A simulation tool for studying

the day-ahead energy market: the case of Italy

M. Dicorato, A. Minoia, R. Sbrizzai, M. Trovato
Dipartimento di Elettrotecnica ed Elettronica, Politecnico di Bari, via Orabona 4, 70125 Bari (Italy)
e-mail: trovato@poliba.it

Abstract: Many challenging issues arise in the newly deregulated

competitive electric power markets worldwide. Instead of
centralized decision-making in a monopolistic environment, as in
the past, many parties with different goals are now involved and
competing in the market. Key questions to address include how to
predict load and Market Clearing Price (MCP).
In this paper a simulation tool for investigating the wholesale
energy market in a compulsory power exchange/ISO environment
is proposed. For each generator (customer) a multi-stage non
decreasing (non increasing) bidding curve is considered, based on
an appropriate set of quantity/price pairs. The proposed approach
allows the analysis of several crucial aspects which may
significantly influence MCP, profits and market shares.
Using published and estimated data, the simulation tool is
applied to investigate the main features of the Italian wholesale
energy market that involves five main companies, represented by
a specific set of generation technologies.
Keywords: pool markets, wholesale market, market clearing
price, competition, bidding strategies.

I. INTRODUCTION
In the recent past, many countries have restructured the
electricity industries by opening energy markets,
unbundling the electricity services and opening the access
to electrical networks. It is deemed that more options and
freedom to the market participants may stimulate the
competition in power trading, in order to achieve lower
power prices, the improvement of system efficiency and
incentives to innovation [1-6].
Every country has developed its own deregulated electric
power market model in accordance with its socioeconomic
and political needs. The degree of competition in electricity
industry consequently depends by local political choices
and influences the effective restructuring process.
Many deregulated power markets are based on a pooloperation structure which includes two separate entities: the
Power Exchange (PX) and the Independent System
Operator (ISO) [7]. The PX and the ISO are independent
and no-profit organizations with no commercial interest in
the market.
In general, the PX directly operates wholesale energy
markets, such as day-ahead and hour-ahead markets, while
the real-time market for energy balancing and the market
for the ancillary services may be operated directly by the
ISO or by PX on behalf of ISO and under specific technical
requirements.
The ISO controls and operates the transmission grid and
facilitates transactions and transmission avoiding influence
on the generation schedules created by the PX.
The Power pool has developed as one of the most
acceptable ways to organize power trading in electricity

market. The pools for trading are not identical. They are
either optional (Argentina) or mandatory (UK, Australia,
Italy), either single-side bidding (UK) or double side
bidding (Norway, New Zealand, Italy), etc.
This paper is concerned with a simulation tool able to
analyze, for a compulsory PX/ISO structure, the day-ahead
energy market based on a double-side auction scheme. In
this case, both power suppliers and customers are allowed
to submit energy-price bidding curves. The supply and
demand bid curves are then aggregated by the PX to obtain
the cumulative sales and purchases curves.
The intersection point of these curves determines the
wholesale energy price, i.e. the Market Clearing Price
(MCP), and correspondently the total Cleared Power (CP).
The power to be awarded to each bidder is then determined
and all the power awards will be compensated at the MCP
[8].
The proposed tool allows the simulation of the day-ahead
market in the presence of generating companies (Gencos)
with different types of generating units. For each thermal
unit and in dependence of the considered fuel mix, the
production cost curve is considered and a specific bid curve
can be assumed.
It is supposed that each supply bid is composed by one or
more quantity/price pairs for each hour, to form a non
decreasing multi-stage bid curve. An analogous scheme is
adopted for purchase offers. In this case a non increasing
multi-stage bid curve is considered for each customer.
The simulation tool allows the analysis of several crucial
aspects of the wholesale energy market. In fact, the MCP
can vary in dependence on various factors: actual
generation technologies, fuel costs and fuel mix, repowering policies, etc.. Moreover, although the MCP
concept should guarantee the maximum social welfare, the
participants may put into action market-power strategies
and then influence the correct competition. At the same
time, competition reduces when a small number of firms
access to the market [9-11].
This paper is organized as follows. In the Section II the
Italian electricity market is described according to the EU
Directive 96/92 [12] which has been implemented by the
legislative decree no. 79/99 [13]. In the Section III a
mathematical formulation of the day-ahead market model is
illustrated. In Section IV, using published and estimated
data, the Italian wholesale energy market is investigated.
Results show how MCP, profit and market share may be
significantly influenced by Gencos strategies and technical
and economical inputs.

