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Op EVIDENCE
(Part VIII of IX)

I. Evidence (Rule 128-133)

A. General Provisions
1. Definitions
Rule 128, Sec. 1. Evidence defined. - Evidence is the means,
sanctioned by these rules, of ascertaining in a judicial proceeding the
truth respecting a matter of fact. (1)
Evidence the means, sanctioned by these rules, of ascertaining in a judicial
proceeding the truth respecting a matter of fact.
Relevant evidence evidence which has a relation to the fact in issue as to
induce belief in its existence or non-existence; evidence which tends in any
reasonable degree to establish the probability or improbability of the fact in
issue.
Material evidence evidence which is directed to prove a fact in issue as
determined by the rules of substantive law and pleadings; evidence of such
quality of substantial importance to the particular issue, apart from its relevance
Escolin: The terms relevant and material are practically the same. They are
used interchangeably by the SC.
Competent evidence evidence which is not excluded by the law or by the
Rules of Court
Direct evidence evidence which proves a fact in dispute without the aid of any
inference or presumption
Circumstantial evidence proof of facts from which, taken collectively, the
existence of the particular fact in dispute may be inferred as a necessary or
probable consequence
Expert evidence testimony of a witness regarding a question of science, art or
trade, when he is skilled therein
Prima facie evidence evidence which suffices for the proof of a particular fact
until contradicted and overcome by other evidence
Conclusive evidence evidence which is incontrovertible and which the law
does not allow to be contradicted
Cumulative evidence evidence of the same kind and character as that already
given and tends to prove the same proposition
Corroborative evidence evidence of a different kind and character tending to
prove the same point
Best evidence evidence which affords the greatest certainty of the fact in
question
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Secondary evidence evidence which is necessarily inferior to primary/best

evidence and shows on its fact that better evidence exists
Factum probans the evidentiary fact by which the factum probandum is to be
established; material evidencing the proposition, existent, and offered for the
consideration of the tribunal
Factum probandum the ultimate fact sought to be established; proposition to
be established, hypothetical, and that which one party affirms and the other
denies
Factum probandum
Proposition to be established

Factum Probans
Material evidencing the proposition

Conceived of as hypothetical; Conceived of for practical purposes as

that which one party affirms and existent, and is offered as such for the
the other denies
consideration of the court
Collateral facts matters other than facts in issue and which are offered as a
basis merely for inference as to the existence or non-existence of the facts in
issue
Real evidence evidence furnished by the things themselves, or view or
inspection as distinguished from a description by them of a witness; that which is
addressed directly to the senses of the court without the intervention of a
witness
Rebuttal evidence evidence which is given to explain, repel, counteract or
disprove facts given in evidence by the adverse party
Positive evidence when a witness affirms that a fact did or did not occur
Negative evidence when a witness states that he did not see or know the
occurrence of a fact

2. Distinguish
Admissibility of evidence

Weight of evidence

Pertains to the ability of the evidence Pertains to the effect of evidence

to be allowed and accepted subject to admitted
its relevancy and competence
Substantive essence or characteristic
feature of evidence as would make it
worthy of consideration by the court
before its admission

The probative value of evidence

which the court may give to admit
after complying with the rules of
relevancy and competency

Proof

Evidence

Effect and result of evidence

Medium of proof

End Result

Means to the end

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3. Scope
a. Rule 128 2
Sec. 2. Scope. - The rules of evidence shall be the same in all courts
and in all trials and hearings, except as otherwise provided by law or
these rules. (2a)

b. Cases
Reyes v. CA, 216 SCRA 25 (1992) The Rules of Court, and its rules on Evidence,
are not even suppletorily applicable to agrarian cases. Special law allows
affidavits to be admitted in evidence in agrarian courts, even without the witness
testifying nor subject to cross-examination.
Escolin: Note that in Reyes, what was presented were affidavits. Ordinarily,
affidavits are not admissible before the regular courts because there is no
opportunity for the other party to cross-examine. Depositions are admissible
because there was an opportunity for the adverse party to cross-examine.
Imperial Textile Mills, Inc. v. NLRC, 217 SCRA 237 (1993) The unverified position
paper is a mere procedural infirmity which does not affect the merits of the case.
Procedural technicalities do not strictly apply to proceedings before the LA.
The rules of evidence does not apply to
.1 probation board
.2 CTA
.3 SEC
.4 Immigration cases
.5 LA/NLRC
.6 CAR

B.Admissibility of Evidence
Sec. 3. Admissibility of evidence. - Evidence is admissible when it is
relevant to the issue and is not excluded by the law or these rules. (3a)
Requisites for admissibility
.1 relevant
.2 competent

1. Relevancy
a. Rule 128 4
Sec. 4. Relevancy; collateral matters. Evidence must have such a
relation to the fact in issue as to induce belief in its existence or nonexistence. Evidence on collateral matters shall not be allowed, except

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when it tends in any reasonable degree to establish the probability or

improbability of the fact in issue. (4a)
Relevance relation to the facts in issue as to induce belief in its existence or
non-existence
Evidence on collateral matters allowed only when it tends in any reasonable
degree to establish the probability or improbability of the fact in issue.

b. Cases
Bautista v. Aparece, 51 OG 805 (1995)
Lopez v. Heesen, 365 P.2d 448 (1961)
State of Missouri v. Ball, 339 S.W2d 783 (1960)

2. Competence
a. Rule 128 3
Sec. 3. Admissibility of evidence. - Evidence is admissible when it is
relevant to the issue and is not excluded by the law or these rules. (3a)
Competence not excluded by the law or the RoC

b. Constitutional rules of exclusion

1) Art. III, Secs. 2 and 3
Art. III, Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and
no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable
cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under
oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized.
Art. III, Section 3. (1) The privacy of communication and
correspondence shall be inviolable except upon lawful order of the court,
or when public safety or order requires otherwise as prescribed by law.
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of this or the preceding section
shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.

2) Art. III, Sec. 12

Art. III, Section 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the
commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right
to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel
preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of
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counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived

except in writing and in the presence of counsel.
(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other
means which vitiate the free will shall be used against him. Secret
detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or other similar forms of
detention are prohibited.
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section
17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.
Xxx

3) Art. III, Sec. 17

Art. III, Section 17. No person shall be compelled to be a witness
against himself.
Absolutely inadmissible evidence obtained
.1 from unreasonable searches and seizures, or
.2 in violation of the right of privacy of communication and correspondence
Relatively inadmissible (inadmissible only against the person whose rights are
violated, admissible for other purposes) evidence obtained
.1 in violation of the right be informed of the right to remain silent and to have
competent and independent counsel
.2 from means which vitiate the free will
.3 in violation of the right against self-incrimination

c. Statutory rules of exclusion

1) NIRC, 201, as amended by RA 8424
Sec. 201. Effect of Failure to Stamp Taxable Document. An
instrument, document or paper which is required by law to be stamped
and which has been signed, issued, accepted or transferred without being
duly stamped, shall not be recorded, nor shall it or any copy thereof or
any record of transfer of the same be admitted or used in evidence in any
court until the requisite stamp or stamps shall have been affixed thereto
and cancelled.
No notary public or other officer authorized to administer oaths shall
add his jurat or acknowledgment to any document subject to
documentary stamp tax unless the proper documentary stamps are
affixed thereto and cancelled.
Failure to stamp a document required by law to be stamped shall render the
document inadmissible in any court until the requisite stamp or stamps shall

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have been affixed thereto and cancelled (201 NIRC). This is an absolute
inadmissibility.

2) General Banking Act of 2000, RA 8791, 55.1 (b)

Sec. 55. Prohibited Transactions. 55.1. No director, officer, employee, or agent of any bank shall
(b) Without order of a court of competent jurisdiction, disclose to any
unauthorized person any information relative to the funds or properties
in the custody of the bank belonging to private individuals, corporations,
or any other entity: Provided, That with respect to bank deposits, the
provisions of existing laws shall prevail;
Elements of the exclusion
.1 director, officer, employee, or agent of any bank
.2 disclosure to unauthorized person
.3 information relative to the funds or properties in the custody of the bank
belonging to private individuals, corporations, or any other entity
.4 without a court order
de Leon: Note that this provision covers only property in the custody of the bank
other than bank deposits. For bank deposits, RA 1405 governs. Note also that the
provision does not state the nature of the inadmissibility. I submit that it is a rule
of absolute inadmissibility.

3) RA 1405: Law on Secrecy of Bank Deposits

Sec. 2. All deposits of whatever nature with banks or banking
institutions in the Philippines including investments in bonds issued by
the Government of the Philippines, its political subdivisions and its
instrumentalities, are hereby considered as of an absolutely confidential
nature and may not be examined, inquired or looked into by any person,
government official, bureau or office, except upon written permission of
the depositor, or in cases of impeachment, or upon order of a competent
court in cases of bribery or dereliction of duty of public officials, or in
cases where the money deposited or invested is the subject matter of the
litigation.
GR: All deposits of whatever nature with banks or banking institutions in the
Philippines including investments in bonds issued by the Government of the
Philippines, its political subdivisions and its instrumentalities, are hereby
considered as of an absolutely confidential nature and may not be examined,
inquired or looked into by any person, government official, bureau or office.
Exceptions
.1 written permission of the depositor
.2 impeachment, or
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.3 order of a competent court in cases of

.a bribery or
.b dereliction of duty of public officials, or
.4 where the money deposited or invested is the subject matter of the litigation.
de Leon: I submit that this is a rule of absolute inadmissibility.

4) RA 4200: Wire-tapping
Sec. 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all
the parties to any private communication or spoken word, to tap any wire
or cable, or by using any other device or arrangement, to secretly
overhear, intercept, or record such communication or spoken word by
using a device commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or
dectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape recorder, or however otherwise
described:
It shall also be unlawful for any person, be he a participant or not in
the act or acts penalized in the next preceding sentence, to knowingly
possess any tape record, wire record, disc record, or any other such
record, or copies thereof, of any communication or spoken word secured
either before or after the effective date of this Act in the manner
prohibited by this law; or to replay the same for any other person or
persons; or to communicate the contents thereof, either verbally or in
writing, or to furnish transcriptions thereof, whether complete or partial,
to any other person: Provided, That the use of such record or any copies
thereof as evidence in any civil, criminal investigation or trial of offenses
mentioned in section 3 hereof, shall not be covered by this prohibition.
Unlawful acts
.1 any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any private
communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any
other device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such
communication or spoken word by using a device commonly known as a
dictaphone or dictagraph or dectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape recorder, or
however otherwise described:
.2 any person to knowingly possess any tape record, wire record, disc record, or
any other such record, or copies thereof, of any communication or spoken
word secured in the manner prohibited by this law; or
.3 any person to replay the same for any other person or persons
.4 any person to communicate the contents thereof, either verbally or in writing,
or
.5 any person to furnish transcriptions thereof, whether complete or partial, to
any other person:
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The use of such record or any copies thereof as evidence in any civil, criminal
investigation or trial of offenses mentioned in section 3 hereof, shall not be
covered by this prohibition.
Sec. 2. Any person who wilfully or knowingly does or who shall aid,
permit, or cause to be done any of the acts declared to be unlawful in the
preceding section or who violates the provisions of the following section
or of any order issued thereunder, or aids, permits, or causes such
violation shall, upon conviction thereof, be punished xxx.
Sec. 3. Nothing contained in this Act, however, shall render it unlawful
or punishable for any peace officer, who is authorized by a written order
of the Court, to execute any of the acts declared to be unlawful in the two
preceding sections in cases involving the crimes of treason, espionage,
provoking war and disloyalty in case of war, piracy, mutiny in the high
seas, rebellion, conspiracy and proposal to commit rebellion, inciting to
rebellion, sedition, conspiracy to commit sedition, inciting to sedition,
kidnapping as defined by the Revised Penal Code, and violations of
Commonwealth Act No. 616, punishing espionage and other offenses
against national security: Provided, That such written order shall only be
issued or granted upon written application and the examination under
oath or affirmation of the applicant and the witnesses he may produce
and a showing: (1) that there are reasonable grounds to believe that any
of the crimes enumerated hereinabove has been committed or is being
committed or is about to be committed: Provided, however, That in cases
involving the offenses of rebellion, conspiracy and proposal to commit
rebellion, inciting to rebellion, sedition, conspiracy to commit sedition,
and inciting to sedition, such authority shall be granted only upon prior
proof that a rebellion or acts of sedition, as the case may be, have
actually been or are being committed; (2) that there are reasonable
grounds to believe that evidence will be obtained essential to the
conviction of any person for, or to the solution of, or to the prevention of,
any of such crimes; and (3) that there are no other means readily
available for obtaining such evidence.
xxx
Conditions for valid wiretapping
.1 any peace officer
.2 authorized by a written order of the Court
.3 in cases involving the crimes of treason, espionage, provoking war and
disloyalty in case of war, piracy, mutiny in the high seas, rebellion, conspiracy
and proposal to commit rebellion, inciting to rebellion, sedition, conspiracy to
commit sedition, inciting to sedition, kidnapping, espionage and other
offenses against national security:
Sec. 4. Any communication or spoken word, or the existence, contents,
substance, purport, effect, or meaning of the same or any part thereof, or
any information therein contained obtained or secured by any person in
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violation of the preceding sections of this Act shall not be admissible in

evidence in any judicial, quasi-judicial, legislative or administrative
hearing or investigation.
Information obtained in violation of the anti-wiretapping act is absolutely
inadmissible.
Ramirez v. CA, 248 SCRA 590 (1995) Even a person privy to a communication
who records his private conversation with another without the knowledge of the
latter violates the anti-wiretapping act. The recording is inadmissible in
evidence.
Gaanan v. IAC, 145 SCRA 112 (1986)
Salcedo Ortaez v. CA, 235 SCRA 111 (1994)

C. What Need Not be Proved

3 things that need not be proved
.1 matters of mandatory judicial notice
.2 matters of discretionary judicial notice
.3 judicial admissions

1. Judicial notice
a. Mandatory (Rule 129 1)
Sec. 1. Judicial notice, when mandatory. - A court shall take judicial
notice, without the introduction of evidence, of the existence and
territorial extent of states, their political history, forms of government
and symbols of nationality, the law of nations, the admiralty and
maritime courts of the world and their seals, the political constitution
and history of the Philippines, the official acts of the legislative,
executive and judicial departments of the Philippines, the laws of nature,
the measure of time, and the geographical divisions. (1a)

Mandatory Judicial Notice

.1 existence and territorial extent of states, their political history, forms of
government and symbols of nationality
.2 the law of nations
.3 the admiralty and maritime courts of the world and their seals
.4 the political constitution and history of the Philippines
.5 the official acts of the legislative, executive and judicial departments of the
Philippines
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.6 the laws of nature

.7 the measure of time, and
.8 the geographical divisions
Sermonia v. CA, 233 SCRA 155 (1994) In determining prescription in a
prosecution for bigamy, the reckoning point is actual discovery of the subsequent
marriage by the offended party, not from the registration of the marriage
contract. The doctrine of constructive knowledge does not apply, even if it is
more favorable to the accused.

b. Discretionary (Rule 129 2)

Sec. 2. Judicial notice, when discretionary. - A court may take judicial
notice of matters which are of public knowledge, or are capable of
unquestionable demonstration, or ought to be known to judges because
of their judicial functions. (1a)
Discretionary Judicial Notice matters which are
.1 of public knowledge, or
.2 are capable of unquestionable demonstration, or
.3 ought to be known to judges because of their judicial functions

c. When hearing required (Rule 129 3)

Sec. 3. Judicial notice, when hearing necessary. - During the trial, the
court, on its own initiative, or on request of a party, may announce its
intention to take judicial notice of any matter and allow the parties to be
heard thereon.
After the trial, and before judgment or on appeal, the proper court, on
its own initiative or on request of a party, may take judicial notice of any
matter and allow the parties to be heard thereon if such matter is
decisive of a material issue in the case.(n)
When court takes judicial notice
.1 During trial, on any matter allow the parties to be heard thereon
.2 After trial, and before judgment or on appeal any matter and allow the
parties to be heard thereon if such matter is decisive of a material issue in the
case
Hearing is necessary when
.1 During the trial, the court
.a motu propio, on request of a party
.b announces its intention to take judicial notice of any matter
.2 After trial
.a before judgment or on appeal
.b motu propio, on request of a party
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.c takes judicial notice of any matter, and

.d if such matter is decisive of a material issue in the case
Hence, the court can take judicial notice of any matter during the trial as long as
there is a hearing. If trial is already over, the court can take judicial notice only
of matters decisive of a material issue in the case as long as there is a hearing (p.
88, Francisco).
de Leon: Why on earth would a court take judicial notice of a matter which is not
decisive of a material issue in a case?
City of Manila v. Garcia, 19 SCRA 413 (1967)
Baguio v. Vda. de Jalagat, 42 SCRA 337 (1971)
Prieto v. Arroyo, 14 SCRA 549 (1965)
Ozaeta Romulo etc. , 92 SCRA 1 (1979)
Yao-Kee v. Sy-Gonzales, 167 SCRA 736 (1988)
Tabuena v. CA, 196 SCRA 650 (1991) As a general rule courts are not authorized
to take judicial notice, in the adjudication of cases pending before them, of the
contents of the records of other cases, even when such cases have been tried or
are pending in the same court, and notwithstanding the fact that both cases may
have been heard or are actually pending before the same judge. However, an
exception is when in the absence of objection, and as a matter of convenience to
all parties, a court may properly treat all or any part of the original record of a
case filed in its archives as read into the record of a case pending before it,
when, with the knowledge of the opposing party, reference is made to it for that
purpose, by name and number or in some other manner by which it is sufficiently
designated; or when the original record of the former case or any part of it, is
actually withdrawn from the archives by the court's direction, at the request or
with the consent of the parties, and admitted as a part of the record of the case
then pending.
People v. Godoy, 250 SCRA 676 (1995)

