THE CONSTITUTION

1. CONSTITUTIONAL
CONSTRUCTION
CIVIL LIBERTIES V EXEC SEC FACTS:
Petitioners: Ignacio P. Lacsina, Luis R.
Mauricio, Antonio R. Quintos and Juan T.
David for petitioners in 83896 and Juan T.
David for petitioners in 83815. Both
petitions were consolidated and are being
resolved jointly as both seek a declaration
of the unconstitutionality of Executive
Order No. 284 issued by President Corazon
C. Aquino on July 25, 1987.
Executive Order No. 284, according to the
petitioners allows members of the Cabinet,
their undersecretaries and assistant
secretaries to hold other than government
offices or positions in addition to their
primary positions. The pertinent provisions
of EO 284 is as follows:
Section 1: A cabinet member,
undersecretary or assistant secretary or
other appointive officials of the Executive
Department may in addition to his primary
position, hold not more than two positions
in the government and government
corporations and receive the corresponding
compensation therefor.
Section 2: If they hold more
positions more than what is required in
section 1, they must relinquish the excess
position in favor of the subordinate official
who is next in rank, but in no case shall
any official hold more than two positions
other than his primary position.
Section 3: AT least 1/3 of the
members of the boards of such corporation
should either be a secretary, or
undersecretary, or assistant secretary.

The petitioners are challenging EO 284s

constitutionality because it adds
exceptions to Section 13 of Article VII other
than those provided in the constitution.
According to the petitioners, the only
exceptions against holding any other office
or employment in government are those
provided in the Constitution namely: 1. The
Vice President may be appointed as a
Member of the Cabinet under Section 3
par.2 of Article VII. 2. The secretary of
justice is an ex-officio member of the
Judicial and Bar Council by virtue of Sec. 8
of article VIII.

Petitioners insist that because of the

phrase "unless otherwise provided in this
Constitution" used in Section 13 of Article
VII, the exception must be expressly
provided in the Constitution.

Public respondents, on the other hand,

maintain that the phrase "unless otherwise
provided in the Constitution" in Section 13,
Article VII makes reference to Section 7,
par. (2), Article I-XB insofar as the
appointive officials mentioned therein are
concerned.
Issue:
Whether or not Executive Order No. 284 is
constitutional.
Decision:
No. It is unconstitutional. Petition granted.
Executive Order No. 284 was declared null
and void.
Ratio:
In the light of the construction given to
Section 13 of Article VII, Executive Order
No. 284 is unconstitutional. By restricting
the number of positions that Cabinet
members, undersecretaries or assistant
secretaries may hold in addition their
primary position to not more that two
positions in the government and
government corporations, EO 284 actually
allows them to hold multiple offices or
employment in direct contravention of the
express mandate of Sec. 13 of Article VII of
the 1987 Constitution prohibiting them
from doing so, unless otherwise provided in
the 1987 Constitution itself.
The phrase unless otherwise provided in
this constitution must be given a literal
interpretation to refer only to those
particular instances cited in the
constitution itself: Sec. 3 Art VII and Sec. 8
Art. VIII.
FRANCISCO v HR
FACTS: Within a period of 1 year, 2
impeachment proceedings were filed
against Supreme Court Chief Justice Hilario
Davide. The justiciable controversy in this
case was the constitutionality of the
subsequent filing of a second complaint to
controvert the rules of impeachment
provided for by law.
ISSUE: Whether or not the filing of the
second impeachment complaint against
Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. with the
House of Representatives is constitutional,

and whether the resolution thereof is a

political question h; as resulted in a
political crisis.

HELD: Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the

Rules of Procedure in Impeachment
Proceedings which were approved by the
House of Representativesare
unconstitutional. Consequently, the second
impeachment complaint against Chief
Justice Hilario G. Davide, is barred under
paragraph 5, section 3 of Article XI of the
Constitution.

REASONING:In passing over the complex

issues arising from the controversy, this
Court is ever mindful of the essential truth
that the inviolate doctrine of separation of
powers among the legislative, executive or
judicial branches of government by no
means prescribes for absolute autonomy in
the discharge by each of that part of the
governmental power assigned to it by the
sovereign people.

At the same time, the corollary doctrine of

checks and balances which has been
carefully calibrated by the Constitution to
temper the official acts of each of these
three branches must be given effect
without destroying their indispensable coequality. There exists no constitutional
basis for the contention that the exercise of
judicial review over impeachment
proceedings would upset the system of
checks and balances. Verily, the
Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole
and "one section is not to be allowed to
defeat another." Both are integral
components of the calibrated system of
independence and interdependence that
insures that no branch of government act
beyond the powers assigned to it bythe
Constitution.

The framers of the Constitution also

understood initiation in its ordinary
meaning. Thus when a proposal reached
the floor proposing that "A vote of at least
one-third of all the Members of the House
shall be necessary to initiate
impeachment proceedings," this was met
by a proposal to delete the line on the
ground that the vote of the House does not
initiate impeachment proceeding but
rather the filing of a complaint does.

Having concluded that the initiation takes

place by the act of filing and referral or
endorsement of the impeachment
complaint to the House Committee on
Justice or, by the filing by at least one-third
of the members of the House of
Representatives with the Secretary General
of the House, the meaning of Section 3 (5)
of Article XI becomes clear. Once an
impeachment complaint has been initiated,
another impeachment complaint may not
be filed against the same official within a
one year period.

The Court in the present petitions

subjected to judicial scrutiny and resolved
on the merits only the main issue of
whether the impeachment proceedings
initiated against the Chief Justice
transgressed the constitutionally imposed
one-year time bar rule. Beyond this, it did
not go about assuming jurisdiction where it
had none, nor indiscriminately turn
justiciable issues out of decidedly political
questions. Because it is not at all the
business of this Court to assert judicial
dominance over the other two great
branches of the government.
B. AMMENDMENT and REVISION
ARTICLE XVII
Amendments or Revisions
SECTION 1. Any amendment to, or revision
of, this Constitution may be proposed by:
(1) The Congress, upon a vote of threefourths of all its Members; or
(2) A constitutional convention.
SECTION 2. Amendments to this
Constitution may likewise be directly
proposed by the people through initiative
upon a petition of at least twelve per
centum of the total number of registered
voters, of which every legislative district
must be represented by at least three per
centum of the registered voters therein. No
amendment under this section shall be
authorized within five years following the
ratification of this Constitution nor oftener
than once every five years thereafter.
The Congress shall provide for the
implementation of the exercise of this
right.
SECTION 3. The Congress may, by a vote of
two-thirds of all its Members, call a
constitutional convention, or by a majority

vote of all its Members, submit to the

electorate the question of calling such a
convention.
SECTION 4. Any amendment to, or revision
of, this Constitution under Section 1 hereof
shall be valid when ratified by a majority of
the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be
held not earlier than sixty days nor later
than ninety days after the approval of such
amendment or revision.

shift the present Bicameral-Presidential

system to a Unicameral-Parliamentary form
of government.
On 30 August 2006, the Lambino Group
filed an Amended Petition with the
COMELEC indicating modifications in the
proposed Article XVIII (Transitory

Any amendment under Section 2 hereof

shall be valid when ratified by a majority of
the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be
held not earlier than sixty days nor later
than ninety days after the certification by
the Commission on Elections of the
sufficiency of the petition.
1. DISTINCTION
LAMBINO V COMELEC

FACTS:
On 25 August 2006, Lambino et al filed a
petition with the COMELEC to hold a
plebiscite that will ratify their initiative
petition to change the 1987 Constitution
under Section 5(b) and (c)2 and Section 73
of Republic Act No. 6735 or the Initiative
and Referendum Act.
The Lambino Group alleged that their
petition had the support of 6,327,952
individuals constituting at least twelve per
centum (12%) of all registered voters, with
each legislative district represented by at

Provisions) of their initiative.

The COMELEC denied the petition citing
Santiago v. COMELEC declaring RA 6735
inadequate to implement the initiative
clause on proposals to amend the
Constitution.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the Lambino Groups initiative
petition complies with Section 2, Article
XVII of the Constitution on amendments to
the Constitution through a peoples
initiative;
2. Whether this Court should revisit its
ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735
incomplete, inadequate or wanting in
essential terms and conditions to
implement the initiative clause on
proposals to amend the Constitution; and
HELD:

least three per centum (3%) of its

registered voters. The Lambino Group also

1.

claimed that COMELEC election registrars

Comply with Section 2, Article XVII of the

had verified the signatures of the 6.3

Constitution on Direct Proposal by the

million individuals.

People

The Lambino Groups initiative petition

Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution is

changes the 1987 Constitution by

the governing constitutional provision that

modifying Sections 1-7 of Article VI

allows a peoples initiative to propose

(Legislative Department)4 and Sections 1-4

amendments to the Constitution. This

of Article VII (Executive Department) and

section states:

The Initiative Petition Does Not

by adding Article XVIII entitled Transitory

Provisions. These proposed changes will

Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution

may likewise be directly proposed by the

people through initiative upon a petition of

burden of proving that they complied with

at least twelve per centum of the total

the constitutional requirements in

number of registered voters of which every

gathering the signatures that the petition

legislative district must be represented by

contained, or incorporated by attachment,

at least three per centum of the registered

the full text of the proposed amendments.

voters therein. x x x x (Emphasis supplied)

The Lambino Group did not attach to their
The framers of the Constitution intended

present petition with this Court a copy of

that the draft of the proposed

the paper that the people signed as their

constitutional amendment should be

initiative petition. The Lambino Group

ready and shown to the people before

submitted to this Court a copy of a

they sign such proposal. The framers

signature sheet after the oral arguments of

plainly stated that before they sign there

26 September 2006 when they filed their

is already a draft shown to them. The

Memorandum on 11 October 2006.

framers also envisioned that the people

should sign on the proposal itself because

2.

the proponents must prepare that

Not Necessary

proposal and pass it around for signature.

A Revisit of Santiago v. COMELEC is

The present petition warrants dismissal for

The essence of amendments directly

failure to comply with the basic

proposed by the people through initiative

requirements of Section 2, Article XVII of

upon a petition is that the entire proposal

the Constitution on the conduct and scope

on its face is a petition by the people. This

of a peoples initiative to amend the

means two essential elements must be

Constitution. There is no need to revisit this

present.First, the people must author and

Courts ruling in Santiago declaring RA

thus sign the entire proposal. No agent or

6735 incomplete, inadequate or wanting

representative can sign on their behalf.

in essential terms and conditions to cover

Second, as an initiative upon a petition, the

the system of initiative to amend the

proposal must be embodied in a petition.

Constitution. An affirmation or reversal of

Santiago will not change the outcome of

These essential elements are present only

the present petition. Thus, this Court must

if the full text of the proposed amendments

decline to revisit Santiago which effectively

is first shown to the people who express

ruled that RA 6735 does not comply with

their assent by signing such complete

the requirements of the Constitution to

proposal in a petition. Thus, an amendment

implement the initiative clause on

is directly proposed by the people through

amendments to the Constitution.

initiative upon a petition only if the people

sign on a petition that contains the full text
of the proposed amendments.

2. STAGES:
PROPOSAL STAGE
Occena vs. Comelec

There is no presumption that the

proponents observed the constitutional
requirements in gathering the
signatures. The proponents bear the

Facts: The challenge in these two

prohibition proceedings against the validity
of three BatasangPambansa
Resolutions proposing constitutional
amendments goes further than merely
assailing their alleged constitutional

infirmity. The rather unorthodox aspect of

these petitions is the assertion that the
1973 Constitution is not the fundamental
law. The three Resolutions were: 1)
Resolution No. 1 proposing an amendment
allowing a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines naturalized in a foreign country
to own a limited area of land for residential
purposes 2) Resolution No. 2 dealing with
the Presidency, the Prime Minister and the
Cabinet, and the National Assembly; and 3)
Resolution No. 3 on the amendment to the
Article on the Commission on Elections.
The three resolutions were approved by
the InterimBatasangPambansa sitting as a
constituent assembly on February 5 and
27, 1981 which the date of plebiscite has
been set on April 7, 1981. It is thus within
the 90-day period provided by the
Constitution.
Issues:(1) Whether or not the 1973
Constitution is a fundamental law.
(2) Whether or not the Interim
BatasangPambansa has the power to
propose amendments.
(3) Whether or not the three-fourth
votes is necessary to propose amendments
as well as the standard for proper
submission.
(4) Whether or not the three
BatasangPambansa Resolutions proposing
constitutional amendments are valid.
Held: Yes, the Interim BatasangPambansa
has the power and privilege to propose
amendments. On January 17, 1973, the
present Constitution came into force and
effect. With such a pronouncement by the
Supreme Court and with the recognition of
the cardinal postulate that what the
Supreme Court says is not only entitled to
respect but must also be obeyed, a factor
for instability was removed. Thereafter, as
a matter of law, all doubts were resolved.
The 1973 Constitution is the fundamental
law. The existence of this power is
indubitable as the applicable provision in
the 1976 Amendments is quite
explicit.The Interim BatasangPambansa,
sitting as a constituent body, can propose
amendments. In that capacity, only a
majority vote is needed. It would be an
indefensible proposition to assert that the
three-fourth votes required when it sits as
a legislative body applies as well when it
has been convened as the agency through
which amendments could be proposed.
That is not a requirement as far as a
constitutional convention is concerned. It is
not a requirement either when, as in this
case, the Interim BatasangPambansa
exercises its constituent power to propose
amendments. Resolution No. 1 proposing
an amendment allowing a natural-born
citizen of the Philippines naturalized in a
foreign country to own a limited area of

land for residential purposes was approved

by the vote of 122 to 5; Resolution No. 2
dealing with the Presidency, the Prime
Minister and the Cabinet, and the National
Assembly by a vote of 147 to 5 with 1
abstention; and Resolution No. 3 on the
amendment to the Article on the
Commission on Elections by a vote of 148
to 2 with 1 abstentionThe three resolutions
were approved by
the InterimBatasangPambansa sitting as a
constituent assembly on February 5 and
27, 1981, thus making them valid.

IMBONG VS COMELEC
FACTS:
Manuel Imbong and Raul Gonzales, filing
separate cases and both interested in
running as candidates for delegates to the
Constitutional Convention, question the
constitutionality of R.A. No. 6132, claiming
that it prejudices their rights as such
candidates. On March 16, 1967, the
Congress, acting as a Constituent
Assembly, passed Res. No. 2 which called
for a Constitutional Convention which shall
have two delegates from each
representative district. On June 17, 1969,
the Congress passed Resolution No. 4
amending Resolution No. 2 by providing
that the convention shall be composed of
320 delegates with at least two delegates
from each representative district. On
August 24, 1970, the Congress, acting as a
legislative body, enacted R.A. 6132,
implementing Res Nos. 2 and 4 and
expressly repealing R.A 4914 which
previously implemented Res. No. 2.
Gonzales assails the validity of Sections 2,
4, 5, and par. 1 of 8(a), and the entire law,
while Imbong questions the
constitutionality of par. 1 of Sec. 8(a) of
said R.A. 6132.

ISSUES:
1. Does the Congress have the right to
call for a constitutional convention and set
the parameters of such convention?
2. Are the provisions of R.A. 6132
constitutional?
HELD:
1. The Congress has authority to call a
constitutional convention as the
constituent assembly. The Congress also
has the authority to enact implementing
details, contained in Res. Nos. 2 and 4 and
R.A. 6132, since such details are within the
competence of the Congress in exercise of
its legislative power.

2. The provisions are constitutional. Sec.

4 of R.A. 6132 is merely in application with
Sec. 2 of Art. XII of the Constitution and
does not constitute a denial of due process
or equal protection of the law. Sec. 2 also
merely obeyed the intent of the Congress
in Res. Nos. 2 and 4 regarding the
apportionment of delegates. The
challenged disqualification of an elected
delegate from running for any public office
in Sec. 5 is a valid limitation as it is
reasonable and not arbitrary. Lastly, par. 1
of Sec. 8(a) which is both contested by the
petitioners is still valid as the restriction
contained in the section is so narrow that
basic constitutional rights remain
substantially intact and inviolate thus the
limitation is a valid infringement of the
constitutional guarantees invoked by the
petitioners.

Constitution, unlike in the other modes of

initiative.
ISSUE:
WON R.A. No. 6735 sufficient to enable
amendment of the Constitution by peoples
initiative.
WON RA 6735 was intended to include
initiative

on

amendments

to

the

Constitution, and if so WON the Act as

worded adequately covers such initiative.
WON COMELEC Res. No. 2300 regarding

SANTIAGO V COMELEC

the conduct of initiative on amendments to

FACTS: On December 6, 1996, Atty. Jesus S.

the constitution is valid, considering the

Delfin, founding member of the Movement

absence in the law of specific provisions on

for

the conduct of such initiative?

People's

COMELEC

Initiative,

"Petition

filed
to

with

the

Amend

the

Constitution, to Lift Term Limits of Elective

Officials,

by

People's

Initiative"

citing

Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution.

Acting on the petition, the COMELEC set
the case for hearing and directed Delfin to

WON the lifting of term limits of elective

national and local official, as proposed in
the

draft

petition

would

constitute

revision of , or an amendment of the

constitution.

have the petition published. After the

WON the COMELEC can take cognizance of

hearing the arguments between petitioners

or has jurisdiction over the petition.

and

opposing

parties,

the

COMELEC

directed Delfin and the oppositors to file

their

"memoranda

and/or

WON it is proper for the Supreme Court to

take cognizance of the petition when there
is a pending case before the COMELEC.

oppositions/memoranda" within five days.

On December 18, 1996, Senator Miriam
Defensor Santiago, Alexander Padilla, and
Maria Isabel Ongpin filed a special civil
action for prohibition under Rule 65 raising
the following arguments, among others:

HELD: NO. R.A. 6735 is inadequate to cover

the system of initiative on amendments to
the

Constitution.

Under

the

said

law,

initiative on the Constitution is confined

only to proposals to AMEND. The people
are not accorded the power to "directly

1.) That the Constitution can only be

amended by peoples initiative if there is
an enabling law passed by Congress, to
which no such law has yet been passed;
and

propose, enact, approve, or reject, in whole

or in part, the Constitution" through the
system of initiative. They can only do so
with

respect

resolutions."

to

"laws,

The

use

ordinances,
of

the

or

clause

2.) That R.A. 6735 does not suffice as an

"proposed laws sought to be enacted,

enabling law on peoples initiative on the

approved

or

rejected,

amended

or

repealed" denotes that R.A. No. 6735

excludes initiative on amendments to the

to run as delegates to the constitutional

Constitution. Also, while the law provides

convention without forfeiting their seats.

subtitles

Congress passed a bill, which, approved by

for

National

Initiative

and

Referendum and for Local Initiative and

Referendum, no subtitle is provided for
initiative on the Constitution. This means
that the main thrust of the law is initiative
and referendum on national and local laws.
If R.A. No. 6735 were intended to fully
provide for the implementation of the
initiative

on

amendments

to

the

Constitution, it could have provided for a

subtitle therefor, considering that in the
order of things, the primacy of interest, or
hierarchy of values, the right of the people
to directly propose amendments to the
Constitution is far more important than the
initiative on national and local laws. While
R.A.

No.

process

6735

specially

detailed

the

in implementing

initiative

and

referendum on national and local laws, it

intentionally did not do so on the system of
initiative

on

amendments

to

the

Constitution. COMELEC Resolution No. 2300

the President on 17 June 1967, became

Republic Act No. 4913, providing that the
amendments to the Constitution proposed
in the aforementioned Resolutions No. 1
and 3 be submitted, for approval by the
people, at the general elections on 14
November 1967.

Issue: Whether or not a resolution of

Congress, acting as a constituent
assembly, violates the Constitution
pursuant to Section 1 Article XV.

Decision: The power to amend the

Constitution or to propose amendments is
not included in the general grant of
legislative power to Congress. Pursuant to
Section 1 Article XV, The Congress in joint
session assembled, by a vote of threefourths of all the Members of the Senate

is hereby declared void and orders the

and of the House of Representatives voting

respondent to forthwith dismiss the Delfin

separately, may propose amendments to

Petition . TRO issued on 18 December 1996

this Constitution or call a contention for

is made permanent. WHEREFORE, petition

that purpose. Such amendments shall be

is GRANTED.

valid as part of this Constitution when

approved by a majority of the votes cast at

RATIFICATION STAGE
GONZALEZ V COMELEC

an election at which the amendments are

submitted to the people for their
ratification. The said resolutions are null

Facts: The case is an original action for

and void because the Congress may not

prohibition, with preliminary injunction. On

avail of both amending and calling a

March 16, 1967, the Senate and the House

convention at the same time and the

of Representatives passed the following

election must be a special election not a

resolutions, (1) increasing the number of

general election for amendment to the

seats in the lower house from 120 to 180,

Constitution shall be submitted for

(2) calling for a constitutional convention,

ratification.

and (3) allowing members of the Congress

members of Congress had been counted,

the
3. JUDICIAL REVIEW

affirmative

votes

in

favor

of

the

proposed amendment would have been

short of the necessary three-fourths vote in

Mabanag vs. Vito

either branch of Congress. The petition for

[GR L-1123, 5 March 1947]

prohibition

En Banc, Tuason (J): 3 concur, 1 concur in

enforcement

separate opinion, 2 dissent in separate

resolution, as it is allegedly contrary to the

opinions, 1 filed separate opinion

Constitution.

sought
of

to
said

The

prevent

the

congressional

members

of

the

Commission on Elections, the Treasurer of

Facts:

Three

senators

and

eight

representatives had been proclaimed by a

majority

vote

of

the

Commission

on

Elections as having been elected senators

and representatives in the elections held
on 23 April 1946. The three senators were

the Philippines, the Auditor General, and

the Director of the Bureau of Printing are
made

defendants.

Eight

senators,

17

representatives, and the presidents of the

Democratic Alliance, the Popular Front and
the Philippine Youth Party.

suspended by the Senate shortly after the

opening of the first session of Congress

Issue: Whether the Court may inquire upon

following the elections, on account of

the irregularities in the approval of the

alleged irregularities in their election. The

resolution proposing an amendment to the

eight representatives since their election

Constitution.

had not been allowed to sit in the lower

House, except to take part in the election
of the Speaker, for the same reason,
although

they

suspended.

had

not

been

resolution

formally

for

their

suspension had been introduced in the

House

of

resolution

Representatives,
had

not

been

but

that

acted

upon

definitely by the House when the petition

for prohibition was filed. As a consequence
these

three

senators

and

eight

representatives did not take part in the

passage of the congressional resolution,
designated "Resolution of both houses
proposing
Constitution

an
of

amendment
the

Philippines

to

the
to

be

appended as an ordinance thereto," nor

was their membership reckoned within the
computation of the necessary three-fourths
vote which is required in proposing an
amendment to the Constitution. If these

Held: It is a doctrine too well established to

need citation of authorities that political
questions are not within the province of the
judiciary, except to the extent that power
to deal with such questions has been
conferred upon the courts by express
constitutional or statutory provision. This
doctrine is predicated on the principle of
the separation of powers, a principle also
too well known to require elucidation or
citation of authorities. The difficulty lies in
determining what matters fall within the
meaning of political question. The term is
not susceptible of exact definition, and
precedents and authorities are not always
in full harmony as to the scope of the
restrictions, on this ground, on the courts
to meddle with the actions of the political
departments

of

the

government.

If

political question conclusively binds the

judges out of respect to the political

departments,

or

the President of his present powers. 20

resolution also binds the judges under the

days after or on 22 September 1976, the

"enrolled bill rule" born of that respect. If

President issued another related decree,

ratification of an amendment is a political

Presidential Decree 1031, amending the

question,

previous

duly

proposal

certified

which

law

leads

to

Presidential

Decree

991,

by

ratification has to be a political question.

declaring the provisions of Presidential

The two steps complement each other in a

Decree 229 providing for the manner of

scheme

single

voting and canvass of votes in "barangays"

objective. It is to be noted that the

(Citizens Assemblies) applicable to the

amendatory process as provided in section

national

I of Article XV of the Philippine Constitution

October

"consists

parts:

Presidential Decree 1031 repealed inter

proposal and ratification." There is no logic

alia, Section 4, of Presidential Decree 991.

in attaching political character to one and

On the same date of 22 September 1976,

withholding that character from the other.

the President issued Presidential Decree

Proposal to amend the Constitution is a

1033,

highly political function performed by the

submitted to the people in the referendum-

Congress

legislative

plebiscite on 16 October 1976. The Decree

capacity and committed to its charge by

recites in its "whereas" clauses that the

the Constitution itself. The exercise of this

people's

power

any

convening of the interim National Assembly

intervention by the Chief Executive. If on

evinces their desire to have such body

grounds

abolished

intended

is

of

in

(only)

its

even

of

to

achieve

two

distinct

sovereign

in

dependent

expediency

of

scrupulous

referendum-plebiscite
1976.

stating

Quite

the

continued

and

of

16

relevantly,

questions

opposition

replaced

to

to

thru

he

the

attention of the judiciary be needed to

constitutional amendment, providing for a

safeguard public interest, there is less

new interim legislative body, which will be

reason for judicial inquiry into the validity

submitted directly to the people in the

of a proposal then into that of ratification.

referendum-plebiscite of October 16. The

Commission on Elections was vested with
the exclusive supervision and control of the
October

SANIDAD v COMELEC

Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential

991

calling

for

national

referendum on 16 October 1976 for the

Citizens

Assemblies

("barangays")

to

resolve, among other things, the issues of

martial law, the interim assembly, its
replacement,

the

National

Referendum-

Plebiscite. On 27 September 1976, Pablo C.

Facts: On 2 September 1976, President

Decree

1976

powers

of

such

replacement, the period of its existence,

the length of the period for the exercise by

Sanidad and Pablito V. Sanidad, father and

son, commenced L-44640 for Prohibition
with

Preliminary

Injunction

seeking

to

enjoin the Commission on Elections from

holding and conducting the Referendum
Plebiscite
without

on
force

October
and

16;

effect

to

declare

Presidential

Decree Nos. 991 and 1033, insofar as they

propose amendments to the Constitution,
as well as Presidential Decree 1031, insofar
as it directs the Commission on Elections to

supervise, control, hold, and conduct the

Members, submit the question of calling

Referendum-Plebiscite

16

such a convention to the electorate in an

October 1976. They contend that under the

election." Section 2 thereof provides that

1935 and 1973 Constitutions there is no

"Any amendment to, or revision of, this

grant

to

Constitution shall be valid when ratified by

exercise the constituent power to propose

a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite

amendments to the new Constitution. As a

which shall be held not later than three

consequence,

Referendum-Plebiscite

months a after the approval of such

on October 16 has no constitutional or

amendment or revision." In the present

legal

period of transition, the interim National

to

the

basis.

another

44684,

incumbent

the

On

action

Preliminary

scheduled

30

President

September

for

Injunction,

1976,

Prohibition
docketed

was

instituted

by

delegate

to

Guzman,

on

with

Assembly

instituted

in

the

Transitory

as

L-

Provisions is conferred with that amending

Vicente

M.

power.

the

1971

Section

Provisions

reads

15

of

"The

the

Transitory

interim

National

Constitutional Convention, asserting that

Assembly, upon special call by the interim

the power to propose amendments to, or

Prime Minister, may, by a majority vote of

revision of the Constitution during the

all its Members, propose amendments to

transition period is expressly conferred on

this Constitution. Such amendments shall

the interim National Assembly under action

take effect when ratified in accordance

16, Article XVII of the Constitution. Still

with Article Sixteen hereof." There are,

another

therefore, two periods contemplated in the

petition

Preliminary

for

Injunction

Prohibition
was

filed

with
on

constitutional life of the nation, i.e., period

October 1976 by Raul M. Gonzales, his son

of normalcy and period of transition. In

Raul Jr., and Alfredo Salapantan, docketed

times of normalcy, the amending process

as L-44714, to restrain the implementation

may be initiated by the proposals of the (1)

of Presidential Decrees relative to the

regular National Assembly upon a vote of

forthcoming

three-fourths of all its members; or (2) by a

Referendum-Plebiscite

of

October 16.

Constitutional Convention called by a vote

Issue: Whether the President may call upon

a referendum for the amendment of the

of two-thirds of all the Members of the

National Assembly. However the calling of a
Constitutional

Constitution.

Convention

may

be

submitted to the electorate in an election

Held: Section 1 of Article XVI of the 1973

voted upon by a majority vote of all the

Constitution on Amendments ordains that

members of the National Assembly. In

"(1) Any amendment to, or revision of, this

times of transition, amendments may be

Constitution may be proposed by the

proposed by a majority vote of all the

National Assembly upon a vote of three-

Members of the interim National Assembly

fourths

upon special call by the interim Prime

constitutional convention. (2) The National

Minister. The Court in Aquino v. COMELEC,

Assembly may, by a vote of two-thirds of

had already settled that the incumbent

all

constitutional

President is vested with that prerogative of

convention or, by a majority vote of all its

discretion as to when he shall initially

its

of

all

its

Members,

Members,

call

or

by

convene the interim National Assembly.

bestowed upon it by the fundamental

The Constitutional Convention intended to

charter itself. In the Philippines, that power

leave to the President the determination of

is provided for in Article XVI of the 1973

the time when he shall initially convene the

Constitution

interim National Assembly, consistent with

Assembly) or in Section 15 of the Transitory

the prevailing conditions of peace and

Provisions

(for

order in the country. When the Delegates

Assembly).

While

to the Constitutional Convention voted on

business of the legislating body to legislate

the Transitory Provisions, they were aware

for the nation by virtue of constitutional

of the fact that under the same, the

conferment, amending of the Constitution

incumbent

the

is not legislative in character. In political

discretion as to when he could convene the

science a distinction is made between

interim National Assembly. The President's

constitutional

decision to defer the convening of the

character

interim

found

character. The distinction, however, is one

support from the people themselves. In the

of policy, not of law. Such being the case,

plebiscite of January 10-15, 1973, at which

approval of the President of any proposed

the ratification of the 1973 Constitution

amendment is a misnomer. The prerogative

was submitted, the people voted against

of the President to approve or disapprove

the convening of the interim National

applies only to the ordinary cases of

Assembly. In the referendum of 24 July

legislation. The President has nothing to do

1973,

with

President

National

the

was

Assembly

Citizens

given

soon

Assemblies

("bagangays") reiterated their sovereign

(for

and

the

regular

the

interim

ordinarily

content
that

proposition

National

of
of

or

National
it

an
a

is

the

organic

legislative

adoption

of

amendments to the Constitution.

will to withhold the convening of the

interim National Assembly. Again, in the
referendum of 27 February 1975, the
proposed question of whether the interim
National

Assembly

shall

be

initially

convened was eliminated, because some of

the members of Congress and delegates of
the Constitutional Convention, who were
deemed automatically members of the
interim National Assembly, were against its
inclusion

since

in

that

referendum

of

January, 1973 the people had already

resolved against it. In sensu striciore, when
the legislative arm of the state undertakes
the

proposals

of

amendment

to

Constitution, that body is not in the usual

function of lawmaking. It is not legislating
when engaged in the amending process.
Rather, it is exercising a peculiar power

C. THE CONSTITUTION AND THE

COURTS
1. VOTING OF THE SC (SEE ARTICLE 8,
SEC 4)
SECTION 4. (1) The Supreme Court shall be
composed of a Chief Justice and fourteen
Associate Justices. It may sit en banc or in
its discretion, in divisions of three, five, or
seven Members. Any vacancy shall be filled
within ninety days from the occurrence
thereof.
(2) All cases involving the constitutionality
of a treaty, international or executive
agreement, or law, which shall be heard by
the Supreme Court en banc, and all other
cases which under the Rules of Court are
required to be heard en banc, including
those involving the constitutionality,
application, or operation of presidential
decrees, proclamations, orders,
instructions, ordinances, and other
regulations, shall be decided with the
concurrence of a majority of the Members
who actually took part in the deliberations
on the issues in the case and voted
thereon.

(3) Cases or matters heard by a division

shall be decided or resolved with the
concurrence of a majority of the Members
who actually took part in the deliberations
on the issues in the case and voted
thereon, and in no case, without the
concurrence of at least three of such
Members. When the required number is not
obtained, the case shall be decided en
banc: Provided, that no doctrine or
principle of law laid down by the court in a
decision rendered en banc or in division
may be modified or reversed except by the
court sitting en banc.

the prima facie nature of the filing of

charges for the commission of such crimes.

He also questioned the accreditation of

some

political

parties

by respondent COMELEC, as authorized by

Batas Pambansa Blg. 53, on the ground
that it is contrary to section 9(1), Art. XII(C)
of the Constitution, which provides that a
"bona fide candidate for any public office

REQUISITES FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW:

1. ACTUAL CASE OR
CONTROVERSY

shall be free from any form of harassment

and discrimination." Apart form this, hey

Dumlao v COMELEC

also attacked the term of office and the

election period. These were Sec 7 of BP 51,

Facts:

Sec 4; Sec 6, and Sec 1 of BP 52.

Petitioner Dumlao is a former Governor of

Nueva Vizcaya, who has filed his certificate
of candidacy for said position of Governor
in the forthcoming elections of January 30,
1980.

He

Issue:
1. Did petitioners have standing
2. Are the statutory provisions violative of
the Constitution?

specifically

questions

the

constitutionality of section 4 of Batas

Pambansa Blg. 52 as discriminatory and
contrary to theequal protection and due
process guarantees of the Constitution.

S4 -Any retired elective provincial, city of

municipal

official

who

has

received

payment of the retirement benefits to

which he is entitled under the law and who
shall have been 65 years of age at the
commencement of the term of office to
which he seeks to be elecOted, shall not be
qualified to run for the same elective local

Held:
1. No
2.

Dumlao's

petition

dismissed.

Igot's

petition partially granted.

Petition granted

Ratio:
1. Dumalo sued as a candidate while Igot
sued as a taxpayer. In order to determine
judicial

review,

three

requisites

are

present:
a. actual case and controversy
b. proper party
c. existence of a constitutional question

office from which he has retired.

a. Dumlao has not yet been affected by the
He claimed that the aforecited provision
was directed insidiously against him, and
that the classification provided therein is
based on "purely arbitrary grounds and,
therefore, class legislation.

statute. No petition has yet been filed for

his

disqualification.

It

was

only

hypothetical question.
b. Did they sustain direct injury as a result
of the enforcement? No one has yet been
adversely affected by the operation of

His colleague Igot, assailed the same law

for the prohibition for candidcay of a
person who was convicted of a crime given
that there was judgment for conviction and

the statutes.
c. They are actually without cause of
action. It follows that the necessity for
resolving the issue of constitutionality is

absent, and procedural regularity would

does not deny equal protection, neither

require that his suit be dismissed.

does it permit such denial.

