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Crammers Case Digests: SOCIAL LEGISLATION & AGRARIAN REFORM

Luz Farms, petitioner,

versus
The
Honorable
Secretary
Department
Of
Reform, respondent.

Of
The
Agrarian

[G.R. No. 86889. December 4, 1990.]

Facts:
This is a petition for prohibition with prayer
for restraining order and/or preliminary and
permanent injunction against the Honorable
Secretary of the Department of Agrarian
Reform.

On June 10, 1988, the President of the

Philippines approved R.A. No. 6657,
which includes the raising of livestock,
poultry and swine in its coverage.
On January 2, 1989, the Secretary of
Agrarian
Reform
promulgated
the
Guidelines and Procedures Implementing
Production
and
Profit
Sharing
as
embodied in Sections 13 and 32 of R.A.
No. 6657
On January 9, 1989, the Secretary of
Agrarian Reform promulgated its Rules
and Regulations implementing Section 11
of R.A. No. 6657
Luz Farms is a corporation engaged in
the livestock and poultry business and
together with others in the same
business allegedly stands to be adversely
affected by the enforcement of Section
3(b), Section 11, Section 13, Section
16(d) and 17 and Section 32 of R.A. No.
6657.
Hence,
this
petition
praying
that
aforesaid laws, guidelines and rules be
declared unconstitutional. Meanwhile, it
is also prayed that a writ of preliminary
injunction or restraining order be issued
enjoining
public
respondents
from
enforcing the same, insofar as they are
made to apply to Luz Farms and other
livestock and poultry raisers.

Issue: Whether the inclusion of lands

devoted to raising livestock, poultry and
swine within the term agriculture as used
in R.A. No. 6657 constitutional.

Held:
Supreme
Court:
PREMISES
CONSIDERED, the instant petition is hereby
GRANTED. Sections 3(b), 11, 13 and 32 of
R.A. No. 6657 insofar as the inclusion of the
raising of livestock, poultry and swine in its
coverage as well as the Implementing Rules
and Guidelines promulgated in accordance
therewith, are hereby DECLARED null and
void for being unconstitutional and the writ of
preliminary injunction issued is hereby MADE
permanent.
Ratio Decidendi:
The transcripts of the
deliberations
of
the
Constitutional
Commission of 1986 on the meaning of the
word "agricultural," clearly show that it was
never the intention of the framers of the
Constitution to include livestock and poultry
industry
in
the
coverage
of
the
constitutionally-mandated agrarian reform
program of the Government.
Separate Opinion concurring (Justice
Sarmiento):
There is merit in the contention of
the petitioner that substantial distinctions
exist between land directed purely to
cultivation and harvesting of fruits or crops
and land exclusively used for livestock,
poultry and swine raising, that make real
differences, to wit:
No land is tilled and no crop is
harvested in livestock and poultry
farming. There are no tenants nor
landlords, only employers and
employees. Livestock and poultry
do not sprout from land nor are
they "fruits of the land." Land is not
even a primary resource in this
industry.
The
land
input
is
inconsequential
that
all
the
commercial hog and poultry farms
combined occupy less than one
percent (1%) (0.4% for piggery,
0.2% for poultry) of the 5.45 million
hectares
of
land
supposedly
covered by the CARP. And most
farms utilize only 2 to 5 hectares of
land. In every respect livestock and
poultry production is an industrial
activity.
Its
use
of
an
inconsequential portion of land is a
mere incident of its operation, as in
any other undertaking, business or
otherwise. The fallacy of defining
livestock and poultry production as
an
agricultural
enterprise
is
nowhere more evident when one
considers that at least 95% of total
investment in these farms is in the