2. Judicial admissions
a. Rule 129 4

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Sec. 4. Judicial admissions. - An admission, verbal or written, made by

a party in the course of the proceedings in the same case, does not
require proof. The admission may be contradicted only by showing that it
was made through palpable mistake or that no such admission was made.
(2a)
Requisites for judicial admission
.1 made by a party
.2 in the course of the proceedings
.3 in the same case
de Leon: If the admission was made in outside the proceedings or in another
case, it is also admissible under admissions of a party (Rule 130, Sec. 26).
The admission may be contradicted only by showing that
.1 it was made through palpable mistake or
.2 no such admission was made

b. Instances of Judicial admissions

Instances of Judicial admissions
.1 the genuineness and due execution of an actionable document copied or
attached to a pleading, when the other party fails to specifically deny under
oath (Rule 8 8)
.2 material allegations in the complaint, when the other party fails to specifically
deny it (Rule 8 11)
.3 admissions in superseded pleadings, when offered in evidence (Rule 10 8)
.4 act, declaration, or omission of a party as to a relevant fact (Rule 130 26)
.5 implied admission of guilt in an offer of compromise by the accused in
criminal cases, except quasi-offenses and those allowed by law to be
compromised (Rule 130 27)
.6 admission by silence (Rule 130 32)

c. Cases
Lucido v. Calupitan, 27 Phil. 48 (1914)
Torres v. CA, 131 SCRA 24 (1984)

D. Object and Documentary Evidence

1. Rule 130 1-2
Sec. 1. Object as evidence. Objects as evidence are those addressed
to the senses of the court. When an object is relevant to the fact in issue,
it may be exhibited to, examined or viewed by the court. (1a)
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Object Evidence evidence addressed to the senses of the court

Ocular inspection qualifies as object evidence.
Sec. 2. Documentary evidence. Documents as evidence consist of
writings or any material containing letters, words, numbers, figures,
symbols or other modes of written expressions offered as proof of their
contents. (n)
Documentary evidence any material containing modes of written expressions
offered as proof of their contents

2. Cases
People v. Bardaje, 99 SCRA 388 (1980)
Sison v. People, 250 SCRA 58 (1995)
Adamczuk v. Holloway, 13 A.2d 2 (1940)
State v. Tatum, 360 P. 2d 754 (1961)

E. Best Evidence Rule

1. Rule 130 3-4
Sec. 3. Original document must be produced, exceptions. When the
subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall be
admissible other than the original document itself, except in the
following cases:
(a) When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be
produced in court, without bad faith on the part of the offeror;
(b) When the original is in the custody or under the control of the
party against whom the evidence is offered, and the latter fails to
produce it after reasonable notice;
(c) When the original consists of numerous accounts or other
documents which cannot be examined in court without great loss of time
and the fact sought to be established from them is only the general result
of the whole; and
(d) When the original is a public record in the custody of a public
officer or is recorded in a public office. (2a)
Best Evidence Rule When the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document,
no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself
Exceptions: When the original
.1 has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, without bad faith
on the part of the offeror;
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.2 is in the custody or under the control of the party against whom the evidence
is offered, and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable notice;
.3 consists of numerous accounts or other documents which cannot be examined
in court without great loss of time and the fact sought to be established from
them is only the general result of the whole; and
.4 the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is recorded
in a public office

2. Cases
People v. Tandoy, 192 SCRA 28 (1990) The best evidence rule does not apply to
the marked money in a buy bust operation because the inquiry is not on the
contents of the marked bill, but merely its existence.
Air France v. Carrascoso, 18 SCRA 155 (1966)
Meyers v. US, 171 F.2d 800 (1948) BER only applies if the subject of inquiry is
the contents of a document; such an inquiry need not be the main issue
People v. Tan, 105 Phil. 1242 (1959)
Seiler v. Lucasfilm, 797 F.2d 1504 (1986) US BER or their equivalents vs.
Philippine BER other modes of written expression; is a disputed work in an
infringement case object or documentary?
US v. Gregorio, 17 Phil. 522 (1910)
Fiscal v. Reyes, 55 Phil 905 (1931)
Sec. 4. Original of document.
(a) The original of a document is one the contents of which are the
subject of inquiry.
(b) When a document is in two or more copies executed at or about
the same time, with identical contents, all such copies are equally
regarded as originals.
(c) When an entry is repeated in the regular course of business, one
being copied from another at or near the time of the transaction, all the
entries are likewise equally regarded as originals. (3a)
Original documents
.1 one the contents of which are the subject of inquiry.
.2 When a document is in two or more copies executed at or about the same
time, with identical contents, all such copies are equally regarded as
originals.

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.3 When an entry is repeated in the regular course of business, one being copied
from another at or near the time of the transaction, all the entries are likewise
equally regarded as originals

F. Secondary Evidence
1. Rule 130 5-8
Sec. 5. When original document is unavailable. When the original
document has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, the
offeror, upon proof of its execution or existence and the cause of its
unavailability without bad faith on his part, may prove its contents by a
copy, or by a recital of its contents in some authentic document, or by the
testimony of witnesses in the order stated. (4a)
Sec. 6. When original document is in adverse party's custody or
control. If the document is in the custody or under the control of the
adverse party, he must have reasonable notice to produce it. If after such
notice and after satisfactory proof of its existence, he fails to produce the
document, secondary evidence may be presented as in the case of its loss.
(5a)
Sec. 7. Evidence admissible when original document is a public
record. When the original of a document is in the custody of a public
officer or is recorded in a public office, its contents may be proved by a
certified copy issued by the public officer in custody thereof. (2a)
cf Rule 132 25-27
Sec. 25. What attestation of copy must state. - Whenever a copy of a document or record is
attested for the purpose of evidence, the attestation must state, in substance, that the copy is
a correct copy of the original, or a specific part thereof, as the case may be. The attestation
must be under the official seal of the attesting officer, if there be any, or if he be the clerk of a
court having a seal, under the seal of such court. (26 a)
Sec. 26. Irremovability of public record. - Any public record, an official copy of which is
admissible in evidence, must not be removed from the office in which it is kept, except upon
order of a court where the inspection of the record is essential to the just determination of a
pending case. (27 a)
Sec. 27. Public record of a private document. - An authorized public record of a private
document may be proved by the original record, or by a copy thereof, attested by the legal
custodian of the record, with an appropriate certificate that such officer has the custody.
(28a)

To prove loss, get affidavits of loss from all the people who possibly has a copy of
the original, e.g. Notarized Deed of Sale
.1 Vendor
.2 vendee
.3 notary public
.4 clerk of the court which gave the notary public commission
.5 Bureau of Archives
Requisites for admission of secondary evidence, according to grounds
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.1 the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court

.a prove execution or existence
.b prove cause of unavailability without bad faith of the offeror
.c proof of contents in the following order
)1

copy

)2

recital of its contents in

)a

some authentic document, or

)b

testimony of witnesses

.2 the original is in the custody or under the control of the adverse party
.a adverse party had reasonable notice to produce the original (Subpoena
duces tecum)
.b proof of the originals existence
.c adverse party fails to produce the original
.d proof of contents in the following order
)1

copy

)2

recital of its contents in

)a

some authentic document, or

)b

testimony of witnesses

.3 the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which cannot

be examined in court without great loss of time and the fact sought to be
established from them is only the general result of the whole; and
.4 the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is recorded
in a public office contents may be proved by a certified copy issued by the
public officer in custody thereof
.a Rule 132 25: What attestation of copy must state
)1

the copy is a correct copy of the original, or a specific part thereof

)2

under the official seal of the attesting officer, if there be any, or if he

be the clerk of a court having a seal, under the seal of such court

.b Rule 132 27: Public record of a private document - may be proved by

)1

the original record, or

)2

by a copy thereof
)a

attested by the legal custodian of the record

)b

with an appropriate certificate that such officer has the custody

2. Cases
Municipality of Victorias v. CA, 149 SCRA 32 (1987)

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Facts: In action to recover land, a party failed to produce the deed of sale, but
presented only a Certificate from the Archives Division of the Bureau of Records
Management of an entry in a notarial register.
Held: Certificate is admissible. Where the original has been lost or destroyed, the
offeror may prove its contents by a recital of its contents in some authentic
document or by testimony of witnesses. The Certificate is one such authentic
document.
de Vera v Aguilar, 218 SCRA 602 (1983) In case of loss of the original of a
document, the order of proof is as follows; 1) existence of the original, 2) its due
execution, 3) loss, and 4) its contents. Failure to prove loss of all the originals
without fault of the offeror renders secondary evidence inadmissible.
Vda. de Corpus v. Brabangco, (C.A.) 59 O.G. 8262 (1963) when the existence of
a document is proven, the court should allow the lost document to be proven by
parole; testimony of a witness need not be verbatim
Compaia Maritima v. Allied Free Workers Union, 77 SCRA 24 (1977)
voluminous character of accounts must be established, and it must be made
available to the adverse party before parole; audit made by or testimony of
private auditor is inadmissible as proof of original record or books of accounts;
auditors opinion not admissible; best evidence on cost of equipment are sales
invoices not testimony of an auditor
Villa Rey Transit, Inc. v. Ferrer, 25 SCRA 845 (1968) it is not necessary for a
party seeking to introduce copy to prove that original is in actual possession of
adverse party as long as it is under his control; adverse party need not admit
that it is in his possession before a copy may be introduced
Michael & Co., Inc. v. Enriquez, 33 Phil. 87 (1915) To prove a lost document,
must prove due execution, delivery (if required), and the fact of lost or
destruction; it is important to have qualified witnesses
Sec. 8. Party who calls for document not, bound to offer it. - A party
who calls for the production of a document and inspects the same is not
obliged to offer it as evidence. (6a)

G. Parol Evidence Rule

1. Rule 130 9
Sec. 9. Evidence of written agreements. When the terms of an,
agreement have been reduced to writing, it is considered as containing
all the terms agreed upon and there can be, between the parties and
their successors in interest, no evidence of such terms other than the
contents of the written agreement.
However, a party may present evidence to modify, explain or add to the
terms of the written agreement if he puts in issue in his pleading:
(a) An intrinsic ambiguity, mistake or imperfection in the written
agreement;

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(b) The failure of the written agreement to express the true intent
and agreement of the parties thereto;
(c)

The validity of the written agreement; or

(d) The existence of other terms agreed to by the parties or their

successors in interest after the execution of the written agreement.
The terms "agreement" includes wills. (7a)
Parol Evidence Rule: When the terms of an, agreement have been reduced to
writing, it is considered as containing all the terms agreed upon and there can
be, between the parties and their successors in interest, no evidence of such
terms other than the contents of the written agreement.
Exceptions: a party may present evidence to modify, explain or add to the terms
of the written agreement if he puts in issue in his pleading
.1 An intrinsic ambiguity, mistake or imperfection in the written agreement
.2 failure of the written agreement to express the true intent and agreement of
the parties
.3 validity of the written agreement; or
.4 The existence of other terms agreed to by the parties or their successors in
interest after the execution of the written agreement
If the ground is subsequently-agreed terms, the subsequently-agreed terms must
also be put in issue in the pleadings.
The rule applies only to the terms of an agreement. If the evidence sought to be
admitted refers to matters other than the terms of the agreement (e.g. statement
of facts), then the PER does not apply, such evidence is admissible.
PER applies only to the parties to the agreement. It does not apply where PER is
invoked against a litigant who is a stranger to the agreement.
Requisites for mistake as exception to PER
.1 mutual between the parties
.2 of fact, not of law
.3 alleged and put in issue in the pleadings
.4 proved by clear and convincing, not merely preponderance of, evidence
Escolin: Note that the rule on self-defense also requires that the circumstances
of self-defense be proven by clear and convincing evidence.

2. Art. 1403 and 1405 Civil Code

Art. 1403. The following contracts are unenforceable, unless they are
ratified:
xxx
(2) Those that do not comply with the Statute of Frauds as set forth in
this number. In the following cases an agreement hereafter made shall be
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unenforceable by action, unless the same, or some note or memorandum,

thereof, be in writing, and subscribed by the party charged, or by his
agent; evidence, therefore, of the agreement cannot be received without
the writing, or a secondary evidence of its contents:
(a) An agreement that by its terms is not to be performed within a year
from the making thereof;
(b) A special promise to answer for the debt, default, or miscarriage of
another;
(c) An agreement made in consideration of marriage, other than a
mutual promise to marry;
(d) An agreement for the sale of goods, chattels or things in action, at
a price not less than five hundred pesos, unless the buyer accept and
receive part of such goods and chattels, or the evidences, or some of
them, of such things in action or pay at the time some part of the
purchase money; but when a sale is made by auction and entry is made by
the auctioneer in his sales book, at the time of the sale, of the amount
and kind of property sold, terms of sale, price, names of the purchasers
and person on whose account the sale is made, it is a sufficient
memorandum;
(e) An agreement of the leasing for a longer period than one year, or
for the sale of real property or of an interest therein;
(f) A representation as to the credit of a third person.
Art. 1405. Contracts infringing the Statute of Frauds, referred to in
No. 2 of article 1403, are ratified by the failure to object to the
presentation of oral evidence to prove the same, or by the acceptance of
benefit under them.
Statute of Frauds: If the following agreements are not in writing and subscribed,
it is unenforceable and evidence thereof is inadmissible
.1 not to be performed within a year from the making thereof
.2 special promise to answer for the debt, default, or miscarriage of another;
.3 agreement made in consideration of marriage, other than a mutual promise to
marry;
.4 agreement for the sale of goods, chattels or things in action, at a price not
less than P500, unless the buyer accept and receive part of such goods and
chattels, or the evidences, or some of them, of such things in action or pay at
the time some part of the purchase money;
.5 lease for more than 1 year, or sale of real property or of an interest therein;
.6 representation as to the credit of a 3rd person.
Exceptions
.1 failure to object to the presentation of oral evidence, or

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.2 acceptance of benefit under the agreement

3. Distinguish parole evidence rule from best evidence

rule
Parole Evidence Rule

Best Evidence Rule

No issue as to the contents of a Issue is contents of a writing

writing
Parol evidence is offered

Secondary evidence is offered

Presupposes that original is in Applies when

court
available

the

original

is

not

Effect is can not add, subtract, or Effect is can not present any evidence
explain the contents
on the contents other than the original
Invoked only if the controversy is Invoked by anybody, whether a party to
between
parties
to
the the instrument or not
agreement
Applies only to agreements and Applies to all kinds of writing
wills

4. Cases
Cruz v CA, 192 SCRA 209 (1990) PER does not apply to receipts because it is not
an agreement. It is proof only of delivery of money. Furthermore, the parole
evidence bars only evidence as to the terms, it does not bar evidence as to
statement of facts. The receipt of money is merely a statement of fact. Lastly,
failure of the adverse party to object renders parole evidence admissible.
Pioneer Savings & Loan Bank v. CA, 226 SCRA 740 (1993)
Facts: Pioneer execute an DoAS of a car in favor of Michael Santos. Pioneer
claims that the car was merely a security for the time deposit placements of
Santos relatives. Since Santos relatives have recovered their placements,
Pioneer sued for recovery of the car.
Held: Evidence of a prior or contemporaneous verbal agreement is generally not
admissible to vary, contradict or defeat the operation of a valid instrument. While
parol evidence is admissible in a variety of ways to explain the meaning of
written contracts, it cannot serve the purpose of incorporating into the contract
additional contemporaneous conditions which are not mentioned at all in the
writing, unless there has been fraud or mistake. Pioneer failed to produce any
instrument or written document which would prove that the deed of sale in
question was only a security for the time deposit placements of Santos' relatives
in Pioneer. The 2 main witnesses for Pioneer, were not mere employees of the
bank. They were bank officers; one being a lawyer and supposed to be steeped in
legal and banking knowledge and practices. They were expected to know the
consequences of their act of signing a document which outrightly transferred
ownership over the subject vehicle in favor of Santos. They could have
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incorporated in the deed of sale (if such was the intention or agreement of the
parties) a stipulation that transfer of ownership and registration of the vehicle in
Santos' name were conditioned on the failure of his relatives to recover their
time deposit placements in petitioner bank. No such stipulation was incorporated
in the deed of sale which was an outright and unconditional transfer of
ownership of the motor vehicle to respondent Santos.
de Leon: Note that the PER exceptions of other term agreed by the parties refer
to those agreed after, not before, the execution of the agreement. Pioneer should
have invoked the exception that the agreement did not express their true intent
and agreement.
Enriquez v. Ramos, 6 SCRA 219 (1962)
Facts: In a foreclosure of REM case, plaintiff invokes the registered mortgage
agreement. Defendant answers that the contract did not express the true
agreement of the parties because it did not include the undertaking of plaintiff to
construct roads on the land. Furthermore, defendant argues that the ordinance
that requires the construction of such roads in the subdivision before the lots
could be sold is deemed included in the contract.
Held: Since the answer alleged that the contract did not express the true
intention of the parties, it has therefore been put in issue in the pleadings. The
same may therefore be subject of parole evidence.
Canuto v. Mariano, 37 Phil. 840 (1918) parol may be introduced to prove
subsequent agreement regardless of how soon such agreement was made
Yu Tek & Co. v. Gonzales, 29 Phil. 384 (1915) Parol evidence inadmissible to
incorporate additional contemporaneous conditions which are not mentioned at
all in the writing, unless there is fraud or mistake
Land Settlement & Development Corp. v. Garcia Plantation, 7 SCRA 750 (1963)
exception to PER may be put in issue in answer to counterclaim; when operation
of contract made to depend upon occurrence of an event, which for that reason is
a condition precedent, such may be established by parol evidence, since if it is
proven, there will be no contract
Maulini v. Serrano, 28 Phil. 640 (1914) PER does not apply where the purpose
of parol evidence is to show that no written contract ever existed
PNB v. Seeto, 91 Phil. 756 (1952) assurances made by an indorser that the
drawer has funds, which assurances induced bank to cash the check, are
admissible in evidence
Woodhouse v. Halili, 93 Phil. 526 (1953) Inducement by fraud may be proved by
parol because it goes into the validity of the agreement
Robles v. Lizarraga, 50 Phil. 387 (1927) parol may be received regardless of
whether the written agreement contains any reference to the collateral
agreement and whether the action is at law or in equity even if it deals with
related matters
Lechugas v. CA, 143 SCRA 335 (1986) PER not applicable where suit is
between one of the parties to the document and 3 rd persons; PER does not apply
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and may not be invoked by either party to the litigation against the other, where
at least one of the parties to the suit is not party or privy to the written
agreement and does not base a claim on the instrument; both parties to the
agreement must be parties to the suit
Inciong v. CA, 257 SCRA 578 (1996) PER does not specify that the agreement
be a public document; need not be in any particular form or signed by the
parties; fraud must be corroborated
Ortaez v. CA contemporaneous conditions not referred to in the contract can
not be proven by parol; merely alleging that the contract is subject to conditions
does not put the exception in issue in the pleadings

H.