However,

procedural

In fine, it bears reiteration that the equal

standard due to the public interest involved

protection clause does not forbid all legal

and the imminent elections.

classification.

they

relaxed

the

What

classification

is

proscribes

which

is

is arbitrary and

2. Section 4 of BP Blg. 52 is not contrary

unreasonable. hat constitutional guarantee

to equal

is

protection.

The

constitutional

not

violated

by

reasonable

guarantee of equal protection of the laws is

classification is germane to the purpose of

subject to rational classification.

the law and applies to all those belonging

to the same class.

If the groupings are based on reasonable

and real differentiations, one class can be

The purpose of the law is to allow the

treated

and

emergence

another

class.

regulated

younger

blood

in

local

service, employees 65 years of age, have

being pursuant to that purpose, it cannot

been

from

be considered invalid "even if at times, it

younger employees. Employees attaining

may be susceptible to the objection that it

that

is marred by theoretical inconsistencies.

classified

are

subject

of

of

governments. The classification in question

age

purposes

from
public

validly

For

differently

differently

to

compulsory

retirement, while those of younger ages

are not so compulsorily retirable.

Regarding Igot's petition, the court held

that explicit is the constitutional provision

The

requirement

to

retire

government

that,

in

all criminal

prosecutions,

the

employees at 65 may or may not be a

accused shall be presumed innocent until

reasonable classification. Young blood can

the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the

be encouraged to come in to politics.

right to be heard by himself and counsel.

An

accusation,

according

to

the

But, in the case of a 65-year old elective

fundamental law, is not synonymous with

local official who has already retired, there

guilt. The challenged proviso contravenes

is reason to disqualify him from running for

the

the same office, as provided for in the

innocence,

challenged provision. The need for new

is disqualified from

blood assumes relevance.

office on the ground alone that charges

constitutional

presumption

as

of

candidate

running

from

public

have been filed against him before a civil

The tiredness of the retiree for government

or military tribunal. It condemns before one

work is present, and what is emphatically

is fully heard. In ultimate effect, except as

significant is that the retired employee has

to the degree of proof, no distinction is

already

made between a person convicted of acts

declared

himself

tired

an

unavailable for the same government work,

of

disloyalty

and

one

against

whom

but, which, by virtue of a change of mind,

charges have been filed for such acts, as

he would like to assume again.

both of them would be ineligible to run for

public office.

It is for the very reason that inequality will

neither result from the application of the

A person disqualified to run for public office

challenged provision. Just as that provision

on the ground that charges have been filed

against him is virtually placed in the same

category as a person already convicted of

Hay Station (Camp John Hay) in the City of

a crime with the penalty of arresto, which

Baguio.

carries with it the accessory penalty of

suspension of the right to hold office during

RA 7227 created the Bases Conversion and

the term of the sentence.

Development Authority' (BCDA), vesting it

with powers pertaining to the multifarious

And although the filing of charges is

considered as but prima facie evidence,
and therefore, may be rebutted, yet, there
is "clear and present danger" that because
the

proximity

of

the

elections,

time

constraints will prevent one charged with

aspects

of

carrying

out

the

ultimate

objective of utilizing the base areas in

accordance with the declared government
policy. RA 7227 likewise created the Subic
Special Economic [and Free Port] Zone

acts of disloyalty from offering contrary

(Subic SEZ) the metes and bounds of which

proof to overcome the prima facie evidence

were to be delineated in a proclamation to

against him.

be

issued

by

the

President

of

the

Philippines; and granted the Subic SEZ

A legislative/administrative determination
of guilt should not be allowed to be
substituted for a judicial determination.
Igot's petition was meritorious.

incentives ranging from tax and duty-free

importations,

exemption

of

businesses

therein from local and national taxes, to

other hall-narks of a liberalized financial
and business climate. RA 7227 expressly
gave authority to the President to create

JOHN

HAY

PEOPLES

ALTERNATIVE

through executive proclamation, subject to

the concurrence of the local government

COALITION v LIM

units
Facts:
Republic

directly

affected,

other

Special

Economic Zones (SEZ) in the areas covered

Act

7227,

entitled

"An

Act

respectively

by

the

Clark

military

Accelerating the Conversion of Military

reservation, the Wallace Air Station in San

Reservations into other Productive uses,

Fernando, La Union, and Camp John Hay.

Creating

and

On 16 August 1993, BCDA entered into a

Development Authority for this Purpose,

Memorandum of Agreement and Escrow

Providing Funds Therefor and for other

Agreement with Tuntex (B.V.L) Co., Ltd.

purposes," otherwise known as the "Bases

(TUNTEX)

Conversion and Development Act of 1992,"

Group,

was enacted on 13 March 1992. The law

corporations registered under the laws of

set out the policy of the government to

the British Virgin Islands, preparatory to

accelerate

balanced

the formation of a joint venture for the

conversion into alternative productive uses

development of Poro Point in La Union and

of the former military bases under the

Camp

1947 Philippines-United States of America

destinations and recreation centers.

the

the

Bases

sound

Conversion

and

and
Inc.

John

Asiaworld

Internationale

(ASIAWORLD),

Hay

as

premier

private

tourist

Military Bases Agreement, namely, the

Clark and Subic military reservations as
well as their extensions including the John

4 months later or on 16 December 16,

1993,

BCDA,

executed

TUNTEX
Joint

and

ASIAWORLD

Venture

Agreements

whereby they bound themselves to put up

be established within the camp." BCDA,

a joint venture company known as the

TUNTEX and ASIAWORLD agreed to some,

Baguio

but

International

Management

Development

Corporation

which

and

rejected

or

modified

the

other

would

proposals of the sanggunian."They stressed

lease areas within Camp John Hay and Poro

the need to declare Camp John Hay a SEZ

Point for the purpose of turning such places

as

into principal tourist and recreation spots,

development

as originally envisioned by the parties

mandate of RA 7227.

under their Memorandum of Agreement.

The Baguio City government meanwhile
passed a number of resolutions in response
to the actions taken by BCDA as owner and
administrator of Camp John Hay.

condition

precedent

in

to

accordance

its

full

with

the

On 11 May 1994, the sanggunian passed a

resolution requesting the Mayor to order
the determination of realty taxes which
may otherwise be collected from real
properties

of

Camp

John

Hay.

The

By Resolution of 29 September 1993, the

resolution was intended to intelligently

Sangguniang Panlungsod of Baguio City

guide the sanggunian in determining its

officially asked BCDA to exclude all the

position on whether Camp John Hay be

barangays partly or totally located within

declared a SEZ, the sanggunian being of

Camp John Hay from the reach or coverage

the

of any plan or program for its development.

exempt

By a subsequent Resolution dated 19

economic activity therein from local or

January 1994, the sanggunian sought from

national taxation.

BCDA an abdication, waiver or quitclaim of

its ownership over the home lots being
occupied by residents of 9 barangays
surrounding the military reservation. Still
by

another

resolution

passed

on

21

February 1994, the sanggunian adopted

and submitted to BCDA a 15-point concept
for the development of Camp John Hay.

view

that

the

such

camp's

declaration
property

would

and

the

More than a month later, however, the

sanggunian passed Resolution 255, (Series
of 1994)," seeking and supporting, subject
to its concurrence, the issuance by then
President

Ramos

of

presidential

proclamation declaring an area of 285.1

hectares

of

the

camp

as

SEZ

in

accordance with the provisions of RA 7227.

The sanggunian's vision expressed, among

Together with this resolution was submitted

other things, a kind of development that

a draft of the proposed proclamation for

affords protection to the environment, the

consideration by the President.

making of a family-oriented type of tourist

destination,

priority

in

employment

opportunities for Baguio residents and free

access

to

the

base

area,

guaranteed

participation of the city government in the

management and operation of the camp,

On 5 July 1994 then President Ramos

issued Proclamation 420 (series of 1994),
"creating and designating a portion of the
area covered by the former Camp John Hay
as the John Hay Special Economic Zone
pursuant to Republic Act 7227."

exclusion of the previously named nine

barangays from the area for development,
and liability for local taxes of businesses to

The John Hay Peoples Alternative Coalition,

et. al. filed the petition for prohibition,

mandamus

and

declaratory

relief

with

present: (1) the existence of an actual and

prayer for a temporary restraining order

appropriate

(TRO) and/or writ of preliminary injunction

substantial interest of the party raising the

on 25 April 1995 challenging, in the main,

constitutional question; (3) the exercise of

the

judicial review is pleaded at the earliest

constitutionality

or

validity

of

case;

opportunity;

the Memorandum of Agreement and Joint

question is the lis mota of the case."

and TUNTEX and ASIAWORLD.

RA

7227

(4)

personal

Proclamation 420 as well as the legality of

Venture Agreement between the BCDA,

and

(2)

the

expressly

concurrence

of

and

constitutional

requires

the

the

affected

local

In maintaining the validity of Proclamation

government units to the creation of SEZs

No. 420, respondents contend that by

out of all the base areas in the country.'"

extending to the John Hay SEZ economic

The grant by the law on local government

incentives similar to those enjoyed by the

units of the right of concurrence on the

Subic SEZ which was established under

bases' conversion is equivalent to vesting a

R.A. No. 7227,

legal standing on them, for it is in effect a

the proclamation is merely

implementing the legislative intent of said

recognition

law to turn the US military bases into hubs

communities

of business activity or investment.

They

particular base area have in its utilization.

the

Thus, the interest of petitioners, being

governments policy of bases conversion

inhabitants of Baguio, in assailing the

can not be achieved without extending the

legality of Proclamation 420, is personal

same tax exemptions granted by R.A. No.

and

7227 to Subic SEZ to other SEZs.

sustained or will sustain direct injury as a

underscore

the

point

that

Denying that Proclamation No. 420 is in

derogation of the local autonomy of Baguio
City

or

that

is

violative

real

nearby

or

substantial

of

the

such

interests

that

surrounding

that

government

they

act

have

being

challenged."
Theirs is a material interest, an interest in

equal

issue affected by the proclamation and not

protection, respondents assail petitioners

merely an interest in the question involved

lack of standing to bring the present suit

or an incidental interest," for what is at

even as taxpayers and in the absence of

stake in the enforcement of Proclamation

any actual case or controversy to warrant

420 is the very economic and social

this Courts exercise of its power of judicial

existence of the people of Baguio City.

guarantee

of

of

the

the

constitutional

it

result

of

review over the proclamation.

Moreover, Petitioners Edilberto T. Claravall

Issue: Whether the petitioners have legal

and Lilia G. Yaranon were duly elected

standing in filing the case questioning the

councilors of Baguio at the time, engaged

validity of Presidential Proclamation 420.

in the local governance of Baguio City and

Held: It is settled that when questions of

constitutional significance are raised, the
court can exercise its power of judicial
review only if the following requisites are

whose duties included deciding for and on

behalf of their constituents the question of
whether to concur with the declaration of a
portion of the area covered by Camp John
Hay as a SEZ. Certainly then, Claravall and

Yaranon,

as

city

officials

who

voted

against" the sanggunian Resolution No.

255

(Series

issuance

of

of

1994)
the

supporting

now

the

challenged

Proclamation 420, have legal standing to

bring the present petition.

rights and interests is thus beyond doubt.

The mootness of the issues concerning the
agreements

events.
What

between

public

and private respondents is of no moment.

petitioners

seek

is

not

the

adjudication of a case but simply the

holding of an academic exercise. And since
a

That there is herein a dispute on legal

questioned

even if there is capable repetition of the

majority

of

the

present

Court

is

unpersuaded that its decision in NPC is

founded in error, it will suffice for present
purposes simply to reaffirm the ruling in
that case. Stare decisis et non quieta
movere. This is what makes the present
case different from the overruling decision

OSMENA v COMELEC
FACTS: Emilio Osmena, a candidate for
President and Pablo Garcia, a candidate to
reelection as governor in Cebu Province.
They are candidates for public office in the
1998 elections, seek to invalidate provision
of RA 6646 (Electoral Reform Law of 1987),

invoked by petitioners.
Nevertheless,

we

have

undertaken

to

revisit the decision in NPC v. COMELEC in

order to clarify our own understanding of
its reach and set forth a theory of freedom
of speech.
CRUZ v DENR, opinion of J. MENDOZA

which prohibits mass media from selling or

giving free of charge print space or air time

FACTS: Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar

for campaign or other political purposes,

Europa filed a suit for prohibition and

except to the COMELEC. They contend that

mandamus

the ban has not only failed to level the

assailing the constitutionality of certain

playing field, but actually worked to the

provisions

of

grave disadvantage of the poor candidates

otherwise

known

by depriving them of a medium which they

Peoples Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA) and its

can afford to pay while their affluent rivals

implementing rules and regulations (IRR).

can always resort to other means of

The petitioners assail certain provisions of

reaching voters as per the events in ruling

the IPRA and its IRR on the ground that

in NPC vs. COMELEC.

these amount to an unlawful deprivation of

ISSUE: Whether or not the contention has

an actual case or controversy.

as

citizens

Republic
as

and

taxpayers,

Act

No.

8371,

the

Indigenous

the States ownership over lands of the

public domain as well as minerals and
other natural resources therein, in violation

HELD: The petition is dismissed. There is

no case or controversy to decide only an

of

the

regalian

doctrine

embodied

in

section 2, Article XII of the Constitution.

academic discussion to hold. General rule

cases rendered moot and academic the
petition will be dismissed, however it can

ISSUE:

Do

the

provisions

of

IPRA

contravene the Constitution?

prosper if it is capable of repetition, thus it

HELD: No, the provisions of IPRA do not

is the courts discretion also to dismiss

contravene the Constitution. Examining the

IPRA, there is nothing in the law that grants

proceedings as are established by law for

to the ICCs/IPs ownership over the natural

the protection or enforcement of rights, or

resources within their ancestral domain.

the prevention, redress or punishment of

Ownership over the natural resources in

wrongs.[1] In this case, the purpose of the

the ancestral domains remains with the

suit is not to enforce a property right of

State and the rights granted by the IPRA to

petitioners against the government and

the ICCs/IPs over the natural resources in

other

their ancestral domains merely gives them,

compensation for injuries suffered by them

as owners and occupants of the land on

as a result of the enforcement of the law,

which the resources are found, the right to

but only to settle what they believe to be

the

the

small

scale

utilization

of

these

respondents

doubtful

or

character

to

of

demand

the

law

in

resources, and at the same time, a priority

question. Any judgment that we render in

in

and

this case will thus not conclude or bind real

exploitation. Additionally, ancestral lands

parties in the future, when actual litigation

and ancestral domains are not part of the

will bring to the Court the question of the

lands of the public domain. They are

constitutionality of such legislation. Such

private lands and belong to the ICCs/IPs by

judgment

native title, which is a concept of private

amounts to no more than an expression of

land title that existed irrespective of any

opinion upon the validity of the provisions

royal grant from the State. However, the

of the law in question.[2]

their

large

scale

development

right of ownership and possession by the

ICCs/IPs of their ancestral domains is a
limited form of ownership and does not
include the right to alienate the same.

cannot

be

executed

as

it

I do not conceive it to be the function of

this

Court

under

Art.

VIII,

of

the

Constitution to determine in the abstract

whether or not there has been a grave

SEPARATE OPINION

abuse of discretion amounting to lack or

excess of jurisdiction on the part of the

MENDOZA, J.:

legislative and executive departments in

This suit was instituted to determine the
constitutionality of certain provisions of
R.A. No. 8371, otherwise known as the
Indigenous Peoples Rights Act. Petitioners
do not complain of any injury as a result of
the application of the statute to them. They

enacting

the

IPRA.

Our

jurisdiction

is

confined to cases or controversies. No one

reading Art. VIII, 5 can fail to note that, in
enumerating the matters placed in the
keeping of this Court, it uniformly begins
with the phrase all cases. . . .

assert a right to seek an adjudication of

constitutional questions as citizens and
taxpayers,

upon

the

plea

that

the

questions raised are of transcendental

importance.

The statement that the judicial power

includes the duty to determine whether
there has been a grave abuse of discretion
was inserted in Art. VIII, 1 not really to give
the judiciary a roving commission to right

The judicial power vested in this Court by

Art. VIII, 1 extends only to cases and
controversies for the determination of such

any wrong it perceives but to preclude

courts from invoking the political question
doctrine in order to evade the decision of

certain cases even where violations of civil

applied to him, it is unconstitutional. Here

liberties are alleged.

the IPRA is sought to be declared void on

The statement is based on the ruling of the

its face.

Court in Lansang v. Garcia,[3] in which this

The only instance where a facial challenge

Court, adopting the submission of the

to a statute is allowed is when it operates

Solicitor General, formulated the following

in the area of freedom of expression. In

test of its jurisdiction in such cases:

such instance, the overbreadth doctrine

[J]udicial inquiry into the basis of the

questioned proclamation can go no further
than to satisfy the Court not that the
Presidents decision is correct and that
public

safety

was

endangered

by

the

rebellion and justified the suspension of the

writ, but that in suspending the writ, the

permits a party to challenge the validity of

a statute even though as applied to him it
is not unconstitutional but it might be if
applied to others not before the Court
whose

activities

are

constitutionally

protected. Invalidation of the statute on its

face rather than as applied is permitted in
the interest of preventing a chilling effect

President did not act arbitrarily.

on freedom of expression. But in other

That is why Art. VII, 18 now confers on any
citizen

standing

proclamation

of

to

question

martial

law

or

the
the

suspension of the privilege of the writ of

habeas corpus. It is noteworthy that Chief
Justice Roberto Concepcion, who chaired

cases, even if it is found that a provision of

a statute is unconstitutional, courts will
decree only partial invalidity unless the
invalid portion is so far inseparable from
the rest of the statute that a declaration of
partial invalidity is not possible.

the Committee on the Judiciary of the

Constitutional Commission, was the author
of the opinions of the Court in Lopez v.

For the Court to exercise its power of

review

when

there

is

no

case

or

controversy is not only to act without

Roxas and Lansang v. Garcia.

jurisdiction but also to run the risk that, in

Indeed,

the

judicial

power

cannot

be

extended to matters which do not involve

actual

cases

or

controversies

without

upsetting the balance of power among the

three branches of the government and
erecting,

as

it

were,

the

judiciary,

particularly the Supreme Court, as a third

branch of Congress, with power not only to
invalidate statutes but even to rewrite
them. Yet that is exactly what we would be
permitting in this case were we to assume
jurisdiction

and

decide

wholesale

adjudicating

abstract

or

hypothetical

questions, its decision will be based on

speculation

rather

than

experience.

Deprived of the opportunity to observe the

impact of the law, the Court is likely to
equate questions of constitutionality with
questions of wisdom and is thus likely to
intrude into the domain of legislation.
Constitutional adjudication, it cannot be
too often repeated, cannot take place in a
vacuum.

the

constitutional validity of the IPRA contrary

to the established rule that a party can
question the validity of a statute only if, as

Some of the brethren contend that not

deciding the constitutional issues raised by
petitioners will be a galling cop out[4] or an
advocacy of timidity, let alone isolationism.

[5] To decline the exercise of jurisdiction in

this power is legitimate only in the last

this case is no more a cop out or a sign of

resort,

timidity

Justice

determination of real, earnest, and vital

Marshall in Marbury v. Madison[6] to hold

controversy between individuals.[9] Until,

that

therefore, an actual case is brought to test

than

it was

petitioner

for

had

the

Chief

right

to

the

and

as

peace of the District of Columbia only to

presumption

declare in the end that after all mandamus

inheres in every statute, must be accorded

did not lie, because 13 of the Judiciary Act

to it.

1789,

which

conferred

original

jurisdiction on the United States Supreme

Court to issue the writ of mandamus, was
unconstitutional as the courts jurisdiction is
mainly appellate.

the

the

the

of

of

in

issuance of his commission as justice of the

of

constitutionality

necessity

IPRA,

constitutionality,

the

which

Justice Kapunan, on the other hand, cites

the statement in Severino v. Governor
General,[10] reiterated in Tanada v. Tuvera,
[11] that when the question is one of public
right and the object of mandamus to

Today Marbury v. Madison is remembered

procure the enforcement of a public duty,

for the institution of the power of judicial

the people are regarded as the real party in

review, and so that there can be no doubt

interest,

of this power of our Court, we in this

instigation the proceedings are instituted

country have enshrined its principle in Art.

need not show that he has any legal or

VIII, 1. Now, the exercise of judicial review

special interest in the result, it being

can result either in the invalidation of an

sufficient that he is a citizen and as such is

act of Congress or in upholding it. Hence,

interested in the execution of the laws. On

the checking and legitimating functions of

the basis of this statement, he argues that

judicial review so well mentioned in the

petitioners have standing to bring these

decisions[7] of this Court.

proceedings.[12]

To

decline,

at

whose

jurisdiction where there is no genuine

question was whether mandamus lay to

controversy is not to show timidity but

compel the Governor General to call a

respect for the judgment of a coequal

special election on the ground that it was

department of government whose acts,

his duty to do so. The ruling was that he

unless shown to be clearly repugnant to

did not have such a duty. On the other

the fundamental law, are presumed to be

hand, although mandamus was issued in

valid.

Tanada

of

exercise

relator

In Severino v. Governor General,[13] the

polestar

the

the

of

The

therefore,

and

constitutional

v.

Tuvera,

it

was

clear

that

adjudication was set forth by Justice Laurel

petitioners had standing to bring the suit,

in the Angara case when he said that this

because the public has a right to know and

power of judicial review is limited to actual

the failure of respondents to publish all

cases and controversies to be exercised

decrees and other presidential issuances in

after full opportunity of argument by the

the Official Gazette placed petitioners in

parties,

the

danger of violating those decrees and

constitutional question raised or the very

issuances. But, in this case, what public

lis mota, presented.[8] For the exercise of

right is there for petitioners to enforce

and

limited

further

to

when the IPRA does not apply to them

except in general and in common with

other citizens.
For the foregoing reasons I vote to dismiss
the petition in this case.

EXC: MOOT AND ACADEMIC

ENRILE v SET

Facts:
Said
case
is
a
Petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended,
assailing for having been issued with grave
abuse of discretion Resolution 97-22
denying petitioners Motion to Annul/Set
Aside Partial Results in Pimentels Protest
and to Conduct Another Appreciation of
Ballots in the Presence of All Parties; and
Resolution No. 98-02 denying his motion
for reconsideration in SET Case No. 001-95,
Aquilino Pimentel, Jr. vs. Gregorio B.
Honasan, et al.
Prior to petition, on January 20,
1995 Senator Pimentel filed and election
protest to the SET against Senator Enrile
and other senatorial candidates who wone
the May 1995 senatorial elections. On June
30, 1995 Enrile filed a counter-protest
where SET required the parties to submit
lists of pilot precincts (no more that 25% of
the total precincts involved in protest). SET
conducted a revision of ballots. On August
21, 1997 SET held a press conference
announcing the partial results in Pimentels
protest, where Enriles result dropped from
11th to 15th. September 24, 1997 petitioner
filed a motion to set aside the results and
re-tabulate in presence of all parties
assailing said results were erroneous;
however SET denied petitioners motion
since there was no sufficient basis. Thus
this case.
Issues:
Public respondent committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to
lack of or excess of jurisdiction in
ruling that no sufficient basis exists
to annul the manifestly erroneous
tabulation of the results of revision
and appreciation of ballots.
Public
respondent
committed
patent and gross error in rectifying
the results of the physical count, as
reflected in the revision reports by
using other election documents.
Public respondent committed grave
abuse of discretion when it
released partial and tentative

results
which
caused
grave
prejudice to herein petitioner.
The public respondent committed
grave abuse of discretion in ruling
that petitioner is not entitled to be
heard
in
the
appreciation
proceedings.

Ruling
As per the main issues of grave
abuse of discretion and the
erroneous partial results claimed
by petitioner does not hold since it
was proven the accuracy of the
tribunals results, proven from
various sources.
The petition is also moved to be
moot and academic since the
tenure of the contested senatorial
election expired on June 30, 1998.
Also since there is no more actual
case and controversy between said
parties and no useful purpose can
be served.
PETITION IS DISMISSED

EXC TO EXC:
1. QUESTION

OF

CAPABLE

REPITION YET EVADING REVIEW

ALUNAN v MIRASOL
Facts:
LGC of 1991 provided for an SK in every
barangay to be composed of a chairman,
7members, a secretary and a treasurer,
and provided that the first SK elections
wereto be held 30 days after the next local
elections. The Local Government Code
wasenacted January 1, 1992.
The first elections under the code were
held May of 1992. August 1992, COMELEC
provided guidelines for the holding of the
general elections for the SK on Sept.
30,1992,

which

also

placed

the

SK

elections under the direct control and

supervision of DILG, with the technical
assistance

of

COMELEC.

After

postponements, they were held December

activities in order to implement the general

4, 1992.

elections. The case was re raffled to a

Registration in 6 districts of Manila was

conducted.

152,363

21registered,

people

15,749

of

aged

them

15filing

certificated of candidacy. The City Council

passed the necessary appropriations for

different branch of the same court, and the

new judge held that DILG had no power to
exempt Manila from holding SK elections,
because

that

COMELEC,

and

power
that

rests

solely

COMELEC

in

already

determined that Manila has not previously

the elections.

held elections for KB by calling for a

September 18, 1992 The DILG, through
Alunan,
exempting

issued

Manila

letter-resolution

from

holding

SK

elections because the elections previously

held

on

May

26,

1990

were

to

be

general election, and that the exemption of

Manila violated the equal protection clause
because

of

the 5,000 barangays

that

previously held elections, only in Manila,

897 barangay, were there no elections.

considered the first SK elections under the

new

LGC.

Santiago,

DILGacted
acting

on

President

of

letter

by

the

KB

(Kabataang Barangay) City Federation of

Manila and a member of the City Council of

Issue: Whether COMELEC can validly vest

the DILG with the power of direct control
and supervisionover the SK elections with
the technical assistance of COMELEC

Manila, which stated that elections for the

Whether DILG can exempt an LGU from

Kabataang Barangay were held on May 26,

holding SK elections

1990. In this resolution, DILG stated that

the

LGC

intended

to

exempt

Held:

those

barangay chapters which conducted their

KB elections from January 1, 1998 to
January 1, 1992 from the forth coming SK

Despite the holding of SK elections in

1996, the case is not moot; it is capable of
repetition, yet evading review.

elections. The terms of those elected would

DILG had the authority to determine

be extended to coincide with the terms of

whether Manila would be required to hold

those elected in the SK elections

SK elections.

Private respondents, claiming to represent

24,000 members of the Katipunan ng
Kabataan, filed a petition for certiorari and
mandamus, arguing that the DILG had no
power to amend the resolutions of the
COMELEC calling for general elections for
SKs, and that DILG denied them equal

COMELEC vesting DILG with such powers is

not unconstitutional. Election forSK officers
are not subject to the supervision of
COMELEC in the same waythat contests
involving elections of SK officials do not fall
within the jurisdiction of COMELEC.

protection of laws.

SALONGA v HERMOSO, separate opinion J,

RTC issued an injunction and ordered

TEEHANKEE

petitioners to desist from implementing the

order of the DILG Secretary, and ordered
them to perform the specified pre-election

FACTS: During the time of Martial Law,

Jovito Salonga filed a case for mandamus
against Rolando Hermoso of the Travel

Processing Center to compel the latter to

engagements as the only Filipino member

issue a certificate of eligibility to travel in

of the Board of Trustees of the United

favor of Salonga.

Board for Higher Christian Education in

ISSUE: Whether or not the right to travel

Asia based in New York. His last trip abroad

was from February 21, 1980 March 15,

may be prohibited during martial law.

1980 without any complaint from any

HELD: No. This issue became moot and
academic because it appears that Hermoso
did issue and did not deny Salongas
request for a certificate of eligibility to
travel.

government agency. There seems no valid

basis for the delay in the issuance of
petitioner's travel permit (which he had
long applied for on April 1, 1980) and for
his representative to have had to follow up

The issuance of the certificate was in

pursuant to the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights on the Right to Travel. The
Philippines, even though it is under martial
law, shall in no instance facilitate the
erosion

of

Processing

human
Center

rights.

The

should

Travel

exercise

the

in vain daily from the scheduled release

date of April 11, 1980 until he was
constrained to file the present petition on
April 18th as his scheduled trip on April
23rd was in jeopardy (while all other
applications had already been long acted
upon favorably).

utmost care to avoid the impression that

As the Chief Justice stresses in the Court's

certain citizens desirous of exercising their

resolution "it is desirable that respondent

constitutional right to travel could be

Travel Processing Center should exercise

subjected to inconvenience or annoyance

the utmost care to avoid the impression

this is to avoid such similar cases to face

that certain citizens desirous of exercising

the Court which needlessly expire the

their constitutional right to travel could be

Courts effort and time

subjected to inconvenience or annoyance."

Under the antecedents, with petitioner

J, TEEHANKEE, SEPARATE OPINION,

having previously established his right to

travel as sanctioned by the Ministry of

In Salonga vs. Medalla * after the therein

public respondents in charge of the Travel
Processing Center had issued in 1978 to
herein petitioner the corresponding travel
permit or certificate, I remarked "that the
issuance

of

the

travel

certificate

necessarily is a recognition of petitioner's

right

to

travel

under

the

present

circumstances."
The circumstances have not changed in
any manner. Petitioner is the holder of a
Philippine passport issued on March 3,
1980 and valid up to March 1982 and has
urgent medical appointments and official

Foreign Affairs which duly issued him his

passport, petitioner has cause to complain
that

he

should

not

be

placed

by

respondents on their "watch list without

benefit of previous notice and hearing so
as to be afforded the opportunity to rebut
whatever adverse information might have
been compiled or given in secret against
him.
Finally, it is not amiss to call the attention
of the public officials concerned to the
provisions of Article 27 of the Civil Code
that "Any person suffering material or

moral loss because a public servant or

counter-evidence.

employee refuses or neglects, without just

that up to the time martial law was lifted

cause, to perform his official duty may file

on

an action for damages and other relief

assurance to the contrary, he has not

against the latter, without prejudice to any

received any copies of the charges against

disciplinary administrative action that may

him

be taken."

supporting evidence.

2. SC

EXERCISES

SYMBOLIC

January

nor

any

The

17,

petitioner

1981,

copies

of

and

the

states

despite

so-called

The counsel for Salonga was furnished a

copy of an amended complaint signed by

FUNCTION

Gen. Prospero Olivas, dated 12 March

1981, charging Salonga, along with 39

SALONGA v PANO

other accused with the violation of RA

Facts:

The

petitioner

invokes

the

1700, as amended by PD 885, BP 31 and

constitutionally protected right to life and

PD 1736. On 15 October 1981, the counsel

liberty guaranteed by the due process

for Salonga filed a motion to dismiss the

clause, alleging that no prima facie case

charges against Salonga for failure of the

has been established to warrant the filing

prosecution to establish a prima facie case

of an information for subversion against

against him. On 2 December 1981, Judge

him. Petitioner asks the Court to prohibit

Ernani Cruz Pano (Presiding Judge of the

and prevent the respondents from using

Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch

the iron arm of the law to harass, oppress,

XVIII, Quezon City) denied the motion. On 4

and persecute him, a member of the

January 1982, he (Pano) issued a resolution

democratic opposition in the Philippines.

ordering the filing of an information for

The case roots backs to the rash of

bombings which occurred in the Metro
Manila area in the months of August,
September and October of 1980. Victor
Burns Lovely, Jr, one of the victims of the
bombing, implicated petitioner Salonga as

violation of the Revised Anti-Subversion

Act,

as

amended,

against

40

people,

including Salonga. The resolutions of the

said judge dated 2 December 1981 and 4
January 1982 are the subject of the present
petition for certiorari. It is the contention of
Salonga that no prima facie case has been

one of those responsible.

established by the prosecution to justify

On

December

10,

1980,

the

Judge

Advocate General sent the petitioner a

Notice of Preliminary Investigation in
People v. Benigno Aquino, Jr., et al. (which
included

petitioner

as

co-accused),

the filing of an information against him. He

states

that

to

sanction

his

further

prosecution despite the lack of evidence

against him would be to admit that no rule
of law exists in the Philippines today.

stating that the preliminary investigation

of the above-entitled case has been set at
2:30 oclock p.m. on December 12, 1980
and that petitioner was given ten (10) days
from receipt of the charge sheet and the
supporting evidence within which to file his

Issues:
1. Whether the above case still falls under
an actual case

2. Whether the above case dropped by the

bench and bar on the extent of protection

lower court still deserves a decision from

given by constitutional guarantees.

the Supreme Court

In dela Camara vs Enage (41 SCRA 1), the

Held:

court ruled that:

1. No. The Court had already deliberated

The fact that the case is moot and

on this case, a consensus on the Courts

academic should not preclude this Tribunal

judgment had been arrived at, and a draft

from setting forth in language clear and

ponencia was circulating for concurrences

unmistakable, the obligation of fidelity on

and separate opinions, if any, when on

the part of lower court judges to the

January

18,

unequivocal command of the Constitution

Rodolfo

Ortiz

1985,

respondent

granted

the

Judge

motion

of

respondent City Fiscal Sergio Apostol to

drop the

subversion case against the

petitioner. Pursuant to instructions of the

Minister

of

Justice,

the

prosecution

restudied its evidence and decided to seek

the exclusion of petitioner Jovito Salonga
as one of the accused in the information
filed under the questioned resolution.

that excessive bail shall not be required.

In Gonzales v. Marcos (65 SCRA 624)
whether or not the Cultural Center of the
Philippines could validly be created through
an

executive

order

was

mooted

by

Presidential Decree No. 15, the Centers

new charter pursuant to the Presidents
legislative

powers

Nevertheless,

the

under
Court

martial

law.

discussed

the

The court is constrained by this action of

constitutional mandate on the preservation

the prosecution and the respondent Judge

and development of Filipino culture for

to

national Identity. (Article XV, Section 9,

withdraw

the

draft

ponencia

from

circulating for concurrences and signatures

and to place it once again in the Courts
crowded agenda for further deliberations.

Paragraph 2 of the Constitution).

In the habeas corpus case of Aquino, Jr., v.
Enrile, 59 SCRA 183), the fact that the

Insofar as the absence of a prima facie

petition was moot and academic did not

case to warrant the filing of subversion

prevent this Court in the exercise of its

charges is concerned, this decision has

symbolic function from promulgating one

been rendered moot and academic by the

of the most voluminous decisions ever

action of the prosecution.

printed in the Reports.

