JULY 25, 2015

Eugenio v. Drilon
G.R. No. 109404 (January 22, 1996)
FACTS:
Private Respondent purchased on installment b
asis from Petitioner, two lots.Private respondent suspended payment of his amortizations because of non-development
on the property. Petitioner then sold one of the two lots to spousesRelevo and the title was registered under their name.
Respondent prayed forannulment of sale and reconveyance of the lot to him. Applying P.D. 957 TheSubdivision and
Condominium Buyers Protective Decree, the Human SettlementsRegulatory Commission ordered Petitioner to
complete the development, reinstatePrivate Respondents purchase contract over one lot and immediately refund him
ofthe payment (including interest) he made for the lot sold to the spouses. Petitionerclaims that the Exec. Sec. erred in
applying P.D. 957 saying it should have not beengiven retroactive effect and that non-development does not justify the
non-paymentof the amortizations.
ISSUE:
W/N the Executive Secretary acted with grave abuse of discretion when he
decided P.D. 957 will be given retroactive effect.
HELD:
No. Respondent Executive Secretary did not act with grave abuse ofdiscretion and P.D. 957 is to given retroactive effect
so as to cover even thosecontracts executed prior to its enactment in 1976. P.D. 957 did not expressly providefor
retroactivity in its entirety, but such can be plainly inferred from the unmistakableintent of the law. The intent of the
statute is the law.

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 135869. September 22, 1999]
RUSTICO

H.

ANTONIO, petitioner,

vs.

COMMISSION

ON

ELECTIONS

and

VICENTE

T.

MIRANDA,

JR., respondents.
DECISION
GONZAGA_REYES, J.:
Is the period to appeal a decision of a municipal trial court to the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) in an
election protest involving a barangay position five (5) days per COMELEC Rules of Procedure or ten (10) days as
provided for in Republic Act 6679 [1] and the Omnibus Election Code? This is the sole issue posed in the instant petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure seeking to annul the order dated August 3, 1998 of the
Second Division of the COMELEC, [2] dismissing the appeal of petitioner Rustico Antonio for having been filed out of
time pursuant to COMELEC Rules of Procedure, and the order promulgated on October 14, 1998 of the COMELEC en
banc, denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.
The antecedents as found by the COMELEC in the order dated October 14, 1998 are:
The parties in this case were rival candidates for the Punong Barangay of Barangay Ilaya, Las Pias City, Metro
Manila. After the board of canvassers proclaimed protestee-appellant Rustico Antonio, protestant-appellee Vicente T.
Miranda, Jr. filed an election protest docketed as Election Protest Case No. 97-0017 against Antonio before the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Las Pias City (Branch LXXIX). The trial court rendered a Decision dated 9 March 1998, the
dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, the Court declares the protestant Vicente Miranda as the duly elected Barangay Chairman of Barangay
Ilaya, Las Pias City, Metro Manila.
Antonio admitted receipt of the above-quoted decision on 18 March 1998. Subsequently, Antonio filed a Notice of
Appeal with the trial court on 27 March 1998 or nine (9) days after receipt thereof.Meanwhile, Miranda moved to
execute the trial courts decision. Rustico, in his Opposition to the Motion for Execution or Execution Pending Appeal,
argued against Mirandas motion for execution. After the trial court denied the motion for execution, the records of this
case was forwarded to the Commission (Second Division).
On 10 August 1998, protestee-appellant Rustico Antonio received from this Commission (Second Division)
an Order dated 3 August 1998 stating as follows:
In the light of the aforequoted rules, protestee RUSTICO ANTONIO, failed to perfect his appeal within the five (5) days
period prescribed for perfecting his appeal, as he filed his Notice of Appeal only on March 27, 1998 or nine (9) days after
receipt of the decision sought to be appealed.
The Period aforestated is jurisdictional and failure of the protestee to perfect his appeal within the said period deprives the
Commission of its appellate jurisdiction.
ACCORDINGLY, the instant appeal is hereby DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction.
Hence, this motion for reconsideration.

The instant Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED and We AFFIRM the Order dated 3 August 1998 of this Commission
(Second Division).[3]
In the instant petition for certiorari, petitioner argues that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it dismissed the appeal for the following reasons:
(a) In barangay electoral protest cases, the period of appeal is ten (10) days from receipt of the decision of
the Metropolitan or Municipal Trial Court. This is provided for by Sec. 9 of R.A. 6679 and Sec. 252 of the
Omnibus Election Code
(b) The provisions of Sec. 21, Rule 37 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure providing for a five-day period
within which to appeal from the decision of the Metropolitan or Municipal Trial Court could not prevail
upon the express provisions of Rep. Act No. 6679 and Sec. 252 of the Omnibus Election Code;
(c) Moreover, the COMELEC committed an error of jurisdiction when it disregarded the provisions of
Sections 5,6 & 7, Rule 22 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure requiring the filing of briefs by the
appellant and the appellee. The questioned resolution of August 3, 1998 was issued motu propio and
without prior notice and hearing. The petitioner was fast tracked;
(d) The alleged winning margin of the private respondent over the petitioner as found by the Metropolitan
Trial Court of Las Pias is only four (4) votes the results being MIRANDA 1,171; ANTONIO 1,167. The
peoples will must not go on procedural points. An election protest involves public interest, and
technicalities should not be sanctioned when it will be an obstacle in the determination of the true will
of the electorate in the choice of its public officials. [Macasundig vs. Macalanagan, 13 SCRA 577; Vda.
De Mesa vs. Mensias, 18 SCRA 533; Juliano vs. Court of Appeals, 20 SCRA 808; Genete vs. Archangel, 21
SCRA 1178; Maliwanag vs. Herrera, 25 SCRA 175; De Castro vs. Genete, 27 SCRA 623]
(e) The questioned resolutions violated the above principle because the COMELEC did not appreciate the
contested ballots.[4]
In dismissing the appeal, the COMELEC relied on Section 21, Rule 35 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure which
reads:
SEC. 21. Appeal From any decision rendered by the court, the aggrieved party may appeal to the Commission on
Elections within five (5) days after the promulgation of the decision.
On the other hand, petitioner contends that the period of appeal from decisions of the Municipal Trial Courts or
Metropolitan Trial Courts involving barangay officials is governed by Section 9 of Republic Act 6679 and Section 252 of
the Omnibus Election Code.
Section 9 of Republic Act 6679 reads:
SEC. 9. A sworn petition contesting the election of a barangay official may be filed with the proper municipal or
metropolitan trial court by any candidate who has duly filed a certificate of candidacy and has been voted for a
barangay office within ten (10) days after the proclamation of the results of the election. The trial court shall decide the
election protest within thirty (30) days after the filing thereof. The decision of the municipal or metropolitan trial court
may be appealed within ten (10) days from receipt of a copy thereof by the aggrieved party to the regional trial court
which shall decide the issue within thirty (30) days from receipt of the appeal and whose decision on questions of fact
shall be final and non-appealable. For purposes of the barangay elections, no pre-proclamation cases shall be allowed.
Similarly, Section 252 of the Omnibus Election Code provides:

