The Unique World of the Timaeus

Richard D. Parry

Journal of the History of Philosophy, Volume 17, Number 1, January

1979, pp. 1-10 (Article)
Published by Johns Hopkins University Press
DOI: 10.1353/hph.2008.0257

For additional information about this article

http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/hph/summary/v017/17.1parry.html

Access provided by Universidad Complutense de Madrid (2 Sep 2015 13:21 GMT)

The Unique World of the Timaeus

RICHARD D. P A R R Y

AT 30cl TO 31b3 o r TI~E Timaeus, T i m a e u s i n t r o d u c e s t h e M o d e l F o r m that the D e m i urge will use in m a k i n g the w o r l d a n d argues that the M o d e l a n d the w o r l d c o p i e d after it will be u n i q u e . ' T h e r e has been m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g o f this p a s s a g e from m a n y
sides. In this p a p e r I will begin by reviewing one o f t h e recent i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s , m a d e
by David Keyt, a n d then by giving the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n I believe to be the correct one.
A n u m b e r o f c o n s e q u e n c e s o f this i n t e r p r e t a t i o n will t h e n be d r a w n t h a t effect F. M.
C o r n f o r d ' s c o m m e n t a r y on this p o i n t a n d H. C h e r n i s s ' s r e a d i n g o f this a r g u m e n t .
I.
In a n article entitled " T h e M a d C r a f t s m a n o f t h e T i m a e u s " D a v i d Keyt says
that the a r g u m e n t at 31a2-5 c o m m i t s the c r a f t s m a n ' s version o f the fallacy o f division." W h e n s o m e o n e is m a k i n g , for e x a m p l e , a table f r o m d i r e c t i o n s , if he m a d e the
table out o f p a p e r b e c a u s e the directions are on p a p e r , he w o u l d be c o m m i t t i n g this
fallacy. Just so, while the aim o f P l a t o ' s a r g u m e n t is to s h o w t h a t o u r w o r l d is
unique, a c c o r d i n g to Keyt, P l a t o tries to p r o v e this c l a i m by a p p e a l i n g to the uniqueness o f the F o r m on which the D e m i u r g e fashions o u r world. But uniqueness is a
p r o p e r t y t h a t belongs to the F o r m because it is a F o r m , n o t b e c a u s e it is a p a r a d i g m .
The fallacy here is in a t t r i b u t i n g to the c o p y a p r o p e r t y t h a t b e l o n g s to the F o r m q u a
F o r m ; such a p r o p e r t y is called b y Keyt a formal p r o p e r t y . 3 H e illustrates the fallacy:
Plato's argument is this: the cosmos was made according to its model; its model is unique;
therefore, the cosmos is unique. If Plato accepts this argument, he should also be prepared to
accept the following one, which within his system has true premises and a false conclusion: the
planet Mercury was made according to its model (the Form of heavenly god); its model is
unique; therefore, Mercury is the only heavenly god (that is, the only celestial body).'
Before we can assess K e y t ' s criticism we m u s t a n a l y z e the a r g u m e n t w h e r e b y P l a t o
arrives at the uniqueness o f the M o d e l F o r m . This is relevant for it will allow us to
see the kind o f uniqueness the M o d e l F o r m has. W h e n we c o m e to see the kind o f
uniqueness this F o r m has, we will see that it is not, as Keyt c h a r g e d , a formal p r o p e r ty o f the F o r m at all. In fact, we shall see that the uniqueness o f the F o r m is not a
1 would like to express my gratitude to Professor David T. Furley, who discussed this paper with me
and made a number of helpful suggestions.
' Internal references to the Timaeus and the Gorgias in this paper are taken from volumes 3 and 4 of
Platonis Opera, J. Burnet, ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1902).
2 Philosophical Review 80 (1971) : 230-35.
' Ibid., p. 230.
' Ibid., pp. 232-33. A similar point is made by I. M. Crombie in An Examination of Plato's Philosophical Doctrines, 2 vols. (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1963), 2:200. Keyt goes on to argue that
Plato is guilty of the same kind of fallacy in two other places in the Timaeus; in this paper I shall concentrate on this argument at 31a2.