Interpretation of Documents

1. Rule 130 10-19

Sec. 10. Interpretation of a writing according to its legal meaning.
The language of a writing is to be interpreted according to the legal
meaning it bears in the place of its execution, unless the parties intended
otherwise. (8)
Sec. 11. Instrument construed so as to give effect to all provisions. In
the construction of an instrument where there are several provisions or
particulars. such a construction is, if possible, to be adopted as will give
effect to all. (9)
Sec. 12. Interpretation according to intention; general and particular
provisions. In the construction of an instrument, the intention of the
parties is to be pursued; and when a general and a particular provision
are inconsistent, the latter is paramount to the former. So a particular
intent will control a general one that is inconsistent with it. (10)
Sec. 13. Interpretation according to circumstances. For the proper
construction of an instrument, the circumstances under which it was
made, including the situation of the subject thereof and of the parties to
it, may be shown, so that the judge may be placed in the position of those
whose language he is to interpret. (11)
Sec. 14. Peculiar signification of terms. The terms of a writing are
presumed to have been used in their primary and general acceptation,
but evidence is admissible to show that they have a local, technical, or
otherwise peculiar signification, and were so used and understood in the
particular instance, in which case the agreement must be construed
accordingly.(12)
Sec. 15. Written words control printed. When an instrument consists
partly of written words and partly of a printed form, and the two are
inconsistent, the former controls the latter. (13)
Sec. 16. Experts and interpreters to be used in explaining certain
writings. When the characters in which an instrument is written are
difficult to be deciphered, or the language is not understood by the court,
the evidence of persons skilled in deciphering the characters, or who
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understand the language, is admissible to declare the characters or the

meaning of the language. (14)
Sec. 17. Of two constructions, which preferred. When the terms of an
agreement have been intended in a different sense by the different
parties to it, that sense is to prevail against either party in which he
supposed the other understood it, and when different constructions of a
provision are otherwise equally proper, that is to be taken which is the
most favorable to the party in whose favor the provision was made. (15)
Sec. 18. Construction in favor of natural right. When an instrument
is equally susceptible of two interpretations, one is favor of natural right
and the other against it, the former is to be adopted. (16)
Sec. 19. Interpretation according to usage. An instrument may be
construed according to usage, in order to determine its true character.
(17)
Rules of interpretation of documents
.1 Interpretation of a writing according to its legal meaning in the place of
execution
.2 Instrument construed so as to give effect to more provisions
.3 Interpretation according to intention of the parties
.4 particular over general
.5 Interpretation according to circumstances of the parties and the subject
.6 Terms presumed to be used in primary and general acceptation, evidence of
local, technical, or peculiar signification use admissible
.7 Written words control printed
.8 When the characters are difficult to decipher, or the language is foreign, the
evidence of experts and interpreters is admissible
.9 When the terms of an agreement have been intended in a different sense by
the different parties to it, that sense is to prevail against either party in which
he supposed the other understood it
.10 When different constructions of a provision are otherwise equally proper,
that is to be taken which is the most favorable to the party in whose favor the
provision was made
.11

preference for natural right

.12

usage may be considered

2. Arts. 1370-1379 Civil Code

Art. 1370. If the terms of a contract are clear and leave no doubt upon
the intention of the contracting parties, the literal meaning of its
stipulations shall control.

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If the words appear to be contrary to the evident intention of the

parties, the latter shall prevail over the former.
Art. 1371. In order to judge the intention of the contracting parties,
their contemporaneous and subsequent acts shall be principally
considered.
Art. 1372. However general the terms of a contract may be, they shall
not be understood to comprehend things that are distinct and cases that
are different from those upon which the parties intended to agree.
Art. 1373. If some stipulation of any contract should admit of several
meanings, it shall be understood as bearing that import which is most
adequate to render it effectual.
Art. 1374. The various stipulations of a contract shall be interpreted
together, attributing to the doubtful ones that sense which may result
from all of them taken jointly.
Art. 1375. Words which may have different significations shall be
understood in that which is most in keeping with the nature and object of
the contract.
Art. 1376. The usage or custom of the place shall be borne in mind in
the interpretation of the ambiguities of a contract, and shall fill the
omission of stipulations which are ordinarily established.
Art. 1377. The interpretation of obscure words or stipulations in a
contract shall not favor the party who caused the obscurity.
Art. 1378. When it is absolutely impossible to settle doubts by the
rules established in the preceding articles, and the doubts refer to
incidental circumstances of a gratuitous contract, the least transmission
of rights and interests shall prevail. If the contract is onerous, the doubt
shall be settled in favor of the greatest reciprocity of interests.
If the doubts are cast upon the principal object of the contract in such
a way that it cannot be known what may have been the intention or will of
the parties, the contract shall be null and void.
Art. 1379. The principles of interpretation stated in Rule 123 of the
Rules of Court shall likewise be observed in the construction of
contracts.
Statutory rules of interpretation
.1 If the terms are clear, the literal meaning shall control.
.2 If the words appear to be contrary to the evident intention of the parties, the
intention shall prevail
.3 In order to judge the intention of the contracting parties,
contemporaneous and subsequent acts shall be principally considered.

their

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.4 terms of a contract shall not be understood to comprehend things that are

distinct and cases that are different from those upon which the parties
intended to agree
.5 If some stipulation of any contract should admit of several meanings, it shall
be understood as bearing that import which is most adequate to render it
effectual.
.6 The various stipulations of a contract shall be interpreted together, attributing
to the doubtful ones that sense which may result from all of them taken
jointly.
.7 Words which may have different significations shall be understood in that
which is most in keeping with the nature and object of the contract.
.8 The usage or custom of the place shall be borne in mind in the interpretation
of the ambiguities of a contract, and shall fill the omission of stipulations
which are ordinarily established.
.9 The interpretation of obscure words or stipulations in a contract shall not
favor the party who caused the obscurity.
.10 When it is absolutely impossible to settle doubts by the rules established in
the preceding articles
.a the doubts refer to incidental circumstances of
)1

a gratuitous contract, the least transmission of rights and interests

shall prevail

)2

an onerous contract, the doubt shall be settled in favor of the

greatest reciprocity of interests

.b If the doubts are cast upon the principal object of the contract in such a
way that it cannot be known what may have been the intention or will of
the parties, the contract shall be null and void.
.11 The principles of interpretation stated in the Rules of Court shall likewise
be observed

3. Cases
Lambert v. Fox, 26 Phil. 588 (1914) If from the words the meaning is plain,
contract should be enforced according to the words
Capital Insurance v. Sadang, 21 SCRA 1183 (1967) doubt resolved against one
who prepared the document

I. Rule 130 20: Qualifications of Witnesses

Sec. 20. Witnesses; their qualifications. Except as provided in the
next succeeding section, all persons who can perceive, and perceiving,
can make known their perception to others, may be witnesses.
Religious or political belief, interest in the outcome of the case, or
conviction of a crime unless otherwise provided by law, shall not be a
ground for disqualification. (18 a)
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Qualifications of witnesses
.1 can perceive
.2 perceiving
.3 can make known their perception to others
NOT ground for disqualification
.1 Religious belief
.2 political belief
.3 interest in the outcome of the case, or
.4 conviction of a crime, unless otherwise provided by law, e.g.
.a A state witness must not have been convicted of any crime involving moral
turpitude [Rule 119, Sec. 17 (e)]
.b A person who has been convicted of falsification of a document, perjury or
false testimony is disqualified from being a witness to a will (Art. 821 NCC)

1. Mental Incapacity or Immaturity

a. Rule 130 21
Sec. 21. Disqualification by reason of mental incapacity or immaturity.
The following persons cannot be witnesses:
(a) Those whose mental condition, at the time of their production for
examination, is such that they are incapable of intelligently making
known their perception to others;
(b) Children whose mental maturity is such as to render them
incapable of perceiving the facts respecting which they are examined and
of relating them truthfully. (19a)
For a mentally defective person to be a witness, he must be mentally capable at
the time of production, even if he was not so at the time of perception. A child
must be mentally mature both at the time of perception and at the time of
production.
With regards to the subject matter of the testimony, we must make a distinction
between absolute disqualifications and relative disqualifications. Objections
based on absolute disqualifications may be raised upon the calling of the
disqualified witness. Objections based on relative disqualifications may be raised
when it becomes apparent that the subject matter of the testimony covers
inadmissible matters.
Absolutely disqualified witnesses
.1 cant perceive
.2 not perceiving
.3 cant make known their perception to others

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.4 whose mental condition, at the time of their production for examination,

render them incapable of intelligently making known their perception to
others
.5 whose mental maturity is such as to render them incapable of perceiving the
facts respecting which they are examined and relating them truthfully
.6 marital disqualification
.7 parental and filial privilege
Relative disqualifications
.1 dead mans statute
.2 marital communication privilege
.3 attorney-client privilege
.4 an attorney's secretary, stenographer, or clerk concerning any fact the
knowledge of which has been acquired in such capacity
.5 Physician-Patient Privilege
.6 Priest-Penitent Privilege
.7 State Secrets

b. Cases
People v. de Jesus, 129 SCRA 4 (1984) even though feeble minded, there is no
showing that she could not convey her ideas by words or signs ___ competent;
even if she had difficulty comprehending the questions
People v. Salomon, 229 SCRA 402 (1993) being mental retardate is not per se a
disqualification; although speech was slurred, testimony was positive, clear, plain
and unambiguous
People v. Mendoza, G.R. No. 113791, Feb. 2, 1996 any child, regardless of age,
can be a witness as long as he meets the qualifications for competency:
observation, recollection, and communication

2. Marriage
a. Rule 130 22: Marital Disqualification Rule
Sec. 22. Disqualification by reason of marriage. During their
marriage, neither the husband nor the wife may testify for or against the
other without the consent of the affected spouse, except in a civil case by
one against the other, or in a criminal case for a crime committed by one
against the other or the latter's direct descendants or ascendants. (20a)
Requisites for marital disqualification rule
.1 marriage subsists

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.2 a spouse is a litigant
.3 no consent from the spouse-litigant
.4 not a civil case by one against the other, or a criminal case for a crime
committed by one against the other or the latter's direct descendants or
ascendants.
GR: During their marriage, spouses may not testify for or against the other
without the consent of the affected spouse
Exceptions:
.1 in a civil case by one against the other, or
.2 in a criminal case for a crime committed by one against
.a the other or
.b the others direct descendants or ascendants
The marital disqualification rule refers to all matters, whether or communicated
by one spouse to the other. It applies only during the existence of the marriage.
It can be invoked only if one spouse is a party to the action. It is an absolute
disqualification and can be invoked the moment that one spouse is called to
testify.
This is a testimonial disqualification, as opposed to the testimonial privilege of
ascendants and descendants (Rule 130 25). Hence, the witness has no say
whether the objection is to be raised or not. The holder of the privilege is the
spouse-litigant. When the spouse-litigant consents to the testimony, the spousewitness must testify whether he wants to or not.
cf Rule 130 24 (a), Marital Communications
Sec. 24. Disqualification by reason of privileged communication. The following persons
cannot testify as to matters learned in confidence in the following cases:
(a) The husband or the wife, during or after the marriage, cannot be examined without the
consent of the other as to any communication received in confidence by one from the other
during the marriage except in a civil case by one against the other, or in a criminal case for a
crime committed by one against the other or the latter's direct descendants or ascendants;

Marital Disqualification

Marital Communications

Covers all matters regardless of Covers only those communicated by

source
one spouse to another
Applies during the marriage

Applies during and after the marriage

A spouse must be a litigant

A spouse need not be a litigant

Invoked when a spouse is called Invoked when the testimony appears to

to testify
cover privileged matters
Note that the exceptions under the marital disqualification and marital
communications rule are the same.

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b. Cases
Ordoo v. Daquigan, 62 SCRA 270 (1975) The wife can therefore testify against
her husband in such a case for rape against her daughter because it is
considered a crime against the wife. When an offense directly attacks, or directly
impairs the conjugal relation, it comes within the exception to the marital
disqualification rule.
de Leon: Note that when this case was decided, a crime by a spouse against the
others descendant was not yet an express exception to the marital
disqualification rule.
People v. Castaeda, 88 SCRA 562 (1979) The wife can testify against the
husband in a case for falsification of the wifes signature in public documents to
sell share of wife in conjugal property because it is a crime committed by the
husband against the wife.
Lezama v Rodriguez, 23 SCRA 1166 (1968) Wife who is a co-defendant of her
husband in a case of collusive fraud, where their interests are not separate, can
not be examined as a hostile witness by the adverse party
People v. Francisco, 78 Phil. 694 (1947) when the husband imputes crime
against wife, he waives the marital disqualification rule

3. Dead Mans Statute

a. Rule 130 23
Sec. 23. Disqualification by reason of death or insanity of adverse
party. Parties or assignors of parties to a case, or persons in whose
behalf a case is prosecuted, against an executor or administrator or other
representative of a deceased person, or against a person of unsound
mind, upon a claim or demand against the estate of such deceased
person or against such person of unsound mind, cannot testify as to any
matter of fact occurring before the death of such deceased person or
before such person became of unsound mind. (20a)
Requisites for dead mans statute
.1 the witness sought to be disqualified is the plaintiff
.2 Executor, administrator or representative of a deceased person, or the person
of unsound mind is the defendant
.3 upon claim or demand against the estate of such deceased person or against
such person of unsound mind
.4 as to any matter of fact occurring before the death of such deceased person or
before such person became of unsound mind.
.5 [no counterclaim is filed]

b. Cases

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Razon v. IAC, 207 SCRA 234 (1992) The dead mans statute does not apply where
the case is filed by the estate. Besides, cross-examination of the witness is a
waiver of the privilege.
Reyes v. Wells, 54 Phil 102 (1929) If the witness sought to be disqualified is not
the plaintiff (e.g. disinterested 3rd party), the dead mans statute is not
applicable.
Guerrero v. St. Clares Realty, 124 SCRA 553 (1983) Mere witnesses not parties
to the case are not disqualified by the dead mans statute. Furthermore, the rule
requires that the defendant must be the estate. It does not apply where the heirs
are being sued in their individual capacities. Representatives are only those
who, like the executor, one sued in their representative, not personal, capacity
Abraham v. Recto-Kasten, 4 SCRA 298 (1962) A cross-examination of the
disqualified witness is a waiver of the dead mans privilege, even if there was a
continuing objection.
Lichauco v. Atlantic Gulf, 84 Phil. 330 (1949) This in effect ruled that the Dead
Mans statute can not be invoked against a plaintiff-corporation. Interest no
longer disqualifies a witness. Officers/stockholder of corporation may testify in a
case filed against the estate of a deceased by the corporation
Escolin: In an action where the administrator is the plaintiff, the defendant may
testify on facts occurring prior to the death of the decedent.
Tongco v. Vianzon, 50 Phil 698 (1927) action must be brought against the
estate, not by the estate, to be covered under the dead mans statute
Escolin: The dead mans rule does not apply in cadastral cases.
Escolin: If there is no instrument evidencing the claim, it would be difficult to
prove the claim in the estate proceeding because of the dead mans statute.
However, if there is such an instrument, it is not barred by the dead mans
statute (Neibert v. Neibert)
Goi v. CA, 144 SCRA 222 (1986) heirs of a deceased are representatives
within the ambit of the dead mans statute; waived by defendant if he files
counterclaim against plaintiff; adverse party may testify to transactions or
communications with deceased which were made with an agent of such person if
the agents is still alive and can testify as long as it is confined to the transactions

J. Privileged Communications
Privileged Communications
.1 marital
.2 attorney-client
.3 physician-patient
.4 priest-penitent
.5 state secrets

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Sec. 24. Disqualification by reason of privileged communication. The

following persons cannot testify as to matters learned in confidence in
the following cases:
This is a rule of relative disqualification. Each of those enumerated is disqualified
to testify as to specific matters only. It does not disqualify them from testifying
on matters not privileged. Hence, it is improper to object to their testimony upon
mere subpoena. One must wait until it becomes apparent that their testimony
covers matters that are privileged (e.g. upon asking of a question that covers
privileged matters; when the purpose of their testimony as admitted by the
offeror covers privileged matters) before one may properly object.
Though a relative disqualification, it is nevertheless a testimonial
disqualification, as opposed to the testimonial privilege of ascendants and
descendants (Rule 130 25). [careful not to be confused in the multiple meanings
of the word privilege] Hence, the witness has no say whether the objection is
to be raised or not. When the holder of the privilege (not necessarily the
opposing party) consents to the testimony, the witness must testify.
Note that the wording of the law is to the effect that (someone) may not be
examined without the consent of (another). The law does not say that one can
not testify or be examined over the objection of another. The wording of the law
is to the effect that an objection of the other party in the privileged
communication is not necessary for the privilege to hold. Consent of the other
party in the privileged communication is an act that needs to be proved for the
testimony to be admitted. This is not to say that failure of a such a party to object
will never render such testimony admissible. This is to say that where the other
party to the privileged communication is not a litigant in the case, and privileged
communication is offered in evidence without the consent of such party, the
litigant against whom the testimony is offered may object to its admission on the
ground of privileged communication. Where the other party in the privileged
communication is a litigant, then his failure to object will be taken as a consent
to the testimony or a waiver of a privilege.
The communication that is privileged need not be in any form. It can be oral or
written.
The communication ceases to be privileged if knowingly communicated in the
presence of 3rd persons. In such a case, the privilege may not be invoked at all.
However, if the privileged communication was within the surreptitious
observation of a 3rd person, then the communication can be invoked if either the
communicator or communicatee called to testify. However, the privilege can not
be invoked if the 3rd person is called to testify.

