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Libona vs Mangelin

.R. No. 80391, 28 February 1989

words, what is the extent of self-government given to the two


autonomous governments of Region IX and XII?

Facts:

Held:

Petitioner was appointed member of the Sanguniang


Pampook, Regional Autonomous Government and was later
elected Speaker of the Regional Legislative Assembly.
Congressman Datu invited petitioner in his capacity as
Speaker of the Assembly for consulations and dialogues on
the recent and present political developments and other issues
affecting Regions IX and XII hopefully resulting to chart the
autonomous governments of the two regions as envisioned
and may prod the President to constitute immediately the
Regional Consultative Commission as mandated by the
Commission.
Consistent with the said invitation, Petitioner addressed all
Assemblymen that there shall be no session in November as
our presence in the house committee hearing of Congress
take (sic) precedence over any pending business in batasang
pampook .
In defiance of Petitioners advice, After declaring the presence
of a quorum, the Speaker Pro-Tempore was authorized to
preside in the session. On Motion to declare the seat of the
Speaker vacant, all Assemblymen in attendance voted in the
affirmative.

Firstly, We therefore order reinstatement, with the caution that


should the past acts of the petitioner indeed warrant his
removal, the Assembly is enjoined, should it still be so minded,
to commence proper proceedings therefor in line with the most
elementary requirements of due process. And while it is within
the discretion of the members of the Sanggunian to punish
their erring colleagues, their acts are nonetheless subject to
the moderating band of this Court in the event that such
discretion is exercised with grave abuse.
the Decree PD 168 established internal autonomy in the two
regions [w]ithin the framework of the national sovereignty and
territorial integrity of the Republic of the Philippines and its
Constitution, with legislative and executive machinery to
exercise the powers and responsibilities specified therein

Issue:
Is the expulsion valid? Are the so-called autonomous
governments of Mindanao, as they are now constituted,
subject to the jurisdiction of the national courts? In other

Now, autonomy is either decentralization of


administration or decentralization of power. There is
decentralization of administration when the central
government delegates administrative powers to political
subdivisions in order to broaden the base of government
power and in the process to make local governments
more responsive and accountable, and ensure their
fullest development as self-reliant communities and make
them more effective partners in the pursuit of national
development and social progress. At the same time, it
relieves the central government of the burden of managing
local affairs and enables it to concentrate on national

concerns. The President exercises general supervision over


them, but only to ensure that local affairs are administered
according to law. He has no control over their acts in the
sense that he can substitute their judgments with his own.
Decentralization of power, on the other hand, involves an
abdication of political power in the favor of local
governments units declare to be autonomous . In that
case, the autonomous government is free to chart its own
destiny and shape its future with minimum intervention
from central authorities. According to a constitutional
author, decentralization of power amounts to selfimmolation, since in that event, the autonomous
government becomes accountable not to the central
authorities but to its constituency.
An autonomous government that enjoys autonomy of the latter
category [CONST. (1987), art. X, sec. 15.] is subject alone to
the decree of the organic act creating it and accepted
principles on the effects and limits of autonomy. On the other
hand, an autonomous government of the former class is, as
we noted, under the supervision of the national government
acting through the President (and the Department of Local
Government). If the Sangguniang Pampook (of Region XII),
then, is autonomous in the latter sense, its acts are, debatably
beyond the domain of this Court in perhaps the same way that
the internal acts, say, of the Congress of the Philippines are
beyond our jurisdiction. But if it is autonomous in the former
category only, it comes unarguably under our jurisdiction. An
examination of the very Presidential Decree creating the
autonomous governments of Mindanao persuades us that they
were never meant to exercise autonomy in the second sense,
that is, in which the central government commits an act of self-

immolation. Presidential Decree No. 1618, in the first place,


mandates that [t]he President shall have the power of general
supervision and control over Autonomous Regions. In the
second place, the Sangguniang Pampook, their legislative
arm, is made to discharge chiefly administrative services
Hence, we assume jurisdiction.

Sultan Maminta M. Radia vs Review Committee under E.O.


