Quimiguing vs.

Icao
Quimiguing vs. ICAO
G.R. No. L-26795. 31 July 1970.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
Appeal on points of law from an order of the CFI of Zamboanga del Norte.
Facts: Plaintiff and defendant were neighbors and had close and confidential relations.
Defendant, although married, succeeded in having carnal intercourse with the plaintiff
several times by force and intimidation and without her consent. As a result she became
pregnant and had to stop studying. Later she gave birth to a baby girl. She instituted an
action to recover damages from the defendant. The lower court dismissed the case on
the ground that the original complaint averred no cause of action. Plaintiff appealed.
Issue: W/N defendant is liable for damages.
Held: The orders under appeal are reversed and set aside.
Ratio: A second reason for reversing the orders appealed from is that for a married man
to force a woman not his wife to yield to his lust (as averred in the original complaint in
this case) constitutes a clear violation of the rights of his victim that entitles her to claim
compensation for the damage caused. Says Article 21 of Civil Code of the Philippines:
Art. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is
contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the
damage.

Geluz v CA G.R. No. L-16439 July 20, 1961

J. J. B.L. Reyes
Facts:
The litigation was commenced in the Court of First Instance of Manila by respondent
Oscar Lazo, the husband of Nita Villanueva, against petitioner Antonio Geluz, a physician.
Lazos cuase of action was the third and last abortion of his wife to the said doctor.
The wife aborted the first baby before they were legally married. She had herself aborted
again by the defendant in October 1953. Less than two years later, she again became
pregnant and was aborted when the husband was campaigning in the province. He did
not give his consent.
The trial court granted the petition and order the doctor to pay Php 3,000. The CA
sustained. The doctor appealed to the Supreme Court.
Issue: WON the husband can recover damages from the death of a fetus
Held: No. Petition granted.
Ratio:
Fixing a minimum award of P3,000.00 for the death of a person, does not cover the case
of an unborn foetus that is not endowed with personality.
Since an action for pecuniary damages on account of personal injury or death pertains
primarily to the one injured, it is easy to see that if no action for such damages could be
instituted on behalf of the unborn child on account of the injuries it received, no such
right of action could derivatively accrue to its parents or heirs. In fact, even if a cause of
action did accrue on behalf of the unborn child, the same was extinguished by its prenatal death, since no transmission to anyone can take place from on that lacked juridical
personality.
Under Article 40 of the Civil Code, the child should be subsequently born alive: "provided
it be born later with the condition specified in the following article". (Read Art 41 of the
Civil Code) In the present case, there is no dispute that the child was dead when
separated from its mother's womb.
As to the reward of moral damages to Lazo: The court ruled that evidently because the
appellee's indifference to the previous abortions of his wife, also caused by the
appellant, clearly indicates that he was unconcerned with the frustration of his parental
hopes and affections.
He appeared to have taken no steps to investigate or pinpoint the causes thereof, and
secure the punishment of the responsible practitioner. Even after learning of the third
abortion, the appellee does not seem to have taken interest in the administrative and
criminal cases against the appellant. His only concern appears to have been directed at
obtaining from the doctor a large money payment, since he sued for P50,000.00
damages and P3,000.00 attorney's fees, an "indemnity" claim that, under the
circumstances of record, was clearly exaggerated.

De Jesus v. Syquia
58 Phil 866
Facts:
Antonia de Jesus went to court for the purpose of recovering damages from Cesar Syquia
stemming from a breach of a promise to marry and to compel the defendant to recognize
and support her two children. Cesar Syquia had an affair with Antonia de Jesus which
resulted in de Jesus giving birth to a baby boy on June 17, 1931. For a year or so, Syquia
supported de Jesus and his child. He, however, lost interest in the relationship when De
Jesus became pregnant with their second child. Syquia left and eventually married
another woman. De Jesus now claims that Syquia broke his promise to marry her.
Issue:
Whether de Jesus can claim damages for breach of promise to marry
Held:
The trial court did not grant damages to de Jesus for supposed breach of contract. Action
for breach of promise to marry has no standing in civil law. At any rate, such promise was
not satisfactorily proven by De Jesus. During the course of their relationship, defendant
never expressed anything to that effect.