1. Marital Communications
a. Rule 130 24 (a)
(a) The husband or the wife, during or after the marriage, cannot be
examined without the consent of the other as to any communication
received in confidence by one from the other during the marriage except
in a civil case by one against the other, or in a criminal case for a crime
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committed by one against the other or the latter's direct descendants or

ascendants;
Requisites for Marital Communications Rule
.1 communication received
.a from the spouse
.b in confidence
.c during the marriage
.2 without the consent of the spouse
Note that the marital communication rule applies even after the marriage. It
applies only to matters communicated by one spouse to another in confidence. It
does not cover knowledge of matters that a spouse obtains from a source other
than other spouse. It can be invoked even if neither spouse is a party to the
action. It is a relative disqualification and can be invoked only when it is
apparent that the testimony would cover privileged matters.
The exceptions to the rule are
.1 in a civil case by one against the other, or
.2 in a criminal case for a crime committed by one against the other or the
latter's direct descendants or ascendants
cf Rule 130 22: Marital Disqualification Rule
Sec. 22. Disqualification by reason of marriage. During their marriage, neither the husband
nor the wife may testify for or against the other without the consent of the affected spouse,
except in a civil case by one against the other, or in a criminal case for a crime committed by
one against the other or the latter's direct descendants or ascendants. (20a)

The marital disqualification rule refers to all matters, whether or communicated

by one spouse to the other. It applies only during the existence of the marriage.
It can be invoked only if one spouse is a party to the action. It is an absolute
disqualification and can be invoked the moment that one spouse is called to
testify.
Marital Disqualification (Rule 130,
Sec. 22)

Marital Communications (Rule

130,
Sec. 24 [a])

Covers
source

all

matters

regardless

of Covers
only
matters
communicated by one spouse to
another, during the marriage

Applies during the marriage

Applies during
marriage

A spouse must be a litigant

A spouse need not be a litigant

Invoked when a spouse is called to Invoked

testify
appears
matters

and

when
the
to
cover

after

the

testimony
privileged

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MEMORIZE!

b. Cases
People v. Carlos, 47 Phil. 626 (1925) where the privilege communication from
one spouse to the other comes into the hands of a 3 rd party, without collusion or
voluntary disclosure on the part of either spouse, not privilege; illegality of
seizure must be raised by motion before trial for return of letter; unanswered
letter inadmissible

2. Attorney-Client Privilege
a. Rule 130 24 (b)
(b) An attorney cannot, without the consent of his client, be examined
as to any communication made by the client to him, or his advice given
thereon in the course of, or with a view to, professional employment, nor
can an attorney's secretary, stenographer, or clerk be examined, without
the consent of the client and his employer, concerning any fact the
knowledge of which has been acquired in such capacity;
Requisites for attorney-client privilege
.1 existence of an attorney-client relationship
.2 witness is an attorney
.3 as to communication made by the client to him, or his advice given thereon
.4 the communication was made in confidence
.5 communication was made in the course of, or with a view to professional
employment
The privilege extends to the attorney's secretary, stenographer, or clerk
concerning any fact the knowledge of which has been acquired in such capacity.
The difference being consent of only the client is needed for the attorney to
testify. However, the consent of both the attorney and the client is necessary for
the attorney's secretary, stenographer, or clerk to testify.
The attorney-client privilege does not apply if the attorney was sued by his client.

b. Cases
Uy Chico v. Union Life, 29 Phil. 163 (1915) communication made by client to
attorney for purpose of being communicated to others not privileged, e.g.
compromise agreement
Regala v. Sandiganbayan, 262 SCRA 124 (1996) prosecution can not use
attorneys as leverage to compel them to name their clients; clients identity is
protected when there is a strong probability exists that revealing clients name
would implicate him in the very activity for which he sought advice
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Barton v. Leyte Asphalt and Mineral Oil Co., 46 Phil. 938 (1924) letter from
client to attorney obtained by adverse party, admitted authentic in court, not
privileged regardless whether legally or illegally obtained (what about
constitutional rule of exclusion on evidence obtained in violation of the right to
privacy of communication and correspondence?); one who overhears the
communication with or without clients knowledge is not privileged
Orient Insurance v. Revilla, 54 Phil. 919 (1930) introduction in evidence of a
part of a paper by one party waives privilege as to other parts of the same
writing; when a party invokes BER, it is the party who produces original who is
deemed to have introduced it in evidence; contract for attorneys fees is not
privileged; there is no partial waiver of privilege
Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947) privilege does not extend to information
gathered by an attorney from witnesses; WP can not be secured without
sufficient justification
Upjohn Company v. US, 449 U.S. 383 (1981) Privilege extends to information
given by employees to corporate not to facts.
In re Grand Jury Investigation, 732 F.2d 447 (1983) The general rule is the
identity of a client is not protected; legal advice exception may be defeated
through prima facie showing that the legal representation was secured in
furtherance of present or intended continuing illegality, as where the
representation itself is part of a larger conspiracy; it is the link between the
client and the communication, not the link between client and possibility of
potential criminal prosecution which is protected; last link exception is
abandoned; disclosure might possibly implicate client in criminal activity not an
exception
US v. McPartlin, 595 F.2d 1321 (7th Cir. 1979) statement made by co-defendant
to an investigator acting for defendants counsel protected; communication by
client to attorney remain privileged when attorney shares them with codefendant for a common defense
US v. Gordon-Nikkar, 518 F.2d 972 (5th Cir. 1975) protection does not extend to
the communication regarding an intended crime; communication divulged to
strangers not protected
US v. Nobles, 422 US 225 (1975) WPD waived when client presents
investigator as witness
People v. Sandiganbayan, 275 SCRA 505 (1997)

3. Physician-Patient Privilege
a. Rule 130 24 (c)
(c) A person authorized to practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics
cannot in a civil case, without the consent of the patient, be examined as
to any advice or treatment given by him or any information which he may
have acquired in attending such patient in a professional capacity, which
information was necessary to enable him to act in that capacity, and
which would blacken the reputation of the patient;
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Waivers of the physician-patient privilege, cf Rule 28, Sec. 3 and 4

Sec. 3. Report of findings. If requested by the party examined, the party causing the
examination to be made shall deliver to him a copy of a detailed written report of the
examining physician setting out his findings and conclusions. After such request and delivery,
the party causing the examination to be made shall be entitled upon request to receive from
the party examined a like report of any examination, previously or thereafter made, of the
same mental or physical condition. If the party examined refuses to deliver such report, the
court on motion and notice may make an order requiring delivery on such terms as are just,
and if a physician fails or refuses to make such a report the court may exclude his testimony if
offered at the trial. (3a)
Sec. 4. Waiver of privilege. By requesting and obtaining a report of the examination so
ordered or by taking the deposition of the examiner, the party examined waives any privilege
he may have in that action or any other involving the same controversy, regarding the
testimony of every other person who has examined or may thereafter examine him in respect
of the same mental or physical examination. (4)

Requisites for physician-client privilege

.1 civil case
.2 witness is a person authorized to practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics
.3 as to any advice or treatment given by him or any information which he may
have acquired in attending such patient in a professional capacity
.4 the information was necessary to enable him to act in that capacity
.5 the information would blacken the reputation of the patient
Escolin: The old rule used the word character (what the person actually is).
The new rules use the word reputation (what people think of the person).
Note that the patient need not be the source of the information.
Only persons authorized to practice medicine, surgery or obstetrics are covered
by the privilege. Hence, nurses, midwives and other people who attend to the ill
can be called to testify as to any matter.
The privilege does not cover expert opinion as long as the witness does not
testify to matters specifically referring to the patient.
There is no physician-patient privilege in criminal cases.
de Leon: What about civil cases impliedly instituted with criminal cases?

1) Cases
Lim v. CA, 214 SCRA 273 (1992) The physician-patient privilege is not violated by
permitting physician to give expert testimony regarding hypothetical facts.
Krohn v. CA, 233 SCRA 146 (1994) Non-physician testimony on a medical
psychologists report is not covered by the physician patient privilege. This is
hearsay but there was no objection.

4. Rule 130 24(d): Priest-Penitent Privilege

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(d) A minister or priest cannot, without the consent of the person

making the confession, be examined as to any confession made to or any
advice given by him in his professional character in the course of
discipline enjoined by the church to which the minister or priest belongs;
Requisites for Priest-Penitent Privilege
.1 witness is a minister or priest
.2 as to any confession made to or any advice given by him in his professional
character
.3 in the course of discipline enjoined by the church to which the minister or
priest belongs

5. State Secrets
a. Rule 130 24(e)
(e) A public officer cannot be examined during his term of office or
afterwards, as to communications made to him in official confidence,
when the court finds that the public interest would suffer by the
disclosure. (21a)
Requisites for the State Secrets rule
.1 witness is a public officer
.2 as to communications made to him in official confidence
.3 the court finds that the public interest would suffer by the disclosure

b. Cases
US v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974) absent a claim of need to protect military,
diplomatic or sensitive national security secrets, executive privilege can not
prevail over due process
Banco Filipino v. Monetary Board, 142 SCRA 523 (1986) confidential
information is not necessarily privileged; no public interest is prejudiced by
disclosure, thus not protected; is there a need for a law to declare it confidential?

6. Newsmans Privilege
a. RA 53 as amended by RA 1477
Sec. 1. Without prejudice to his liability under the civil and criminal
laws, the publisher, editor, columnist or duly accredited reporter of any
newspaper, magazine or periodical of general circulation cannot be
compelled to reveal the source of any news-report or information
appearing in said publication which was related in confidence to such
publisher, editor or reporter unless the court or a House or committee of
Congress finds that such revelation is demanded by the security of the
State.
Requisites of newsmans privilege
.1 publisher, editor, columnist or duly accredited reporter
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.2 of any newspaper, magazine or periodical of general circulation

.3 cannot be compelled to reveal
.4 as to the source of any news report or information appearing in said
publication
.5 related in confidence
Exception: Court, a House or committee of Congress finds that such revelation is
demanded by the security of the State.

b. Cases
Matter of Farber (A.B.), 394 A. 2d 330 (1978) Constitution prevails over shield
law, but entitled to hearing to prove relevance.

7. Bank Deposits (RA 1405)

Sec. 2. All deposits of whatever nature with banks or banking
institutions in the Philippines including investments in bonds issued by
the Government of the Philippines, its political subdivisions and its
instrumentalities, are hereby considered as of an absolutely confidential
nature and may not be examined, inquired or looked into by any person,
government official, bureau or office, except upon written permission of
the depositor, or in cases of impeachment, or upon order of a competent
court in cases of bribery or dereliction of duty of public officials, or in
cases where the money deposited or invested is the subject matter of the
litigation.
Note that the privilege applies only to bank deposits. As to other property being
held by a bank, bank personnel may be examined upon order of a court (Sec.
55.1 [d], RA 8791, General Banking Act of 2000).

K.Parental and Filial Privilege

1. Rule 130 25
Sec. 25. Parental and filial privilege. No person may be compelled to
testify against his parents, other direct ascendants, children or other
direct descendants. (20a)
There is no distinction between legitimate or illegitimate relations.
Note that this is a testimonial privilege, not a testimonial disqualification, found
in 22-24 of Rule 130 [careful not to be confused in the multiple use of the word
privilege]. Here, the witness is the holder of the privilege and has the power to
invoke or waive the privilege. The relative against whom he is testifying can not
invoke nor waive the privilege. However this must be construed in the light of
Art. 215 of the Family Code
Art. 215. No descendant shall be compelled, in a criminal case, to testify against his parents
and grandparents, except when such testimony is indispensable in a crime against the
descendant or by one parent against the other. (315a)

Hence, a descendant may be compelled to testify in a criminal case where

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.1 the descendant-witness himself is the victim, or

.2 the descendant-witnesss parent commits a crime against the descendantwitnesss other parent.
Note that an ascendant may not be compelled to testify even if it is a crime by
the descendant against the ascendant-witness. The ascendant-witness may
testify voluntarily though.

2. Case
People v. Publico, 7 CAR (2s) 703 (1972) information given by child to 3rd
person is protected

L. Admissions
Admissions that are admissible against a party
.1 Admissions against interest
.2 Compromises
.3 Exceptions to Res Inter Alios Acta
.a Partners/Agents admissions
.b Co-conspirators statements
.c Admission by Privies
.4 Admissions by silence

1. Admissions against interest

a. Rule 130, 26
Sec. 26. Admissions of a party. The act, declaration or omission of a
party as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence against him. (22)
The general rule is evidence as to extra-judicial acts, omissions, and declarations
(AODs) of a party is admissible. These evidences can either be favorable or
unfavorable to a party. Rule 130, 26 expressly allows evidence of AODs
prejudicial to the AODer. However, an objection may be raised as to the
admissibility of AODs favorable to the AODer on the grounds of that these are
self-serving AODs. The argument is Rule 130 26 only allows evidence of AODs
prejudicial to the AODer. However, 26 is only a rule of admissibility. It allows
evidence of AODs prejudicial to the AODer, but does not prohibit evidence on
AODs favorable to AODer. There being no express prohibition, any evidence on
AODs favorable to the AODer falls under the general rule that evidence not
excluded by law or the Rules is admissible (Rule 128 3). Any doubt as to such
evidence refers to its weight or probative value and not to its admissibility.
Self-serving statements = hearsay? Declaration against interest is an exception
to the hearsay rule only applies if the declarant is deceased or unable to testify.

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Self-defeating statements can not be excluded by the hearsay rule because it is

expressly admissible by the rules.
Is personal knowledge on the part of the AODer required?

b. Cases
Keller & Co. v. COB presidents admission binds corporation

2. Compromises
a. Rule 130, 27
Sec. 27. Offer of compromise not admissible. In civil cases, an offer
of compromise is not an admission of any liability, and is not admissible
in evidence against the offeror. In criminal cases, except those involving
quasi-offenses (criminal negligence) or those allowed by law to be
compromised, an offer of compromise by the accused may be received in
evidence as an implied admission of guilt.
A plea of guilty later withdrawn, or an unaccepted offer of a plea of
guilty to a lesser offense, is not admissible in evidence against the
accused who made the plea or offer.
An offer to pay or the payment of medical, hospital or other expenses
occasioned by an injury is not admissible in evidence as proof of civil or
criminal liability for the injury. (24a)
Note that the offer of compromise in civil cases is not admissible only as
evidence of liability. If the offer of compromise is offered as evidence on other
matters (e.g. amount of liability), then the evidence is admissible.
In civil cases, an offer of compromise is inadmissible regardless of the cause of
action. In criminal cases, the general rule is an offer of compromise is
admissible. However, it is inadmissible under the following cases:
.1 quasi-offenses (criminal negligence)
.2 cases allowed by law to be compromised (e.g. BIR can compromise tax cases)
.3 plea of guilty later withdrawn
.4 unaccepted offer to plead guilty to a lesser offense
.5 offer to pay or payment of expenses occasioned by an injury
.6 [the offer is made only to avoid the consequences of litigation]
Note that the inadmissible offer to pay refers only to expenses occasioned by an
injury. It does not include offers to pay other expenses. Ergo, an offer to pay for
damages to property is admissible in criminal cases.
Further note that an offer to pay for expenses other than those occasioned by an
injury is inadmissible in civil cases. Though the 3rd paragraph of 27 excludes in
civil cases offers to pay only for expenses occasioned by an injury, offers to pay
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for other expenses fall under the general rule that an offer to compromise in civil
cases is not admissible. The exclusion in civil cases of offers to pay for expenses
occasioned by an injury is merely a superfluity. Even if the exclusion was
expressly applied to only criminal cases, an offer to pay for expenses occasioned
by an injury is in the nature of an offer to compromise which is undoubtedly
admissible in civil cases. The bottomline is: an offer to pay for any expense in
civil cases is inadmissible.

b. Cases
Veradero v. Insular Lumber, 46 Phil. 176 (1924) evidence on an offer to
compromise is admissible even in civil cases if it is to prove amount of a liability
and not the liability itself.
US v. Torres, 34 Phil. 994 (1916) offer of compromise in criminal cases
inadmissible when accused shows that it was made not under a consciousness of
guilt, but merely to avoid inconvenience of imprisonment or for some other
reason; in this case, the law allowed compromise, thus the offer to compromise is
not admitted
People v. Godoy, 250 SCRA 676 (1995) offer to compromise made by a person
other than the accused is inadmissible if the accused repudiated the actions of
such person by raising the trial courts admission of evidence of such offer as an
error.
People v. de Guzman, 265 SCRA 228 (1996) the offer to compromise made by a
person other than the accused was admitted in evidence because the accused
failed to repudiate such acts by raising the trial courts admission of evidence on
such offer as an error.
People v. Yparriguirre, 268 SCRA 35 (1997) whether a complaint has been filed
or not is irrelevant as to the admissibility of an offer to compromise.
People v. Maqui, 27 Phil. 97 (1914)

3. Res Inter Alios Acta

a. Rule 130, 28
Sec. 28. Admission by third party. The rights of a party cannot be
prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of another, except as
hereinafter provided. (25a)
The general rule is extra-judicial acts of a person other than a party are
inadmissible against such party. However, the rules also provide for exceptions
.1 Partners admissions
.2 agents admissions
.3 admissions by a joint owner, joint debtor, or other person jointly interested
with the party.
.4 Co-conspirators statements
.5 Admission by privies

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Is personal knowledge required for these exceptions to apply?

b. Cases
People v. Tena, 215 SCRA 43 (1992)
Facts: Accused was convicted of robbery with homicide on the basis of an extrajudicial confession of another admitting his participation in the offense.
Held: This is not a co-conspirators statement because there was no evidence of
conspiracy independent of the extra-judicial confession. Furthermore, the
confession was executed long after the supposed conspiracy had ended.
Escolin: Had the co-conspirator taken the witness stand and pointed to his coaccused, the testimony would have been admissible. In this case, what was
presented was a merely his affidavit.
People v. Alegre, 94 SCRA 109 (1979) absent independent evidence of
conspiracy, extra-judicial confession of the accused is not admissible against
others
People v. Raquel, 265 SCRA 248 (1996) extra-judicial confession of accused can
not be used to implicate co-accused unless repeated in open court.

c. Exceptions
Note that all the exceptions to res inter alios acta require that the relationship be
proven by evidence independent of the act or declaration sought to be admitted.

