Digests

Cabang, Ramos, Rivera,

Patricio v. Dario
AUTHOR: Ocampo, Miguel
G.R. No. 170829, November 20,
2006
TOPIC: Beneficiaries, FC 154, 158,
194-196, 199
PONENTE: Ynares-Santiago, J.
FACTS:

On July 5, 1987, Marcelino V. Dario died intestate and was survived by his wife, petitioner Perla Patricio and their 2 sons,
Marcelino Marc Dario and respondent Marcelino G. Dario III.
He left properties such as the disputed ones, house and lot and a pre-school building in Cubao w/ 755 sqm.
On Aug. 10, 1987, Perla and the 2 sons extra-judicially settled the estate of Marcelino V. They cancelled the TCTS of the 2
disputed properties and new ones were issued in their names.
Perla and Marcelino Marc advised Marcelino III about their intention to partition the disputed properties and terminate the
co-ownership but he refused and this prompted Perla to file this petition for partition at the RTC of QC.
RTC granted the partition where Perla would get 4/6 of it and 1/6 to each son.
Marcelino III filed w/ the CA but it affirmed the RTCs decision at first.
But when he filed for his 2nd motion for reconsideration, thats when the CA dismissed Perlas petition for partition because
the family home should continue despite their fathers death as long as theres still a minor beneficiary residing in it.
The CA considered Marcelino IIIs son, Marcelino Lorenzo Dario IV, as a minor beneficiary (makes him grandson of the
deceased and Perla.)

ISSUE:

WON respondent Marcelino IIIs son is considered a minor beneficiary w/c would be the reason for the continued existence
of the family home. NO.

HELD:

Marcelino V. died on July 5, 1987 and the family home should continue to exist for 10 yrs. or until July 1997. But respondent
argues that his 12 yr. old son is a minor beneficiary w/c would continue the existence of the family home beyond July 1997.
Perla argues that their 2 sons are already of age at the time of their husband/fathers death, hence, no more minor
beneficiary to speak of.
The SC cites FC154 w/c enumerates the beneficiaries and in relation to FC159 (10 yr. existence after death of spouse/s).
In FC159, the SC takes into consideration Dr. Tolentinos comments where he stated the requisites to be considered a minor
beneficiary:
a. The relationship enumerated in FC154;
b. They live in the family home;
c. Dependent for legal support upon the head of the family.
In contemplating such requisites:
a. Since the son is the grandson Perla and the deceased, he is a descendant w/c satisfies (a);

b. The son, has been living in the family home since 1994, hence, also satisfies (b);
c. However, he is not dependent from his grandmother (Perla) because such obligation is burdened on Marcelino III as he is
the head of his family. Hence, not a beneficiary.
Professor Pinedas comments were also taken into account wherein she stated that pursuant to FC199 (Order of support),
the obligation for legal support is vested on the parents first. It only becomes the burden of the grandparents when parents
are in default or incapable. Therefore, grandchildren cannot demand support directly from their grandparents if they have
parents capable of supporting them.
Reason is the closer the relationship of the relatives are, the stronger the tie that binds them.
Since, there are no more persons dependent on Perla, the petition for partition is granted but remanded the case to the RTC
for it to conduct a partition by commissioners, 4/6 for Perla and 1/6 to each son.

Arriola vs. Arriola

G.R. No. 177703. January
28, 2008
TOPIC: Family home when
terminated
PONENTE:
AUSTRIAMARTINEZ, J.

AUTHOR: PARIAN
NOTES: (if applicable)
SC ruled that RTC should have dismissed the contempt case right away for procedural
error. They went on and resolved the issue anyway.

FACTS: (chronological order)

Fidel died intestate. John (respondent), his son from his 1 st marriage, filed an action for judicial partition against Vilma
and Anthony (petitioners), Fidels 2nd wife and son, on the properties Fidel left.
RTC ordered the disputed lot to be partitioned equally to them.
However before the auction, Vilma and Anthony refused to include the house - which is their family home for 20
years - standing on the subject land, as it was not part of the RTC decision.
John filed for contempt. RTC denied the motion and held that the subject house should not be included in the auction.
John appealed to the CA. CA held that the house is an accessory to the land. Accessory must follow the principal.
Therefore, the house must be included in the auction sale.
Vilma and Anthony filed for certiorari.

ISSUE(S): WON the family home should be included in the auction of the land.
HELD: NO. Only the land outside the area of the family home may be auctioned.
RATIO:

SC upheld CAs postulate that the house is an accessory to the land, in which the former should be included in the auction.
However, the house being the family home, it is precluded from being partitioned by the heirs within 10 years after the
death of Fidel or as long as there is a minor beneficiary; as stated in FC Art. 159.
This includes the lot where the house is standing; as stated in FC Art. 153: The family home is deemed constituted on a
house and lot from the time it is occupied as a family residence.

CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:

The heirs are barred to partition the family home within 10 years after the death of their decedent or until a minor is
residing in it.
DISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINION(S):
FORTALEZA v. LAPITAN
AUTHOR: Villaseor, Pamela
[G.R. No. 178288. August 15, 2012]
NOTES:
TOPIC: The family home When may be
sold
PONENTE: Del Castillo, J.
FACTS:

Spouses Fortaleza (Petitioners) obtained a loan from spouses Lapitan (Respondent). As security, spouses Fortaleza executed
a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage over their residential house and lot situated in Los Baos, Laguna
When spouses Fortaleza failed to pay their debt, the creditors applied for extrajudicial foreclosure of the Real Estate
Mortgage. A public auction was made and Lapitans son emerged as the highest bidder and was issued the Certificate of
Sales. The 1 year redemption period expired without spouses Fortaleza redeeming the mortgage.
Spouses Lapitan executed an affidavit of consolidation of ownership and caused the cancellation and the registration of the
subject property in the names of Spouses Fortaleza.
Spouse Fortaleza refused spouses Lapitans formal demand to vacate and surrender possession of the subject property.
Spouses Lapitan filed an ex parte petition for the issuance of writ of possession with RTC Calamba City As new registered
owners of the subject property, spouses Lapitan claimed that they were entitled to its possession, but spouses Fortaleza
questions the validity of the mortgage and the foreclosure sale.
RTC allowed the presentation of evidence ex parte because of the failure spouses Fortaleza to appear on the scheduled
hearings. RTC then ordered the issuance of a writ of possession in the name of spouses Lapitan. They explained that it is a
ministerial duty of the court especially since the redemption period had expired and a new title had already been issued.
Spouses Fortaleza filed for motion for reconsideration. They argued that the subject property is their family home and is
exempt from foreclosure sale. RTC dismissed their motion.
CA affirmed. It was stressed that any question regarding the regularity and validity of the mortgage or its foreclosure cannot
be raised as a justification for opposing the issuance of the writ of possession since the proceedings is ex parte and nonlitigious.

ISSUE(S): Is the family home exempted from a forced sale?

HELD: No. Petition is denied. CA affirmed.
RATIO:

As a rule, the family home is exempt from execution, forced sale or attachment. However, Article 155(3) of the Family
Code explicitly allows the forced sale of a family home for debts secured by mortgages on the premises before or after

such constitution.
In this case, there is no doubt that spouses Fortaleza voluntarily executed a deed of Real Estate Mortgage over the subject
property which was even notarized.
Assuming that the property is exempt from forced sale, spouses Fortaleza did not set up and prove to the Sheriff such
exemption from forced sale before it was sold at the public auction.
Honrado vs. CA presented: Such claim for exemption should be set up and proved to the Sheriff before the sale of the
property at public auction. Failure to do so would estop the party from later claiming the exemption.

CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:

DISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINION(S):

one-year period for a judgment debtor to redeem the

property. rll

Fortaleza
As elucidated in Honrado v. Court of Appeals:
While it is true that the family home is constituted on a house
and lot from the time it is occupied as a family residence and
is exempt from execution or forced sale under Article 153 of
the Family Code, such claim for exemption should be set
up and proved to the Sheriff before the sale of the
property at public auction. Failure to do so would estop
the party from later claiming the exemption.
As this Court ruled in Gomez v. Gealone:
Although the Rules of Court does not prescribe the period
within which to claim the exemption, the rule is,
nevertheless, well-settled that the right of exemption is a
personal privilege granted to the judgment debtor and
as such, it must be claimed not by the sheriff, but by
the debtor himself at the time of the levy or within a
reasonable period thereafter.
Certainly, reasonable time for purposes of the law on
exemption does not mean a time after the expiration of the

Equally without merit is spouses Fortaleza s reliance on the

cases of Tolentino and De Los Reyes in praying for the
exercise of the right of redemption even after the expiration
of the one-year period. In Tolentino, we held that an action to
redeem filed within the period of redemption, with a
simultaneous deposit of the redemption money tendered to
the sheriff, is equivalent to an offer to redeem and has the
effect of preserving the right to redemption for future
enforcement even beyond the one-year period. And in De Los
Reyes, we allowed the mortgagor to redeem the disputed
property after finding that the tender of the redemption price
to the sheriff was made within the one-year period and for a
sufficient amount.
The circumstances in the present case are far different. The
spouses Fortaleza neither filed an action nor made a formal
offer to redeem the subject property accompanied by an
actual and simultaneous tender of payment. It is also
undisputed that they allowed the one-year period to
lapse from the registration of the certificate of sale
without redeeming the mortgage. For all intents and
purposes,
spouses
Fortaleza
have
waived
or
abandoned their right of redemption.