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Crammers Case Digests: SOCIAL LEGISLATION & AGRARIAN REFORM
form of fixed assets which are
industrial in nature. These include
(1) animal housing structures and
facilities complete with drainage,
waterers, blowers, misters and in
some cases even piped-in music;
(2)
feedmills
complete
with
grinders,
mixers,
conveyors,
exhausts, generators, etc.; (3)
extensive warehousing facilities for
feeds and other supplies; (4) antipollution equipment such as biogas and digester plants augmented
by lagoons and concrete ponds; (5)
deepwells, elevated water tanks,
pumphouses
and
accessory
facilities; (6) modern equipment
such
as
sprayers,
pregnancy
testers,
etc.;
(7)
laboratory
facilities complete with expensive
tools and equipment; and a myriad
other
such
technologically
advanced appurtances. How then
can livestock and poultry farmlands
be arable when such are almost
totally
occupied
by
these
structures? The fallacy of equating
the status of livestock and poultry
farmworkers
with
that
of
agricultural tenants surfaces when
one considers contribution to
output. Labor cost of livestock and
poultry farms is no more than 4%
of total operating cost. The 98%
balance represents inputs not
obtained from the land nor
provided by the farmworkers
inputs
such
as
feeds
and
biochemicals (80% of the total
cost), power cost, cost of money
and several others. Moreover,
livestock and poultry farmworkers
are covered by minimum wage law
rather than by tenancy law. They
are entitled to social security
benefits where tenant-farmers are
not. They are paid fixed wages
rather than crop shares. And as in
any other industry, they receive
additional
benefits
such
as
allowances, bonuses, and other
incentives such as free housing
privileges,
light
and
water.
Equating livestock and poultry
farming with other agricultural
activities is also fallacious in the
sense that like the manufacturing
sector, it is a market for, rather
than a source of agricultural
output. At least 60% of the entire
domestic
supply
of
corn
is

absorbed by livestock and poultry

farms. So are the by-products of
rice (rice-bran), coconut (copra
meal), banana (banana pulp meal),
and fish (fish meal).
In view of the foregoing, it is clear that
both kinds of lands are not similarly situated
and hence, cannot be treated alike.
Therefore, the assailed provisions which
allow for the inclusion of livestock and
poultry industry within the coverage of the
agrarian reform program constitute invalid
classification and must accordingly be struck
down as repugnant to the equal protection
clause of the Constitution.

Sharp International Marketing, petitioner

versus.
Hon. Court Of Appeals (14th Division),
Land Bank Of The Philippines And
Deogracias Vistan, respondents
[G.R. No. 93661 September 4, 1991]

Facts: This case involves the aborted sale of

the Garchitorena estate to the Government in
connection with the CARP.

The subject-matter of the proposed sale

is a vast estate consisting of eight
parcels
of
land
situated
in
the
municipality
of
Garchitorena
in
Camarines Norte covering an area of
1,88.819 hectares. On April 27,1988,
UCPB entered into a Contract to Sell the
property to Sharp International Marketing
(Sharp), with the agreement that it be
converted to a Deed of Absolute Sale
(DAS) upon payment of the full price of P
3,183,333.33. Even before it had
acquired the land, the petitioner, through
its President Alex Lina, offered to sell the
same to the Government for P
56,000,000.00 which was later increased
to P 65,000,000.00
On December 1, 1988 a Deed of Absolute
Sale was executed between UCPB and
Sharp, where the former sold the estate
to
the
latter
for
the
stipulated
consideration of P 3,183,333.33. When
the property was registered in the name
of the petitioner, DAR Secretary Juico,
issued an order directing the acquisition
of the estate for the recommended

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Crammers Case Digests: SOCIAL LEGISLATION & AGRARIAN REFORM

amount and requiring LBP to pay the

same to Sharp, 30% in cash and the
balance
in
government
financial
instruments negotiable within 30 days
from
issuance
by
Sharp
of
the
corresponding muniments of title.
When the DAS was signed, LBP received
a copy of the order issued by Secretary
Juico. LBP president Vistan, taking into
account the reservations and discovery
that Sharp had acquired the property for
only P 3.1M and requesting the Secretary
to reconsider his order.
On April 18, 1989 Sharp filed a petition
for mandamus with the court ot compel
DAR and LBP to comply with the contract,
prompting Juico to issue an order for reappraisal and re-evaluation of the subject
property.
On appeal, The CA dismissed the petition
stating that mandamus is not available to
control discretion. Moreover, the sale was
null and void ab initio because it violated
section 6 of RA 6657, which was in force
at the time the transaction was entered
into.

Association of Small Landowners,

petitioner
versus
Secretary of Department of Agrarian
Reform, respondent
[Consolidated Cases G.R. No. 78742, G.R.
No. 79310 & G.R. No. 79744 July 14, 1989]
Facts:
These are consolidated cases involving
common legal questions including serious
challenges to the constitutionality of R.A. No.
6657 also known as the "Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law of 1988"

Issue: Whether the CA erred in holding that

petitioner is not entitled to writ of
mandamus.
Held: Yes. The act required of the LBP
President is not merely ministerial but
involves a high degree of discretion. Sec. 6 of
E.O 229 stresses that even if already
approved and signed by the DAR Secretary, it
will still be transmitted to the LBP for its
review, evaluation and approval. Respondent
cannot be compelled by a writ of mandamus
to discharge duty that involves the exercise
of judgment and discretion, especially where
disbursement of public funds is concerned.
In RA 6657 with respect to the indispensable
role of LBP in the determination of the
amount to be compensated to the land
owner. Under section 8 thereof, "the LBP shall
compensate the landowner in such amount
as may be agreed upon by the landowner
and the DAR and LBP, in accordance with the
criteria provided, or may be finally
determined by the court, as the just
compensation for the land."