1) Partners/Agents admissions
a) Rule 130, 29
Sec. 29. Admission by co-partner or agent. The act or declaration of a
partner or agent of the party within the scope of his authority and during
the existence of the partnership or agency, may be given in evidence
against such party after the partnership or agency is shown by evidence
other than such act or declaration. The same rule applies to the act or
declaration of a joint owner, joint debtor, or other person jointly
interested with the party. (26a)
Requisites for admission by co-partner or agent
.1 act or declaration of a partner, agent, or person jointly interested with the
party
.2 within the scope of authority
.3 made during the existence of the partnership, agency or joint interest
.4 the partnership, agency, or joint interest is shown by evidence other than such
act or declaration

b) Cases
Ormachea v. Trillana, 13 Phil 194 (1909) Discharge of a debt given by a
managing partner, 2 years after the partnership had been dissolved does not
qualify as a partners admission and can not prejudice or bind the other partners.
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Kiel v. Estate of Sabert, 46 Phil 193 (1924)

Facts: After a partner died, the remaining partner sought to recover his share in
the partnership.
Held: The declarations of one partner, not made in the presence of his co-partner,
are not competent to prove the existence of a partnership, between them as
against such other partner. The existence of a partnership cannot be established
by general reputation, rumor, or hearsay.
Mahlandt v. Wild Canid Survival, 588 F.2d 626 (8th Cir. 198) the jurisdiction in
which this case is decided has a law which explicitly declared that an act of a
party or his agent is not hearsay; agent need not have personal knowledge of his
statement as long as it is within the scope of his authority, may be used against
him and his principal

2) Co-conspirators statements
a) Rule 130, 30
Sec. 30. Admission by conspirator. The act or declaration of a
conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during its existence, may be
given in evidence against the co-conspirator after the conspiracy is
shown by evidence other than such act of declaration. (27)
Requisites for co-conspirators statements
.1 act or declaration of a conspirator
.2 relating to the conspiracy
.3 made during its existence
.4 the conspiracy is shown by evidence other than such act of declaration.

b) Cases
People v. Cabrera, 57 SCRA 715 (1974)
Facts: Accused was convicted based on the extra-judicial confession of his coaccused.
Held: The statement was made after, not during, the conspiracy, hence it was
inadmissible.
People v. Yatco, 97 Phil. 941 (1955) confession regarding conspiracy may be
used against confessor (multiple admissibility); confession regarding conspiracy
should be conditionally admitted until conspiracy is proved; statements must be
made during the conpiracy and in furtherance of its object to be admissible
People v. Chaw Yaw Shun, 23 SCRA 127 (1968) conspiracy must be proved by
independent evidence other than the confession; reiterated in furtherance
People v. Serrano, 105 Phil. 531 (1959) requirement that conspiracy must be
shown 1st other than confession applies only to extra-judicial confessions not to
testimony in open court
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3) Admission by Privies
a) Rule 130, 31
Sec. 31. Admission by privies. Where one derives title to property
from another, the act, declaration, or omission of the latter, while
holding the title, in relation to the property, is evidence against the
former. (211)

Requisites for admission by privies

.1 a party derives title to property from another
.2 act, declaration, or omission of the transferor
.3 made while holding the title
.4 in relation to the property
Tequillo: Does this not violate the Property Registration Decree, that says 3 rd
parties are not bound unless the encumbrance is registered?

b) Cases
Alpuerto v. Pastor, 38 Phil. 785 (1918) privies denotes any act whereby the
successor is substituted in the place of the predecessor in interest; purchaser at
execution sale is a privy of the execution debtor; 3 rd parties are persons who
have not intervened in the execution of the instrument either as principals or
witnesses
City of Manila v. Del Rosario, 5 Phil. 227 (1905) admission must be made while
one holds title

4. Admissions by silence
a. Rule 130 32
Sec. 32. Admission by silence. An act or declaration made in the
presence and within the hearing or observation of a party who does or
says nothing when the act or declaration is such as naturally to call for
action or comment if not true, and when proper and possible for him to
do so, may be given in evidence against him. (23a)
Requisites for admission by silence
.1 The act or declaration is made in the presence and within the hearing or
observation of a party
.2 The party does or says nothing
.3 The act or declaration naturally calls for action or comment if not true
.4 Such action or comment is proper and possible on the part of the party.

b. Cases
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People v. Paragsa, 84 SCRA 105 (1978) Failure by a supposed rape victim to

rebut sweetheart defense based on testimonial evidence may be taken against
her. Requirements for admission by silence: 1) heard and understood, 2) at
liberty to deny, 3) affects his rights, 4) within his knowledge, and 5) material to
the issue
People v. Alegre, 94 SCRA 109 (1979) silence of accused in custody during
investigation can not be used as evidence against him
Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 853 (1965) court may not comment on accuseds
failure to testify regarding facts within his knowledge

M.

Confessions

1. Rule 130, 33
Sec. 33. Confession. The declaration of an accused acknowledging
his guilt of the offense charged, or of any offense necessarily included
therein, may be given in evidence against him. (29a)
This rule is applicable only in criminal cases.
A confession need not be in writing in order to be admissible in evidence.
If it is in writing, it is NOT required to be under oath.
Escolin: However, if it is not in writing, the prosecution may find difficulty in
proving it.

2. Art. III, 12 and 17, 1987 Constitution

Section 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission
of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to remain
silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his
own choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must
be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing
and in the presence of counsel.
(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other
means which vitiate the free will shall be used against him. Secret
detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or other similar forms of
detention are prohibited.
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or
Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence against him.
Section 17. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against
himself.

3. Rule 115 (e)

Sec. 1. Rights of accused at trial. xxx
(e) To be exempt from being compelled to be a witness against himself.

4. Cases

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People v. Sarmiento, 147 SCRA 252 (1987) A confession, to be admissible, must

have been executed in the presence of counsel. Waiver of right to counsel must
be with the assistance of counsel.
People v. Marra, 236 SCRA 565 (1994) Where the confession was made even
before the accused was under custodial investigation, it is admissible even if he
was not assisted by counsel. Custodial investigation involves any questioning
initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody
or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. Only after
the investigation ceases to be a general inquiry into an unsolved crime and
begins to focus on a particular suspect, the suspect is taken into custody, and the
police carries out a process of interrogations that lends itself to eliciting
incriminating statements that the accused is said to be under custodial
investigation.
People v. Sumayo, 70 SCRA 488 (1976) Where the extra-judicial confessions of
the accused are consistent in many material details and manifest amazing
consistency and accuracy in the narration of events and of facts which could not
have been known to the police investigators if the same were not voluntarily
given by the accused, such statements are admissible against the accused on the
doctrine of interlocking confessions.
de Leon: The value of the doctrine of interlocking confessions is when a
confession is inadmissible against one accused (e.g. obtained without counsel),
but it is nevertheless admissible against the other co-accused. The confession of
one may be used against another to produce evidence of guilt beyond reasonable
doubt.
People v. Compil, 244 SCRA 135 (1995)
People v. Wong Chuen Ming, 256 SCRA 182 (1996)
People v. Alegre, 94 SCRA 109 (1979)
People v. Yip Wai Ming, 264 SCRA 224 (1996)
People v. Maqueda, 242 SCRA 565 (1995)
Bruton v. US,
Parker v. Randolph, 442 U.S. 62 (1979)
People v. Encipido, G.R. No. 7009l, Dec. 29, 1986

N.Previous Conduct as Evidence

1. Rule 130, 34-35
Sec. 34. Similar acts as evidence. Evidence that one did or did not do
a certain thing at one time is not admissible to prove that he did or did
not do the same or a similar thing at another time; but it may be received
to prove a specific intent or knowledge, identity, plan, system, scheme,
habit, custom or usage, and the like. (48 a)

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GR: Evidence that one did or did not do a certain thing at one time is not
admissible to prove that he did or did not do the same or a similar thing at
another time
Exceptions: It may be received to prove a specific
.1 intent
.2 knowledge
.3 identity
.4 plan
.5 system
.6 scheme
.7 habit
.8 custom or
.9 usage, and
.10

the like.

Sec. 35. Unaccepted offer. An offer in writing to pay a particular sum

of money or to deliver a written instrument or specific personal property
is, if rejected without valid cause, equivalent to the actual production and
tender of the money instrument, or property. (49 a)

2. Cases
US v. Evangelista, 24 Phil 453 (1913) In a trial for arson, the prosecution may
prove that the accused had attempted to set fire to the house on the day previous
to the burning alleged in the information, for the purpose of showing the intent
of the accused in subsequently setting fire to the house. Where a person is
charged wit the commission of a specific crime, testimony may be received of the
other similar acts committed about the same time, only for the purpose of
establishing the criminal intent of the accused.
US v. Pineda, 37 Phil 457 (1918)
Facts: A druggist filled a prescription for protassium chlorate with barium
chlorate, a poison, causing the death of two horses. After analyzing the
packages, two chemists went to the drug store of the defendant and bought
potassium chlorate, which when analyzed was found to be barium chlorate.
Held: The testimony of the chemist was admissible in order to demonstrate
defendant's motive and negligence. It is permissible to ascertain defendant's
knowledge and intent and to fix his negligence. If the defendant has on more
than one occasion performed similar acts, accident in good faith is possibly
excluded, negligence is intensified, and fraudulent intent may even be
established. There is no better evidence of negligence than the frequency of
accidents. Evidence is admissible in a criminal action which tends to show
motive, although it tends to prove the commission of another offense by the
defendant.
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People v. Irang, 64 Phil 285 (1937)

Facts:
After barging into her home, a man ordered Maximiniana Vicente to bring out
her money and jewelry. As she turned over the items, she looked at the man's
face and saw that he had pockmarks and a scar on his left eyelid. Irang was
identified by Maximiana from a police line-up and was charged. During the trial,
Maximianas neighbor, Juana de la Cruz, testified that on the night in question,
her house was assaulted by malefactors. de la Cruz noticed that one of them had
pockmarks and a scar on the left eyelid. She identified that man to be Irang.
Held: The testimony of Juana de la Cruz indirectly corroborates Maximinianas
testimony that the man of the same description was the one who went to her
house and demanded delivery of her money and jewelry. While evidence of
another crime is, as a rule, not admissible in a prosecution for robbery, it is
admissible when it is otherwise relevant, as where it tends to identify defendant
as the perpetrator of the robbery charged, or tends to show his presence at the
scene or in the vicinity of the crime at the time charged, or when it is evidence of
a circumstance connected with the crime.
People v. Soliman, 53 O.G. 8083 (1957)
People v. Babiera, 52 Phil. 97 (1928)
US v. Mercado, 26 Phil. 127 (1913)

O. Hearsay Rule
1. Testimonial Knowledge
a. Rule 130, 36
Sec. 36. Testimony generally confined to personal knowledge; hearsay
excluded. A witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of his
personal knowledge; that is, which are derived from his own perception,
except as otherwise provided in these rules. (30 a)

b. Cases
People v. Damaso, 212 SCRA 547 (1992) Hearsay evidence, whether objected to
or not, cannot be given credence. The lack of objection may make any
incompetent evidence admissible. But admissibility of evidence should not be
equated with weight of evidence. Hearsay evidence whether objected to or not
has no probative value.
People v. Brioso, 37 SCRA 336 (1971)
People v. Cusi, 14 SCRA 944 (1965)
People v. Gaddi, 170 SCRA 649 (1989)
Leake v. Hagert, 175 N.W.2d 675 (1970)
U.S. v. Zenni, 492 F. Supp. 464 (1980)

2. Exceptions
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Exceptions to the hearsay rule

.1 waiver
.2 independently relevant evidence
.3 dying declaration
.4 Declaration against interest
.5 Act or declaration about pedigree
.6 Family reputation or tradition regarding pedigree
.7 Common reputation
.8 Part of the res gestae
.9 Verbal acts
.10

Entries in the course of business

.11

Entries in official records

.12

Commercial lists and the like

.13

Learned treatises

.14

Testimony or deposition at a former proceeding

a. Dying Declaration
1) Rule 130, 37
Sec. 37. Dying declaration. The declaration of a dying person, made
under the consciousness of an impending death, may be received in any
case wherein his death is the subject of inquiry, as evidence of the cause
and surrounding circumstances of such death. (31 a)
Requisites for admissibility of a dying declaration
.1 declaration of a dying person
.2 made under the consciousness of an impending death
.3 his death is the subject of inquiry
.4 as evidence of the cause and surrounding circumstances of such death

2) Cases
People v. Devaras, 37 SCRA 697 (1971)
Facts: The next morning after being stabbed or 11 hours later, as the victim was
about to be taken to the hospital, a patrolman was able to get his statement as to
the identity of the perpetrators. The victim was unable to sign the statement and
he died the next day.
Held: The statement was not part of the res gestae because of the lapse of
considerable time between the commission of the offense and the taking of the
statement. However, the statement amounts to a dying declaration, as it is a
statement coming from a seriously wounded person even if death occurs hours or
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days after it was inflicted if there be showing that it was due to the wound whose
gravity did not diminish from the time he made his declaration until the end
came. There is no need for proof that the declarant state "that he has given up
the hope of life. It is enough if. from the circumstances, it can be inferred with
certainty that such must have been his state of mind. It is sufficient that the
circumstances are such as to lead inevitably to the conclusion that the time [of
such statement] the declarant did not expect to survive the injury from which he
actually died. Its admissibility is not affected by death occurring hours or days
afterwards.
People v. Laquinon, 135 SCRA 91 (1985)
Facts: Pablo Remonde was shot. The barrio captain found him lying on the sand
at the bank of a river. Pablos hands were tied on his back and he was lying face
down. The barrio captain took Pablos ante-mortem statement and learned that
he was Pablo Remonde, he was shot by Gregorio Laquinon, and that Pablo was
not sure if he would survive the gunshot wounds he suffered. Pablo died in the
hospital 3 days later. Laquinon was charged and convicted of Murder. Laquinon
argues that the statement is not a dying declaration because it was not made
under the consciousness of an impending death.
Held: The statement of the deceased Pablo Remonde is not admissible as a dying
declaration since the deceased was in doubt as to whether he would die or not.
The declaration fails to show that the deceased believed himself in extremis, at
the point of death when every hope of recovery is extinct, which is the sole basis
for admitting this kind of declarations as an exception to the hearsay rule. It may
be admitted, however, as part of the res gestae since the statement was made
immediately after the incident and the deceased Pablo Remonde had no
sufficient time to concoct a charge against the accused.
de Leon: In Devaras, consciousness of impending death was inferred from the
extent of the injuries. In Laquinon, the declarant expressly said that he was not
sure that we was going to die. The moral of the story is, in taking a dying
declaration, dont ask if the declarant thinks he will die.
People v. Sabio, 102 SCRA 218 (1981)
Facts: Catralino Espina was found by his grandnephew in his house lying and
wounded. Espina asked for the police. When police officers arrived, they asked
Espina who slashed and robbed him. Espina answered that it was Sabio. His
declaration was taken down and thumbmarked by him. Sabio was charged and
convicted of robbery with homicide. Sabio questions the admissibility of the
declaration on the ground that it was not made under the consciousness of an
impending death because the victim had hopes of recovery for his first word to
his grandnephew was for the latter to fetch the police.
Held: Statement is admissible. The seriousness of the injury on the victim's
forehead which had affected the brain and was profusely bleeding; the victim's
inability to speak unless his head was raised; the spontaneous answer of the
victim that "only Papu Sabio is responsible for my death"; and his subsequent
demise from the direct effects of the wound on his forehead, strengthen the
conclusion that the victim must have known that his end was inevitable. That
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death did not ensue till 3 days after the declaration was made will not alter its
probative force since it is not indispensable that a declarant expires immediately
thereafter. It is the belief in impending death and not the rapid succession of
death, that renders the dying declaration admissible. The fact that the victim told
his grandnephew to fetch the police, does not negative the victim's feeling of
hopelessness of recovery but rather emphasizes the realization that he had so
little time to disclose his assailant to the authorities.
However, only homicide was proved. The evidence supportive of the charge of
robbery is at best circumstantial and does not establish beyond reasonable doubt
that the accused had carried away personality belonging to the offended party.
There was no eyewitness to the alleged robbery, nor was any part of the alleged
missing objects recovered. The consummation of the robbery cannot he inferred
nor presumed from the circumstance that the accused was seen running "with
his hands inside his shirt", or that the "barro", alleged to have contained cash
amounting to about P8, was seen on the floor, open and empty, or that the things
and merchandise inside the house were in disarray. Nor can the dying
declaration of the victim be admitted to establish the fact of robbery. The
admission of dying declarations has always been strictly limited to criminal
prosecutions for homicide or murder as evidence of the cause and surrounding
circumstances of death.
de Leon: Could not have the statement been admissible as proof of Sabios guilt
of robbery as a part of the res gestae?
People v. de Joya, 203 SCRA 343 (1991)
Facts: Eulalia Deamse was fatally wounded. Her grandson, Alvin Valencia, came
home and found her wounded. He asked his grandmother "Apo, Apo, what
happened?" The deceased victim said: "Si Paqui". After uttering those two words,
she expired. It is not disputed that "Paqui" is the nickname of Pioquinto de Joya.
De Joya was charged and convicted of robbery with homicide.
Held: A dying declaration to be admissible must be complete in itself. To be
complete in itself does not mean that the declarant must recite everything that
constituted the res gestae of the subject of his statement, but that his statement
of any given fact should be a full expression of all that he intended to say as
conveying his meaning in respect of such fact. The statement as offered must not
be merely a part of the whole as it was expressed by the declarant; it must be
complete as far it goes. It is immaterial how much of the whole affair of the death
is related, provided the statement includes all that the declarant wished or
intended to include in it. Thus, if an interruption cuts short a statement which
thus remains clearly less than that which the dying person wished to make, the
fragmentary statement is not receivable, because the intended whole is not
there, and the whole might be of a very different effect from that of the
fragment; yet if the dying person finishes the statement he wishes to make, it is
no objection that he has told only a portion of what he might have been able to
tell. Since the declarant was prevented from saying all that he wished to say,
what he did say might have been qualified by the statements which he was
prevented from making. That incomplete declaration is not therefore entitled to