[l]

HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY

f o r m a l but a m a t e r i a l p r o p e r t y ; that is, it is a p r o p e r t y the F o r m has, not because it is

a F o r m , b u t b e c a u s e o f the k i n d o f F o r m it is. A n y o n e r e a d i n g K e y t ' s article w o u l d
fail to see this i m p o r t a n t feature o f the a r g u m e n t for the uniqueness o f the F o r m
b e c a u s e t h e article d o e s not include this p o r t i o n o f the overall a r g u m e n t for the
uniqueness of our world.
!1.
In fact, the b u l k o f the a r g u m e n t at 31a-b is d e v o t e d to the F o r m called (in
t h e C o r n f o r d t r a n s l a t i o n used in this p a p e r ) the Living C r e a t u r e . T h e aim o f the
a r g u m e n t is t o p r o v e t h a t this F o r m has a u n i q u e p r o p e r t y in virtue o f t h e k i n d o f
F o r m it i s . ' O n c e P l a t o has established the u n i q u e p r o p e r t y o f the F o r m he will be
a b l e to a r g u e t h a t w h a t e v e r is fashioned after this F o r m will have the p e r c e p t i b l e
e q u i v a l e n t o f this p r o p e r t y . This, in turn, will m e a n t h a t w h a t e v e r is fashioned on
this F o r m will be u n i q u e in the p e r c e p t i b l e w o r l d .
A c c o r d i n g l y , in t h e following I will outline the w h o l e a r g u m e n t for the uniqueness
o f o u r w o r l d . T h e a r g u m e n t will be a t t a c k e d in t w o p a r t s . T h e first will d e a l with the
u n i q u e n e s s o f the F o r m ; the second with the a p p l i c a t i o n o f this p r e v i o u s a r g u m e n t to
the issue o f t h e u n i q u e n e s s o f o u r world.
T h e p o i n t o f the a r g u m e n t from 31a4-8 is to establish the uniqueness o f the F o r m
Living C r e a t u r e . In t h e C o r n f o r d t r a n s l a t i o n , 31a4-8 reads:
For that which embraces all the intelligible living creatures that there are, cannot be one of a
pair; for then there would have to be yet another Living Creature embracing those two, and
they would be parts of it; and thus our world would be more truly described as a likeness, not
of them, but of that other which would embrace them. s
P l a t o ' s s t r a t e g y h e r e is to show that the F o r m is u n i q u e n o t just b e c a u s e it is a F o r m
b u t b e c a u s e o f t h e k i n d o f F o r m it is. That is, it is u n i q u e because o f s o m e p r o p e r t y it
has as the k i n d o f F o r m it is r a t h e r than b e c a u s e o f a p r o p e r t y it has b e c a u s e it is a
Form.
By t y p e it is a reductio a r g u m e n t . A c t u a l l y , t h e reductio does n o t l e a d to an a b s u r d i t y so m u c h as to a c o n c l u s i o n that is o d d e n o u g h t h a t P l a t o o b v i o u s l y t h i n k s it
w o u l d d e t e r his listeners. W e shall see what this o d d i t y is later. W h a t e v e r the sort o f
reductio, the c o n c l u s i o n to be d e r i v e d in t h e last step is: the F o r m t h a t e m b r a c e s all
the intelligible living c r e a t u r e s t h a t there are c a n n o t be o n e o f a p a i r . So we can begin
the o u t l i n e b y a s u m i n g the o p p o s i t e o f this c o n c l u s i o n :
(1)

T h e F o r m t h a t e m b r a c e s all the intelligible living c r e a t u r e s t h a t there are is

one of a pair.