2. Yes. Despite the SCs dismissal of the

LEGITIMIZING FUNCTIONS OF THE SC

petition due to the cases moot and

academic

nature,

it

has

on

several

Javellana vs. Executive Secretary, 50

SCRA 33

occasions rendered elaborate decisions in

similar cases where mootness was clearly

In 1973, Marcos ordered the immediate

implementation

apparent.

of

the

new

1973

Constitution. Josue Javellana, a Filipino and

The Court also has the duty to formulate
guiding

and

controlling

constitutional

principles, precepts, doctrines, or rules. It

has the symbolic function of educating

a registered voter sought to enjoin the

Exec Sec and other cabinet secretaries
from implementing the said constitution

filing

prohibition

restrain

was left to the people in their sovereign

respondents from implementing any of the

capacity to answer. Their ratification of the

provisions of the proposed constitution not

same

found

Furthermore,

in

the

case

present

January 20, 1973.

to

constitution

on

had

shown

such

whether

acquiescence.

constitutional

Javellana averred that

amendment has been properly adopted

the said constitution is void because the

according to an existing constitution is a

same was initiated by the president. He

judicial question as it is the absolute duty

argued that the President is w/o power to

of the judiciary to determine whether the

proclaim the ratification by the Filipino

Constitution has been amended in the

people

manner required by the constitution. The

of

the

proposed

constitution.

Further, the election held to ratify such

Constitution

constitution is not a free election there

Convention was not validly ratified in

being intimidation and fraud. Javellana

accordance with Article XV section 1 of the

maintained that the respondents are acting

1935 Constitution which provides only one

without or in excess of jurisdiction in

way for ratification (election or plebiscite

implementing proposed constitution and

held in accordance with law and only with

that the president is without power to

qualified voters). Due to the environmental

proclaim the ratification of the constitution.

and social conditions in the Philippines (i.e.

Similar actions were filed by Vidal Tan,

martial law) the Court cannot honestly say

Gerardo Roxas, among others. Petitioners

that the people acquiesced to the proposed

pray for the nullification of Proclamation

Constitution. The majority ruled to dismiss

1102 (Citizens Assemblies) and any order,

the cases as the effectivity of the proposed

decree, and proclamation which are similar

Constitution is the basic issue posed by the

in objective.

cases

ISSUE: Whether or not the president acted

which

proposed

by

considerations

the

1971

other than

judicial are relevant and unavoidable. The

new constitution is in force as there are not

without or in excess of jurisdiction.

enough votes to say otherwise.

HELD: The SC ruled that no, the president
did

not

act

without

or

in

excess

of

PROPER PARTY (LOCUS STANDI):

jurisdiction and that they cannot rule upon

1. TAXPAYERS SUIT- REQUISITES

the case at bar. Majority of the SC justices

expressed

the

view

that

they

were

concluded by the ascertainment made by

the president of the Philippines, in the
exercise

of

Further,

there

evidence

to

his

political
being

show

no

such

competent
fraud

and

assumed that the people had acquiesced in

or accepted the 1973 Constitution. The
of

the

validity

FACTS:

prerogatives.

intimidation during the election, it is to be

question

MACALINTAL V. SET

of

the

1973

Constitution is a political question which

Before the Court is a petition for certiorari

and

prohibition

filed

by

Romulo

B.

Macalintal, a member of the Philippine Bar,

seeking

declaration

that

certain

provisions of Republic Act No. 9189 (The

Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003)
suffer

from

constitutional

infirmity.

Claiming that he has actual and material

affidavit shall also state that he/she has

legal interest in the subject matter of this

not

case in seeing to it that public funds are

country. Failure to return shall be cause for

properly

and

the removal of the name of the immigrant

appropriated, petitioner filed the instant

or permanent resident from the National

petition as a taxpayer and as a lawyer.

Registry of Absentee Voters and his/her

and

lawfully

used

applied

permanent

ISSUES:

for

citizenship

disqualification

in

to

another

vote

in

absentia. Petitioner claims that this is

(1) Whether or not Section 5(d) of Republic
Act

No.

9189

violates

the

residency

requirement in Section 1 of Article V of the

Constitution.

violative of the residency requirement in

Section 1 Article V of the Constitution
which requires the voter must be a resident
in the Philippines for at least one yr, and a

(2) Whether or not Section 18.5 of the

resident in the place where he proposes to

same

constitutional

vote for at least 6 months immediately

mandate under Section 4, Article VII of the

preceding an election. However, OSG held

Constitution that the winning candidates

that ruling in said case does not hold water

for President and the Vice-President shall

at present, and that the Court may have to

be proclaimed as winners by Congress.

discard that particular ruling. Panacea of

law

violates

the

(3) Whether or not Congress may, through

the

Joint

Congressional

Oversight

Committee created in Section 25 of Rep.

Act No. 9189, exercise the power to review,
revise,

amend,

and

approve

the

Implementing Rules and Regulations that

the Commission on Elections, promulgate
without violating the independence of the
COMELEC under Section 1, Article IX-A of
the Constitution.

the controversy: Affidavit for without it, the

presumption

of

abandonment

of

Phil

domicile shall remain. The qualified Filipino

abroad

who

executed

an

affidavit

is

deemed to have retained his domicile in

the Philippines and presumed not to have
lost his domicile by his physical absence
from this country. Section 5 of RA No. 9189
does not only require the promise to
resume

actual

physical

permanent

residence in the Philippines not later than 3

HELD:

years after approval of registration but it

9189

also requires the Filipino abroad, WON he is

enumerates those who are disqualified

a green card holder, a temporary visitor or

voting under this Act. It disqualifies an

even on business trip, must declare that

immigrant or a permanent resident who is

he/she has not applied for citizenship in

recognized as such in the host country.

another country. Thus, he/she must return

However, an exception is provided i.e.

to the Philippines otherwise consequences

unless he/she executes, upon registration,

will be met according to RA No. 9189.

an affidavit prepared for the purpose by

Although there is a possibility that the

the Commission declaring that he/she shall

Filipino

resume

permanent

exercised his right to vote, the Court is not

residence in the Philippines not later than 3

in a position to rule on the wisdom of the

years from approval of registration. Such

law or to repeal or modify it if such law is

(1)

No.

Section

actual

of

RA

physical

No.

will

not

return

after

he

has

found to be impractical. However, it can be

of independence of the COMELEC. Under

said that the Congress itself was conscious

such a situation, the Court is left with no

of

for

option but to withdraw from its usual

deterrence which is that the Filipino who

silence in declaring a provision of law

fails to return as promised stands to lose

unconstitutional

this

probability

and

provided

his right of suffrage. Accordingly, the votes

he cast shall not be invalidated because he
was qualified to vote on the date of the
elections. Expressum facit cessare tacitum:
where a law sets down plainly its whole

OPOSA V FACTORAN
FACTS:

meaning, the Court is prevented from

making it mean what the Court pleases. In
fine, considering that underlying intent of
the

Constitution,

as

is

evident

in

its

statutory construction and intent of the

framers,

which

immigrants

is

and

to

grant

permanent

Filipino
residents

abroad the unquestionable right to exercise

the right of suffrage (Section 1 Article V)
the Court finds that Section 5 of RA No.

(2) Yes. Congress should not have allowed

to

usurp

constitutionally

belongs

canvassing

the

of

power
to

votes

Juan Antonio Oposa, et al., representing

their

generation

DENR. They prayed that judgment be

rendered

the

defendant,

his

acting in his behalf to:

that

Agreements (TLA) in the country;

2. Cease and desist from receiving,

it.

The

accepting,

and

the

appraising new TLAs; and granting the

equitable

nation

alleged

the

ordering

agents, representatives and other persons

President and Vice President for the entire

in

yet

against Fulgencio Factoran Jr., Secretary of

plaintiffs

remain

generations

unborn, and represented by their parents

proclamation of the winning candidates for

must

and

1. Cancel all existing Timber Licensing

9189 is not constitutionally defective.

COMELEC

A taxpayers class suit was filed by minors

hands

of

processing,

such

other

under
that

reliefs

the

they

renewing,

just

premises.

have

or

and
They

clear

and

Congress as its duty and power under

constitutional right to a balanced and

Section 4 of Article VII of the Constitution.

healthful

COMELEC has the authority to proclaim the

protection by the State in its capacity as

winning candidates only for Senators and

parens patriae. Furthermore, they claim

Party-list Reps.

that the act of the defendant in allowing

TLA

ecology

holders

remaining

to

and

cut

are

and

forests

entitled

deforest

constitutes

to

the
a

(3) No. By vesting itself with the powers to

misappropriation and/or impairment of the

approve, review, amend and revise the

natural resources property he holds in trust

Implementing Rules & Regulations for RA

for the benefit of the plaintiff minors and

No. 9189, Congress went beyond the scope

succeeding generations.

of its constitutional authority. Congress

The defendant filed a motion to dismiss the

trampled upon the constitutional mandate

complaint on the following grounds:

1. Plaintiffs have no cause of action against

the

him;

generations to come.

2. The issues raised by the plaintiffs is a

protection

of

that

right

for

the

AGAN V PIATCO

political question which properly pertains

to the legislative or executive branches of
the government.
ISSUE:Do

the

petitioner-minors

have

cause of action in filing a class suit to

prevent

the

misappropriation

or

impairment of Philippine rainforests?

HELD: Yes. Petitioner-minors assert that
they represent their generation as well as
generations to come. The Supreme Court
ruled that they can, for themselves, for
others of their generation, and for the
succeeding generation, file a class suit.
Their

personality

to

sue

in

behalf

of

succeeding generations is based on the

concept of intergenerational responsibility
insofar as the right to a balanced and
healthful ecology is concerned. Such a
right considers the rhythm and harmony
of nature which indispensably include,
inter

alia,

utilization,

the

judicious

management,

conservation

of

the

disposition,
renewal

countrys

and

forest,

mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife,

offshore areas and other natural resources
to

the

end

that

their

exploration,

development, and utilization be equitably

accessible to the present as well as the
future generations.
Needless to say, every generation has a
responsibility to the next to preserve that
rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment
of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a
little differently, the minors assertion of
their

right

constitutes

to

at

the

sound
same

environment
time,

the

performance of their obligation to ensure

FACTS:
On October 5, 1994, AEDC submitted an
unsolicited proposal to the Government
through the DOTC/MIAA for the
development of NAIA International
Passenger Terminal III (NAIA IPT III).
DOTC constituted the Prequalification Bids
and Awards Committee (PBAC) for the
implementation of the project and
submitted with its endorsement proposal to
the NEDA, which approved the project.
On June 7, 14, and 21, 1996, DOTC/MIAA
caused the publication in two daily
newspapers of an invitation for competitive
or comparative proposals on AEDCs
unsolicited proposal, in accordance with
Sec. 4-A of RA 6957, as amended.
On September 20, 1996, the consortium
composed of Peoples Air Cargo and
Warehousing Co., Inc. (Paircargo), Phil. Air
and Grounds Services, Inc. (PAGS) and
Security Bank Corp. (Security Bank)
(collectively, Paircargo Consortium)
submitted their competitive proposal to the
PBAC. PBAC awarded the project to
Paircargo Consortium. Because of that, it
was incorporated into Philippine
International Airport Terminals Co., Inc.
AEDC subsequently protested the alleged
undue preference given to PIATCO and
reiterated its objections as regards the
prequalification of PIATCO.
On July 12, 1997, the Government and
PIATCO signed the Concession Agreement
for the Build-Operate-and-Transfer
Arrangement of the NAIA Passenger
Terminal III (1997 Concession Agreement).
The Government granted PIATCO the
franchise to operate and maintain the said
terminal during the concession period and
to collect the fees, rentals and other
charges in accordance with the rates or
schedules stipulated in the 1997
Concession Agreement. The Agreement
provided that the concession period shall
be for twenty-five (25) years commencing
from the in-service date, and may be
renewed at the option of the Government
for a period not exceeding twenty-five (25)
years. At the end of the concession period,
PIATCO shall transfer the development
facility to MIAA.

Meanwhile, the MIAA which is charged with

the maintenance and operation of the NAIA
Terminals I and II, had existing concession
contracts with various service providers to
offer international airline airport services,
such as in-flight catering, passenger
handling, ramp and ground support,
aircraft maintenance and provisions, cargo
handling and warehousing, and other
services, to several international airlines at
the NAIA.
On September 17, 2002, the workers of the
international airline service providers,
claiming that they would lose their job
upon the implementation of the questioned
agreements, filed a petition for prohibition.
Several employees of MIAA likewise filed a
petition assailing the legality of the various
agreements.
During the pendency of the cases, PGMA,
on her speech, stated that she will not
honor (PIATCO) contracts which the
Executive Branchs legal offices have
concluded (as) null and void.
ISSUE: Whether or not the State can
temporarily take over a business affected
with public interest.
RULING: Yes. PIATCO cannot, by mere
contractual stipulation, contravene the
Constitutional provision on temporary
government takeover and obligate the
government to pay reasonable cost for the
use of the Terminal and/or Terminal
Complex.
Article XII, Section 17 of the 1987
Constitution provides:

affected by the temporary takeover cannot,

likewise, claim just compensation for the
use of the said business and its properties
as the temporary takeover by the
government is in exercise of its police
power and not of its power of eminent
domain.
Article XII, section 17 of the 1987
Constitution envisions a situation wherein
the exigencies of the times necessitate the
government to temporarily take over or
direct the operation of any privately owned
public utility or business affected with
public interest. It is the welfare and
interest of the public which is the
paramount consideration in determining
whether or not to temporarily take over a
particular business. Clearly, the State in
effecting the temporary takeover is
exercising its police power. Police power is
the most essential, insistent, and
illimitable of powers. Its exercise therefore
must not be unreasonably hampered nor
its exercise be a source of obligation by the
government in the absence of damage due
to arbitrariness of its exercise. Thus,
requiring the government to pay
reasonable compensation for the
reasonable use of the property pursuant to
the operation of the business contravenes
the Constitution.

OPLE V TORRES
Facts:
The petition at bar is a commendable
effort on the part of Senator Blas F. Ople to

Section 17. In times of national emergency,

when the public interest so requires, the
State may, during the emergency and
under reasonable terms prescribed by it,
temporarily take over or direct the
operation of any privately owned public
utility or business affected with public
interest.
The above provision pertains to the right of
the State in times of national emergency,
and in the exercise of its police power, to
temporarily take over the operation of any
business affected with public interest. The
duration of the emergency itself is the
determining factor as to how long the
temporary takeover by the government
would last. The temporary takeover by the
government extends only to the operation
of the business and not to the ownership
thereof. As such the government is not
required to compensate the private entityowner of the said business as there is no
transfer of ownership, whether permanent
or temporary. The private entity-owner

prevent the shrinking of the rightto privacy,

which the revered Mr. Justice Brandeis
considered as "the most comprehensive of
rights and the rightmost valued by civilized
men."

Petitioner

Ople

prays

that

we

invalidate Administrative Order No. 308

entitled"Adoption
Computerized

of

National

Identification

Reference

System" on two important constitutional

grounds,
viz
(1)it is a usurpation of the power of
Congress

to

legislate,

and(2)it

impermissibly intrudes on our citizenry's

protected zone of privacy.We grant the

petition

for

the

be

of the Petition at bar is not affected by the

vindicated by the petitioner need stronger

fact that the implementing rules of A.O.No.

barriers against furthererosion.A.O. No. 308

308 have yet to be promulgated. Petitioner

was

of

Ople assails A.O. No. 308 as invalidper

general circulation on January 22, 1997

seand as infirmed on itsface. His action is

and January 23, 1997. On January 24,

not premature for the rules yet to be

1997, petitioner filed the instant petition

promulgated cannot cure its fatal defects.

against

Moreover,

published

rights

in

sought

four

respondents,

to

newspapers

then

Executive

therespondents

themselves

Secretary Ruben Torresand the heads of

have started the implementation of A.O.

the

as

No. 308 without waiting for the rules. As

members of the Inter-Agency Coordinating

early as January 19, 1997, respondent

Committee,

Social Security System (SSS) caused the

government

agencies,

arecharged

who

with

the

implementation of A.O. No. 308. On April 8,

publication

1997, we issued a temporary restraining

themanufacture

orderenjoining its implementation.

Identification

Issue:WON the petitioner has the stand to

of

notice
of

(ID)

to

the
card.

bid

for

National
Respondent

Executive Secretary Torres has publicly

announcedthat representatives from the

assail the validity of A.O. No. 308

GSIS and the SSS have completed the

Ruling: YES

guidelines

for

the

national

Rationale: As is usual in constitutional

identificationsystem.All signals from the

litigation, respondents raise the threshold

respondents show their unswerving will to

issues relating to the standing to sue of

implement A.O. No. 308 and we need not

thepetitioner and the justiciability of the

wait forthe formality of the rules to pass

case at bar. More specifically, respondents

judgment on its constitutionality. In this

aver that petitioner has no legalinterest to

light,

uphold and that the implementing rules of

wetighten the rule on standing is not a

A.O. No. 308 have yet to be promulgated.

commendable stance as its result would be

These submissions do not deserve our

to

sympathetic

principle and a fundamental right.

ear.

Petitioner

Ople

is

the

throttle

dissenters

an

insistence

that

importantconstitutional

distinguished member of our Senate. Asa

Senator, petitioner is possessed of the
requisite standing to bring suit raising the
issue that the issuance of A.O.No. 308 is a
usurpation of legislative power.

TADTAD V SECRETARY OF ENERGY

As

taxpayer

Government

and
Service

member

of

the

InsuranceSystem

(GSIS), petitioner can also impugn the

legality of the misalignment of public funds
and the misuse of GSISfunds to implement
A.O. No. 308. The ripeness for adjudication

FACTS:
The

petitions

challenge

the

constitutionality of RA No. 8180 entitled

An Act Deregulating the Downstream Oil
Industry and For Other Purposes. The

deregulation process has two phases: (a)

declining and when the exchange rate of

the transition phase (Aug. 12, 1996) and

the peso to the US dollar is considered

the (b) full deregulation phase (Feb. 8,

stable. Webster defines practicable as

1997 through EO No. 372). Sec. 15 of RA

meaning possible to practice or perform,

No. 8180 constitutes an undue delegation

decline as meaning to take a downward

of legislative power to the President and

direction, and stable as meaning firmly

the Sec. of Energy because it does not

established.

provide a determinate or determinable

standard to guide the Executive Branch in
determining when to implement the full
deregulation

of

the

downstream

oil

industry, and the law does not provide any

specific standard to determine when the
prices of crude oil in the world market are
considered to be declining nor when the
exchange rate of the peso to the US dollar

(b) YES. Sec. 15 did not mention the

depletion of the OPSF fund as a factor to be
given weight by the Executive before
ordering full deregulation. The Executive
department failed to follow faithfully the
standards set by RA No. 8180 when it
co0nsidered

the

extraneous

factor

of

depletion of the OPSF fund. The Executive

is bereft of any right to alter either by

is considered stable.

subtraction or addition the standards set in

Issue:w/n the provisions of RA No. 8180
and EO No. 372 is unconstitutional.

RA No. 8180 for it has no powers to make

laws

sub-issue: (a) w/n sec. 15 violates the

constitutional

prohibition

on

undue

delegation of power, and (b) w/n the

Executive misapplied RA No. 8180 when it
considered the depletion of the OPSF fund
as

factor

in

fully

deregulating

the

downstream oil industry in Feb. 1997.

CHAVEZ V PEA AND AMARI

In

1973,

Highways

the

Comissioner

entered

into

on

Public

contract

to

reclaim areas of Manila Bay with the

Construction and Development Corportion
of the Philippines (CDCP).
PEA (Public Estates Authority) was created

HELD/RULING:

by President Marcos under P.D. 1084,

(a) NO. Sec. 15 can hurdle both the

tasked

completeness

reclaimed

test

and

the

sufficient

with

developing

lands.

These

and
lands

leasing
were

standard test. RA No. 8180 provided that

transferred to the care of PEA under P.D.

the full deregulation will start at the end of

1085 as part of the Manila Cavite Road and

March 1997 regardless of the occurrence of

Reclamation Project (MCRRP). CDCP and

any event. Thus, the law is complete on

PEA entered into an agreement that all

the question of the final date of full

future projects under the MCRRP would be

deregulation.

funded and owned by PEA.

Sec.

15

lays

down

the

standard to guide the judgment of the

By 1988, President Aquino issued Special

Presidenthe is to time it as far as

Patent No. 3517 transferring lands to PEA.

practicable when the prices of crude oil

It was followed by the transfer of three

and petroleum in the world market are

Titles (7309, 7311 and 7312) by the

Register of Deeds of Paranaque to PEA

of PEA, are alienable lands of the public

covering the three reclaimed islands known

domain. PEA may lease these lands to

as the FREEDOM ISLANDS.

private corporations but may not sell or

Subsquently, PEA entered into a joint

venture agreement (JVA) with AMARI, a
Thai-Philippine corporation to develop the
Freedom Islands. Along with another 250
hectares, PEA and AMARI entered the JVA

transfer

ownership

of

these

lands

to

private corporations. PEA may only sell

these lands to Philippine citizens, subject
to the ownership limitations in the 1987
Constitution and existing laws.

which would later transfer said lands to

2. The 592.15 hectares of submerged areas

AMARI. This caused a stir especially when

of Manila Bay remain inalienable natural

Sen.

resources

Maceda

assailed

the

agreement,

of

the

public

domain

until

claiming that such lands were part of

classified as alienable or disposable lands

public domain (famously known as the

open to disposition and declared no longer

mother of all scams).

needed for public service. The government

Peitioner Frank J. Chavez filed case as a

taxpayer praying for mandamus, a writ of
preliminary injunction and a TRO against
the sale of reclaimed lands by PEA to
AMARI and from implementing the JVA.
Following these events, under President
Estradas admin, PEA and AMARI entered
into an Amended JVA and Mr. Chaves claim

can

make

such

classification

and

declaration only after PEA has reclaimed

these submerged areas. Only then can
these lands qualify as agricultural lands of
the public domain, which are the only
natural resources

the government

can

alienate. In their present state, the 592.15

hectares

of

submerged

areas

are

inalienable and outside the commerce of

that the contract is null and void.

man.
Issue:
3. Since the Amended JVA seeks to transfer
w/n: the transfer to AMARI lands reclaimed
or

to

be

reclaimed

as

part

of

the

stipulations in the (Amended) JVA between

AMARI and PEA violate Sec. 3 Art. XII of the
1987 Constitution

to AMARI, a private corporation, ownership

of 77.34 hectares110 of the Freedom
Islands, such transfer is void for being
contrary to Section 3, Article XII of the
1987 Constitution which prohibits private

w/n: the court is the proper forum for

corporations from acquiring any kind of

raising the issue of whether the amended

alienable land of the public domain.

joint

venture

agreement

is

grossly

disadvantageous to the government.

4. Since the Amended JVA also seeks to

transfer to AMARI ownership of 290.156
hectares111 of still submerged areas of

Held:
On the issue of Amended JVA as violating
the constitution:

Manila Bay, such transfer is void for being

contrary to Section 2, Article XII of the
1987

Constitution

which

prohibits

the

1. The 157.84 hectares of reclaimed lands

alienation of natural resources other than

comprising

agricultural lands of the public domain.

the

Freedom

Islands,

now

covered by certificates of title in the name

PEA may reclaim these submerged areas.

PTC from performing its functions. They

Thereafter, the government can classify

argued that:

the

reclaimed

lands

as

alienable

or

disposable, and further declare them no

longer needed for public service. Still, the
transfer of such reclaimed alienable lands

(a) E.O. No. 1 violates separation of powers

as it arrogates the power of the Congress
to create a public office and appropriate
funds for its operation.

of the public domain to AMARI will be void

in view of Section 3, Article XII of the
1987Constitution which prohibits private
corporations from acquiring any kind of
alienable land of the public domain.

(b) The provision of Book III, Chapter 10,

Section 31 of the Administrative Code of
1987 cannot legitimize E.O. No. 1 because
the delegated authority of the President to
structurally reorganize the Office of the

BIRAOGO V TRUTH COMMISSION, DISSENT

President to achieve economy, simplicity

OF J. NACHURA AND J. CARPIO MORALES

and efficiency does not include the power

to create an entirely new public office

FACTS: Pres. Aquino signed E. O. No. 1

which was hitherto inexistent like the

establishing Philippine Truth Commission of

Truth Commission.

2010 (PTC) dated July 30, 2010.PTC is a

mere ad hoc body formed under the Office
of the President with the primary task to
investigate reports of graft and corruption
committed by third-level public officers and
employees, their co-principals, accomplices
and

accessories

during

the

previous

administration, and to submit its finding

and recommendations to the President,

(c)

E.O.

No.

illegally

amended

the

Constitution and statutes when it vested

the Truth Commission with quasi-judicial
powers duplicating, if not superseding,
those of the Office of the Ombudsman
created under the 1987 Constitution and
the DOJ created under the Administrative
Code of 1987.

Congress and the Ombudsman. PTC has all

(d) E.O. No. 1 violates the equal protection

the powers of an investigative body. But it

clause

is not a quasi-judicial body as it cannot

investigation and prosecution officials and

adjudicate, arbitrate, resolve, settle, or

personnel of the previous administration as

render

if corruption is their peculiar species even

awards

in

disputes

between

it

selectively

collect and assess evidence of graft and

administrations, past and present, who

corruption and make recommendations. It

may be indictable.

less order their arrest. Although it is a fact-

those

of

the

for

as

power to cite people in contempt, much

excludes

targets

contending parties. All it can do is gather,

may have subpoena powers but it has no

it

as

other

Respondents, through OSG, questioned the

legal standing of petitioners and argued
that:

finding body, it cannot determine from

such facts if probable cause exists as to
warrant the filing of an information in our

1] E.O. No. 1 does not arrogate the powers

courts of law. Petitioners asked the Court to

of

declare it unconstitutional and to enjoin the

executive power and power of control

Congress

because

the

Presidents

necessarily include the inherent power to

actual case or controversy calling for the

conduct investigations to ensure that laws

exercise of judicial power; (2) the person

are faithfully executed and that, in any

challenging the act must have the standing

event,

Revised

to question the validity of the subject act or

PD

No.

issuance; otherwise stated, he must have a

141616 (as amended), R.A. No. 9970 and

personal and substantial interest in the

settled

case such that he has sustained, or will

the

Constitution,

Administrative

Code

of

jurisprudence,

1987,

authorize

the

President to create or form such bodies.

sustain, direct injury as a result of its

2] E.O. No. 1 does not usurp the power of

Congress to appropriate funds because
there is no appropriation but a mere
allocation of funds already appropriated by

The

(3)

the

question

of

constitutionality must be raised at the

earliest opportunity; and (4) the issue of
constitutionality must be the very lis mota
of the case.

Congress.
3]

enforcement;

Truth

Commission

does

not

duplicate or supersede the functions of the

Ombudsman and the DOJ, because it is a
fact-finding body and not a quasi-judicial
body and its functions do not duplicate,
supplant or erode the latters jurisdiction.

1. The petition primarily invokes usurpation

of the power of the Congress as a body to
which they belong as members. To the
extent

the

powers

of

Congress

are

impaired, so is the power of each member

thereof, since his office confers a right to
participate in the exercise of the powers of

4] The Truth Commission does not violate

the equal protection clause because it was
validly created for laudable purposes.

that institution. Legislators have a legal

standing to see to it that the prerogative,
powers

and

privileges

vested

by

the

Constitution in their office remain inviolate.

ISSUES:
1. WON the petitioners have legal standing
to file the petitions and question E. O. No.
1;

Thus, they are allowed to question the

validity of any official action which, to their
mind, infringes on their prerogatives as
legislators. With regard to Biraogo, he has

2. WON E. O. No. 1 violates the principle of

not shown that he sustained, or is in

separation of powers by usurping the

danger of sustaining, any personal and

powers of Congress to create and to

direct

appropriate

implementation of E. O. No. 1. Locus standi

funds

for

public

offices,

injury

attributable

to

the

agencies and commissions;

is a right of appearance in a court of

3. WON E. O. No. 1 supplants the powers of

justice on a given question. In private

the Ombudsman and the DOJ;

suits, standing is governed by the real-

4. WON E. O. No. 1 violates the equal

protection clause.
RULING:
The power of judicial review is subject to
limitations, to wit: (1) there must be an

parties-in interest rule. It provides that

every

action

must

be

prosecuted

or

defended in the name of the real party in

interest.

Real-party-in

interest

is

the

party who stands to be benefited or injured

by the judgment in the suit or the party

entitled to the avails of the suit. Difficulty

2. There will be no appropriation but only

of determining locus standi arises in public

an allotment or allocations of existing

suits. Here, the plaintiff who asserts a

funds already appropriated. There is no

public right in assailing an allegedly

usurpation on the part of the Executive of

illegal

the power of Congress to appropriate

representative of the general public. He

funds. There is no need to specify the

has to show that he is entitled to seek

amount to be earmarked for the operation

judicial protection. He has to make out a

of

sufficient interest in the vindication of the

funds the Congress has provided for the

public order and the securing of relief as a

Office of the President will be the very

citizen or taxpayer. The person who

source of the funds for the commission.

impugns the validity of a statute must have

The amount that would be allocated to the

a personal and substantial interest in the

PTC shall be subject to existing auditing

case such that he has sustained, or will

rules

sustain direct injury as a result. The Court,

impropriety in the funding.

official

however,

finds

action,

does

reason

so

in

as

Biraogos

assertion that the petition covers matters

of transcendental importance to justify the
exercise of jurisdiction by the Court. There
are constitutional issues in the petition
which deserve the attention of this Court in
view of their seriousness, novelty and
weight as precedents The Executive is
given much leeway in ensuring that our
laws are faithfully executed. The powers of
the President are not limited to those
specific powers under the Constitution.
One of the recognized powers of the
President

granted

pursuant

constitutionally-mandated

duty

to
is

this

commission

and

because,

regulations

so

whatever

there

is

no

3. PTC will not supplant the Ombudsman or

the DOJ or erode their respective powers. If
at all, the investigative function of the
commission will complement those of the
two offices. The function of determining
probable

cause

for

the

filing

of

the

appropriate complaints before the courts

remains to be with the DOJ and the
Ombudsman. PTCs power to investigate is
limited to obtaining facts so that it can
advise and guide the President in the
performance of his duties relative to the
execution and enforcement of the laws of
the land.

the

power to create ad hoc committees. This

flows from the obvious need to ascertain
facts and determine if laws have been
faithfully executed. The purpose of allowing
ad hoc investigating bodies to exist is to
allow an inquiry into matters which the
President is entitled to know so that he can
be properly advised and guided in the
performance of his duties relative to the
execution and enforcement of the laws of
the land.

the

4. Court finds difficulty in upholding the

constitutionality of Executive Order No. 1 in
view of its apparent transgression of the
equal

protection

clause

enshrined

in

Section 1, Article III (Bill of Rights) of the

1987

Constitution.

Equal

protection

requires that all persons or things similarly

situated should be treated alike, both as to
rights

conferred

and

responsibilities

imposed. It requires public bodies and

institutions

to

individuals

in

treat
a

similarly

similar

situated

manner.

The

purpose of the equal protection clause is to

exclude the other past administrations. The

secure

states

PTC must, at least, have the authority to

and

investigate all past administrations. The

every

person

within

jurisdiction

against

arbitrary

discrimination,

intentional

whether

Constitution

is

the

fundamental

and

occasioned by the express terms of a

paramount law of the nation to which all

statue or by its improper execution through

other

the states duly constituted authorities.

accordance with which all private rights

There must be equality among equals as

determined

determined

valid

administered. Laws that do not conform to

clause

the Constitution should be stricken down

permits classification. Such classification,

for being unconstitutional. WHEREFORE,

however, to be valid must pass the test of

the

reasonableness.

Order

according

classification.

Equal

to

protection

The

test

has

four

laws

and

petitions
No.

must

all

are
1

conform

public

GRANTED.
is

hereby
insofar

and

in

authority

Executive
declared

requisites: (1) The classification rests on

UNCONSTITUTIONAL

as

it

is

substantial distinctions; (2) It is germane to

violative of the equal protection clause of

the purpose of the law; (3) It is not limited

the Constitution.

to existing conditions only; and (4) It

2. NO LOCUS STANDI

applies equally to all members of the same

class. The classification will be regarded as
invalid if all the members of the class are
not similarly treated, both as to rights
conferred

and

obligations

imposed.

GUANZON V DE VILLA, DISSENT OF J, CRUZ

AND J SARMIENTO
Facts:

Executive Order No. 1 should be struck

down as violative of the equal protection
clause.

The

clear

mandate

of

truth

commission is to investigate and find out

the truth concerning the reported cases of
graft and corruption during the previous
administration only. The intent to single out
the previous administration is plain, patent
and manifest. Arroyo administration is but
just a member of a class, that is, a class of
past administrations. It is not a class of its
own. Not to include past administrations
similarly situated constitutes arbitrariness
which the equal protection clause cannot
sanction.

Such

discriminating

differentiation clearly reverberates to label

the

commission

as

vehicle

for

vindictiveness and selective retribution.

Superficial differences do not make for a
valid classification. The PTC must not

The

41

petitioners

alleged

that

the

"saturation drive" or "aerial target zoning"

that were conducted in their place (Tondo
Manila) were unconstitutional. They alleged
that there is no specific target house to be
search and that there is no search warrant
or warrant of arrest served. Most of the
policemen are in their civilian clothes and
without nameplates or identification cards.
The residents were rudely rouse from their
sleep by banging on the walls and windows
of their houses. The residents were at the
point of high-powered guns and herded like
cows. Men were ordered to strip down to
their briefs for the police to examine their
tattoo marks. The residents complained
that their homes were ransacked, tossing
their

belongings

valuables.

Some

and
of

destroying
their

money

their
and

valuables

had

disappeared

operation.

The

residents

after

However,

the

remedy

should

not

be

reported

brought by a taxpayer suit where not one

incidents of maulings, spot-beatings and

victim complaints and not one violator is

maltreatment. Those who were detained

properly charged. In the circumstances of

also suffered mental and physical torture to

this taxpayers' suit, there is no erring

extract

tactical

soldier or policeman whom the court can

information. The respondents said that

order prosecuted. In the absence of clear

such accusations were all lies. Respondents

facts no permanent relief can be given. In

contend that the Constitution grants to

the meantime where there is showing that

government the power to seek and cripple

some abuses were committed, the court

subversive

temporary restraint the alleged violations

confessions

also

the

and

movements

for

the

maintenance of peace in the state. The

which

are

shocking

aerial target zoning were intended to flush

WHEREFORE,

out subversives and criminal elements

REMANDED to the Regional Trial Courts of

coddled by the communities were the said

Manila, Malabon, and Pasay City where the

drives were conducted. They said that they

petitioners

have intelligently and carefully planned

supporting their allegations and where

months ahead for the actual operation and

specific erring parties may be pinpointed

that local and foreign media joined the

and prosecuted.

the

to

the

senses.

is

hereby

petition

may

present

evidence

operation to witness and record such

EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY

event.
Issue: Whether or Not the saturation drive

UMALI V GUINGONA

committed consisted of violation of human

Facts:

rights.

Osmundo

Umali

was

appointed

Regional Director of the Bureau of Internal

Revenue.