Lastly, we agree with the CA that any question regarding the

regularity and validity of the mortgage or its foreclosure
cannot be raised as a justification for opposing the petition
for the issuance of the writ of possession. The said issues
may be raised and determined only after the issuance of the
writ of possession. Indeed, "[t]he judge with whom an
application for writ of possession is filed need not look into
the validity of the mortgage or the manner of its
foreclosure." The writ issues as a matter of course. "The
rationale for the rule is to allow the purchaser to have
possession of the foreclosed property without delay, such
possession being founded on the right of ownership." To
underscore this mandate, Section 8 of Act No. 3135 gives the
debtor-mortgagor the right to file a petition for the setting
aside of the foreclosure sale and for the cancellation of a writ

Equitable PCI Bank vs. OJ- Mark trading

G.R. No. 165950, August 11, 2010
Facts:
Respondent-spouses Oscar and Evangeline Martinez obtained
loans from petitioner Equitable PCI Bank, Inc. in the
aggregate amount of P4,048,800.00. As security for the said
amount, a Real Estate Mortgage (REM) was executed over a
condominium unit where the spouses are residing.
Respondent Oscar Martinez signed the REM both as principal
debtor and as President of the registered owner and thirdparty mortgagor, respondent OJ-Mark Trading, Inc.
Respondent-spouses defaulted in the payment of their
outstanding loan obligation; thus, they offered to settle their
indebtedness with the assignment to the Bank of a

of possession in the same proceedings where the writ was

issued within 30 days after the purchaser-mortgagee was
given possession. The courts decision thereon may be
appealed by either party, but the order of possession
shall continue in effect during the pendency of the
appeal.
"Clearly then, until the foreclosure sale of the
property in question is annulled by a court of
competent jurisdiction, the issuance of a writ of
possession remains the ministerial duty of the trial
court. The same is true with its implementation; otherwise,
the writ will be a useless paper judgment a result inimical to
the mandate of Act No. 3135 to vest possession in the
purchaser immediately."
commercial lot, which at that time, was not transferred in
their name. While petitioners officers held a meeting with
respondent Martinez, the latter however failed to submit the
required documents such as certificates of title and tax
declarations so that the bank can evaluate his proposal to
pay the mortgage debt via dacion en pago. Consequently,
petitioner initiated the extrajudicial foreclosure of the real
estate mortgage. On the other hand, respondents filed a civil
case for TRO and annulment of the extrajudicial sale. They
alleged, among others, that the REM is void for having been
illegally notarized; that the petitioner acted in BAD FAITH
because it did not officially inform them of the denial or of
their proposal to settle the loan obligation by dacion. The
RTC ruled in favor of respondents and issued the TRO. The
same was affirmed by the CA, the latter holding that
respondents have sufficiently shown their proprietary right
over the condominium unit sought to be foreclosed, entitling
it to the questioned TRO. Thus, petitioner filed a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 contending as follows: 1) it
has a clear right to foreclose the mortgage because the
respondents failed to settle their obligations; 2) there
respondents have no right to an injunction because they
have no clear right to a dacion en pago.

Issue: Whether or not the respondents have shown a clear

legal right to enjoin the foreclosure and public auction of the
third-party mortgagors property.
Held: The Court REVERSED the decision of the CA. The Court
held that respondent spouses are NOT entitled to an
injunctive writ because their rights are merely contingent and
not in esse. According to the Court:
1. Respondents failed to show that they have a right to be
protected and that the acts against which the writ is to be
directed are violative of the said right.
On the face of their clear admission that they were unable to
settle their obligations which were secured by the mortgage,
petitioner has a clear right to foreclose the mortgage.
Foreclosure is but a necessary consequence of non-payment
of a mortgage indebtedness. In a real estate mortgage when
the principal obligation is not paid when due, the mortgagee
has the right to foreclose the mortgage and to have the
property seized and sold with the view of applying the
proceeds to the payment of the obligation.
This Court has denied the application for a Writ of Preliminary
Injunction that would enjoin an extrajudicial foreclosure of a
mortgage, and declared that foreclosure is proper when the
debtors are in default of the payment of their obligation.
Where the parties stipulated that the mortgagee is
authorized to foreclose the mortgaged properties in case of
default by the mortgagors, the mortgagee has a clear right to
foreclosure in case of default, making the issuance of a Writ
of Preliminary Injunction improper. Therefore, the allegations
of denial of due process and prematurity of a loan are not
sufficient to defeat the mortgagees unmistakable right to an
extrajudicial foreclosure.
2. There was no bad faith on the part of the petitioner.
It bears stressing that the existing written contract between
petitioner and respondent was admittedly one of loan
restructuring; there is no mention whatsoever or even a
slightest reference in that written contract to a supposed

