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Rule1.ApplytheLawwhenitisCLEAR.DonotInterpretorCONSTRUE.
The RULES are simplified in the middle of this REVIEWER. Done by a Freshman, by ang aging
FreshmanwhoshallbeaLawyersoooooon!!!
literalmeaningorplainmeaningrule
duralexsedlex
doctrineofnecessaryimplication
ejusdemgeneris
limitationsofejusdemgeneris
expressiouniosestexclusioalterius
negativeoppositedoctrine
applicationofexpressiouniusrule
doctrineofcasusomissus
doctrineoflastantecedent
reddeddosingulasingulis
staredecisis
resjudicata
obiterdictum
A
legislature is a kind of
deliberative assembly with the power to pass,
[1]
amend, and repeal
laws
. The law created by a legislature is called
legislation or
statutory law
. In addition to
enacting laws, legislatures usually
have exclusive authority to raise or lower
taxes and adopt the
budget and
other
money bills
. Legislatures are known by many names, the most
common being
parliament and
congress
, although these terms also have
morespecificmeanings.
Legislativeintent
In law, the
legislative intent of the
legislature in enacting
legislation may
sometimes be considered by the
judiciary when interpreting the law (see
judicialinterpretation
).Thejudiciarymayattempttoassesslegislativeintent
where legislation is ambiguous, or does not appear to directly or
adequately addressa particular issue,orwhenthereappearstohavebeen
alegislativedraftingerror.
Whenastatuteisclearandunambiguous,thecourtshavesaid,repeatedly,
that the inquiry into legislative intent ends at that point. It is only when a
statute could be interpretedin morethan one fashion that legislative intent
mustbeinferredfromsourcesotherthantheactualtextofthestatute.
Sourcesoflegislativeintent
Courts frequently look to the following sources in attempting to determine
the goals and purposes that the legislative body had in mind when it
passedthelaw:
thetextofthebillasproposedtothelegislativebody,
amendmentstothebillthatwereproposedandacceptedorrejected,
therecordofhearingsonthetopic,
legislativerecordsorjournals,
speechesandfloordebatemadepriortothevoteonthebill,
legislativesubcommitteeminutes,factualfindings,and/orreports,
legislativeintentthereasonforpassingthelaw
Itis settledthat inthe absence oflegislative intent todefine words, words andphrases
usedin statuteshouldbegiventheir plain,ordinary,andcommonusagemeaningwhich
is supported by the maxim
generalia verba sunt generaliter intelligenda
or what is
dura lex sed lex or HOC QUIDEM PERQUAM DURUM EST, SED ITA LEX
SCRIPTAEST.
ejusdemgeneris
.
THE SAMEKINDORSPECIE
.
Thisistogiveeffect
to both the particular and general words,
by treating the particular
words as indicating the class
and the
general words as indicating
all
that is embraced in said class
,
although not specificallynamed by
theparticularwords.
The rule of ejusdem generis is not of universal application it should be used tocarry
out,not to defeatthe intent or purpose ofthelaw
the rulemustgiveway in favorof
thelegislativeintent
limitationsofejusdemgeneris
requisites:
1. Statue contains an
enumeration of particular and specific words
,
followedbyageneralwordorphrase
3. The
enumeration of the particular and specific words is not
exhaustive
orisnotmerelybyexamples
4. There is
no indication of legislative intent to give generalwordsor
phrasesabroadermeaning.
expressiouniosestexclusioalterius.
or
Whatisexpressedputsan
end
tothatwhichis
implied
.
interpretationorCONSTRUCTION,beextendedtoothermatters.
These also follows that when a statute specifically lists downsthe exceptions, whatis
not listdown as anexception isACCEPTED
expressinthemaximEXCEPTIOFIRMAT
REGULAMINCASIBUSNONEXCEPTIS,
the
expressexception
,exemptionorsavings
excludesothers.
intend to exclude the person, thing or object from the enumeration. If such legislative
intent isclearly indicated,
theCOURTmaysupply the omission iftodosowill
carryout
theintentofthelegislature
andwillnotdoviolencetoitslanguage.
AD PROXIMUM ANTECEDENS
The
lastantecedentruleis adoctrineofinterpretationofa
statute
,bywhich
"Referential andqualifying phrases,where no contraryintentionappears,refersolelyto
the last antecedent."
The rule is typically bound by "common sense" and is flexible
enough to avoid application that "would involve an absurdity, do violence to the plain
intent of the language, or if the context for other reason requires adeviationfromthe
rule."