However,

confidential

memorandum against him was sent to

Held: It is not the police action per se

President Ramos and thus forwarded to

which should be prohibited rather it is the

Presidential Commission on Anti-Graft and

procedure used or the methods which

Corruption

"offend even hardened sensibilities" .Based

complied with the pleadings and hearings

on the facts stated by the parties, it

set by PCAGC. Umali and his lawyer did not

appears to have been no impediment to

raise

securing search warrants or warrants of

hearing. PCAGC foud prima facie evidence

arrest before any houses were searched or

to support the charges

individuals

were

Ramos issued AO 152 dismissing Umali. He

arrested. There is no showing that the

appealed to the Office of the President but

objectives sought to be attained by the

was denied. He elevated it to RTC alleging

"aerial zoning" could not be achieved even

that he was not accorded due process and

as the rights of the squatters and low

deprived of security of tenure. Petition for

income

Certiorari was denied. CA reversed the

roused

families

from

are

sleep

fully

protected.

for

clarficatory

investigation.

questions

Umali

during

the

and President

decision and was elevated to SC. One of

Umali

raised

the

issue

of

the

interim

appointment

issued

by

the

constitutionality of PCAGC as a government

President of the Philippines in his favor on

agency.

June

Issue: Whether or not the contention of

Umali

was

raised

at

the

earliest

2,

1936,

Commission

and

on

confirmed

by

the

Appointments

of

the

National Assembly-On November 7, 1936,

the date on which Commonwealth Act No.

opportunity?

145,

otherwise

known

Judicial

Reorganization

AO

the

petitioner received from the President of

constitutionality of PCAGC, it was only

the Commonwealth a new ad interim

posed by petitioner in his motion for

appointment as judge of first instance, this

reconsideration before the RTC. It was

time of the Fourth Judicial District, with

certainly too late to raise the said issue for

authority to preside over the Courts of First

the first time at such a late stage of the

Instance

proceedings.

National Assembly adjourned without its

was

lifted.

Regarding

of

Manila

took

the

Decision: In lieu of the supervening events

152

Law,

as

and

effect,

the

Palawan-The

Commission on Appointments having acted

on said ad interim
appointment-Another

ZANDUETA V DE LA COSTA

ad

interim

appointment to the same office was issued

NATURE
This

is

in favor of said petitioner, pursuant to

a

instituted

by

quo
the

warranto
Honorable

proceeding
Francisco

Zandueta against the Honorable Sixto de la

Costa to obtain from this court a judgment
declaring the respondent to be illegally
occupying the office of Judge of the Fifth
Branch of the Court of First Instance of
Manila, Fourth Judicial District, ousting him
from said office, and holding that the
petitioner is entitled to continue occupying
the office in question by placing him in
possession thereof, with costs to said
respondent

which

he

took

new

oath-After

his

appointment and qualification as judge of

first instance of the Fourth Judicial District,
the petitioner, acting as executive judge,
performed several executive acts-On May
19,

1938,

the

Commission

on

Appointments of the National Assembly

disapproved

the

aforesaid

ad

interim

appointment of said petitioner-On August

1, 1938, the President of the Philippines
appointed

the

herein

respondent,

Honorable Sixto de la Costa, judge of first

instance of the Fourth Judicial District, with
authority to preside over the Fifth Branch

FACTS: Prior to the promulgation of

Commonwealth Act No.145, the petitioner,
the Honorable Francisco Zandueta was
discharging the office of judge of first

of the Court of First Instance of Manila and

the Court of First Instance of Palawan, and
his appointment was approved by the
Commission on Appointments

instance, Ninth Judicial District, comprising

solely the City of Manila, and was presiding
over the Fifth Branch of the Court of First
Instance of said city, by virtue of an ad

ISSUE: WON the petitioner may question

the validity of Commonwealth Act No. 145
to entitle him to repossess the office

occupied by him prior to the appointment

appointment may affect public interest or

issued in his favor by virtue of the assailed

when he is compelled to accept it by

statute

reason of legal exigencies. In the case

HELD: When a judge of first instance,

presiding over a branch of a Court of First
Instance of a judicial district by virtue of a
legal

and

valid

appointment,

accepts

another appointment to preside over the

same branch of the same Court of First
Instance, in addition to another court of the
same category, both of which belong to a
new judicial district formed by the addition
of another Court of First Instance to the old
one, enters into the discharge of the
functions of his new office and receives the
corresponding salary, he abandons his old
office and cannot claim to repossess it or
question the constitutionality of the law by
virtue of which his new appointment has

under consideration, the petitioner was

free to accept or not the ad interim
appointment issued by the President of the
Commonwealth in his favor, in accordance
with said Commonwealth Act No. 145. If
the petitioner believed that Commonwealth
Act No.145 is unconstitutional, he should
have refused to accept the appointment
offered him or, at least, he should have
accepted

it

reservation,

had

he

believed that his duty of obedience to the

laws

compelled

him

to

do

so,

and

afterwards resort to the power entrusted

with the final determination of the question
whether a law is unconstitutional or not.The

petitioner,

constitutional

been issued.

with

being

and

aware

legal

of

rights

his
and

obligations, by implied order of the law(art.

by

2, Civil Code), accepted the office and

jurisprudence, is that when a public official

entered into the performance of the duties

voluntarily accepts an appointment to an

inherent therein, after taking the necessary

office newly created or reorganized by law,

oath, thereby acting with full knowledge

which new office is incompatible with the

that if he voluntarily accepted the office to

one formerly occupied by him , qualifies

which he was appointed, he would later be

for the discharge of the functions thereof

stopped from questioning the validity of

by taking the necessary oath, and enters

said appointment by alleging that the law,

into the performance of his duties by

by virtue of which his appointment was

executing acts inherent in said newly

issued, is unconstitutional. The petition for

created or reorganized office and receiving

quo warranto instituted is denied and the

the

same

The

rule

of

equity,

corresponding

sanctioned

salary,

he

will

be

considered to have abandoned the office

is

dismissed

with

costs

to

the

petitioner.

he was occupying by virtue of his former

appointment (46Corpus Juris, 947, sec. 55),
and

he

cannot

question

the

constitutionality of the law by virtue of

NECESSITY

OF

DECIDEING

THE

CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTION
TARROSA V SINGSON

which he was last appointed (11 American

Jurisprudence, 166, par. 121;id., 767, par.

Facts: Gabriel C. Singson was appointed

123). He is excepted from said rule only

Governor

when

President Fidel V. Ramos. Jesus Armando

his

non-acceptance

of

the

new

of

the

Bangko

Sentral

by

Tarrosa, as a "taxpayer", filed a petition for

the respondent from said office as a mere

prohibition questioning the appointment of

usurper. Likewise in Greene v. Knox, 175

Singson for not having been confirmed by

N.Y. 432 (1903), 67 N.E. 910, it was held

the Commission on Appointments (CA).

that the question of title to an office, which

Tarrosa invoked Section 6 of Republic Act

must

No. 7653 which provides that the Governor

proceeding, may not be determined in a

of the BSP if appointed is subject to the

suit to restrain the payment of salary to the

confirmation of the CA. In his comment,

person holding such office, brought by

Singson

someone who does not claim to be the one

claimed

that

the

Congress

exceeded its legislative powers in requiring

the

confirmation

by

the

CA

of

the

appointment of the Governor of the Bangko

Sentral. He contended that an appointment
to the said position is not among the
appointments which have to be confirmed
by the Commission on Appointments, citing
Section 16 of Article VI of the Constitution.
Issues:

be

resolved

quo

warranto

entitled to occupy the said office.

2. Appointment to the position of the
Governor of the BSP is not one of those
that need confirmation by the Commission
on Appointments. Congress cannot by law
expand the confirmation powers of the
Commission on Appointments and require
confirmation

of

government

Whether or not Tarrosa has the locus standi

in a

appointment

officials

not

of

other

expressly

mentioned in the first sentence of Section

16 of Article VII of the Constitution. (Tarrosa

to challenge the appointment.

vs. Singson, G.R. No. 111243, May 25,

Whether or not the Governor of the BSP is

1994)

subject to COAs confirmation.

DECLARATION

Held:

OF

UNCONSTITUIONALITY
1. Tarrosa has no legal standing to question
the appointment. The petition is in the

EFFECTS:

nature of a quo warranto proceeding as it

1. ORTHODOX

seeks the ouster of respondent Singson

or

exercising

the

powers

of

Governor of the Bangko Sentral. Such a

special civil action can only be commenced
by the Solicitor General or by a "person
claiming to be entitled to a public office or
position unlawfully held or exercised by
another." In Sevilla v. Court of Appeals, 209
SCRA 637 (1992), the court held that the
petitioner therein, who did not aver that he
was entitled to the office of the City
Engineer of Cabanatuan City, could not
bring the action for quo warranto to oust

MODERN

VIEW

and alleges that the latter is unlawfully

holding

VIEW

NORTON V SHELBY
Facts:

case

was

filed

before

the

Tennessee Court, questioning the action

upon twenty-nine bonds of $1,000 each,
alleged to be the bonds of Shelby County,
Tennessee, issued on the first of March,
1869, and payable on the first of January,
1873, with interest from January 1, 1869 at
6percent per annum; and three coupons of
$60

each.

Plaintiffs

contend

that

the

commissioners who issued to them the

said bonds were lawful officers, thereby

that if the act creating the board was void,

authorized to bind the county to the legal

and the commissioners were not officers de

obligations of the bonds. However, the

jure, they were nevertheless officers de

defendants

such

facto, and that the acts of the board as a

commissioners were not lawful officers,

de facto court are binding upon the county.

thereby absolving them from the legal

This contention is met by the fact that

obligations of the bonds, and that there

there can be no officer, either de jure or de

was no office in Tennessee as that of a

facto, if there be no office to fill.

county

contend

that

commissioner,

and

thereby

rendering the issued bonds as void. Also

they

challenged

commissioned

the

statutes

the

that

commissioners,

particularly the act of March 9, 1867 which

provides for the creation of the board of
commissioners in issuing the bonds, as
unconstitutional.

MANILA MOTORS CO V FLORES

In May 1954, Manila Motor Company filed
in

the

Municipal

Court

of

Manila

complaint to recover from Manuel T. Flores

the

amount

of

P1,047.98

as

chattel

mortgage installments which fell due in

September

1941.

Defendant

pleaded

Issue: Whether or not the act of March 9,

prescription: 1941 to 1954. The complaint

1867

therefore

was dismissed. On appeal, the Court of

rendering the commissioned officers as

First Instance saw differently, sustaining

illegally appointed.

plaintiff's contention that the moratorium

Held: The Tennessee high court rendered

laws had interrupted the running of the

the act of March 9, 1867 unconstitutional.

prescriptive period, and that deducting the

The creation of the board of commissioners

time during which said laws were in

also confers the powers of the justices of

operation three years and eight months1

the peace of the county court, and such a

the ten year term had not yet elapsed

provision is unconstitutional and void, since

when complainant sued for collection in

these powers shall be exercised only by the

May 1954. Wherefore said court ordered

justices.

the return of the case to the municipal

is

unconstitutional,

judge for trial on the merits.

It is difficult to meet it by any argument
beyond this statement: An unconstitutional

Defendant appealed, arguing principally

act is not a law; it confers no rights; it

that the moratorium laws did not have the

imposes no duties; it affords no protection;

effect

it

limitations,

creates

no

office;

it

is,

in

legal

of

suspending
because

the

period

they

of

were

contemplation, as inoperative as though it

unconstitutional, as declared by this court

had never been passed.

in Rutter vs. Esteban, 49 Off. Gaz. (5) 1807.

He cites jurisprudence holding that when a

The Supreme Court affirmed this decision.

However,

it

said

that

even

if

the

commissioners were not appointed de jure,

they were working de facto, thus still
providing lawful authority. It is contended

statute is adjudged unconstitutional it is as

inoperative as if it had never been passed,
and no rights can be built upon it. Some
members expressed doubts as to whether
the order of the lower court was appealable

in nature; but we agreed not to discuss the

1952. The title of the law was, An Act to

point, inasmuch as the question submitted

Fix the Passing Marks for Bar Examinations

by appellant could speedily be disposed of.

from 1946 up to and including 1955.

InMontilla vs. Pacific Commercial3 we held

that the moratorium laws suspended the

Section 1 provided the following passing

marks:

period of prescription. That was rendered

after the Rutter-Esteban decision. It should
be stated however, in fairness to appellant,
that the Montilla decision came down after
he had submitted his brief. And in answer

1946-195170%
1952 .71%
1953..72%

following

1954..73%

portion is quoted from a resolution of this

1955..74%

to

his

main

contention,

the

Court Rutter vs. Esteban (93 Phil., 68) may

be construed to mean that at the of the
decision the Moratorium law could no

Provided however, that the examinee shall

have no grade lower than 50%.

longer be validly applied because of the

Section 2 of the Act provided that A bar

prevailing

candidate who obtained a grade of 75% in

although

circumstances.
the

general

unconstitutional

At

rate,

that

an

any subject shall be deemed to have

"confers

no

already

rule

statute

any
is

passed

that

subject

and

the

right, create no office, affords no protection

grade/grades shall be included in the

and justifies no acts performed under it."

computation of the general average in

(11 Am. Jur., pp. 828, 829.) there are

subsequent bar examinations.

several instances wherein courts, out of

equity, have relaxed its operation (cf. notes

ISSUE: Whether or not, R.A. No. 972 is

constitutional.

in Cooley's Constitutional Limitations 8th

ed., p. 383 and Notes 53 A. L. R., 273) or
qualified
existence

its
of

effects
a

"since

statute

the

prior

to

actual
such

declaration is an operative fact, and may

have consequences which cannot justly be
ignored (Chicot County vs. Baster, 308 U.
S., 371) and a realistic approach is eroding
the general doctrine (Warring vs. Colpoys,
136 Am. Law Rep., 1025, 1030).

RULING:Section

was

declared

unconstitutional due to the fatal defect of

not being embraced in the title of the Act.
As per its title, the Act should affect only
the bar flunkers of 1946 to 1955 Bar
examinations.

Section2

establishes

permanent system for an indefinite time. It

was also struck down for allowing partial
passing, thus failing to take account of the
fact that laws and jurisprudence are not

Judgment affirmed, without costs.

stationary. As to Section1, the portion for

1946-1951 was declared unconstitutional,

PARTIAL UNCONSTITUIONALITY:

while that for 1953 to 1955 was declared in

force and effect.

IN RE CUNANAN
FACTS:Congress passed Rep. Act No. 972,
or what is known as the Bar Flunkers Act, in

stricken

down

The portion that was

was

based

under

the

following reasons: The law itself admits

that the candidates for admission who

flunked the bar from 1946 to 1952 had

appropriated, petitioner filed the instant

inadequate preparation due to the fact that

petition as a taxpayer and as a lawyer.

this was very close to the end of World War

ISSUES:

II; The law is, in effect, a judgment

revoking the resolution of the court on the
petitions of the said candidates; The law is
an encroachment on the Courts primary
prerogative to determine who may be

(1) Whether or not Section 5(d) of Republic

Act

No.

9189

violates

the

residency

requirement in Section 1 of Article V of the

Constitution.

admitted to practice of law and, therefore,

(2) Whether or not Section 18.5 of the

in excess of legislative power to repeal,

same

alter and supplement the Rules of Court.

mandate under Section 4, Article VII of the

The rules laid down by Congress under this

Constitution that the winning candidates

power

for President and the Vice-President shall

are

only

minimum

norms,

not

designed to substitute the judgment of the

court on who can practice law; and

law

violates

the

constitutional

be proclaimed as winners by Congress.

(3) Whether or not Congress may, through

The pretended classification is arbitrary

the

and amounts to class legislation.

Committee created in Section 25 of Rep.

Joint

Congressional

Oversight

Act No. 9189, exercise the power to review,

As to the portion declared in force and
effect, the Court could not muster enough
votes to declare it void. Moreover, the law
was passed in 1952, to take effect in 1953.
Hence, it will not revoke existing Supreme
Court resolutions denying admission to the
bar of an petitioner.

revise,

amend,

and

approve

the

Implementing Rules and Regulations that

the Commission on Elections, promulgate
without violating the independence of the
COMELEC under Section 1, Article IX-A of
the Constitution.

The same may also

rationally fall within the power to Congress

HELD:

to alter, supplement or modify rules of

(1)

admission to the practice of law.

enumerates those who are disqualified

No.

Section

of

RA

No.

9189

voting under this Act. It disqualifies an

MACALINTAL V COMELEC

immigrant or a permanent resident who is

FACTS:Before the Court is a petition for

certiorari and prohibition filed by Romulo B.
Macalintal, a member of the Philippine Bar,
seeking

declaration

that

certain

provisions of Republic Act No. 9189 (The

Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003)
suffer

from

constitutional

infirmity.

Claiming that he has actual and material

legal interest in the subject matter of this
case in seeing to it that public funds are
properly

and

lawfully

used

and

recognized as such in the host country.

However, an exception is provided i.e.
unless he/she executes, upon registration,
an affidavit prepared for the purpose by
the Commission declaring that he/she shall
resume

actual

physical

permanent

residence in the Philippines not later than 3

years from approval of registration. Such
affidavit shall also state that he/she has
not

applied

for

citizenship

in

another

country. Failure to return shall be cause for

the removal of the name of the immigrant

or permanent resident from the National

exercised his right to vote, the Court is not

Registry of Absentee Voters and his/her

in a position to rule on the wisdom of the

permanent

law or to repeal or modify it if such law is

disqualification

to

vote

in

absentia.

found to be impractical. However, it can be

said that the Congress itself was conscious
of

Petitioner claims that this is violative of the

residency requirement in Section 1 Article
V of the Constitution which requires the
voter must be a resident in the Philippines
for at least one yr, and a resident in the
place where he proposes to vote for at

this

probability

and

provided

for

deterrence which is that the Filipino who

fails to return as promised stands to lose
his right of suffrage. Accordingly, the votes
he cast shall not be invalidated because he
was qualified to vote on the date of the
elections.

least 6 months immediately preceding an

election.
Expressum facit cessare tacitum: where a
law sets down plainly its whole meaning,
However, OSG held that ruling in said case
does not hold water at present, and that
the

Court

may

particular

have

ruling.

to

discard

Panacea

that

of

the

controversy: Affidavit for without it, the

presumption

of

abandonment

of

Phil

domicile shall remain. The qualified Filipino

abroad

who

executed

an

affidavit

is

deemed to have retained his domicile in

the Philippines and presumed not to have
lost his domicile by his physical absence

the Court is prevented from making it

mean what the Court pleases. In fine,
considering that underlying intent of the
Constitution, as is evident in its statutory
construction and intent of the framers,
which is to grant Filipino immigrants and
permanent

residents

abroad

the

unquestionable right to exercise the right

of suffrage (Section 1 Article V) the Court
finds that Section 5 of RA No. 9189 is not
constitutionally defective.

from this country. Section 5 of RA No. 9189

does not only require the promise to
resume

actual

physical

permanent

(2) Yes. Congress should not have allowed

residence in the Philippines not later than 3

COMELEC

to

usurp

years after approval of registration but it

constitutionally

belongs

also requires the Filipino abroad, WON he is

canvassing

the

a green card holder, a temporary visitor or

proclamation of the winning candidates for

even on business trip, must declare that

President and Vice President for the entire

he/she has not applied for citizenship in

nation

another country. Thus, he/she must return

Congress as its duty and power under

to the Philippines otherwise consequences

Section 4 of Article VII of the Constitution.

will be met according to RA No. 9189.

COMELEC has the authority to proclaim the

of

must

remain

power
to

votes

in

the

that

it.

The

and

the

hands

of

winning candidates only for Senators and

Party-list Reps.
Although there is a possibility that the
Filipino

will

not

return

after

he

has

(3) No. By vesting itself with the powers to

one subject which shall be expressed in the

approve, review, amend and revise the

title of the bill. Constitutional provision

Implementing Rules & Regulations for RA

contains

No. 9189, Congress went beyond the scope

legislative power:

of its constitutional authority. Congress

trampled upon the constitutional mandate
of independence of the COMELEC. Under

1.

DUAL

Congress

LIMITATIONS

is

conglomeration,

to

under

refrain
one

upon

from

statute,

of

heterogenous subjects.

such a situation, the Court is left with no

option but to withdraw from its usual
silence in declaring a provision of law

2. The title of the bill is to be couched in a

language sufficient to notify the legislators
and the public and those concerned of the

unconstitutional

import of the single subject thereof. It

violates the constitutional requirement that
the subject of the bill be expressed in its
EXCEPTION

title. It did not inform the Congress the full

impact of the Law. Moreover, It did not

LINDASAN V COMELEC

inform thecitizens of Buldon and Parang in

FACT: Bara Lidasan was a resident of

Parang, Cotabato. Later, Republic Act No.
4790,

entitled

An

Act

Creating

the

Municipality of Dianaton in the Province of

Lanao

del

Sur,

was

passed.

Lidasan

however discovered that certain barrios

located

in

Cotabato

were

included

in

Dianaton, Lanao Del Sur pursuant to RA

4790. [Remarkably, even the Congressman
of Cotabato voted in favor of RA 4790.]
Pursuant to this law, COMELEC proceeded
to establish precincts for voter registration
in the said territories of Dianaton. Lidasan
then filed a case to have RA 4790 be
nullified

for

being

averred

that

the

indicate

in

its

unconstitutional.
law

title

did
that

not
in

He

clearly
creating

Dianaton, it would be including in its

territory several barrios from Cotabato.

Cotabato that part of their territory is being

taken

away

from

their

towns

and

municipalities and that such will be added

to the Province of Lanao del Sur. The
subject was the creation of the municipality
of Dianaton. Hence, it makes the title
misleading

and

deceptive.

Even

upon

removing the barrios of Cotabato included

in the municipality of Dianaton, it is still
unconstitutional because the valid part is
not independent of the invalid portion.
Thus, it is indivisible, and it is accordingly
null and void in its totality
DOCTRINE

OF

RELATIVE

CONSTITUIONALITY
CENTRAL BANK EMPLOYEES ASS,N IC V BSP
FACTS:
First the facts.

ISSUE: Whether or not RA 4790 is valid?

RULING: RA 4790 declared as NULL and
VOID.

Constitutional

requirement

aforestated that no bill which may be

enacted into law shall embrace more than

On July 3, 1993, R.A. No. 7653 (the New

Central Bank Act) took effect. It abolished
the old Central Bank of the Philippines, and
created a new BSP.
On June 8, 2001, almost eight years after
the effectivity of R.A. No. 7653, petitioner
Central Bank (now BSP) Employees

Association, Inc., filed a petition for

prohibition against BSP and the Executive
Secretary of the Office of the President, to
restrain
respondents
from
further
implementing the last proviso in Section
15(c), Article II of R.A. No. 7653, on the
ground that it is unconstitutional.
Article II, Section 15(c) of R.A. No. 7653
provides:
Section 15. Exercise of Authority - In the
exercise of its authority, the Monetary
Board shall:
xxx xxx xxx
(c)
establish
a
human
resource
management system which shall govern
the selection, hiring, appointment, transfer,
promotion, or dismissal of all personnel.
Such system shall aim to establish
professionalism and excellence at all levels
of the Bangko Sentral in accordance with
sound principles of management.
The thrust of petitioners challenge is that
the
above
proviso
makes
an
unconstitutional cut between two classes
of employees in the BSP, viz: (1) the BSP
officers or those exempted from the
coverage of the Salary Standardization Law
(SSL) (exempt class); and (2) the rank-andfile (Salary Grade [SG] 19 and below), or
those not exempted from the coverage of
the SSL (non-exempt class). Petitioner also
claims that it is not germane to the
purposes of Section 15(c), Article II of R.A.
No. 7653, the most important of which is to
establish professionalism and excellence at
all levels in the BSP.[1]
Respondent BSP, in its comment,[10]
contends that the provision does not
violate the equal protection clause and can
stand the constitutional test, provided it is
construed in harmony with other provisions
of the same law, such as fiscal and
administrative autonomy of BSP, and the
mandate of the Monetary Board to
establish professionalism and excellence at
all levels in accordance with sound
principles of management.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the last paragraph of
Section 15(c), Article II of R.A. No. 7653,
runs afoul of the constitutional mandate
that "No person shall be. . . denied the
equal protection of the laws."[12]?
RULING:
THE ENACTMENT OF SUBSEQUENT
LAWS - EXEMPTING ALL OTHER RANK-ANDFILE EMPLOYEES OF GFIs FROM THE SSL -

RENDERS THE CONTINUED APPLICATION OF

THE CHALLENGED PROVISION A VIOLATION
OF THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE.
The concept of relative constitutionality.
The constitutionality of a statute cannot, in
every instance, be determined by a mere
comparison of its provisions with applicable
provisions of the Constitution, since the
statute may be constitutionally valid as
applied to one set of facts and invalid in its
application to another.[24] A statute valid
at one time may become void at another
time because of altered
The foregoing provisions impregnably
institutionalize in this jurisdiction the long
honored legal truism of "equal pay for
equal work." Persons who work with
substantially equal qualifications, skill,
effort and responsibility, under similar
conditions, should be paid similar salaries.
Congress retains its wide discretion in
providing for a valid classification, and its
policies should be accorded recognition
and respect by the courts of justice except
when they run afoul of the Constitution.
The
deference
stops
where
the
classification violates a fundamental right,
or prejudices persons accorded special
protection by the Constitution.
In the case at bar, the challenged proviso
operates on the basis of the salary grade
or officer-employee status. It is akin to a
distinction based on economic class and
status, with the higher grades as recipients
of a benefit specifically withheld from the
lower grades. The implications are quite
disturbing: BSP rank-and-file employees
are paid the strictly regimented rates of
the SSL while employees higher in rank possessing higher and better education
and opportunities for career advancement are given higher compensation packages
to entice them to stay.
To be sure, the
BSP rank-and-file employees merit greater
concern from this Court. They represent
the
more
impotent
rank-and-file
government
employees
who,
unlike
employees in the private sector, have no
specific right to organize as a collective
bargaining unit and negotiate for better
terms and conditions of employment, nor
the power to hold a strike to protest unfair
labor practices.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, we hold that the
continued operation and implementation of
the last proviso of Section 15(c), Article II
of
Republic
Act
No.
7653
is
unconstitutional.
II. THE FUNDEMENTAL POWERS OF
THE STATE

A. SIMILARITIES,
DISTINCTIONS
AND LIMITATIONS
B. POLICE POWER
1. DEFINITION,
SCOPE
CHARACTERISTICS
INCHONG V HERNANDEZ
Facts: Republic Act No. 1180 is entitled "An
Act to Regulate the Retail Business." In
effect it nationalizes the retail trade
business.
Petitioner
attacks
the
constitutionality of the Act, contending
that: (1) it denies to alien residents the
equal protection of the laws and deprives
of their liberty and property without due
process of law ; (2) the subject of the Act is
not expressed or comprehended in the title
thereof; (3) the Act violates international
and treaty obligations of the Republic of
the Philippines; (4) the provisions of the
Act against the transmission by aliens of
their retail business thru hereditary
succession, and those requiring 100%
Filipino capitalization for a corporation or
entity to entitle it to engage in the retail
business, violate the spirit of Sections 1
and 5, Article XIII and Section 8 of Article
XIV of the Constitution. In answer, the
Solicitor-General and the Fiscal of the City
of Manila contend that: (1) the Act was
passed in the valid exercise of the police
power of the State, which exercise is
authorized in the Constitution in the
interest of national economic Survival; (2)
the Act has only one subject embraced in
the title; (3) no treaty or international
obligations are infringed; (4) as regards
hereditary succession, only the form is
affected but the value of the property is
not impaired, and the institution of
inheritance is only of statutory origin.
Issue: Whether the conditions which the
disputed law purports to remedy really or
actually exist.
Held: Yes. We hold that the disputed law
was enacted to remedy a real actual threat
and danger to national economy posed by
alien dominance and control of the retail
business and free citizens and country
from dominance and control. Such
enactment clearly falls within the scope of
the police power of the State, thru which
and by which it protects its own
personality and insures its security and
future. Furthermore, the law does not
violate the equal protection clause of the
Constitution because sufficient grounds
exist for the distinction between alien and
citizen in the exercise of the occupation
regulated, nor the due process of law
clause, because the law is prospective in
operation and recognizes the privilege of
aliens already engaged in the occupation

and reasonably protects their privilege.

The wisdom and efficacy of the law to
carry out its objectives appear to us to be
plainly evident as a matter of fact it
seems not only appropriate but actually
necessary and that in any case such
matter falls within the prerogative of the
Legislature, with whose power and
discretion the Judicial department of the
Government may not interfere. Moreover,
the provisions of the law are clearly
embraced in the title, and this suffers from
no duplicity and has not misled the
legislators or the segment of the
population affected; and that it cannot be
said to be void for supposed conflict with
treaty obligations because no treaty has
actually been entered into on the subject
and the police power may not be curtailed
or surrendered by any treaty or any other
conventional agreement.

ORTIGAS AND CO. V CA

Facts: On March 4, 1952, Ortigas sold Lot 5
and 6, Block 31 of the Highway Hills
Subdivision at Mandaluyong to Augusto
Padilla y Angeles and Natividad Angeles.
The latter transferred their rights in favour
of Emma Chavez, upon completion of
payment a deed was executed with
stipulations, one of which is that the use of
the lots are to be exclusive for residential
purposes only. This was annotated in the
Transfer Certificate of Titles No. 101509
and 101511. Feati then acquired Lot 5
directly from Emma Chavez and Lot 6 from
Republic Flour Mills. On May 5, 1963, Feati
started construction of a building on both
lots to be devoted for banking purposes
but could also be for residential use.
Ortigas sent a written demand to stop
construction
but
Feati
continued
contending that the building was being
constructed according to the zoning
regulations
as
stated
in
Municipal
Resolution 27 declaring the area along the
West part of EDSA to be a commercial and
industrial zone. Civil case No. 7706 was
made and decided in favour of Feati.

Issue: Whether or not Resolution number

27 declaring Lot 5 and 6 to be part of an
industrial and commercial zone is valid
considering the contract stipulation in the
Transfer Certificate of Titles.

Held: Resolution No. 27 prevails over the

contract stipulations. Section 3 of RA 2264
of the Local Autonomy Act empowers a
Municipal Council to adopt zoning and

subdivision ordinances or regulations for

the Municipality. Section 12 or RA 2264
states
that implied power of
the
municipality should be liberally construed
in its favour, to give more power to the
local government in promoting economic
conditions, social welfare, and material
progress in the community. This is found
in the General Welfare Clause of the said
act. Although non-impairment of contracts
is constitutionally guaranteed, it is not
absolute since it has to be reconciled with
the legitimate exercise of police power, e.g.
the power to promote health, morals,
peace, education, good order or safety and
general welfare of the people. Resolution
No. 27 was obviously passed in exercise of
police power to safeguard health, safety,
peace and order and the general welfare of
the people in the locality as it would not be
a conducive residential area considering
the amount of traffic, pollution, and noise
which results in the surrounding industrial
and commercial establishments. Decision
dismissing the complaint of Ortigas is
AFFIRMED
PRC V DE GUZMAN
Facts: The respondents are all graduates of
the Fatima College of Medicine, Valenzuela
City, Metro Manila. They passed the
Physician Licensure Examination conducted
in February 1993 by the Board of Medicine
(Board). Petitioner Professional Regulation
Commission (PRC) then released their
names as successful examinees in the
medical licensure examination. Shortly
thereafter, the Board observed that the
grades of the seventy-nine successful
examinees from Fatima College in the two
most difficult subjects in the medical
licensure exam, Biochemistry (Bio-Chem)
and Obstetrics and Gynecology (OB-Gyne),
were unusually and exceptionally high.
Eleven Fatima examinees scored 100% in
Bio- Chem and ten got 100% in OB-Gyne,
another eleven got 99% in Bio-Chem, and
twenty-one scored 99% in OB-Gyne. For its
part, the NBI found that the questionable
passing rate of Fatima examinees in the
[1993] Physician Examination leads to the
conclusion that the Fatima examinees
gained early access to the test questions.
Issue: Was the act pursuant to R.A. 2382 a
valid exercise of police power
Ruling: Yes, it is true that this Court has
upheld the constitutional right of every
citizen to select a profession or course of
study subject to a fair, reasonable, and
equitable
admission
and
academic
requirements. But like all rights and
freedoms guaranteed by the Charter, their
exercise may be so regulated pursuant to

the police power of the State to safeguard

health, morals, peace, education, order,
safety, and general welfare of the people.
Thus, persons who desire to engage in the
learned professions requiring scientific or
technical knowledge may be required to
take an examination as a prerequisite to
engaging in their chosen career
2. WHO MAY EXERCISE
MMDA V GARIN
Respondent Garin was issued a traffic
violation receipt and his drivers license
was confiscated for parking illegally. Garin
wrote MMDA Chairman Prospero Oreta
requesting the return of his license and
expressed his preference for case to be
filed in Court. Without an immediate reply
from the reply from the Chairman, Garin
filed a complaint for preliminary injunction
assailing among other that Sec 5(+) of RA
7942 violates the constitutional prohibition
against undue delegation of legislative
authority, allowing MMDA to fix and impose
unspecified and unlimited fines and
penalties. RTC rules in his favor directing
MMDA to return Garins drivers license and
for MMDA to desist from confiscating
drivers license without first giving the
driver to opportunity to be heard in an
appropriate proceeding.