' The main point of this argument is correctly given by Archer-Hind, in one succinct sentence (The
Timaeus of Plato [New York: Arno Press, 1973], p. 94, n. 10). However, he does not analyze the argument. Perhaps it is for this reason that he does not see the full thrust of the argument (and its main point)
and is therefore open to the criticism Keyt levels at him. Keyt takes the Model Form to be a genus and
points out that Archer-Hind's interpretation conflicts with such a position (p. 233). Since Archer-Hind
does seem to take the Model Form to be a genus (p. 94, n. 2), he is made, in effect, to call into question his
own reading. However, my analysis of the argument shows that the Model Form is not a genus.
6 F. M. Cornford, Plato's Cosmology (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1975), pp. 41-42. I can note the difficulties of translating Z6on as Jiving creature; but since it is Cornford's choice I shall use it throughout
this paper.

PLATO'S TIMAEUS
(2)
(3)

Then there would have to be another Living Creature embracing those

two, and they would be parts of it.
Thus our world would be more truly described as a likeness, not of them,
but of that other that would embrace them.

There are, obviously, suppressed premises between steps (1) and (2). l shall first give
the premises and then argue that these premises are the ones Plato meant. The two
premises needed are:
(la)
(lb)

Each of the pair of Forms which embrace all intelligible living creatures is
itself an intelligible living creature.
There is a Form which embraces, in a system, all the intelligible living
creatures there are.

With these assumptions we can move from step (1) to step (2) in the following way.
The original pair fails to embrace all intelligible living creatures because they fail to
embrace one another. They are distinct systems: that is what their being a pair
means. And they are each intelligible living creatures; so if there is a Form that embraces all intelligible living creatures, there will have to be a third Form, embracing
this pair into a system. Since the embracing Form is a Living Creature, this third
Form will itself be a Living Creature.
The incipient infinite regress threatened by this argument already shows the futility of multiplying the Form that embraces all intelligible living creatures. But Plato
does not stop here; he draws the further consequence for the role of these Forms as
Models for our world, that is, step (3).
Let us turn to step (3), then. Step (3) follows from (I), (la), (lb), and (2) if we add
another assumption between (2) and (3). We must assume:
(2a)

The exemplar for our world will be the most complete Living Creature.

Then we can conclude that our world will be a copy of the third Living Creature
rather than one of the original pair because the third Living Creature contains all the
intelligible living creatures that there are. The other two fail to contain each other,
thereby being incomplete.
Now we can offer justification for the added premises. This justification will all be
taken from the immediate context of the argument and therefore makes no appeal to
claims about the relation of the Timaeus to other dialogues. We can start with (la),
which says that each of the pair of Forms that embrace all intelligible living creatures
is itself an intelligible living creature. The chief reason for making (la) a premise is
that the notion of the pair of intelligible living creatures is arrived at by doubling the
notion of the Form that embraces all intelligible living creatures (31a4). This Form,
in turn, is itself called an intelligible living creature three times by Plato (30c3, 31a6,
31bl). By doubling this Form, then, we get a pair of intelligible living creatures.
It is necessary to insist that these two Forms be intelligible living creatures and not
just systems of intelligible living creatures. If they were just systems of living creatures that were not themselves living creatures, there would be no need for the third