Limjuco vs Pedro Fragante

TITLE: Limjuco vs. The Estate of Pedro Fragante
CITATION: 45 OG No. 9, p.397
FACTS:
Pedro Fragante, a Filipino citizen at the time of his death, applied for a certificate of public
convenience to install and maintain an ice plant in San Juan Rizal. His intestate estate is
financially capable of maintaining the proposed service. The Public Service Commission
issued a certificate of public convenience to Intestate Estate of the deceased, authorizing
said Intestate Estate through its special or Judicial Administrator, appointed by the proper
court of competent jurisdiction, to maintain and operate the said plant. Petitioner claims
that the granting of certificate applied to the estate is a contravention of law.
ISSUE: Whether or not the estate of Fragante may be extended an artificial judicial
personality.
HELD:
The estate of Fragante could be extended an artificial judicial personality because under the
Civil Code, estate of a dead person could be considered as artificial juridical person for the
purpose of the settlement and distribution of his properties. It should be noted that the
exercise of juridical administration includes those rights and fulfillment of obligation of
Fragante which survived after his death. One of those surviving rights involved the pending
application for public convenience before the Public Service Commission.
Supreme Court is of the opinion that for the purposes of the prosecution of said case No.
4572 of the Public Service Commission to its final conclusion, both the personality and
citizenship of Pedro O. Fragrante must be deemed extended, within the meaning and intent
of the Public Service Act, as amended, in harmony with the constitution: it is so adjudged
and decreed.

Dumlao vs Quality Plastics

TITLE: Dumlao v Quality Plastics
CITATION: GR No. L27956, April 30, 1976
FACTS:
Judgement for Civil Case T-662 was rendered on February 28, 1962 ordering defendants
Soliven, Pedro Oria, Laurencio, Sumalbag and Darang to pay solidarity Quality Plastics
the sum of P3,667.03 plus legal rate of interest from November 1958 before its decision
became final or else Quality Plastics is hereby authorized to foreclose the bond.
Defendants failed to pay the amount before the limit given. Oria's land, which was
covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 28732 and has an area of nine and six-tenths
hectares, was levied upon and sold by the sheriff at public auction on September 24,
1962 which he has given as security under the bond.
Apparently, Oria died on April 23, 1959 or long before June 13, 1960. Quality Plastics
was not aware on Orias death. The summons and copies of complaint was personally
served on June 24, 1960 by a deputy sheriff to Soliven which the latter acknowledged
and signed in his own behalf and his co-defendants.
Dionisio, Fausta, Amado and Benjamin, all surnamed Dumlao and all testamentary heirs
in Oria's duly probated will, sued Quality Plastic Products, Inc on March 1, 1963 for the
annulment of the judgment against Oria and the execution against his land (T-873).
Dionisio also sued in his capacity as administrator of Orias testate estate.

ISSUE: Whether judgment against Oria and execution against his land be annulled on
the ground of lack in juridical capacity.
HELD:
Quality Plastics upon receiving the summons on T-873 just learned that Oria was already
dead prior case T-662 was filed. The Dumalaos agreed in their stipulation that indeed
Quality Plastics was unaware of Orias death and that they acted in good faith in joining
Oria as a co-defendant.
However, no jurisdiction was acquired over Oria, thus, the judgment against him is a
patent nullity. Lower courts judgment against Oria in T-662 is void for lack of jurisdiction
over his person as far as Oria was concerned. He had no more civil personality and his
juridical capacity which is the fitness to be the subject of legal relations was lost through
death.
The fact that Dumlao had to sue Quality Plastics in order to annul the judgment against
Oria does not follow that they are entitiled to claim attorneys fees against the
corporation.

WHEREFORE, the lower court's decision is reversed and set aside. Its judgment in Civil
Case No. T-662 against Pedro Oria is declared void for lack of jurisdiction. The execution
sale of Oria's land covered by OCT No. 28732 is also void.