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II. THE POOL MODEL IN ITALY

According with the EU Directive 96/92 [12], the
electricity industry reform was made in Italy by the 79/99
legislative decree, known as Bersani decree [13], and by
specific electricity market trading rules [14,15]. This
regulation has some special features relevant to the
situation of the Italian electricity sector. Electricity
generation and supply are liberalized activities, while
transmission and distribution activities remain natural
monopolies with the principle of regulated third party
access to the grids.
The 79/99 decree distinguishes between eligible and
franchised customers. According with the wider definition
of eligible customers adopted by the Italian legislator, the
eligible customers can directly enter the electricity
wholesale market. At the moment, customers with an
annual consumption of at least 20 GWh (to be reduced to 9
GWh in 2002) are defined as eligible wholesale customers.
These customers cannot enter into physical bilateral
contracts with generators but only financial bilateral
contracts are possible. In fact, the 79/99 decree allows
physical bilateral contracts as an exception. At the moment,
existing contracts deriving by import/export long-run
agreements with foreign suppliers or by generator/
customer agreements are guaranteed.
The franchised customers are represented in the market
by the single buyer (SB) that is in charge of buying
electricity on behalf of these. The SB executes and manages
supply contracts in order to ensure that electricity supply is
available to franchised customers under conditions of equal
tariff treatment.
The 79/99 decree provides for a compulsory power pool
which includes two autonomous separate entities: the
Independent System Operator (ISO), called Gestore della
Rete di Trasmissione Nazionale (GRTN), and a Power
Exchange (PX), called Gestore del Mercato Elettrico
(GME).
The ISO is responsible for the transmission network
coordination and security. In particular, it controls the
network operation in real time, adjusting for disturbances
and ordering the required ancillary services needed for
network operation.
The PX is directly responsible for two energy markets: the
day-ahead wholesale-energy-market and the adjustment
market.
The day-ahead energy market manages electricity demand
and supply bids for defining power injection (generation)
and withdrawal (load) schedules. The adjustment market
operates in two sessions. The first session takes place after
the day-ahead energy market and allows the adjustment of
schedules for each hour of the following day, while the
second session takes place at the beginning of the day to
which electricity trading refers and allows the adjustment of
schedules for each hour following the closure of the session.
The PX is also in charge, on behalf of the ISO, for the
management of three further services markets: the
congestion management market, the reserve market and the
balancing market. The congestion management market

arranges bids for increase or decrease of injections or

withdrawals to be used by ISO for congestion resolving and
the efficient use of the transmission network. In the reserve
market, the power plants ensuring the availability of reserve
for secondary and tertiary regulation are identified. Finally,
in the balancing market the deviations of actual power
injections and withdrawals from the schedules defined in
the previously mentioned markets are compensated [14].
In Fig. 1 the general structure of the day-ahead energy
market is illustrated. Each Genco submits to the PX a
supply bid curve for each generating unit. Cumulative
supply bid curves are also permitted for a portfolio of: (i)
hydro units, (ii) renewable-energy plants, (iii) thermal units
with installed power less than 50 MVA.
Fig. 1 The day ahead energy market
Single Buyer

Distributors

Franchised
customers

Demand
Bid

Independent
System Operator
(ISO)
Supply
Bid

Day ahead
market
Demand
Bid

Renewable
energy plants

Supply
Bid

Power Exchange (PX)