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the presumption of truthfulness which constitutes the basis upon which dying
declarations are received.
In this case, the dying declaration of the deceased victim here was incomplete.
The words "Si Paqui" do not constitute by themselves a sensible sentence. The
phrase "Si Paqui" must, moreover, be related to the question asked by Alvin:
"Apo, Apo, what happened?" Alvin's question was not: "Apo, Apo, who did this to
you?" The deceased was cut off by death before she could convey a complete or
sensible communication to Alvin. The trial court simply assumed that by uttering
the words "Si Paqui", the deceased had intended to name her killer. But Eulalia
herself did not say so and we cannot speculate what the rest of her
communication might have been had death not interrupted her. We are unable to
regard the dying statement as a dying declaration naming the appellant as the
doer of the bloody deed.
Escolin: Justices Relova and Francisco and I disagree with this decision. Under
the context, what else could have Si Paqui meant other than that he was
responsible for the crime?
People v. Salison, G.R. No. L-115690, Feb. 20, 1996

b. Declaration Against Interest

1) Rule 130, 38
Sec. 38. Declaration against interest. The declaration made by a
person deceased, or unable to testify, against the interest of the
declarant, if the fact asserted in the declaration was at the time it was
made so far contrary to declarant's own interest, that a reasonable man
in his position would not have made the declaration unless he believed it
to be true, may be received in evidence against himself or his successors
in interest and against third persons. (32 a)
Requirements for hearsay testimony on declaration against interest
.1 declaration made by a person deceased, or unable to testify
.2 against the interest of the declarant
.3 the fact asserted in the declaration was at the time it was made so far
contrary to declarant's own interest, that a reasonable man in his position
would not have made the declaration unless he believed it to be true
.4 as evidence against himself or his successors in interest and against third
persons
cf Rule 130 Sec. 31
Sec. 31. Admission by privies. Where one derives title to property from another, the act,
declaration, or omission of the latter, while holding the title, in relation to the property, is
evidence against the former. (211)

Admission by privies

Declaration against interest

One of 3 exceptions to res inter alios Exception to hearsay

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acta
Evidence against the successor in Evidence
against
even
the
interest of the admitter
declarant, his successor in interest,
or 3rd persons
Admitter need not be dead or unable Declarant is dead or unable to
to testify
testify
Relates to title to property

Relates to any interest

Admission need not be against the Declaration must be against the

admitters interest
interest of the declarant

2) Cases
Viacrusis v. CA, 44 SCRA 176 (1972) Previous recognition of ownership in
another by a party in possession of property in dispute is admission against
interest which may be received even against 3rd persons.
People v. Toledo, 51 Phil. 825 (1928) Declaration against interest, as an
exception to the hearsay rule, covers not only pecuniary interest, but also penal
interest.
People v. Majuri, 96 SCRA 472 (1980)
Fuentes v. CA, 253 SCRA 430 (1996)

c. Pedigree
1) Rule 130, 39
Sec. 39. Act or declaration about pedigree. The act or declaration of
a person deceased, or unable to testify, in respect to the pedigree of
another person related to him by birth or marriage, may be received in
evidence where it occurred before the controversy, and the relationship
between the two persons is shown by evidence other than such act or
declaration. The word "pedigree" includes relationship, family genealogy,
birth, marriage, death, the dates when and the places where these facts
occurred, and the names of the relatives. It embraces also facts of family
history intimately connected with pedigree. (33 a)
Requisites for admissibility of hearsay evidence as to pedigree
.1 act or declaration of a person deceased, or unable to testify
.2 in respect to the pedigree of another person
.3 related to him by birth or marriage
.4 where it occurred before the controversy
.5 the relationship between the 2 persons is shown by evidence other than such
act or declaration.

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"Pedigree" includes relationship, family genealogy, birth, marriage, death, the

dates when and the places where these facts occurred, the names of the
relatives, and facts of family history intimately connected with pedigree.

2) Cases
Gravador v. Mamigo, 20 SCRA 742 (1967)
Tison v. CA, 276 SCRA 582 (1997)

d. Family Tradition
1) Rule 130, 40
Sec. 40. Family reputation or tradition regarding pedigree. The
reputation or tradition existing in a family previous to the controversy, in
respect to the pedigree of any one of its members, may be received in
evidence if the witness testifying thereon be also a member of the family,
either by consanguinity or affinity. Entries in family bibles or other family
books or charts, engravings on rings, family portraits and the like, may
be received as evidence of pedigree. (34 a)
Requisites for admissibility of hearsay evidence as to family reputation or
tradition regarding pedigree
.1 reputation or tradition existing in a family
.2 previous to the controversy
.3 in respect to the pedigree of any one of its members
.4 the witness testifying thereon be also a member of the family, either by
consanguinity or affinity
Entries in family bibles or other family books or charts, engravings on rings,
family portraits and the like, may be received as evidence of pedigree.
de Leon: note that in family tradition, the declarant must be dead or unable to
testify. In family reputation or tradition, there is not even a declarant to speak of;
just a witness who was aware of an exiting family reputation or tradition.

2) Case
People v. Alegado, 201 SCRA 37 (1991) Testimony of a witness and the witness
grandfather as to the date of birth and age of the witness is evidence on family
tradition which is admissible as an exception to hearsay.
Ferrer v. de Inchausti, 38 Phil 905 (1918) Entries in family bibles or other family
books or charts, engravings on rings, family portraits and the like, to be
admissible as an evidence of pedigree, need NOT be proven to have been made
at the same time as the occurrence of the events documented.

e. Common Reputation
1) Rule 130, 41
Sec. 41. Common reputation. Common reputation existing previous
to the controversy, respecting facts of public or general interest more
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than thirty years old, or respecting marriage or moral character, may be

given in evidence. Monuments and inscriptions in public places may be
received as evidence of common reputation. (35)
Requisites for admissibility of hearsay evidence as to Common reputation
.1 Common reputation
.2 existing previous to the controversy
.3 respecting either
.a facts of public or general interest more than 30 years old, or
.b marriage or
.c moral character
Monuments and inscriptions in public places may be received as evidence of
common reputation.

2) Cases
City of Manila v. Del Rosario, 5 Phil 227 (1905)

f. Res Gestae
1) Rule 130, 42
Sec. 42. Part of the res gestae. Statements made by a person while a
startling occurrence is taking place or immediately prior or subsequent
thereto with respect to the circumstances thereof, may be given in
evidence as part of the res gestae. xxx
Requisites for admissibility of hearsay evidence as to res gestae
.1 Statements made by a person either
.a while a startling occurrence is taking place or
.b immediately prior or
.c immediately subsequent thereto
.2 with respect to the circumstances thereof

2) Cases
People v. Putian, 74 SCRA 133 (1976) A declaration made by a person
immediately after being wounded, pointing out or naming his assailant, may be
considered as part of the res gestae and is admissible in evidence. A statement
was given sometime after the stabbing while the declarant was undergoing
treatment at a medical clinic, where he had no time to concoct a falsehood or to
fabricate a malicious charge against the accused and no motive has been shown
as to why he would frame-up the accused would render the statement admissible
as a part of the res gestae.
People v. Peralta, 237 SCRA 218 (1994)
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Facts: Atanacia Ramos had a daughter Rosita. Rosita married Domiciano Peralta.
They had a daughter Siony. On morning, Siony came to Atanacia at her house
frantically told her that Domiciano was strangling Rosita. They went to the
Peralta home and found Rosita dead. Domiciano was not there. They immediately
reported the matter to the police, who eventually arrested the Domiciano. At the
preliminary investigation, Siony executed a sworn statement implicating her
father. Domiciano was charged with Parricide. At the trial Atanacia testified as to
Sionys declaration. However, Siony testified for her father and said that though
she saw someone strangling her mother, she did not see who it was. After the
defense rested, the prosecution presented the investigating judge who testified
as to the regularity of the conduct of the preliminary investigation. TC convicts.
Held: The statement Siony made to her grandmother when she rushed to inform
her of her father's attack on her mother was part of the res gestae. Res gestae
means the "thing done." It refers to those exclamations and statements made by
either the participants, victims or spectators to a crime immediately before,
during or immediately after the commission of the crime, when the
circumstances are such that the statements were made as a spontaneous
reaction or utterance inspired by the excitement of the occasion and there was
no opportunity for the declarant to deliberate and to fabricate a false statement.
Siony rushed to Atanacia immediately upon seeing her father strangling her
mother to death. Her spontaneous declaration to Atanacia was part of the res
gestae and is assumed to preclude the probability of premeditation of
fabrication. Since the utterance was made under the immediate and uncontrolled
domination of the senses rather than reason and reflection, and during the brief
period when consideration of self-interest could not have been fully brought to
bear, the utterance may be taken as expressing Siony's real belief as to the facts
just observed by her.
Besides, where a witness executes a statement for the prosecution and retracts
his testimony and subsequently testified for the defense, the test to decide which
testimony to believe is one of comparison coupled with the application of the
general rules of evidence. Retractions are generally unreliable and are looked
upon with considerable disfavor by the courts. Siony testified during the
preliminary examination conducted by Judge Paano that the appellant choked
her mother to death. Her subsequent retraction was an afterthought and has no
probative value at all.
Furthermore, there are certain circumstances that may have persuaded the
daughter to change her former declaration and testify in favor of her father.
First, the accused was her father after all, and she probably felt that she should
not be responsible for his incarceration for the rest of his life. Second, her
testimony was given 7 years after the incident and therefore could not be
expected to be as accurate as the statement she made in the preliminary
investigation only hours after the killing. Third, during all this time, her father
had been under detention and she must have believed that this was punishment
enough for him. Lastly, she was, at the time she testified in court, living with her
father's sister, who may have greatly influenced her testimony and caused her to
recant her earlier statement.

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g. Verbal acts
1) Rule 130, 42
Sec. 42. Part of the res gestae. xxx So, also, statements
accompanying an equivocal act material to the issue, and giving it a legal
significance, may be received as part of the res gestae (36 a)
Requisites for admissibility of hearsay evidence as to verbal acts
.1 statements accompanying an equivocal act
.2 material to the issue
.3 giving it a legal significance

2) Case
Dusepec v. Torres, 39 Phil 760 (1919)
Facts: Tan Po Pik died in the Philippines intestate. After he died, Marta Torres,
claiming to be his widow, took possession of his estate and partitioned it between
herself and her children by the deceased. Plaintiffs claim to be the legal wife and
children of the deceased from China. They now sue to recover their supposed
share of the estate. The SC found numerous inconsistencies as to the testimonial
and documentary evidence of the plaintiffs as to lead to the conclusion that the
plaintiffs are not who they claim to be. However, the plaintiff offered in evidence
a sworn declaration of the deceased that the plaintiffs were his children.
Defendants offered letters between the deceased and his brother showing that
deceaseds sworn declaration was to deceive the customs authorities to allow
plaintiffs to enter the country. Plaintiffs object to the admissibility of such letters.
Held: The declaration was made in proceedings before customs authorities upon
arrival of the plaintiffs from China. The arrival and admission of these plaintiffs
and the declaration of Tan Po Pik are isolated parts of an event which is the
voyage from China to the Philippines of these supposed children of the deceased.
Their preparations for the voyage and the plans conceived by them to obtain
their sure entrance into this country are also part of the voyage. In order to
consider the declaration made by Tan Po Pik before the customs authorities, the
other acts, declarations, and events occurring before the said entrance into the
country, which may have an essential bearing or which have led to the realization
of their entrance into the country are admissible in evidence in this case on the
ground that they constitute parts of the same transaction, or of the res gestae. A
word, an expression, or an act of a person, considered apart from the
circumstances surrounding them, does not signify anything, and in many cases it
signifies the opposite of the true sense of the said word, expression, or act. It is
imprudent and illegal to consider the declaration made by Tan Po Pik before the
customs authorities separately from the circumstances which prompted him to
make such a declaration. We must therefore inquire into circumstances which
surrounded the entrance of the plaintiffs and the declaration made by Tan Po Pik
on that occasion.
In this case, letters between Tan Po Pik and his brother in China contained an
agreement that for plaintiffs to enter the Philippines, Tan Po Pik was to declare
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before the customs authorities that plaintiffs were his children. The names of the
children whom Tan were supposed to declare as his children were the same as
the names of the plaintiffs, except that they now bear the surname Tan. The
letters even refer to one of the plaintiffs as the deceaseds nephew. If these
plaintiffs were really children of Tan Po Pik, there would have been no necessity
for the above letters. Thus, Tan Po Piks declaration before the customs
authorities is for the sole purpose of allowing the children to enter the
Philippines, and such a declaration is entirely false. All these letters formed an
essential part of the fact of the coming of these plaintiffs to Manila, because if
these letters had not been transmitted and received the plaintiffs could not have
succeeded in entering the Philippines. Therefore, all the statements and
declarations-of Tan Po Ho in these documents relative to the prosecution of the
object of the conspiracy are admissible in evidence.
People v. Lungayan, 162 SCRA 100 (1988)
People v. Tolentino, 218 SCRA 337 (1993)

h. Entries in the Course of Business

1) Rule 130, 43
Sec. 43. Entries in the course of business. Entries made at, or near
the time of the transactions to which they refer, by a person deceased, or
unable to testify, who was in a position to know the facts therein stated,
may be received as prima facie evidence, if such person made the entries
in his professional capacity or in the performance of duty and in the
ordinary or regular course of business or duty. (37 a)
Requisites for admissibility of hearsay evidence as to Entries in the course of
business
.1 Entries made at, or near the time of the transactions to which they refer
.2 by a person deceased, or unable to testify
.3 who was in a position to know the facts therein stated
.4 if such person made the entries in his professional capacity or in the
performance of duty and in the ordinary or regular course of business or duty.
Note that in business records, the person making the entry must be deceased or
unable to testify. In official records, the person making the entry need not be
deceased or unable to testify (Rule 130, Sec. 44). Both official and business
records are only prima facie evidence.
If the person making the entry is still alive, use the record to refresh his memory.
(Rule 132, Sec. 16)

2) Cases
Palmer v. Hoffman, 318 U.S. 109 (1943)
Philamlife v. Capital Assurance Corp., (CA) 72 O.G. 3941

i. Official Records
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1) Rule 130, 44
Sec. 44. Entries in official records. Entries in official records made in
the performance of his duty by a public officer of the Philippines, or by a
person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law, are prima
facie evidence of the facts therein stated. (38)
Requisites for admissibility of hearsay evidence as to Entries in official records
.1 made in the performance of his duty
.2 by either
.a a public officer of the Philippines, or
.b by a person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law
Note that in official records, the person making the entry need not be deceased
or unable to testify, but he must be a public officer or a person in the
performance of a duty specially enjoined by law. In business records, the person
making the entry must be deceased or unable to testify. Both official and
business records are only prima facie evidence.

2) Cases
Fortus v. Novero, 23 SCRA 1330 (1968)
Facts: Ciriaca Angelo was the owner of the parcel of land. She had only one
child, Crisanta Ilagan. Crisanta predeceased her mother. Crisanta was married to
Fermin Fortus. They had an only son, the Victorino Fortus. Ciriaca died intestate.
The property therefore passed on to Victorino Fortus. However, Victorino never
caused the OCT to be cancelled and to have another issued in his name. Ciriacas
estate was therefore not yet closed.
Victorino Fortus and Julia Fortus were husband and wife but were childless.
Upon Victorino's death, Julia executed an affidavit of extra-judicial summary
settlement of Ciriacas estate and had it registered. Rosario Novero, claiming to
be an illegitimate child of Victorino with Patricia Novero, initiated proceedings
for summary settlement of Ciriacas estate. Julia opposed, along with the
Fortuses, who claim to be Victorinos half-brother and sisters. They claim to be
the legitimate children of Fermin Fortus with Jacoba Aguil.
The Fortuses did not present the marriage contract or certificate of their alleged
parents, but sought to present secondary evidence. The SC found the testimonial
evidence the Fortuses presented to lay the basis for introduction of secondary
evidence were inconsistent, incredible and insufficient to establish than an
original marriage contract was indeed executed. However, the Fortuses
presented baptismal certificates of some of them to prove the marriage of their
parents. Note that they must prove marriage because otherwise, they would be
illegitimate relatives of Victorino which would disqualify them from inheriting
from him.
Held: The record of baptism attests to the fact of the administration of the
sacrament on the date stated therein, but not the truth of the statements therein
made as to the parentage of the child baptized. Neither are the baptismal
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certificates public documents or public writings, because the parochial records

of baptisms are not public or official records, as they are not kept by public
officers, and are not proof of relationship or filiation of the child baptized.
Furthermore, though the Fortuses invoke that since for the past 30 years their
parents had deported themselves in public as husband and wife and had been
living under the same roof, the legal presumption is that they had entered into a
lawful marriage. This presumption, however, is only applicable where there is no
clear and concrete evidence showing otherwise. In this case, however, there is a
certificate from the Division of Archives to the effect that 'no copy of the
marriage record of spouses Fermin Fortus and Jacoba Aguil supposed to have
been solemnized in the year 1902 and 1905 in the Municipality of Rosario,
Batangas had been received by said office for file', and this certification is
further strengthened by the affirmation of Clemente Barbosa, a clerk in the office
of the municipal treasurer of Rosario, Batangas, that there was no record of such
marriage supposedly contracted between the spouses Fermin Fortus and Jacoba
Aguil from 1902 and 1922 of the Municipality of Rosario, Batangas. At most, the
baptismal certificates were only a prima facie proof which oppositor Julia Fortus
had overcome by satisfactory evidence to the effect that Fermin Fortus and
Jacoba Aguil were never married and hence all of their children are not
legitimate brothers or half brothers and therefore have no right to inherit from
Victorino Fortus.
Escolin: Before, baptismal certificates were competent evidence to establish the
parentage of the child. After Act 3753, baptismal certificates were no longer
competent.
Johnson v. Lutz, ()
Africa v. Caltex, 16 SCRA 448 (1966)
People v. Leones, 117 SCRA 382 (1982)
Manalo v. Robles Trans. Co., Inc., 99 Phil. 729 (1956)
People v. Cabuang, 217 SCRA 675 (1993)
People v. Gabriel, G.R. No. L-107735, Feb. 1, 1996

j. Commercial Lists
1) Rule 130, 45
Sec. 45. Commercial lists and the like. Evidence of statements of
matters of interest, to persons engaged in an occupation contained in a
list, register, periodical, or other published compilation is admissible as
tending to prove the truth of any relevant matter so stated if that
compilation is published for use by persons engaged in that occupation
and is generally used and relied upon by them therein. (39)
Requisites for admissibility of hearsay evidence as to Commercial lists
.1 statements of matters of interest