Evidencethataqualifyingphraseissupposedtoapplyto
refers to each phrase or expression to its appropriate object, or let each be put in its
proper place, that is, the words should be takenDISTRIBUTIVELY toeffectthateach
word is to be applied to the subject to which it appears by context most appropriate
relatedandtowhichitismostapplicable.
REDDENDO
SINGULA
SINGULIS
,
construction.
By
Stare Decisis
[Latin,
Letthedecision stand
.]
The policy of courtsto abide
Res Judicata
[
Latin,
A thing adjudged.
]
A rule that a final judgment
on the merits by a court having jurisdiction is conclusive between the
parties toa suit asto all matters that werelitigatedorthatcouldhavebeen
litigatedinthatsuit.
The partyasserting res judicata,havingintroduced a final judgment on the
merits, must thenshow that the decision in the first lawsuit was conclusive
asto the matters in the second suit. For example, assume that the plaintiff
in the first lawsuit asserted that she was injured in an auto accident. She
sues the driver of the other auto under a theory of
Negligence
.
A jury
returns a verdict that finds that the defendant was not negligent.
The injured driver then files a second lawsuit alleging additional facts that
wouldhelp her provethat theother driver was negligent.
Acourtwould
dismissthesecondlawsuit
underresjudicatabecausethesecond
lawsuit is
based on the same
Cause of Action
(negligence) and the
sameinjuryclaim.
Obiter Dictum
[Latin
, By the way
.]
Words of an opinion entirely
unnecessary
for the decision of the case
. A remark made or opinion expressed by a judge in a
decisionupon a cause, "bythe way",that is, incidentallyorcollaterally,andnotdirectly
upon the question before the court or upon a point not necessarily involved in the
determination of thecause,orintroducedby wayofillustration,oranalogyorargument.
Sucharenotbindingasprecedent.
InterpretationandCONSTRUCTIONofStatutesmustbedone
to avoid evil and injustice. EA EST ACCIPIENDA
INTERPRETATIOQUAEVITIOCARET.
interpretation that will give the thing the EFFICACY is to beadopted. Law
must receivesensible interpretation to promote theendsforwhichtheyare
enacted. They should be given practical CONSTRUCTION that will give
LIFEtothem,IFITCANBEDONEwithoutdoingVIOLENCEtoreason.
InPAREMATERIA
,ofthesamepersonorthing.
CONTEMPORANEOUS
CONSTRUCTIONS
or
CONTEMPORARY
CONSTRUCTIONSaremadebytheEXECUTIVEDepartments.
First type of Contemporary Constructions are the interpretations of the
Executive on Statutes, for them to implement it, they must understand it
and interpret it if the language of the law is AMBIGUOUS. The executive
makes RULES orIRRs for this statutes,or ADMINISTRATIVERULESand
PROCEDURES. TheseIRRs orRULESissuedbytheexecutivetoexecute
theStatuteareCONTEMPORARYConstruction.
Second Type of ContemporaryConstructionsarethe INTERPRETATIONS
of the JUSTICE Secretary in carrying out PENAL LAWS and all OTHER
LAWS, under her are the PROSECUTORS, FISCALS of the Philippine
Republic. The issuances on how laws are to be prosecuted are
CONTEMPORARYCONSTRUCTIONoftheJusticeSecretary.
The third type are the DECISIONS OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE BODIES
handling disputes in a QUASIJUDICIAL MANNER. These decisions are
W
ITH THE GRANT OF POWERS, RIGHTS, PRIVILEGES IS ALSO THE
RIGHT TO INCIDENTAL POWERS OF THE POWERS, RIGHTS AND
PRIVILEGES. THE GREATER POWER IMPLIES INCIDENTAL LESSER
POWER.
WHATISAUTOLIMITATION?
Doctrineof Autolimitation
ItisthedoctrinewherethePhilippinesadheresto
principlesofinternationallawasalimitationtotheexerciseofitssovereignty.
Functus officio
an officer or agency whosemandatehasexpiredeitherbecauseofthearrivalofanexpirydate
orbecauseanagencyhasaccomplishedthepurposeforwhichitwascreated.FunctionismereFORMALITY.
Sinperjuicojudgmentsarejudgment,w/oanystatedfactsin
supportoftheconclusion.
RULESinSTATUTORYCONSTRUCTION
Thesolemndecisionsofthejudgesuponastatutebecomepartof
the statute andthesecurityofmen'slivesandproperty, require that they should
be adhered to:
for precedents serve to regulate our conduct and there is more
but upon the opinion of the judge, who may happen to try him, than which a more
miserablestateofthingscannotbeconceived.
