Case: 13-15411, 11/19/2015, ID: 9762266, DktEntry: 78-1, Page 1 of 6

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FILED
NOV 19 2015
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

SHINGLE SPRINGS BAND OF MIWOK

INDIANS,

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

No. 13-15411
D.C. No. 2:08-cv-03133-JAM-AC

Plaintiff - Appellee,
MEMORANDUM*

v.
CESAR CABALLERO,
Defendant - Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Eastern District of California
John A. Mendez, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted September 1, 2015
San Francisco, California
Before: GRABER and WATFORD, Circuit Judges, and FRIEDMAN,** District
Judge.

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent

except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
**

The Honorable Paul L. Friedman, United States District Judge for the
District of Columbia, sitting by designation.

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1. Plaintiff-Appellee Shingle Springs Band of Miwok Indians (the Tribe)

alleges that Cesar Caballero infringed various trademarks related to the Tribe and a
casino it owns and operates, the Red Hawk Casino, in violation of the Lanham Act,
the California Business and Professions Code, and common law, and that
Caballero cybersquatted on related domain names. The district court granted
summary judgment to the Tribe on those claims and permanently enjoined
Caballero from using the marks in any way. Caballero appeals the district courts
judgment.
The trademarks allegedly infringed by Caballero fall into two categories:
(1) marks related to the Tribe and its Rancheria (the Tribal Marks); and (2) the
Red Hawk Casino Mark. The latter mark is registered with the United States
Patent and Trademark Office; the Tribal Marks are not.
2. We have jurisdiction over Caballeros appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
1291, and review the district courts grant of summary judgment de novo.
Hexcel Corp. v. Ineos Polymers, Inc., 681 F.3d 1055, 1059 (9th Cir. 2012). To
obtain summary judgment, the moving party in this case the Tribe has the
burden of establishing the absence of any genuine dispute of material fact and its
entitlement to judgment as a matter of law. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,
322-23 (1986). An issue of material fact is genuine if the evidence is such that a
2

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reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). We must view the evidence in the
light most favorable to the nonmovant and draw all reasonable inferences in the
nonmovants favor. Clicks Billiards, Inc. v. Sixshooters, Inc., 251 F.3d 1252, 1257
(9th Cir. 2001). We reverse and remand for further proceedings.1
3. For both the unregistered Tribal Marks and the registered Red Hawk
Casino Mark, under the Lanham Act, the Tribe must show that Caballero used the
marks in connection with . . . goods or services to establish infringement. 15
U.S.C. 1125(a)(1) (unregistered marks); 15 U.S.C. 1114(1)(a) (registered
marks) (requiring use in commerce . . . in connection with the sale, offering for
sale, distribution, or advertising of any goods or services). The Tribe primarily
points to the following evidence to demonstrate that Caballero used the Tribal
Marks in connection with a good or service: (1) Caballeros statements at a
deposition that his rival tribe provides association services, welfare services,
employment services, and special event services; and (2) Caballeros website,

We decline to consider Caballeros argument that the Tribal Marks are

invalid because they identify an ethnic group, nor do we consider his related
contention that the Tribes trademark claims hinge on a determination of its
legitimacy as the federally recognized tribe. These arguments were not
sufficiently developed before the district court nor squarely raised on appeal. In
any event, we need not address them because we conclude that the Tribe failed to
meet its burden on summary judgment.
3

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www.shinglespringsreservation.com, which provided an email address under the

heading Enrollment Questions.
This evidence fails to carry the Tribes burden on summary judgment. There
is insufficient evidence in the record to prove that Caballero offered association
services within the meaning of the Lanham Act. Caballeros own vague and
conclusory statements are insufficient to establish that Caballero or his tribe
provided or offered any services. The only remaining factual support for the
Tribes allegations is a snapshot of Caballeros website depicting a contact email
address for those with Enrollment Questions, which, standing on its own, does
not support the grant of summary judgment. Even if the Enrollment Questions
heading on his website could be construed as constituting an offer of membership
what Caballero refers to as association services solicitation of members in
and of itself is insufficient to constitute an offer of a service without evidence as to
what those prospective members would be joining. As to the Red Hawk Casino
Mark, the Tribe has failed to present any evidence that Caballero used the mark in
connection with a good or service. On the present record, no reasonable jury could
conclude that Caballero offered or provided any service in connection with his use

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of either the Tribal Marks or the Red Hawk Casino Mark.2

4. The Tribe also is not entitled to summary judgment on the cybersquatting
claims. To establish liability under the Anti-Cybersquatting Consumer Protection
Act, the Tribe must show that, by registering, trafficking in, or using a domain
name identical or confusingly similar to a protected mark, 15 U.S.C.
1125(d)(1)(A)(ii), Caballero acted with bad faith intent to profit from that
mark, 15 U.S.C. 1125(d)(1)(A)(i); see DSPT Intl, Inc. v. Nahum, 624 F.3d
1213, 1218-19 (9th Cir. 2010). The intent to profit . . . means simply the intent
to get money or other valuable consideration, id. at 1221, and may include using
the domain name to get leverage in a business dispute, id. at 1219. There is no
evidence in the record not even in Caballeros brief exchange with the Tribes
counsel at his deposition that Caballero intended to profit by using the domain