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.2 to persons engaged in an occupation

.3 contained in a list, register, periodical, or other published compilation
.4 as tending to prove the truth of any relevant matter so stated
.5 the compilation is
.a published for use by persons engaged in that occupation and
.b generally used and relied upon by them therein.
e.g. NEDA reports, part of the newspaper which reports the prices of shares

2) Cases
State v. Lungsford, 400 A.2d 843 (1979)
Estrada vs. Noble, [C.A,] 49 O.G. 139

k. Learned Treatises
1) Rule 130, 46
Sec. 46. Learned treatises. A published treatise, periodical or
pamphlet on a subject of history, law, science or art is admissible as
tending to prove the truth of a matter stated therein if the court takes
judicial notice, or a witness expert in the subject testifies that the writer
of the statement in the treatise, periodical or pamphlet is recognized in
his profession or calling as expert in the subject. (40 a)
Requisites for admissibility of hearsay evidence as to Learned treatises (used to
prove unwritten foreign law)
.1 published treatise, periodical or pamphlet
.2 on a subject of history, law, science or art
.3 Either
.a the court takes judicial notice, or
.b a witness expert in the subject testifies
.4 that the writer of the statement in the treatise, periodical or pamphlet is
recognized in his profession or calling as expert in the subject

2) Cases
Yao Kee v. Sy-Gonzales, 167 SCRA 736 (1988) Philippine courts can not take
judicial notice of foreign law. Failure to prove foreign law whether unwritten
under Rule 130, Sec. 46 or written under Rule 132, Sec. 24, raises the
presumption that the law is the same as ours.
Escolin: This provision is useful to prove an unwritten law. E.g. learned treatises
on unwritten law which the court has taken judicial notice: Manresa, SanchezRoman. E.g. of writers of treatises acknowledged as experts: Corpus juris,
Corpus juris secundum, LRA
If it is a written law that is sought to be proven, cf Rule 132, Sec. 19
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Sec. 19. Classes of documents. For the purpose of their presentation in evidence, documents
are either public or private.
Public documents are:
(a) The written official acts, or records of the official acts of the sovereign authority, official
bodies and tribunals, and public officers, whether of the Philippines, or of a foreign country;
xxx

E.g. of written official acts: Judicial decisions, executive orders. Our courts take
judicial notice of local laws. However, there are certain instances when an official
copy of the written official act is required to be presented. cf Rule 132, Sec. 24
Sec. 24. Proof of official record. The record of public documents referred to in paragraph (a)
of Section 19, when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication
thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his
deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that
such officer has the custody. If the office in which the record is kept is in a foreign country,
the certificate may be made by a secretary of the embassy or legation, consul general, consul,
vice consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines
stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of
his office. (25 a)

Ways to prove written foreign official acts

.1 official publication, or
.2 copy
.a attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his
deputy, and
.b if the record is not kept in the Philippines
)1

accompanied with a certificate that such officer has the custody

made by
)a

a secretary of the embassy or legation

)b

consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent or

)c
)2

by any Philippine officer in the foreign service stationed in the

foreign country in which the record is kept
and, authenticated by the seal of his office.

l. Prior Testimony
1) Rule 130, 47
Sec. 47. Testimony or deposition at a former proceeding. The
testimony or deposition of a witness deceased or unable to testify, given
in a former case or proceeding, judicial or administrative, involving the
same parties and subject matter, may be given in evidence against the
adverse party who had the opportunity to cross-examine him. (41 a)
cf with the rules on admissions (Rule 130 Secs. 26-33, RoC) and interrogatories
(Rule 24, RoC)

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Requisites for admissibility of hearsay evidence as to prior testimony

.1 testimony or deposition
.2 of a witness deceased or unable to testify
.3 given in a former case or proceeding
.4 involving the same parties and subject matter
.5 as evidence against the adverse party
.6 adverse party had the opportunity to cross-examine him

2) Cases
Tan v. CA, 20 SCRA 54 (1967) Absent a showing that the witness is dead, outside
the Philippines, or unable to testify, their prior testimony is inadmissible. Mere
refusal to testify is does not amount to inability to testify. The party could have
urged to court to have these witnesses summoned, arrested, and punished for
contempt in case of refusal to obey the summons.
People v. Liwanag, 73 SCRA 473 (1976)
Facts: The prosecution moved that the testimony of the witnesses presented
during the preliminary investigation of this case be adopted as part of the
evidence in chief of the prosecution. The trial court granted the motion subject to
the condition that the witnesses be further cross-examined by counsel for the
accused. At the trial, the witnesses for the prosecution who testified at the
preliminary investigation were recalled and were again cross-examined by
counsel for the appellant.
Held: The testimony sought to be made part of the evidence in chief are not exparte affidavits, but testimony of witnesses taken down by question and answer
during the preliminary investigation in the presence of the accused and his
counsel who subjected the said witnesses to a rigid and close cross-examination.
The inclusion of said testimony was made subject to the right of the defendant to
further cross-examine the witnesses whose testimony are sought to be
reproduced and, pursuant to said order, the witnesses were recalled to the stand
during the trial and again examined in the presence of the appellant. Upon the
facts, there was no curtailment of the constitutional right of the accused to meet
the witnesses face to face.
Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980)

P. Opinion Rule
1. Rule 130, 48-50
Sec. 48. General rule. The opinion of a witness is not admissible,
except as indicated in the following sections. (42)
Sec. 49. Opinion of expert witness. The opinion of a witness on a
matter requiring special knowledge, skill, experience or training which
he is shown to possess, may be received in evidence. (43 a)

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Sec. 50. Opinion of ordinary witnesses. The opinion of a witness for

which proper basis is given, may be received in evidence regarding (a) the identity of a person about whom he has adequate knowledge;
(b) A handwriting with which he has sufficient familiarity; and
(c) The mental sanity of a person with whom he is sufficiently
acquainted.
The witness may also testify on his impressions of the emotion,
behavior, condition or appearance of a person. (44 a)
GR: The opinion of a witness is not admissible.
Exceptions: Admissible opinion evidence
.1 a matter requiring special knowledge, skill, experience or training which he is
shown to possess, may be received in evidence.
.2 the identity of a person about whom he has adequate knowledge;
.3 a handwriting with which he has sufficient familiarity
.4 the mental sanity of a person with whom he is sufficiently acquainted.
.5 his impressions of the
.a emotion
.b behavior
.c condition or
.d appearance of a person

2. Cases
Dilag & Co. v. Merced, 45 O.G. 5536 (1949)
U.S. v. Trono, 3 Phil. 213 (1904)
State v. Garver, 225 P.2d 771 (1950)
U.S. v. Stifel, 433 F.2d 431 (6th Cir. 1970)
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993)
United States v. Bonds, 12 F.3d 540 (1993)

Q. Rule 130, 51: Character Evidence

Sec. 51. Character evidence not generally admissible; exceptions.
(a) In Criminal Cases:
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(1) The accused may prove his good moral character which is pertinent
to the moral trait involved in the offense charged.
(2) Unless in rebuttal, the prosecution may not prove his bad moral
character which is pertinent it to the moral trait involved in the offense
charged.
Note that in criminal cases, the prosecution goes first. Hence, it can not present
evidence on the bad moral character of the accused on its evidence in chief.
(3) The good or bad moral character of the offended party may be
proved if it tends to establish in any reasonable degree the probability or
improbability of the offense charged.
(b) In Civil Cases:
Evidence of the moral character of a party in a civil case is admissible
only when pertinent to the issue of character involved in the case.
This covers either party to the case.
(c) In the case provided for in Rule 132, Section 14. (46 a, 47 a)
cf Rule 132, Sec. 14
Sec. 14. Evidence of good character of witness. Evidence of the good character of a witness
is not admissible until such character has been impeached. (17)

GR: Character evidence not generally admissible

Exceptions
.1 In Criminal Cases:
.a accused may prove his good moral character which is pertinent to the
moral trait involved in the offense charged.
.b In rebuttal, the prosecution may prove the bad moral character of the
accused which is pertinent it to the moral trait involved in the offense
charged.
.c moral character of the offended party may be proved if it tends to establish
in any reasonable degree the probability or improbability of the offense
charged.
.2 In Civil Cases only when pertinent to the issue of character involved in the
case.
.3 good character of an impeached witness

R. Rule 131, 1: Burden of Proof

Sec. 1. Burden of proof. Burden of proof is the duty of a party to
present evidence on the facts in issue necessary to establish his claim or
defense by the amount of evidence required by law. (1 a, 2 a)
Burden of proof the duty of a party to present evidence on the facts in issue
necessary to establish his claim or defense by the amount of evidence required
by law
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1. Civil Cases
a. Rule 133, Sec. 1
Rule 133, Sec. 1. Preponderance of evidence, how determined. In
civil cases, the party having the burden of proof must establish his case
by a preponderance of evidence.
In determining whether a contract is a sale or equitable mortgage, the evidence
presented must be clear and convincing, not merely a preponderance of
evidence.

b. Cases
Pornellosa v. LTA, L-14040, 31 January 1986
IFC v. Tobias, 78 SCRA 28 (1977)

2. Criminal Cases
a. Rule 133, Sec. 2
Rule 133, Sec. 2. Proof beyond reasonable doubt. In a criminal case,
the accused is entitled to an acquittal, unless his guilt is shown beyond
reasonable doubt.
For self-defense, the accused must show clear and convincing evidence.

b. Cases
People v. Pajenado, 31 SCRA 812 (1970) The prosecution has the burden of
proving even the negative elements of a crime (e.g. lack of license to possess a
firearm).
Escolin: The remedy is to present the certification of the officer, who is in charge
of issuing the licenses, that the accused was not issued a license.
People v. Verzola, 80 SCRA 600 (1977) The elements of self-defense must be
proven by clear, satisfactory and convincing evidence.
U.S. v. Dube, 520 F.2d 250 (1st Cir. 1975)
Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 19 (1977)

3. Administrative Cases
a. Rule 133, Sec. 5
Rule 133, Sec. 5. Substantial evidence. In cases filed before
administrative or quasi-judicial bodies, a fact may be deemed established
if it is supported by substantial evidence, or that amount of relevant
evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a
conclusion. (n)
substantial evidence that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.
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b. Cases

S. Presumptions
1. Conclusive presumptions
a. Rule 131, 2
Sec. 2. Conclusive presumptions. The following are instances of
conclusive presumptions:
(a) Whenever a party has, by his own declaration, act, or omission,
intentionally and deliberately led another to believe a particular thing
true, and to act upon such belief, he cannot, in any litigation arising out
of such declaration, act or omission, be permitted to falsify it:
(b) The tenant is not permitted to deny the title of his landlord at the
time of the commencement of the relation of landlord and tenant
between them. (3 a)
Instances of conclusive presumptions
.1 a party has, by his own declaration, act, or omission, intentionally and
deliberately led another to believe a particular thing true, and to act upon
such belief, he cannot, in any litigation arising out of such declaration, act or
omission, be permitted to falsify it:
.2 The tenant is not permitted to deny the title of his landlord at the time of the
commencement of the relation of landlord and tenant between them.

b. Arts. 1431-1439 NCC: Estoppel

Art. 1431. Through estoppel an admission or representation is
rendered conclusive upon the person making it, and cannot be denied or
disproved as against the person relying thereon.
Art. 1432. The principles of estoppel are hereby adopted insofar as
they are not in conflict with the provisions of this Code, the Code of
Commerce, the Rules of Court and special laws.
Art. 1433. Estoppel may in pais or by deed.
Art. 1439. Estoppel is effective only as between the parties thereto or
their successors in interest.
Art. 1434. When a person who is not the owner of a thing sells or
alienates and delivers it, and later the seller or grantor acquires title
thereto, such title passes by operation of law to the buyer or grantee.
Art. 1435. If a person in representation of another sells or alienates a
thing, the former cannot subsequently set up his own title as against the
buyer or grantee.

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Art. 1436. A lessee or a bailee is estopped from asserting title to the

thing leased or received, as against the lessor or bailor.
Art. 1437. When in a contract between third persons concerning
immovable property, one of them is misled by a person with respect to
the ownership or real right over the real estate, the latter is precluded
from asserting his legal title or interest therein, provided all these
requisites are present:
(1) There must be fraudulent representation or wrongful concealment
of facts known to the party estopped;
(2) The party precluded must intend that the other should act upon
the facts as misrepresented;
(3) The party misled must have been unaware of the true facts; and
(4) The party defrauded must have acted in accordance with the
misrepresentation.
Art. 1438. One who has allowed another to assume apparent ownership
of personal property for the purpose of making any transfer of it, cannot,
if he received the sum for which a pledge has been constituted, set up his
own title to defeat the pledge of the property, made by the other to a
pledgee who received the same in good faith and for value.
Statutory instances of estoppel
.1 non-owner transferor who later acquires title passes ownership to the
transferee by operation of law (Art. 1434 NCC)
.2 agent who alienates can not claim title against the transferee (Art. 1435 NCC)
.3 a lessee or a bailee is estopped from asserting title to the thing leased or
received, as against the lessor or bailor. (Art. 1436 NCC)
.4 in a contract between 3rd persons concerning immovable property, one of
them is misled by a person with respect to the ownership or real right over
the real estate, the latter is precluded from asserting his legal title or interest
therein, provided all these requisites are present:
.a fraudulent representation or wrongful concealment of facts known to the
party estopped;
.b party precluded must intend that the other should act upon the facts as
misrepresented;
.c party misled must have been unaware of the true facts; and
.d party
defrauded
must
have
acted
misrepresentation. (Art. 1437 NCC)

in

accordance

with

the

.5 One who has allowed another to assume apparent ownership of personal

property for the purpose of making any transfer of it, cannot, if he received
the sum for which a pledge has been constituted, set up his own title to defeat
the pledge of the property, made by the other to a pledgee who received the
same in good faith and for value. (Art. 1438 NCC)
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c. Cases
Molina v. CA, 109 Phil 769 (1960)
Facts: Felix Molina then overseer of Basilisa Manjon, informed her that some
guerilla soldiers would arrest her for investigation, because one Conchita Cuba
complained to them against her for having illegally encroached on her property.
Afraid to be taken to the guerilla camp Manjon asked the Molina what was best
for her to do. He suggested that she execute a fictitious deed of sale in his favor
for the portion in question which was the one claimed by Conchita Cuba, in order
that he could defend her rights in his name against the claim of Conchita Cuba.
Manjon accepted the suggestion and asked Molina to have the corresponding
deed of sale prepared which Manjon signed. However, Manjon made the Molina
sign a statement in, which he expressly admitted that the transaction was only a
simulated sale. The Molina denied the whole story and asserted that the
statement was a forgery. Manjon sues Molina for recovery of possession of land.
TC ruled for the Manjon on the ground that she could not have disposed the land
because it was part of the public domain, sales patent having been issued to
plaintiff by the government only on 1948. CA affirms.
Held: Under the doctrine of estoppel by deed, when a person who is not the
owner of a thing sells or alienates and delivers it and later the seller or grantor
acquires title thereto, such title passes by operation of law to the buyer or
grantee. Case remanded to determine whether the sale was indeed fictitious.
Fige v. CA, 233 SCRA 586 (1994) The juridical relation between petitioners and
private respondents is that of lessee and lessor. Considering this jural
relationship, petitioners cannot claim that they purchased the questioned lot
from somebody else. A tenant cannot, in an action involving the possession of the
leased premises, controvert the title of his landlord. Nor can a tenant set up any
inconsistent right to change the relation existing between himself and his
landlord, without first delivering up to the landlord the premises acquired by
virtue of the agreement between themselves.