SEC. 252. Election contest for barangay offices. A sworn petition contesting the election of a barangay officer shall be
filed with the proper municipal or metropolitan trial court by any candidate who has duly filed a certificate of
candidacy and has been voted for the same office within ten days after the proclamation of the results of the
election. The trial court shall decide the election protest within fifteen days after the filing thereof. The decision of the
municipal or metropolitan trial court may be appealed within ten days from receipt of a copy thereof by the aggrieved
party to the regional trial court which shall decide the case within thirty days from its submission, and whose
decisions shall be final.
In applying Section 21 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure rather than Section 9 of Republic Act 6779 and
Section 252 of the Omnibus Election Code, the COMELEC rationalized thus:
Antonio asserts that Section 9 of Republic Act 6679 and Section 252 of the Omnibus Election Code providing for a tenday period to appeal prevails over the provisions of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure.According to Antonio, quasijudicial bodies, including this Commission, cannot amend an act of Congress and in case of discrepancy between the
basic law and an interpretative or administrative ruling, the former prevails. Generally, yes. But the situation herein
does not fall within the generic situation contemplated therein.
No less than the 1987 Constitution (Article IX-A, Section 6 and Article IX-C, Section 3) grants and authorizes this
Commission to promulgate its own rules of procedure as long as such rules concerning pleadings and practice do
not diminish, increase or modify substantive rights. Hence, the COMELEC Rules of Procedure promulgated in 1993 as
amended in 1994 is no ordinary interpretative or administrative ruling. It is promulgated by this Commission pursuant
to a constitutionally mandated authority which no legislative enactment can amend, revise or repeal.
The COMELEC Rules of Procedure (Rule 37 Section 21) provides that from the decision rendered by the court, the
aggrieved party may appeal to the Commission on Elections within five (5) days after the promulgation of the
decision. Rule 22 Section 9 (d) of Our Rules of Procedure further provides that an appeal from decisions of courts in
election protest cases may be dismissed at the instance of the Commission for failure to file the required notice
of appeal within the prescribed period.
In case at bar, Antonio filed his notice of appeal before the trial court on the ninth (9) day from receipt of the decision
appealed from or four (4) days after the five-day prescribed period to appeal lapsed.Therefore, the present appeal must
be dismissed. For it is axiomatic that the perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period laid down by the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure is not only mandatory but also jurisdictional. As a consequence, the failure to perfect an
appeal within the prescribed period as required by the Rules has the effect of defeating the right of appeal of a party
and precluding the appellate court from acquiring jurisdiction over the case. So the High Court rules in Villanueva vs.
Court of Appeals, et.al. (205 SCRA 537). And so, it should also be in the case at bar.
Worth noting is that Our Rules of Procedure may be amended, revised or repealed pursuant to the 1987 Constitution
(Article VIII Section 5[5]) providing that rules of procedure of quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless
disapproved by the Supreme Court. But far from being disapproved the COMELEC Rules of Procedure received
approbation and has constantly been cited by the Supreme Court in a number of decisions such as in the case
of Pahilan vs. Tabalba (230 SCRA 205, at 211) and Rodillas vs. Commission on Elections (245 SCRA 702, at 704). In the
more recent case of Calucag vs. Commission on Elections promulgated on 19 June 1997 (G.R. N.o 123673), the
Supreme Court stated that:
Therefore, the COMELEC is the proper appellate court clothed with jurisdiction to hear the appeal WHICH APPEAL MUST
BE FILED WITHIN FIVE DAYS AFTER THE PROMULGATION OF THE MTC DECISION(page 4-5).
The repeated recognition given by the Supreme Court of this five-day rule within which to file the required notice of
appeal will make questionable the legislative enactment providing for a ten-day period. [5]
Without adopting the foregoing ratiocination of the COMELEC, we nonetheless find the instant petition devoid of
merit.

It is beyond cavil that legislative enactments prevail over rules of procedure promulgated by administrative or
quasi-judicial bodies and that rules of procedure should be consistent with standing legislative enactments. In relation
to the above-quoted Section 9 of Republic Act 6679 and Section 252 of the Omnibus Election Code, petitioner points
out that in Flores vs. Commission on Elections[6], this Court had declared that decisions of the Metropolitan or
Municipal Court in election protest cases involving barangay officials are no longer appealable to the Regional Trial
Court but to the COMELEC pursuant to Section 2(2) of Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution. [7] Petitioner submits that
the dispositive portion in the Flores case only declared unconstitutional that portion of Section 9 of Republic Act 6679
providing for appeal to the Regional Trial Court but not the ten (10) day period of appeal. The dispositive portion of
the Flores case reads:
1. Declaring Section 9 of Rep. Act No. 6679 UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it provides that barangay election contests
decided by the municipal or metropolitan trial court shall be appealable to the regional trial court:
Petitioner admits that the provisions in Republic Act No. 6679 and for that matter the Omnibus Election Code
providing for appellate jurisdiction to the Regional Trial Court had been declared unconstitutional in the
aforecited Flores case. A verbatim comparison of both provisions reveals that they provide the same remedy, that is,
appeal from a decision of the municipal or metropolitan trial court in barangay election cases to the regional trial
court. Both provisions provide that (1) results of a barangay election may be contested by filing a sworn petition with
the municipal trial court within ten days from proclamation; (2) the MTC shall decide within thirty days per Republic
Act No. 6679 or fifteen days per Omnibus Election Code; and (3) the decision of the municipal trial court may be
appealed to the regional trial court within ten days from receipt by the aggrieved party, which decision is final and nonappealable. There is no appreciable basis to make a distinction between the two provisions, except for their different
numbers, to advance that they provide for two different remedies. It would be superfluous to insist on a categorical
declaration of the unconstitutionality of the appeal provided for in Sec. 252 of the Omnibus Election Code, as the same
appeal in Sec. 9, Republic Act No. 6679 had already been categorically declared unconstitutional. Further, Sec. 252 of
the Omnibus Election Code[8] as amended by the new law, Republic Act No. 6679[9], has in effect, been superseded by
the latter. While the appellate procedure has been retained by the amendatory act, Republic Act No. 6679 nonetheless
supersedes the verbatim provision in the Omnibus Election Code. Hence, it was not necessary for Flores to mention
Sec. 252 of the Omnibus Election Code, considering that as aforestated, Section 9 of Republic Act No. 6679 was a mere
reenactment of the former law.
Petitioner is of the opinion, though, that the unconstitutionality extended only as to which court has appellate
jurisdiction without affecting the period within which to appeal. According to petitioner, only the portion providing for
the appellate jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court in said cases should be deemed unconstitutional. The rest of the
provisions, particularly on the period to appeal, free from the taint of unconstitutionality, should remain in force and
effect in view of the separability clauses contained in Republic Act 6779 [10] and the Omnibus Election Code.[11]
We do not agree.
First, petitioners argument raises the presumption that the period to appeal can be severed from the remedy or
the appeal itself which is provided in Section 9, Republic Act 6679 and survive on its own.The presumption cannot be
sustained because the period to appeal is an essential characteristic and wholly dependent on the remedy.
Aptly, the rules on statutory construction prescribe:
The general rule is that where part of a statute is void as repugnant to the Constitution, while another part is valid, the
valid portion, if separable from the invalid, may stand and be enforced. The presence of a separability clause in a
statute creates the presumption that the legislature intended separability, rather than complete nullity, of the
statute. To justify this result, the valid portion must be so far independent of the invalid portion that it is fair to
presume that the legislature would have enacted it by itself if it had supposed that it could not constitutionally enact
the other. Enough must remain to make a complete, intelligible, and valid statute, which carries out the legislative
intent. The void provisions must be eliminated without causing results affecting the main purpose of the act in a
manner contrary to the intention of the legislature. The language used in the invalid part of the statute can have no
legal effect or efficacy for any purpose whatsoever, and what remains must express the legislative will independently of
the void part, since the court has no power to legislate.