MOY YA LIM YAO VS. COMMISSIONER OF IMMIGRATION

G.R. No. L-21289, October 4 1971, 41 SCRA 292
FACTS:
Lau Yuen Yeung applied for a passport visa to enter the Philippines as a non-immigrant on 8
February 1961. In the interrogation made in connection with her application for a temporary
visitor's visa to enter the Philippines, she stated that she was a Chinese residing at Kowloon,
Hongkong, and that she desired to take a pleasure trip to the Philippines to visit her great grand
uncle, Lau Ching Ping. She was permitted to come into the Philippines on 13 March 1961 for a
period of one month.
On the date of
among others,
the expiration
discretion the
allow.

her arrival, Asher Y. Cheng filed a bond in the amount of P1,000.00 to undertake,
that said Lau Yuen Yeung would actually depart from the Philippines on or before
of her authorized period of stay in this country or within the period as in his
Commissioner of Immigration or his authorized representative might properly

After repeated extensions, Lau Yuen Yeung was allowed to stay in the Philippines up to 13
February 1962. On 25 January 1962, she contracted marriage with Moy Ya Lim Yao alias Edilberto
Aguinaldo Lim an alleged Filipino citizen. Because of the contemplated action of the
Commissioner of Immigration to confiscate her bond and order her arrest and immediate
deportation, after the expiration of her authorized stay, she brought an action for injunction. At
the hearing which took place one and a half years after her arrival, it was admitted that Lau Yuen
Yeung could not write and speak either English or Tagalog, except for a few words. She could not
name any Filipino neighbor, with a Filipino name except one, Rosa. She did not know the names
of her brothers-in-law, or sisters-in-law. As a result, the Court of First Instance of Manila denied
the prayer for preliminary injunction. Moya Lim Yao and Lau Yuen Yeung appealed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Lau Yuen Yeung ipso facto became a Filipino citizen upon her marriage to a
Filipino citizen.
HELD:
Under Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473, an alien woman marrying a Filipino, native born or
naturalized, becomes ipso facto a Filipina provided she is not disqualified to be a citizen of the
Philippines under Section 4 of the same law. Likewise, an alien woman married to an alien who is
subsequently naturalized here follows the Philippine citizenship of her husband the moment he
takes his oath as Filipino citizen, provided that she does not suffer from any of the
disqualifications under said Section 4. Whether the alien woman requires to undergo the
naturalization proceedings, Section 15 is a parallel provision to Section 16. Thus, if the widow of
an applicant for naturalization as Filipino, who dies during the proceedings, is not required to go
through a naturalization proceedings, in order to be considered as a Filipino citizen hereof, it
should follow that the wife of a living Filipino cannot be denied the same privilege.
This is plain common sense and there is absolutely no evidence that the Legislature intended to
treat them differently. As the laws of our country, both substantive and procedural, stand today,
there is no such procedure (a substitute for naturalization proceeding to enable the alien wife of
a Philippine citizen to have the matter of her own citizenship settled and established so that she
may not have to be called upon to prove it everytime she has to perform an act or enter into a

transaction or business or exercise a right reserved only to Filipinos), but such is no proof that
the citizenship is not vested as of the date of marriage or the husband's acquisition of
citizenship, as the case may be, for the truth is that the situation obtains even as to native-born
Filipinos. Everytime the citizenship of a person is material or indispensible in a judicial or
administrative case. Whatever the corresponding court or administrative authority decides
therein as to such citizenship is generally not considered as res adjudicata, hence it has to be
threshed out again and again as the occasion may demand. Lau Yuen Yeung, was declared to
have become a Filipino citizen from and by virtue of her marriage to Moy Ya Lim Yao al as
Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim, a Filipino citizen of 25 January 1962.