agreement of dacion en pago. In fine, it is still necessary for

petitioner to establish in the main case its rights on the
alleged dacion en pago before those rights become in esse or
actual and existing. Only then can the injunctive writ be
properly issued. It cannot be the other way around.
Otherwise, it will be like putting the cart before the horse.
The respondents position, therefore, that petitioners act of
initiating extrajudicial foreclosure proceeding while they
negotiated for a dacion en pago was illegal and done in bad
faith is without merit. As respondent-spouses themselves
admitted, they failed to comply with the documentary
requirements imposed by the petitioner for proper evaluation
of their proposal. In any event, petitioner had found the
subdivision lots offered for dacion as unacceptable, not only
because the lots were not owned by respondents as in fact,
the lots were not yet titled but also for the reason that
respondent Oscar Martinezs claimed right therein was
doubtful or inchoate, and hence not in esse.
Requests by debtors-mortgagors for extensions to pay and
proposals for restructuring of the loans, without acceptance
by the creditor-mortgagee, remain as that. Without more,
those proposals neither novated the parties mortgage
contract nor suspended its execution. In the same vein,
negotiations for settlement of the mortgage debt by dacion
en pago do not extinguish the same nor forestall the creditormortgagees exercise of its right to foreclose as provided in
the mortgage contract.
3. Respondent-spouses alleged proprietary right in the
mortgaged condominium unit appears to be based merely on
respondents averment that respondent OJ-Mark Trading, Inc.
is a family corporation.
However, there is neither allegation nor evidence to show
prima facie that such purported right, whether as majority
stockholder or creditor, was superior to that of petitioner as
creditor-mortgagee. The rule requires that in order for a
preliminary injunction to issue, the application should clearly
allege facts and circumstances showing the existence of the

requisites. It must be emphasized that an application for

injunctive relief is construed strictly against the pleader.
4. The contention that the family home is exempt from
execution sale does not hold water.
The contention that the family home is exempt from
execution is entirely inconsistent with the clear contractual

agreement of the REM.

Assuming arguendo that the
mortgaged condominium unit constitutes respondents family
home, the same will not exempt it from foreclosure as Article
155 (3) of the same Code allows the execution or forced sale
of a family home for debts secured by mortgages on the
premises before or after such constitution. Respondents
thus failed to show an ostensible right that needs protection
of the injunctive writ.

De Mesa v. Acero
AUTHOR: Ocampo, Miguel
G.R. No. 185064 January 16, 2012
TOPIC: Rights of creditors, FC
157, 160-162
PONENTE: Reyes, J.
FACTS:

Before petitioner-sps. Araceli and Ernesto De Mesa got married, they purchased on April 17, 1984 a parcel of land in Mt.
Carmel Subd. in Bulacan. A house was later built on it and became the family home after they got married on Jan. 1987.
On Sept. 1988, Araceli got a 100k loan from respondent Claudio Acero secured by a mortgage on the property. As payment,
Araceli issued a check from China Bank payable to Claudio.
However, the check was dishonored because the account was already closed and De Mesas failed to pay. This prompted
Claudio to file a petition for violating B.P.22.
RTC acquitted the De Mesas but ordered them to pay the 100k and a writ of execution was made and the Sheriff levied on
the family home w/c was eventually sold to Claudio and a TCT was issued in his name.
On Feb. 1995, Claudio leased it to them and a certain Juanito Oliva for 5.5k/month. They defaulted in payment and the debt
amounted to 170.5k. Meanwhile, a final deed of sale was issued in Claudios name regarding the property.
Unable to collect the debt, Claudio and his wife Rufina (Acero sps.) filed for ejectment w/ the MTC of Bulacan against the
lessor-sps. and that Juanito. De Mesa sps. as defense states that they were the lawful owners since its their family home.
MTC and CA ruled in favor of Acero sps. stating that the Torrens title was registered in the name of Claudio and never did
the De Mesas questioned the levy of the Sheriff and the Torrens title.
On Oct. 29, 1999, De Mesas filed w/ the RTC of Bulacan complaining to nullify the TCT in Claudios name because it is their
family home w/c is exempted from execution. However, the RTC dismissed their petition, which the CA affirmed, both
stating that no time did the petitioners raise the supposed exemption of the subject property from execution on account of
the same being a family home.
De Mesas now file appeal to the SC. Aceros commented it is forum shopping because of the MTC, CA ruling earler.

ISSUE:

WON there was forum shopping. NO.

WON the lower courts erred in not cancelling the Torrens title in favor of Claudio over the subject property. NO.

HELD:

Not focusing here but no forum shopping because no identity of issues between the first petition for ejectment and the

petition for nullity of the Torrens title.

The SC agrees w/ the CA (ejectment case) that it is true that it is the family home of the De Mesas and should therefore be
exempted from execution. However, such right to prove it to be exempted can be waived and in this case, they are barred
due to laches.
The De Mesas negligence:
a. Allowed the property to be levied upon and the public sale to proceed;
b. The final deed of sale was issued to Claudio and, later, Araceli De Mesas Torrens title was cancelled and a new one
issued under Claudios name, still, they remained silent;
c. It was only after the Aceros filed for unlawful detainer (4 years from after the auction), that they claimed that the subject
property is a family home, thus, exempt from execution.

TAKE NOTE: Got this from the Biala v. CA in ObliCon.