No. 17
G.R. No. 78973
January 29, 1988
Facts:
Petitioner was appointed as City Engineer of Marawi City on 1
May 1985.
On 1 April 1986, respondent Basman, OIC of the City Mayors
Office of Marawi City, issued a Memorandum addressed to all
Heads of Offices and Personnel directing the immediate
transfer & delivery of all office equipment to, and directing all
personnel, to hold office at the New City Hall, Bangon, Marawi
City effective April 2, 1986.
On 4 April 1986, Basman issued a Memorandum directly
addressed to petitioner stating that he had been reliably
informed that most of the City Engineering Equipment had
been intentionally destroyed by some bad elements. He
directed petitioner to transfer immediately all equipment to the
present City Public Works and Highway Engineers Office with
the warning that failure to comply would constitute
malfeasance and serious insubordination and that petitioner
would be held responsible for any further loss of or damage to
the said City Equipment.
On 30 April 1986, respondent Basman terminated petitioner
from his position and designated Pangadapun as OIC of the
Office of the City Engineer of Marawi City.
On 28 May 1986, petitioner wrote to the Regional Director,
Regional Office No. 12, Civil Service Commission (CSC),
Cotabato City protesting his termination from the service and
asking that the Pangadapuns designation be withdrawn. The
CSC Regional Director then withdrew his approval of

Pangadapuns appointment/designation, but eventually


reversed his initial ruling & re-approved Pangadapuns
appointment upon Basmans Motion for Reconsideration,
subject to final resolution of petitioners protest by the Review
Committee under Executive Order No. 17.
Petitioner sought reconsideration of the CSC Regional
Directors last ruling. This request was forwarded to the
Minister of Justice for appropriate action under the provisions
of EO No. 17.
On 10 October 1986, the Review Committee under EO No. 17
dismissed petitioners appeal for lack of merit. Petitioner then
appealed to the Office of the President, but was dismissed by
the latter stating that decisions of the Review Committee are
final and unappealable under Section 8 of Executive Order No.
17.
Issues:
WON the following are null and void:
(1) The termination of petitioner as City Engineer of by
Basman and the designation of Pangadapun as OIC City
Engineer
(2) The Review Committees Resolution affirming the
termination of petitioners appointment.
Held:
Article III (2) of of the Provisional Constitution provided as
follows:
All elective and appointive officials under the 1973 Constitution
shall continue in office until otherwise provided by
proclamation or executive order or upon the designation or
appointment and qualification of their successors, if such is
made within a period of one year from February 25, 1986.

(Emphasis supplied)
The above organic provision did not require the existence of
any cause for removal/termination of any of the elective and
appointive officials under the 1973 Constitution. This being so,
petitioner was lawfully terminated from his position as City
Engineer upon the designation/appointment and qualification
of respondent Pangadapun as his successor. Respondent
Basmans authority, as OIC of the Office of the City Mayor of
Marawi City, to appoint/designate the City Engineer cannot be
seriously questioned in review of the provisions of Section 185
(1) of B.P. Blg. 337 (LGC) which amended the provisions of
the City Charter of Marawi City, originally lodging that authority
in the President of the Philippines.
Although the Provisional Constitution did not require any
ground/cause for removal, the Government, in an act of autolimitation and to prevent indiscriminate dismissals of
personnel in the Career Civil Service whose qualifications and
performance meet the standards of public service of the New
Government, issued EO No. 17 which enumerated certain
grounds for the separation or replacement of elective and
appointive officials authorized under Article III (2) of the
Provisional Constitution.
These grounds were:
1) Existence of a case for summary dismissal pursuant to
Section 40 of the Civil Service Law;
2) Existence of a probable cause for violation of the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act as determined by the Ministry Head
concerned;
3) Gross incompetence or inefficiency in the discharge of
functions;
4) Misuse of public office for partisan political purposes; [and]
5) Any other analogous ground showing that the incumbent is

unfit to remain in the service or his separation/replacement is


in the interest of the service.
In the instant case, petitioner appealed to the respondent
Review Committee established under Section 5 of Executive
Order No. 17 precisely to pass upon all petitions for
reconsideration filed by any official or employee separated
from the service in the course of implementing Article III (2) of
the Provisional Constitution. The Review Committee held that
petitioners persistent failure to comply with lawful orders of
respondent Basman fell within Ground No. 5 of Executive
Order No. 17.
The Solicitor General has pointed out that, although heads of
local governments, provincial governors and municipal mayors
may be under the supervision of the Secretary of Local
Government.
Local Governments are not attached to the Department of
Local Governments in the same sense that bureaus and
offices under, for instance, the Department of Justice are
attached to that department. Provinces and municipalities are
instrumentalities or units of local government vested with their
own legislative and executive powers under the Local
Government Code.
Accordingly, for the limited purposes of Executive Order No.
17, heads of local governments may well be considered as
Ministry (department) Heads. Petitioners removal was
reviewed and confirmed by the Review Committee, a body
which is certainly of ministerial rank. Thus, the assumed
requirement of EO No. 17 that the removal of petitioner be
effected by a Ministry Head may be regarded as substantially
complied with.
EO 17 is a self-limiting act & its provisions are not only nonpenal in nature, but also clearly more favorable to petitioner