The exception to the general rule is that when the parts of a statute are so mutually dependent and connected, as
conditions, considerations, inducements, or compensations for each other, as to warrant a belief that the legislature
intended them as a whole the nullity of one part will vitiate the rest. In making the parts of the statute dependent,
conditional, or connected with one another, the legislature intended the statute to be carried out as a whole and would
not have enacted it if one part is void, in which case if some parts are unconstitutional, all the other provisions thus
dependent, conditional, or connected must fall with them. [12]
In the instant petition, the exception applies. Section 9 of Republic Act No. 6679 and Section 252 of the Omnibus
Election Code, without the constitutionally infirm portion on the appellate jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts in
barangay election protest cases, does not remain complete in itself, sensible, capable of being executed and wholly
independent of the portion which was rejected. In other words, with the elimination of the forum, the period cannot
stand on its own. Moreover, when this Court stated that Section 9 of Rep. Act No. 6679 is declared
unconstitutional insofar as it provides that barangay election contests decided by the municipal or metropolitan trial
court shall be appealable to the regional trial court, it meant to preserve the first two sentences on the original
jurisdiction of municipal and metropolitan trial courts to try barangay election protests cases but not, as advanced by
the petitioner, the ten-day period to appeal to the Regional Trial Court. This is the logical and sound interpretation of
subject portion of the Flores case.
Second, what was invalidated by the Flores case was the whole appeal itself and not just the question of which
court to file the petition. If the remedy itself is declared unconstitutional how could the period to appeal possibly
survive? How could the time limit exist if there is nothing to be done within such time?
Third, we cannot indulge in the assumption that Congress still intended, by the said laws, to maintain the ten
(10) day period to appeal despite the declaration of unconstitutionality of the appellate jurisdiction of the regional trial
court, Republic Act No. 7166 [13] amending the Omnibus Election Code, evinces the intent of our lawmakers to expedite
the remedial aspect of election controversies. The law was approved on November 26, 1991, after the Flores case which
was promulgated on April 20,1990, and presumably, the legislature in enacting the same was cognizant of the ruling
in Flores. Said law provides the same five (5) day period to appeal decisions of the trial court in election contests for
municipal officers to the COMELEC. Section 22 thereof reads:
Sec. 22. Election Contests for Municipal Officers. All election contests involving municipal offices filed with the
Regional Trial Court shall be decided expeditiously. The decision may be appealed to the Commission within five (5)
days from promulgation or receipt of a copy thereof by the aggrieved party. The Commission shall decide the appeal
within sixty (60) days after it is submitted for decision, but not later than six (6) months after the filing of the appeal,
which decision shall be final, unappealable and executory.
There would be no logic nor reason in ruling that a longer period to appeal to the COMELEC should apply to
election contests for barangay officials.
Fourth, since the whole remedy was invalidated, a void was created. Thus, the COMELEC had to come in and
provide for a new appeal in accordance with the mandate of the Constitution. As correctly pointed out by the
COMELEC, Section 6, Article IX-A[14] of the 1987 Constitution grants and authorizes the COMELEC to promulgate its
own rules of procedure. The 1993 COMELEC Rules of Procedure have provided a uniform five (5) day period for taking
an appeal[15] consistent with the expeditious resolution of election-related cases. It would be absurd and therefore not
clearly intended, to maintain the 10-day period for barangay election contests. Hence, Section 3, Rule 22 of the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure is not in conflict with any existing law. To adopt a contrary view would defeat the
laudable objective of providing a uniform period of appeal and defy the COMELECs constitutional mandate to enact
rules of procedure to expedite disposition of election cases.
In view of the Flores case, jurisprudence has consistently recognized that the COMELEC Rules of Procedure are
controlling in election protests heard by a regional trial court. [16] The Court en banc has held in Rodillas vs.
COMELEC[17] that the procedure for perfecting an appeal from the decision of the Municipal Trial Court in a barangay
election protest case is set forth in the COMELEC Rules of Procedure. More recently, in Calucag vs. Commission on
Elections[18], the Court en banc had occasion to state that:

It follows that after the promulgation of Flores, the same arguments propounded therein by the petitioner may no
longer be employed. Article 8 of the Civil Code states that (j)udicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the
constitution shall form part of the legal system of the Philippines. Said pronouncement of the Court, having formed
part of the law of the land, ignorance thereof can no longer be countenanced. Therefore, the COMELEC is the proper
appellate court clothed with jurisdiction to hear the appeal, which appeal must be filed within five days after
the promulgation of the MTCs decision. The erroneous filing of the appeal with the RTC did not toll the running of
the prescriptive period. xxx. The five-day period having expired without the aggrieved party filing the appropriate
appeal before the COMELEC, the statutory privilege of petitioner to appeal is deemed waived and the appealed
decisions has become final and executory.
Significantly, Section 5(5), Article VIII of the Constitution provides in part that [r]ules of procedure of special
courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless disapproved by the Supreme Court.
Equally devoid of merit is the contention that petitioner was fast tracked because the COMELEC did not require
the parties to file their appeal briefs; that the dismissal was issued motu proprio without prior notice and hearing; and
that dismissal of the appeal defeats the peoples will on procedural points. Suffice it to state that the period for filing an
appeal is by no means a mere technicality of law or procedure. It is an essential requirement without which the
decision appealed from would become final and executory as if no appeal was filed at all. The right of appeal is merely a
statutory privilege and may be exercised only in the manner prescribed by, and in accordance with, the provisions of
the law.[19] Further, by virtue of Section 9 (d), Rule 22 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure which provides that an
appeal may be dismissed upon motion of either party or at the instance of the Commission for failure to file a notice of
appeal within the prescribed period, the COMELEC is precisely given the discretion, in a case where the appeal is not
filed on time to dismiss the action or proceeding.
The COMELEC, therefore, did not commit an abuse of discretion in dismissing the appeal.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. The assailed orders of the
Commission on Elections dated August 3, 1998 and October 14, 1998 are hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Purisima,
Buena, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
Pardo, J., no part

Taada vs. Tuvera 136 SCRA 27 (April 24, 1985)

146 SCRA 446 (December 29, 1986)
TAADA VS. TUVERA

The Solicitor General, representing the respondents,

moved for the dismissal of the case, contending that
petitioners have no legal personality to bring the
instant petition.

136 SCRA 27 (April 24, 1985)

ISSUE:

FACTS:

Whether or not publication in the Official Gazette is

required before any law or statute becomes valid and
enforceable.

Invoking the right of the people to be informed on

matters of public concern as well as the principle that
laws to be valid and enforceable must be published in
the Official Gazette, petitioners filed for writ of
mandamus to compel respondent public officials to
publish and/or cause to publish various presidential
decrees, letters of instructions, general orders,
proclamations, executive orders, letters of
implementations and administrative orders.

HELD:
Art. 2 of the Civil Code does not preclude the
requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even
if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity.
The clear object of this provision is to give the general
public adequate notice of the various laws which are to

regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. Without

such notice and publication, there would be no basis
for the application of the maxim ignoratia legis
nominem excusat. It would be the height of injustive to
punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the
transgression of a law which he had no notice
whatsoever, not even a constructive one.
The very first clause of Section 1 of CA 638 reads:
there shall be published in the Official Gazette. The
word shall therein imposes upon respondent officials
an imperative duty. That duty must be enforced if the
constitutional right of the people to be informed on
matter of public concern is to be given substance and
validity.
The publication of presidential issuances of public
nature or of general applicability is a requirement of
due process. It is a rule of law that before a person
may be bound by law, he must first be officially and
specifically informed of its contents. The Court
declared that presidential issuances of general
application which have not been published have no
force and effect.

general application, for strictly speaking, all laws relate

to the people in general albeit there are some that do
not apply to them directly. A law without any bearing
on the public would be invalid as an intrusion of
privacy or as class legislation or as an ultra vires act of
the legislature. To be valid, the law must invariably
affect the public interest eve if it might be directly
applicable only to one individual, or some of the people
only, and not to the public as a whole.
All statutes, including those of local application and
private laws, shall be published as a condition for their
effectivity, which shall begin 15 days after publication
unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the
legislature.
Publication must be in full or it is no publication at all,
since its purpose is to inform the public of the content
of the law.
Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that publication of
laws must be made in the Official Gazette, and not
elsewhere, as a requirement for their effectivity. The
Supreme Court is not called upon to rule upon the
wisdom of a law or to repeal or modify it if it finds it
impractical.

TAADA VS. TUVERA

The publication must be made forthwith, or at least as

soon as possible.

146 SCRA 446 (December 29, 1986)

J. Cruz:

FACTS:

Laws must come out in the open in the clear light of

the sun instead of skulking in the shadows with their
dark, deep secrets. Mysterious pronouncements and
rumored rules cannot be recognized as binding unless
their existence and contents are confirmed by a valid
publication intended to make full disclosure and give
proper notice to the people. The furtive law is like a
scabbarded saber that cannot faint, parry or cut
unless the naked blade is drawn.

This is a motion for reconsideration of the decision

promulgated on April 24, 1985. Respondent argued
that while publication was necessary as a rule, it was
not so when it was otherwise as when the decrees
themselves declared that they were to become effective
immediately upon their approval.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not a distinction be made between laws
of general applicability and laws which are not as to
their publication;
2. Whether or not a publication shall be made in
publications of general circulation.
HELD:
The clause unless it is otherwise provided refers to
the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of
publication itself, which cannot in any event be
omitted. This clause does not mean that the legislature
may make the law effective immediately upon
approval, or in any other date, without its previous
publication.
Laws should refer to all laws and not only to those of

Tatad v Secretary of Energy [Nov 5, 1997]

FACTS:
The petitions challenge the constitutionality of RA No.
8180 entitled An Act Deregulating the Downstream
Oil Industry and For Other Purposes. The
deregulation process has two phases: (a) the transition
phase (Aug. 12, 1996) and the (b) full deregulation
phase (Feb. 8, 1997 through EO No. 372).
Sec. 15 of RA No. 8180 constitutes an undue
delegation of legislative power to the President and the
Sec. of Energy because it does not provide a
determinate or determinable standard to guide the
Executive Branch in determining when to implement
the full deregulation of the downstream oil industry,
and the law does not provide any specific standard to

determine when the prices of crude oil in the world

market are considered to be declining nor when the
exchange rate of the peso to the US dollar is
considered stable.
Issue:
w/n the provisions of RA No. 8180 and EO No. 372 is
unconstitutional.
sub-issue: (a) w/n sec. 15 violates the constitutional
prohibition on undue delegation of power, and (b) w/n
the Executive misapplied RA No. 8180 when it
considered the depletion of the OPSF fund as factor in
fully deregulating the downstream oil industry in Feb.
1997.
HELD/RULING:
(a) NO. Sec. 15 can hurdle both the completeness test
and the sufficient standard test. RA No. 8180 provided
that the full deregulation will start at the end of March
1997 regardless of the occurrence of any event. Thus,
the law is complete on the question of the final date of
full deregulation.