Laches - failure or neglect, for an unreasonable length of time to do that which, by exercising due diligence could or should
have been done earlier; negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time warranting a presumption that the
party entitled to assert it either has abandoned or declined to assert it. It has 4 elements:
a. Conduct of defendant that give rise to the situation of which complaint is made and seeks remedy;
b. Delay in asserting complainants rights despite knowledge or motive of defendants conduct and having opportunity to
do so;
c. Lack of knowledge or motive of defendant that complainant will file suit;
d. Defendant will be the injured or prejudiced party if the suit be allowed or not barred.

Rivera v Heirs
Rivera v. Villanueva

comprising a number of the aforementioned properties. In

this document, Villanueva, for the amount of P30,000,
conveyed his interests in the estate to Angelina.

Facts:
Petitioners- half brothers, half sister and children of the half
brother of the deceased, Pacita Gonzales.
Respondents are the Heirs of Villanueva, represented by
Melchor. They were allowed to be substitute for Villanueva
upon his death. The remaining respondents are Angelina and
her husband Victorino, are allegedly the daughter and son-inlaw of the late Villanueva.
From 1927 until 1980, Gonzales cohabited with
without the benefit of marriage because the
married to Amanda Musngi who died in 1963. In
of their cohabitation, they acquired several
including the properties contested in this case.

Villanueva
latter was
the course
properties

Gonzales died without a will.

In 1980, Villanueva and
Angelina executed a deed of extrajudicial partition with sale,
that is, an extrajudicial settlement of Gonzales estate

Later on, the Petitioners filed a case for partition of Gonzales

estate and annulment of titles and damages with the RTC of
Sto. Domingo, Nueva Ecija.
RTC- 2 Findings:
1. Gonzales was never married to Villanueva and
2. Respondent Angelina was her illegitimate child by
Villanueva and therefore her sole heir, to the
exclusion of petitioners
Petitioners appealed to the CA and the latter affirmed the RTC
decision.
Issue:
Whether or not respondent Angelina was the illegitimate
daughter of the decedent Gonzales

Held:
No.
According to the assailed decision, the birth certificate
clearly discloses that Pacita Gonzales was the mother of
Angelina
proof
that
respondent
Angelina
was
Gonzales illegitimate child.
It is well-settled that a record of birth is merely a prima
facie evidence of the facts contained therein.
It is not
conclusive evidence of the truthfulness of the statements
made there by the interested parties. Following the logic of
Benitez v. CA, respondent Angelina and her co-defendants in
SD-857 should have adduced evidence of her adoption, in
view of the contents of her birth certificate. The records,
however, are bereft of any such evidence.
There are several parallels between this case and BenitezBadua v. CA that are simply too compelling to ignore. First,
both Benitez-Badua and respondent Angelina submitted birth
certificates as evidence of filiation. Second, both claimed to

Suntay III vs. CojuangcoSuntay (MR)

G.R. No. 183053. October 10,
2012
TOPIC: legitimate children
PONENTE: Perez, J.

be children of parents relatively advanced in age. Third, both

claimed to have been born after their alleged parents had
lived together childless for several years.
There are, however, also crucial differences between BenitezBadua and this case which ineluctably support the conclusion
that respondent Angelina was not Gonzales daughter,
whether illegitimate or adopted. Gonzales, unlike BenitezBaduas alleged mother Chipongian, was not only 36 years
old but 44 years old, and on the verge of menopause at the
time of the alleged birth. Unlike Chipongian who had been
married to Vicente Benitez for only 10 years, Gonzales had
been living childless with Villanueva for 20 years. Under the
circumstances, we hold that it was not sufficiently
established that respondent Angelina was Gonzales
biological daughter, nor even her adopted daughter. Thus,
she cannot inherit from Gonzales. Since she could not have
validly participated in Gonzales estate, the extrajudicial
partition which she executed with Villanueva on August 8,
1980 was invalid.

AUTHOR: PARIAN
NOTES: (if applicable)
This is only for the administration of the estate, not the partition among heirs.
In Suntay v Suntay, 1998, SC ruled that Isabel and her siblings are legitimate
children of Emilio I and Isabel; given that their marriage were annulled. (This should
be the case being discussed under this topic. This is more of a succession case.)
My opinion: Federicos adoption of Emilio III only came about after Cristinas death.
Even so, he cannot be considered as Cristinas next of kin, only Federicos.

FACTS: (chronological order)

Cristina Suntay died intestate. Her husband Federico died while the case was pending. Cristina and Federicos son,
Emilio I, predeceased the spouses.
The illegitimate grandchildren were under the care of the grandparents since birth. Federico even adopted Emilio III
as his son when Cristina died.
This case is a motion for reconsideration, filed by Isabel, of SCs decision appointing Emilio III and Isabel as co-

administrator of Cristinas estate.

Isabel assails that she should be the sole administrator as she is the next of kin, not Emilio III; and that Emilio III is
not fit to administer the estate.
Isabel alleged that since 2001, when RTC appointed him, he has mismanaged and did not properly account the
estate

ISSUE(S): WON Emilio III should be excluded as co-administrator.