than those of Article III (2) of the Provisional Constitution. As


such, there is no legal nor moral obstacle to the retrospective
application of EO No. 17 which expressly envisaged its
application to those already separated from the service on the
issuance of this Order, including those whose resignations
were accepted or whose
Basco vs PAGCOR GR 91649 (May 14, 1991)
GR 91649197 SCRA 52, 65May 14, 1991
FACTS:
Petitioners seek to annul the PAGCOR charter PD 1869 for
being allegedly contrary to morals, public policy and order,
monopolistic & tends toward crony economy, waiving the
Manila City governments right to impose taxes & license fees,
and violating the equal protection clause, local autonomy and
other state policies in the Constitution.
ISSUES:
Whether PD 1869 is valid.
HELD:
Every law has in its favor the presumption of
constitutionality. For a law to be nullified, it must be shown
that there is a clear & unequivocal breach of the Constitution.
The grounds for nullity must be clear and beyond reasonable
doubt. The question of wether PD 1869 is a wise legislation is
up for Congress to determine.
The power of LGUs to regulate gambling through the grant
of franchises, licenses or permits was withdrawn by PD 771,
and is now vested exclusively on the National
Government. Necessarily, the power to demand/collect
license fees is no longer vested in the City of Manila.
LGUs have no power to tax Government instrumentalities.
PAGCOR, being a GOCC, is therefore exempt from local
taxes. The National Government is supreme over local

governments. As such, mere creatures of the State cannot


defeat national policies using the power to tax as a tool for
regulation. The power to tax cannot be allowed to defeat
an instrumentality of the very entity which has the
inherent power to wield it. The power of LGUs to impose
taxes & fees is always subject to limitation provided by
Congress.
The principle of local autonomy does not make LGUs
sovereign within a state, it simply means decentralization.
A law doesnt have to operate in equal force on all
persons/things. The equal protection clause doesnt preclude
classification of individuals who may be accorded different
treatment under the law as long as the classification is not
unreasonable/arbitrary. The mere fact that some gambling
activities are legalized under certain conditions, while others
are prohibited, does not render the applicable laws
unconstitutional.

THE PROVINCE OF ZAMBOANGA DEL NORTE, plaintiffappellee,


vs.
CITY OF ZAMBOANGA, SECRETARY OF FINANCE and
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE,defendantsappellants.
Facts:
Prior to its incorporation as a chartered city, the Municipality of
Zamboanga used to be the provincial capital of the then
Zamboanga Province. On October 12, 1936, Commonwealth
Act 39 was approved converting the Municipality of
Zamboanga into Zamboanga City. Sec. 50 of the Act also
provided that Buildings and properties which the province
shall abandon upon the transfer of the capital to another place
will be acquired and paid for by the City of Zamboanga at a
price to be fixed by the Auditor General.

and Zamboanga del Sur. As to how the assets and obligations


of the old province were to be divided between the two new
ones, Sec. 6 of that law provided Upon the approval of this
Act, the funds, assets and other properties and the obligations
of the province of Zamboanga shall be divided equitably
between the Province of Zamboanga del Norte and the
Province of Zamboanga del Sur by the President of the
Philippines, upon the recommendation of the Auditor General.
However, on June 17, 1961, Republic Act 3039 was approved
amending Sec. 50 of Commonwealth Act 39 by providing that,
All buildings, properties and assets belonging to the former
province of Zamboanga and located within the City of
Zamboanga are hereby transferred, free of charge, in favor of
the said City of Zamboanga.
This constrained Zamboanga del Norte to file on March 5,
1962, a complaint against defendants-appellants Zamboanga
City; that, among others, Republic Act 3039 be declared
unconstitutional for depriving Zamboanga del Norte of property
without due process and just compensation.
Lower court declared RA 3039 unconstitutional as it deprives
Zamboanga del Norte of its private properties.
Hence the appeal.