Sec. 15 lays down the standard to guide the judgment

of the Presidenthe is to time it as far as practicable
when the prices of crude oil and petroleum in the
world market are declining and when the exchange
rate of the peso to the US dollar is considered stable.
Webster defines practicable as meaning possible to
practice or perform, decline as meaning to take a
downward direction, and stable as meaning firmly
established.
(b) YES. Sec. 15 did not mention the depletion of the
OPSF fund as a factor to be given weight by the
Executive before ordering full deregulation. The
Executive department failed to follow faithfully the
standards set by RA No. 8180 when it co0nsidered the
extraneous factor of depletion of the OPSF fund. The
Executive is bereft of any right to alter either by
subtraction or addition the standards set in RA No.
8180 for it has no powers to make laws.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 98382 May 17, 1993

PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and EPIFANIO DE LA CRUZ, respondents.
Santiago, Jr., Vidad, Corpus & Associates for petitioner.
Pedro R. Lazo for spouses-intervenors.
Rosendo G. Tansinsin, Jr. for private respondent.

MELO, J.:
The notices of sale under Section 3 of Act No. 3135, as amended by Act No. 4118, on extra-judicial foreclosure of real
estate mortgage are required to be posted for not less than twenty days in at least three public places of the
municipality or city where the property is situated, and if such property is worth more than four hundred pesos, such
notices shall also be published once a week for at least three consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in
the municipality or city.
Respondent court, through Justice Filemon Mendoza with whom Justices Campos, Jr. and Aldecoa, Jr. concurred,
construed the publication of the notices on March 28, April 11 and l2, 1969 as a fatal announcement and reversed the
judgment appealed from by declaring void, inter alia, the auction sale of the foreclosed pieces of realty, the final deed of
sale, and the consolidation of ownership (p. 27, Rollo).
Hence, the petition at bar, premised on the following backdrop lifted from the text of the challenged decision:
The facts of the case as related by the trial court are, as follows:
This is a verified complaint brought by the plaintiff for the reconveyance to him
(and resultant damages) of two (2) parcels of land mortgaged by him to the
defendant Philippine National Bank (Manila), which the defendant allegedly
unlawfully foreclosed. The defendant then consolidated ownership unto itself, and
subsequently sold the parcels to third parties. The amended Answer of the
defendant states on the other hand that the extrajudicial foreclosure,
consolidation of ownership, and subsequent sale to the third parties were all valid,
the bank therefore counterclaims for damages and other equitable remedies.
xxx xxx xxx
From the evidence and exhibits presented by both parties, the Court is of the
opinion that the following facts have been proved: Two lots, located at Bunlo,

Bocaue, Bulacan (the first covered by Torrens Certificate No. 16743 and possessed
of an area of approximately 3,109 square meters: the second covered by Torrens
Certificate No. 5787, possessed of an area of around 610 square meters, and upon
which stood a residential-commercial building were mortgaged to the defendant
Philippine National Bank. The lots were under the common names of the plaintiff
(Epifanio dela Cruz), his brother (Delfin) and his sister (Maria). The mortgage was
made possible because of the grant by the latter two to the former of a special
power of attorney to mortgage the lots to the defendant. The lots were mortgaged
to guarantee the following promissory notes:
(1) a promissory note for Pl2,000.00, dated September 2, 1958, and payable within 69 days (date of
maturity Nov. l0, 1958);
(2) a promissory note for P4,000.00, dated September 22, 1958, and payable within 49 days (date of
maturity Nov. 10, 1958);
(3) a promissory note for P4,000.00, dated June 30, 1.958 1 and payable within 120 days (date of
maturity Nov. 10, 1958) See also Annex C of the complaint itself).
[1 This date of June 30, 1958 is disputed by the plaintiff who claims that the correct date is June
30, 1961, which is the date actually mentioned in the promissory note. It is however difficult to
believe the plaintiff's contention since if it were true and correct, this would mean that nearly three
(3) years elapsed between the second and the third promissory note; that at the time the third note
was executed, the first two had not yet been paid by the plaintiff despite the fact that the first two
were supposed to be payable within 69 and 49 days respectively. This state of affairs would have
necessitated the renewal of said two promissory notes. No such renewal was proved, nor was the
renewal ever alleged. Finally, and this is very significant: the third mentioned promissory note states
that the maturity date is Nov. 10, 1958. Now then, how could the loan have been contracted on June
30, 1961? It will be observed that in the bank records, the third mentioned promissory note was
really executed on June 30, 1958 (See Exhs. 9 and 9-A). The Court is therefore inclined to believe
that the date "June 30, 1961" was a mere clerical error and hat the true and correct date is June
1958. However, even assuming that the true and correct date is June 30, 1961, the fact still remains
that the first two promissory notes had been guaranteed by the mortgage of the two lots, and
therefore, it was legal and proper to foreclose on the lots for failure to pay said two promissory notes.
On September 6, 1961, Atty. Ramon de los Reyes of the bank (PNB) presented under Act No. 3135 a
foreclosure petition of the two mortgaged lots before the Sheriff's Office at Malolos, Bulacan;
accordingly, the two lots were sold or auctioned off on October 20, 1961 with the defendant PNB as
the highest bidder for P28,908.46. On March 7, 1963, Sheriff Leopoldo Palad executed a Final Deed
of Sale, in response to a letter-request by the Manager of the PNB (Malolos Branch). On January 15,
1963 a Certificate of Sale in favor of the defendant was executed by Sheriff Palad. The final Deed of
Sale was registered in the Bulacan Registry of Property on March 19, 1963. Inasmuch as the plaintiff
did not volunteer to buy back from the PNB the two lots, the PNB sold on June 4, 1970 the same to
spouses Conrado de Vera and Marina de Vera in a "Deed of Conditional Sale". (Decision, pp.3-5;
Amended Record on Appeal, pp. 96-98).
After due consideration of the evidence, the CFI on January 22, 1978 rendered its Decision, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the instant complaint against the
defendant Philippine National Bank is hereby ordered DISMISSED, with costs
against the plaintiff. The Counterclaim against the plaintiff is likewise
DISMISSED, for the Court does not believe that the complaint had been made in
bad faith.