1.PresumptionofCorrectness
a. "When testing the constitutional validity of statutes, courts shall presume the
statutetobevalid." Consequently, the burden to show the constitutional defect ison
the challenger.
"Every act of the legislature is
presumed to
be
constitutional
, and the Constitution is to be given a liberal construction so as to
sustain the enactment in question, if practicable." "When theconstitutionalityofan
act is challenged,
a heavy burden of proof is thrust upon the party making the
challenge
. Alllawsarepresumedtobeconstitutionalandthispresumptionisoneof
thestrongestknowntothelaw.
earlierenactedstatute.
c.
legislation
.
d. Whenamendments areenactedsoonaftercontroversiesarise
"as to the interpretation of the original act, it is logical to regard
theamendmentasalegislativeinterpretationoftheoriginalact,a
formalchangerebuttingthepresumptionofsubstantialchange.
whenitenactedtherelevantstatute."
whencurrentandpriorversionsofa statuteareatissue
,
thereis
f.
we assume that
unnecessary.
oflaw,"
itispresumedthatCONGRESSintendedto
overrideanypotential
conflictswith
earlierlegislation.
i."
Theconstructionofstatutesbyagencieschargedwith
administrationofthosestatutesisentitledtogreatweight.
A
decisionofanagencyspecifiedtoexecutethelawmadebyCONGRESScarriesgreat
weightandisentitledtodeferenceunlessitisproventheagencyerred.
Thegrantof
regulatoryauthorityextendsonlytodutiesorpowersconferredbylaw
.
Assuch,"regulations,promulgatedpursuanttodefinitivestatutoryauthority,havethe
forceandeffectoflaw.Moreover,thoseregulationswhich"clearlyandexplicitly
mirror"statutoryauthorityarelikeliesttobesustained.Anyregulationofthe
Departmentmustbereasonablygroundedinanidentifiableanddefinitivestatutory
foundation.
"Generally,thecourtaccordssubstantialdeferencetoanagency'sinterpretationsofitsownregulations.
Providedtheinterpretation"doesnotviolatetheConstitution,itmustbe
given'controllingweightunlessitisplainlyerroneousorinconsistentwith
theregulation.
j.
we will overturn COURTs decision only if it can be fairly characterized as "arbitrary or
capricious"andthusa"clearabuseofdelegateddiscretion."Ontheotherhand,an"agencydoesnot
possess specialized competence over the interpretation ofastatutemerelybecauseitaddresses
topics within theagency'sdelegable authority. Pure statutoryconstruction,amatterwithinthe"core
competency ofthejudiciary," ."Thisaxiom stemsfrombasic principlesof separationof powers.
It
question whether the statute delegates or withholds discretion is itself a question of statutory
interpretation,oneimplicatingourdutyofdenovoreview."
abdication
,anditrequiresustoacceptonlythoseagencyinterpretations
that are reasonable in light oftheprinciples of constructioncourtsnormally
employ. No matter how one calibrates
judicial deference, the
injeopardythe"enhancedpoliticalaccountabilityofagencypolicydecisions
adopted through the rulemaking process" and the democratic virtue of
allowing "all potentially affected members of the public an opportunity to
participateintheprocessofdeterminingtherulesthataffectthem.
l. "
However, whenever an "agency's statutory interpretation conflicts
with the language of the statute or when the interpretation hasnot been
consistently and regularly applied, the usual deference accorded to an
agency'sinterpretationshouldbewithheld.
m.
When Congress
enacts an imprecisestatute that it commits
overthatimplementation(except,ofcourse,throughfurther,more
precise, legislation).
The legislative and executive functions are not
combined.
But when anagencypromulgatesanimpreciserule,itleavestoitselfthe
implementation of that rule, and thus the initial determination of the rule'smeaning.
And though the adoption of a rule is an exercise of the executive rather than the
legislative power, a properly adopted rule has fully the effect of law.
Itseems
its own rule encourages the agency to enact vague rules which giveitthepower, in
futureadjudications,todowhatitpleases.
ConstruedAgainsttheState/Vagueness
a."
Itisanancientmaximofthelawthatallsuchstatutesmustbe
construedstrictlyagainstthestateandfavorablytothelibertyofthe
citizen
.Themaximisfoundedonthetendernessofthelawfortherightsof
individualsandontheplainprinciplethatthepowerofpunishmentisvestedinthe
legislatureandnotinthejudicialdepartment.Nomanincursapenaltyunlesstheact
whichsubjectshimtoitisclearlywithinthespiritandletterofthestatutewhich
imposessuchpenalty.Therecanbenoconstructiveoffenses,andbeforeamancan
bepunishedhiscasemustbeplainlyandunmistakablywithinthestatute.Ifthese
principalsareviolated,thefateoftheaccusedisdeterminedbythearbitrarydiscretion
ofthejudgesandnotbytheexpressauthorityofthelaw."
b."Whena
statuteispenalinnature
,it"mustbe
strictlyconstrued
against
theSTATEand
infavorofanaccused.
c.