In G.R. No. 79777, the petitioners are

questioning the P.D No. 27 and E.O Nos.
228 and 229 on the grounds inter alia of
separation of powers, due process, equal
protection
and
the
constitutional
limitation that no private property shall
be taken for public use without just
compensation.
In G.R. No. 79310, the petitioners in this
case claim that the power to provide for
a
Comprehensive
Agrarian
Reform
Program as decreed by the Constitution
belongs to the Congress and not to the
President,
they
also
allege
that
Proclamation No. 131 and E.O No. 229
should be annulled for violation of the
constitutional
provisions
on
just
compensation, due process and equal
protection. They contended that the
taking must be simultaneous with
payment of just compensation which
such payment is not contemplated in
Section 5 of the E.O No. 229.
In G.R. No. 79744, the petitioner argues
that E.O Nos. 228 and 229 were invalidly
issued by the President and that the said
executive
orders
violate the
constitutional provision that no private
property shall be taken without due
process or just compensation which was
denied to the petitioners.
In G.R. No 78742 the petitioners claim
that they cannot eject their tenants and
so are unable to enjoy their right
of retention because the Department of
Agrarian Reform has so far not issued the
implementing rules of the decree. They
therefore ask the Honorable Court for a
writ of mandamus to compel the
respondents to issue the said rules.

Issue/s:
1. Whether the assailed statutes are
valid exercises of police power.

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Crammers Case Digests: SOCIAL LEGISLATION & AGRARIAN REFORM
2. Whether the content and manner of
just compensation provided for the
CARP is violative of the Constitution.
3. Whether the CARP and EO 228
contravene a well accepted principle
of eminent domain by divesting the
land owner of his property even
before actual payment to him in full
of just compensation
Held:
1. Yes. The subject and purpose of agrarian
reform have been laid down by the
Constitution itself, which satisfies the
first requirement of the lawful subject.
However, objection is raised to the
manner fixing the just compensation,
which
it
is
claimed
is
judicial
prerogatives. However, there is no
arbitrariness in the provision as the
determination of just compensation by
DAR is only preliminary unless accepted
by all parties concerned. Otherwise, the
courts will still have the right to review
with finality the said determination.
2. No. Although the traditional medium for
payment of just compensation is money
and no other, what is being dealt with
here is not the traditional exercise of the
power and eminent domain. This is a
revolutionary kind of expropriation, which
involves not mere millions of pesos. The
initially intended amount of P50B may
not be enough, and is in fact not even
fully available at the time. The
invalidation of the said section resulted in
the nullification of the entire program.
3. No. EO 228 categorically stated that all
qualified farmer-beneficiaries were
deemed full owners of the land they
acquired under PP 27, after proof of full
payment of just compensation. The CARP
Law, for its part, conditions the transfer
of possession and ownership of the land
to the government on the receipt by the
landowner of the corresponding payment
or the deposit of DAR of the
compensation in cash or LBP bonds with
an accessible bank. Until then, title also
remains with the landowner.

Salvador Pejo, As Regional Director,

Ministry Of Agrarian Reform, And Juana S.
Vda. De Paitan, respondents.
[G.R. No. 60269. September 13, 1991]

Facts: Petitioner challenges in this petition

for prohibition with prayer for restraining
order the validity and constitutionality of
Letter of Instructions No. 474 and
Memorandum Circular No. 11, Series of
1978 and likewise seeks the cancellation of
Certificate of Land Transfer No. 0046145
issued to Domingo Paitan by the deposed
President Ferdinand Marcos.

Petitioner Magana is the owner of a

parcel of riceland situated in the barrio
of Talisay, Camarines Norte. The said
riceland was tenanted by the late
Domingo Paitan, husband of private
respondent herein, Juana Vda. de
Paitan, under an agricultural leasehold
agreement.

On October 20, 1977, Magana filed a

petition for the termination of the
leasehold agreement allegedly due to
(1) non-payment of rentals; (2) inability
and failure of Domingo Paitan to do the
tilling and cultivation of the riceland
due to his long illness; and (3)
subleasing of the land holding to third
parties.