ISSUE: Whether or not Sec 5(+) of RA 7942

which authorizes MMDA to confiscate and
suspend or revoke drivers license in the
enforcement of traffic constitutional.
RULING: The MMDA is not vested with
police power. It was concluded that MMDA
is not a local government unit or a public
corporation endowed with legislative power
and it has no power to enact ordinances for
the welfare of the community. Police power
as an inherent attribute of sovereignty is
the power vested in the legislative to
make, ordain and establish all manner of
wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes
and ordinances either with penalties or
without, not repugnant to the constitution,
as they shall judge to be for the good and
welfare of the commonwealth, and for
subjects of the same. There is no provision
in RA 7942 that empowers MMDA or its
council to enact ordinances, approve
resolutions and appropriate funds for the
general welfare of the inhabitants of Metro
Manila. All its functions are administrative
in nature. It is an agency created for the
purpose of laying down policies and
coordinating with the various national
government agencies, P.O., NGOs and

private sector for the efficient

expeditious delivery of services.

and

3. TEST OF VALID EXERCISE

(LIMITATIONS)
LAWFUL SUBJECTS
TAXI CAB OPERATORS OF METRO MANILA V
BOARD OF TRANSPORTATION
FACTS:
Petitioner
assailed
the
constitutionality of an administrative
regulation phasing out taxicabs more than
six years old on grounds that it is violative
of the constitutional rights of equal
protection because it is only enforced in
Manila and directed solely towards the taxi
industry. Respondents contend that the
purpose of the regulation is the promotion
of safety and comfort of the riding public
from the dangers posed by old and
dilapidated taxis.
ISSUE: Whether or not an administrative
regulation phasing out taxicabs more than
six years old is a valid exercise of police
power.
HELD: No, the State in the exercise of its
police power, can prescribe regulations to
promote the safety and general welfare of
the people. In addition, there is no
infringement of the equal protection clause
because it is common knowledge that
taxicabs in Manila are subjected to heavier
traffic pressure and more constant use,
creating a substantial distinction from
taxicabs of other places.
-----Facts: Board of Transportation issued
Memorandum Circular No. 77-42 providing
for the phasing out and replacement of old
and dilapidated taxis beyond 6 years old.
Pursuant to the BOT circular, the
Bureau of Land Transportation issued
Implementing Circular No. 52 instructing
the implementation of said circular and
formulating a schedule of phase-out of
vehicles to be allowed and accepted for
registration as public conveyances.
Petitioners seek to declare the nullity of the
circulars on the ground that fixing the
ceiling at 6 years is arbitrarily and
oppressive because the road worthiness
of taxicabs depends upon their kind of
maintenance and the use to which they are
subjected and therefore their actual
physical condition should be taken into
consideration
at
the
time
of
the
registration.
Issue: WON a circular phasing out taxicabs
more than 6 years old is unreasonable and
arbitrary.

Held: No, A reasonable standard must be

adopted to apply to all vehicles uniformly,
fairly and justly. The span of 6 years
supplies that reaonable standard. By the
time taxis have fully depreciated, their cost
recovered, and a fair return on investment
obtained.
They
are
also
generally
dilapidated and no longer fit for safe and
comfortable service to the public. Taxicabs
in Manila, compared to those in other
places are subject to heavier traffic
pressure and constant use
TIO V VRB
Facts: The case is a petition filed by
petitioner
on
behalf
of
videogram
operators adversely
affected
by
Presidential Decree No. 1987, An Act
Creating the Videogram Regulatory Board
with broad powers to regulate and
supervise the videogram industry. A month
after the promulgation of the said
Presidential Decree, the amended the
National Internal Revenue Code provided
that:
SEC. 134. Video Tapes. There shall be
collected on each processed video-tape
cassette, ready for playback, regardless of
length, an annual tax of five pesos;
Provided, That locally manufactured or
imported blank video tapes shall be subject
to sales tax.
Section 10. Tax on Sale, Lease or
Disposition
of
Videograms.

Notwithstanding any provision of law to the

contrary, the province shall collect a tax of
thirty percent (30%) of the purchase price
or rental rate, as the case may be, for
every sale, lease or disposition of a
videogram containing a reproduction of
any
motion
picture
or
audiovisual
program. Fifty percent (50%) of the
proceeds of the tax collected shall accrue
to the province, and the other fifty percent
(50%) shall accrue to the municipality
where the tax is collected; PROVIDED, That
in Metropolitan Manila, the tax shall be
shared equally by the City/Municipality and
the Metropolitan Manila Commission. The
rationale behind the tax provision is to curb
the
proliferation
and
unregulated
circulation of videograms including, among
others, videotapes, discs, cassettes or any
technical
improvement
or
variation
thereof, have greatly prejudiced the
operations of movie houses and theaters.
Such unregulated circulation have caused a
sharp decline in theatrical attendance
by at least forty percent (40%) and a
tremendous drop in the collection of sales,
contractors specific, amusement and other
taxes, thereby resulting in substantial
losses estimated at P450 Million annually in

government
revenues.
Videogram(s)
establishments collectively earn around
P600 Million per annum from rentals, sales
and disposition of videograms, and these
earnings have not been subjected to tax,
thereby depriving the Government of
approximately P180 Million in taxes each
year. The
unregulated
activities
of
videogram
establishments
have
also
affected the viability of the movie industry.
Issues: (1) Whether or not tax imposed by
the DECREE is a valid exercise of police
power. (2) Whether or nor the DECREE is
constitutional.
Held: Taxation has been made the
implement of the states police power. The
levy of the 30% tax is for a public purpose.
It was imposed primarily to answer the
need for regulating the video industry,
particularly because of the rampant film
piracy, the flagrant violation of intellectual
property rights, and the proliferation of
pornographic video tapes. And while it was
also an objective of the DECREE to protect
the movie industry, the tax remains a valid
imposition.
We find no clear violation of the
Constitution which would justify us in
pronouncing Presidential Decree No. 1987
as unconstitutional and void. While the
underlying objective of the DECREE is to
protect the moribund movie industry, there
is no question that public welfare is at
bottom of its enactment, considering the
unfair competition posed by rampant film
piracy; the erosion of the moral fiber of the
viewing public brought about by the
availability of unclassified and unreviewed
video tapes containing pornographic films
and films with brutally violent sequences;
and losses in government revenues due to
the drop in theatrical attendance, not to
mention the fact that the activities of video
establishments are virtually untaxed since
mere payment of Mayors permit and
municipal license fees are required to
engage in business.
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is hereby
dismissed. No costs
DEPED V SAN DIEGO
Facts: The private respondent is a graduate
of the University of the East with a degree
of Bachelor of Science in Zoology. The
petitioner claims that he took the NMAT
three times and flunked it as many times. 1
When he applied to take it again, the
petitioner rejected his application on the
basis:
MECS Order No. 12, Series of 1972

h) A student shall be allowed only three (3)

chances to take the NMAT. After three (3)
successive failures, a student shall not be
allowed to take the NMAT for the fourth
time.
He then went to the Regional Trial Court of
Valenzuela, Metro Manila, to compel his
admission to the test. In his original
petition for mandamus, he first invoked his
constitutional rights to academic freedom
and quality education. By agreement of the
parties, the private respondent was
allowed to take the NMAT scheduled on
April 16, 1989, subject to the outcome of
his petition. In an amended petition filed
with leave of court, he squarely challenged
the constitutionality of MECS Order No. 12,
Series of 1972. The additional grounds
raised were due process and equal
protection.
After hearing, the respondent judge
rendered a decision on July 4, 1989,
declaring the challenged order invalid
and
granting
the
petition.
Judge
TeresitaDizon- Capulong held that the
petitioner had been deprived of his right to
pursue a medical education through an
arbitrary exercise of the police power.
DECS appealed the decision, hence this
case.
Issue: Is MECS Order No. 12, Series of
1972 a valid exercise of police power by
the state?
Held:The decision of the lower court dated
January 13, 1989, is REVERSED and the
petition is GRANTED. In Tablarin v.
Gutierrez, the court ruled that the
government is entitled to prescribe an
admission test like the NMAT as a means of
achieving its stated objective of "upgrading
the selection of applicants into [our]
medical schools" and of "improv[ing]
the quality of medical education in the
country and is recognized as a valid
exercises of governmental power. The
country is entitled to hold that the NMAT is
reasonably related to the securing of the
ultimate end of legislation and regulation in
this area. That end, it is useful to recall, is
the protection of the public from the
potentially deadly effects of incompetence
and ignorance in those who would
undertake to treat our bodies and minds for
disease or trauma.
Police power is validly exercised if (a) the
interests of the public generally, as
distinguished from those of a particular
class, require the interference of the State,
and (b) the means employed are
reasonably necessary to the attainment of
the object sought to be accomplished and

not unduly oppressive upon individuals.The

subject of the challenged regulation is
certainly within the ambit of the police
power. It is the right and indeed the
responsibility of the State to insure that the
medical profession is not infiltrated by
incompetents to whom patients may
unwarily entrust their lives and health. The
method employed by the challenged
regulation is not irrelevant to the purpose
of the law nor is it arbitrary or oppressive.
The three-flunk rule is intended to insulate
the medical schools and ultimately the
medical profession from the intrusion of
those not qualified to be doctors. The right
to quality education invoked by the private
respondent
is
not
absolute.
The
Constitution also provides that "every
citizen has the right to choose a profession
or course of study, subject to fair,
reasonable and equitable admission and
academic
requirements.The
private
respondent must yield to the challenged
rule and give way to those better prepared.
No depreciation is intended or made
against the private respondent. It is
stressed that a person who does not qualify
in the NMAT is not an absolute incompetent
unfit for any work or occupation. The only
inference is that he is a probably better,
not for the medical profession, but for
another calling that has not excited his
interest. It is time indeed that the State
took decisive steps to regulate and enrich
our system of education by directing the
student to the course for which he is best
suited as determined by initial tests and
evaluations. Otherwise, we may be
"swamped with mediocrity," in the words of
Justice Holmes, not because we are lacking
in intelligence but because we are a nation
of misfits,
SANGALANG V IAC
FACTS: The Mayor of Makati directed BelAir Village Association (BAVA) to opening of
several streets to the general public, after
a series of developments in zoning
regulations. All but Jupiter St. was
voluntarily opened. The strong opposition
later gave way when the municipal officials
force-opened the gates of said street for
public use. The area ceased to be purely
residential. Action for damages was
brought against Ayala Corporation and
BAVA for alleged breach of contract, to
maintain the purely residential status of
the area. Other similarly situated also filed
their respective cases. All were dismissed
in the trial court. The Court of Appeals
affirmed the said dismissals.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is a contract

between
homeowners
and
Ayala
Corporation violated in opening the Jupiter
street for public use.

HELD: No. There was no contract to speak

of in the case, hence nothing was violated.
RATIO: Petitioners cannot successfully rely
on the alleged promise by Ayala
Corporation, to build a [f]ence along
Jupiter [street] with gate for entrance
and/or exit as evidence of Ayalas alleged
continuing obligation to maintain a wall
between the residential and commercial
sections. Assuming there was a contract
violated, it was still overtaken by the
passage of zoning ordinances which
represent a legitimate exercise of police
power. The petitioners have not shown why
Courts should hold otherwise other than for
the supposed non-impairment guaranty
of the Constitution, which is secondary to
the more compelling interests of general
welfare. The Ordinance has not been
shown to be capricious or arbitrary or
unreasonable to warrant the reversal of the
judgments so appealed
---------Facts: The incident before the Court refers
to charges for contempt against Atty. J.
Cezar Sangco, counsel for the petitioners
Spouses Jose and Lutgarda Sangalang. On
February 2, 1989, the Court issued a
Resolution, requiring, among other things,
Atty. Sangco to show cause why he should
not be punished for contempt "for using
intemperate and accusatory language." On
March 2, 1989, Atty. Sangco filed an
explanation. The
Court
finds
Atty.
Sangco's remarks in his motion for
reconsideration, particularly, . . . The
Court not only put to serious question its
own integrity and competence but also
jeopardized its own campaign against
graft and corruption undeniably pervading
the
judiciary
.
.
.
disparaging,
intemperate,
and
uncalled-for.
His
suggestions that the Court might have
been guilty of graft and corruption in acting
on these cases are not only unbecoming,
but comes, as well, as an open assault
upon the Court's honor and integrity.
Issue: Whether or not the counsels act
constitutes malpractice in violation of the
Codes (CPR) provision on the use of
scandalous
offensive
or
menacing
language or behavior before the courts.
Held: In rendering its judgment, the Court
yielded to the records before it, and to the
records alone, and not to outside

influences, much less, the influence of any

of the parties. Atty. Sangco, as a former
judge of an inferior court, should know
better that in any litigation, one party
prevails, but his success will not justify
indictments of bribery by the other party.
He should be aware that because of his
accusations, he has done an enormous
disservice to the integrity of the highest
tribunal and to the stability of the
administration of justice in general. Atty.
Sangco is entitled to his opinion, but not to
a license to insult the Court with
derogatory statements and recourses to
argumenta ad hominem . In that event, it is
the Court's duty "to act to preserve the
honor and dignity . . . and to safeguard the
morals and ethics of the legal profession."
The Court in their "show-cause" Resolution,
they sought to hold Atty. Sangco in
contempt, specifically, for resort to
insulting
language
amounting
to
disrespect toward the Court within the
meaning of Section 1, of Rule 71, of the
Rules of Court. Clearly, however, his act
also constitutes malpractice as the term is
defined by Canon 11 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
DEL ROSARIO V BENGZON
Facts: Philippine Medical Association is
the national organization of medical
doctors in the Philippines. They assail the
constitutionality of some of the provisions
of Generics Act of 1988 (Rep. Act 6675)
and the implementation of Administrative
Order No. 62. The law specifically provides
that All government health agencies shall
use generic terminology or generic names
in all transactions related to purchasing,
prescribing, dispensing, and administering
of drugs and medicines. It also includes
medical, dental and veterinary, private
practitioners shall write prescriptions using
the generic name.
The petitioners main argument is the
alleged unequal treatment of government
practitioners and those on the private
practice. It is because the former are
required to use only generic terminology in
the prescription while the latter may write
the brand name of the drug below the
generic name. It is allegedly a specie of
invalid class legislation.
In addition, the petitioners gave a distorted
interpretation on RA 6675 and Admin Order
No. 62 saying that the salesgirl and or
druggist have the discretion to substitute
the doctors prescription. The court says
that the salesgirl at the drugstore counter
merely informs the customer, but does not
determine all the other drug products or

brands that have the same generic name

and their prices.
Issue: Whether or not the Generics Act is
constitutional as to the exercise of police
power by the government.
Held: Petition Dismissed. The court has
been unable to find any constitutional
infirmity in the Generics Act. It implements
the constitutional mandate for the State
to protect and promote the right to health
of the people and to make essential
goods, health and other social services
available to all the people at affordable
cost. The alleged unequal treatment of
government physicians, dentists and
veterinarians on one hand and those in the
private practice in the other, is a
misinterpretation of the law. The salesgirl
at the drugstore counter merely informs
the customer of all available products, but
does not determine all the other drug
products or brands that have the same
generic name and their corresponding
process. The penal sanction in violation of
the law is indispensable because they are
the teeth of the law. Without them, the law
would be toothless. The Generics Act and
the implementing administrative orders of
the Secretary of Health are constitutional.
The purpose of the Generics Act is to
promote and require the use of generic
drug products that are therapeutically
equivalent
to
their
brand
name
counterparts. The effect of the drug does
not depend on its brand but on the active
ingredients which it contains.
TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND BROADCAST
ATTORNEY V COMELEC
Facts: Petitioner Telecommunications and
Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines, Inc.
(TELEBAP) is an organization of lawyers of
radio
and
television
broadcasting
companies. It was declared to be without
legal standing to sue in this case as,
among other reasons, it was not able to
show that it was to suffer from actual or
threatened injury as a result of the subject
law. Petitioner GMA Network, on the other
hand, had the requisite standing to bring
the constitutional challenge. Petitioner
operates radio and television broadcast
stations in the Philippines affected by the
enforcement of Section 92, B.P. No. 881.
Petitioners challenge the validity of Section
92, B.P. No. 881 which provides:
Comelec Time- The Commission shall
procure radio and television time to be
known as the Comelec Time which shall
be allocated equally and impartially among
the candidates within the area of coverage

of all radio and television stations. For this

purpose, the franchise of all radio
broadcasting and television stations are
hereby amended so as to provide radio or
television time, free of charge, during the
period of campaign.
Petitioner contends that while Section 90 of
the same law requires COMELEC to procure
print space in newspapers and magazines
with payment, Section 92 provides that air
time shall be procured by COMELEC free of
charge. Thus it contends that Section 92
singles out radio and television stations to
provide free air time.
Petitioner claims that it suffered losses
running to several million pesos in
providing COMELEC Time in connection
with the 1992 presidential election and
1995 senatorial election and that it stands
to suffer even more should it be required to
do so again this year. Petitioners claim that
the primary source of revenue of the radio
and television stations is the sale of air
time to advertisers and to require these
stations to provide free air time is
toauthorize unjust taking of private
property.
According to petitioners, in 1992 it lost
P22,498,560.00 in providing free air time
for one hour each day and, in this years
elections, it stands to lost P58,980,850.00
in view of COMELECs requirement that it
provide at least 30 minutes of prime time
daily for such.
Issues:
(1) Whether of not Section 92 of B.P. No.
881 denies radio and televisionbroadcast
companies the equal protection of the
laws.
(2) Whether or not Section 92 of B.P. No.
881 constitutes taking of property without
due process of law and without just
compensation.
Held: Petitioners argument is without
merit. All broadcasting, whether radio or by
television stations, is licensed by the
government. Airwave frequencies have to
be allocated as there are more individuals
who want to broadcast that there are
frequencies
to
assign.
Radio
and
televisionbroadcasting companies, which
are given franchises, do not own the
airwaves and frequencies through which
they transmit broadcast signals and
images. They are merely given the
temporary privilege to use them. Thus,
such exercise of the privilege may
reasonably
be
burdened
with
theperformance by the grantee of some
form of public service. In granting the

privilege to operate broadcast stations and

supervising radio and television stations,
the state spends considerable public funds
in licensing and supervising them.
The argument that the subject law singles
out radio and television stations to provide
free air time as against newspapers and
magazines which require payment of just
compensation for the print space they may
provide
is
likewise
without
merit.
Regulation of the broadcast industry
requires spending of public funds which it
does not do in the case of print media. To
require the broadcast industry to provide
free air time for COMELEC is a fair
exchange for what the industry gets. As
radio and television broadcast stations do
not own the airwaves, no private property
is taken by the requirement that they
provide air time to the COMELEC.
OPLE V TORRES
Facts:
The
petition
at
bar
is
a
commendable effort on the part of Senator
Blas F. Ople to prevent the shrinking of the
rightto privacy, which the revered Mr.
Justice Brandeis considered as "the most
comprehensive of rights and the rightmost
valued by civilized men." Petitioner Ople
prays that we invalidate Administrative
Order No. 308 entitled"Adoption of a
National
Computerized
Identification
Reference System" on two important
constitutional grounds,
viz :(1)it is a usurpation of the power of
Congress
to
legislate,
and(2)it
impermissibly intrudes on our citizenry's
protected zone of privacy.We grant the
petition for the rights sought to be
vindicated by the petitioner need stronger
barriers against furthererosion.A.O. No. 308
was published in four newspapers of
general circulation on January 22, 1997 and
January 23, 1997.
On January 24, 1997, petitioner filed the
instant petition against respondents, then
Executive Secretary Ruben Torresand the
heads of the government agencies, who as
members of the Inter-Agency Coordinating
Committee,
arecharged
with
the
implementation of A.O. No. 308. On April 8,
1997, we issued a temporary restraining
orderenjoining its implementation.
Issue: WON the petitioner has the stand to
assail the validity of A.O. No. 308

Ruling: Yes, As is usual in constitutional

litigation, respondents raise the threshold
issues relating to the standing to sue of
thepetitioner and the justiciability of the

case at bar. More specifically, respondents

aver that petitioner has no legalinterest to
uphold and that the implementing rules of
A.O. No. 308 have yet to be promulgated.
These submissions do not deserve our
sympathetic ear. Petitioner Ople is a
distinguished
member of our Senate. Asa Senator,
petitioner is possessed of the requisite
standing to bring suit raising the issue that
the issuance of A.O.No. 308 is a usurpation
of legislative power. As taxpayer and
member of the Government Service
InsuranceSystem (GSIS), petitioner can
also
impugn
the
legality
of
the
misalignment of public funds and the
misuse of GSISfunds to implement A.O. No.
308. The ripeness for adjudication of the
Petition at bar is not affected by the fact
that the implementing rules of A.O.No. 308
have yet to be promulgated. Petitioner
Ople assails A.O. No. 308 as invalidper
seand as infirmed on itsface. His action is
not premature for the rules yet to be
promulgated cannot cure its fatal defects.
Moreover,
therespondents
themselves
have started the implementation of A.O.
No. 308 without waiting for the rules. As
early as January 19, 1997, respondent
Social Security System (SSS) caused the
publication of a notice to bid for
themanufacture
of
the
National
Identification
(ID)
card.
Respondent
Executive Secretary Torres has publicly
announcedthat representatives from the
GSIS and the SSS have completed the
guidelines
for
the
national
identificationsystem.All signals from the
respondents show their unswerving will to
implement A.O. No. 308 and we need not
wait forthe formality of the rules to pass
judgment on its constitutionality. In this
light, the dissenters insistence that
wetighten the rule on standing is not a
commendable stance as its result would be
to throttle an importantconstitutional
principle and a fundamental right.

LAWFUL MEANS
YNOT V IAC
Facts: On January 13, 1984, the petitioner
transported six carabaos in a pump boat
from Masbate to Iloilo when the same was
confiscated
by
the
police
station
commander of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo for the
violation of E.O. 626-A. A case was filed by
the
petitioner
questioning
the
constitutionality of executive order and the
recovery of the carabaos. After considering

the merits of the case, the confiscation was

sustained and the court declined to rule on
the constitutionality issue. The petitioner
appealed the decision to the Intermediate
Appellate Court but it also upheld the
ruling of RTC.
Issue: Is E.O. 626-A unconstitutional?
Ruling: The Respondent contends that it is
a valid exercise of police power to justify
EO 626-A amending EO 626 in asic rule
prohibiting the slaughter of carabaos
except under certain conditions. The
supreme court said that The reasonable
connection between the means employed
and the purpose sought to be achieved by
the questioned measure is missing the
Supreme Court do not see how the
prohibition of the inter-provincial transport
of
carabaos
can
prevent
their
indiscriminate slaughter, considering that
they can be killed anywhere, with no less
difficulty in one province than in another.
Obviously, retaining the carabaos in one
province will not prevent their slaughter
there, any more than moving them to
another province will make it easier to kill
them there The Supreme Court found E.O.
626-A unconstitutional. The executive act
defined the prohibition, convicted the
petitioner
and
immediately
imposed
punishment, which was carried out
forthright. Due process was not properly
observed. In the instant case, the carabaos
were arbitrarily confiscated by the police
station commander, were returned to the
petitioner only after he had filed a
complaint for recovery and given a
supersedeas bond of P12,000.00. The
measure struck at once and pounced upon
the petitioner without giving him a chance
to be heard, thus denying due process
PHILIPPINE PRESS INSTITUTE V COMELEC
FACTS: COMELEC issued resolution 2772
directing newspapers to provide provide
free print space of not less than one half
(1/2) page for use as Comelec Space
which
shall
be
allocated
by
the
Commission, free of charge, among all
candidates within the area in which the
newspaper, magazine or periodical is
circulated to enable the candidates to
make known their qualifications, their
stand on public issues and their platforms
and programs of government. Philippine
Press Institute, a non-stock, non-profit
organization of newspaper and magazine
publishers asks the Court to declare said
resolution unconstitutional and void on the
ground that it violates the prohibition
imposed by the Constitution upon the
government, and any of its agencies,

against the taking of private property for

public use without just compensation.
The Office of the Solicitor General, on
behalf of Comelec alleged that the
resolution does not impose upon the
publishers any obligation to provide free
print space in the newspapers. It merely
established guidelines to be followed in
connection with the procurement of
Comelec space. And if it is viewed as
mandatory, the same would nevertheless
be valid as an exercise of the police power
of the State- a permissible exercise of the
power of supervision or regulation of the
Comelec over the communication and
information operations of print media
enterprises during the election period to
safeguard and ensure a fair, impartial and
credible election.
ISSUE: Whether the resolution was a valid
exercise of the power of eminent domain?
HELD: No. The court held that the
resolution does not constitute a valid
exercise of the power of eminent domain.
To compel print media companies to
donate Comelec-space amounts to
taking of private personal property for
public use or purposes without the
requisite just compensation. The extent of
the
taking
or
deprivation
is
not
insubstantial; this is not a case of a de
minimis temporary limitation or restraint
upon the use of private property. The
monetary value of the compulsory
donation, measured by the advertising
rates ordinarily charged by newspaper
publishers whether in cities or in non-urban
areas, may be very substantial indeed.
The threshold requisites for a lawful taking
of private property for public use are the
necessity for the taking and the legal
authority to effect the taking. The element
of necessity for the taking has not been
shown by respondent Comelec. It has not
been suggested that the members of PPI
are unwilling to sell print space at their
normal rates to Comelec for election
purposes. Indeed, the unwillingness or
reluctance of Comelec to buy print space
lies at the heart of the problem. Similarly,
it has not been suggested, let alone
demonstrated, that Comelec has been
granted the power of eminent domain
either by the Constitution or by the
legislative
authority.
A
reasonable
relationship between that power and the
enforcement and administration of election
laws by Comelec must be shown; it is not
casually to be assumed. The taking of
private property for public use is, of course,
authorized by the Constitution, but not
without payment of just compensation

(Article III, Section 9). And apparently the

necessity of paying compensation for
Comelec space is precisely what is
sought to be avoided by respondent
Commission.

C. Eminent Domain(also read Rule

67 (Re Expropriation) of the
Rules of Court
RULE 67
Expropriation
Section 1. The complaint. The right of
eminent domain shall be exercised by the
filing of a verified complaint which shall
state with certainty the right and purpose
of expropriation, describe the real or
personal
property
sought
to
be
expropriated, and join as defendants all
persons owning or claiming to own, or
occupying, any part thereof or interest
therein, showing, so far as practicable, the
separate interest of each defendant. If the
title to any property sought to be
expropriated appears to be in the Republic
of the Philippines, although occupied by
private individuals, or if the title is
otherwise obscure or doubtful so that the
plaintiff cannot with accuracy or certainty
specify who are the real owners, averment
to that effect shall be made in the
complaint. (1a)
Section 2. Entry of plaintiff upon
depositing
value
with
authorized
government depositary. Upon the filing
of the complaint or at any time thereafter
and after due notice to the defendant, the
plaintiff shall have the right to take or enter
upon the possession of the real property
involved if he deposits with the authorized
government
depositary
an
amount
equivalent to the assessed value of the
property for purposes of taxation to be held
by such bank subject to the orders of the
court. Such deposit shall be in money,
unless in lieu thereof the court authorizes
the deposit of a certificate of deposit of a
government bank of the Republic of the
Philippines payable on demand to the
authorized government depositary.
If personal property is involved, its value
shall be provisionally ascertained and the
amount to be deposited shall be promptly
fixed by the court.
After such deposit is made the court shall
order the sheriff or other proper officer to
forthwith place the plaintiff in possession of
the property involved and promptly submit
a report thereof to the court with service of
copies to the parties. (2a)
Section 3. Defenses and objections. If a
defendant has no objection or defense to
the action or the taking of his property, he

may file and serve a notice of appearance

and a manifestation to that effect,
specifically designating or identifying the
property in which he claims to be
interested, within the time stated in the
summons. Thereafter, he shall be entitled
to notice of all proceedings affecting the
same.
If a defendant has any objection to the
filing of or the allegations in the complaint,
or any objection or defense to the taking of
his property, he shall serve his answer
within the time stated in the summons. The
answer shall specifically designate or
identify the property in which he claims to
have an interest, state the nature and
extent of the interest claimed, and adduce
all his objections and defenses to the
taking of his property. No counterclaim,
cross-claim or third-party complaint shall
be alleged or allowed in the answer or any
subsequent pleading.
A defendant waives all defenses and
objections not so alleged but the court, in
the interest of justice, may permit
amendments to the answer to be made not
later than ten (10) days from the filing
thereof. However, at the trial of the issue of
just compensation whether or not a
defendant has previously appeared or
answered, he may present evidence as to
the amount of the compensation to be paid
for his property, and he may share in the
distribution of the award. (n)
Section 4. Order of expropriation. If the
objections to and the defenses against the
right of the plaintiff to expropriate the
property are overruled, or when no party
appears to defend as required by this Rule,
the court may issue an order of
expropriation declaring that the plaintiff
has a lawful right to take the property
sought to be expropriated, for the public
use or purpose described in the complaint,
upon the payment of just compensation to
be determined as of the date of the taking
of the property or the filing of the
complaint, whichever came first.
A final order sustaining the right to
expropriate the property may be appealed
by any party aggrieved thereby. Such
appeal, however, shall not prevent the
court
from
determining
the
just
compensation to be paid.
After the rendition of such an order, the
plaintiff shall not be permitted to dismiss or
discontinue the proceeding except on such
terms as the court deems just and
equitable. (4a)
Section
5.
Ascertainment
of
compensation. Upon the rendition of the
order of expropriation, the court shall
appoint not more than three (3) competent
and
disinterested
persons
as
commissioners to ascertain and report to
the court the just compensation for the
property sought to be taken. The order of

appointment shall designate the time and

place of the first session of the hearing to
be held by the commissioners and specify
the time within which their report shall be
submitted to the court.
Copies of the order shall be served on the
parties. Objections to the appointment of
any of the commissioners shall be filed
with the court within ten (10) days from
service, and shall be resolved within thirty
(30) days after all the commissioners shall
have received copies of the objections. (5a)
Section 6. Proceedings by commissioners.
Before entering upon the performance of
their duties, the commissioners shall take
and subscribe an oath that they will
faithfully
perform
their
duties
as
commissioners, which oath shall be filed in
court with the other proceedings in the
case. Evidence may be introduced by
either party before the commissioners who
are authorized to administer oaths on
hearings
before
them,
and
the
commissioners shall, unless the parties
consent to the contrary, after due notice to
the parties, to attend, view and examine
the property sought to be expropriated and
its surroundings, and may measure the
same, after which either party may, by
himself or counsel, argue the case. The
commissioners
shall
assess
the
consequential damages to the property not
taken and deduct from such consequential
damages the consequential benefits to be
derived by the owner from the public use
or purpose of the property taken, the
operation
of
its
franchise
by
the
corporation or the carrying on of the
business of the corporation or person
taking the property. But in no case shall the
consequential benefits assessed exceed
the consequential damages assessed, or
the owner be deprived of the actual value
of his property so taken. (6a)
Section 7. Report by commissioners and
judgment thereupon. The court may
order the commissioners to report when
any particular portion of the real estate
shall have been passed upon by them, and
may render judgment upon such partial
report, and direct the commissioners to
proceed with their work as to subsequent
portions of the property sought to be
expropriated, and may from time to time
so
deal
with
such
property.
The
commissioners shall make a full and
accurate report to the court of all their
proceedings, and such proceedings shall
not be effectual until the court shall have
accepted their report and rendered
judgment
in
accordance
with
their
recommendations. Except as otherwise
expressly ordered by the court, such report
shall be filed within sixty (60) days from
the date the commissioners were notified
of their appointment, which time may be
extended in the discretion of the court.
Upon the filing of such report, the clerk of
the court shall serve copies thereof on all
interested parties, with notice that they are
allowed ten (10) days within which to file

objections to the findings of the report, if

they so desire. (7a)
Section
8.
Action
upon
commissioners' report.

Upon
the
expiration of the period of ten (10) days
referred to in the preceding section, or
even before the expiration of such period
but after all the interested parties have
filed their objections to the report or their
statement of agreement therewith, the
court may, after hearing, accept the report
and render judgment in accordance
therewith, or, for cause shown, it may
recommit the same to the commissioners
for further report of facts, or it may set
aside the report and appoint new
commissioners; or it may accept the report
in part and reject it in part and it may make
such order or render such judgment as
shall secure to the plaintiff the property
essential to the exercise of his right of
expropriation, and to the defendant just
compensation for the property so taken.
(8a)
Section
9.
Uncertain
ownership; conflicting claims. If the
ownership of the property taken is
uncertain, or there are conflicting claims to
any part thereof, the court may order any
sum or sums awarded as compensation for
the property to be paid to the court for the
benefit of the person adjudged in the same
proceeding to be entitled thereto. But the
judgment shall require the payment of the
sum or sums awarded to either the
defendant or the court before the plaintiff
can enter upon the property, or retain it for
the public use or purpose if entry has
already been made. (9a)
Section 10. Rights of plaintiff after
judgment and payment. Upon payment
by the plaintiff to the defendant of the
compensation fixed by the judgment, with
legal interest thereon from the taking of
the possession of the property, or after
tender to him of the amount so fixed and
payment of the costs, the plaintiff shall
have the right to enter upon the property
expropriated and to appropriate it for the
public use or purpose defined in the
judgment, or to retain it should he have
taken immediate possession thereof under
the provisions of section 2 hereof. If the
defendant
and
his
counsel
absent
themselves from the court, or decline to
receive the amount tendered, the same
shall be ordered to be deposited in court
and such deposit shall have the same
effect as actual payment thereof to the
defendant or the person ultimately
adjudged entitled thereto. (10a)
Section 11. Entry not delayed by
appeal; effect of reversal. The right of
the plaintiff to enter upon the property of
the defendant and appropriate the same
for public use or purpose shall not be
delayed by an appeal from the judgment.
But if the appellate court determines that
plaintiff has no right of expropriation,
judgment shall be rendered ordering the

Regional Trial Court to forthwith enforce the

restoration to the defendant of the
possession of the property, and to
determine
the
damages
which
the
defendant sustained and may recover by
reason of the possession taken by the
plaintiff. (11a)
Section 12. Costs, by whom paid. The
fees of the commissioners shall be taxed as
a part of the costs of the proceedings. All
costs, except those of rival claimants
litigating their claims, shall be paid by the
plaintiff, unless an appeal is taken by the
owner of the property and the judgment is
affirmed, in which event the costs of the
appeal shall be paid by the owner. (12a)
Section 13. Recording judgment, and its
effect. The judgment entered in
expropriation proceedings shall state
definitely, by an adequate description, the
particular property or interest therein
expropriated, and the nature of the public
use or purpose for which it is expropriated.
When real estate is expropriated, a
certified copy of such judgment shall be
recorded in the registry of deeds of the
place in which the property is situated, and
its effect shall be to vest in the plaintiff the
title to the real estate so described for such
public use or purpose. (13a)
Section 14. Power of guardian in such
proceedings.

The
guardian
or
guardian ad litem of a minor or of a person
judicially declared to be incompetent may,
with the approval of the court first had, do
and perform on behalf of his ward any act,
matter,
or
thing
respecting
the
expropriation for public use or purpose of
property belonging to such minor or person
judicially declared to be incompetent,
which such minor or person judicially
declared to be incompetent could do in
such proceedings if he were of age or
competent. (14a)

1. Definition and Scope

-

Power of Expropriation

The highest and the most exact

idea of property remaining in
the
government
that
may
acquired from some public
purpose through a method in
the nature of a compulsory sale
of the State.