"While it is true that penal statutes must be strictly construed against the
togiveapersonof
ordinaryintelligencenoticethathercontemplated
conductisforbiddenbythestatute
andencouragesselectiveprosecution
StatutoryExceptions,NegativeElementv.Affirmative
Defense
1) "
When construing
PENAL STATUTES which contain qualifications,
exceptions or exemptions to their application,
the limiting language may be
In determining
whether
specificlimitinglanguage isanelementoftheoffenseora
statutory defense, a
courtshouldlookbothtotheintentof
the statute as a whole and the ability of the
respective
state must prove all the essential facts entering into the
descriptionoftheoffense.Butithasbeenheldinmanycasesthat
when a negation of a fact lies peculiarly within the knowledge of
thedefendantitisincumbentonhimtoestablishthatfact).
Wenextobservethatthe"validprescription"exemptionofCode18.2250relatesto
afactthatwouldbesolelywithintheknowledgeoftheaccused.Ifweaccept
appellant'scontentionthattheSTATEmustproveappellanthadnovalidprescription,
theoffensewouldbevirtuallyunprovable.Underappellant'stheory,toobtaina
convictionunderthefactsofthiscase,theSTATEwouldberequiredtoprovethatno
medicalprofessional,whereverlocated,inthisCommonwealthorelsewhere,had
prescribedthedrugtoappellant.Thiswouldinvolveanationwidesearchofchain
drugstores,aswellasindependentpharmacies,hospitals,prisoninfirmaries,etc.
Appellant,atoralargument,concededthatsuchanundertakingwouldmostlikelybe
impossible.CONGRESSclearlydidnotintendsucharesult,norwouldtheyenact
suchanimpotentstatute
ConstitutionalConstruction
1) "The rights enumerated in this Bill of Rights shall not be construed to limit other
rightsofthepeoplenotthereinexpressed.
2)
The office and purposeof the constitution is toshape and fixthelimitsof
IMPLICITLY implied
4)"Itisan"establishedprincipleofconstitutionallawthatacourtwillnotruleupon
theconstitutionalityofastatuteunlesssuchadeterminationisabsolutelynecessaryto
decidethemeritsofthecase.
Astatutewillbeconstruedtoavoida
constitutionalquestionwheneverthisispossible.
5)"
Theconstructionofaconstitutional
provisionbyCONGRESS
(
note it is congress construing, not the supreme court
,
thatiswhyitisCALLED
CONTEMPORANEOUSCONSTRUCTION
)isentitledtoconsideration,andi
f
theconstructioniscontemporaneouswithadoptionofthe
constitutionalprovision
,itisentitledtogreatweight.Inaddition,Long
acquiescenceinsuchanannouncedconstructionsostrengthensit
thatitshouldnot
bechangedunlessplainlywrong.
6)
Constitutional
provisions are
EITHER SELFEXECUTING
OR
MANDATORY.
A
selfexecuting provision
does not require enabling legislation for its
enforcement.
A
mandatory provision declares or
imposes a duty or
requirement
thatmustbefollowed.
A
Directory provision sets forth procedures
legislature"foritsimplementation
.
or "
confers discretion on the
OF A
STATUTE
DE NOVO. When the constitutionality of a statute is challenged,
we are guided by the principle that all acts of CONGRESS are presumed to be
constitutional.
Where a statute is constitutional as applied to a litigant, the
litigant has no standing to challenge the statute on the ground that it may be
unconstitutional on its face
,
that
hypothetical situation
. As a general rule, "a party has standing to challenge
the constitutionality of a statute
only
impact on his
own
rights
8
) "However, when a court, in determining the constitutionality of a
11)
isaccordinglysubjecttodenovoreviewbythisCourt.
denovo
isaLatinexpressionmeaning"fromthebeginning,""afresh,""anew,""beginningagain."
RetroactiveEnactmentofLaws
1)"Accordingly,whenastatuteisamendedwhileanactionispending,therightsof
thepartiesaretobedeemedinaccordancewiththelawineffectwhentheactionis
begun,unlesstheamendedstatuteshowsaclearintentiontovarysuchrights.
(Our
analysisisguidedbythefundamentalprinciplesofstatutory
constructionthatretroactivelawsarenotfavored,andthatastatuteis
alwaysconstruedtooperateprospectivelyunlessacontrarylegislative
intentismanifest.)
