Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Presented at 10th Conference on the Jack-up Platform, London City University, London, UK, September 2005
and re-printed with the kind permission of the City University of London
Abstract
Three Jack-up Drilling Units were lost during transit in heavy weather between 1988 and 1990. These losses motivated
the Offshore Industry to investigate the reasons for the accidents and try to find ways to prevent similar recurrences. The
main findings of the Industry studies were operational in nature; however the investigations also disclosed weaknesses in
the subdivision standards of Jack-ups that need correction.
The American Bureau of Shipping (ABS), the Classification Society that classes the majority of the jack-up fleet, took
the lead to review the current damage stability criterion and the internal subdivision Rule requirements for Jack-ups. An
ad-hoc committee was formed that included designers, builders, regulators, and drilling contractors to investigate
requirements outlined in the current Rules. The research by the committee resulted in a new criterion for damage
stability and subdivision for these units.
This paper presents the historical background, the activities of the ad-hoc committee, the procedures leading to the new
standard, the approach to resolving the concerns, and the technical support for the new criteria.
Key words: damage, intact, jack-up, regulations, rules, stability
The New Standard
A Rule Change Notice (RCN)[1] proposed by the ABS Special Committee on MODU in their annual meeting of 2004
was approved by the ABS Technical Committee in July of 2004. The RCN is the document that precedes the changes to
the published Rules. These committees are comprised of Industry representatives under the policies and procedures of
the ABS.
The RCN has introduced a number of changes to the 2001 ABS MODU Rules[2] including an additional standard for
residual stability after damage for Self-elevating Drilling Units (jack-up). The new Rule applies to all units contracted on
or after January 1st, 2005. The new Rule supersedes and eliminates the requirement for maximum size of watertight
compartment that was conditionally published a year earlier. The relevant part of Stability and Subdivision of the current
ABS Rules are attached as an appendix.
Background
The causes and rationale leading to the development of the new subdivision is presented in The Future of Jack-Up
Stability - Learning From Our Past, a paper presented to this Conference in 2003[3].
The many differences between MODUs and conventional vessels, is the reason for the introduction to intact and damage
stability standards in the ABS MODU Rules of 1968[4]. Some Jack-up losses while under tow in the 1950s, confirmed
the need for a robust subdivision. At the time of publication of the first Rules for MODUs, most designs had a certain
level of subdivision probably guided more by the functional needs than by damage stability standards. The 1968 Rules
established a one compartment flooding standard by requiring the flooding from the sea of any one main compartment
which may reasonably be expected to be flooded. The expectation after damage was sufficient reserve buoyancy and
stability to survive considering the adverse effects of wind and sea.
Further changes to the Rules in 1973, narrowed the meaning of reasonably be expected to be flooded to compartments
exposed to the collision of an attending vessel and compartments adjacent to the bottom and upper deck. In practice, this
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Most regulations only address waterline damages to the peripheral compartments disregarding the scenario
found on most jack-up losses. The record shows that typically jack-up floundered after the flooding of several
internal compartments.
The UK GN had been withdrawn and ABS Rules applied to a limited number of internal compartments. Most
other regulations have no restriction to the size of internal compartments. Should designers not apply their selfimposed subdivision standards, it was conceivable to design a jack-up that could have a damage stability
problem after the flooding of a compartment.
All units classed by ABS operating on the UKCS in the period analyzed maintained a subdivision that met the
UK GN standards. Few units with ABS class, working outside the North Sea, appear to lack subdivision of the
internal compartments.
Evaluate the ABS Rules and determine if new or additional subdivision standards were needed
Evaluate the status of the fleet classed by ABS and identify any designs that showed an unusual vulnerability to
damage
Develop new standards to close any loophole allowed by the Rules that could lead to inadequate subdivision
The Ad Hoc committee agreed that the current Rules could allow the design of a jack-up with a well subdivided
collision belt with a very large internal compartment (open architecture) with its centroid close to or on the centroid of
the waterplane. Open architecture, such as the one shown in the illustration below, if applied well, can provide an
excellent subdivision. However, the Class or statutory standards in force at the time could not prevent a design with an
internal compartment that, if flooded, would place the rig on an extremely vulnerable waterline. Taken to the extreme, if
the damaged waterline would be at the main deck elevation, it would comply with the 50 knot wind stability criterion and
yet be easily turned over by the effect of waves and green water.