Article 3, Sec. 9: Private property

shall not be taken for public use
without just compensation.
-

Should be strictly interpreted

against the expropriator and
liberally construed in favour of
the property owner

Distinguished
from
from necessity

destruction

May be validly undertaken

even by private individuals

Not allowed in eminent domain

Cannot require the conversion

of the property taken to public
use

No need for payment of just

compensation

American Print Works vs Lawrence,

23 N.J.L. 590
In
this
case
the
defendant
pleaded in justification a statute of
the State of New York, passed 9th
April, 1813, which provides that
when a building in a city shall be
on fire, it shall be lawful for the
Mayor, Aldermen, &c., to direct or
order the same, or any other
building which they may deem
hazardous and likely to take fire, or
to
convey
the
fire
to other
buildings, to be pulled down or
destroyed.
Such
statute
does not deprive any citizen of his
natural right to destroy buildings,
to prevent the spread of a fire, in a
case of necessity, and exercise that
right at the peril of being held
responsible
for
an error
of
judgment as to the existence of the
necessity, but vested the power of
judging of the existence of the
necessity in the discretion of
certain officers designated by it,
and
makes
their
judgment
conclusive as to the existence of
that necessity. In so doing, the
Legislature do not act in violation
of the 5th Art. of amendments of
Constitution of U. S., which
provides that private property shall
not be taken for public use without
just compensation ; even if the
party is deprived of the right of
trial
by
Jury,
the statute is not therefore
necessarily
unconstitutional.
Baldw. 220, Saxton 687, 3 Page 75.

The
destruction
of
the
building necessarily involved the
destruction of the goods. The
article which constitutes the Mayor,
Aldermen, &c., judges of the
necessity
of
destroying
the
building, must of consequence
make them judges also of the time
at which the act of destruction
becomes
necessary.*
Note: Right to eminent domain public
right, it arises from the laws of society and
is vested in the state, or benefit of the
state, or those under it;
Right to necessity under the laws of
society or society itself, right of selfdefense or self-preservation
2. Who May Exercise
Congress; President of the
Philippines; various local
legislative bodies; certain
public corporation (Land
Authority, National Housing
Authority);
quasi-public
corporation
(Philippine
National
Railways,
PLDT
Co., Meralco)
3. Elements
Necessity of the Exercise
decided by a delegate only of
the
national
legislature;
judiciary

whether
the
expropriation contemplated by
the delegate is necessary or
wise
Republic vs. La Orden De PP.
Benedictinos De Filipinas, G.R. No.
L-12792, February 28, 1961
The Power of Eminent Domain
To ease and solve the daily traffic
congestion on Legarda Street, the
Government drew plans to extend
Azcarraga street from its junction
with Mendiola street, up to the Sta.
Mesa Rotonda, Sampaloc, Manila.
The petitioner in this case is the
Republic of the Philippines through
the Office of the Solicitor General;
and the respondent is La Orden de
PP. Benedictinos de Filipinas, a
domestic religious corporation that
owns the San Beda College.

Facts: To ease and solve the daily

traffic congestion on Legarda
Street, the Government drew plans
to extend Azcarraga St. (now
Recto) from its junction with
Mendiola St., up to the Sta. Mesa
Rotonda, Sampaloc, Manila. To
carry out this plan it offered to buy
a portion of approximately 6,000
square meters of a bigger parcel
belonging to La Orden situated on
Mendiola St. Not having been able
to reach an agreement on the
matter with the owner, the
Government
instituted
an
expropriation proceeding. On May
27, 1957 the trial court valued the
property
in
question
at
P270,000.00
and
authorized
appellant
to
take
immediate
possession upon depositing said
amount. The deposit having been
made with the City Treasurer of
Manila, the trial court issued the
corresponding order directing the
Sheriff of Manila to place appellant
in possession of the property
aforesaid.
In answer, the herein appellee filed
a motion to dismiss the complaint
based on the grounds that: (1) the
property sought to be expropriated
is already dedicated to public use
and therefore is not subject to
expropriation; (2) there is no
necessity
for
the
proposed
expropriation; (3) the proposed
Azcarraga Extension could pass
through a different site which
would entail less expense to the
Government and which would not
necessitate the expropriation of a
property dedicated to education.
The trial court granted the motion,
holding that the expropriation was
not of extreme necessity. Hence
this present petition.
Issue: Whether or not there is a
genuine necessity for the exercise
of the Power of Eminent Domain.

Held: It is the rule in this

jurisdiction that private property
may be expropriated for public use
and
upon
payment
of
just
compensation; that condemnation
of private property is justified only
if it is for the public good and there
is a genuine necessity therefor of a
public character. Consequently, the
courts have the power to inquire
into the legality of the exercise of
the right of eminent domain and to
determine whether or not there is a
genuine necessity therefor.
It
does
not
need
extended
argument to show that whether or
not the proposed opening of the
Azcarraga extension is a necessity
in order to relieve the daily
congestion of traffic on Legarda St.,
is a question of fact dependent not
only upon the facts of which the
trial court very liberally took
judicial notice but also up on other
factors that do not appear of record
and must, therefore, be established
by means of evidence. The parties
should have been given an
opportunity
to
present
their
respective evidence upon these
factors and others that might be of
direct
or
indirect
help
in
determining the vital question of
fact involved, namely, the need to
open the extension of Azcarraga
street to ease and solve the traffic
congestion on Legarda street.
WHEREFORE, the appealed order of
dismissal is set aside and the
present case is remanded to the
trial court for further proceedings
in accordance with this decision.
City of Manila v Chinese Community
PHIL 349 (1919)

40

expropriation of Chinese cemetery

Facts: The City of Manila wants to

expropriate a land owned by the Chinese
community as cemetery for the purpose of
extending Rizal Avenue for public use. The
respondents contend that the land already
acquires a quasi-public character and
many dead bodies are already buried
there. They stress that there is no
necessity of taking the land for public
purpose since such is under Torrens title
and the expropriation will disturb the
resting place of the dead. The plaintiff
contends that under the Charter of City of
Manila, they may condemn private lands
for public purpose, such being an exclusive
function of the legislature and the only

function of the court is to assess the value

of the land expropriated.

Issue: Whether or not the court can inquire

into the necessity of expropriation.

Held: The court ruled that the power of

judicial review on expropriation is not
limited to the inquiry of the existence of
law that grants a municipal corporation to
expropriate private lands for public
purpose. The court has the responsibility to
(1) ensure that a law or authority exists for
the exercise of the right of eminent
domain, and (2) that the right or authority
is being exercised in accordance with the
law. There are two conditions imposed
upon the authority conceded to the City of
Manila: (1) the land must be private; and,
(2) the purpose must be public. The taking
of land in the exercise of power of eminent
domain of the state is not a judicial
question but the court is bound to interfere
to prevent an abuse of the discretion
delegated by the legislature. The very
foundation of the right to exercise eminent
domain is a genuine necessity, and that
necessity must be of a public character.
The ascertainment of the necessity must
precede or accompany, and not follow, the
taking of the land. The court ruled that the
cemetery is a public property and it found
no
great
necessity
to
allow
the
expropriation of the land by the City of
Manila thus thereby affirmed the decision
of the lower court.
Private Property includes real and
personal, tangible, and intangible
properties
Eg. Churches, franchises and other
religious properties and cemeteries
EXCEPTIONS: money and chose in
action a personal right not reduced
into possession but recoverable by a
suit at law, a right to receive, demand
or recover a debt, demand or
damages on a cause of action ex
contractu or for a tort or omission of
duty; conjectural both as to its
validity and value.
Republic vs PLDT 26 SCRA 620
FACTS:
Sometime in 1933, the defendant PLDT
entered into an agreement with RCA
Communications
Inc.,
an
American
corporation, whereby telephone messages
coming from the US and received by RCAs
domestic station, could automatically be
transferred to the lines of PLDT, and vice
versa.
The plaintiff through the Bureau of
Telecommunications, after having set up its
own Government Telephone System, by
utilizing
its
own
appropriation
and

equipment and by renting trunk lines of the

PLDT, entered into an agreement with RCA
for a joint overseas telephone service.
Alleging that plaintiff is in competition with
them, PLDT notified the former and
receiving no reply, disconnected the trunk
lines being rented by the same; thus,
prompting the plaintiff to file a case before
the CFI praying for judgment commanding
PLDT to execute a contract with the Bureau
for the use of the facilities of PLDTs
telephone system, and for a writ of
preliminary
injunction
against
the
defendant to restrain the severance of the
existing trunk lines and restore those
severed.
ISSUE: Whether or not interconnection
between PLDT and the Government
Telephone System can be a valid object for
expropriation.
HELD: Yes, in the exercise of the sovereign
power of eminent domain, the Republic
may require the telephone company to
permit interconnection as the needs of the
government service may require, subject to
the payment of just compensation. The use
of lines and services to allow inter-service
connection between the both telephone
systems, through expropriation can be a
subject to an easement of right of way.
PLDT vs NTC, 190 SCRA 717
Facts: In 1958, Felix Alberto & Co., Inc
(FACI) was granted by Congress a franchise
to build radio stations (later construed as
to include telephony). FACI later changed
its name to Express Telecommunications
Co., Inc. (ETCI). In 1987, ETCI was granted
by
the
National
Telecommunications
Commission a provisional authority to build
a telephone system in some parts of
Manila. Philippine Long Distance Telephone
Co. (PLDT) opposed the said grant as it
avers, among others, that ETCI is not
qualified because its franchise has already
been invalidated when it failed to exercise
it within 10 years from 1958; that in 1987,
the Albertos, owners of more than 40% of
ETCIs shares of stocks, transferred said
stocks to the new stockholders (Cellcom,
Inc.? not specified in the case); that such
transfer involving more than 40% shares of
stocks amounted to a transfer of franchise
which is void because the authorization of
Congress was not obtained. The NTC
denied PLDT. PLDT then filed a petition for
certiorari and prohibition against the NTC.
ISSUE: Whether or not PLDTs petition
should prosper.
HELD: No. PLDT cannot attack ETCIs
franchise in a petition for certiorari. It
cannot be collaterally attacked. It should
be directly attacked through a petition for
quo warranto which is the correct
procedure. A franchise is a property right
and cannot be revoked or forfeited without
due process of law. The determination of
the right to the exercise of a franchise, or
whether the right to enjoy such privilege

has been forfeited by non-user, is more

properly the subject of the prerogative writ
of quo warranto. Further, for any violation
of the franchise, it should be the
government who should be filing a quo
warranto proceeding because it was the
government who granted it in the first
place.
The transfer of more than 40% of the
shares of stocks is not tantamount to a
transfer of franchise. There is a distinction
here. There is no need to obtain
authorization of Congress for the mere
transfer of shares of stocks. Shareholders
can transfer their shares to anyone. The
only limitation is that if the transfer
involves
more
than
40%
of
the
corporations stocks, it should be approved
by the NTC. The transfer in this case was
shown to have been approved by the NTC.
What requires authorization from Congress
is the transfer of franchise; and the person
who shall obtain the authorization is the
grantee (ETCI). A distinction should be
made between shares of stock, which are
owned by stockholders, the sale of which
requires only NTC approval, and the
franchise itself which is owned by the
corporation as the grantee thereof, the sale
or transfer of which requires Congressional
sanction. Since stockholders own the
shares of stock, they may dispose of the
same as they see fit. They may not,
however, transfer or assign the property of
a corporation, like its franchise. In other
words, even if the original stockholders had
transferred their shares to another group of
shareholders, the franchise granted to the
corporation subsists as long as the
corporation, as an entity, continues to
exist. The franchise is not thereby
invalidated by the transfer of the shares. A
corporation has a personality separate and
distinct from that of each stockholder. It
has the right of continuity or perpetual
succession.

Taking may include trespass

without actual eviction of the
owner, material impairment of
the value of the property or
prevention of the ordinary uses
for which the property was
intended.
Requisites of Taking:
1. The
expropriator
must
enter a private property
2. The entry must be for more
than a momentary period.
3. The entry must be under
warrant or color of legal
authority.
4. The
property
must
be
devoted to public use or
otherwise
informally
appropriated or injuriously
affected.
5. The
utilization
of
the
property for public use
must be in such a way as to
oust the owner and deprive
him of beneficial enjoyment
of the property.

Republic vs Castellvi, 58 SCRA 336

GR
#
L-20620
August
15,
1974
(Constitutional Law Eminent Domain,
Elements of Taking)
FACTS: In 1947, the republic, through the
Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP),
entered into a lease agreement with
Castelvi on a year-to-year basis. After the
owner of a parcel of land that has been
rented and occupied by the government in
1947 refused to extend the lease, the latter
commenced expropriation proceedings in
1959. During the assessment of just
compensation, the government argued that
it had taken the property when the
contract of lease commenced and not
when the proceedings begun. The owner
maintains that the disputed land was not
taken when the government commenced
to occupy the said land as lessee because
the essential elements of the taking of
property under the power of eminent
domain,
namely
(1)
entrance
and
occupation by condemnor upon the private
property for more than a momentary
period, and (2) devoting it to a public use
in such a way as to oust the owner and
deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment of
the property, are not present.
ISSUE: Whether or not the taking of
property has taken place when the
condemnor has entered and occupied the
property as lesse.
HELD: No, the property was deemed taken
only when the expropriation proceedings
commenced in 1959.
The essential elements of the taking are:
(1) Expropriator must enter a private
property, (2) for more than a momentary
period, (3) and under warrant of legal
authority, (4) devoting it to public use, or
otherwise informally appropriating or
injuriously affecting it in such a way as (5)
substantially to oust the owner and deprive
him of all beneficial enjoyment thereof.
In the case at bar, these elements were not
present when the government entered and
occupied the property under a contract of
lease.

Examples:
US vs Lynah, 188 US 445
Facts: All private property is held
subject to the necessities of
government and, the right of
eminent domain underlies all such
rights of property.
When
the
United
States
government appropriates property
which it does not claim as its own,
it does so under an implied
contract that it will pay the value of
the property it so appropriates.
When it is alleged in an action that
the government of the United
States in the exercise of its powers
of eminent domain and regulation

of commerce, through officers and

agents duly empowered thereto by
acts of Congress, places dams,
training
walls
and
other
obstructions in the Savannah River
in such manner as to hinder its
natural flow and to raise the water
so as to overflow the land of
plaintiff along the banks to such an
extent as to cause a total
destruction of its value, and the
government does not deny the
ownership, admits that the work
was done by authority of Congress,
and simply denies that the work
has produced the alleged injury
and destruction, the circuit court of
the United States has jurisdiction to
inquire whether the acts done by
the officers of the United States
under the direction of Congress
have resulted in such an overflow
and injury of the land as to render
it absolutely valueless, and, if
thereby the property was, in
contemplation of law, taken and
appropriated by the government,
to render judgment against it for
the value of the property so taken
and appropriated.
Where the government of the
United States, by the construction
of a dam or other public works, so
floods lands belonging to an
individual as to totally destroy its
value, there is a taking of private
property within the scope of the
Fifth Amendment.
The proceeding must be regarded
as an actual appropriation of the
land, including the possession and
the fee, and when the amount
awarded as compensation is paid,
the title, the fee and whatever
rights may attach thereto pass to
the government, which becomes
henceforth the full owner.
Notwithstanding that the work
causing the injury was done in
improving the navigability of a
navigable
river and
by the
Constitution Congress is given full
control over such improvements,
the injuries cannot be regarded as
purely consequential, and the
government cannot appropriate
property without being liable to the
obligation created by the Fifth
Amendment
of
paying
just
compensation.
On February 4, 1897, defendants in
error commenced their action in
the Circuit Court of the United
States for the District of South
Carolina to recover of the United
States the sum of $10,000 as
compensation for certain real
estate (being a part of a plantation
known as Verzenobre) taken and
appropriated by the defendant.

The petition alleged in the first

paragraph the citizenship and
residence of the petitioners; in the
second that they had a claim
against the United States under an
implied contract for compensation
for the value of property taken by
the United States for public use;
third, that they were the owners as
tenants
in
common
of
the
plantation, and in the fourth and
seventh paragraphs:
"Fourth. That for several years
continuously,
and
now
continuously, the said government
of the United States of America, in
the exercise of its power of
eminent
domain
under
the
Constitution of the United States
and by authority of the acts of
Congress, duly empowering its
officers and agents thereto, in that
case made and provided, did erect,
build,
and
maintain,
and
continuously since have been
erecting, building and maintaining,
and are now building, erecting, and
maintaining in and across the said
Savannah River, in the bed of the
said Savannah River, certain dams,
training
walls,
and
other
obstructions,
obstructing
and
hindering the natural flow of the
said Savannah River through, in,
and along the natural bed thereof
and raising the said Savannah
River feet at the point of and above
the said obstructions and dams in
the bed of the said Savannah River,
and causing the said waters of the
Savannah River aforesaid to be
kept back and to flow back and to
be raised and elevated above the
natural height of the Savannah
River along its natural bed at the
points of the said dams, training
walls, and obstructions, and at
points above the said dams,
training walls, and obstructions in
said river."
"Seventh. And your petitioners
further show that the said acts of
the government of the United
States as aforesaid have been done
and are being done lawfully by the
officers and agents of the United
States under the authority of the
United States in the exercise of its
powers of eminent domain and
regulation of commerce under the
Constitution of the United States
and the laws of Congress for the
public purpose of the improvement
of the harbor of Savannah and
deepening the waters of the
Savannah River at the port of
Savannah, a port of entry of the
United States and seaport of the
United States of America situated
within the State of Georgia, on the
Savannah River, and with the
purpose
of
deepening
and
enlarging the navigable channel

and highway for commerce of the

said Savannah River for the public
use, purpose, and benefit of
interstate
and
foreign
and
international trade and commerce,
and for other public purposes,
uses, and benefits."

said
Savannah
River,
and
dependent
for
their
proper
drainage and cultivation upon the
maintenance of the natural flow of
the said river in, through, and over
its natural channel along its natural
bed to the waters of the ocean."

The remaining paragraphs set forth

the effect of the placing by the
government
of
the
dams,
restraining
walls,
and
other
obstructions in the river, together
with the value of the property
appropriated by the overflow. The
answer of the government averred.

"V. This portion of the plantation

fronting on the river and dedicated
to the culture of rice, extended
almost up to, if not quite to, low
water mark, and a large part of it
was between mean high water and
low water mark, protected from the
river by an embankment. Through
this
embankment
trunks
or
waterways were constructed, with
flood gates therein. The outer
opening of the trunk was about a
foot or a little less above the mean
low water mark of the river, in
which the tide ebbs and flows.
When it is desired to flow the lands,
the flood gates are opened and the
water comes in. When it is desired
to draw off this water and to effect
the drainage of the lands, the flood
gates are opened at low water and
the water escapes. It is essential
that the outlets of the trunks or
waterways should always be above
the mean low water mark."

"First. That this defendant has no

knowledge or information sufficient
to form a belief as to the truth of
the allegations contained in the
first and third paragraphs of the
said petition and complaint."
"Second. That this defendant
denies all of the allegations
contained in the second fourth,
fifth, sixth, seventh, and eighth
paragraphs of the said petition and
complaint except so much of the
fourth paragraph as alleges that
the said United States heretofore
erected certain dams in the
Savannah River pursuant to power
vested in it by law, and except so
much of the seventh paragraph as
alleges that the said dams
heretofore erected by the United
States were lawfully erected by its
officers and agents."
For a further defense, the statute
of limitations was pleaded. The
case came on for trial before the
court without a jury, which made
findings of fact, and from them
deduced conclusions of law and
entered a judgment against the
defendant for the sum of $10,000.
The findings were to the effect that
the plaintiffs were the owners of
the plantation, deriving title by
proper mesne conveyances from "a
grant by the lord's proprietors of
South Carolina," made in 1736.
Other findings pertinent to the
questions
which
must
be
considered in deciding this case
were as follows:
"IV. A certain parcel of these
plantations, measuring about 420
acres, had been reclaimed by
drainage, and had been in actual
continued use for seventy years
and upwards as a rice plantation,
used solely for this purpose. This
rice plantation was dependent for
its irrigation upon the waters of the
Savannah River and its ditches,
drains, and canals, through and by
which the waters of the river were
flowed in and upon the lands, and
were then drained therefrom, were
adapted to the natural level of the

"VII. For several years last past and

at
the
present
time,
the
government of the United States,
under
its
proper
officers,
authorized thereto by the act of
Congress, have been engaged in
the improvement of the navigation
of the Savannah River, a navigable
water of the United States, this
improvement being carried on by
virtue of the provisions of Section
8, Article I, of the Constitution,
giving to the Congress the power to
regulate commerce."
"VIII. In thus improving navigation
of this navigable water the United
States has built and maintained,
and
is
now
building
and
maintaining, in and across the
Savannah River, in the bed thereof,
certain dams, training walls, and
other obstructions, obstructing the
natural flow of said river in and
along its natural bed, and so
raising the level of the said river
above said obstructions, and
causing its waters to be kept back
and to flow back and to be
elevated above its natural height in
its natural bed."
"IX. This rice plantation Verzenobre
is above these obstructions. The
direct effect thereof is to raise the
level of the Savannah River at this
plantation, and to keep the point of
mean low water above its natural
point, so that the outlet of the
trunks and waterways above
spoken of in the bank of said

plantation, instead of being above

this point of low water mark, is now
below this point. Another direct
result was that, by seepage and
percolation the water rose in the
plantation until the water level in
the land gradually rose to the
height of the increased water level
in the river, and the super induced
addition of water in the plantation
was about eighteen inches thereby.
By reason of this, it gradually
became difficult, and has now
become impossible, to let off the
water on this plantation or to drain
the same, so that these acres
dedicated to the culture of rice
have become boggy, unfit for
cultivation, and impossible to be
cultivated in rice."
"X. By the raising of the level of the
Savannah River by these dams and
obstructions, the water thereof has
been backed up against the
embankment on the river and has
been caused to flow back upon and
in this plantation above the
obstruction, and has actually
invaded said plantation, directly
raising the water in said plantation
about eighteen inches, which it is
impossible to remove from said
plantation. This flooding is the
permanent condition now, and the
rice
plantation
is
thereby
practically
destroyed
for
the
purpose of rice culture or any other
known agriculture, and is an
irreclaimable bog, and has no
value."
"XI. By reason of this super induced
addition of water actually invading
the said rice plantation, and its
destruction thereby for all purposes
of agriculture, plaintiffs have been
compelled
to
abandon
the
cultivation of said rice plantation
and have been forced to pursue
their calling of planting rice on
other plantations below the dams.
The direct result to plaintiffs is an
actual and practical ouster of
possession
from
this
rice
plantation,
cultivated
by
themselves and family for many
years."
"XII. Beyond the backing up of the
water on and in the plantation by
reason
of
the
dams
and
obstruction, and the invasion of
these lands by this super induced
addition of water at and in the
plantation as above described,
rendered
necessary
by
the
execution of the government's
plans, the United States is not in
actual possession of these lands."
"XIII. Up to this time, no other use
has been discovered for these
lands than for rice culture, and the
direct results above stated have

totally destroyed the market value

of the lands. They now have no
value."
"XIV. The value of these rice lands
before the obstructions aforesaid
were put into the river was about
thirty dollars per acre; between
twenty-five and thirty dollars per
acre. The value of the rice
plantation,
420
acres,
thus
destroyed, is ten thousand dollars."
ISSUE: in this case is was there a
taking of this land in the sense of
the Constitution?
HELD: "The facts found show that,
by reason of the obstruction in the
Savannah River the water has been
directly backed up against the
embankment on the river and the
banks on and in this plantation, the
superinduced addition of water
actually invading it and destroying
its drainage and leaving it useless
for all practical purposes. The
government does not in a sense
take this land for the purposes of
putting its obstructions on it. But it
forces back the water of the river
on the land as a result necessary to
its purpose, without which its
purpose
could
not
be
accomplished. For the purpose of
the government, that water in the
river must be raised. The banks of
this plantation materially assist this
operation, for by their resistance
the water is kept in the channel.
The backing up of the water
against the banks to create this
resistance raises the water in the
plantation
and
destroys
the
drainage of the plantation. This is a
taking. 'It would,' says Mr. Justice
Miller,"
"be
a
very
curious
and
unsatisfactory
result
if,
in
construing
a
provision
of
constitutional
law,
always
understood to have been adopted
for protection and security to the
rights of the individual as against
the government, and which had
received the commendation of
jurists,
statesmen,
and
commentators as placing the just
principles of the common law on
that subject beyond the power of
ordinary legislation to change or
control them, it shall be held that,
if the government refrains from the
absolute
conversion
of
real
property to the uses of the public,
it can destroy its value entirely, can
inflict irreparable and permanent
injury to any extent; can, in effect,
subject to total destruction without
making
any
compensation,
because in the narrowest sense of
that word it has not been taken for
the public use."

"Pumpelly v. Green Bay

Page 188 U. S. 452
Co., 13 Wall. 177, 80 U. S. 178. In
that case, the backing up of water
on land was held to be a taking."
"VI. The plantation of plaintiffs
being
actually
invaded
by
superinduced addition of water
directly caused by the government
dams and obstructions backing up
the water of the Savannah River,
and raising the water level at and
in the rice plantation, and making
it unfit for rice cultivation or for any
other known agriculture, and
plaintiffs having been compelled
thereby to abandon the plantation,
and this actual and practical ouster
of possession being continued and
permanent by reason of the
permanent
condition
of
the
flooding of the plantation, and the
plantation being thereby now an
irreclaimable
bog
of
no
value,makes the action of the
government a taking of lands for
public purposes within the meaning
of the Fifth Amendment, for which
compensation is due to the
plaintiffs. Pumpelly v. Green Bay
Co., 13 Wall. 182; Mugler v. Kansas,
123 U. S. 668."
"VII. The government has not gone
into actual occupancy of this land,
but by reason of these dams and
obstructions made necessary by
this public work and fulfilling its
purpose the water in the Savannah
River has been raised at the
plaintiffs' plantation and has been
backed up on it and remains on it
so that the drainage has been
destroyed and ditches filled up and
superadded water permanently
kept on the land and forced up into
it, making it wholly unfit for
cultivation, and the plaintiffs have
thereby
been
practically
and
actually ousted of their possession.
This is taking of the land for public
purposes, for which compensation
must be provided. Pumpelly v.
Green Bay Co., 13 Wall. 181."
The case involving the application
of the Constitution of the United
States was brought by writ of error
directly to this Court.

US vs Causby, 328 SCRA 256

also various outbuildings which were

mainly used for raising chickens. The end
of
the
airport's
northwest-southeast
runway is 2,220 feet from Causby's barn
and 2,275 feet from their house. The path
of glide to this runway passes directly over
the property-which is 100 feet wide and
1,200 feet long. The 30 to 1 safe glide
angle approved by the Civil Aeronautics
Authority passes over this property at 83
feet, which is 67 feet above the house, 63
feet above the barn and 18 feet above the
highest tree. The use by the United States
of this airport is pursuant to a lease
executed in May 1942, for a term
commencing 1 June 1942 and ending 30
June 1942, with a provision for renewals
until 30 June 1967, or 6 months after the
end of the national emergency, whichever
is the earlier. Various aircraft of the United
States, i.e. bombers, transports and
fighters, use this airport. Since the United
States began operations in May 1942, its
four-motored heavy bombers, other planes
of the heavier type, and its fighter planes
have frequently passed over Causby's land
buildings in considerable numbers and
rather close together. They come close
enough at times to appear barely to miss
the tops of the trees and at times so close
to the tops of the trees as to blow the old
leaves off. The noise is startling. And at
night the glare from the planes brightly
lights up the place. As a result of the noise,
the Causbys had to give up their chicken
business. As many as 6 to 10 of their
chickens were killed in one day by flying
into the walls from fright. The total
chickens lost in that manner was about
150. Production also fell off. The result was
the destruction of the use of the property
as a commercial chicken farm. The
Causbys are frequently deprived of their
sleep and the family has become nervous
and frightened. Although there have been
no airplane accidents on their property,
there have been several accidents near the
airport and close to their place. These are
the essential facts found by the Court of
Claims. On the basis of these facts, it found
that the property had depreciated in value.
It held that the United States had taken an
easement over the property on June 1,
1942, and that the value of the property
destroyed and the easement taken was
$2,000. The United States contends that
when flights are made within the navigable
airspace (Air Commerce Act of 1926, as
amended by the Civil Aeronautics Act of
1938) without any physical invasion of the
property of the landowners, there has been
no taking of property. It says that at most
there was merely incidental damage
occurring as a consequence of authorized
air navigation.

Douglas (J)

Issue: Whether there was taking of the

Causbys property, even in the light that
the United States allegedly has complete
and exclusive national sovereignty in the
air space over the country.

Facts: Causby owns 2.8 acres near an

airport outside of Greensboro, North
Carolina. It has on it a dwelling house, and

Held: The United States conceded that if

the flights over Causby's property rendered
it uninhabitable, there would be a taking

United States vs. Causby [328 US 256, 27

May 1946]

compensable under the 5th Amendment. It

is the owner's loss, not the taker's gain,
which is the measure of the value of the
property taken. Market value fairly
determined is the normal measure of the
recovery. And that value may reflect the
use to which the land could readily be
converted, as well as the existing use. If,
by reason of the frequency and altitude of
the flights, Causby could not use this land
for any purpose, their loss would be
complete. It would be as complete as if the
United States had entered upon the
surface of the land and taken exclusive
possession of it. Herein, there was a taking.
Though it would be only an easement of
flight which was taken, that easement, if
permanent and not merely temporary,
normally would be the equivalent of a fee
interest. It would be a definite exercise of
complete dominion and control over the
surface of the land. The fact that the
planes never touched the surface would be
as irrelevant as the absence in this day of
the feudal livery of seisin on the transfer of
real estate. The owner's right to possess
and exploit the land-that is to say, his
beneficial ownership of it-would be
destroyed. It would not be a case of
incidental damages arising from a legalized
nuisance such as was involved in Richards
v. Washington Terminal Co. (233 U.S. 546).
In that case property owners whose lands
adjoined a railroad line were denied
recovery for damages resulting from the
noise, vibrations, smoke and the like,
incidental to the operations of the trains.
Herein, the line of flight is over the land,
and the land is appropriated as directly and
completely as if it were used for the
runways themselves. However, since the
record in the case is not clear whether the
easement taken is a permanent or a
temporary one, it would be premature for
the Court to consider whether the amount
of the award made by the Court of Claims
was proper, and thus the Court remanded
the cause to the Court of Claims so that it
may make the necessary findings in
conformity with the Court's opinion.
NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION v. HON.
SYLVA G. AGUIRRE PADERANGA, et al. 464
SCRA 481 (2005), THIRD DIVISION (Carpio
Morales, J.)
The determination of just compensation is
a judicial function and the recommendation
of the commissioners is given weight and
consideration if the same is reasonable and
just.
FACTS:
National Power Corporation (NPC) filed a
case for expropriation against Petrona O.
Dilao, et al. before Regional Trial Court of
Cebu, involving parcels of land located in
Cebu. Expropriation was instituted to
implement
Leyte-Cebu
Interconnection
Project. A day after the complaint was
filed, NPC filed an urgent ex parte motion
for the issuance of writ of possession of the
lands.

The RTC issued an order granting NPCs

motion.
It
appointed
3
Board
of
Commissioners
to
determine
just
compensation. The board recommended
appraisal of parcel of land co-owned by
Dilao, et al. at P516.66 per square meter.
However, NPC filed an opposition assailing
the correctness of the appraisal for failing
to take into account Republic Act No. 6395
which provides that the just compensation
for
right-of-way
easement
shall
be
equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the
market value of the property. NPC asserted
that Digao, et al. could still use the
traversed land for agricultural purposes,
subject only to its easement. It added that
the lots were of no use to its operations
except for its transmission lines. The RTC
rendered its decision ordering NPC to pay
fair market value at P516.66 per square
meter. NPC appealed but the same was
denied due to failure to file and perfect its
appeal within the prescribed period. A
motion for execution of judgment was
subsequently filed by Dilao, et al. which
was granted by the lower court. On appeal,
the CA affirmed the lower courts decision.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not RTC abused its authority
by misapplying the rules governing fair
valuation
HELD:
In finding that the trial court did not abuse
its authority in evaluating the evidence and
the reports placed before it nor did it
misapply the rules governing fair valuation,
the Court of Appeals found the majority
reports valuation of P500 per square meter
to be fair. Said factual finding of the Court
of Appeals, absent any showing that the
valuation is exorbitant or otherwise
unjustified, is binding on the parties as well
as this Court.
Indeed, expropriation is not limited to the
acquisition of real property with a
corresponding
transfer
of
title
or
possession. The right-of-way easement
resulting in a restriction or limitation on
property rights over the land traversed by
transmission lines, as in the present case,
also falls within the ambit of the term
expropriation.
From the Commissioners report it cannot
be gainsaid that NPCs complaint merely
involves a simple case of mere passage of
transmission lines over Dilao et al.s
property. Aside from the actual damage
done to the property traversed by the
transmission lines, the agricultural and
economic activity normally undertaken on
the entire property is unquestionably
restricted and perpetually hampered as the
environment is made dangerous to the
occupants
life
and
limb.
The
determination of just compensation in
expropriation proceedings being a judicial
function,
the
Court
finds
the

commissioners
recommendation
P516.66 per square meter, which
approved by the trial court, to be just
reasonable
compensation
for
expropriated property of Dilao and
siblings.

of
was
and
the
her

Taking under Police Power

aimed at improving the general
welfare,
and
whatever
damages are sustained by the
property owners are regarded
as merely incidental to a
proper
execution
of
such
power; loss - damnm obsque
injuria;
recompensation
altruistic feeling special injury if he suffers more than his
aliquot part of the damages, he
will be entitled to payment of
the
corresponding
compensation.

Richards vs. Washington Terminal, 33

US 546
if the petitioner sustained more than
the damage incurred bu the other
houses in the vicinity, he is entitled to
just compensation

invalid taking under the police

power

City of Quezon vs. Ericta 122 SCRA 359

Facts:
Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, S-64
provides that at least 6% of the total area
of the memorial park cemetery shall be set
aside for the charity burial of deceased
persons who are paupers and have been
residents of Quezon City for at least 5
years prior to their death. As such, the
Quezon City engineer required the
respondent, Himlayang Pilipino Inc, to stop
any further selling and/or transaction of
memorial park lots in Quezon City where
the owners thereof have failed to donate
the required 6% space intended for
paupers burial. The then Court of First
Instance and its judge, Hon. Ericta,
declared Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118,
S-64 null and void.
Petitioners argued that the taking of the
respondents property is a valid and
reasonable exercise of police power and
that the land is taken for a public use as it
is intended for the burial ground of
paupers. They further argued that the
Quezon City Council is authorized under its
charter, in the exercise of local police
power, to make such further ordinances
and resolutions not repugnant to law as
may be necessary to carry into effect and
discharge the powers and duties conferred
by this Act and such as it shall deem
necessary and proper to provide for the
health and safety, promote the prosperity,
improve the morals, peace, good order,
comfort and convenience of the city and
the inhabitants thereof, and for the
protection of property therein.