Newlawswillapplyonlytofuturecasesunlessthereis
somethingintheverynatureofthecase
,orinthelanguageofthenewprovision,
whichshowsthatthenewlawwasintendedtohavearetrospectiveeffect.
Further,
everyreasonabledoubtisresolvedagainstaretroactiveoperationofa
statute
,andwordsofastatuteoughtnottohavearetrospectiveoperation
unless
CommonLaw
1)
In construing statutes,the
statutorydefinitionmustprevailover
thecommonlawdefinition
2)
CONGRESS is presumedtohaveknownandtohavehadthe
commonlawinmindintheenactmentofastatute.Thestatutemust
therefore be read along with the provisions of the common law, and the
latter will be read into the statute unless it clearly appears from express
language or by necessary implicationthatthepurposeofthestatutewasto
changethecommonlaw.
3)
"We also apply the established principle that a
4)
" A
statutory provision will not be held to change the common law unless the
PreviousConstructionofaStatute
1)
"
Where
courts
, and is then re-enacted by the legislature, the
construction given to it is presumed to be sanctioned
by the legislature, and
thenceforth becomes
judicial interpretations as well. (STARE DECIS becomes the interpretation and construction of a law or
STATUTEthatisambiguousevenifitwasappliedtoaprivatecase)
NewLawNewRemedy
4) "It is an established principle of statutory interpretation that "
a statute
prescribing anewremedyforanexistingrightshouldneverbeconstruedto
abolish a preexisting remedy in the absence of express words or
necessaryimplication. Further, "
'when a statute givesanewremedy,
TwoStatutesPertainingtotheSameSubject
1)
"Itiswellacceptedthatstatutesrelatingtothesamesubject
shouldnotbereadinisolation
.Suchstatutesshouldbeconsideredin
pari
materia
.Moreover,statutesdealingwiththesamesubjectmattershouldbe
construedtogethertoachieveaharmonious
result,resolvingconflictstogive
effecttolegislativeintent.Anacceptedprincipleofstatutoryconstructionisthat,
whenitisnotclearwhichoftwostatutesapplies,themorespecific
statuteprevailsoverthemoregeneral
.
Also,whenstatutesprovide
differentproceduresonthesamesubjectmatter,"thegeneralmust
givewaytothespecific.
statutoryprovisionsare
not tobeconsideredasisolatedfragmentsoflaw
. Suchprovisionsareto
be considered as a whole, or as parts ofagreaterconnected,homogeneous systemof laws, ora
singleandcompletestatutorycompilation.
the absence of words specifically indicating the contrary, that the legislature did not intend to
innovate on, unsettle, disregard, alter or violatea generalstatuteorsystemofstatutory provisions
the entire subject matter of which is not directly or necessarily involved in the act (noting that in
absenceofwordstocontrary,legislaturedidnotintendtoalterorrepealgeneralstatuteorsystem).
3)
Closelyrelatedstatutesmustbereadas beingconsistent with oneanother.
Two
5)
City
Constitution
.
Thus, if a statute and a local ordinance both can be given
effect,courtsmustharmonizethemandapplythemtogether.
TheMeaningofWords
1)
In the absence of a contrary definition, the words in a statute are
otherwiserepugnanttotherestofthestatute.
4)
"We will not construe a statute bysinglingoutaparticular term orphrase,butwill construethe
inthecontextoftheotherlanguageusedin
thestatute.
5) While in the construction of statutes the constant endeavor of the courts is
to
intentionmustbegatheredfromthewordsused,unlessaliteral
construction would involve a manifest absurdity. "The Court has stated the related
principle that "the plain, obvious, and rational meaning of a statute is always to be
preferred to any curious, narrow, or strained construction
." Statutes should
thanonewhichwilldefeatit.
7)[i]f the language of a statute is plain and unambiguous, and its meaning perfectly
clearanddefinite, effect must be given to it.Itisunnecessarytoresorttoanyrulesof
statutory construction when the language of a statute is unambiguous. In those
situations,thestatute'splainmeaningandintentgovern.
"
Languageisambiguousifitadmitsofbeingunderstood
in more than one way
, refers to two or more things
simultaneously, is difficult to comprehend, is of doubtful
import,orlacksclearnessanddefiniteness.
9)"Black'sLawDictionary1586(8thed.2004)
defines
"valid"
as"
Legally
sufficient
binding
."