SO ORDERED. (Decision, p. B.; Amended Record on Appeal, p. 100)

Not satisfied with the judgment, plaintiff interposed the present appeal assigning as errors the
following:
I.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING IN FOOTNOTE I OF ITS DECISION THAT IT IS
THEREFORE INCLINED TO BELIEVE THAT THE DATE "JUNE 30, 1962" WAS A MERE CLERICAL
ERROR AND THAT THE TRUE AND CORRECT DATE IS JUNE 30, 1958. IT ALSO ERRED IN
HOLDING IN THE SAME FOOTNOTE I THAT "HOWEVER, EVEN ASSUMING THAT THE TRUE AND
CORRECT DATE IS JUNE 30, 1961, THE FACT STILL REMAINS THAT THE FIRST TWO
PROMISSORY NOTES HAD BEEN GUARANTEED BY THE MORTGAGE OF THE TWO LOTS, AND
THEREFORE, IT WAS LEGAL AND PROPER TO FORECLOSE ON THE LOTS FOR FAILURE TO PAY
SAID TWO PROMISSORY NOTES". (page 115, Amended Record on Appeal)
II.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE PETITION FOR EXTRAJUDICIAL
FORECLOSURE WAS PREMATURELY FILED AND IS A MERE SCRAP OF PAPER BECAUSE IT
MERELY FORECLOSED THE ORIGINAL AND NOT THE AMENDED MORTGAGE.
III.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT "IT IS CLEAR THAT THE AUCTION SALE WAS NOT
PREMATURE". (page 117, Amended Record on Appeal)
IV.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT "SUFFICE IT TO STATE THAT ACTUALLY THE
POWER OF ATTORNEY GIVEN TO THE PNB WAS EMBODIED IN THE REAL ESTATE MORTGAGE
(EXB. 10) WHICH WAS REGISTERED IN THE REGISTRY OF PROPERTY OF BULACAN AND WAS
ANNOTATED ON THE TWO TORRENS CERTIFICATES INVOLVED" (page 118, Amended Record on
Appeal).
V.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT "THE NOTICES REQUIRED UNDER SEC. 3 OF ACT
NO. 3135 WERE ALL COMPLIED WITH" AND "THAT THE DAILY RECORD . . . IS A NEWSPAPER OF
GENERAL CIRCULATION (pages 117-118, Amended Record on Appeal).
VI.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DECLARING THE CERTIFICATE OF SALE, FINAL DEED OF
SALE AND AFFIDAVIT OF CONSOLIDATION, NULL AND VOID.
VII.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT ORDERING DEFENDANT TO RECONVEY TO PLAINTIFF THE
PARCELS OF LAND COVERED BY T.C.T. NOS. 40712 AND 40713 OF BULACAN (page 8, Amended
Record on Appeal)
VIII.

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT ORDERING DEFENDANT TO PAY TO PLAINTIFF REASONABLE
AMOUNTS OF MORAL AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES AND ATTORNEY'S FEES (page 8. Amended
Record on Appeal).
IX.
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE INSTANT COMPLAINT AGAINST THE PHILIPPINE
NATIONAL BANK WITH COSTS AGAINST THE PLAINTIFF. (page 118, Amended Record on Appeal)."
(Brief for Plaintiff-Appellant, pp. 1-4) (pp. 17-21, Rollo)
With reference to the pertinent issue at hand, respondent court opined:
The Notices of Sale of appellant's foreclosed properties were published on March 228, April 11 and
April 12, 1969 issues of the newspaper "Daily Record" (Amended Record on Appeal, p. 108). The date
March 28, 1969 falls on a Friday while the dates April 11 and 12, 1969 are on a Friday and
Saturday, respectively. Section 3 of Act No. 3135 requires that the notice of auction sale shall be
"published once a week for at least three consecutive weeks". Evidently, defendant-appellee bank
failed to comly with this legal requirement. The Supreme Court has held that:
The rule is that statutory provisions governing publication of notice of mortgage
foreclosure sales must be strictly complied with, and that even slight deviations
therefrom will invalidate the notice and render the sale at least voidable (Jalandoni
vs. Ledesma, 64 Phil. l058. G.R. No. 42589, August 1937 and October 29, 1937).
Interpreting Sec. 457 of the Code of Civil Procedure (reproduced in Sec. 18(c) of
Rule 39, Rules of Court and in Sec. 3 of Act No. 3135) in Campomanes vs.
Bartolome andGerman & Co. (38 Phil. 808, G.R. No. 1309, October 18, 1918), this
Court held that if a sheriff sells without notice prescribed by the Code of Civil
Procedure induced thereto by the judgment creditor, and the purchaser at the sale
is the judgment creditor, the sale is absolutely void and no title passes. This is
regarded as the settled doctrine in this jurisdiction whatever the rule may be
elsewhere (Boria vs. Addison, 14 Phil. 895, G.R. No. 18010, June 21, 1922).
. . . It has been held that failure to advertise a mortgage foreclosure sale in
compliance with statutory requirements constitutes a jurisdictional defect
invalidating the sale and that a substantial error or omission in a notice of sale
will render the notice insufticient and vitiate the sale (59 C.J.S. 1314).
(Tambunting vs. Court of Appeals, L-48278, November 8, 1988; 167 SCRA 16, 2324).
In view of the admission of defendant-appellee in its pleading showing that there was no compliance
of the notice prescribed in Section 3 of Act No. 3135, as amended by Act 4118, with respect to the
notice of sale of the foreclosed real properties in this case, we have no choice but to declare the
auction sale as absolutely void in view of the fact that the highest bidder and purchaser in said
auction sale was defendant-appellee bank. Consequently, the Certificate of Sale, the Final Deed of
Sale and Affidavit of Consolidation are likewise of no legal efffect. (pp. 24-25, Rollo)
Before we focus our attention on the subject of whether or not there was valid compliance in regard to the required
publication, we shall briefly discuss the other observations of respondent court vis-a-vis herein private respondent's
ascriptions raised with the appellate court when his suit for reconveyance was dismissed by the court of origin even as
private respondent does not impugn the remarks of respondent court along this line.
Although respondent court acknowledged that there was an ambiguity on the date of execution of the third promissory
note (June 30, 1961) and the date of maturity thereof (October 28, 1958), it was nonetheless established that the bank
introduced sufficient proof to show that the discrepancy was a mere clerical error pursuant to Section 7, Rule l30 of