Bilateral contracts

Eligible
Customers

Power
Companies
(Gencos)

Plants with
bilateral
contracts

Each supply bid is composed by one or more

quantity/price pairs for each hour, to form a non decreasing
bid curve. The PX ranks the supply bid curves in order to
create an aggregated supply curve.
Among supply bid curves with the same selling price, the
following priority has to be guaranteed: (i) bids by plants
judged must-run by ISO, (ii) bids managed by ISO and
related to renewable-energy plants.
At the same time, eligible customers and SB submit
demand bids for each withdrawal point. Demand bids are
organized in terms of a non-increasing multi-stage curve.
The PX ranks the demand bid curves in order to obtain an
aggregated curve. Among the demand curves with the same
purchase price the PX guarantees the priority: (i) bids by
the SB, (ii) bids by pumping plants considered essential for
network security.
III.

THE DAY-AHEAD MARKET SIMULATOR

A day-ahead market model is illustrated to simulate the

wholesale energy market, in a compulsory PX/ISO
structure. Market participant are assumed to be generating
companies which provide a bid curve for each generating
unit, eligible customers and SB, with a set of different
offers.
A. Notations:
ST: number of stages of a bid
G: set of supply bids at each hour
L: set of eligible customer bids at each hour
B: set of demand bids submitted by the SB at each hour
GP(i,j): sale price at the j-th stage of the i-th supply bid

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Must-run plants

BMW(i,j) > 0
(9)
the MCP can be evaluated as the average value between
p s and p c [8]. It should be pointed out that analogous

QG(i,j): width of the j-th stage of the i-th supply bid

GMW(i,j): fraction of QG(i,j)
LP(i,j): purchase price at the j-th stage of the i-th customer
bid
QL(i,j): width of the j-th stage of the i-th customer bid
LMW(i,j): fraction of QL(i,j)
BP(i,j): purchase price at the j-th stage of the i-th SB-bid
QB(i,j): width of the j-th stage of the i-th SB-bid
BMW(i,j): fraction of QB(i,j).
B. Mathematical formulation
Using the previous notations, in a day-ahead energy
market based on double-side-bids the determination of the
appropriate generation/load scheduling formally reduces to
the solution of the following linear program:

max LMW(i, j) LP(i, j )

(1)

L
j

ST

+ BMW(i, j ) BP(i, j) GMW(i, j ) GP(i, j )

iB jST
iG jST

s.t.

GMW(i, j) LMW(i, j) BMW(i, j) =

iG jST

iL jST

iB jST

i G
0 GMW(i, j ) QG(i, j )
j ST
i L
0 LMW(i, j ) QL(i, j)
j ST

0
(2)

results can be obtained using a suitable merit order

procedure based on the construction of the aggregated
supply- and demand- curves [7] and different criterions can
be used for determining the MCP.
To this purpose, the cases shown in Fig. 2 can occur. In
Fig. 2a, the MCP corresponds to the price ps of the last
committed supplier and the cleared power (CP) derives
from the last committed customer. In Fig. 2b the MCP is
the price pc of the last committed customer and the CP
derives from the last committed supplier. Fig. 2c shows the
case where p s and p c are identical and the CP
corresponds to the highest permitted power demand or
generation supply. Finally, in Fig. 2d the criterion
explained by the eqns. (5)-(9) can be adopted to determine
the MCP.

price

(a)
MCP

demand bid
CP
price

(3)

MCP
demand bid

Power

CP

price

(c)

jST

PBi =

LMW (i, j)

iL

BMW (i, j)

i B

Power

(b)

supply bid

i B
0 BMW(i, j ) QB(i, j )
j ST
where GMW(i,j), LMW(i,j) and BMW(i,j) are the unknown
variables. Solving the problem (1) with the constraints (2)
and (3) the following generation/load scheduling is
obtained:
PGi = GMW (i, j )
i G
PLi =

supply bid

(4)

jST

supply bid

MCP

demand bid

jST

CP

price

where PGi , PLi and PBi are the actual powers assigned to
the each market participant.
By considering the following two energy prices:
p s = max[GP(i, j )]

Power

(d)
supply bid
MCP

(5)
s.t.

demand bid

GMW(i,j) > 0
(6)
and

CP

Power

Fig. 2 The market clearing process

p c = min[LP (i, j ) , BP(i, j )]

IV. TEST RESULTS

(7)
s.t.