(notingthatiftheSTATUTEdoesnotprovideastatutory
definitionwemaylooktothedictionarydefinitiontodeterminelegislativeintent
10)"Indraftingthestatute,the
legislatureseparatedthetwoprohibitions
witha
comma
followedbythedisjunctiveword
"nor."
Wehavenoted
that,pursuanttotherulesofgrammar,"
phrasesseparatedbyacomma
and[a]disjunctive...
areindependent
.
Thedisjunctiveservesto
connectthetwopartsofthesentencebutalsotokeepthem
separateandindependent.
12)"Theword[willful]oftendenotesanactwhichisintentional,orknowing,or
voluntary,asdistinguishedfromaccidental.Butwhenusedinacriminalstatuteit
generallymeansanactdonewithabadpurposewithoutjustifiableexcuse
stubbornly,obstinately,perversely[.]Thewordisalsoemployedtocharacterizea
thingdonewithoutgroundforbelievingitislawful.Theterm
"willfulact"imports
knowledgeandconsciousnessthati
njurywillresultfromtheactdone.
The
actdonemustbeintendedoritmustinvolvearecklessdisregardfortherightsof
anotherandwillprobablyresultinaninjury.[T]he
term"gross,wanton,and
culpable"describesconduct
.Theword"gross"means"aggravatedorincreased
negligence"whiletheword"culpable"means"deservingofblameorcensure."
'Grossnegligence'isculpableorcriminalwhenaccompaniedbyactsofcommission
oromissionofawantonorwillfulnature,showingarecklessorindifferentdisregard
oftherightsofothers,undercircumstancesreasonablycalculatedtoproduceinjury,or
whichmakeitnotimprobablethatinjurywillbeoccasioned,andtheoffenderknows,
orischargedwiththeknowledgeof,theprobableresultofhisacts
13)
"But,courts arenotpermittedtoaddlanguagetoastatutenor
15)"Undertheruleof
ejusdemgeneris
,whenaparticularclassofpersonsor
words) when general and specific words aregrouped, the general words are limited
bythespecificandwillbeconstruedtoembraceonlyobjectssimilarinnaturetothose
thingsidentifiedbythespecificwords.
16)
Ifastatuteexpresslyexceptsaclasswhichwouldotherwisefallwithinits
terms, the exception negates the idea that any other class is to be
excepted
.
word, phrase, or clause that can be made an antecedent without impairing the
meaning of the sentence.' Thus a proviso usually is construed to apply to the
provision or clause immediately preceding it.
erroneousinterpretationofastatutebythosecharged withits
19)
"An
enforcement
cannot be permitted to override [the statute's] clear meaning.
Amendmentsofstatutescanonlybemadebythelegislatureandnotbythe
courtsoradministrativeofficerschargedwiththeirenforcement
20)
"Butprinciplesofstatutoryconstructionarenotso rigid
. Althoughwepresume
used in different parts of the same act are intended to have the same
meaning isnot rigidandreadily yieldswhenever thereissuchvariationinthe
connection in which the words are used as reasonably to warrant the conclusion
thattheywere employedin differentpartsof the actwithdifferent intent.Ibid.A
given term in the same statute may take on distinct characters from association
withdistinctstatutoryobjectscallingfordifferentimplementationstrategies."
Ibid.(
Latin
, shortfor
ibidem
,meaning"thesame place")isthetermusedtoprovidean
endnoteor
footnote
citationor
referencefora
source that was cited in the preceding endnote or footnote. It is similarin meaningto
idem(meaning somethingthat hasbeen
[1]
mentionedpreviouslythe same),abbreviated
Id.
, whichis commonlyusedin
legalcitation
.Tofindthe
ibid.
source,onemustlook
atthereferenceprecedingit.
21)
are independent.
(finding that, the word "or" connects two parts of a sentence,
"'but disconnect[s] their meaning'") (noting disjunctive results in alternatives,
which must be treated separately) (finding that limiting phrase in statute is
independentofanddoesnotmodifytwoearlierphrasesbecausethelimitingphrase
is separatedfromthefirsttwobyacommaandthedisjunctive "or")(interpreting
the use of a comma and the disjunctive "or" as implying two separate and
independent phrases in a Virginia statute authorizing payment of dividends by
corporation "out of net earnings, or out of its net assets inexcessof itscapital").
Accordingly,thephrase,"madebytheDefendanttoanylawenforcementofficer,"
is independent of and does not modify the phrase, "[a]ny written or recorded
statementorconfessions."
TheTermsMay/Shall
1)Theterm
"may,"
asusedinastatute,shouldbegivenits
ordinarymeaning
intendedbytheCONGRESS
permission,importingdiscretion.