On June 2, 1978, the former Presiding

Judge of the Court of Agrarian
Relations, Judge Juan Llaguno, referred
the case to the Secretary of the
Department of Agrarian Reform for
certification as to whether or not it was
proper for trial in accordance with
Presidential Decree No. 316, but said
office failed to act upon the request for
certification, for a period of more than
three (3) years.

On July 10, 1980, the riceland was

instead placed under the Land Transfer

Engracia Vinzons-Magana, petitioner,

Versus
Honorable Conrado Estrella In His
Capacity As Minister Of Agrarian Reform,

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Crammers Case Digests: SOCIAL LEGISLATION & AGRARIAN REFORM
Program by virtue of Memorandum
Circular No. 11, Series of 1978, which
implemented Letter of Instructions No.
474, which placed all tenanted
ricelands with areas of 7 hectares or
less belonging to landowners who own
agricultural lands of more than 7
hectares in aggregate areas under the
Land
Transfer
Program
of
the
government.

The prescribed procedures therein

were subsequently undertaken and
thereafter, on July 10, 1980, a
certificate of Land Transfer was finally
awarded in favor of Domingo Paitan. As
a consequence thereof, the rentals
were no longer paid to Magana but
were deposited instead with the Land
Bank and credited as amortization
payments for the riceland. Apparently
aggrieved by this turn of events,
Magana took the present recourse.

dated November 29, 1976 and has therefore

complied with the publication requirement.
As to the constitutionality of DAR Memo
Circular No. 11, it is evident that DAR Memo
Circular No. 11 merely implements LOI 474
whose constitutionality has already been
established, clarifying for DAR personnel the
guidelines set for under said LOI 474.
Moreover, it is an elementary rule in
administrative
law
that
administrative
regulations
and
policies
enacted
by
administrative bodies to interpret the law
which they are entrusted to enforce, have
the force of law and are entitled to great
respect.
2. No. The issuance of Certificate of Land
Transfer to Domingo Paitan without first
expropriating said property to pay petitioner
landowner the full market value thereof
before ceding and transferring the land to
Paitan and or heirs, is invalid and
unconstitutional as it is confiscatory and
violates the due process clause of the
Constitution.

Issue/s:
1.

2.

Whether the said Letter of Instructions

and
Memorandum
Circular
are
unconstitutional.
Whether the Certificate of Land
Transfer issued to Domingo Paitan is
valid.

Natalia Realty Inc,, petitioner

versus
Department
respondent
[G.R. No. 103302

Held: 1. No, the petition is bereft of merit.

This Court also upheld the validity and
constitutionality of Letter of Instructions No.
474 which directed then Secretary of
Agrarian
Reform
Conrado
Estrella
to
"undertake to place under the Land Transfer
Program of the government pursuant to
Presidential Decree No. 27, all tenanted
rice/corn lands with areas of seven hectares
or less belonging to landowners who own
other agricultural lands of more than seven
hectares in aggregate areas or lands used for
residential, commercial, industrial or other
urban purposes from which they derive
adequate income to support themselves and
their families". It was held that LOI 474 is
neither a class legislation nor does it deprive
a person of property without due process of
law or just compensation. Moreover, LOI 474
was duly published in the Official Gazette

of

Agrarian

Reform,

17 August 1993]

Facts:

Natalia Realty Inc. (NATALIA) is the owner

of a 125-hectare land in Antipolo, Rizal.

On
April
18,
1979,
Presidential
Proclamation No. 1637 set aside 20,312
hectares of land located in Antipolo, San
Mateo and Montalban as townsite areas
to absorb the population overspill within
the areas proclaimed as townsite
reservation.

Private landowners were allowed to

develop their properties into low-cost

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Crammers Case Digests: SOCIAL LEGISLATION & AGRARIAN REFORM
housing
subdivisions
reservation.

within

the

The Human Settlements Regulatory

Commission (now Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board) granted NATALIA the
necessary permit to develop the land into
a subdivision.
When the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Law took effect on 15 June 1988,
the Department of Agrarian Reform
issued a Notice of Coverage on the
underdeveloped
portions
of
the
subdivision.
NATALIA sought the cancellation of the
Notice of Coverage on the ground that
the land in question ceased to be
agricultural lands when Presidential
Proclamation No. 1637 transformed it
into a townsite reservation.

versus
The Honorable Court Of Appeals,
Credito Asiatic, Inc., et al, respondents.
[Consolidated Cases G.R. No. 142359 & G.R.
No. 142980. May 25, 2004]

Facts: This is a petition for certiorari.