HELD: YES. MR granted.
RATIO:

The letters of administration, generally, is granted to the surviving spouse. If there is no surviving spouse, the next of kin
is preferred. (RoC Rule 78, Sec. 6)
It had been decided that Isabel is a legitimate child of Emilio I. In effect, she is the legitimate grandchild of Cristina. Her
next of kin.
In contrast, Emilio III cannot be considered as the preferred next of kin of Cristina since he is an illegitimate grandchild,
and since a legitimate next of kin is present.
Also, he is excluded as co-administrator because he is unfit and incompetent to administer the estate.

CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:

In administering the estate of an intestate decedent, the legitimate next of kin is preferred.
DISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINION(S):
ARBOLARIO v CA
(G.R. No. 129163; April 22, 2003; J. Panganiban)
FACTS:
The original owners of the controverted lot, spouses Anselmo
Baloyo and Macaria Lirazan, had 5 children. Everyone
mentioned is dead. The first child, Agueda Colinco, was
survived by her two children, namely, Antonio Colinco and
Irene Colinco (respondent); Antonio Colinco predeceased his
three daughters, respondents Ruth, Orpha, and Goldelina, all
surnamed Colinco. The second child, Catalina Baloyo, was
married to Juan Arbolario and their union was blessed with
the birth of only one child, Purificacion Arbolario, who, in
1985, died a spinster and without issue. Juan Arbolario,
consorted with another woman by the name of Francisca
Malvas and from this cohabitation petitioners Voltaire

Arbolario, Lucena Arbolario Taala, Fe Arbolario, Exaltacion

Arbolario, and Carlos Arbolario (referred to hereinafter as
Arbolarios) were born. All the foregoing petitioners were
born well before the year 1951.
In 1946, the third child, Eduardo Baloyo, sold his entire
interest in the lot to his sister, Agueda (first child), by virtue
of a notarized document. In 1951, a notarized declaration of
heirship was executed by and between Agueda, Catalina,
Gaudencia, and their brothers Eduardo and Julian, who
extrajudicially declared themselves to be the only heirs of the
late spouses Anselmo Baloyo and Macaria Lirazan. The
fourth child, Gaudencia Baloyo, conveyed her interest in the
said lot in favor of her two nieces, Irene Colinco to one-half
(1/2) and Purificacion Arbolario to the other half. Purificacion
Arbolario was then allowed to take possession of a portion of

the disputed parcel until her death sometime in 1984 or

1985.
Respondents Irene Colinco, Ruth Colinco, Orpha Colinco, and
Goldelina Colinco, believing themselves to be the only
surviving heirs of Anselmo Baloyo and Macaria Lirazan,
executed a Declaration of Heirship and Partition Agreement,
dated May 8, 1987 where they adjudicated upon themselves
their proportionate or ideal shares: Irene Colinco, to one-half
(1/2); while the surviving daughters of her (Irenes) late
brother Antonio, namely Ruth, Orpha, and Goldelina Colinco,
to share in equal, ideal proportions to the remaining half
(1/2).
On October 2, 1987, the Colincos filed a case against
Spouses Rosalita Rodriguez Salhay and Carlito Salhay,
seeking to recover possession of a portion of the aforesaid lot
occupied by respondent spouses (Salhays hereinafter) since
1970. The Salhays alleged in their defense that they have
been the lawful lessees of the late Purificacion Arbolario since
1971 up to 1978; and that said spouses allegedly purchased
the disputed portion of Lot from the deceased lessor
sometime in September 1978.
On May 9, 1988 before the case was tried the Arbolarios and
spouses Carlito Salhay and Rosalita Rodriguez Salhay (all
respondents in the case) filed another case [f]or Cancellation
of Title with Damages.
The Arbolarios, joined by the
Salhays, contend that the Declaration of Heirship and
Partition Agreement executed by the Colincos was defective
and thus voidable as they (Arbolarios) were excluded therein.
The Arbolarios claim that they succeeded intestate to the
inheritance of their alleged half-sister, Purificacion Arbolario;
and, as forced heirs, they should be included in the
distribution of the aforesaid lot.
(Relevant) ISSUE:
(1) WoN Arbolarios are illegitimate children
HELD:
(1) YES, they are illegitimate.** There is no solid basis for
the argument of petitioners that Juan Arbolarios
marriage to Francisca Malvas was valid. It does not

