71230.
As stated at the threshold hereof, the Court of Appeals, in
a Decision dated September 3, 2003,[6] denied petitioners recourse
thereto for being merely dilatory and accordingly upheld the validity
of the aforementioned DARAB decision of 17 January 2001 and
resolution of 15 March 2002, as follows:
WHEREFORE, in consonance with the Supreme Courts directive
not to further delay the implementation of the August 20, 1957
Decision, the instant petition is hereby DENIED for being dilatory.
The assailed Decision of the DARAB dated 17 January 2001 and
Resolution dated 15 March 2002 are declared VALID.
Petitioner and its counsel are warned not to further resort to
measures of this nature, otherwise, they shall be dealt with severely
for having abused the processes of the courts.
The individual respondents who received the amount of P54,000.00
are ordered to return the same to the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

The local National Police, Armed Forces of the Philippines or any of

the component units are hereby directed to assist the DAR in the
enforcement and/or implementation of this resolution xxx.
This resolution is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
From the aforequoted resolution of the Provincial Agrarian
Reform Adjudicator, Lapanday and/or L.S. Ventures, Inc., went on
appeal to the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board
(DARAB), at Quezon City where the appeal was docketed
as DARAB Case No. 8117.
[5]

In time, petitioner moved for a reconsideration, which motion

was denied by the same court in the herein equally
assailed Resolution dated January 19, 2004 [7] for being merely pro
forma.
Hence, this recourse by petitioner Lapanday Agricultural &
Development Corporation on its basic submission that the
Department of Agrarian Reform thru its Provincial Agrarian Reform
Adjudicator, the DARAB and the Court of Appeals all erred (1) in
assuming jurisdiction over an issue covering a public land; and (2) in
rendering judgment against it even as it is not a real party-in-interest
in the case.
The petition is bereft of merit.

In a decision dated January 17, 2001, the DARAB, ruling that

the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator had no jurisdiction to
declare the entire 716-hectare landholding as covered by the CARP
and that the only issue within his competence is to find out whether
sufficient grounds exist to warrant respondents dispossession from
the 317-hectare portion thereof which was earlier awarded to the
heirs of Orval Hughes, modified the appealed resolution of Provincial
Adjudicator Edica, thus:

Before going any further, however, we shall first address

respondents concern as to what remedy petitioner has resorted to in
coming to this Court: whether by petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, wherein only questions of law
may be raised, albeit jurisprudence extends this remedy even to
questions of fact in exceptional cases,[8] or by the special civil action
of certiorari under Rule 65, whereunder the main inquiry is whether
there is grave abuse of discretion or lack of jurisdiction.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed Resolution of

October 20, 1997, is hereby MODIFIED to read as follows:

While the petition raises jurisdictional issue, it is apparent from

our reading thereof that the same is a petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45. For one, the very recourse itself is captioned as a
petition for review on certiorari. For another, even as petitioner came
to this Court from a final decision of the Court of Appeals, the latter
is not impleaded as a nominal party-respondent in the petition thus
filed, as in fact the ones impleaded as respondents in the caption
thereof are only the very same original parties to the case while still
in the offices a quo.

1. Ordering respondents heirs of Orval Hughes to vacate the

premises of the 133 (sic, should be 399) hectares which were long
ago awarded to 133 awardees who were identified in the Order of
Natural Resources Minister dated September 17, 1981, and turn
over the peaceful possession thereof to the said 133 awardees or
their heirs;
2. Ordering respondents Lapanday and/or L.S. Ventures and
Hughes heirs to restore petitioners Maximo Estita, et al., to their
respective farmlots within the 317 hectares owned by the Hughes
Heirs; and

We shall then deal with the petition as one filed under Rule 45
and treat the alleged lack of jurisdiction on the part of the
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), the DARAB and the Court of
Appeals as allegation of reversible error.
Petitioner first contends that the subject landholding is still part
of the public domain, hence, still under the jurisdiction of the

Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) and,

therefore, beyond the coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Program (CARP).

this case, does not require proof (Sec. 4, Rule 129 of the Revised
Rules on Evidence).