2)Itisalsotrue,however,thattheSupremeCourthasheldthattheword
"may,"
whileordinarilyimportingpermission,
willbeconstruedtobe
mandatory
when
itis
necessarytoaccomplish
themanifest
purposeofthelegislature.
3)
Theuseoftheword
"shall"
inastatute
generallyimplies
thatits
terms
areintended
tobemandatory
,ratherthanpermissiveordirective.
4)"[T]heuseof
shall,
inastatute
requiringactionbyapublicofficial,
is
directoryand
notmandatory
unlessthestatutemanifestsacontraryintent."14"A
statutedirectingthemodeofproceedingbypublicofficersistobedeemeddirectory,
andaprecisecomplianceisnottobedeemedessentialtothevalidityofthe
proceedings,unlesssodeclaredbystatute.
TheTermAggrievedLocusStandi
1) ""The term 'aggrieved' has a settled meaning when it becomes necessary to
determine who is a proper party to seek court relief from an adverse decision. In
order for a petitioner to be 'aggrieved,' it must affirmatively appear that
such
person had some direct interest in the subject matter of the proceeding
thatheseekstoattack. .. . Thepetitioner
'mustshowthathehasanimmediate,
the petitioner is to
advance some
perceived public right or to
redress some
anticipated public injury when the only wrong he has
MensRea/Scienter/Intent
1)
"In the final analysis, the issue whether mens rea or scienter is a necessary
2)
"
The contention that an injury can amount to a crime only when
andevil.
Arelationbetweensomementalelementandpunishmentforaharmfulactis
almostasinstinctiveasthechild'sfamiliarexculpatory"ButIdidn'tmeanto,"andhas
afforded the rational basis for a tardy and unfinished substitution of deterrence and
reformation in place of retaliation and vengeance as the motivation for public
prosecution.
problemcametoberecognized.
Crime, as a compound concept,
concurrence ofanevilmeaningmindwithanevildoinghand,wascongenial
toanintenseindividualism.
As the states codified the common law of crimes, even if their enactments were
silent on the subject, their courts assumed that the omission did not signify
disapproval of the principle but merely recognized that intent was so inherent in
the idea of the offense that it required no statutory affirmation
.
Courts,withlittlehesitationordivision,foundanimplicationofthe
requirementastooffensesthatweretakenoverfromthecommonlaw.The
unanimitywithwhichtheyhaveadheredtothecentralthoughtthat
wrongdoingmustbeconscioustobecriminalisemphasizedbythevariety,
disparityandconfusionoftheirdefinitionsoftherequisitebutelusivemental
element.
The purpose and obvious effect of doing away with the requirement of a guilty intent
is to ease the prosecution's path to conviction, to strip the defendant of such benefit
as he derived at common law from innocence of evil purpose, and to circumscribe
the freedom heretofore allowed juries.
Suchamanifestimpairmentoftheimmunitiesoftheindividualshouldnotbe
extendedtocommonlawcrimesonjudicialinitiative.
3)"Thepresenceofa"viciouswill"ormensreawaslongarequirementof
criminalresponsibility.Butthelistofexceptionsgrew,especiallyinthe
expandingregulatoryareainvolvingactivitiesaffectingpublichealth,safety,
andwelfare.Id.,at254.Thestatutoryoffenseofembezzlement,borrowed
fromthecommonlawwherescienterwashistoricallyrequired,wasina
differentcategory.13Id.,at260261.
"[W]hereCongressborrowstermsofartinwhichareaccumulatedthelegal
traditionandmeaning[401U.S.601,608]ofcenturiesofpractice,it
presumablyknowsandadoptstheclusterofideasthatwereattachedto
eachborrowedwordinthebodyoflearningfromwhichitwastakenandthe
meaningitsusewillconveytothejudicialmindunlessotherwiseinstructed."
TheDillonRuleandGrantsofAuthority
TheDillonRuleofstrictconstructioncontrolsourdeterminationofthepowersof
localgoverningbodies.Thisruleprovidesthat
municipalcorporations
haveonlythosepowersthatareexpresslygranted
,those
necessarilyorfairlyimpliedfromexpresslygrantedpowers,andthosethatare
essentialandindispensable.
"
In determining legislative intent, the rule is clear that where
necessarycorollaryisthatwhereagrantofpowerissilentuponitsmodeofexecution,
amethodofexerciseclearlycontrarytolegislativeintent,orinappropriatetotheends
soughttobeaccomplishedbythegrant,alsowouldbeunreasonable.
"Consistentwiththenecessitytoupholdlegislativeintent,the
doctrineofimplied
powersshould
never
beappliedtocreateapowerthatdoesnot
existorto
expandanexistingpowerbeyondrationallimits.