follow that just because his first wife has died, a man is
already conclusively married to the woman who bore
his children. A marriage certificate or other generally
accepted proof is necessary to establish the marriage
as an undisputable fact. Since they failed to prove the
fact (or even the presumption) of marriage between
their parents, Juan Arbolario and Francisca Malvas;
hence, they cannot invoke a presumption of legitimacy
in their favor. Paternity or filiation, or the lack of
it, is a relationship that must be judicially
established.
NOTES:
LOWER COURT RULINGS:
o RTC: Arbolarios were the brothers and the
sisters of the deceased Purificacion Arbolario,
while the Colincos were her cousins and nieces.
The Colincos could not inherit from her, because
she had half-brothers and half-sisters (CC,
Article 1009).
Their 1987 Declaration of
Heirship and Partition Agreement was made in
bad faith, because they knew all along the
existence of, and their relationship with, the
Arbolarios. The Salhays, on the other hand, had
no document to prove their acquisition and
possession of a portion of the disputed lot.
o CA: Arbolarios are illegitimate. Illegitimate
children are barred by Article 992 of the Civil
Code from inheriting intestate from the
legitimate children and relatives of their father
or mother. As the illegitimate siblings of the late
Purificacion
Arbolario,
petitioners
cannot
conveniently undermine the legal limitations by
insisting that they were treated as half-brothers
and half-sisters by the deceased.
**(other reasons for illegitimacy, seemed less
important): A review of the 1951 Declaration reveals
that the year of Catalinas death was intercalated. The
first two numbers (1 and 9) and the last digit (3) are
legible; but the third digit has been written over to
make it look like a 0. Further, the paragraph quoted
by petitioners should show a chronological progression

in the heirs years of death: Agueda died in 1940 and

Eduardo in 1947. Hence, if Catalina had indeed died in
1903, why then was her name written after Aguedas
and not before it? Moreover, the document, being in
Spanish, requires an official translation. We cannot
readily accept the English translation proffered by
petitioners, since respondents did not agree to its
correctness. Besides, it consisted of only a paragraph
of the whole document.
OTHER ISSUES IN THE CASE:
o WoN CA committed a serious error when it
disregarded the testimony that the Salhays had
purchased the portion of the lot they had been
occupying since 1970; SC says NO, though the
sale was not expressly assigned as an error in
their Brief, respondents (as petitioners in the
CA) still assailed the existence of the sale
o WoN CA overstepped its bounds when it ruled
that since respondents did not raise the issue of
partition on appeal, the RTC had no jurisdiction
to divide the disputed lot; SC says NO, the
purpose of partition is to put an end to coownership.
It seeks a severance of the
individual interests of co-owners, vesting in each
of them a sole estate in a specific property and
a right to enjoy the allotted estate without
supervision or interference.

Continental Steel vs Montao

Hortillano is an employee of the CSMC and is a member of
Nagkakaisang Manggagawa ng Centro Steel CorporationSolidarity of Trade Unions in the Philippines for Empowerment
and Reforms

He claimed Paternity leave, Bereavement Leave, and Death

and Accident Insurance claims pursuant to the CBA agreed
upon by the Cntinental Steel Manufacturing Corporation from
based from Article 10 and 18 of the CBA. He is claiming it
based on the death of the Unborn child
A trial ensued but the Union had to file for grievance before
the National Conciliation and Mediation Board and before the
Department of Labor and Employment. They both chose Atty
Montao to mediate.
Atty. Montao concluded that there was no issue about the
marriage of Hortillano and his wife and that the unborn
child may enjoy the presumption of legal personality.
CSMC filed a case in the CA for Review on Certiorari because
they argued that the death of a fetus, at whatever stage, was
excluded from the CBA. CA, however, affirmed Atty Montao
Issue
WON the parents are entitled to the benefits?
Held:
1. The issue of civil personality is irrelevant. We need not
establish civil personality of the unborn child since
his/her provisional capacity and capacity to act as a
person are not in issue. The right to bereavement and
other death benefits in the instance case pertain
directly to the parents of the unborn child
2. Art 40 42 of the civil code do not provide the
definition of death. Moreover, it does not state
explicitly that only those who have acquired juridical
capacity could die.

Moore v. Republic
AUTHOR: Ocampo, Miguel
G.R. No. L-18407. June 26, 1963
TOPIC:
Rights
of
legitimate
children, FC 173-174

PONENTE:
FACTS:

Petitioner Elaine Moore, a US citizen, had 2 marriages:

a. Married Joseph Velarde, also US citizen, in which they had a child, William Velarde (14 yrs. old, living in LA, USA);
b. After a divorce was decreed by the SC of California on (a), Elaine married Don Moore on Sept. 29, 1956 in LA, USA.
Don treated William like his own son and this prompted Elaine to file this petition for change of name of William Velarde to
William Moore.
The govt opposed such petition stating 2 issues:
a. Whether under our laws a minor may be permitted to adopt and use the surname of the second husband of his mother;
b. Whether justifiable reasons exist to allow such change of name.

ISSUE:

WON William, the son, is allowed to use the surname of the subsequent husband of Elaine. NO.

HELD:

The SC cites NCC364 w/c provides that legitimate children shall principally use the surname of their father.
NCC369 also provides that in case of annulment of avoidable marriage the children conceived before the annulment, must
principally use the surname of the father. In this case, William was born before the divorce was decreed.
The SC states the reason that if a child born out of a lawful wedlock be allowed to use the surname of the 2nd husband of
the mother, should the 1st husband die or be separated by a decree of divorce, there may result a confusion to his real
paternity.
Also, in the long run, the change of name may redound to the prejudice of the child in the community.