Issue: Whether the underdeveloped portions

of the NATALIA properties are covered by the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law.

Held: The underdeveloped portions of the

NATALIA properties are not covered by the
Comprehensive
Agrarian
Reform
Law
because they are not agricultural lands.
Agricultural lands do not include commercial,
industrial or residential lands. The NATALIA
properties ceased to be agricultural lands
upon approval of their inclusion in the
townsite reservation.

Pasong Bayabas Farmers Association,

Inc.,

petitioners,

Lakeview
Development
Corporation
(LDC) bought a parcel of land, issued it in
the name of its successor, the Credito
Asiatic, Inc. (CAI) and subsequently
subdivided it into two parcels.
LDC/CAI undertook to develop its 75hectare property into a residential and
industrial estate
CAI embarked on the development of the
housing project into 3 phases and
secured a locational clearance for the
project from the Human Settlements
Regulatory Commission (HSRC)
CAI decided to continue with the
development of its Hakone Housing
Project but the project was stymied by a
Complaint for Damages with Prayer for
Temporary
Restraining
Order
and
Preliminary Injunction
The plaintiffs alleged that they had
reached an agreements with the
respondent that they would remain in
peaceful possession of their farmholdings
but notwithstanding such, the defendant
ordered the bulldozing of the property
In answer to the complaint, CAI denied
that it allowed the plaintiffs to possess
and cultivate the landholding with fixed
rentals
Meanwhile, CAI and 6 of the 14 plaintiffs
entered into a compromise agreement
which eventually led to all of the
other plaintiffs
entering
into
an
agreement with CAI
CAI was stymied anew when a Petition for
Compulsory Coverage under Rep. Act No.
6657,
otherwise
known
as
the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law
(CARL) was filed before the DAR by
seventeen (17) individuals who alleged
that they are farmers who have occupied
a parcel of public agricultural land
adjacent to Pasong Bayabas River
According to the petitioners, the said
illegal bulldozing activities would convert

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Crammers Case Digests: SOCIAL LEGISLATION & AGRARIAN REFORM
the land from agricultural to nonagricultural land, thereby depriving the
members of the PBFAI of their tenancy
rights over the property. For this reason,
the petitioners prayed that a temporary
restraining order be issued ex-parte to
stop the bulldozing of the property, and
that a preliminary injunction or a status
quo order be later issued to enjoin the
same.
Issue/s:
1. Whether the property subject of the
suit is covered by RA No. 6657, the
Agrarian Reform Law (CARL)
2. Whether the DARAB had original and
appellate
jurisdiction
over the
complaint of the petitioner PBFAI
against the private respondent;
3. Whether the petitioners-members of
the PBFAI have a cause of action
against the private respondent for
possession and cultivation of the
property in suit;
4. Whether the dismissal by the RTC of
the complaint in Civil Case No. BCV87-13 is a bar to the complaint of the
petitioners-members of the PBFAI;
and
5. Whether
the
appellate
court
committed a reversible error in
dismissing the petition for review
in CA-G.R. SP No. 49363.
Held:
1.
2.

3.

4.

5.

The contention of the petitioners

has no merit.
Rep. Act No. 6657 took effect only on
June 15, 1988. But long before the
law took effect, the property subject
of the suit had already been
reclassified and converted from
agricultural to non-agricultural or
residential land.
With our finding that the property
subject of the suit was classified as
residential land since 1976, the
DARAB had no original and appellate
jurisdiction over the property subject
of the action of the petitioner PBFAI
and its members.
Since the members of the petitioner
PBFAI were not the tenants of the
private respondent CAI, the
petitioners and its members had no
cause of action against the private
respondent for possession of the
landholding to maintain possession
thereof and for damages.
When the complaint was filed,
twenty-five (25) of the thirty seven

(37) members of the petitioners had

already executed separate deeds of
quitclaim in favor of the private
respondent CAI over the portions of
the landholding they respectively
claimed, after receiving from the
private respondent CAI varied sums
of money. In executing the said
deeds, the members of the petitioner
PBFAI thereby waived their respective
claims over the property. Hence, they
have no right whatsoever to still
remain in possession of the same.
Petition denied.

Jose, Julio and Federico, All Surnamed

Junio, petitioners,
versus
Ernesto D. Garilao, in His Capacity as
Secretary
of
Agrarian
Reform, respondent.
[G.R. No. 147146. July 29, 2005]

Facts: This is a petition for review under Rule

45 of Rules of Court.