Such properties include lots of capitol site, schools, hospitals,


leprosarium, high school playgrounds, burleighs, and hydroelectric sites.
On June 6, 1952, Republic Act 711 was approved dividing the
province of Zamboanga into two (2): Zamboanga del Norte

Issue:
Whether RA 3039 is unconstitutional on the grounds that it
deprives Zamboanga del Norte of its private properties.

Held:
No. RA 3039 is valid. The properties petitioned by Zamboanga
del Norte is a public property.

paid for by said provinces, cities, or municipalities. All other


property possessed by any of them is patrimonial and shall be
governed by this Code, without prejudice to the provisions of
special laws.

The validity of the law ultimately depends on the nature of the


50 lots and buildings thereon in question. For, the matter
involved here is the extent of legislative control over the
properties of a municipal corporation, of which a province is
one. The principle itself is simple: If the property is owned by
the municipality (meaning municipal corporation) in its public
and governmental capacity, the property is public and
Congress has absolute control over it. But if the property is
owned in its private or proprietary capacity, then it is
patrimonial and Congress has no absolute control. The
municipality cannot be deprived of it without due process and
payment of just compensation.

Applying the above cited norm, all the properties in question,


except the two (2) lots used as High School playgrounds,
could be considered as patrimonial properties of the former
Zamboanga province. Even the capital site, the hospital and
leprosarium sites, and the school sites will be considered
patrimonial for they are not for public use. They would fall
under the phrase public works for public service for it has
been held that under the ejusdem generis rule, such public
works must be for free and indiscriminate use by anyone, just
like the preceding enumerated properties in the first paragraph
of Art 424. The playgrounds, however, would fit into this
category.

The capacity in which the property is held is, however,


dependent on the use to which it is intended and devoted.
Now, which of two norms, i.e., that of the Civil Code or that
obtaining under the law of Municipal Corporations, must be
used in classifying the properties in question?

Law of Municipal Corporations

Civil Code
The Civil provide: ART. 423. The property of provinces, cities,
and municipalities is divided into property for public use and
patrimonial property; ART. 424. Property for public use, in the
provinces, cities, and municipalities, consists of the provincial
roads, city streets, municipal streets, the squares, fountains,
public waters, promenades, and public works for public service

On the other hand, applying the norm obtaining under the


principles constituting the law of Municipal Corporations, all
those of the 50 properties in question which are devoted to
public service are deemed public; the rest remain patrimonial.
Under this norm, to be considered public, it is enough that the
property be held and, devoted for governmental purposes like
local administration, public education, public health, etc.
Final Ruling
The controversy here is more along the domains of the Law of
Municipal Corporations State vs. Province than along

that of Civil Law. If municipal property held and devoted to


public service is in the same category as ordinary private
property, then that would mean they can be levied upon and
attached; they can even be acquired thru adverse possession
all these to the detriment of the local community. It is wrong
to consider those properties as ordinary private property.
Lastly, the classification of properties other than those for
public use in the municipalities as patrimonial under Art. 424 of
the Civil Code is without prejudice to the provisions of
special laws. For purpose of this article, the principles,
obtaining under the Law of Municipal Corporations can be
considered as special laws. Hence, the classification of
municipal property devoted for distinctly governmental
purposes as public should prevail over the Civil Code
classification in this particular case.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby set aside
and another judgment is hereby entered as follows:.
(1) Defendant Zamboanga City is hereby ordered to return to
plaintiff Zamboanga del Norte in lump sum the amount of
P43,030.11 which the former took back from the latter out of
the sum of P57,373.46 previously paid to the latter; and
(2) Defendants are hereby ordered to effect payments in favor
of plaintiff of whatever balance remains of plaintiffs 54.39%
share in the 26 patrimonial properties, after deducting
therefrom the sum of P57,373.46, on the basis of Resolution
No. 7 dated March 26, 1949 of the Appraisal Committee
formed by the Auditor General, by way of quarterly payments
from the allotments of defendant City, in the manner originally

adopted by the Secretary of Finance and the Commissioner of


Internal Revenue. No costs. So ordered.