Frivaldo vs. Comelec

G.R. No. 120295 (June 28, 1996)
Facts:
Juan G. Frivaldo was proclaimed governor-elect of the province of Sorsogon on 22 January
1988, and assumed office in due time. On 27 October 1988, the league of Municipalities,
Sorsogon Chapter represented by its President, Salvador Estuye, who was also suing in his
personal capacity, filed with the Comelec a petition for the annulment of Frivaldos election
and proclamation on the ground that he was not a Filipino citizen, having been naturalized in
the United States on 20 January 1983. Frivaldo admitted that he was naturalized in the
United States as alleged but pleaded the special and affirmative defenses that he had sought
American citizenship only to protect himself against President Marcos. His naturalization, he
said, was merely forced upon himself as a means of survival against the unrelenting
persecution by the Martial Law Dictators agents abroad. He also argued that the challenge
to his title should be dismissed, being in reality a quo warranto petition that should have
been filed within 10 days from his proclamation, in accordance with Section 253 of the
Omhibus Election Code.
Issue:
Whether Juan G. Frivaldo was a citizen of the Philippines at the time of his election on 18
January 1988, as provincial governor of Sorsogon.
Held:
The Commission on Elections has the primary jurisdiction over the question as the sole judge
of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the
Congress and elective provincial and city officials. However, the decision on Frivaldos
citizenship has already been made by the COMELEC through its counsel, the Solicitor
General, who categorically claims that Frivaldo is a foreigner. The Solicitors stance is
assumed to have bben taken by him after consultation with COMELEC and with its approval.
It therefore represents the decision of the COMELEC itself that the Supreme Court may
review. In the certificate of candidacy filed on 19 November 1987, Frivaldo described himself
as a natural-born citizen of the Philippines, omitting mention of any subsequent loss of
such status. The evidence shows, however, that he was naturalized as a citizen of the United
States in 1983 per the certification from the United States District Court, Northern District of
California, as duly authenticated by Vice Consul Amado P. Cortez of the Philippine Consulate
General in San Francisco, California, U.S.A. There were many other Filipinos in the United
States similarly situated as Frivaldo, and some of them subject to greater risk than he, who
did not find it necessary nor do they claim to have been coerced to abandon their
cherished status as Filipinos. Still, if he really wanted to disavow his American citizenship and
reacquire Philippine citizenship, Frivaldo should have done so in accordance with the laws of
our country. Under CA No. 63 as amended by CA No. 473 and PD No. 725, Philippine
citizenship may be reacquired by direct act of Congress, by naturalization, or by repatriation.
He failed to take such categorical acts. Rhe anomaly of a person sitting as provincial
governor in this country while owing exclusive allegiance to another country cannot be
permitted. The fact that he was elected by the people of Sorsogon does not excuse this
patent violation of the salutary rule limiting public office and employment only to the citizens

of this country. The will of the people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of
ineligibilityQualifications for public office are continuing requirements and must be
possessed not only at the time of appointment or election or assumption of office but during
the officers entire tenure. Once any of the required qualifications is lost, his title may be
seasonably challenged. Frivaldo is disqualified from serving as governor of Sorsogon.

Romualdez-Marcos vs COMELEC
248 SCRA 300
Facts:
March 8, 1995 Marcos filed her Certificate of Candidacy for the position of
Representative of the First District of Leyte with the Provincial Election Supervisor.
March 23, 1995 Montejo, incumbent of and candidate for the same position, filed a
petition for cancellation and disqualification with the COMELEC, alleging that Marcos did
not meet the residency requirement.
March 29, 1995 Marcos filed an Amended/Corrected Certificate of Candidacy in the
COMELECs head office in Intramuros claiming that her error in the first certificate was
the result of an honest misrepresentation and that she has always maintained
Tacloban City as her domicile or residence.
April 24, 1995 COMELEC Second Division by a vote of 2-1 came up with a Resolution
that found Montejos petition for disqualification meritorious, Marcos corrected
certificate of candidacy void, and her original certificate cancelled.
May 7, 1995 COMELEC en banc denied Marcos Motion for Reconsideration of the
Resolution drafted on April 24.
May 11, 1995 COMELEC issued another Resolution allowing Marcos proclamation to the
office should the results of the canvass show that she obtained the highest number of
votes. However, this was reversed and instead directed that the proclamation would be
suspended even if she did win.
May 25, 1995 In a supplemental petitition, Marcos declared that she was the winner of
the said Congressional election.
Issues/ Held/Ratio:
(1)
WON plaintiff had established legal residency required to be a voter, and thus candidate,
of the first district of Leyte.
Yes. It is the fact if residence, not a statement in a certificate of candidacy which out to
be decisive in determining whether or not an individual has satisfied the constitutions
residency qualification requirement (as intended by the framers of the constitution)2.
The confusion of the honest mistake made when filed her Certificate of Candidacy can
be attributed to the fact that the entry for residence is immediately followed by the entry
for the number of years and months in the residence where the candidate seeks to hold
office immediately after the elections. This honest mistake should not be allowed to