the Rules of Court. Anent the second disputation aired by private respondent, the appellate court observed that
inasmuch as the original as well as the subsequent mortgage were foreclosed only after private respondent's default,
the procedure pursued by herein petitioner in foreclosing the collaterals was thus appropriate albeit the petition
therefor contained only a copy of the original mortgage.
It was only on the aspect of publication of the notices of sale under Act No. 3135, as amended, and attorney's fees
where herein private respondent scored points which eliminated in the reversal of the trial court's decision. Respondent
court was of the impression that herein petitioner failed to comply with the legal requirement and the sale effected
thereafter must be adjudged invalid following the ruling of this Court in Tambunting vs. Court of Appeals (167 SCRA 16
[1988]); p. 8, Decision, p. 24, Rollo). In view of petitioner's so-called indifference to the rules set forth under Act No.
3135, as amended, respondent court expressly authorized private respondent to recover attorney's fees because he was
compelled to incur expenses to protect his interest.
Immediately upon the submission of a supplemental petition, the spouses Conrado and Marina De Vera filed a petition
in intervention claiming that the two parcels of land involved herein were sold to them on June 4, 1970 by petitioner for
which transfer certificates of title were issued in their favor (p. 40, Rollo). On the other hand, private respondent
pressed the idea that the alleged intervenors have no more interest in the disputed lots in view of the sale effected by
them to Teresa Castillo, Aquilino and Antonio dela Cruz in 1990 (pp. 105-106, Rollo).
On March 9, 1992, the Court resolved to give due course to the petition and required the parties to submit their
respective memoranda (p. 110, Rollo).
Now, in support of the theory on adherence to the conditions spelled in the preliminary portion of this discourse, the
pronouncement of this Court in Bonnevie vs. Court of Appeals (125 SCRA [1983]; p. 135, Rollo) is sought to be utilized
to press the point that the notice need not be published for three full weeks. According to petitioner, there is no breach
of the proviso since after the first publication on March 28, 1969, the second notice was published on April 11, 1969
(the last day of the second week), while the third publication on April 12, 1969 was announced on the first day of the
third week. Petitioner thus concludes that there was no violation from the mere happenstance that the third
publication was made only a day after the second publication since it is enough that the second publication be made
on any day within the second week and the third publication, on any day within the third week. Moreover, in its bid to
rectify its admission in judicio, petitioner asseverates that said admission alluded to refers only to the dates of
publications, not that there was non-compliance with the publication requirement.
Private respondent, on the other hand, views the legal question from a different perspective. He believes that the period
between each publication must never be less than seven consecutive days (p. 4, Memorandum; p. 124,Rollo).
We are not convinced by petitioner's submissions because the disquisition in support thereof rests on the erroneous
impression that the day on which the first publication was made, or on March 28, 1969, should be excluded pursuant
to the third paragraph of Article 17 of the New Civil Code.
It must be conceded that Article 17 is completely silent as to the definition of what is a "week". In Concepcion vs.
Zandueta (36 O.G. 3139 [1938]; Moreno, Philippine Law Dictionary, Second Ed., 1972, p. 660), this term was
interpreted to mean as a period of time consisting of seven consecutive days a definition which dovetails with the
ruling in E.M. Derby and Co. vs. City of Modesto, et al. (38 Pac. Rep. 900 [1984]; 1 Paras, Civil Code of the Philippines
Annotated, Twelfth Ed., 1989, p. 88; 1 Tolentino, Commentaries and Jurisprudence on th Civil Code, 1990, p. 46).
Following the interpretation in Derby as to the publication of an ordinance for "at least two weeks" in some newspaper
that:
. . . here there is no date or event suggesting the exclusion of the first day's publication from the
computation, and the cases above cited take this case out of the rule stated in Section 12, Code Civ.
Proc. which excludes the first day and includes the last;
the publication effected on April 11, 1969 cannot be construed as sufficient advertisement for the second
week because the period for the first week should be reckoned from March 28, 1969 until April 3, 1969 while

the second week should be counted from April 4, 1969 until April 10, 1969. It is clear that the announcement
on April 11, 1969 was both theoretically and physically accomplished during the first day of the third week
and cannot thus be equated with compliance in law. Indeed, where the word is used simply as a measure of
duration of time and without reference to the calendar, it means a period of seven consecutive days without
regard to the day of the week on which it begins (1 Tolentino, supra at p. 467citing Derby).
Certainly, it would have been absurd to exclude March 28, 1969 as reckoning point in line with the third paragraph of
Article 13 of the New Civil Code, for the purpose of counting the first week of publication as to the last day thereof fall
on April 4, 1969 because this will have the effect of extending the first week by another day. This incongruous
repercussion could not have been the unwritten intention of the lawmakers when Act No. 3135 was enacted. Verily,
inclusion of the first day of publication is in keeping with the computation in Bonnevie vs. Court of Appeals (125 SCRA
122 [1983]) where this Court had occasion to pronounce, through Justice Guerrero, that the publication of notice on
June 30, July 7 and July 14, 1968 satisfied the publication requirement under Act No. 3135. Respondent court
cannot, therefore, be faulted for holding that there was no compliance with the strict requirements of publication
independently of the so- called admission in judicio.
WHEREFORE, the petitions for certiorari and intervention are hereby dismissed and the decision of the Court of
Appeals dated April 17, 1991 is hereby affirmed in toto.
SO ORDERED.
Feliciano, Bidin, Davide and Romero, JJ., concur.

RAMIREZ v CA
G.R. No. 93833 | September 28, 1995 | J. Katipunan
Facts:
A civil case damages was filed by petitioner Socorro Ramirez in the Quezon City RTC alleging that the private
respondent, Ester Garcia, in a confrontation in the latters office, allegedly vexed, insulted and humiliated her in a
hostile and furious mood and in a manner offensive to petitioners dignity and personality, contrary to morals, good
customs and public policy.
In support of her claim, petitioner produced a verbatim transcript of the event and sought damages. The transcript on
which the civil case was based was culled from a tape recording of the confrontation made by petitioner.
As a result of petitioners recording of the event and alleging that the said act of secretly taping the confrontation was
illegal, private respondent filed a criminal case before the Pasay RTC for violation of Republic Act 4200, entitled An Act
to prohibit and penalize wire tapping and other related violations of private communication, and other purposes.
Petitioner filed a Motion to Quash the Information, which the RTC later on granted, on the ground that the facts
charged do not constitute an offense, particularly a violation of R.A. 4200.
The CA declared the RTCs decision null and void and denied the petitioners MR, hence the instant petition.