Searching for a reasonably simple standard, that would allow early design stage planning of the subdivision, the AHC
proposed a standard limiting the maximum size of any one compartment. ABS made an exhaustive research of all
designs representative of the market. Older designs and those built as one-offs were not researched. Standard designs,
built with more than one subdivision arrangement, were investigated in each version.
The AHC completed its task and submitted a proposed Rule change to the ABS Special Committee of MODU in the May
2003 meeting. The new subdivision standard applied to all watertight compartments in the unit and limited their
maximum size to 33% of the reserve buoyancy of the unit at its deepest waterline.
In the investigation it was established that all the existing designs that showed a rational subdivision met the standard.
The very few units that did not, showed one or maybe two compartments that were clearly oversized.
The Special Committee on MODU accepted a modified version allowing the size of the compartment to 40% of the
reserve buoyancy. The Rule change was approved by the ABS Technical Committee. The new Rule applied to all units
contracted after January 1st, 2004. The Special Committee also directed the AHC to reconvene to develop a different
standard that would address several valid objections raised during the meeting:
The Maximum compartment size did not consider the relative position of the flooded compartment with respect
to the center of the rig.
The new designs seemed to require larger compartment to accommodate the increasing size and number of
below deck equipment. Newly designed rigs have rooms with volume very close to the 33% limit and the new
Rule lacked the technical robustness to allow such compartments even when well located on the unit.
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The TRT met 11 times in a six-month period and it reported or met with the Ad Hoc Committee four times. Between
meetings, an exhaustive list of tasks was set to test and validate the ideas presented on the previous meeting. The
following sections present some of the ideas, the results of the investigation, and rationale for acceptance and rejections.
Flooding scenarios and extent of damage
The reports of the jack-up rigs lost in transit indicate that the flooding extended to several compartments. The
compartments involved were mostly operational compartments and not tanks or voids. The source of flooding water was
through the topsides and not as the result of a breach to the side shell or bottom plating.
While the possible distribution of water into multiple compartments is unlimited in number and percentage of fill, a
regulatory representation of the extent of flooding would be the assumption of a selected number of compartments, filled
to a fraction of their capacity. The alternatives proposed to the AHC were:
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It was also suggested that only combinations of adjacent compartments should be considered but this alternative became
moot when the TRT favored the One-Compartment filled to 100% capacity approach. Eventually, the TRT proposed and
the AHC accepted this alternative in spite of the difference between the single compartment flooding and the flooding
scenario experienced by the lost rigs. Various arguments supported this choice:
The one compartment option was determined to be the most conservative. The effect of free surface in multiple
compartments may or may not add to the conservative but the multiple options on how to apply it, would lead to
conflicting results.
A multiple compartment approach would require the analysis of the many combinations of two, three, or four
compartments. This without consideration to the infinite combinations of different levels of flooding that each
compartment could have suffered.
Partial filling of compartments, as discussed below, requires an analytical procedure that is not available in most
software packages, and the input and results can be interpreted in conflicting ways.
Mode of Flooding
On a typical incident in transit, the compartments were flooded from the topside. The water level in each compartment
was possibly, but not necessarily, the same as in the other flooded compartments but different from the level of the sea.
The conventional damage stability analysis assumes that the compartment is in direct communication with the sea (DCS)
and most naval architecture software only provide that option for analysis.
A great number of damage cases were analyzed for twenty-two different designs. In most cases, each member of the
TRT researched their own designs but ABS addressed the cases where the designer was not available or when the team
member lacked the resources. One series of tests evaluated the one-compartment filled to capacity scenario. In spite of
the apparent simplicity, each member of the TRT had a different approach, and the results were not quite comparable.
Eventually, it was agreed that the assumption of DCS was a better analytic choice despite its less realistic approach. The
following reasons were presented to support this approach:
Most software lacks the capability of analyzing the effect of simple filling but all can do the DCS.