In a Complaint dated February 12, 1994,

filed with the Department of Agrarian
Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) by
complainants (some of whom are herein
petitioners), identified as Potential CARP
Beneficiaries per Certification of OIC
[Municipal
Agrarian
Reform
Officer
(MARO)] dated November 21, 1991. It is
prayed that a writ of preliminary
injunction
be
issued
against
the
registered owners of a certain parcel of
agricultural land consisting of 71
hectares, more or less, known as Lot No.
835-B of Bacolod Cadastre, Brgy.
Pahanocoy, Bacolod City, covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-79622.

Petitioners claim that Sta. Lucia Realty

Corporation and the Estate of Guillermo
Villasor, represented by Irving Villasor,
are bulldozing and leveling the subject
property for the purpose of converting it

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Crammers Case Digests: SOCIAL LEGISLATION & AGRARIAN REFORM
into a residential subdivision; that as
prospective CARP beneficiaries of the
land in question, being former laborers,
actual
occupants
and
permanent
residents of Barangay Pahanocoy, their
rights will be prejudiced by the illegal
conversion of the land into a residential
subdivision.

On April 13, 1994, the DARAB OIC

Executive
Director
forwarded
the
complaint to [Provincial Agrarian Reform
Adjudicator (PARAD)], DAR, Region VI,
Bacolod City for appropriate action.
Before any hearing could be conducted
thereon, the Secretary of the Department
of Agrarian Reform issued an Order dated
September 13, 1994 in RE: PETITION FOR
EXEMPTION FROM CARP COVERAGE
PURSUANT TO DOJ OPINION NO. 44,
SERIES OF 1990, IRVING P. VILLASOR, et
al., Rep. by Atty. Angel Lobaton,

Jr., Petitioners, portions of which read as

follows:
After a careful study of the facts of
the
case
and
the
evidences
presented by the parties, this Office
finds the petition for exemption to be
well founded. Under DOJ Opinion No.
44, Series of 1990, it provides that
lands which has already been
classified
as
mineral,
forest,
residential, commercial and industrial
areas, prior to June 15, 1988 shall be
excluded from CARP coverage. To
this, it is an inescapable conclusion
that the subject property is exempted
from CARP coverage considering the
fact that the same was classified as
residential as evidenced by the
Resolution No. 5153-A, Series of 1976
of the City Council of Bacolod and as
approved by the Human Settlements
Regulatory Commission (now HLURB)
in its Resolution dated September 24,
1980 as per Certification dated June
22, 1994 issued by the said
Commission. The Certification of the
National Irrigation Administration
(NIA) dated June 9, 1994 stated that
the subject land is not irrigable or is

outside the service area of the

irrigation system in the locality. In
effect the said application had
conformed to the requirements of the
law on exemption. In accord thereto,
the stand of Mr. Espanola that the
portion, which he planted to trees
and
developed
into
mini-forest
should be covered by CARP, is
beyond recognition as the program
does not apply to those which are
already classified as residential lands
prior to the effectivity of CARL on
June 15, 1988. Instead, it is confined
only to agricultural lands, which
under R.A. 6657, Sec. 3(c), it defines
agricultural lands as lands devoted to
agricultural activity as defined in this
Act and not classified as mineral,
forest, residential or industrial land.
With the above stated definition, it is
beyond reason that the placing of the
said portion under CARP coverage
(1.5 hectare) is devoid of legal and
factual basis.
The Court of Appeals sustained the
Exemption
Order
issued
by
public
respondent. It found that prior to June 15,
1988, Lot 835-B had been reclassified from
agricultural to residential land. It relied on
the Courts pronouncement in Natalia Realty
v. Department of Agrarian Reform that lands
were outside the coverage of the CARL if
they had been converted to non-agricultural
uses by government agencies, other than the
DAR, prior to the effectivity of that law.
Further, the CA ruled that neither the
CARL nor the Local Government Code of
1991 had nullified the reclassification of Lot
835-B. The appellate court noted that the
land had been validly reclassified from
agricultural to residential in 1976, prior to the
effective date of both laws. It added that
neither of those two laws could be applied
retroactively, since they contained no
provision authorizing their retroactivity

Issue: Whether the subject landholding has

been reclassified as residential land.