The proposed power pool simulator has been applied to

the energy market structure that should be implemented in
Italy according with the pool model described in Section II.
The Italian power system has been represented at 380-220

LMW(i,j) > 0
(8)

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91

ahead energy market and the renewable energy plants.

A power demand of 44015 MW has been assumed, with
all generating groups supposed in service. The total
demand of franchised customers, managed by the SB, has
been assumed equal to 22270 MW. A ten stages bidding
curve has been assumed for each supply- and demandoffer. Each generating group has been supposed to offer at
its marginal cost.
The Fig. 3 shows the aggregated supply- and demandcurve for the base case. The MCP is equal to 34.76 /MWh
and the CP is equal to 43735 MW which corresponds to the
dispatched demand. The MCP has been evaluated
according to the market clearing process illustrated in Fig.
2 of Section III.
TABLE I
GENCOS IN THE ITALIAN COMPETITIVE ENERGY MARKET

Genco

Generating units
type
MW
H
8139
T
20289
GT
698
CC
326
H
394
T
5739
H
1012
T
4350
H
1333
T
2229
CC
906
H
63
T
2562
H
120
T
321

n.
92
53
8
4
3
22
3
17
35
14
18
1
10
---

EPR

EUR
ELE
ITA
INT
OTH

29452

6133
5362
4468
2625
441

100

80
demand-curve
60

40
supply-curve

20

0
0

10000

20000

30000
MW

40000

50000

60000

Fig. 3. The aggregated supply- and demand-curve for the base case

In Table II, the profit per unit of commissioned power

(/MW), the market share and the total scheduled
generation are shown for each Genco. It can be observed
that EPR has the highest market share (56.6%) and
commissioned power (24792 MW). The scheduled power is
the 84.4% of the offered capacity. ITA realizes the
maximum unitary profit (26.6 /MW) with a market share
equal to 7.9%.
The total power supplied through the interconnections is
ascribed to a fictitious Genco called Interconnections (ITC).
ITC is completely dispatched since maximum bids of 12.91
/MW and of 20.66 /MW have been assumed for France
and for the remaining interconnections, respectively.