There can be no debate at all that under the Public Land Act,
the management and disposition of public lands is under the primary
control of the Director of Lands (now the Director of the Lands
Management Bureau or LMB) subject to review by the DENR
Secretary[9]

Petitioners filing of an Answer has thereby cured whatever

jurisdictional defect it now raises. As we have said time and
again, the active participation of a party in a case pending against
him before a court or a quasi judicial body, is tantamount to a
recognition of that courts or bodys jurisdiction and a willingness to
abide by the resolution of the case and will bar said party from later
on impugning the courts or bodys jurisdiction.[16]

The hard reality in this case, however, is that the land in

question has ceased to be public, as in fact it is already titled. As
found by both the DARAB and the Court of Appeals, the 317-hectare
land awarded to the Hughes Heirs is covered by Original
Certificate of Title No. P-4712, the existence of which was never
refuted by the petitioner. Specifically, the DARAB decision of
January 17, 2001,[10] partly states:
On August 20, 1957 the Office of the President gave due course to
applications to cover only 317 hectares at 63 hectares each heir as
per OCT No. P-4712 but awarding 399 hectares to 133 awardees at
three (3) hectares each (Emphasis supplied),
a finding reechoed on page 3 of the CA decision of September 3,
2003.[11]
With the above, and bearing in mind that the CARP covers,
regardless of tenurial arrangement and commodity produce, all
public and private agricultural lands,[12] with the DAR vested with
primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate, through its
adjudication boards, agrarian reform matters, and exclusive
jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of the
agrarian reform program,[13] we rule and so hold, contrary to
petitioners assertion, that the DAR, thru its Provincial Agrarian
Reform Adjudicator at Digos, Davao del Sur correctly took
cognizance of the case in the first instance.
Petitioner next argues that the DARAB decision, as affirmed
by the Court of Appeals, ordering Lapanday and/or L.S. Ventures
Inc. to restore [respondents] Maximo Estita et al. to their respective
farm lots within the 317 hectares owned by the Hughes Heirs, has
no valid force and effect against petitioner because it is not a real
party-in-interest, pointing out that Lapanday and/or L.S. Ventures,
Inc., are separate and distinct from petitioners corporate personality.
Petitioner asserts that Lapanday has no juridical personality, while
the corporate life of L.S. Ventures Inc. has ceased when said entity
merged with petitioner in 1996. Moreover, petitioner points out that it
has no business operations in Davao del Sur where the land in
question lies.
We are not persuaded.
To begin with, it is basic in the law of procedure that misjoinder
of parties is not a ground for the dismissal of an action, as parties
may be dropped or added by order of the court on motion of any
party or on its own initiative at any stage of the proceedings and on
such terms as are just[14]
Then, too, there is the rule that objections to defects in parties
should be made at the earliest opportunity, that is, at the moment
such defect becomes apparent, by a motion to strike the names of
the parties wrongly impleaded. For, objections to misjoinder cannot
be raised for the first time on appeal.[15]
Here, aside from unsubstantiated denials that it is not the party
referred to in the complaint for forcible entry, etc., commenced by the
respondents before the office of the Provincial Agrarian Reform
Adjudicator of Digos, Davao del Sur, petitioner did not even file a
motion to strike its name in all the proceedings below. Quite the
contrary, and as correctly found by the Court of Appeals in the
decision under review, petitioner corporation x x x filed an Answer (Annex D, Rollo, pp.91-96) thereby submitting
to the jurisdiction of the Board. The same answer bears the name
LAPANDAY AND/OR L.S. VENTURES, INC., signed by its
representative Caesar E. Barcenas and assisted by its counsel Jose
V. Yap (Ibid, Rollo, p. 96). This alone negates the petitioners stance
that there is no entity by the name of Lapanday and that L.S.
Ventures, Inc. is seperate and distinct from any company (see
Annex M Rollo, p. 159 on Merger of Lapanday Agricultural &
Development Corporation and L.S. Ventures, Inc.). And such
admission made by the petitioner in the course of the proceedings in

