LEGAL ETHICS

CANON 9
1. U.S V NEY AND BOSQUE, 8 Phil 146
FACTS:
1902 Court decides Bosque 9co-defendant) not entitled
to admission to practise law
1904 Bosque made to co-defendant NEY to practice
together, Bosque doing consultation and paper works
relating to Spanish law
May 1, 1905 & Sept. 15, 1906 court refused to consider
petitions signed by the defendants and continuously
repeating the same on Oct. 2, 1906
ISSUE: WON both the defendants can be punished for
contempt?
HELD: No, defendant Bosque is not answerable as he is
not an officer of the court, on the other hand Codefendant NEY, is liable for the conduct of misbehaviour
for the improper signature of the pleadings. He was
chiefly and personally responsible.
The repeated irregular signature of pleadings by an
attorney in the name of a firm improperly constituted,
with one partner, who, by an order of the court, had been
denied the right to practise and the participation by him
in an act of contempt committed by such partner, is
misbehaviour which renders him guilty of contempt.
CANON 9 - A LAWYER SHALL NOT, DIRECTLY OR INDIRECTLY,
ASSIST IN THE UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW.
Rule 9.01 - A lawyer shall not delegate to any
unqualified person the performance of any task which
by law may only be performed by a member of the bar
in good standing.

2. LICHAUCO V ALEJANDRINO, 21 PHIL 52

Facts:
Plaintiff Faustino Lichauco commence an action against
Alejandrino for recovery of sum of money.
Ruling:
Faustino Lichauco has brought this action for himself and
in representation of his co-heirs. So far as the record
shows, co-heirs of the pendency of the action have no
knowledge of the pendency of the action. Faustino
Lichauco shows no authority for representing his coheirs except the mere allegation in the title of his
complaint. He speaks of himself as the plaintiff. The
attorney signs himself as attorney for the plaintiff not
for plaintiffs. Faustino Lichauco represents himself and his
co-heirs, and the attorney-at law, who signs the
complaint, represents as he alleges the plaintiff there,
is nothings in the record which shows that the co-heirs
are not capable of representing themselves. There is
nothing in the record which shows that they ever gave
their consent to the commencement of the present
action. It may be assumed that they did, but this is not
sufficient, The code of civil procedure in civil actions
provides in courts of first instance a party may conduct
his litigation personally or by the aid of a lawyer, and his
appearance must either be personal or by the aid of a
duly authorized member of the bar (sec. 34 Act 190) in
the present case the co-heirs are neither in court
personally nor by the duly authorized member of the bar.
Therefore they are not in court at all, and any judgement
which we might render in the present case, with
reference to the heirs, either pro or con, would in no way
be binding upon them
LEGAL ETHICS 1PAFLU V BINALBAGAN SUGAR, 42 SCRA 302

FACTS: The above-named petitioners were complainants

in Case No. 72-ULP-Iloilo, entitled, "PAFLU, et al, vs.
Binalbagan-Isabela Sugar Co., et al." After trial, the Court
of Industrial Relations rendered a decision, on 29 March
1961, ordering the reinstatement with back wages of
complainants Enrique Entila and Victorino Tenazas. Said
decision became final On 18 October 1963, Cipriano Cid
& Associates, counsel of record for the winning
complainants, filed a notice of attorney's fee equivalent
to 30% of the total back wages.
On 22 November 1963, Atty. Atanacio Pacis also filed a
similar notice for a reasonable amount. Complainants
Entila and Tenazas, on 3 December 1963, filed a
manifestation indicating their non-objection to an award
of attorney's fees for 25% of their back wages, and, on
the same day, Quintin Muning filed a "Petition for Award
of Services Rendered" equivalent to 20% of the back
wages. Muning's petition was opposed by Cipriano Cid &
Associates on the ground that he is not a lawyer. The
award of 10% to Quintin Muning, who is not a lawyer
according to the order, is sought to be voided in the
present petition. Applicable to the issue at hand is the
principle
enunciated
in
Amalgamated
Laborers'
Association, et al. vs. Court of Industrial Relations, et al.,
L-23467, 27 March 1968, that an agreement providing for
the division of attorney's fees, whereby a non-lawyer
union president is allowed to share in said fees with
lawyers, is condemned by Canon 34 of Legal Ethics and is
immoral and cannot be justified. An award by a court of
attorney's fees is no less immoral in the absence of a
contract, as in the present case. The reasons are that the
ethics of the legal profession should not be violated; that
acting as an attorney without authority constitutes
contempt of court, which is punishable by fine or
imprisonment or both, and the law will not assist a
person to reap the fruits or benefit of an unlawful act or
an act done in violation of law; and that if fees were to be

allowed to non-lawyers, it would leave the public in

hopeless confusion as to whom to consult in case of
necessity and also leave the bar in a chaotic condition,
aside from the fact that non-lawyers are not amenable to
disciplinary measures. The weight of the reasons
heretofore stated why a non-lawyer may not be awarded
attorney's fees should suffice to refute the possible
argument that appearances by non-lawyers before the
Court of Industrial Relations should be excepted on the
ground that said court is a court of special jurisdiction;
such special jurisdiction does not outweigh the aforesaid
reasons and cannot justify an exception. WHEREFORE,
the orders under review are hereby set aside insofar as
they awarded 10% of the back wages as attorney's fees
for respondent Quintin Muning. Said orders are affirmed
in all other respects. Costs against respondent Muning.
RATIONALE: if attorneys fees were allowed to nonlawyer, it would leave the public in hopeless confusion as
to whom to consult in case of necessity and also to leave
the bar in a chaotic condition aside from the fact that
non-lawyers are not amenable to disciplinary measures
Rule 9.02 - A lawyer shall not divide or stipulate to
divide a fee for legal services with persons not
licensed to practice law, except:
(a) Where there is a pre-existing agreement
with a partner or associate that, upon the
latter's death, money shall be paid over a
reasonable period of time to his estate or to
persons specified in the agreement; or
(b) Where a lawyer undertakes to complete
unfinished legal business of a deceased lawyer;
or
(c) Where a lawyer or law firm includes nonlawyer employees in a retirement plan even if
the plan is based in whole or in part, on a
profit sharing agreement.
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