Umil vs Ramos

Facts: On 1 February 1988, military agents were

dispatched to the St. Agnes Hospital, Roosevelt Avenue,

Quezon City, to verify a confidential information which was
received by their office, about a "sparrow man" (NPA
member) who had been admitted to the said hospital with
a gunshot wound. That the wounded man in the said
hospital was among the five (5) male "sparrows" who
murdered two (2) Capcom mobile patrols the day before,
or on 31 January 1988 at about 12:00 o'clock noon, before
a road hump along Macanining St., Bagong Barrio,
Caloocan City. The wounded man's name was listed by the
hospital management as "Ronnie Javellon," twenty-two
(22) years old of Block 10, Lot 4, South City Homes, Bian,
Laguna however it was disclosed later that the true name
of the wounded man was Rolando Dural. In view of this
verification, Rolando Dural was transferred to the Regional
Medical Servicesof the CAPCOM, for security reasons. While
confined thereat, he was positively identified by the
eyewitnesses as the one who murdered the 2 CAPCOM
mobile patrols.

Issue: Whether or Not Rolando was lawfully arrested.

Held: Rolando Dural was arrested for being a member of
the NPA, an outlawed subversive organization. Subversion
being a continuing offense, the arrest without warrant is
justified as it can be said that he was committing as
offense when arrested. The crimes rebellion, subversion,
conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes, and crimes
or offenses committed in furtherance therefore in
connection therewith constitute direct assaults against the
state and are in the nature of continuing crimes.

People vs. Burgos

The State (P) vs. Suspect NPA Rebel (D)
GR L-68955, September 4, 1986 (144 SCRA 1)

[T]
Summary: An informant identified a certain person as a member of a subversive
group who forcibly recruited him and based on this information, the police went to
arrest the suspect. At the time of the arrest, the suspect was merely plowing his
field.
Rule of Law: In a warrantless arrest, the officer arresting a person who has just
committed, is committing, or is about to commit an offense must have personal
knowledge of that fact.
Facts: Cesar Masamlok personally and voluntarily surrendered to the authorities
stating that he was forcibly recruited by accused Ruben Burgos (D) as member of
the NPA, threatening him with the use of firearm against his life, if he refused.
Pursuant to this information, PC-INP members went to the house of the Burgos (D)
and saw him plowing his field when they arrived. One of the arresting offices called
Burgos (D) and asked him about the firearm. At first, Burgos (D) denied having any
firearm, but later, Burgos's (D) wife pointed to a place below their house where a
gun was buried in the ground.
After recovery of said firearm, Burgos (D) pointed to a stock pile of cogon where the
officers recovered alleged subversive documents. Burgos (D) further admitted that
the firearm was issued to him by Nestor Jimenez, team leader of sparrow unit.

Issues: Is the warrantless arrest valid? Is the warrantless search valid?

Ruling: No. Under Section 6(a) of Rule 113, the officer arresting a person who has
just committed, is committing, or is about to commit an offense must have personal
knowledge of that fact. The offense must also be committed in his presence or
within his view. (Sayo vs. Chief of Police, 80 Phil. 859).
There is no such personal knowledge in this case. Whatever knowledge was
possessed by the arresting officers, it came in its entirety from the information
furnished by Cesar Masamlok. The location of the firearm was given by the wife of
Burgos (D).
In arrests without a warrant under Section 6(b), however, it is not enough that there
is reasonable ground to believe that the person to be arrested has committed a
crime. A crime must in fact or actually have been committed first. That a crime has
actually been committed is an essential precondition. It is not enough to suspect

that a crime may have been committed. The fact of the commission of the offense
must be undisputed. The test of reasonable ground applies only to the identity of
the perpetrator.
In this case, the Burgos (D) was arrested on the sole basis of Masamlok's verbal
report. Masamlok led the authorities to suspect that the accused had committed a
crime. They were still fishing for evidence of a crime not yet ascertained. The
subsequent recovery of the subject firearm on the basis of information from the lips
of a frightened wife cannot make the arrest lawful. If an arrest without warrant is
unlawful at the moment it is made, generally nothing that happened or is
discovered afterward can make it lawful. The fruit of a poisoned tree is necessarily
also tainted.

Villavicencio vs Lukban - A case digest

G.R. No. L-14639 March 25, 1919ZACARIAS VILLAVICENCIO, ET AL. vs. JUSTO
LUKBAN, ET AL.
Issue:
The writ of Habeas Corpus was filed by the petitioner, with the prayer that the
respondent produce around 170 women whom Justo Lukban et, al deported to
Davao. Liberty of abode was also raised versus the power of the executive of the
Municipality in deporting the women without their knowledge in his capacity as
Mayor.
Facts:
Justo Lukban as Manila City's Mayor together with Anton Hohmann, the city's Chief
of Police, took custody of about 170 women at the night of October 25 beyond the
latters consent and knowledge and thereafter were shipped to Mindanao
specifically in Davao where they were signed as laborers. Said women are inmates
of the houses of prostitution situated in Gardenia Street, in the district of Sampaloc.
That when the petitioner filed for habeas corpus, the respondent moved to dismiss
the case saying that those women were already out of their jurisdiction and that , it
should be filed in the city of Davao instead.
The court ruled in favor of the petitioner with the instructions;
For the respondents to have fulfilled the court's order, three optional courses were
open: (1) They could have produced the bodies of the persons according to the
command of the writ; or (2) they could have shown by affidavit that on account of
sickness or infirmity those persons could not safely be brought before the court; or
(3) they could have presented affidavits to show that the parties in question or their
attorney waived the right to be present.