Compiled by: Georgia Dawn C. Gacus

SocLeg | 9
Crammers Case Digests: SOCIAL LEGISLATION & AGRARIAN REFORM
Held: Yes. The subject landholding was in
fact reclassified as residential before June 15,
1988, the date of effectivity of the CARL. The
Exemption Order of the DAR secretary
pointed out that the parcel had indeed been
reclassified as residential under Resolution
No. 5153-A of the City Council of Bacolod.
This reclassification was later affirmed by the
HSRC. The courts generally accord great
respect, if not finality, to factual findings of
administrative agencies because of their
special knowledge and expertise over
matters falling under their jurisdiction. It
must be stressed at this point that with the
DAR lies the power to determine whether Lot
835-B is non-agricultural and, hence, exempt
from the coverage of the CARL.
There is no law or jurisprudence that
holds that the land classification embodied in
the tax declarations are conclusive and final
nor would proscribe any further inquiry.
Furthermore, the tax declarations are clearly
not the sole basis of the classification of a
land. In fact, DAR Administrative Order No. 6
lists other documents, aside from tax
declarations, that must be submitted when
applying for exemption from CARP. In Halili v.
Court of Appeals, we sustained the trial court
when it ruled that the classification made by
the Land Regulatory Board of the land in
question outweighed the classification stated
in the tax declaration.

Celso
Pagtalunan
&
Paulina
P.
Pagtalunan, petitioners,
versus
Hon. Roque A. Tamayo, Presiding Judge of
the CFI of Bulacan, Branch VI, REPUBLIC OF
THE PHILIPPINES and Turandot, Traviata,
Marcelita, Marlene Pacita, Matthew And
Rosary,
All
Surnamed
Aldaba,
respondents.
[G.R. No. L-54281 March 19, 1990]
Facts:

On January 17, 1978, respondent

Republic of the Philippines filed a
complaint with the Court of First
Instance of Bulacan for expropriation
of a parcel of land located in Bo.
Tikay, Malolos, Bulacan, and owned
by private respondents herein as
evidenced by TCT No. 24006, issued
by the Register of Deeds of the
province of Bulacan.

On March 2, 1978, the Court of First

Instance issued a writ of possession
placing the Republic in possession of
the land, upon its deposit of the
amount of Php7,200.00 as provisional
value of the land.

On June 8, 1978, petitioners herein

filed a supplemental motion for leave
to intervene, with complaint in
intervention
attached
thereto,
alleging
that
petitioner
Celso
Pagtalunan
has
been
the bona
fide agricultural tenant of a portion of
the land. Petitioners asked the trial
court to order payment to Celso
Pagtalunan of just compensation for
his landholding or, in the alternative,
to order payment of his disturbance
compensation as bona fide tenant in
an amount not less than Fifteen
Thousand Pesos (P15,000.00) per
hectare.

On December 8, 1978, respondent

Judge Roque A. Tamayo issued an
order
denying
the
petitioners'

Consequently, even if the subject

landholding has been declared as agricultural
for taxation purposes, once a local
government has reclassified it as residential,
that determination must prevail for zoning
purposes.

Compiled by: Georgia Dawn C. Gacus

SocLeg | 10
Crammers Case Digests: SOCIAL LEGISLATION & AGRARIAN REFORM
supplemental motion, holding that to
admit
petitioners'
complaint
in
intervention would be tantamount to
allowing a person to sue the State
without its consent since the claim
for disturbance compensation is a
claim against the State.

On December 22, 1978, the Office of

the Solicitor General filed in behalf of
the Republic of the Philippines a
notice of appeal, as well as a first
motion for extension of thirty (30)
days from January 12, 1979 within
which to file record on appeal which
was granted by respondent court.
The Solicitor General was appealing
from that portion of the December 8,
1978 decision of the Court of First
Instance
which
fixed
the
compensation
for
the
land
expropriated at Thirty Pesos (P30.00)
per square meter. Counsel for private
respondents filed an objection to the
public respondent's record on appeal
claiming that the same was filed
beyond the reglementary period.

On August 13, 1979 the Court of First

Instance
dismissed
the
appeal
interposed by the Republic. The
Office of the Solicitor General moved
for reconsideration but this was
denied for lack of merit. Thereafter,
public respondent filed with the Court
of Appeals a petition for certiorari,
prohibition
and mandamus with
preliminary injunction seeking the
annulment of the orders of the Court
of First Instance.

On April 29, 1980, the Court of

Appeals
rendered
a
decision
dismissing
public
respondent's
petition. On October 24, 1980, public
respondent filed with this Court a
petition, docketed as G.R. No. 54886,
asking this Court to annul the
decision of the Court of Appeals and
to direct and compel the lower court
to approve the Government's record
on appeal and to elevate the same to
the Court of Appeals.