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92

MW

120

/MWh

kV voltage levels, with a total number of buses equal to

465. At each bus, the energy-price bidding curves of
different power suppliers and customers have been
considered.
The supposed market scenario includes five generation
companies: ENEL Produzione (EPR), Elettrogen (ELE),
Eurogen (EUR), Interpower (INT) and Italenergia (ITA).
ENEL Produzione, Eurogen, Elettrogen and Interpower
arise by the subdivision of the original generation park
belonging to the ENEL S.p.A. (the old vertically integrated
national utility). These companies have been created in
order to support the privatization process and improve the
competition in the new energy market.
Italenergia was recently born and essentially includes the
generating units of Edison and Sondel. These two Gencos
were already present before the electricity industry
deregulation as independent power producers.
Each Genco is eligible to participate to the day ahead
market and has a portfolio of generating units which, in
general, includes hydro (H), thermal (T), gas turbine (GT)
and combined cycle (CC) units. It has been considered that
thermoelectric plants can burn different types of fuel (oil,
orimulsion, coke, natural gas, etc.) with various fuel mix.
This allows the implementation of several bidding
strategies.
A base case has been carried out to verify the
effectiveness of the proposed market simulator. For each
company, an appropriate subset of the total available
generation capacity has been selected. In Table I, the
principal technical data of the generation scenario are
summarized [16-22]. In this Table the term Other (OTH)
refers to minor suppliers. For each generation technology,
the number of units and the correspondent net efficient
power are reported. The Gencos are listed accordingly with
their total net efficient power. The entire net efficient power
is equal to 48481 MW.
Together with the previous Gencos, foreign suppliers will
compete in the new market by submitting bidding curves
through the interconnections of the Italian transmission
network with the remaining European power system. In
particular, 15 links have been considered with the following
countries [22]: France (#4, 2000MW), Switzerland (#8,
2900MW), Slovene (#2, 300MW) and Austria (#1,
200MW). For each link, a cumulative bidding curve has
been considered in the proposed market simulator. The
maximum net transfer capacity through the interconnection
is equal to 5900MW.
Although, in the starting phase of the market, the ISO
should guarantee the old long-run agreements with foreign
suppliers and independent power producers, the absence of
any form of bilateral contracts has been assumed in the
simulation studies. Therefore, all net transfer capacity
through the interconnections has been considered available
for trading in the market.
The role of an atypical power supplier has been assigned,
in the market simulator, to the ISO. In fact, the ISO has
been considered responsible for dispatching the must-run
plants, for which a certain priority is defined in the day

TABLE II
BASE CASE: PROFIT, MARKET SHARE AND SCHEDULED POWER
Dispatched Power
Market
Profit
Share
Genco
H
T
GT
CC
Total

[/MW]

[%]

EPR

12,5

56.6

EUR

3,5

9.8

[MW] [MW] [MW] [MW] [MW]

2479
1632
0
326
8139
2
7
394 3883
--4277

69.4

10,5

8.7

1012

2790

--

--

3802

70.9

26,6

7.9

1333

1221

--

906

3460

77.4

INT

1,7

4.1

63

1732

--

--

1795

68.4

OTH

11.6

0.8

119

225

--

--

344

78.1
100.
0

12.0

--

5265

In order to evaluate the influence on the market of

bidding strategies which may not correspond to offers at the
marginal cost, three different supply curves have been
considered for each Genco. In Fig. 4, the bidding curves
assumed for EPR are illustrated and compared with the
base-case curve. For each Genco, analogous bidding curves
have been adopted.
In Table III, the MCP and its percent variation respect to
the base case are reported. It can be noted that major
increments of MCP may be caused by the behavior of EPR.
Decrements of MCP are due to a reduced commissioned
power. Correspondently, the percent variation of total profit
65

(c)
60
(b)
55
(a)

/MWh

50
base case
45
40
35
30
25
5000

10000

15000

20000

25000

30000

35000

MW

Fig. 4 Alternative cumulative bidding curves for EPR Genco.

Genco

[]

[]