But even assuming, in gratia argumenti, that Lapanday does

not have a juridical personality, it may nonetheless be sued under
such a name considering that respondents commonly know
petitioner by the name Lapanday Group of Companies, as shown in
their alleged letter of intent to relinquish their rights over the subject
land.[17] This brings to mind Section 15, Rule 3, of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, which reads:
SEC. 15. Entity without juridical personality as defendant. - When
two or more persons not organized as an entity with juridical
personality enter into a transaction, they may be sued under the
name by which they are generally or commonly
known (Emphasis added).
Aware of the hopelessness of its cause, petitioner invariably
posits that the herein respondents are not real parties-in-interest and
are bereft of any legal personality to file and initiate the complaint for
forcible entry, etc. before the office of the Provincial Agrarian Reform
Adjudicator of Digos, Davao del Sur because they are not tenanttillers of the land in dispute. Consequently, so petitioner argues,
respondents are not entitled to be restored thereto.
Petitioners posture cannot hold water.
Both the DAR Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator and the
DARAB affirmed and confirmed the tenancy status of the
respondents. We see no reason why the Court of Appeals should not
rely on such a finding in upholding the respondents right to be
restored to their respective farmlots as leasehold tenants thereof.
For sure, the evidence adduced by the respondents clearly
indicate that they were tenant-tillers of the 317-hectare land owned
by the heirs of Orval Hughes. Indeed, documents [18]showing that the
Judicial Administrator of the Intestate Estate of Orval Hughes had
filed cases in court against the respondents for their failure to deliver
the Estates share in the harvests, are unmistakable proofs that a
tenurial arrangement exists regarding the agricultural produce of the
land.
Besides, the heirs of Orval Hughes as former landlords of the
respondents, never denied the tenancy status of the latter, as in fact
they did not even bother to answer respondents complaint for
forcible entry, etc., before the Office of the Provincial Agrarian
Adjudicator.
In any event, it need not be stressed that the question
regarding the respondents tenancy status is factual in nature, which
is not proper in a petition for review.[19] More so must this be where,
as here, the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator, the DARAB and
the Court of Appeals were one in upholding the tenancy status of the
respondents.
Moreover, it is axiomatic that findings of administrative
agencies, which have acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is
confined to specific matters, are accorded not only respect but even
finality by the courts[20] In Corpuz vs. Sps. Grospe,[21] we
categorically held:
As a rule, if the factual findings of the CA coincide with those of the
DARAB an administrative body which has acquired expertise on the
matter such findings are accorded respect and will not be disturbed
on appeal
As tenant-tillers of the 317-hectare land owned by the heirs of
Orval Hughes, respondents are undeniably parties-in-interest to this
controversy. As such, they have the legal personality to institute the
action in the office a quo, namely, the office of the Provincial
Agrarian Reform Adjudicator at Digos, Davao del Sur.
But then, there is petitioners contention that respondents
interests over the subject land have already been waived when

quitclaims to that effect were allegedly executed and signed by

them.
The submission is equally puerile.
Waivers of rights and/or interests over landholdings awarded
by the government are invalid for being violative of the agrarian
reform laws. To quote from our decision in Torres vs. Ventura,[22] as
reiterated in Corpuz vs. Sps. Grospe: [23]
x x x As such [the farmer-beneficiaries] gained the rights to possess,
cultivate and enjoy the landholding for himself. Those rights over
that particular property were granted by the government to him and
no other. To insure his continued possession and enjoyment of the
property, he could not, under the law, make any valid form of
transfer except to the government or by hereditary succession, to his
successors
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED and the
assailed decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals
AFFIRMED in toto.

Instead of filing an answer, defendant filed a Motion to Strike Out

arguing that the new allegations in the complaint are false. After the
period to answer lapsed and no answer was submitted, complainant
filed a Motion for Summary Judgment dated 15 December 1999.
Defendant opposed the motion.
On 30 May 2000, defendants motion to strike out was granted by
respondent Judge. Complainant filed a motion for reconsideration of
the aforesaid order.
Based on the foregoing, complainant accuse[d] respondent Judge of
Neglect of Duty anchored on the following grounds:
a. Defendant should have filed an answer instead of a Motion to
Strike Out. Inspite thereof, respondent Judge granted the motion
120 days after its filing, thus defeating the summary nature of the
case;
b. The Order granting the motion to strike out is bereft of any
findings of fact because no hearing was conducted relative thereon;

Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
Panganiban,
(Chairman),
Corona, and Carpio-Morales, JJ., concur.

Sandoval-Gutierrez,

THIRD DIVISION

[A.M. No. MTJ-02-1429. October 4, 2002]

FRANCISCA P. PASCUAL, complainant, vs. Judge EDUARDO U.

JOVELLANOS, Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Alcala,
Pangasinan, respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
Municipal trial court judges ought to be familiar with the Rules
on Summary Procedure governing ejectment cases. Failure to
observe them constitutes gross ignorance of the law.

Statement of the Case

The sworn Administrative Complaint, 1 filed by Francisca P.