Simple filling analysis can be done with several conflicting approaches and thus creating a new issue to
standardize.
If the new criteria also apply to compartments exposed to peripheral compartments (as it was eventually agreed),
each peripheral compartment would have to be analyzed twice; one as simple filling and once in DCS.
An observation against the DCS choice is that the damage compartment is not likely to be filled to capacity. However, in
a damage scenario that is significant as determined by its effect on the stability analysis, a compartment damaged with
DCS is likely to be filled very close to 100% and the conservatism of the "loss of buoyancy" compensates for the
difference between "close to" and "100% fill."
Again, the AHC chose the simpler and conservative approach over the more laborious and physically correct one.
Residual stability Criteria
This part of the research was the most difficult to agree as the alternatives are many. Even after narrowing the options to
a few, the evaluation of each one as it was applied to the twenty-two jack-up designs selected became a very arduous
effort.
The proprietary nature of each design was discussed in the early stages of these analyses; agreement to maintain the
confidentiality of the information was established. Results would be disclosed to all members of the TRT but the results
would not be associated with any particular design. This meant that ABS personnel, who are bound by their internal
confidentiality procedures and the ABS Code of Ethics, would develop many of the displays and statistics.
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Several criteria were suggested as a way to evaluate resistance to capsize and sinkage. From the many suggested the
following seven were selected as reasonable and further investigated by the TRT:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
2.
3.
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5.
6.
Green water
The stability effect of green water on deck was carefully considered. The models tests have shown how the effect of
water on deck is the dominating force that caused capsizing. ABS Corporate Technology Department (R&D)
hydrodynamicists were consulted on this subject. The conclusions from this discussion were that, while the
computational tools are available, they are complex and must be validated. Further, the effect of green water would
eventually have to be reduced to simple tools. Such a research would be very long and of uncertain results.
The criterion was not investigated any further because the schedule set for the development of the new Rule had no
room for a lengthy research.
7.
8.0
7.0
6.0
5.0
4.0
3.0
2.0
1.0
0.0
0
10
15
20
Heel (deg)
0% of RoB
15% of RoB
30% of RoB
45% of RoB
60% of RoB
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It must be noted that while the RoS is established independent of the wind curve, the wind was retained as the
environmental effect in the waterline damage analysis.
Validation of the selected criteria
Damage stability analysis was carried out on the selected group of twenty-two jack-up designs; including the design used
for the model testing. This series was carried several times with varying parameters. As understanding of the results
grew and trends were identified, the studies focused on the results for the jack-up loaded with the allowable VCG in ABS
record and as loaded VCG obtained from the operations manual for each unit.
Results were further identified by the location of the damage compartment into three groups:
Peripheral compartments,
Internal-lateral compartments,
Internal central compartments
Results were displayed in various chart formats. In the analysis of results, it was determined that while the RoS best
correlated with the resistance to capsize if the detrimental effect of the static angle of heel after damage was also
considered.
The chart below presented the result in the most eloquent way and the studies focused in this way. These are some
notable aspects of the data.
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The double circular markings correspond to the model test results when the rig did not capsize. It showed the
trend and assisted in determining the minimum acceptable RoS.
Each marker represents a damage stability analysis performed. The designs are not identified in the chart to
maintain the confidentiality of each design. However, members could identify the results of their own designs
and compare how they fit on the scatter.
A few markers appear to show extremely low results. The ABS members of the TRT separately evaluated the
cases and sometimes discussed with the designer of the specific jack-up. When analyzed individually, these
cases would often be clearly the result of a less than ideal subdivision. Some of the cases showing very low
RoS were on large compartments resulting from changes of subdivision after construction. Some were for units
that operated at drafts deeper than conceived at design.
Criteria:
RoS 7+(1.5 * Static Angle w/o wind)
0
4
10
12
14
16
18
20
22
24
26
28
30
32
Peripheral Compartments
Internal-Lateral Compartments
Internal-Central
The current criteria that govern the size of peripheral compartments established the acceptable level of subdivision.
Therefore, the boundary of minimum RoS should not be more severe than the RoS available after damage of those
compartments.
2.