H I S T O R Y OF P H I L O S O P H Y

Form to embrace them. First of all, two systems of intelligible living creatures need
not contain different living creatures; they could each contain all the intelligible living creatures and be distinct from one another. In somewhat the same way, two distinct political entities can contain the same people but have different functions. If the
two Forms both contained all the intelligible living creatures but were not themselves
intelligible living creatures, there would be no need for a third Form to embrace all
the intelligible living creatures. If anything, the intelligible living creatures would be
overcontained. Further, even if we suppose the two Forms to contain somewhat
different members, while still not being themselves intelligible living creatures, the
third Form would be needed, not to contain the two F o r m s - - a s Plato says it i s - b u t
only to comprehend their members. The third Form embraces all intelligible living
creatures, not all systems of intelligible living creatures.
Premise (lb) says that there is a Form that embraces, in a system, all the intelligible living creatures that there are. Strictly speaking, this is not a suppressed premise
but an import from the earlier part of the passage: " L e t us rather say that the world
is like, above all things, to that Living Creature of which all other living creatures,
severally and in their families, are parts. ''7 Plato has asserted that there is such a
thing; now he is trying to prove something about it.
Finally, (2a) says that the exemplar of our world will be the most complete Living
Creature. This means that it will contain all, and not just a part of, intelligible living
creatures. Again, this premise is imported from the earlier part of this passage where
Plato is talking about the Model for our world. At 30c5, Cornford's translation
reads, " W e must not suppose that it was any creature that ranks only as a species;
for no copy of that which is incomplete can ever be good. ''a We will have grounds
for taking exception to the translation of en m e r o u s eidei as species; but the present
point will remain the same. Here Plato is recalling his earlier claim about this world,
that is, that "this world is the best of things that have become. ''9 And in this previous passage (29a-b), Plato has argued that if this world is the best of the things
that have become, it must be copied after an eternal Form (29a2-5). In the present
passage, he is claiming that if the world is to be good, the Model must also be the
most complete. The completeness means that it will not contain just a part of the intelligible living creatures that there are.
Now, if we have been successful so far in completing P l a t o ' s argument, we can ask
the question as to why the conclusion, step (3), is so unacceptable that everyone is
expected to prefer the opposite of the first premise, viz., that the Form that embraces
all intelligible living creatures is not one of a pair, that is, is unique. The conclusion
simply says that the nonunique Form embracing all intelligible living creatures
would lose its status as an exemplar for our world. That consequence is not absurd,
of course. But that Plato makes it the last step of an obvious reductio argument
shows that the only reason for supposing there to be such a F o r m is that it is to be
used as a Model. That it is to be so used isneither a formal nor a material property of
the Form; but it is a feature of the reason for which Plato is entertaining its existence.
He is saying, then, that any Form embracing all intelligible living creatures that was
' Ibid., p. 40; 30c5-7.
' Ibid., p. 40.
' Ibid., p. 23; 29a5.

PLATO'S TIMAEUS

not unique, and therefore not complete, would lose interest for us as a Model, and
we would need to look for another one.
This role of the Form, which embraces all intelligible living creatures, as Model
can be seen from another point of view. If the premises attributed to Plato in this
paper are correctly attributed, then it will be seen that Plato could have gotten to the
conclusion of his reductio argument without going through step (2) and step (3). It is
enough to suppose (1), (la), and (lb) because they imply the contradiction that there
are two distinct Forms, themselves living creatures, that contain all intelligible living
creatures. This is a contradiction because, failing to contain one another, the Forms,
which are supposed to contain all intelligible living creatures, cannot contain all intelligible living creatures. That Plato did not stop here but went through steps (2)
and (3) shows that he is interested in this Form that embraces all living creatures not
just as a peculiar kind of Form but as a Model for our world. And the important
property it has as a Model is its completeness.
A reductio argument that stopped at the contradictory result just outlined would
not make this point; it would not be complete enough for Plato's purposes. After all,
a contradictory result leaves a fork: either the Form that embraces all intelligible living creatures is not one of a pair or the pair does not embrace all intelligible living
creatures. Plato can be seen as following the second prong, that is, the harder case
for his position. His motivation for doing this is to illustrate how the Model for our
world must be complete. For given that there is a Form that embraces all intelligible
living creatures, it will embrace these two (incomplete) intelligible living creatures.
This third Form, then, becomes the exemplar for our world because of that property
most important for our world, completeness. A secondary motivation here could be
his precluding anyone's taking the second prong, thinking thereby to have escaped
altogether from the notion of an all-embracing Form. Plato is able to remind us that
this alternative is not open.
111.
Having arrived at the conclusion that the Living Creature is unique, we can
see that the Living Creature has a unique property that belongs to it in virtue of the
kind of Form it is. The property is the one of embracing all intelligible living creatures. This is a property that only one Form can have. Any Form that has this
property cannot be one of a pair.
After establishing this conclusion, Plato turns in the next sentence to what effect
this has on our world. Here we are to assume that our world is a copy of the Living
Creature, of course. This Form is unique because it embraces all intelligible living
creatures. Its copy will have the corresponding property in the perceptible world. So
our world will embrace all perceptible living creatures. Having this property, it is
unique. If there were any perceptible living creatures outside it, it would fail to be a
copy of the Living Creature just by lacking the perceptible counterpart to that
unique property of the Living C r e a t u r e - that very property in virtue of which the
Living Creature was chosen to be the exemplar for our world.
I can explicate this claim, perhaps, by giving an argument reminiscent of the argument given for the uniqueness of the Living Creature:
(1)