Pascual, charged Judge Eduardo U. Jovellanos of the Municipal
Circuit Trial Court of Alcala, Pangasinan with gross ignorance of the
law, bias and partiality, abuse of discretion and neglect of duty.2

The Antecedents

The facts in the present case are summarized by the Office of

the Court Administrator (OCA) in its January 28, 2002
Memorandum3 addressed to this Court as follows:
Complainant x x x alleges that she filed a complaint for forcible entry
docketed as Civil Case No. 730 against a certain Lorenzo L.
Manaois. The complaint was dismissed without prejudice for being
insufficient in some material allegations (Order dated 13 October
1999). On 15 November 1999, she filed a corrected complaint which
was docketed as Civil Case No. 740.

c. Respondent Judge exhibited his bias and partiality in favor of the

defendant in his Order granting the motion to strike out when he
pointed out x x x that the complaint in this case is virtually a rehash
of the complaint in Civil Case No. 730 x x x. Complainant asserts
that the same is to be expected because the defects or insufficiency
in the first complaint were just being rectified in the later one;
d. Her Motion for Summary Judgment remains, until the present,
unacted upon.
Meanwhile, defendant, taking advantage of the lull in the
proceedings, started the construction of a one-storey building on the
subject land. To protect her interest, complainant filed an Application
for Preliminary Injunction dated 8 May 2000. Acting thereon,
respondent Judge issued a Temporary Restraining Order dated 9
May 2000 and set the hearing on the Injunction. On said date,
complainant was able to present evidence in support of her
application while defendant chose not to present controverting
evidence and to just submit a memorandum.
On the last day of the effectivity of the TRO (29 May 2000),
complainant filed an Extremely Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to grant her
application for injunction. On 7 June 2000 defendant filed his
memorandum. However, until the present, respondent Judge has not
ruled on her application on preliminary injunction.
Instead of obeying the TRO, defendant continued with the
construction of the building and even started with a new one. Hence,
a contempt charge was filed by herein complainant on 8 May 2000.
Defendant moved to dismiss the contempt charge on the ground that
it was filed in the same proceedings ([C]ivil [C]ase No. 740) and the
filing fee was not paid. The court, however, motu propio docketed
the complaint for contempt as Civil Case No. 744 while the required
docket and other fees were paid by defendant on 31 May 2000. On
same date, the court issued an Order furnishing anew the
defendants/respondents with a copy of the contempt charge. These,
complainant claims, cured the defect cited by
defendants/respondents in their motion to dismiss. However,
respondent Judge still has not resolved the aforesaid motion to the
prejudice of herein complainant.4
In his Comment5 dated September 30, 2000, respondent
denied the allegations in the Complaint. He accused Atty. Alejandro
V. Peregrino, complainants counsel in the forcible entry case, of
having a penchant for filing administrative cases against him instead
of appealing decisions before the proper court. Respondent added
that none of the charges had any factual or legal bases. He insisted
that his Decision in Civil Case No. 730 had been rendered with
utmost good faith, honesty and sound discretion.6

The OCAs Recommendation

After investigation of this case, the OCA found that respondent

failed to apply the Rule on Summary Procedure, which he ought to
have been very conversant with, because it was a common
procedure in municipal courts. Accordingly, it recommended that
respondent be FINED in the amount of P10,000.00 and warned that
the commission of a similar infraction will be dealt with more
severely.7

This Courts Ruling

We agree with the findings of the OCA, but increase the

penalty, taking note that this is respondents second infraction.

governed by the Rule on Summary Procedure.28 In fact, all cases of

forcible entry and unlawful detainer are governed by this Rule.29
It must likewise be underscored that respondent dismissed
Civil Case No. 730 without prejudice, on the theory that the date of
the dispossession had not been initially indicated in the Complaint.
Thus, it would reasonably be expected that the allegations in that
civil case would be reiterated in Civil Case No. 740. Needless to
state, what also contributed to the delay in the resolution of the main
case was the grant of the Motion to Strike Out based on misplaced
reasoning.30
Lack of knowledge of the Rules on Summary Procedure
reflects a serious degree of incompetence. 31 When the law is so
elementary, as in this case, not to be aware of it constitutes gross
ignorance of the law.32 A member of the bench must be constantly
abreast of legal and jurisprudential developments, bearing in mind
that this learning process never ceases. It is indispensable to the
correct dispensation of justice.33