On the otherhand, respondent Himlayang

Pilipino, Inc. contended that the taking or
confiscation of property was obvious
because
the
questioned
ordinance
permanently restricts the use of the
property such that it cannot be used for
any reasonable purpose and deprives the
owner of all beneficial use of his property.
Issue:
Is Section 9 of the ordinance in question a
valid exercise of the police power?
Held:
No. The Sec. 9 of the ordinance is not a
valid exercise of the police power.
Occupying the forefront in the bill of rights
is the provision which states that no
person shall be deprived of life, liberty or
property without due process of law (Art.
Ill, Section 1 subparagraph 1, Constitution).
On the other hand, there are three inherent
powers of government by which the state
interferes with the property rights,
namely-. (1) police power, (2) eminent
domain, (3) taxation. These are said to
exist independently of the Constitution as
necessary attributes of sovereignty.
An examination of the Charter of Quezon
City (Rep. Act No. 537), does not reveal any
provision that would justify the ordinance
in question except the provision granting
police power to the City. Section 9 cannot
be justified under the power granted to
Quezon City to tax, fix the license fee, and
regulate such other business, trades, and
occupation as may be established or
practised in the City. The power to regulate
does not include the power to prohibit or
confiscate. The ordinance in question not
only confiscates but also prohibits the
operation of a memorial park cemetery.
Police power is defined by Freund as the
power of promoting the public welfare by
restraining and regulating the use of liberty
and property. It is usually exerted in order
to merely regulate the use and enjoyment
of property of the owner. If he is deprived
of his property outright, it is not taken for
public use but rather to destroy in order to
promote the general welfare. In police
power, the owner does not recover from
the government for injury sustained in
consequence thereof.
Under the provisions of municipal charters
which are known as the general welfare
clauses, a city, by virtue of its police
power, may adopt ordinances to the peace,
safety, health, morals and the best and
highest interests of the municipality. It is a
well-settled principle, growing out of the
nature of well-ordered and society, that
every holder of property, however absolute
and may be his title, holds it under the
implied liability that his use of it shall not
be injurious to the equal enjoyment of
others having an equal right to the
enjoyment of their property, nor injurious
to the rights of the community. A property
in the state is held subject to its general

regulations, which are necessary to the

common good and general welfare. Rights
of property, like all other social and
conventional rights, are subject to such
reasonable limitations in their enjoyment
as shall prevent them from being injurious,
and to such reasonable restraints and
regulations, established by law, as the
legislature, under the governing and
controlling power vested in them by the
constitution, may think necessary and
expedient. The state, under the police
power, is possessed with plenary power to
deal with all matters relating to the general
health, morals, and safety of the people, so
long as it does not contravene any positive
inhibition of the organic law and providing
that such power is not exercised in such a
manner as to justify the interference of the
courts to prevent positive wrong and
oppression.
However, in the case at hand, there is no
reasonable relation between the setting
aside of at least six (6) percent of the total
area of an private cemeteries for charity
burial grounds of deceased paupers and
the promotion of health, morals, good
order, safety, or the general welfare of the
people. The ordinance is actually a taking
without compensation of a certain area
from a private cemetery to benefit paupers
who are charges of the municipal
corporation.
Instead
of
building
or
maintaining a public cemetery for this
purpose, the city passes the burden to
private cemeteries.

The expropriation without compensation of

a portion of private cemeteries is not
covered by Section 12(t) of Republic Act
537, the Revised Charter of Quezon City
which empowers the city council to prohibit
the burial of the dead within the center of
population of the city and to provide for
their burial in a proper place subject to the
provisions of general law regulating burial
grounds and cemeteries. When the Local
Government Code, Batas Pambansa Blg.
337 provides in Section 177 (q) that a
Sangguniang panlungsod may provide for
the burial of the dead in such place and in
such manner as prescribed by law or
ordinance it simply authorizes the city to
provide its own city owned land or to buy
or expropriate private properties to
construct public cemeteries. This has been
the law and practise in the past. It
continues to the present. Expropriation,
however,
requires
payment
of
just
compensation. The questioned ordinance is
different from laws and regulations
requiring owners of subdivisions to set
aside certain areas for streets, parks,
playgrounds, and other public facilities
from the land they sell to buyers of
subdivision lots. The necessities of public
safety, health, and convenience are very
clear from said requirements which are
intended to insure the development of
communities
with
salubrious
and
wholesome
environments.
The
beneficiaries of the regulation, in turn, are
made to pay by the subdivision developer
when individual lots are sold to homeowners.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is
hereby DISMISSED. The decision of the
respondent court is affirmed.
PHILIPPINE PRESS INSTITUTE VS. COMELEC
[244 SCRA 272; G.R. No. 119694; 22 May
1995]
Facts: Respondent Comelec promulgated
Resolution No. 2772 directing newspapers
to provide free Comelec space of not less
than one-half page for the common use of
political parties and candidates. The
Comelec space shall be allocated by the
Commission, free of charge, among all
candidates to enable them to make known
their qualifications, their stand on public
Issue and their platforms of government.
The Comelec space shall also be used by
the Commission for dissemination of vital
election information.
Petitioner Philippine Press Institute, Inc.
(PPI),
a
non-profit
organization
of
newspaper and magazine publishers, asks
the Supreme Court to declare Comelec
Resolution No. 2772 unconstitutional and
void on the ground that it violates the
prohibition imposed by the Constitution
upon the government against the taking of
private property for public use without just
compensation. On behalf of the respondent
Comelec, the Solicitor General claimed that
the Resolution is a permissible exercise of
the power of supervision (police power) of
the
Comelec
over
the
information

operations of print media enterprises

during the election period to safeguard and
ensure a fair, impartial and credible
election.
Issue: Whether or not Comelec Resolution
No. 2772 is unconstitutional.
Held: The Supreme Court declared the
Resolution as unconstitutional. It held that
to compel print media companies to
donate Comelec space amounts to
taking of private personal property
without payment of the just compensation
required in expropriation cases. Moreover,
the element of necessity for the taking has
not been established by respondent
Comelec, considering that the newspapers
were not unwilling to sell advertising
space. The taking of private property for
public use is authorized by the constitution,
but
not
without
payment
of
just
compensation. Also Resolution No. 2772
does not constitute a valid exercise of the
police power of the state. In the case at
bench, there is no showing of existence of
a national emergency to take private
property of newspaper or magazine
publishers.
> Public Use any use directly
available to the general public as a
matter of right and not merely of
forbearance or accommodation.
-Res communes subject to direct
enjoyment by any and all members of
the public indiscriminately
-Telephone or light companies such
services are demandable as a matter
of right by any one prepared to pay
for them
-Any member of the general public, as
such, can demand the right to use the
converted property for his direct and
personal convenience.
-if the lot is transferred already, it
ceases to be public property and come
under the exclusive ownership of the
transferees; the promotion of social
objectives is more paramount.
-slum clearance
- valid object of
expropriation
under
the
modern
expanded interpretation of public use.
Province of Cam Sur v CA, 222 SCRA 137,
GR 103125 (1993)

Facts: On December 22, 1988, the

Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province
of Camarines Sur passed a Resolution
authorizing the Provincial Governor to
purchase
or
expropriate
property
contiguous to the provincial Capitol site, in
order to establish a pilot farm for non-food
and non-traditional agricultural crops and a
housing project for provincial government
employees

Pursuant to the Resolution, the Province of

Camarines Sur, through its Governor, filed
two separate cases for expropriation
against Ernesto N. San Joaquin and Efren N.
San Joaquin, at the Regional Trial Court, Pili,
Camarines Sur.
The San Joaquins moved to dismiss the
complaints on the ground of inadequacy of
the price offered for their property. In an
order, the trial court denied the motion to
dismiss and authorized the Province of
Camarines Sur to take possession of the
property upon the deposit with the Clerk of
Court the amount provisionally fixed by the
trial court to answer for damages that
private respondents may suffer in the
event that the expropriation cases do not
prosper.
The San Joaquins filed a motion for relief
from the order, authorizing the Province of
Camarines Sur to take possession of their
property and a motion to admit an
amended motion to dismiss. Both motions
were denied in the order dated February
26, 1990.
In their petition before the Court of
Appeals, the San Joaquins asked: (a) that
Resolution
of
the
Sangguniang
Panlalawigan be declared null and void; (b)
that the complaints for expropriation be
dismissed; and (c) that the order denying
the motion to dismiss and allowing the
Province of Camarines Sur to take
possession of the property subject of the
expropriation and the order dated February
26, 1990, denying the motion to admit the
amended motion to dismiss, be set aside.
They also asked that an order be issued to
restrain the trial court from enforcing the
writ of possession, and thereafter to issue a
writ of injunction.
Asked by the Court of Appeals to give his
Comment to the petition, the Solicitor
General stated that under Section 9 of the
Local Government Code (B.P. Blg. 337),
there was no need for the approval by the
Office of the President of the exercise by
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the right
of eminent domain. However, the Solicitor
General expressed the view that the
Province of Camarines Sur must first secure
the approval of the Department of Agrarian
Reform of the plan to expropriate the lands
of petitioners for use as a housing project.
The Court of Appeals set aside the order of
the trial court, allowing the Province of
Camarines Sur to take possession of
private respondents' lands and the order
denying the admission of the amended
motion to dismiss. It also ordered the trial
court to suspend the expropriation
proceedings until after the Province of
Camarines Sur shall have submitted the
requisite approval of the Department of
Agrarian
Reform
to
convert
the
classification of the property of the private
respondents from agricultural to nonagricultural land.

Issue: WON the Province of Cam Sur must

first secure the approval of the Department
of Agrarian Reform of the plan to
expropriate the lands of the San Joaquins.
HELD: To sustain the Court of Appeals
would mean that the local government
units can no longer expropriate agricultural
lands needed for the construction of roads,
bridges, schools, hospitals, etc., without
first applying for conversion of the use of
the lands with the Department of Agrarian
Reform, because all of these projects would
naturally involve a change in the land use.
In effect, it would then be the Department
of Agrarian Reform to scrutinize whether
the expropriation is for a public purpose or
public use.
Ratio:
WHEREFORE,
the
petition
is
GRANTED and the questioned decision of
the Court of Appeals is set aside insofar as
it (a) nullifies the trial court's order
allowing the Province of Camarines Sur to
take possession of private respondents'
property; (b) orders the trial court to
suspend the expropriation proceedings;
and (c) requires the Province of Camarines
Sur to obtain the approval of the
Department of Agrarian Reform to convert
or reclassify private respondents' property
from agricultural to non-agricultural use.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is
AFFIRMED insofar as it sets aside the order
of the trial court, denying the amended
motion
to
dismiss
of
the
private
respondents.
SO ORDERED.

Just Compensation - full and

fair equivalent of the property
taken from the privateowner
by the expropriator; intended
to indemnify the owner fully
for the loss he hassustained as
a result of the expropriation.if
it is prejudicial to rge public, it
will
not
satisfy
the
requirementof
just
compensation.

Eslaban vs. De Onono, G.R. No. 146062,

June 28, 2001
Eslaban vs. Vda. de Onorio [GR 146062, 28
June 2001]
Second Division, Mendoza (J): 4 concur
Facts: Clarita Vda. de Onorio is the owner
of a lot in Barangay M. Roxas, Sto. Nino,
South Cotabato with an area of 39,512
square meters (Lot 1210-A-Pad-11-000586,
TCT T-22121 of the Registry of Deeds,
South Cotabato). On 6 October 1981,
Santiago Eslaban, Jr., Project Manager of
the NIA, approved the construction of the
main irrigation canal of the NIA on the said
lot, affecting a 24,660 square meter
portion thereof. De Onorio's husband
agreed to the construction of the NIA canal
provided that they be paid by the
government for the area taken after the

processing
of
documents
by
the
Commission on Audit. Sometime in 1983, a
Rightof-Way agreement was executed
between De Onorio and the NIA. The NIA
then paid De Onorio the amount of
P4,180.00 as Right-of-Way damages. De
Onorio subsequently executed an Affidavit
of Waiver of Rights and Fees whereby she
waived any compensation for damages to
crops and improvements which she
suffered as a result of the construction of a
right-of-way on her property. The same
year, Eslaban offered De Onorio the sum of
P35,000,00 by way of amicable settlement
(financial assistance) pursuant to Executive
Order 1035, 18. De Onorio demanded
payment for the taking of her property, but
Eslaban/NIA refused to pay. Accordingly, De
Onorio filed on 10 December 1990 a
complaint against Eslaban before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), praying that
Eslaban/NIA be ordered to pay the sum of
P111,299.55 as compensation for the
portion of her property used in the
construction of the canal constructed by
the NIA, litigation expenses, and the costs.
Eslaban admitted that NIA constructed an
irrigation canal over the property of De
Onorio and that NIA paid a certain
landowner whose property had been taken
for irrigation purposes, but Eslaban
interposed the defense that: (1) the
government had not consented to be sued;
(2) the total area used by the NIA for its
irrigation canal was only 2.27 hectares, not
24,600 square meters; and (3) that De
Onorio was not entitled to compensation
for the taking of her property considering
that she secured title over the property by
virtue of a homestead patent under
Commonwealth Act 141. On 18 October
1993, the trial court rendered a decision,
ordering the NIA to pay to De Onorio the
sum of P107,517.60 as just compensation
for the questioned area of 24,660 square
meters of land owned by De Onorio and
taken by the NIA which used it for its main
canal plus costs. On 15 November 1993,
the NIA appealed to the Court of Appeals
which, on 31 October 2000, affirmed the
decision of the Regional Trial Court. NIA
filed the petition for review.
Issue: Whether the valuation of just
compensation is determined at the time
the property was taken or at the time the
complaint for expropriation is filed.
Held: Whenever public lands are alienated,
granted or conveyed to applicants thereof,
and the deed grant or instrument of
conveyance [sales patent] registered with
the
Register
of
Deeds
and
the
corresponding certificate and owner's
duplicate of title issued, such lands are
deemed registered lands under the Torrens
System and the certificate of title thus
issued is as conclusive and indefeasible as
any other certificate of title issued to
private lands in ordinary or cadastral
registration
proceedings.
The
only
servitude which a private property owner is
required to recognize in favor of the
government is the easement of a "public
highway, way, private way established by

law, or any government canal or lateral

thereof where the certificate of title does
not state that the boundaries thereof have
been pre-determined." This implies that the
same should have been pre-existing at the
time of the registration of the land in order
that the registered owner may be
compelled to respect it. Conversely, where
the easement is not pre-existing and is
sought to be imposed only after the land
has been registered under the Land
Registration Act, proper expropriation
proceedings should be had, and just
compensation paid to the registered owner
thereof. Herein, the irrigation canal
constructed by the NIA on the contested
property was built only on 6 October 1981,
several years after the property had been
registered on 13 May 1976. Accordingly,
prior expropriation proceedings should
have been filed and just compensation paid
to the owner thereof before it could be
taken for public use. With respect to the
compensation which the owner of the
condemned property is entitled to receive,
it is likewise settled that it is the market
value which should be paid or "that sum of
money which a person, desirous but not
compelled to buy, and an owner, willing
but not compelled to sell, would agree on
as a price to be given and received
therefor." Further, just compensation
means not only the correct amount to be
paid to the owner of the land but also the
payment of the land within a reasonable
time from its taking. Without prompt
payment,
compensation
cannot
be
considered "just" for then the property
owner is made to suffer the consequence
of being immediately deprived of his land
while being made to wait for a decade or
more before actually receiving the amount
necessary
to
cope
with
his
loss.
Nevertheless, there are instances where
the expropriating agency takes over the
property prior to the expropriation suit, in
which case just compensation shall be
determined as of the time of taking, not as
of the time of filing of the action of eminent
domain. The value of the property, thus,
must be determined either as of the date
of the taking of the property or the filing of
the complaint, "whichever came first."

Who is the owner who shall

receive the payment?

Knecht vs. CA, 297 SCRA 754

KNECHT VS. COURT OF APPEALS [290 SCRA
223; G.R. NO. 108015, 20 MAY 1998]
Saturday, January 31, 2009 Posted by
Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law
Facts: The instant case is an unending
sequel to several suits commenced almost
twenty years ago involving a parcel of land
located at the corner of the south end of
EDSA and F.B. Harrison in Pasay City. The
land was owned by petitioners Cristina de
Knecht and her son, Rene Knecht. On the
land, the Knechts constructed eight

houses, leased out the seven and occupied

one of them as their residence. In 1979,
the government filed for the expropriation
of Knechts property. The government
wanted to use the land for the completion
of the Manila Flood Control and Drainage
Project and the extension of the EDSA
towards Roxas Boulevard. In 1982, the City
Treasurer of Pasay discovered that the
Knechts failed to pay real estate taxes on
the property from 1980 to 1982. As a
consequence of this deficiency, the City
Treasurer sold the property at public
auction for the same amount of their
deficiency taxes. The highest bidders were
respondent Spouses Anastacio and Felisa
Babiera (the Babieras) and respondent
Spouses Alejandro and Flor Sangalang (the
Sangalangs). Subsequently, Sangalang and
Babiera sold the land to respondent Salem
Investment Corporation. On February 17,
1983, the Batasang Pambansa passed B.P.
Blg.
340
authorizing
the
national
government
to
expropriate
certain
properties in Pasay City for the EDSA
Extension. The property of the Knechts was
part of those expropriated under B.P. Blg.
340. The government gave out just
compensation for the lands expropriated
under B.P. Blg. 340. Salem was included
and received partial payment. Seven of the
eight houses of the Knechts were
demolished and the government took
possession of the portion of land on which
the houses stood. Since the Knechts
refused to vacate their one remaining
house, Salem filed a case against them for
unlawful detainer. As defense, the Knechts
claimed ownership of the land and
building. The Municipal Trial Court however
ordered the Knechts' ejectment thus their
residence was demolished.
The
Knechts
continuously
claimed
ownership of the property and allege that
they must be given just compensation.
Issue: Whether or not Knechts are the
lawful owners of the land at subject.
Held: The Supreme Court held that the
Knechts were not the owners anymore of
the said land. The Knechts' right to the
land had been foreclosed after they failed
to redeem it one year after the sale at
public
auction.
Since
the
petitions
questioning the order of dismissal were
likewise dismissed by the Court of Appeals
and this Court, the order of dismissal
became final and res judicata on the issue
of ownership of the land. Petitioners
contended that they did not receive notice
of their tax delinquency. Neither did they
receive notice of the auction sale.
However, this question has been previously
raised in the cases which have been
already set aside. The court is not a trier of
facts. Res judicata has already set it. The
Knechts therefore are not the lawful
owners of the land and are not any longer
accountable for just compensation given by
the government.
Note: Res judicata is a ground for dismissal
of an action. It is a rule that precludes

parties from relitigating Issue actually

litigated and determined by a prior and
final judgment. It pervades every wellregulated system of jurisprudence, and is
based upon two grounds embodied in
various maxims of the common law one,
public policy and necessity, that there
should be a limit to litigation; and another,
the individual should not be vexed twice for
the same cause. When a right of fact has
been judicially tried and determined by a
court of competent jurisdiction, or an
opportunity for such trial has been given,
the judgment of the court, so long as it
remains unreversed, should be conclusive
upon the parties and those in privity with
them in law or estate. To follow a contrary
doctrine would subject the public peace
and quiet to the will and neglect of
individuals and prefer the gratification of
the litigious disposition of the parties to the
preservation of the public tranquility.
Res judicata applies when: (1) the former
judgment or order is final; (2) the judgment
or order is one on the merits; (3) it was
rendered by a court having jurisdiction
over the subject matter and the parties; (4)
there is between the first and second
actions, identity of parties, of subject
matter and of cause of action.

Determination
Function

of

JC:

Judicial

NHA vs Reyes, 123 SCRA 245

Facts: National Housing Authority filed
several expropriation complaints on the
sugarland owned by the petitioners Reyes.
The land is located in Dasmarinas, Cavite.
The purpose of the expropriation is for the
expansion of the Dasmarinas Resettlement
Project to accommodate the squatters who
were relocated from Manila. The trial court
rendered
judgment
ordering
the
expropriation of these lots with payment of
just compensation. It was affirmed by the
Supreme Court.
The petitioners Reyes alleged the failure of
the respondents to comply with the
Supreme Court order, so they filed a
complaint for forfeiture of their rights
before the RTC of Quezon City. They also
said that NHA did not relocate squatters
from Manila on the expropriated lands
which violate the reason for public
purpose. The petitioners prayed that NHA
be enjoined from disposing and alienating
the expropriated properties and that
judgment be rendered forfeiting all its
rights and interests under the expropriation
judgment.
In the answer of NHA, they already paid a
substantial amount to the petitioners.
Thus, several issues are already raised in
the expropriation court.
The trial court dismissed the case. It held
that NHA did not abandon the public
purpose
because
the
relocation
of
squatters involves a long and tedious
process. It also entered into a contract with

a developer for the construction of a lowcost housing to be sold to qualified low

income beneficiaries. The payment of just
compensation is independent of the
obligation of the petitioners to pay capital
gains tax. Lastly, the payment of just
compensation is based on the value at the
time the property was taken.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision.
Issue: Whether or not the property
expropriated is taking for public purpose.
Held: The decision appealed is modified.
The 1987 Constitution explicitly provides
for the exercise of the power of eminent
domain over the private properties upon
payment of just compensation. Sec. 9,
Article III states that private property shall
not be taken for public use without just
compensation. The constitutional restraints
are public use and just compensation.
The expropriation judgment declared that
NHA has a lawful right to take petitioners
properties for the public use or purpose of
expanding the Dasmarinas Resettlement
Project.
The public use is synonymous with
public interest, public benefit, public
welfare, and public convenience. The
act of NHA in entering a contract with a
real estate developer for the construction
of low cost housing cannot be taken to
mean as a deviation from the stated public
purpose of their taking.
Expropriation of private lands for slum
clearance and urban development is for a
public purpose even if the developed area
is later sold to private homeowners,
commercial firms, entertainment and
service companies and other private
concerns.
The expropriation of private property for
the purpose of socialized housing for the
marginalized sector is in furtherance of the
social justice provision under Section 1,
Article XIII of the Constitution.
When land has been acquired for public
use in fee simple unconditionally, either by
the exercise of eminent domain or by
purchase, the former owner retains no
rights in the land, and the public use may
be abandoned, or the land may be devoted
to a different use, without any impairment
of the estate or title acquired, or any
reversion to the former owner.
The constitutional limitation of just
compensation is considered to be the sum
equivalent to the market value of the
property, broadly described to be the price
fixed by the seller in open market in the
usual and ordinary course of legal action
and competition or the fair value of the
property as between one who receives, and
one who desires to sell, it being fixed at the
time of the actual taking by the
government. Thus, if property is taken for

public
use
before
compensation
is
deposited with the court having jurisdiction
over the case, the final compensation must
include interests on its just value to be
computed from the time the property is
taken to the time when compensation is
actually paid or deposited with the court. In
fine, between the taking of the property
and the actual payment, legal interests
accrue in order to place the owner in a
position as good as (but not better than)
the position he was in before the taking
occurred.
Records show that there is an outstanding
balance of P1,218,574.35 that ought to be
paid to petitioners.[16] It is not disputed
that
respondent
NHA
took
actual
possession of the expropriated properties
in 1977.[17] Perforce, while petitioners are
not entitled to the return of the
expropriated property, they are entitled to
be paid the balance of P1,218,574.35 with
legal interest thereon at 12% per annum
computed from the taking of the property
in 1977 until the due amount shall have
been fully paid.
WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is
modified as follows:

property while invoking PD No. 1533 that

indicates
the determination of just
compensation is based on the declared
value indicated by the land owner and the
assessor whichever is lower and there is no
need to appoint commissioners for the
purpose of assessing the property value.
Issue: Whether or not the court erred in
appointing commissioners to the case at
bar
Held: The court ruled that PD No. 1533 only
serves as a guiding principle providing
some considerations in the determination
of just compensation in expropriation
proceedings. It does not substitute the
discretion vested upon the court to
exercise in determining the fair and just
compensation in expropriating property.
The appointment of commissioners is one
way the court may determine the fair and
just compensation in dispute for judicial
evaluation.

Form of JC

Association of Small Landowners in the

Philippines Inc. vs. Secretary of Agrarian
Reform [GR

1. Ordering respondent National Housing

Authority to pay petitioners the amount of
P1,218,574.35 with legal interest thereon
at 12% per annum computed from the
taking of the expropriated properties in
1997 until the amount due shall have been
fully paid;

78741, 14 July 1989]; Also Acuna vs. Arroyo

[GR 79310], Pabico vs. Juico [GR 79744],
and

2. Ordering petitioners to pay the capital

gains tax; and

Facts: On 17 July 1987, President Corazon

C. Aquino issued Executive Order (EO) 228,
declaring full land ownership in favor of the
beneficiaries of Presidential Decree (PD) 27
and providing for the valuation of still
unvalued lands covered by the decree as
well as the manner of their payment. This
was followed on 22 July 1987 by PD 131,
instituting a comprehensive agrarian
reform program (CARP), and EO 229,
providing
the
mechanics
for
its
implementation. Subsequently, with its
formal organization, the revived Congress
of the Philippines took over legislative
power from the President and started its
own deliberations, including extensive
public hearings, on the improvement of the
interests of farmers. The result, after
almost a year of spirited debate, was the
enactment of Republic Act (RA) 6657,
otherwise known as the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law of 1988, which
President Aquino signed on 10 June 11988.
This law, while considerably changing RA
3844 (Agricultural Land Reform Code, 8
August 1963) and PD 27 (21 October
1972), nevertheless gives them suppletory
effect insofar as they are not inconsistent
with its provisions.

3. Ordering petitioners to surrender to

respondent National Housing Authority the
owners duplicate certificates of title of the
expropriated properties upon full payment
of just compensation.
SO ORDERED.

EPZA v Dulay 149 SCRA 305 (1987)

appointment
of
determine
just
expropriation

commissioners
compensation

to
in

Facts: A land reserve was provided for the

Export Processing Zone which some portion
of the land is privately owned by the
respondents. Petitioner offered to purchase
the land but both parties did not come to
an agreement in terms of the assessed
value of the property. Petitioner files an
expropriation case which the court decided
in favor of them and issued a writ of
possession for the immediate possession of
land subject to just compensation.
Respondents however are not amenable to
the amount and thus the court appointed
commissioners
to
determine
the
appropriate property value. Petitioner now
questions
the
appointment
of
commissioners to determine the value of

Manaay vs. Juico [GR 79777]

En Banc, Cruz (J): 14 concur

[GR 79777] Nicolas Manaay and his wife

owned a 9-hectare riceland worked by 4
tenants, while Augustin Hermano Jr. owned
a 5-hectare riceland worked by four
tenants. The tenants therein were declared
full owners of these lands by EO 228 as

qualified farmers under PD 27. Manaay and

Hermano questioned the constitutionality
of PD 27, and EOs 228 and 229, before the
Supreme Court, in GR 79777, on grounds
inter alia of separation of powers, due
process,
equal
protection
and
the
constitutional limitation that no private
property shall be taken for public use
without just compensation. In the amended
petition dated 22 November 1988, it was
contended that PD 27, EOs 228 and 229
(except Sections 20 and 21) have been
impliedly repealed by RA 6657, but that the
latter statute should itself also be declared
unconstitutional because it suffers from
substantially the same infirmities as the
earlier
measures.
A
petition
for
intervention was filed with leave of court
on 1 June 1988 by Vicente Cruz, owner of a
1.83-hectare land, who complained that
the department of Agrarian Reform (DAR)
was insisting on the implementation of PD
27 and EO 228 despite a compromise
agreement he had reached with his tenant
on the payment of rentals.
[GR 79310] Arsenio Al. Acua, Newton
Jison, Victorino Ferraris, Dennis Jereza,
Herminigildo Gustilo, and Paulino D.
Tolentino are landowners and sugar
planters in the Victorias Mill District,
Victorias, Negros Occidental; while the
Planters' Committee, Inc. is an organization
composed of 1,400 planter-members. They
filed a petition (GR 79310) seeking to
prohibit
the
implementation
of
Proclamation 131 and EO 229, claiming
that the power to provide for a
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program
as decreed by the Constitution belongs to
Congress and not the President; that
although they agree that the President
could exercise legislative power until the
Congress was convened, she could do so
only to enact emergency measures during
the transition period; and that, even
assuming that the interim legislative power
of the President was properly exercised,
Proclamation 131 and EO 229 would still
have to be annulled for violating the
constitutional
provisions
on
just
compensation, due process, and equal
protection. Furthermore, they contend that
taking must be simultaneous with payment
of just compensation as it is traditionally
understood, i.e., with money and in full, but
no such payment is contemplated in
Section 5 of the EO 229. On the contrary,
Section 6, thereof provides that the Land
Bank of the Philippines "shall compensate
the landowner in an amount to be
established by the government, which shall
be based on the owner's declaration of
current fair market value as provided in
Section 4 hereof, but subject to certain
controls to be defined and promulgated by
the Presidential Agrarian Reform Council."
This compensation may not be paid fully in
money but in any of several modes that
may consist of part cash and part bond,
with interest, maturing periodically, or
direct payment in cash or bond as may be
mutually agreed upon by the beneficiary
and the landowner or as may be prescribed
or approved by the PARC. A motion for

intervention was filed on 27 August 1987

by the National Federation of Sugarcane
Planters
(NASP)
which
claims
a
membership of at least 20,000 individual
sugar planters all over the country. On 10
September 1987, another motion for
intervention was filed, this time by Manuel
Barcelona, et al., representing coconut and
riceland owners. Both motions were
granted by the Court. On 11 April 1988,
Prudencio Serrano, a coconut planter, filed
a petition on his own behalf, assailing the
constitutionality of EO 229. In addition to
the arguments already raised, Serrano
contends
that
the
measure
is
unconstitutional because (1) only public
lands should be included in the CARP; (2)
EO 229 embraces more than one subject
which is not expressed in the title; (3) The
power of the President to legislate was
terminated on 2 July 1987; and (4) The
appropriation of a P50 billion special fund
from the National Treasury did not originate
from the House of Representatives. [GR
79744] Inocentes Pabico in his petition (GR
79744) alleges that the then Secretary of
Department of Agrarian Reform, in
violation of due process
and the
requirement for just compensation, placed
his landholding under the coverage of
Operation Land Transfer. Certificates of
Land Transfer were subsequently issued to
Salvador Talento, Jaime Abogado, Conrado
Avancea, and Roberto Taay, who then
refused payment of lease rentals to him.
On 3 September 1986, Pabico protested
the erroneous inclusion of his small
landholding under Operation Land Transfer
and asked for the recall and cancellation of
the Certificates of Land Transfer in the
name of the Talento, et. al. Pabico claims
that on 24 December 1986, his petition
was denied without hearing. On 17
February 1987, he filed a motion for
reconsideration, which had not been acted
upon when EO 228 and 229 were issued.
These orders rendered his motion moot
and academic because they directly
effected the transfer of his land to Talento,
et. al. Pabico argues that (1) EOs 228 and
229 were invalidly issued by the President
of the Philippines; 92) the said executive
orders are violative of the constitutional
provision that no private property shall be
taken without due process or just
compensation; and (3) Pabico is denied the
right of maximum retention provided for
under the 1987 Constitution.
[GR 78742] The Association of Small
Landowners in the Philippines, Inc., Juanito
D. Gomez, Gerardo B. Alarcio, Felife A.
Guico, Jr., Bernardo M. Almonte, Canuto
Ramir B. Cabrito, Isidro T. Guico, Felisa I.
Llamido, Fausto J. Salva, Reynaldo G.
Estrada, Felisa C. Bautista, Esmenia J.
Cabe, Teodoro B. Madriaga, Aurea J.
Prestosa, Emerenciana J. Isla, Felicisima C.
Apresto, Consuelo M. Morales, Benjamin R.
Segismundo, Cirila A. Jose, and Napoleon S.
Ferrer invoke in their petition (GR 78742)
the right of retention granted by PD 27 to
owners of rice and corn lands not
exceeding 7 hectares as long as they are
cultivating or intend to cultivate the same.

Their respective lands do not exceed the

statutory limit but are occupied by tenants
who are actually cultivating such lands.
They claim they cannot eject their tenants
and so are unable to enjoy their right of
retention because the Department of
Agrarian Reform (DAR) has so far not
issued the implementing rules required
under PD 316, implementing PD 27. They
therefore ask the Court for a writ of
mandamus to compel the Secretary of
Agrarian Reform to issue the said rules.
Issue: Whether just compensation should
exclusively be made in money and not
other things of value.
Held: This is not an ordinary expropriation
where only a specific property of relatively
limited area is sought to be taken by the
State from its owner for a specific and
perhaps local purpose. What is dealt with
herein
is
a
revolutionary
kind
of
expropriation. The Court assumes that the
framers of the Constitution were aware of
this difficulty when they called for agrarian
reform as a top priority project of the
government. It is a part of this assumption
that
when
they
envisioned
the
expropriation that would be needed, they
also intended that the just compensation
would have to be paid not in the orthodox
way but a less conventional if more
practical method. There can be no doubt
that they were aware of the financial
limitations of the government and had no
illusions that there would be enough
money to pay in cash and in full for the
lands they wanted to be distributed among
the farmers. The court may therefore
assume that their intention was to allow
such manner of payment as is now
provided for by the CARP Law, particularly
the payment of the balance (if the owner
cannot be paid fully with money), or indeed
of the entire amount of the just
compensation, with other things of value.
The Court has not found in the records of
the
Constitutional
Commission
any
categorical
agreement
among
the
members regarding the meaning to be
given the concept of just compensation as
applied to the comprehensive agrarian
reform program being contemplated. On
the other hand, there is nothing in the
records either that militates against the
assumptions we are making of the general
sentiments and intention of the members
on the content and manner of the payment
to be made to the landowner in the light of
the magnitude of the expenditure and the
limitations of the expropriator. Accepting
the theory that payment of the just
compensation is not always required to be
made fully in money, the Court find further
that the proportion of cash payment to the
other things of value constituting the total
payment, as determined on the basis of
the areas of the lands expropriated, is not
unduly oppressive upon the landowner. It is
noted that the smaller the land, the bigger
the payment in money, primarily because
the small landowner will be needing it
more than the big landowners, who can
afford a bigger balance in bonds and other

things of value. No less importantly, the

government financial instruments making
up the balance of the payment are
"negotiable at any time." The other modes,
which are likewise available to the
landowner at his option, are also not
unreasonable because payment is made in
shares of stock, LBP bonds, other
properties or assets, tax credits, and other
things of value equivalent to the amount of
just
compensation.
Admittedly,
the
compensation contemplated in the law will
cause the landowners, big and small, not a
little inconvenience. However, this cannot
be avoided.
Landbank vs CA, 249 SCRA 149
In 1980, ECO Management Corporation
(ECO) obtained loans amounting to about
P26 million from Land Bank. ECO defaulted
in its payment but in 1981, ECO submitted
a Payment Plan with the hope of
restructuring its loan. The plan was
rejected and Land Bank sued ECO. It
impleaded Emmanuel C. Oate, the
majority stockholder of ECO who is serving
as the Chairman and treasurer of ECO.
The trial court ruled in favor of Land Bank
but Oate was absolved from liabilities.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision
of the trial court.
Land Bank appealed as it wanted Oate to
be personally liable on the following
grounds (among others): a) ECO stands for
Emmanuel C. Oate, b) Oate is the
majority stockholder, c) ECO was formed
ostensibly to allow Oate to acquire loans
from Land Bank which he used for his
personal advantage, d) Oate holds two
positions in the corporation, and e) ECO
never held any board meeting which just
shows only Oate was in control of the
corporation.
ISSUE: Whether or not Oate should be
held personally.
HELD: No. Land Bank was not able to
produce sufficient evidence to prove its
claim. A corporation, upon coming into
existence, is invested by law with a
personality separate and distinct from
those persons composing it as well as from
any other legal entity to which it may be
related. The corporate fiction is only
disregarded when the fiction is used to
defeat public convenience, justify wrong,
protect fraud, defend crime, confuse
legitimate
legal
or
judicial
issues,
perpetrate
deception
or
otherwise
circumvent the law. This is likewise true
where the corporate entity is being used as
an alter ego, adjunct, or business conduit
for the sole benefit of the stockholders or
of another corporate entity. None of the
foregoing was proved by Land Bank.
The mere fact that Oate owned the
majority of the shares of ECO is not a
ground to conclude that Oate and ECO is
one and the same. Mere ownership by a
single stockholder of all or nearly all of the

capital stock of a corporation is not by

itself sufficient reason for disregarding the
fiction of separate corporate personalities.
Anent the issue of the corporate name, the
fact that Oates initials coincide with the
corporate name ECO is not sufficient to
disregard the corporate fiction. Even if ECO
does stand for Emmanuel C. Oate, it
does not mean that the said corporation is
merely a dummy of Oate. A corporation
may assume any name provided it is
lawful. There is nothing illegal in a
corporation acquiring the name or as in
this case, the initials of one of its
shareholders.