There are two worlds that embody as far as possible the properties of the
Living Creature, that is, each is a system of perceptible living creatures.

H I S T O R Y OF P H I L O S O P H Y
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)

Each is a system distinct from the other.

Each is a perceptible living creature.
Each fails to contain the other in its system.
Thus, each of these worlds is a bad copy of the Living Creature because it
fails to contain all the perceptible living creatures, that is, it fails to embody the unique characteristic of the Living Creatures.

IV.
1 now turn to some of the consequences of this interpretation. It will be
noted that step (la) of the argument for the uniqueness of the Form that embraces all
intelligible living creatures involves self-predication. Since the Form that embraces
all intelligible living creatures is called an intelligible living creature, the predicate
"intelligible living creature" is applied to the products o f the hypothetical doubling
of the original Form because it was applied to the original Form. There are a few
consequences of this instance of self-predication that need to be looked into. First is
the effect it has on Cornford's position that the Form that embraces all intelligible
living creatures is a genus of a special sort.'~ Second is Cherniss's interpretation of
the argument at 31a4-8, that is, the argument that the Model Form is unique. Cherniss maintains that this argument not only proves the uniqueness of the Form but actually contains an answer to the self-predication problems posed in the Parm e n i d e s . " So, if Cherniss is correct in his interpretation, not only does this argument not contain self-predication, it actually shows a way out of the problems posed
for Plato's theory of Forms by self-predication. I will deal with C o r n f o r d ' s interpretation of the Living Creature first.
Throughout this paper I have referred to the Form that embraces all intelligible
living creatures as a system of intelligible living creatures. The notion implicit in so
calling the Model Form is that it is the paradigmatic system that connects all its constituents in such a way that the system so connected can itself be called living. The
copy of this paradigm is a perceptible system of living creatures that itself can be
called living. Consequently, our world is something like an organic entity where the
constituents contribute to something that can be called the life of the whole. This
interpretation shows that Plato meant, in the Timaeus, to put forth a strongly teleological theory about our world. A living creature is a prime instance of teleology
since the parts function for the good of the whole as well as for their own good. The
best Platonic illustration of such an organic system is the city-soul of Books 2-4 of
the Republic.
Now this interpretation of the Model Form as a system of intelligible living creatures is incompatible with Cornford's interpretation of the Model Form as a genus-even a genus of a rich sort. In order to defend the interpretatiofi offered here, I wish
to show the incompatibility of Cornford's interpretation with the text. But first, let
us outline his interpretation:
The visible world, being "in very truth" a living creature with soul and body, has for its
original a complex Form, or system of Forms, called "the intelligible Living Creature." This is
,0 Ibid., p. 40; cf. Cornford, Plato's Theory of Knowledge (New York: The Liberal Arts Press, 1957),
pp. 268ff.
" Harold Cherniss, Aristotle's Criticism of Plato and the Academy (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press,
1944), pp. 295-97.