negate the fact of residence in the First District. The instances (i.e. when Marcos lived in
Manila and Ilocos after marrying her husband) used by the COMELEC to disqualify Marcos
were only actual residences incurred during their marriage; and as such, she was
required to change residences and apply for voters registration in these cited locations.
When she got married to the late dictator, it cannot be argued that she lost her domicile
of origin by operation of law stated in Article 110 of the CC3 and further contemplated in
Article 1094 of the same code. It is the husbands right to transfer residences to
wherever he might see fit to raise a family. Thus, the relocation does not mean or intend
to lose the wifes domicile of origin. After the death of her husband, her choice of domicle
was Tacloban, Leyte as expressed when she wrote the PCGG chairman seeking
permission to rehabilitate their ancestral house in Tacloban and their farm in Olot, Leyte.
(2)
WON COMELEC the proper jurisdiction in disqualifying the plaintiff under Article 78 of the
Omnibus Election Code had already lapsed, thereby transmitting jurisdiction to the
House of Representatives.
Yes. The mischief in petitioners contention lies in the fact that our courts and other
quasi-judicial bodies would then refuse to render judgments merely on the ground of
having failed to reach a decision within a given or prescribed period. In any event,
Sections 6
2 As discussed during the deliberations of the 1987 Constitution by Mr. Nolledo and Mr.
Davide, and Mrs. Rosario and Mr. De Los Reyes in the RECORD OF THE 1987
CONSTITUTIONAL CONVETION July 22, 1986.
3 The husband shall fix the residence of the family. But the court may exempt the wife
from living with the husband if he should live abroad unless in the service of the
Republic.
4 The husband and wife are obligated to live together, observe mutual respect and
fidelity, and render mutual help and support.
and 7 of R.A. 6646 in relation to Sec. 78 of B.P. 881, it is evident that the respondent
Commission does not lose jurisdiction to hear and decide a pending disqualification case
under Sec. 78 of B.P. 881 even after the elections.
(3)
WON the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) had jurisdiction over the
question of the petitioners qualifications after the elections.
No. The HRETs jurisdiction of all contests relating to the elections, returns, and
qualifications of members of Congress begins only after a candidate has become a
member of the House of Representatives.
Puno, J. (Concurring):
All her life, Marcos domicile of origin was Tacloban. When she married the former
dictator, her domicile became subject to change by law and the right to change it was
given by Article 110 of the CC. She has been in Tacloban since 1992 and has lived in
Tolosa since August 1994. Both places are within the First Congressional District of Leyte.

Francisco, J. (Concurring):
Residence for election purposes means domicile. Marcos has been in Tacloban since
1992 and has lived in Tolosa since August 1994. Both places are within the First
Congressional District of Leyte.
Romero, J. (Separate):
Womens rights as per choosing her domicile after husbands death is evident in this
case. Marcos living in Leyte is sufficient to meet the legal residency requirement.
Vitug, J. (Separate):
It seems unsound to vote for someone who has already been declared disqualified. The
Court refrain from any undue encroachment on the ultimate exercise of authority by the
Electoral Tribunal on matters which, by no less than a constitutional fiat, are explicitly
within their exclusive domain. Voted for dismissal.
Mendoza, J. (Concurring):
The issue is whether or not the COMELEC has the power to disqualify candidates on the
ground that they lack eligibility for the office to which they seek to be elected. It has
none and the qualifications of candidates may be questioned only in the event they are
elected, by filing a petition for quo warranto or an election protest in an appropriate
forum (not necessarily COMELEC, but the HRET).
Padilla, J. (Dissenting):
Provisions in the Constitution should be adhered to. The controversy should not be
blurred by academic disquisitions. COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in
holding the petitioner disqualified. And the law is clear that in all situations, the votes
cast for a disqualified candidate shall not be counted.
Regalado, J. (Dissenting):
A woman loses her domicile of origin once she gets married. The death of her husband
does not automatically allow her domicile to shift to its original. Such theory is not stated
in any of the provisions of law.
Davide, Jr. J. (Dissenting):
A writ of certiorari may only be granted if a government branch or agency has acted
without or in excess of its jurisdiction. The COMELECs resolutions are within the scope
and jurisdiction of this particular agencys powers. In agreement with Regalado, re:
womans domicile.