EPR

36.07

3.77

37.16

6.90

38.22

9.95

35.29

1.52

35.45

1.99

35.76

2.88

ELE

35.05

0.83

35.31

1.58

35.40

1.84

ITA

34.60

-0.46

34.60

-0.46

34.76

0.00

INT

34.60

-0.46

35.19

1.24

35.23

1.35

OTH

34.76

0.00

34.76

0.00

34.76

0.00

All Gencos

37.18

6.96

39.25

12.92

42.06

21.00

ITA

INT

OTH

All

EPR

19.1

4.5

4.2

-1.0

3.6

0.0

35.6

26.7

40.0

0.0

0.0

6.7

0.0

133.3

ELE

15.0

5.0

10.0

-2.5

5.0

0.0

42.5

ITA

8.7

2.2

2.2

-1.1

1.1

0.0

17.4

INT

66.7

0.0

0.0

0.0

66.7

66.7

300.0

OTH

25.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

0.0

-25.0

50.0

Supply curve
EPR

EUR

ELE

ITA

INT

OTH

All

EPR

-17.5

4.2

1.9

0.0

1.8

0.0

-2.7

EUR

41.8

-39.8

8.2

1.0

5.1

1.0

1.0

ELE

31.0

6.9

-32.2

0.0

1.1

0.0

3.4

ITA

12.7

2.5

2.5

-2.5

2.5

0.0

8.9

INT

46.3

14.6

14.6

2.4

-46.3

0.0

4.9

OTH

25.0

12.5

12.5

0.0

12.5

-25.0

25.0

The case of a 30% conversion of oil-fired thermal

generation of each Genco into combined cycle has been
investigated.
In Table VI the percent variation of profit with respect to
the base case is reported. It can be noted that this strategy
reveals, in general, fruitful for the Genco that implements
the policy but with different increments of the profit. At the
same time, this strategy may influence in a different
manner the profit of the other Gencos. A 30% combinedcycle conversion adopted by EPR provides a 1% increase of
its own profit and significantly reduces the profit of other
Gencos. On the contrary, EUR and INT receive greater
benefits with a general positive incidence on the profits of
other Gencos.
TABLE VI
COMBINED-CYCLE CONVERSION: PERCENT VARIATION OF PROFIT
Genco

30% Combined-cycle conversion

EPR

EUR

ELE

ITA

INT

All

EPR

1.06

0.48

0.08

0.44

0.00

-1.00

EUR

-13.84

91.71

5.56

5.56

5.56

66.96

ELE

-4.39

1.22

24.12

1.22

0.32

14.34

ITA

-4.45

0.00

0.00

5.09

0.00

-1.66

-0.05

180.8
4

141.25

INT

EUR

ELE

EUR

Genco

(c)

[]

EUR

TABLE V
STRATEGIC BIDS: PERCENT VARIATION OF MARKET SHARE

and of the market share have been evaluated for each

Genco.
The results are illustrated in Tables IV and V for the case
where each Genco adopts, in turn, the (b)-like bidding
curve. It can be observed that, in general, a strategic
bidding may involve an increment of the profit with a
reduction of market share.
TABLE III
STRATEGIC BIDS: VARIATION OF MCP
Supply curve
(a)
(b)

Supply curve
EPR

84.4

ELE

17.3

Genco

[%]

ITA

ITC

TABLE IV
STRATEGIC BIDS: PERCENT VARIATION OF PROFIT

-42.93

-0.05

-0.05

The impact on the market of an increasing amount of

power generated by renewable sources has been analyzed.
In Table VII the percent variations of the profit and of
the market share are respectively reported for each Genco
when the contribution from renewables is equal to 2000
MW, 4000 MW and 6000 MW. In correspondence, the
MCP reduces to 34.19, 33.57 and 33.28 /MW,
respectively.

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93

[4] B. Murray, Electricity markets: Investment, Performance and

Analysis, Wiley, 1998.
[5] I.J. Perez-Arriaga, H. Rudnick and W.O. Stadlin,
"International Power System Transaction Open Access
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[6] D. Porrini, Economics of the 96/92 Directive with reference
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Restructuring in the Electricity Business, 13th PSCC,
Trondheim, June 28- July 2nd, 1999.
[8] G.B. Shrestha, S. Kai and L.K. Goel, An efficient Power
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[10] X. Guan and P.B. Luh, Integrated Resource Scheduling and
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[12] 96/92/EC European Directive concerning with Electricity
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[16] http://www.enel.it/produzione
[17] http://www.enel.it/elettrogen
[18] http://www.enel.it/eurogen
[19] http://www.enel.it/interpower
[20] http://www.sondel.it
[21] http://www.edison.it
[22] http://www.grtn.it