P L A T O ' S TIMA E U S

a generic Form containing within itself the Forms of all the subordinate species, members of
which inhabit the visible world. '2
Cornford is correct in saying that the Model Form is a complex, or system of
Forms. But he is not correct in saying that the relation of part to whole within the
complex is that of genus to species. Even if he changes, as he attempts to do, the
ordinary meaning of that relation, he cannot avoid difficulties. Here is his altered
version of the genus-species relation: " T h e generic Form must be conceived, not as a
bare abstraction obtained by leaving out all the specific differences determining the
subordinate species, but as a whole, richer in content than any of the parts it contains and embraces. '''~ Aside from whatever inherent conceptual difficulties such a
notion of genus has, it will not answer to Plato's notion of the Model Form. Even
the "richer in content" genus does not find itself instantiated as another animal embracing the instances of its species. But Plato's Model Form is instantiated as
another animal embracing all other perceptible living creatures. " F o r the god . : .
fashioned it [our world] as a single visible living creature, containing within itself all
living things whose nature is of the same o r d e r . ' " ' It should be noted that this argument does not depend on self-predication for the Form Living Creature, though it
does depend on calling our world a living creature.
Finally, we can turn to Cherniss's interpretation of the argument at 31a4-8. Cherhiss maintains that this argument is designed to defeat the third-man argument of the
Parmenides. It shows the uniqueness of the Model Form with regard to the property
F, of which the Model is the F o r m , that is, that the Model Form is F in a way no
other thing is. This move stops the third-man argument in its tracks because the
Model and copy are not F i n the same way and are not, therefore, similar with regard
to F. 'S Cherniss maintains that any Form is unique with regard to its property F
because it and only it is ho esti F. This means that it and only it is identical with F.
Thus Cherniss is maintaining the uniqueness of the Model Form on the basis of a
formal property since being ho esti F belongs to the Model Form in virtue of its being
a Form. '
Now if Plato were making such an agument here, he would be denying self-predication of the Form. The difference between saying some x (which is not the Form) is
F a n d saying the Form is F w o u l d be th.at the former is predication but the latter is an
identity statement. But in fact Plato is not making such an argument here, even if he
is in the tenth book of the Republic (597c). Cherniss's attempt to maintain the similarity between the argument at 31a4-8 in the Timaeus and the argument at 597c of
the Republic depends on whether in the Timaeus Plato is implicitly using as a part of
his argument the notion ho esti F. It can be seen that he is not.

'~ Plato's Cosmology, p. 40.

'J Ibid.
,4 Ibid.; 30dl-31al.
'5 Cherniss, p. 295.
" If Cherniss's interpretation is correct, then the uniqueness o f the Form Z 6on is a formal and not a
material property. Thus, in arguing for the uniqueness of our world on the basis of the uniqueness of its
Model, Plato would be guilty of the charge leveled by Keyt. Cherniss's interpretation, then, has the immediate disadvantage that it commits Plato to this fallacy. But there are other disadvantages, as we shall see
in the sequel.