ONG v. CA
AUTHOR: Villaseor, Pamela
[204 SCRA 297. November 29, 1991]
NOTES:
TOPIC:
Administration
of
exclusive
property By the other spouse
PONENTE: Paras, J.
FACTS:

Teodora Ong conducted her own logging business in Camarines Sur. She secured a loan from Francisco Boix in the amount
of P2,827.83.
She was unable to pay. Thus, Boix was awarded by the court a parcel of land that was to be auctioned.
CFI of Manila awarded the land to Boix.
Ramon Ong, husband of Teodora, filed an Omnibus Motion to quash the writ of possession. It was denied.
Ramon then filed before CA a petition to annul the auction sale as it was irregularly executed on the grounds that the
property was conjugal and thus could not be held liable for personal debts contracted by the wife, and that there was no
valid publication thus making the auction sale void. CA affirmed the decision of the Trial Court. Motion for reconsideration
was also denied.
Hence, this petition for certiorari.

ISSUE(S): Is the property conjugal? If yes, would it have been saved from being auctioned?
HELD: No, the property is not conjugal. No, it would not have been saved from being auctioned.
RATIO:

It is undisputed that the subject parcel was declared solely in the wifes name, but the house built thereon was declared in
the name of the spouses. The lot in question is a paraphernal property of the wife and should be liable for the debts of the
wife.
When the property is registered in the name of a spouse only and there is no showing as to when the property was
acquired by said spouse, this is an indication that the property belongs exclusively to said spouse. And this presumption
under Art. 160 of the Civil Code cannot prevail when the title is in the name of only one spouse and the rights of innocent
third parties are involved.
Conjugal property may still be held liable for the debts of the wife.
Art 117 of the CC provides that the wife may engage in business although the husband may object, but there are no signs
that he objected and in fact even approved said business.

CASE LAW/ DOCTRINE:

DISSENTING/CONCURRING OPINION(S):
Republic v. CA (Vicencio)
G.R. No. 88202 December
1998

AUTHOR: Ocampo, Miguel

14,

TOPIC:
Rights
of
legitimate
children, FC 173-174
PONTENTE: Quisumbing, J.
FACTS:

Respondent Cynthia was born on Jan. 19, 1971 as result of the marriage of Pablo Vicencio and Fe Ezperanza de Vega
Leabres.
However, Pablo left the family on Jan. 10, 1972 after a disagreement. He never gave support after he left. It was a certain
Ernesto Yu who gave support to Fe and Cynthia after the husbands abandonment.
Fe filed several petitions w/ different dates w/ the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court:
a. On June 29, 1976, for the dissolution of the CPG; and
b. On 1983, change of name wherein shed drop Vicencio;
c. On 1984, to declare Pablo as absentee;
On April 15, 1986, she married Ernesto Yu w/c was solemnized by Mayor Abalos of Mandaluyong.
Ernesto Yu was like a father to Cynthia and w/ her using the surname Vicencio has caused confusion as to her parentage
and was even subjected to questions by neighbors and classmates like on 2 occasions:
a. When she ran as a beauty contestant at the Lions Club Affair; and
b. At the Manila Red Cross pageant because the name she used was Cynthia Yu.
The RTC and CA ruled in favor of Cynthia granting her to use the surname Yu:
a. RTC says no valid cause as to deny her petition and could not compel Ernesto to adopt Cynthia because adoption is a
voluntary act;
b. CA says the change of surname would give her opportunity to improve her personality and welfare.
OSG appeals to SC.

ISSUE:

WON the Cynthia should be allowed to change her surname. NO.

HELD:

The SC cites Rep. v. Hernandez wherein change of surname is allowed under the ff. circumstances:
a. When the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or pronounce;
b. When the change is a legal consequence of legitimation or adoption;
c. When the change will avoid confusion;
d. When one has continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino name and was unaware of alien
parentage;
e. When the change is based on a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage, all in good
faith and without prejudice to anybody; and
f. When the surname causes embarrassment and there is no showing that the desired change of name was for a
fraudulent purpose, or that the change of name would prejudice public interest.
g. Cynthia claims her case falls under 1 of the circumstances above but the SC points out that she used Vicencio in her
school documents and subsequently used Yu in the 2 beauty contest and in her debut at the Mnl Hotel.
The OSG was correct in saying that it might give confusion as to the legal implications because Ernesto had 2 children w/
Fe and when Ernesto dies, it is possible that Cynthia may even claim inheritance rights as a legitimate daughter.
Also, the RTC already gave Ernesto the remedy to have Cynthia the opportunity to use his surname, w/c is to adopt

Cynthia. But it seems that he did not want to because he had no intention in making her an heir.
A legitimate child generally bears the surname of his or her father. It must be stressed that a change of name is a
privilege, not a matter of right, addressed to the sound discretion of the court, which has the duty to consider carefully the
consequences of a change of name and to deny the same unless weighty reasons are shown.