Always,thetestinapplicationofthedoctrineisreasonableness,inwhichconcernfor
whatis
necessarytopromotethepublicinterestisakeyelement.
6)
When the legislature delegates authority to an administrative
InconsistentRegulations/Laws
ASingleBodyofLaw
1)"WhenattemptingtodefinetermsinonepartoftheCode,courtsshouldreada
statutewith"
aviewtowardharmonizingitwithotherstatutes.
"
Ordinarily,whenaparticularwordinastatuteisnotdefinedtherein,a
courtmustgiveititsordinarymeaning.
2)
"Whenaskedtointerpretvariouscodesections,theSUPREMECourt
often
examinesotherrelatedstatutesthatcontain
similarorcontrastinglanguage
tohelpdeterminelegislative
intent.
TheExclusionRule
Ambiguity
1)
"Languageis
ambiguous
whenitmaybe
understoodin
morethanoneway
,orsimultaneouslyreferstotwoormore
things.
2)"Whenthelanguageofastatuteisambiguous,
it must be interpreted in a
manner that will give effect to the intent of CONGRESS.
3)"Theprimarygoalof
statutory
effect
to
legislativeintent
,withthereadingofastatuteasawhole
influencingtheproperconstructionofambiguousindividualprovisions
4)
Doctrine
of Contra proferentem:
"
Usedintheconnection
withtheconstructionofwrittendocumentstotheeffectthatan
ambiguousprovisionisconstruedmoststronglyagainstthepersonwho
selectedthelanguage."
Black'sLawDictionary,5thEd.
5)"Instead, wefindtherestrictivecovenant,inparticularthephrase"residentialpurposes,"tobe ambiguousin
several respects....Indeed, even thecircuitcourt's interpretationthattheterm " '[r]esidence' means more than
merephysicalpresenceandlessthandomicile"isambiguous.Itcanbearguedthatanightlyorweeklyrentalis
morethanmerephysical presence. Moreover,if thephrase"residentialpurposes"carrieswith ita "durationof
use" component, it is ambiguous as to when a rental of the property moves from shortterm to longterm.
Under ourcaselaw, arestrictivecovenant of"substantialdoubtorambiguity"mustbeinterpreted "infavorof
thefreeuseofpropertyandagainstrestrictions
CriminalVersusCivilIntentofaStatute
The question whether a particular statutorily defined penalty is civil or
criminal is a matter of statutory construction." First, one must determine
whether the legislature, in establishing the penalizing mechanism, indicates
either expressly or impliedly a preference for one label or the other. Second,
where the legislature has indicated an intention to establish a civil penalty,
one must address "whether the statutory scheme was so punitive either in
purpose or effect as to negate that intention
SupremacyClauseoftheConstitution
1)
"ByvirtueoftheSupremacyClauseoftheConstitution
supersedesanyconflictingstatelaw.
ThepreemptionofLocallawsby
STATUTESmayoccurbyexpressstatutorylanguageorotherclearindicationthat
Congressintendedtolegislateexclusivelyinthearea.EvenifCongressdoesnot
intendtheenactmentofaSTATUTORYschemecompletelytopreemptLocallawsin
thearea,congressionalenactmentsinthesamefieldoverrideLocallawswithwhich
theyconflict.
TheSupremeCourthasidentifiedthreewaysinwhich
preemptionmayoccur:
may adopt
express language setting forth the
existence and scope of preemption
;
(2)
Congress may adopt a framework for regulation that
"occupies the field" and leaves no room for states to adopt
supplemental laws
; and
(1)
Congress
(3)
whenstatuteactuallyconflictswiththeconstitution,typicallywhen
compliancewithbothlawsisa"physicalimpossibility"orthestatute
stands"asanobstacletotheaccomplishmentandexecutionofthefull
purposesandobjectivesofCongress.
2)
"Settledlegalprinciplesprovidethatthe
Constitution,notastate
courterroneousinterpretationofit,iscontrolling
.(incontextof
determiningwhethertoapplyretroactivelyanewrulefortheconductof
criminalprosecutions,adoptingBlackstonianviewthatjudges...findthe
lawratherthanmakethelawandthatjudicialdeclarationoflawis
merelyastatementofwhatthelawhasalwaysbeen.
PublicPolicy
1) "A
court may not "secondguess the lawmakers on matters of
economics, sociologyandpublicpolicy
....Those considerations
belong
exclusively in the legislative domain. Regardless of
whetherit"mayormay notbebetter publicpolicy".
MeaningCOURTS