Held:
The court concluded the case by granting the parties aggrieved the sum of 400
pesos each, plus 100 pesos for nominal damage due to contempt of court.
Reasoning further that if the chief executive of any municipality in the Philippines
could forcibly and illegally take a private citizen and place him beyond the
boundaries of the municipality, and then, when called upon to defend his official
action, could calmly fold his hands and claim that the person was under no restraint
and that he, the official, had no jurisdiction over this other municipality.
We believe the true principle should be that, if the respondent is within the
jurisdiction of the court and has it in his power to obey the order of the court and
thus to undo the wrong that he has inflicted, he should be compelled to do so. Even
if the party to whom the writ is addressed has illegally parted with the custody of a
person before the application for the writ is no reason why the writ should not issue.
If the mayor and the chief of police, acting under no authority of law, could deport
these women from the city of Manila to Davao, the same officials must necessarily
have the same means to return them from Davao to Manila. The respondents,
within the reach of process, may not be permitted to restrain a fellow citizen of her
liberty by forcing her to change her domicile and to avow the act with impunity in
the courts, while the person who has lost her birthright of liberty has no effective
recourse. The great writ of liberty may not thus be easily evaded.

Stonehill vs Diokno (20 SCRA 383)

Posted by taxcasesdigest on Tuesday, July 14, 2009
Labels: constitutional law, corporation, general warrant, search and seizure

Facts: Respondents issued, on different dates, 42 search warrants against

petitioners personally, and/or corporations for which they are officers directing
peace officers to search the persons of petitioners and premises of their
offices, warehouses and/or residences to search for personal properties
books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts,
ledgers, journals, portfolios, credit journals, typewriters, and other documents
showing all business transactions including disbursement receipts, balance
sheets and profit and loss statements and Bobbins(cigarettes) as the subject
of the offense for violations of Central Bank Act, Tariff and Customs Laws,
Internal Revenue Code, and Revised Penal Code.
[if !supportEmptyParas] [endif]
Upon effecting the search in the offices of the aforementioned corporations and on
the respective residences of the petitioners, there seized documents, papers, money
and other records. Petitioners then were subjected to deportation proceedings and
were constrained to question the legality of the searches and seizures as well as the
admissibility of those seized as evidence against them.

[if !supportEmptyParas] [endif]

On March 20, 1962, the SC issued a writ of preliminary injunction and partially lifted
the same on June 29, 1962 with respect to some documents and papers.
[if !supportEmptyParas] [endif]
Held:
a Search warrants issued were violative of the Constitution and the Rules, thus,
illegal or being general warrants. There is no probable cause and warrant did
not particularly specify the things to be seized. The purpose of the requirement
is to avoid placing the sanctity of the domicile and the privacy of
communication and correspondence at the mercy of the whims, caprice or
passion of peace officers.
b Document seized from an illegal search warrant is not admissible in court as a
fruit of a poisonous tee. However, they could not be returned, except if
warranted by the circumstances.
c Petitioners were not the proper party to question the validity and return of
those taken from the corporations for which they acted as officers as they are
treated as personality different from that of the corporation.
G.R. No. L-64261 December 26, 1984
JOSE BURGOS, SR vs. THE CHIEF OF STAFF- AFP, ET AL
Facts:
Assailed in this petition for certiorari prohibition and mandamus with
preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction is the validity of two [2]
search warrants issued on December 7, 1982 by Judge Ernani Cruz-Pano of
the then CFI of Rizal [Quezon City], under which the premises of the
"Metropolitan Mail" and "We Forum" newspapers, respectively, were
searched, and office and printing machines, equipment, paraphernalia, motor
vehicles and other articles used in the printing, publication and distribution
of the said newspapers, as well as numerous papers, documents, books and
other written literature alleged to be in the possession and control of
petitioner Jose Burgos, Jr. publisher-editor of the "We Forum" newspaper,
were seized.
Petitioners further pray that a writ of preliminary mandatory and prohibitory
injunction be issued for the return of the seized articles, and that respondents
be enjoined from using the articles thus seized as evidence against petitioner
Jose Burgos, Jr. and the other accused in Criminal Case No. Q- 022782 of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, entitled People v. Jose Burgos, Jr. et al.
Issue: Was the closure of WE Forum a case of prior restraint?
Ruling:
Yes. As heretofore stated, the premises searched were the business and
printing offices of the "Metropolitan Mail" and the "We Forum newspapers.
As a consequence of the search and seizure, these premises were padlocked
and sealed, with the further result that the printing and publication of said
newspapers were discontinued. Such closure is in the nature of previous

restraint or censorship abhorrent to the freedom of the press guaranteed

under the fundamental law, and constitutes a virtual denial of petitioners'
freedom to express themselves in print. This state of being is patently
anathematic to a democratic framework where a free, alert and even militant
press is essential for the political enlightenment and growth of the citizenry.