Time of assessing JC
Eslaban vs. De Onorio, supra
Hacienda Luisita Inc. (HLI) v.
Presidential
Agrarian
Reform
Council (PARC), et al., G.R. No.
171101, November 22, 2011
RESOLUTION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
I.

THE FACTS

On July 5, 2011, the Supreme Court

en banc voted unanimously (11-0)
to DISMISS/DENY the petition filed
by
HLI
and
AFFIRM
with
MODIFICATIONS the resolutions of
the PARC revoking HLIs Stock
Distribution Plan (SDP) and placing
the subject lands in Hacienda
Luisita under compulsory coverage
of the Comprehensive Agrarian
Reform Program (CARP) of the
government.
The Court however did not order
outright land distribution. Voting 65, the Court noted that there are
operative facts that occurred in the
interim and which the Court cannot
validly ignore. Thus, the Court
declared that the revocation of the
SDP must, by application of the
operative fact principle, give way
to the right of the original 6,296
qualified farmworkers-beneficiaries
(FWBs) to choose whether they
want to remain as HLI stockholders
or [choose actual land distribution].
It thus ordered the Department of
Agrarian
Reform
(DAR)
to
immediately schedule meetings
with the said 6,296 FWBs and
explain to them the effects,
consequences
and
legal
or
practical implications of their
choice, after which the FWBs will
be asked to manifest, in secret
voting, their choices in the ballot,
signing their signatures or placing
their thumbmarks, as the case may
be, over their printed names.
their

The parties thereafter filed

respective
motions
for

reconsideration
decision.
II.

of

the

Court

THE ISSUES

(1) Is the operative fact doctrine

available in this case?
(2)
Is Sec. 31 of RA 6657
unconstitutional?
(3)
Cant the Court order that
DARs compulsory acquisition of
Hacienda Lusita cover the full
6,443 hectares allegedly covered
by RA 6657 and previously held by
Tarlac Development Corporation
(Tadeco), and not just the 4,915.75
hectares covered by HLIs SDP?
(4) Is the date of the taking (for
purposes of determining the just
compensation payable to HLI)
November 21, 1989, when PARC
approved HLIs SDP?
(5)
Has the 10-year period
prohibition on the transfer of
awarded lands under RA 6657
lapsed on May 10, 1999 (since
Hacienda Luisita were placed under
CARP coverage through the SDOA
scheme on May 11, 1989), and
thus the qualified FWBs should now
be allowed to sell their land
interests in Hacienda Luisita to
third parties, whether they have
fully paid for the lands or not?
(6) THE CRUCIAL ISSUE: Should
the ruling in the July 5, 2011
Decision that the qualified FWBs be
given an option to remain as
stockholders
of
HLI
be
reconsidered?
III. THE RULING
[The Court PARTIALLY
GRANTED
the
motions
for
reconsideration
of
respondents
PARC, et al. with respect to the
option granted to the original
farmworkers-beneficiaries (FWBs)
of Hacienda Luisita to remain with
petitioner HLI, which option the
Court thereby RECALLED and SET
ASIDE. It reconsidered its earlier
decision that the qualified FWBs
should be given an option to
remain as stockholders of HLI, and
UNANIMOUSLY directed immediate
land distribution to the qualified
FWBs.]
1.
YES, the operative fact
doctrine is applicable in this case.
[The Court maintained its stance
that the operative fact doctrine is
applicable in this case since,
contrary to the suggestion of the
minority, the doctrine is not limited
only to invalid or unconstitutional
laws but also applies to decisions
made by the President or the
administrative agencies that have
the force and effect of laws. Prior to
the nullification or recall of said
decisions, they may have produced

acts and consequences that must

be respected. It is on this score
that the operative fact doctrine
should be applied to acts and
consequences that resulted from
the implementation of the PARC
Resolution approving the SDP of
HLI. The majority stressed that the
application of the operative fact
doctrine by the Court in its July 5,
2011 decision was in fact favorable
to the FWBs because not only were
they allowed to retain the benefits
and homelots they received under
the stock distribution scheme, they
were also given the option to
choose for themselves whether
they
want
to
remain
as
stockholders of HLI or not.]
2.
NO, Sec. 31 of RA 6657 NOT
unconstitutional.

considered commonly-owned by
farmworkers,
and
these
may
necessarily result in the decrease
of the area size that may be
awarded per FWB the Court
reconsiders
its
Decision
and
resolves to give the DAR leeway in
adjusting the area that may be
awarded per FWB in case the
number of actual qualified FWBs
decreases. In order to ensure the
proper
distribution
of
the
agricultural lands of Hacienda
Luisita per qualified FWB, and
considering that matters involving
strictly
the
administrative
implementation and enforcement
of agrarian reform laws are within
the jurisdiction of the DAR, it is the
latter which shall determine the
area with which each qualified FWB
will be awarded.

[The Court maintained that the

Court is NOT compelled to rule on
the constitutionality of Sec. 31 of
RA 6657, reiterating that it was not
raised at the earliest opportunity
and that the resolution thereof is
not the lis mota of the case.
Moreover, the issue has been
rendered moot and academic since
SDO is no longer one of the modes
of acquisition under RA 9700. The
majority clarified that in its July 5,
2011 decision, it made no ruling in
favor of the constitutionality of Sec.
31 of RA 6657, but found
nonetheless that there was no
apparent grave violation of the
Constitution that may justify the
resolution
of
the
issue
of
constitutionality.]

On the other hand, the majority

likewise reiterated its holding that
the
500-hectare
portion
of
Hacienda Luisita that have been
validly converted to industrial use
and have been acquired by
intervenors
Rizal
Commercial
Banking Corporation (RCBC) and
Luisita Industrial Park Corporation
(LIPCO), as well as the separate
80.51-hectare SCTEX lot acquired
by the government, should be
excluded from the coverage of the
assailed PARC resolution. The Court
however ordered that the unused
balance of the proceeds of the sale
of the 500-hectare converted land
and of the 80.51-hectare land used
for the SCTEX be distributed to the
FWBs.]

3.
NO, the Court CANNOT order
that DARs compulsory acquisition
of Hacienda Lusita cover the full
6,443 hectares and not just the
4,915.75 hectares covered by HLIs
SDP.

4.
YES, the date of taking is
November 21, 1989, when PARC
approved HLIs SDP.

[Since what is put in issue before

the Court is the propriety of the
revocation of the SDP, which only
involves
4,915.75
has.
of
agricultural land and not 6,443
has., then the Court is constrained
to rule only as regards the
4,915.75 has. of agricultural land.
Nonetheless,
this
should
not
prevent the DAR, under its
mandate under the agrarian reform
law, from subsequently subjecting
to
agrarian
reform
other
agricultural lands originally held by
Tadeco that were allegedly not
transferred to HLI but were
supposedly covered by RA 6657.
However since the area to be
awarded to each FWB in the July 5,
2011
Decision
appears
too
restrictive considering that there
are roads, irrigation canals, and
other portions of the land that are

[For the purpose of determining

just compensation, the date of
taking is November 21, 1989 (the
date when PARC approved HLIs
SDP) since this is the time that the
FWBs were considered to own and
possess the agricultural lands in
Hacienda Luisita. To be precise,
these lands became subject of the
agrarian reform coverage through
the stock distribution scheme only
upon the approval of the SDP, that
is, on November 21, 1989. Such
approval is akin to a notice of
coverage ordinarily issued under
compulsory acquisition. On the
contention of the minority (Justice
Sereno) that the date of the notice
of
coverage
[after
PARCs
revocation of the SDP], that is,
January 2, 2006, is determinative
of the just compensation that HLI is
entitled to receive, the Court
majority noted that none of the
cases cited to justify this position
involved the stock distribution
scheme. Thus, said cases do not

squarely apply to the instant case.

The foregoing notwithstanding, it
bears stressing that the DAR's land
valuation is only preliminary and is
not, by any means, final and
conclusive upon the landowner.
The landowner can file an original
action with the RTC acting as a
special agrarian court to determine
just compensation. The court has
the right to review with finality the
determination in the exercise of
what is admittedly a judicial
function.]
5.
NO, the 10-year period
prohibition on the transfer of
awarded lands under RA 6657 has
NOT lapsed on May 10, 1999; thus,
the qualified FWBs should NOT yet
be allowed to sell their land
interests in Hacienda Luisita to
third parties.
[Under RA 6657 and DAO 1, the
awarded lands may only be
transferred or conveyed after 10
years from the issuance and
registration of the emancipation
patent (EP) or certificate of land
ownership
award
(CLOA).
Considering that the EPs or CLOAs
have not yet been issued to the
qualified FWBs in the instant case,
the 10-year prohibitive period has
not even started. Significantly, the
reckoning point is the issuance of
the EP or CLOA, and not the placing
of the agricultural lands under
CARP coverage. Moreover, should
the FWBs be immediately allowed
the option to sell or convey their
interest in the subject lands, then
all efforts at agrarian reform would
be rendered nugatory, since, at the
end of the day, these lands will just
be transferred to persons not
entitled to land distribution under
CARP.]
6.
YES, the ruling in the July 5,
2011 Decision that the qualified
FWBs be given an option to remain
as stockholders of HLI should be
reconsidered.
[The Court reconsidered its earlier
decision that the qualified FWBs
should be given an option to
remain as stockholders of HLI,
inasmuch as these qualified FWBs
will never gain control [over the
subject lands] given the present
proportion of shareholdings in HLI.
The Court noted that the share of
the FWBs in the HLI capital stock is
[just] 33.296%. Thus, even if all the
holders
of
this
33.296%
unanimously vote to remain as HLI
stockholders, which is unlikely,
control will never be in the hands
of the FWBs. Control means the
majority of [sic] 50% plus at least
one share of the common shares
and other voting shares. Applying

the
formula
to
the
HLI
stockholdings, the number of
shares that will constitute the
majority is 295,112,101 shares
(590,554,220 total HLI capital
shares divided by 2 plus one [1]
HLI share).
The 118,391,976.85
shares subject to the SDP approved
by PARC substantially fall short of
the 295,112,101 shares needed by
the FWBs to acquire control over
HLI.]

Entitlement of owner to interest

Urtula vs Republic, 22 SCRA 477
Facts: The Court of First Instance
had rendered judgment on 16
November 1957 in its Civil Case
No. 3837, for the expropriation of
the Hacienda Quitang, owned by
Dalmacio Urtula by the Republic of
the Philippines, for the sum of
P213,094.00, "and upon making
the payment the plaintiff shall take
full possession of the land." The
Republic appealed the decision to
the Court of Appeals, raising the
sole issue of whether the amount
fixed by the trial court was a just
compensation for the property.
While the appeal was pending
before the Court of Appeals, the
Republic
of
the
Philippines
deposited on 29 July 1958, with the
Philippine National Bank the sum of
P117,690.00 as provisional value of
the land, in accordance with an
order of the trial court dated 3
January 1958, and this deposit was
withdrawn by Dalmacio Urtula in
August of 1958.
Thereafter, on 10 September 1958,
the Court of Appeals granted the
Republic's petition to be placed in
possession of the property; and
under a writ of possession issued
by the provincial sheriff of the
province,
the
Land
Tenure
Administration took actual physical
possession of the land on 11
October 1958.
Subsequently, the Court of Appeals
found that the issue between the
parties was purely one of law and
thereby elevated the appeal to the
Supreme
Court.
This
Court
rendered judgment thereon on 29
November 1960 in case No. L16028, affirming the appealed
judgment of the Court of First
Instance, without modification.
The Supreme Court had affirmed,
as aforesaid, the decision of the
trial court fixing the amount of just
compensation for P213,094.00;
thus, at the time the decision
became final, the balance still due
was P95,404.00. Of this balance,
the Republic paid Dalmacio Urtula
the sum of P5,404.00 on 17 April
1961; but on the same day, Urtula

deposited same amount with the

Land Tenure Administration in
payment of taxes and penalties for
prior years up to 1958 on the
expropriated land and for the
surveyor's fee for segregating one
hectare donated by condemnee
Urtula for a school site. On
liquidation at a later date, an
excess in the amount of P423.38
was found, and the Republic
refunded this excess to Urtula on
25 September 1961. On 3 May
1961, the Republic paid the
remaining balance of P90,000.00.

Engineering Corp., et al. vs. Ceniza,

etc., et al., L-17834, 29 Sept.
1962). It is settled that a former
judgment constitutes a bar, as
between the parties, not only as to
matters expressly adjudged, but all
matters that could have been
adjudged at the time (Rule 39, sec.
49; Corda vs. Maglinti, L-17476,
Nov. 30, 1961; Rodriguez vs. Tan,
48 Off. Gaz. 3330). It follows that
interest upon the unrecoverable
interest, which plaintiff also seeks,
cannot, likewise, be granted.
It is not amiss to note that Section
3 of Rule 67 of the Revised Rules of
Court (Sec. 4, Rule 69 of the old
Rules),
in
fact,
directs
the
defendant in an expropriation case
to "present in a single motion to
dismiss or for other appropriate
relief, all of his objections and
defenses . . ." and if not so
presented "are waived." (Emphasis
Supplied.) 2 As it is, the judgment
allowing the collection of interest,
now under appeal in effect amends
the
final
judgment
in
the
expropriation case, a procedure
abhorrent
to
orderly
judicial
proceedings.

The taxes due and unpaid,

including penalties, on the land for
the years 1959, 1960 and 70% of
1961 were computed at a total of
P3,534.23 as of 28 February 1962.
The interest of 6% on P95,404.00
from 11 October 1958, the date
when the condemnor Republic took
possession of the land to May
1961, when the final balance was
paid to Urtula was also computed
at a total of P14,633.52.
On 26 January 1961, the plaintiff
demanded payment of said interest
(P14,633.52) but the defendant
Republic refused, on the ground
that no payment of interest had
been ordered in the decision in
Civil
Case
No.
3837,
the
expropriation proceedings, or in the
affirmatory
decision
of
the
Supreme Court in G.R. No. L-16028.

The Republic took possession on 11

October 1958. From this date,
therefore,
the
owner,
while
retaining the naked title, was
deprived of the benefits from the
land and it is just and fair that
realty taxes for the years 1959 and
onward should be borne by the
entity exercising the right of
eminent domain. (City of Manila vs.
Roxas, 60 Phil. 215).

The parties further stipulated as a

fact that the plaintiff had agreed to
pay his counsel 10% of the amount
recoverable from the defendant, as
attorney's fees.

Costs in cases of eminent domain,

except those of rival claimants
litigating their claims, are charged
against the plaintiff. (Sec. 12, Rule
67, Rules of Court; Sec. 13, Rule 67
of the old Rules.) But the present
case is not one of eminent domain
but an ordinary civil action where
the Republic of the Philippines is a
party. Section 1 of Rule 142
provides that no costs shall be
allowed against it, unless otherwise
provided by law. No provision of
law providing the contrary has
been cited; hence, costs should be
charged against Urtula.

Upon the foregoing stipulated

facts, the trial court rendered
judgment for plaintiff Urtula and
ordered the defendant Republic to
pay P14,633.52 as interest on the
balance of P95,404.00 from 11
October 1958 to 3 May 1961 and to
pay the costs, but denied the
plaintiff's claim on the land taxes 1
and attorney's fees.
Both parties were not satisfied with
the decision; hence, both appealed
to this Court.
Issue:
Whether
or
not
the
defendant to pay interest upon a
sum determined by final judgment
as compensation for the property
expropriated in a previous case of
eminent domain between the same
parties.

FOR THE FOREGOING REASONS,

the appealed judgment is reversed
and the case dismissed, with costs
against the plaintiffs Dalmacio
Urtula, et al.

Held: As the issue of interest could

have been raised in the former
case but was not raised, res
judicata blocks the recovery of
interest in the present case.
(Tejedor vs. Palet, 61 Phil. 494; Phil.

Right of landowner in case of

non-payment
of
Just
Compensation
REPUBLIC vs. CA
G.R. No. 146587 July 2, 2002

FACTS:Petitioner (PIA) instituted

expropriation proceedings covering
a total of 544,980 square meters of
contiguous land situated along
MacArthur
Highway,
Malolos,
Bulacan, to be utilized for the
continued broadcast operation and
use of radio transmitter facilities
for the Voice of the Philippines
project.
Petitioner made a deposit of
P517,558.80, the sum provisionally
fixed as being the reasonable value
of the property. On 26 February
1979, or more than 9 years after
the institution of the expropriation
proceedings, the trial court issued
this order condemning the property
and ordering the plaintiff to pay the
defendants the just compensation
for the property.
It would appear that the National
Government failed to pay the
respondents the just compensation
pursuant to the foregoing decision.
The respondents then filed a
manifestation
with
a
motion
seeking
payment
for
the
expropriated property. In response,
the court issued a writ of execution
for the implementation thereof.
Meanwhile, Pres. Estrada issued
Proc. No. 22 transferring 20
hectares of the expropriated land
to the Bulacan State University.
Despite the courts order, the
Santos heirs remained unpaid and
no action was on their case until
petitioner filed its manifestation
and motion to permit the deposit in
court of the amount P4,664,000 by
way of just compensation.
The Santos heirs submitted a
counter-motion
to
adjust
the
compensation from P6/sq.m. as
previously fixed to its current zonal
value of P5,000/sq.m. or to cause
the return of the expropriated
property.
The RTC Bulacan ruled in favor of
the Santos heirs declaring its 26
February 1979 Decision to be
unenforceable on the ground of
prescription in accordance with
Sec. 6, Rule 39 of the 1964/1997
ROC which states that a final and
executory judgment or order may
be executed on motion within 5
years from the date of its entry.
RTC denied petitioners Motion to
Permit Deposit and ordered the
return of the expropriated property
to the heirs of Santos.
ISSUES:
1. WON the petitioner
appropriate the property

may

2. WON the respondents

entitled to the return of
property in question

are
the

HELD:
1. The right of eminent domain is
usually understood to be an
ultimate right of the sovereign
power to appropriate any property
within its territorial sovereignty for
a public purpose. Fundamental to
the independent existence of a
State, it requires no recognition by
the Constitution, whose provisions
are
taken
as
being
merely
confirmatory of its presence and as
being regulatory, at most, in the
due exercise of the power. In the
hands of the legislature, the power
is inherent, its scope matching that
of taxation, even that of police
power itself, in many respects. It
reaches to every form of property
the State needs for public use and,
as an old case so puts it, all
separate interests of individuals in
property are held under a tacit
agreement or implied reservation
vesting upon the sovereign the
right to resume the possession of
the property whenever the public
interest so requires it.
The
ubiquitous
character
of
eminent domain is manifest in the
nature
of
the
expropriation
proceedings.
Expropriation
proceedings are not adversarial in
the conventional sense, for the
condemning
authority
is
not
required to assert any conflicting
interest in the property. Thus, by
filing the action, the condemnor in
effect merely serves notice that it
is taking title and possession of the
property,
and
the
defendant
asserts title or interest in the
property, not to prove a right to
possession, but to prove a right to
compensation for the taking.
Obviously, however, the power is
not without its limits: first, the
taking must be for public use, and
second, that just compensation
must be given to the private owner
of the property. These twin
proscriptions have their origin in
the recognition of the necessity for
achieving balance between the
State interests, on the one hand,
and private rights, upon the other
hand, by effectively restraining the
former and affording protection to
the latter. In determining public
use, two approaches are utilized the first is public employment or
the actual use by the public, and
the second is public advantage or
benefit. It is also useful to view the
matter as being subject to constant
growth, which is to say that as
society advances, its demands
upon the individual so increases,

and each demand is a new use to

which the resources
of the
individual may be devoted.
The expropriated property has
been shown to be for the continued
utilization by the PIA, a significant
portion thereof being ceded for the
expansion of the facilities of the
Bulacan State University and for
the propagation of the Philippine
carabao, themselves in line with
the requirements of public purpose.
Respondents question the public
nature of the utilization by
petitioner
of
the
condemned
property, pointing out that its
present use differs from the
purpose originally contemplated in
the
1969
expropriation
proceedings. The argument is of no
moment.
The property has
assumed a public character upon
its expropriation. Surely, petitioner,
as the condemnor and as the
owner of the property, is well
within its rights to alter and decide
the use of that property, the only
limitation being that it be for public
use, which, decidedly, it is.
2. NO. In insisting on the return of
the
expropriated
property,
respondents would exhort on the
pronouncement
in
Provincial
Government of Sorsogon vs. Vda.
de Villaroya where the unpaid
landowners were allowed the
alternative remedy of recovery of
the property there in question. It
might be borne in mind that the
case
involved
the
municipal
government of Sorsogon, to which
the power of eminent domain is not
inherent, but merely delegated and
of limited application. The grant of
the power of eminent domain to
local governments under Republic
Act No. 7160 cannot be understood
as being the pervasive and allencompassing power vested in the
legislative branch of government.
For local governments to be able to
wield the power, it must, by
enabling law, be delegated to it by
the national legislature, but even
then, this delegated power of
eminent domain is not, strictly
speaking, a power of eminent, but
only of inferior, domain or only as
broad or confined as the real
authority would want it to be.
Thus, in Valdehueza vs. Republic
where the private landowners had
remained unpaid ten years after
the
termination
of
the
expropriation
proceedings,
this
Court ruled The
such
and,
lots

points in dispute are whether

payment can still be made
if so, in what amount. Said
have been the subject of

expropriation proceedings. By final

and executory judgment in said
proceedings, they were condemned
for public use, as part of an airport,
and
ordered
sold
to
the
government. x x x It follows that
both by virtue of the judgment,
long final, in the expropriation suit,
as well as the annotations upon
their title certificates, plaintiffs are
not entitled to recover possession
of their expropriated lots - which
are still devoted to the public use
for which they were expropriated but only to demand the fair market
value of the same.
"Said relief may be granted under
plaintiffs' prayer for: `such other
remedies, which may be deemed
just and equitable under the
premises'."
The Court proceeded to reiterate
its pronouncement in Alfonso vs.
Pasay City where the recovery of
possession of property taken for
public use prayed for by the unpaid
landowner was denied even while
no
requisite
expropriation
proceedings were first instituted.
The landowner was merely given
the
relief
of
recovering
compensation for his property
computed at its market value at
the time it was taken and
appropriated by the State.
The judgment rendered by the
Bulacan RTC in 1979 on the
expropriation proceedings provides
not only for the payment of just
compensation
to
herein
respondents but likewise adjudges
the property condemned in favor of
petitioner over which parties, as
well as their privies, are bound.
Petitioner has occupied, utilized
and, for all intents and purposes,
exercised
dominion
over
the
property pursuant to the judgment.
The exercise of such rights vested
to it as the condemnee indeed has
amounted to at least a partial
compliance or satisfaction of the
1979
judgment,
thereby
preempting any claim of bar by
prescription on grounds of nonexecution. In arguing for the return
of their property on the basis of
non-payment, respondents ignore
the fact that the right of the
expropriatory authority is far from
that of an unpaid seller in ordinary
sales, to which the remedy of
rescission might perhaps apply. An
in rem proceeding, condemnation
acts upon the property. After
condemnation, the paramount title
is in the public under a new and
independent title; thus, by giving
notice to all claimants to a
disputed
title,
condemnation
proceedings provide a judicial
process for securing better title

against all the world than may be

obtained by voluntary conveyance.
Respondents, in arguing laches
against petitioner did not take into
account that the same argument
could likewise apply against them.
Respondents
first
instituted
proceedings for payment against
petitioner on 09 May 1984, or five
years after the 1979 judgment had
become final. The unusually long
delay in bringing the action to
compel payment against herein
petitioner would militate against
them. Consistently with the rule
that one should take good care of
his own concern, respondents
should have commenced the
proper action upon the finality of
the
judgment
which,
indeed,
resulted
in
a
permanent
deprivation of their ownership and
possession of the property.
The constitutional limitation of
just compensation is considered
to be the sum equivalent to the
market value of the property,
broadly described to be the price
fixed by the seller in open market
in the usual and ordinary course of
legal action and competition or the
fair value of the property as
between one who receives, and
one who desires to sell, it fixed at
the time of the actual taking by the
government. Thus, if property is
taken for public use before
compensation is deposited with the
court having jurisdiction over the
case, the final compensation must
include interests on its just value to
be computed from the time the
property is taken to the time when
compensation is actually paid or
deposited with the court. In fine,
between the taking of the property
and the actual payment, legal
interests accrue in order to place
the owner in a position as good as
(but not better than) the position
he was in before the taking
occurred.
The Bulacan trial court, in its 1979
decision, was correct in imposing
interests on the zonal value of the
property to be computed from the
time
petitioner
instituted
condemnation proceedings and
took the property in September
1969. This allowance of interest on
the amount found to be the value
of the property as of the time of
the taking computed, being an
effective forbearance, at 12% per
annum should help eliminate the
issue of the constant fluctuation
and inflation of the value of the
currency over time. Article 1250 of
the Civil Code, providing that, in
case of extraordinary inflation or
deflation, the value of the currency
at the time of the establishment of

the obligation shall be the basis for

the payment when no agreement
to the contrary is stipulated, has
strict
application
only
to
contractual obligations. In other
words, a contractual agreement is
needed
for
the
effects
of
extraordinary inflation to be taken
into account to alter the value of
the currency.
All given, the trial court of Bulacan
in issuing its order, dated 01 March
2000, vacating its decision of 26
February 1979 has acted beyond
its lawful cognizance, the only
authority left to it being to order its
execution.
Verily,
private
respondents, although not entitled
to the return of the expropriated
property, deserve to be paid
promptly on the yet unpaid award
of just compensation already fixed
by final judgment of the Bulacan
RTC on 26 February 1979 at P6.00
per square meter, with legal
interest thereon at 12% per annum
computed from the date of "taking"
of the property, i.e., 19 September
1969, until the due amount shall
have been fully paid.
REPUBLIC vs. LIM
GR no. 161656, June 29, 2005
FACTS:
In 1938, the Republic instituted a
special civil action for expropriation
of a land in Lahug, Cebu City for
the purpose of establishing a
military
reservation
for
the
Philippine Army. The said lots were
registered in the name of Gervasia
and Eulalia Denzon. The Republic
deposited P9,500 in the PNB then
took possession of the lots.
Thereafter, on May 1940, the CFI
rendered its Decision ordering the
Republic to pay the Denzons the
sum
of
P4,062.10
as
just
compensation.
The
Denzons
appealled to the CA but it was
dismissed on March 11, 1948. An
entry of judgment was made on
April 5, 1948.
In 1950, one of the heirs of the
Denzons, filed with the National
Airports Corporation a claim for
rentals for thetwo lots, but it
"denied knowledge of the matter."
On September 6, 1961, Lt. Cabal
rejected the claim but expressed
willingness to pay the appraised
value of the lots within a
reasonable time. For failure of the
Republic to pay for the lots, on
September 20, 1961, the Denzons
successors-in-interest,Valdehueza
and Panerio, filed with the same
CFI an action for recovery of
possession with damages against
the Republicand AFP officers in
possession of the property. On
November 1961, Titles of the said

lots were issued in the names of

Valdehueza and Panerio with the
annotation "subject to the priority
of the National Airports Corporation
to acquire said parcels of land, Lots
932
and939
upon
previous
payment of a reasonable market
value". On July 1962, the CFI
promulgated its Decision in favor of
Valdehueza and Panerio, holding
that they are the owners and have
retained their right as such over
lots because of the Republics
failure to pay the amount of P
4,062.10,adjudged
in
the
expropriation
proceedings.
However, in view of the annotation
on their land titles, they were
ordered to execute a deed of sale
in favor of the Republic. They
appealed the CFIs decision to the
SC. The latter held that Valdehueza
and Panerio are still the registered
owners of Lots 932 and 939, there
having been no payment of just
compensation by the Republic. SC
still ruled that they are not entitled
to recover possession of the lots
but may only demand the payment
of
their
fair
market
value.Meanwhile,
in
1964,
Valdehueza and Panerio mortgaged
Lot 932 to Vicente Lim herein
respondent, as security for their
loans. For their failure to pay Lim
despite demand, he had the
mortgage foreclosed in 1976. The
lot title was issued in his name. On
1992, respondent Lim filed a
complaint for
quieting of title with the RTC
against the petitioners herein. On
2001, the RTC rendered a decision
in favor of Lim, declaring that he is
the absolute and exclusive owner
of the lot with all the rights of an
absolute owner including the right
to possession. Petitioners elevated
the case to the CA. In its Decision
dated September 18, 2003, it
sustained the RTC Decision saying:
... This is contrary to the rules of
fair play because the concept of
just compensation embraces not
only the correct determination of
the amount to be paid to the
owners of the land, but also the
payment for the land within a
reasonable time from its taking.
Without
prompt
payment,
compensation
cannot
be
considered just"...Petitioner,
through the OSG, filed with the SC
a petition for review alleging that
they remain as the owner of Lot
932.
ISSUE: Whether the Republic has
retained ownership of Lot 932
despite
its
failure
to
pay
respondentspredecessors-ininterest the just compensation
therefor pursuant to the judgment

of the CFI rendered as early asMay

14, 1940.
Held: One of the basic principles
enshrined in our Constitution is
that no person shall be deprived of
his private property without due
process of law; and in expropriation
cases, an essential element of due
process is that there must be just
compensation whenever private
property is taken for public use.[7]
Accordingly, Section 9, Article III, of
our Constitution mandates: Private
property shall not be taken for
public
use
without
just
compensation.
The Republic disregarded the
foregoing provision when it failed
and refused to pay respondents
predecessors-in-interest the just
compensation for Lots 932 and
939. The length of time and the
manner with which it evaded
payment demonstrate its arbitrary
high-handedness and confiscatory
attitude. The final judgment in the
expropriation proceedings (Civil
Case No. 781) was entered on April
5, 1948. More than half of a
century has passed, yet, to this
day,
the
landowner,
now
respondent, has remained emptyhanded. Undoubtedly, over 50
years of delayed payment cannot,
in any way, be viewed as fair. This
is more so when such delay is
accompanied
by
bureaucratic
hassles. Apparent from Valdehueza
is the fact that respondents
predecessors-in-interest were given
a run around by the Republics
officials and agents. In 1950,
despite the benefits it derived from
the use of the two lots, the
National
Airports
Corporation
denied knowledge of the claim of
respondents
predecessors-ininterest. Even President Garcia,
who sent a letter to the Civil
Aeronautics Administration and the
Secretary of National Defense to
expedite the payment, failed in
granting relief to them. And, on
September 6, 1961, while the Chief
of Staff of the Armed Forces
expressed willingness to pay the
appraised value of the lots, nothing
happened.
The Court of Appeals is correct in
saying that Republics delay is
contrary to the rules of fair play, as
just compensation embraces not
only the correct determination of
the amount to be paid to the
owners of the land, but also the
payment for the land within a
reasonable time from its taking.
Without
prompt
payment,
compensation
cannot
be
considered just. In jurisdictions
similar to ours, where an entry to
the expropriated property precedes

the payment of compensation, it

has been held that if the
compensation is not paid in a
reasonable time, the party may be
treated as a trespasser ab initio.
As early as May 19, 1966, in
Valdehueza, this Court mandated
the Republic to pay respondents
predecessors-in-interest the sum of
P16,248.40 as reasonable market
value of the two lots in question.
Unfortunately, it did not comply
and allowed several decades to
pass without obeying this Courts
mandate.
Such
prolonged
obstinacy bespeaks of lack of
respect to private rights and to the
rule of law, which we cannot
countenance. It is tantamount to
confiscation of private property.
While it is true that all private
properties are subject to the need
of
government,
and
the
government
may
take
them
whenever the necessity or the
exigency of the occasion demands,
however,
the
Constitution
guarantees
that
when
this
governmental right of expropriation
is exercised, it shall be attended by
compensation.[10] From the taking
of
private
property
by
the
government under the power of
eminent domain, there arises an
implied promise to compensate the
owner for his loss.
Thus, SC ruled that the special
circumstances prevailing in this
case
respondent
to
recover

possession of the expropriated lot

from the Republic.
While the prevailing doctrine is that
the
non-payment
of
just
compensation does not entitle the
private landowner to recover
possession of the expropriated lots,
[26] however, in cases where the
government failed to pay just
compensation within five (5)[27]
years from the finality of the
judgment in the expropriation
proceedings, the owners concerned
shall have the right to recover
possession of their property. This is
in consonance with the principle
that the government cannot keep
the property and dishonor the
judgment.[28] To be sure, the fiveyear
period
limitation
will
encourage the government to pay
just compensation punctually. This
is in keeping with justice and
equity. After all, it is the duty of the
government, whenever it takes
property from private persons
against their will, to facilitate the
payment of just compensation. In
Cosculluela v. Court of Appeals,[29]
we defined just compensation as
not only the correct determination
of the amount to be paid to the
property owner but also the
payment of the property within a
reasonable time. Without prompt
payment, compensation cannot be
considered just.