Administrative Liability

Judges are the visible representations of law and

justice.8 They ought to be embodiments of competence, integrity and
independence.9 In particular, municipal judges are frontline officers in
the administration of justice.10 It is therefore essential that they live
up to the high standards demanded by the Code of Judicial
Conduct.11 To be able to render substantial justice and to maintain
public confidence in the legal system, they are expected to exhibit
more than just a cursory acquaintance with statutes and procedural
rules. They are likewise expected to keep abreast of all laws and
prevailing jurisprudence.12 Judicial competence requires no less.13
Moreover, judges are bound to dispose of the courts business
promptly and to decide cases within the required period. 14 For it
cannot be gainsaid that justice delayed is justice denied.
Procrastination among members of the judiciary in rendering
decisions and in acting upon cases before them not only causes
great injustice to the parties involved, but also invites suspicion of
ulterior motives on their part.15
It must be emphasized that rules of procedure have been
formulated and promulgated by this Court to ensure the speedy and
efficient administration of justice. Failure to abide by these rules
undermines the wisdom behind them and diminishes respect for the
rule of law.16 The Rule on Summary Procedure was promulgated
precisely to achieve an expeditious and inexpensive determination
of cases. Failure to observe the period within which to render a
judgment subjects the defaulting judge to administrative
sanctions.17 For this reason, the Rule frowns upon delays and
expressly prohibits, altogether, the filing of motions for extension.18
In this case, it is very clear that respondent lacks awareness of
the relevant provisions on ejectment. 19 He has evidently been remiss
in resolving the forcible entry case, pursuant to the Revised Rules
on Summary Procedure.20 Verily, judgment should have been
rendered based on the allegations of the Complaint and the
evidence presented therein, inasmuch as the defendant failed to file
his answer after the lapse of ten (10) days from the service of the
summons.21 Section 6 of the Rule allows the trial court to render
judgment, even motu proprio, upon failure of the defendant to file an
answer within the reglementary period.22 Moreover, under Section 10
of the Rule, respondent was duty-bound to render his decision within
thirty (30) days from receipt of the last affidavits and position papers,
or the expiration of the period for filing them. 23 This notwithstanding,
he has not yet ruled on the Motion for Summary Judgment 24 dated
December 15, 1999, filed in accordance with Section 6 of the Rule
on Summary Procedure.
Furthermore, respondent failed to apply these very basic rules
when he granted the defendants Motion to Strike Out which was in
reality a motion to dismiss, a prohibited pleading. 25 In his
Order26 dated May 30, 2000, he ruled that the Complaint in Civil
Case No. 740 was a mere rehash of the dismissed Complaint in Civil
Case No. 730. He cited Section 12 27 of Rule 8 of the 1997 Rules on
Civil Procedure as basis for this ruling. In doing so, he committed an
obvious mistake showing gross ignorance of the law. This is
because the civil case assigned to him is for forcible entry, which is

Delay

Respondent claimed that if there was any delay on his part in

resolving the incidents, it was not intentional but merely brought
about by pressure from work.34
We are not convinced. Rule 3.05 of Canon 3 of the Canons on
Judicial Ethics mandates that a judge should dispose of the courts
business promptly and decide each case within the period
prescribed therefor.35 We have held in numerous cases that failure to
decide within the reglementary period constitutes gross inefficiency
and warrants the imposition of administrative sanctions.36
In the present case, the heavy caseload in respondents sala,
though unfortunate, cannot excuse him from due observance of the
rules. We reiterate that judges, when burdened by heavy caseloads
that prevent them from deciding cases within the reglementary
period, may ask for additional time from this Court. Indubitably,
respondent has failed to do so. 37 He ought to know that the speedy
resolution of forcible entry cases is a matter of public policy. His
inaction for almost three years on complainants Motion for Summary
Judgment practically rendered nugatory the whole purpose of
summary proceedings -- to promote a more expeditious and
inexpensive determination of cases. 38 By tarrying too long in
deciding this forcible entry case, he failed to live up to the mandate
of the Code of Judicial Conduct to maintain professional
competence.39 Judges are called upon to observe utmost diligence
and dedication in the performance of their judicial functions and
duties.40
In determining his administrative liability, we note that this is
not the first infraction of respondent.41 In Espiritu v. Jovellanos,42 he
was found guilty of gross misconduct for his partiality to one of the
parties, for which he was fined P20,000.
Indeed, it seems that he has remained undeterred in
disregarding the law and the Code which he has pledged to
uphold.43 He appears to be unfazed by the previous penalties and
warnings meted out to him.44 Since this is his second infraction, he
deserves a sanction heavier than that recommended by the OCA.
WHEREFORE, Judge Eduardo Jovellanos is hereby
found GUILTY of gross ignorance of the law and is FINED in the
amount of fifteen thousand pesos (P15,000). He is further warned
that a repetition of this or similar offenses will be dealt with even
more severely.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Corona, and Carpio-Morales, JJ., concur.
Sandoval-Gutierrez, J., abroad on official leave.