Surigao Electric Co., and Arturo Lumanlan filed a petition for


review challenging the validity of the order of respondent
Public Service Commission, dated July 11, 1963, wherein it
held that it had no alternative but to approve the tentative
schedule of rates submitted by the applicant, the Municipality
of Surigao.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a municipal government can directly maintain
& operate an electric plant without obtaining a specific
franchise for the purpose and without a certificate of public
convenience and necessity duly issued by the PSC.

urigao Electric Co., Inc.vs. Municipality of Surigao


Posted on October 23, 2012
No. L-22766 August 30, 1968
FACTS:
On June 18,1960, Congress amended the Public Service Act
and introduced doing away with the requirement of a certificate
of public convenience and necessity from the Public Service
Commission for public services owned or operated by
government entities or government-owned and controlled
corporations (GOCC), but at the same time affecting its power
of regulation which while exempting public services owned or
operated by any instrumentality of the government or any
GOCC from its supervision, jurisdiction and control stops short
of including the fixing of rates.

HELD:
Yes.
The Municipality of Surigao is not a GOCC. However, it cannot
be said that it is not a government entity.
As early as 1916, in Mendoza v. de Leon (33 Phil. 508), the
dual character of a municipal corporation has long been
recognized: (1) as Governmental, being a branch of the
general administration of the State, and (2) as Quasi-Private
and Corporate.
It is an undeniable fact that legislative and government
powers are conferred upon a municipalityto enable it to aid
a state in properly governing that portion of the people residing
within its municipality, such powers (being) in their nature
public, xxx (1 Dilon, Commentaries on the Law of Municipal
Corporations, 5th ed., p.68 [1911]).
Governmental affairs do not lose their governmental character
by being delegated to the municipal governmentsto preserve

the peace, protect the morals and health of the community and
so on is to administer government, whether it be done by the
central government itself or is shifted to a local organization.
(Mendoza v. de Leon).
A municipal corporation is a government entity and
functions as an extension of the national government,
and, therefore, it is an instrumentality of the latter. By
express provisions of Sec.14(e) of RA 2677, an
instrumentality of the national government is exempted from
the jurisdiction of the PSC except with respect to the fixing of
rates.
A legislative franchise cannot override the specific
constitutional restriction that no franchise or right shall
be granted to any individual or corporation except under
a condition that it shall be subject to amendment,
alteration or repeal by Congress (Art.XIV, Sec.8,
Constitution). Such amendment/alteration may be implied
from a latter act of general applicability.
A legislative franchise cannot be availed of to defeat the
proper exercise of police power. In the American case of
Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge (1837): the continued
existence of a government would be of no great value ifit
was disarmed of the powers necessary to accomplish the ends
of its creation; and the functions it was designed to perform,
transferred to the hands of privileged corporations. xxx while
the rights of private property are sacredly guardedthe
community also have rights, and that the happiness and wellbeing of every citizen depends on their faithful preservation.

GANZON VS CA
Rodolfo Ganzon was the then mayor of Iloilo City. 10
complaints were filed against him on grounds of misconduct
and misfeasance of office. The Secretary of Local Government
issued several suspension orders against Ganzon based on
the merits of the complaints filed against him hence Ganzon
was facing about 600 days of suspension. Ganzon appealed
the issue to the CA and the CA affirmed the suspension order
by the Secretary. Ganzon asserted that the 1987 Constitution
does not authorize the President nor any of his alter ego to
suspend and remove local officials; this is because the 1987
Constitution supports local autonomy and strengthens the
same. What was given by the present Constitution was mere
supervisory power.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Secretary of Local Government, as
the Presidents alter ego, can suspend and or remove local
officials.
HELD: Yes. Ganzon is under the impression that the
Constitution has left the President mere supervisory powers,
which supposedly excludes the power of investigation, and
denied her control, which allegedly embraces disciplinary
authority. It is a mistaken impression because legally,
supervision is not incompatible with disciplinary authority.
The SC had occasion to discuss the scope and extent of the
power of supervision by the President over local government
officials in contrast to the power of control given to him over
executive officials of our government wherein it was
emphasized that the two terms, control and supervision, are
two different things which differ one from the other in meaning
and extent. In administration law supervision means
overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that

subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fail or


neglect to fulfill them the former may take such action or step
as prescribed by law to make them perform their duties.
Control, on the other hand, means the power of an officer to
alter or modify or nullify of set aside what a subordinate officer
had done in the performance of his duties and to substitute the
judgment of the former for that of the latter. But from this
pronouncement it cannot be reasonably inferred that the power
of supervision of the President over local government officials
does not include the power of investigation when in his opinion
the good of the public service so requires.
The Secretary of Local Government, as the alter ego of the
president, in suspending Ganzon is exercising a valid power.
He however overstepped by imposing a 600 day suspension.