Because the parties agree that the Tribes state law claims follow
directly from its federal claims, we also reverse the district courts grant of
summary judgment to the Tribe on its state law claims. See Seltzer v. Green Day,
Inc., 725 F.3d 1170, 1180 n.1 (9th Cir. 2013) (We have consistently held that
state common law claims of unfair competition and actions pursuant to California
Business and Professions Code 17200 are substantially congruent to claims
made under the Lanham Act.) (quoting Cleary v. News Corp., 30 F.3d 1255,
1262-63 (9th Cir. 1994)); Jada Toys, Inc. v. Mattel, Inc., 518 F.3d 628, 632 (9th
Cir. 2008) (California state law trademark infringement claims are subject to the
same test as federal claims under the Lanham Act); Mallard Creek Indus., Inc. v.
Morgan, 56 Cal. App. 4th 426, 435 (Cal. Ct. App. 1997).
5

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names involving the Tribal Marks or the domain names involving the Red Hawk
Casino Mark, either in the traditional sense or as exerting pressure on the Tribe to
gain an advantage in a business dispute. The Tribe therefore has failed to provide
sufficient evidence on this statutory element of its claims for cybersquatting.3
Whether the parties may be permitted to supplement the record and file
additional motions for summary judgment, as to both the trademark and
cybersquatting claims, are matters that we leave to the district courts discretion on
remand.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.

Because we conclude that the Tribe has failed to show evidence of

bad faith intent to profit, we do not reach the question with respect to a separate
requisite statutory element: whether the domain names at issue were identical or
confusingly similar to a protected mark owned by the plaintiff. DSPT Intl, Inc.,
624 F.3d at 1218-19.
6

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FILED
NOV 19 2015

Shingle Springs Band of Miwok Indians v. Caballero, No. 13-15411

GRABER, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part:

MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS

I agree with the majority that the district court erred in granting summary
judgment to Plaintiff on the claims related to the Red Hawk Casino Mark.
Accordingly, I concur in that part of the judgment. But I disagree with the
majority as to the claims related to the Tribal Marks. I would affirm as to those
claims. Accordingly, I dissent from that part of the judgment.
Summary judgment for the Tribe is appropriate on the trademark claim with
respect to the Tribal Marks. Defendant has registered for a fictitious business
name in the Tribes name, leading to a proof of publication that he was doing
business under the Tribes name; he received a business license in the Tribes
name; he opened bank accounts in the Tribes name; he received an employer
identification number from the IRS in the Tribes name; he registered domain
names using variations on the Tribes name; he criminally attempted to divert the
Tribes mail to his own address; he called a Berkeley museum about efforts by the
Tribe to repatriate tribal artifacts; he represented himself as "the chief of the
Shingle Springs Band of Miwok Indians" and told the museums repatriation
coordinator not to continue her contacts with the Tribe; and his website invites
visitors to email him with any "Enrollment Questions." In my view, those
actionsthe fact of which are not disputed by Defendantare highly likely to

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cause confusion because governmental entities and members of the public would
be confused about whether Defendant represents the federally recognized tribe.
See Comm. for Idahos High Desert, Inc. v. Yost (CIHD), 92 F.3d 814, 823 (9th
Cir. 1996) ("The acts that the individual appellants performed included the
formation of the appellant corporation under the name Committee for Idahos
High Desert, Inc. and Hoffman's testimonyunder the title of president of CIHD,
with the intent to add to his credibility as an environmentalistat a U.S. Air
Force hearing in favor of an air force training range in southern Idaho. . . . [T]hese
acts would be sufficient to render the individual appellants liable under [the
Lanham Act] for using in commerce, in connection with services, a name which is
likely to confuse." (emphasis added) (citations omitted)).
For related reasons, summary judgment for the Tribe also is appropriate on
the cybersquatting claim with respect to the Tribal Marks. See 15 U.S.C.
1125(d)(1)(B)(i)(V) (permitting a court to consider, when determining bad faith,
"the intent to tarnish or disparage the mark, by creating a likelihood of confusion as
to the source, sponsorship, affiliation, or endorsement of the site" (emphasis
added)).
In summary, I would affirm the district courts grant of summary judgment
on the claims related to the Tribal Marks and reverse the district courts grant of
2

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summary judgment on the claims related to the Red Hawk Casino Mark. I
therefore concur in part and dissent in part.

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United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

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Form 10. Bill of Costs ................................................................................................................................(Rev. 12-1-09)

United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

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Form 10. Bill of Costs - Continued

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Date
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(To Be Completed by the Clerk)

Date

Costs are taxed in the amount of $

Clerk of Court
By:

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