HISTORY OF P H I L O S O P H Y
First, let us see Cherniss's interpretation of the argument at 31a4-8 in the
Timaeus:
In the Timaeus he contends that two (or more ) ideas of ~t~v would necessarily imply a third
which would "include" them and these two would then not be the ideas of ~t~v at all; in the
language of the Republic they would have the idea but would not be 6/~oxt ~ o v . '~
In interpreting the argument in this way, Cherniss does not say why there is a need
for a third Form. But what he says about the pair of Forms gives us a clue. Both of
the pair of Forms have a common characteristic-z6on, being living creatures.
Moreover, their being a pair of Forms sharing a common characteristic implies that
neither can be identical with the Form corresponding to that characteristic. Therefore, to this common characteristic there must correspond a third Form, the Form
ZCJon, in virtue of which they have the characteristic. It is from this Form that our
world is copied because it, and not the original pair, is the Form that is identical with
the characteristic zt~on.
In this interpretation Cherniss is attributing to Plato the following assumptions:
(A) the pair of Forms are each living creatures. To this assumption we have already
agreed; it is equivalent to (la) of the interpretation offered in this paper. (B) when
there are two or more Forms with a common characteristic, there must be a third
Form, corresponding to that characteristic, in which they participate. Presumably,
this is a version of the principle from Book 10 of the Republic, adapted for Forms
(596a). (C) when two or more Forms share a characteristic, neither can be that
characteristic. From this and (A) and (B) it follows that (C') the two intelligible living
creatures that embrace all intelligible living creatures are not the Form Zt~on because
they share that characteristic, instead of being it. Finally, from (1)--the hypothesis
that the Form that embraces all living creatures is one of a pair--and (A), (B), (C),
and (C'), one can conclude (2') that there must be a third Form, the Form Z6on, in
which the pair participate. But these do not lead to Plato's conclusion that (2) " t h e r e
would have to be yet another Living Creature embracing these two, and they would
be parts o f it.'" ,a Even if Cherniss has shown that the two living creatures participate
in the Form Zt~on, he has not shown that they are parts of Zi~on. The relation of participating is different from the relation of being contained. Plato would never have
said that all the beautiful things are embraced by and are parts of the beautiful itself,
for example.
Of course, one might counter that when a species Form is said to participate in a
genus Form the relation can be easily characterized as one on which the genus Form
contains the species Form.'9 Consequently, if one is dealing with a genus Form and a
species Form in this passage, there would be room for maintaining that (1), (A), (B),
(C), and (C') prove ( 2 ) - a s long as we added a further premise (to be called (D))
equating the relations of "participating" and "being contained" among genus and
species Forms. First of all, such an interpretation is more complex than the one
being urged in this paper. Second, the key assumptions (C) and (D) are not from the
immediate text the way (la), (lb), and (2a) are. Finally, I have already pointed out
" Cherniss, p. 296; notice the author's use of quotation marks around "include."
" Cornford, Plato's Cosmology, pp. 41--42 (emphasis added).
" Cornford, Plato's Theory of Knowledge, p. 269.

PLATO'S TIMAEUS

the difficulty for maintaining that the Living Creature and the intelligible living creatures are related as genus and species.
Finally, Cherniss, in his attempt to make it an answer to the Parmenides, misses
the thrust of Plato's argument. Under his interpretation the reason our world cannot
be a copy of either of the pair is that neither is the Form ZOon. But it is clear from the
way in which Plato introduces this Form that the important respect in which the
Form is to be the paradigm for our world is that it contains all intelligible living creatures. By having this characteristic, it can be a paradigm for a world that will contain
all perceptible living creatures. That this Form is also a living creature is just a
further way of characterizing it. If Cherniss had seen this point, he should have
argued that the Form Z6on is also uniquely that which embraces all intelligible living
creatures, that is, is ho esti that which embraces all intelligible living creatures.
However, if Cherniss had argued that way, he would have been forced to maintain
that the Form Zaon and our world are not similar in respect of the property of embracing living c r e a t u r e s - o n e at the level of Forms, the other at the perceptible level.
The Form ZOon might be the embracingness o f living creatures. But this item does
not contain all intelligible living creatures. According to Cherniss, to be the property
is not to have the property. One cannot maintain that the property instantiates itself
in some Pickwickian way without giving up the distinction between being and having
the property.
However, if they were not similar in thisrespect, the Form Z6on could not be a
paradigm for our world. But it was as containing intelligible living creatures that the
Form ZOon was to be the paradigm for our world, which was, in turn, to contain all
perceptible living creatures. The whole point of the F o r m is to serve as a paradigm
for embracing living creatures:
Let us rather say that the world is like, above all things, to that Living Creature of which all
other living creatures, severally and in their families, are parts. For that embraces and contains
within itself all the intelligible living creatures, just as this world contains ourselves and all
other creatures that have been formed as things visible.2~
The parallel in the last sentence will not sustain the Cherniss interpretation. One cannot say that the Form ZOon is the embracingness of all intelligible living creatures
just as (kathaper) this world contains all perceptible living creatures. No more can
one say that the author of Waverly is Sir Walter Scott just as the author of Gone
With the Wind is Georgian.
V.
There emerges from this reading a notion of Form that is different from that
in the other dialogues. As I have pointed out, the intelligible Living Creature that
comprehends the four lower orders of intelligible living creatures is the paradigm o f a
self-contained organic system. The intelligible Living Creature contains entities that
are so related that the whole is itself an intelligible Living Creature, and the only
intelligible Living Creature of its magnitude of comprehension. This contrasts with
the notion of a Form as a genus in some important ways, of course; I can point out
some of them by way of a conclusion. First, the most important difference is that
between the kinds of internal relations of the two types of Form. A genus m a y show
2oCornford, Plato's Cosmology, p. 40; 30c7-dl (emphasis added). "For" is the translation of gar;
"just as," for kathaper.