In a decision dated August 10, 1981,

the Court granted the petition and
directed the trial court to approve the
Government's record on appeal and
to elevate the same to the Court of
Appeals.

Issue: Whether the petitioners have the

right to intervene in the expropriation
proceedings instituted by the State against
private respondents as registered owner of
the subject property.

Held: The petition is denied for lack of merit.

In the present case, the State in the exercise
of its sovereign power of eminent domain has
decided to expropriate the subject property
for public use as a permanent site for the
Bulacan Area Shop of the Department of
Public Works and Highways. On the other
hand, petitioners have not been issued
an emancipation patent. Furthermore, they
do
not
dispute
private
respondents'
allegation that they have not complied with
the conditions enumerated in their certificate
of land transfer which would entitle them to a
patent. In fact, petitioners do not even claim
that
they
had
remitted
to
private
respondents, through the Land Bank of the
Philippines, even a single amortization
payment for the purchase of the subject
property.
Under
these
circumstances,
petitioners cannot now successfully argue
that Celso Pagtalunan is legally entitled to a
portion
of
the
proceeds
from
the
expropriation proceedings corresponding to
the value of the landholding.

Department
of
Agrarian
Reform
represented by Sec. Jose Mari Ponce,
petitioner
versus

Compiled by: Georgia Dawn C. Gacus

SocLeg | 11
Crammers Case Digests: SOCIAL LEGISLATION & AGRARIAN REFORM
Delia Sutton, et al., respondent
[G.R. No. 162070 19 October 2005]

Facts:

Sutton and her siblings inherited a parcel

of land in Masbate devoted exclusively to
cow and calf breeding. Pursuant to the
Agrarian Reform Program at that time,
they made a Voluntary Offer to Sell their
landholding to the Department of
Agrarian Reform (DAR) to avail of the
incentives in 1987.

In 1988, a new law, Comprehensive

Agrarian Reform Law (CARL), took effect,
which included farms used for raising
livestock under its coverage. In light of
Luz Farms ruling, the Suttons filed a
formal
request
to
withdraw
their
Voluntary Offer to Sell. As their land was
outside the coverage of CARL. DAR
ignored their request.

In 1993, the DAR issued AO 9-1993,

which provides that only lands used for
raising livestock, poultry, and swine are
outside the coverage of CARL.

In 1995, the DAR ordered a part of the

Suttons landholdings to be segregated
land and placed under Compulsory
Acquisition.

Issue: Whether the assailed Administrative

Order is constitutional.

reform and prescribing a maximum retention

limit for their ownership. However, the
deliberations of the 1987 Constitutional
Commission show a clear intent to exclude,
inter alia, all lands exclusively devoted to
livestock, swine and poultry-raising. The
Court clarified in the Luz Farms case that
livestock, swine and poultry-raising are
industrial activities and do not fall within the
definition of "agriculture" or "agricultural
activity." The raising of livestock, swine and
poultry is different from crop or tree farming.
It is an industrial, not an agricultural, activity.
A great portion of the investment in this
enterprise is in the form of industrial fixed
assets, such as: animal housing structures
and facilities, drainage, waterers and
blowers, feed mill with grinders, mixers,
conveyors,
exhausts
and
generators,
extensive warehousing facilities for feeds and
other supplies, anti-pollution equipment like
bio-gas and digester plants augmented by
lagoons and concrete ponds, deep wells,
elevated water
tanks,
pump houses,
sprayers,
and
other
technological
appurtenance.
Moreover, it is a fundamental rule of
statutory construction that the reenactment
of a statute by Congress without substantial
change is an implied legislative approval and
adoption of the previous law. On the other
hand, by making a new law, Congress seeks
to supersede an earlier one. In the case at
bar, after the passage of the 1988 CARL,
Congress enacted R.A. No. 7881which
amended certain provisions of the CARL.
Specifically, the new law changed the
definition of the terms "agricultural activity"
and "commercial farming" by dropping from
its coverage lands that are devoted to
commercial livestock, poultry and swineraising. With this significant modification,
Congress clearly sought to align the
provisions of our agrarian laws with the
intent of the 1987 Constitutional Commission
to exclude livestock farms from the coverage
of agrarian reform.

Held: No. The impugned A.O. is invalid as it

contravenes the Constitution. The A.O.
sought to regulate livestock farms by
including them in the coverage of agrarian

Compiled by: Georgia Dawn C. Gacus