The trend dictated by the model tests is a strong identifier and the minimum to be established. It would be
reasonable to expect that the capsizing conditions in the model test should be located on the left side of the boundary
line. The selection of a median line is based on the recognition that the environmental condition to which the
model was exposed is far more severe than what is intended in the Rules.
On the above basis the RoS 7 + (1.5 s) was established based on a boundary line that separated the reasonably sized
compartments from the oversized ones. Further, the discussion focused on the minimum. It was argued that while the
trend of the limiting line was acceptable, the minimum that applied for centrally located compartments was too low. A
minimum RoS of 10 degrees was established and unanimously approved.
A very important decision followed when the TRT recommended that downflooding should not be considered as a factor
in the evaluation of the RoS. There are several reasons for this determination:
Downflooding through weathertight protected openings (tank vents, doors, hatches, etc) is already controlled by the
existing 50-knot wind criteria.
Downflooding through openings such as ventilation intake and exhaust is taken into account in the intact stability
studies and the downflooding angles are larger than the RoS limits. The difference is large enough to account for the
effect of damage.
The purpose of the new Rule is mainly to restrict any compartment size in association with the stability properties of
the hull
It was further agreed that the RoS standard should apply to all compartments. This may be objectionable because the
existing standard that restricted the size of peripheral compartments was already acceptable. However, the wider
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Practical application
The new standard has been applied to several, new and existing, designs since last January. Despite its apparent
simplicity, designers and ABS have found technical difficulties when analyzing the RoS after damage. This difficulty is
not a new finding; in fact it was reported by J. A. van Santen in 1986[6]. The difficulty is mostly found when variable
trim righting arm calculation can result in more than one balanced trim. Further difficulty is created by the conventional
approach to develop righting arms from different fixed directions. In actuality, the rolling of the hull does not
necessarily follow this restricted pattern and leads the conventional analysis to unexpected results. The rationale to
resolve this challenge is currently investigated by ABS on the basis of a presentation by J. A. van Santen and others. A
solution is expected soon.
Conclusion
The new requirement for residual stability after damage closes a gap left open by the ABS Rules since first published.
The Rule provides guidance to limit the size of the hull compartments but is not an assurance against rig loss after
flooding.
The Rule is neither a reflection of the incident that the rig is expected to suffer, or the residual stability that will prevent
the loss of the unit. Further, this Rule consolidates the many flooding scenarios that may be expected into a simple one.
The RoS was selected as the residual stability parameter that appears to best reflect the many affected by damage. As in
many other Rules, this is a simplification that provides a level of safety comparable to or higher than one obtained by far
more complex methods. It also reduces the risk for errors in interpretation and application.
Despite the possibility of unusually large internal compartments allowed by the previous Rules, the research found that
most built designs are reasonably subdivided. Even rigs that have one or two compartments that fall short of the new
subdivision standard are not necessarily at unreasonably high risk.
Open architecture designs (i.e. a collision belt surrounding one very large compartment) are in a special group that must
be considered. Open architecture has been found to be a very viable solution to resolve the challenges of flooding.
While a few of such rigs show vulnerability to flooding the internal compartment, the great majority were carefully
located and sized to offer especially high residual buoyancy and stability. In addition to the residual stability qualities,
open architecture resolves the uncertainty of the extent of flooding, the concern on the adequacy of watertight closures,
and provides a residual freeboard round the deck.
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References
[1] American Bureau of Shipping Rules for Building and Classing Mobile Offshore Drilling Units, 2001 - Notice No.
4 December 2004
[2] American Bureau of Shipping Rules for Building and Classing Mobile Offshore Drilling Units, 2001
[3] The Future of Jack-Up Stability - Learning From Our Past. Ninth International Conference-The Jack-Up Platform,
Design, Construction & Operation, 2003,London, England
[4] American Bureau of Shipping Rules for Building and Classing Offshore Mobile Drilling Units, 1968
[5] UK Health and Safety Executive, Offshore Installations: Guidance on design construction and certification, Fourth
Edition, 1990
[6] Stability Calculations for Jack-up and Semisubmersibles J. A. van Santen Conference in Computer Aided
Design, Manufacture and Operation in the Marine and Offshore Industry
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