10

HISTORY OF P H I L O S O P H Y

the differential relations among its species or the similarities among its members; but
it does not show how the species or members are related so as to form another living
being. Of course, Plato does not give any details about how the constituent living
creatures form another Living Creature; he merely says that they do.
There is a close relation between the Living Creature's being this kind of Form
and its being a model for our world. We can begin to see this close relation by first
taking a cursory look at Plato's notion of the craftsman in the Gorgias. All
craftsmen are said to seek to bring order and harmony into their work (503el504a5). This order seems to be a mental paradigm or an envisioned goal. It is
obviously motivating. This order is also the excellence (arete) of each object (506el507al) and makes it good. The good Plato talks about in the examples is a functional
o n e - t h e good of a house or the good of a ship (504a7-b5). The craftsman, however,
is drawn not so much by the function of the objects as by their order and harmony.
Not only is it explicitly said that the craftsman seeks to bring these qualities into existence; but the language used in this passage shows the attitude toward order that
Plato is attributing to the craftsman. The multiplication o f words and phrases for
order, coupled with the address to Callicles on the value of order (507e6-508a8),
shows something approaching enthusiasm.
In the light of these passages, we can understand the Demiurge's using a paradigm
of systemic and self-contained order. This paradigm would not be just a blueprint
for the perceptible world nor just a chart of its generic relations; it would be a model
that displayed the order by which the product would have its functional goodness. It
would thereby motivate a craftsman such as the Demiurge (30a5-6), who greatly
prefers order. It would be an embodiment in the intelligible world of the goal he
seeks to instantiate in the perceptible world. Of course, the order cannot be perfectly
instantiated; Plato always reminds us of this. But then all the more reason to have an
ideal for the Demiurge to seek to instantiate.
However, such a model provides not only motivation; it is also, in a stronger
sense, a determining factor for the Demiurge, who wishes his product to be the best.
The Demiurge must use the best possible model (29a2-6); and one of the qualities
that makes the Model Form best is that it is the most complete (30dl-31al). But it
must be remarked in what way this makes the Model Form the best. Completeness
does not qualify the Model Form as model--as, for example, ease of use or durability in testing would an earthly model for an oil tanker. Nor does it qualify only the
copy that is fashioned on the best model. While completeness is a goodmaking
quality that the copy will have in its way, the argument shows that completeness is a
goodmaking quality not just in the perceptible world but in the ideal world as well.
More specifically, a Form that is complete is better than one that is not; and it is
better intrinsically, not just as a model for something else. In using the best Form,
that is, the complete Form, as a model one is then transferring what is best in the
intelligible world to the perceptible world, mutatis mutandis. So seeing what is best
in the intelligible world tells one, as it were, what is best for the perceptible world to
attempt to embody.
These are some o f the ways, then, in which a craftsman's model differs from the
epistemologist's genus. If we take seriously the former role of the intelligible Living
Creature and do not mix it with the ~atter, the Demiurge does not seem mad at all.

Agnes Scott College