TABLE VII
RENEWABLE S IMPACT: PERCENT VARIATION OF PROFIT AND MARKET
SHARE

Genco

Power from renewable resources

2000 MW
4000 MW
6000 MW

EPR

-3.8

-3.2

-7.7

-6.2

-9.0

-11.3

EUR

-5.5

-12.2

-8.0

-24.2

-7.9

-32.0

ELE

-2.5

-10.4

-3.7

-21.0

-4.3

-27.4

ITA

-2.2

-2.4

-4.4

-4.1

-5.5

-4.6

INT

-23.5

-9.2

-29.4

-22.8

-27.0

-30.2

OTH

-4.8

-9.4

-4.1

-18.7

-5.9

-18.8

ITC

-3.3

0.0

-6.9

0.0

-8.6

-0.1

Moreover, the influence of a 10% increment of the fuel

price for thermal oil-fired units of each Genco has been
analyzed. The results reported in Table VIII show that
profit and market share variations can have different sign
when a single Genco experiments the increment of oil
price. An analogous increment of oil price has been also
considered for all Gencos. In this case, a significantly
increase of the MCP is obtained with an increment of 6.6%
of the global profit respect to the base case.
TABLE VIII
INFLUENCE ON THE MARKET OF A 10% INCREMENT OF OIL PRICE
MCP
Profit
Market share

EPR

/MW

36.55

5.16

310564

0.21

49.86

-12.0

EUR

35.60

2.41

14920

-0.33

5.02

-48.6

ELE

35.28

1.49

40401

1.20

6.13

-29.5

ITA

34.76

0.00

89820

-2.41

7.90

0.0

INT

35.23

1.35

2427

-20.47

1.90

-53.7

All Gencos

37.70

8.46

490402

6.63

--

V. CONCLUSIONS
A simulation tool for investigating the day-ahead energy
market in a compulsory PX/ISO structure has been
developed. Sale- and purchases offers have been
represented by price-quantity multi-stage curves. In
addition, the presence of a Single-Buyer entity has been
considered to represent franchised customers.
The tool allows the analysis of the volatility of the MCP
as a consequence of different factors: actual generation
technologies, fuel costs and fuel mix, re-powering policies,
etc.. The effects of strategies that participants may put into
action to influence the correct competition can be also
investigated.
The procedure has been applied to the Italian wholesale
market which has been represented in detail with the
generation set the present Gencos. The results have
revealed how MCP, profit and market share can vary
significantly according with Gencos strategies and
technical and economical inputs.

VII. BIOGRAPHIES
Maria Dicorato was born in Cerignola, Italy, in 1969. She received the
degree in Electrical Engineering from the Politecnico di Bari (Italy) in 1997.
She received her Ph.D. in Electrical Engineering from the Politecnico of Bari
in 2001. She is Member of the IEEE PES and A.E.I.
Anna Minoia was born in Conversano, Italy, in 1977. She received the
degree in Electrical Engineering from the Politecnico di Bari (Italy) in 2001.
She is currently working at Politecnico di Bari. She is Student Member of the
IEEE PES and AEI.
Roberto Sbrizzai was born in Bari, Italy, in 1962. he received the degree in
Electrical Engineering from University of Bari (Italy) in 1986. in 1992 he
received his Ph.D. in Electrical Engineering from the Politecnico di Bari. He
is currently Associate Professor at the Electrical and Electronic Engineering
Department of the Politecnico di Bari.
Michele Trovato was born in Bitonto, Italy, in 1953. He received the degree
in Electrical Engineering in 1979 from University of Bari. In 1980, he joined
the Electrical Engineering Institute of the University of Bari, where he became
Associate Professor of Transmission and Distribution Systems. He is currently
full professor of Electrical Energy Systems at the Electrical and Electronic
Engineering Department of the Politecnico di Bari. His areas of interest are
power system analysis and control. He is member of the IEEE PES and A.E.I.

VI. REFERENCES
[1] L. Philipson and H. Lee Willis, Understanding Electric
Utilities and Deregulation, Marcel Dekker Inc., 1999.
[2] H. Chao and H.G. Huntington, Designing competitive
electricity market, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1998.
[3] S. Hunt and G. Shuttleworth, Competition and choice in
Electricity, Wiley, 1996.

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