Issue:
W/N the Anti-Wiretapping Act applies in recordings by one of the parties in the conversation

Held:
Yes. Section 1 of R.A. 4200 entitled, An Act to Prohibit and Penalized Wire Tapping and Other Related Violations of
Private Communication and Other Purposes, provides:
Sec. 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any private communication or
spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or
record such communication or spoken word by using a device commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or
detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape recorder, or however otherwise described.
The aforestated provision clearly and unequivocally makes it illegal for any person, not authorized by all the parties to
any private communication to secretly record such communication by means of a tape recorder. The law makes no
distinction as to whether the party sought to be penalized by the statute ought to be a party other than or different
from those involved in the private communication. The statutes intent to penalize all persons unauthorized to make
such recording is underscored by the use of the qualifier any. Consequently, as respondent Court of Appeals correctly
concluded, even a (person) privy to a communication who records his private conversation with another without the
knowledge of the latter (will) qualify as a violator under this provision of R.A. 4200.
A perusal of the Senate Congressional Records, moreover, supports the respondent courts conclusion that in enacting
R.A. 4200 our lawmakers indeed contemplated to make illegal, unauthorized tape recording of private conversations or
communications taken either by the parties themselves or by third persons.

The nature of the conversations is immaterial to a violation of the statute. The substance of the same need not be
specifically alleged in the information. What R.A. 4200 penalizes are the acts of secretly overhearing, intercepting or
recording private communications by means of the devices enumerated therein. The mere allegation that an individual
made a secret recording of a private communication by means of a tape recorder would suffice to constitute an offense
under Section 1 of R.A. 4200. As the Solicitor General pointed out in his COMMENT before the respondent court:
Nowhere (in the said law) is it required that before one can be regarded as a violator, the nature of the conversation, as
well as its communication to a third person should be professed.
Petitioners contention that the phrase private communication in Section 1 of R.A. 4200 does not include private
conversations narrows the ordinary meaning of the word communication to a point of absurdity. The word
communicate comes from the latin word communicare, meaning to share or to impart. In its ordinary signification,
communication connotes the act of sharing or imparting signification, communication connotes the act of sharing or
imparting, as in a conversation, or signifies the process by which meanings or thoughts are shared between
individuals through a common system of symbols (as language signs or gestures)
These definitions are broad enough to include verbal or non-verbal, written or expressive communications of meanings
or thoughts which are likely to include the emotionally-charged exchange, on February 22, 1988, between petitioner
and private respondent, in the privacy of the latters office. Any doubts about the legislative bodys meaning of the
phrase private communication are, furthermore, put to rest by the fact that the terms conversation and
communication were interchangeably used by Senator Taada in his Explanatory Note to the Bill.
KAREN E. SALVACION, minor, thru Federico N. Salvacion, Jr., father and Natural Guardian, and Spouses
FEDERICO N. SALVACION, JR., and EVELINA E. SALVACION vs. CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, CHINA
BANKING CORPORATION and GREG BARTELLI y NORTHCOTT
G.R. No. 94723 August 21, 1997
FACTS: Greg Bartelli, an American tourist, was arrested for committing four counts of rape and serious illegal
detention against Karen Salvacion. Police recovered from him several dollar checks and a dollar account in the China
Banking Corp. He was, however, able to escape from prison. In a civil case filed against him, the trial court awarded
Salvacion moral, exemplary and attorneys fees amounting to almost P1,000,000.00.
Salvacion tried to execute the judgment on the dollar deposit of Bartelli with the China Banking Corp. but the latter
refused arguing that Section 11 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 exempts foreign currency deposits from attachment,
garnishment, or any other order or process of any court, legislative body, government agency or any administrative
body whatsoever. Salvacion therefore filed this action for declaratory relief in the Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Should Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 and Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6426, as amended by
PD 1246, otherwise known as the Foreign Currency Deposit Act be made applicable to a foreign transient?
HELD: NO.
The provisions of Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 and PD No. 1246, insofar as it amends Section 8 of
Republic Act No. 6426, are hereby held to be INAPPLICABLE to this case because of its peculiar circumstances.
Respondents are hereby required to comply with the writ of execution issued in the civil case and to release to
petitioners the dollar deposit of Bartelli in such amount as would satisfy the judgment.
Supreme Court ruled that the questioned law makes futile the favorable judgment and award of damages that
Salvacion and her parents fully deserve. It then proceeded to show that the economic basis for the enactment of RA No.
6426 is not anymore present; and even if it still exists, the questioned law still denies those entitled to due process of
law for being unreasonable and oppressive. The intention of the law may be good when enacted. The law failed to
anticipate the iniquitous effects producing outright injustice and inequality such as the case before us.

The SC adopted the comment of the Solicitor General who argued that the Offshore Banking System and the Foreign
Currency Deposit System were designed to draw deposits from foreign lenders and investors and, subsequently, to give
the latter protection. However, the foreign currency deposit made by a transient or a tourist is not the kind of deposit
encouraged by PD Nos. 1034 and 1035 and given incentives and protection by said laws because such depositor stays
only for a few days in the country and, therefore, will maintain his deposit in the bank only for a short time.
Considering that Bartelli is just a tourist or a transient, he is not entitled to the protection of Section 113 of Central
Bank Circular No. 960 and PD No. 1246 against attachment, garnishment or other court processes.
Further, the SC said: In fine, the application of the law depends on the extent of its justice. Eventually, if we rule that
the questioned Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 which exempts from attachment, garnishment, or any
other order or process of any court, legislative body, government agency or any administrative body whatsoever, is
applicable to a foreign transient, injustice would result especially to a citizen aggrieved by a foreign guest like accused
Greg Bartelli. This would negate Article 10 of the New Civil Code which provides that in case of doubt in the
interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail.
___________
NOTES:
On February 4, 1989, Greg Bartelli y Northcott, an American tourist, coaxed and lured petitioner Karen Salvacion,
then 12 years old to go with him to his apartment. Therein, Greg Bartelli detained Karen Salvacion for four days, or up
to February 7, 1989 and was able to rape the child once on February 4, and three times each day on February 5, 6,
and 7, 1989. On February 7, 1989, after policemen and people living nearby, rescued Karen, Greg Bartelli was arrested
and detained at the Makati Municipal Jail. The policemen recovered from Bartelli the following items: 1.) Dollar Check
No. 368, Control No. 021000678-1166111303, US 3,903.20; 2.) COCOBANK Bank Book No. 104-108758-8 (Peso
Acct.); 3.) Dollar Account China Banking Corp., US$/A#54105028-2; 4.) ID-122-30-8877; 5.) Philippine Money
(P234.00) cash; 6.) Door Keys 6 pieces; 7.) Stuffed Doll (Teddy Bear) used in seducing the complainant.