2. Disputable presumptions
a. Rule 131, 4
Sec. 3. Disputable presumptions. The following presumptions are
satisfactory if uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and overcome by
other evidence:
(a) That a person is innocent of crime or wrong;
(b) That an unlawful act was done with an unlawful intent;
(c) That a person intends the ordinary consequences of his voluntary
act;
(d) That a person takes ordinary care of his concerns;
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(e) That evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if produced;

(f) That money paid by one to another was due to the latter;
(g) That a thing delivered by one to another belonged to the latter;
(h) That an obligation delivered up to the debtor has been paid;
(i) That prior rents or installments had been paid when a receipt for
the later ones is produced;
(j) That a person found in possession of a thing taken in the doing of a
recent wrongful act is the taker and the doer of the whole act; otherwise,
that things which a person possesses, or exercises acts of ownership over,
are owned by him;
(k) That a person in possession of an order on himself for the payment
of the money, or the delivery of anything, has paid the money or delivered
the thing accordingly;
(1) That a person acting in a public office was regularly appointed or
elected to it;
(m) That official duty has been regularly performed;
(n) That a court, or judge acting as such, whether in the Philippines or
elsewhere, was acting in the lawful exercise of jurisdiction;
(o) That all the matters within an issue raised in a case were laid
before the court and passed upon by it; and in like manner that all
matters within an issue raised in a dispute submitted for arbitration were
laid before the arbitrators and passed upon by them;
(p) That private transactions have been fair and regular;
(q) That the ordinary course of business has been followed;
(r) That there was a sufficient consideration for a contract;
(s) That a negotiable instrument was given or indorsed for a sufficient
consideration;
(t) That an indorsement of a negotiable instrument was made before
the instrument was overdue and at the place where the instrument is
dated;
(u) That a writing is truly dated;
(v) That a letter duly directed and mailed was received in the regular
course of the mail;
(w) That after an absence of seven years, it being unknown whether or
not the absentee still lives, he is considered dead for all purposes, except
for those of succession.
The absentee shall not be considered dead for the purpose of opening
his succession till after an absence of ten years. If he disappeared after

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the age of seventy-five years, an absence of five years shall be sufficient

in order that his succession may be opened.
The following shall be considered dead for all purposes including the
division of the estate among the heirs:
(1) A person on board a vessel lost during a sea voyage, or an aircraft
which is missing, who has not been heard of for four years since the loss
of the vessel or aircraft;
(2) A member of the armed forces who has taken part in armed
hostilities, and has been missing for four years;
(3) A person who has been in danger of death under other
circumstances and whose existence has not been known for four years;
(4) If a married person has been absent for four consecutive years, the
spouse present may contract a subsequent marriage if he or she has a
well-founded belief that the absent spouse is already dead. In case of
disappearance, where there is danger of death under the circumstances
hereinabove provided, an absence of only two years shall be sufficient for
the purpose of contracting a subsequent marriage. However, in any case,
before marrying again, the spouse present must institute a summary
proceeding as provided in the Family Code and in the rules for a
declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to
the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse.
(x) That acquiescence resulted from a belief that the thing acquiesced
in was conformable to the law or fact;
(y) That things have happened according to the ordinary course of
nature and the ordinary habits of life;
(z) That persons acting as copartners have entered into a contract of
copartnership;
(aa) That a man and woman deporting themselves as husband and wife
have entered into a lawful contract of marriage;
(bb) That property acquired by a man and a woman who are
capacitated to marry each other and who live exclusively with each other
as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void
marriage, has been obtained by their joint efforts, work or industry.
(cc) That in cases of cohabitation by a man and a woman who are not
capacitated to marry each other and who have acquired property through
their actual joint contribution of money, property or industry, such
contributions and their corresponding shares including joint deposits of
money and evidences of credit are equal.
(dd) That if the marriage is terminated and the mother contracted
another marriage within three hundred days after such termination of
the former marriage, these rides shall govern in the absence of proof to
the contrary:
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(1) A child born before one hundred eighty days after the
solemnization of the subsequent marriage is considered to have been
conceived during the former marriage, provided it be born within three
hundred days after the termination of the former marriage;
(2) A child born after one hundred eighty days following the
celebration of the subsequent marriage is considered to have been
conceived during such marriage, even though it be born within the three
hundred days after the termination of the former marriage.
(ee) That a thing once proved to exist continues as long as is usual
with things of that nature;
(ff) That the law has been obeyed;
(gg) That a printed or published book, purporting to be printed or
published by public authority, was so printed or published;
(hh) That a printed or published book, purporting to contain reports of
cases adjudged in tribunals of the country where the book is published,
contains correct reports of such cases;
(ii) That a trustee or other person whose duty it was to convey real
property to a particular person has actually conveyed it to him when such
presumption is necessary to perfect the title of such person or his
successor in interest;
(jj) That except for purposes of succession, when two persons perish in
the same calamity, such as wreck, battle, or conflagration, and it is not
shown who died first, and there are no particular circumstances from
which it can be inferred, the survivorship is determined from the
probabilities resulting from the strength and age of the sexes, according
to the following rules:
1. If both were under the age of fifteen years, the older is deemed to
have survived;
2. If both were above the age of sixty, the younger is deemed to have
survived;
3. If one is under fifteen and the other above sixty, the former is
deemed to have survived;
4. If both be over fifteen and under sixty, and the sex be different, the
male is deemed to have survived; if the sex be the same, the older;
5. If one be under fifteen or over sixty, and the other between those
ages, the latter is deemed to have survived.
(kk) That if there is a doubt, as between two or more persons who are
called to succeed each other, as to which of them died first, whoever
alleges the death of one prior to the other, shall prove the same; in the
absence of proof, they shall be considered to have died at the same time.
(5 a)

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b. Cases
People v. Padiernos, 69 SCRA 484 (1976) Mere non-presentation of a written
statement of a witness to the police which she allegedly did not sign, does not
give rise to the presumption that it "contained declarations disastrous to the
prosecution case". The presumption that suppressed evidence is unfavorable
does not apply where the evidence was at the disposal of both the defense and
the prosecution through use of compulsory processes, e.g. subpoena duces
tecum.
People v. Pablo, 213 SCRA 1 (1992) The presumption that evidence willfully
suppressed would be adverse if produced does not apply when the testimony of
the witness is merely corroborative. Neither does it apply in cases where the
witness, as in this case, is available to the accused because then, the evidence
would have the same weight against one party as against the other. Mere failure
to present the poseur-buyer in a buy-bust operation is not suppression of
evidence.
Pascual v. Angeles, 4 Phil. 604 (1905)
Ormachea v. Trillana, 13 Phil. 194 (1909)
Yee Hem v. United States, 268 U.S. 178 (1925)
County Court of Ulster City v. Allen, 442 U.S. 140
Sandstrom v. Montana, 442 U.S. 510 (1979)

3. Rule 131, 4: Legitimacy or Illegitimacy

Sec. 4. No presumption of legitimacy or illegitimacy. There is no
presumption of legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child born after three
hundred days following the dissolution of the marriage or the separation
of the spouses. Whoever alleges the legitimacy or illegitimacy of such
child must prove his allegation. (6)

T. Examination of Witnesses
1. Rule 132 1-18
Sec. 1. Examination to be done in open court. The examination of
witnesses presented in a trial or hearing shall be done in open court, and
under oath or affirmation. Unless the witness is incapacitated to speak,
or the question calls for a different mode of answer, the answers of the
witness shall be given orally. (1 a)
Examination of witnesses presented in a trial or hearing
.1 done in open court
.2 under oath or affirmation
.3 answers of the witness shall be given orally, unless
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.a the witness is incapacitated to speak, or

.b the question calls for a different mode of answer
Sec. 2. Proceedings to be recorded. The entire proceedings of a trial
or hearing, including the questions propounded to a witness and his
answers thereto, the statements made by the judge or any of the parties,
counsel, or witnesses with reference to the case, shall be recorded by
means of shorthand or stenotype or by other means of recording found
suitable by the court.
A transcript of the record of the proceedings made by the official
stenographer, stenotypist or recorder and certified as correct by him
shall be deemed prima facie a correct statement of such proceedings. (2
a)
The rules now require even the statements of the judge be recorded.
Requisites for transcript to be deemed prima facie a correct statement of the
proceedings
.1 made by the official stenographer, stenotypist or recorder and
.2 certified as correct by him
Sec. 3. Rights and obligations of a witness. A witness must answer
questions, although his answer may tend to establish a claim against
him. However, it is the right of a witness:
(1) To be protected from irrelevant, improper, or insulting questions,
and from harsh or insulting demeanor;
(2) Not to be detained longer than the interests of justice require;
(3) Not to be examined except only as to matters pertinent to the
issue;
(4) Not to give an answer which will tend to subject him to a penalty
for an offense unless otherwise provided by law; or
(5) Not to give an answer which will tend to degrade his reputation,
unless it be to the very fact at issue or to a fact from which the fact in
issue would be presumed. But a witness must answer to the fact of his
previous final conviction for an offense. (3 a, l9 a)
Obligation of a witness answer questions, although his answer may tend to
establish a claim against him

Rights of a witness
.1 To be protected from irrelevant, improper, or insulting questions, and from
harsh or insulting demeanor;
.2 Not to be detained longer than the interests of justice require;

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.3 Not to be examined except only as to matters pertinent to the issue;

.4 Not to give an answer which will tend to subject him to a penalty for an
offense, unless otherwise provided by law; or
.5 Not to give an answer which will tend to degrade his reputation, unless it be
to the fact
.a at issue or
.b from which the fact in issue would be presumed
.c of his previous final conviction for an offense.
Sec. 4. Order in the examination of an individual witness. The order
in which an individual witness may be examined is as follows:
(a) Direct examination by the proponent;
(b) Cross-examination by the opponent;
(c) Re-direct examination by the proponent;
(d) Re-cross-examination by the opponent. (4)
Sec. 5. Direct examination. Direct examination is the examination-inchief of a witness by the party presenting him on the facts relevant to the
issue. (3 a)
Direct examination the examination-in-chief of a witness by the party
presenting him on the facts relevant to the issue.

Sec. 6. Cross-examination; its purpose and extent. Upon the

termination of the direct examination, the witness may be crossexamined by the adverse party as to any matters stated in the direct
examination, or connected therewith, with sufficient fullness and
freedom to test his accuracy and truthfulness and freedom from interest
or bias, or the reverse, and to elicit all important facts bearing upon the
issue. (8a)
Witness may be cross-examined by the adverse party
.1 as to any matters stated in the direct examination, or connected therewith
.2 with sufficient fullness and freedom
.a to test his
)1

accuracy and

)2

truthfulness and

)3

freedom from interest or bias, or the reverse

.b to elicit all important facts bearing upon the issue

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Sec. 7. Re-direct examination; its purpose and extent. After the crossexamination of the witness has been concluded, he may be re-examined
by the party calling him, to explain or supplement his answers given
during the cross-examination. On re-direct examination, questions on
matters not dealt with during the cross-examination, may be allowed by
the court in its discretion. (12)
Re-direct examination
.1 to explain or supplement his answers given during the cross-examination
.2 with leave of court, on matters not dealt with during the cross-examination
Sec. 8. Re-cross-examination.
examination, the adverse party
matters stated in his re-direct
matters as may be allowed by the

Upon the conclusion of the re-direct

may re-cross-examine the witness on
examination, and also on such other
court in its discretion. (13)

Re-cross-examination
.1 on matters stated in his re-direct examination, and
.2 with leave of court, other matters
Sec. 9. Recalling witness. After the examination of a witness by both
sides has been concluded, the witness cannot be recalled without leave of
the court. The court will grant or withhold leave in its discretion, as the
interests of justice may require. (14)
A witness can be recalled only with leave of the court.
Sec. 10. Leading and misleading questions. A question which
suggests to the witness the answer which the examining party desires is a
leading question. It is not allowed, except:
(a) On cross examination;
(b) On Preliminary matters;
(c) When there is difficulty in getting direct and intelligible answers
from a witness who is ignorant, or a child of tender years, or is of feeble
mind, or a deaf-mute;
(d) Of an unwilling or hostile witness; or
(e) Of a witness who is an adverse party or an officer, director, or
managing agent of a public or private corporation or of a partnership or
association which is an adverse party.
A misleading question is one which assumes as true a fact not yet
testified to by the witness, or contrary to that which he has previously
stated. It is not allowed. (5 a, 6 a, and 8 a)
Leading questions a question which suggests to the witness the answer which
the examining party desires
GR: Leading questions not allowed.
Exceptions
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.1 cross examination;
.2 Preliminary matters;
.3 difficulty in getting direct and intelligible answers from a witness who is
.a ignorant, or
.b a child of tender years, or
.c feeble mind, or
.d a deaf-mute;
.4 unwilling or hostile witness (cf Rule 132, Sec. 12); or
Sec. 12. Party may not impeach his own witness. xxx
A witness may be considered as unwilling or hostile only if so declared by the court upon
adequate showing of his adverse interest, unjustified reluctance to testify, or his having
misled the party into calling him to the witness stand.

.5 witness is an adverse party or an officer, director, or managing agent of a

public or private corporation or of a partnership or association which is an
adverse party.
Misleading question one which assumes as true a fact not yet testified to by the
witness, or contrary to that which he has previously stated.
Misleading questions are never allowed. No exceptions.
Sec. 11. Impeachment of adverse party's witness. A witness may be
impeached by the party against whom he was called, by contradictory
evidence, by evidence that his general reputation for truth, honesty, or
integrity is bad, or by evidence that he has made at other times
statements inconsistent with his present testimony, but not by evidence
of particular wrongful acts, except that it may be shown by the
examination of the witness, or the record of the judgment, that he has
been convicted of an offense. (15)
Impeachment of adverse party's witness
.1 contradictory evidence
.2 evidence that his general reputation for truth, honesty, or integrity is bad
.3 evidence that he has made at other times statements inconsistent with his
present testimony
.4 evidence of conviction of an offense
Sec. 12. Party may not impeach his own witness. Except with respect
to witnesses referred to in paragraphs (d) and (e) of Section 10, the party
producing a witness is not allowed to impeach his credibility.
A witness may be considered as unwilling or hostile only if so declared
by the court upon adequate showing of his adverse interest, unjustified
reluctance to testify, or his having misled the party into calling him to
the witness stand.

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The unwilling or hostile witness so declared, or the witness who is an

adverse party, may be impeached by the party presenting him in all
respects as if he had been called by the adverse party, except by evidence
of his bad character. He may also be impeached and cross-examined by
the adverse party, but such cross examination must only be on the
subject matter of his examination-in-chief. (6 a, 7 a)
GR: The party producing a witness is not allowed to impeach his credibility.
Exceptions: When party may impeach his own witness (except evidence of bad
character)
.1 an unwilling or hostile witness; or
.2 a witness who is an adverse party or an officer, director, or managing agent of
a public or private corporation or of a partnership or association which is an
adverse party.
Grounds for declaring a witness unwilling or hostile
.1 adverse interest
.2 unjustified reluctance to testify, or
.3 misled the party into calling him to the witness stand.
Consequences of being an unwilling, hostile, or adverse witness
.1 may be impeached by the proponent, except by evidence of bad character
.2 may also be impeached by the opponent
.3 may be cross-examined by the opponent, only on the subject matter of his
direct examination
.4 proponent may ask leading questions
Sec. 13. How witness impeached by evidence of inconsistent
statements. Before a witness can be impeached by evidence that he has
made at other times statements inconsistent with his present testimony,
the statements must be related to him, with the circumstances of the
times and places and the persons present, and he must be asked whether
he made such statements, and if so, allowed to explain them. If the
statements be in writing they must be shown to the witness before any
question is put to him concerning them. (16)
Requisites for impeaching a witness by prior inconsistent statements
.1 If the statements be in writing they must be shown to the witness before any
question is put to him concerning them.
.2 the statements must be
.a related to him
.b with the circumstances of the times and places and the persons present
.3 he must be asked whether he made such statements
.4 if so, allowed to explain them
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Escolin: if the witness refuses to acknowledge the prior inconsistent statement,

present someone who can testify that the recording of the prior statement was
accurate (e.g. stenographer, in which case, the statement is prima facie evidence
of the fact stated therein).
Sec. 14. Evidence of good character of witness. Evidence of the good
character of a witness is not admissible until such character has been
impeached. (17)
cf Rule 130, Sec. 51
Sec. 51. Character evidence not generally admissible; exceptions.
xxx
(c) In the case provided for in Rule 132, Sec(ion 14. (46 a, 47 a)

Evidence of the good character of a witness is not admissible until such

character has been impeached.
Sec. 15. Exclusion and separation of witnesses. On any trial or
hearing, the judge may exclude from the court any witness not at the
time under examination, so that he may not hear the testimony of other
witnesses. The judge may also cause witnesses to be kept separate and to
be prevented from conversing with one another until all shall have been
examined. (18)
Sec. 16. When witness may refer to memorandum. A witness may be
allowed to refresh his memory respecting a fact, by anything written or
recorded by himself or under his direction at the time when the fact
occurred, or immediately thereafter, or at any other time when the fact
was fresh in his memory and he knew that the same was correctly written
or recorded; but in such case the writing or record must be produced and
may be inspected by the adverse party, who may, if he chooses, crossexamine the witness upon it, and may read it in evidence. So, also, a
witness may testify from such a writing or record, though he retain no
recollection of the particular facts, if he is able to swear that the writing
or record correctly stated the transaction when made; but such evidence
must be received with caution. (10 a)
Requisites for a witness to refer to a memorandum
.1 the memorandum must have been written or recorded by himself or under his
direction
.2 either
.a at the time when the fact occurred, or
.b immediately thereafter, or
.c at any other time when the fact was fresh in his memory
.3 he knew that the same was correctly written or recorded

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.4 the memorandum must be produced and may be inspected by the adverse

party, who may, if he chooses, cross-examine the witness upon it, and may
read it in evidence.
.5 if the witness retains no recollection of the particular facts, he must swear
that the writing or record correctly stated the transaction when made
Sec. 17. When part of transaction, writing or record given in evidence,
the remainder admissible. When part of an act, declaration,
conversation, writing or record is given in evidence by one party, the
whole of the same subject may be inquired into by the other, and when a
detached act, declaration, conversation, writing or record is given in
evidence, any other act, declaration, conversation, writing or record
necessary to its understanding may also be given in evidence. (11 a)
When part of an act, declaration, conversation, writing or record is given in
evidence by one party, the whole of the same subject may be inquired into by the
other.
When a detached act, declaration, conversation, writing or record is given in
evidence, any other act, declaration, conversation, writing or record necessary to
its understanding may also be given in evidence.
cf Dusepec v. Torres, 39 Phil 760 (1919) under Rule 130 Sec. 42
Sec. 18. Right to inspect writing shown to witness. Whenever a
writing is shown to a witness, it may be inspected by the adverse party. (9
a)

2. Cases
a. Examination in Open Court
People v. Estenzo, 72 SCRA 428 (1976)

b. Cross-Examination
de la Paz, Jr. v. IAC, 154 S 65 (1987)Where a party has had the opportunity to
cross-examine a witness but failed to avail himself of it, he necessarily forfeits
the right to cross-examine and the testimony given on direct examination of the
witness will be received or allowed to remain in the record. Implied waiver of the
right of cross-examine may take various forms, as long as the party was given the
opportunity to confront and cross-examine an opposing witness but failed to take
advantage of it reasons attributable to himself alone. Repeated absences, and/or
unjustified motions for postponement of the hearing in which the witness is
scheduled to be cross-examined until the witness passed away is a waiver of the
right to cross-examine.
Fulgado v. CA, 182 S 81 (1990) The right of a party to confront and crossexamine opposing witnesses in a judicial litigation, be it criminal, civil, or
administrative, is a fundamental right which is part of due process. The right is
not to an actual, but a mere opportunity to cross-examine. Failure of the adverse
party to move to schedule the hearing for the cross-examination of a witness
before he died or migrated abroad (the imminence of which the adverse party
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was aware) is a waiver of such right. The burden is on the party wishing to
exercise the right to cross-examination, not necessarily the plaintiff, to schedule
the hearing.
Capital Subdivision v. Negros Occidental, 52 O.G. 4672 (1956)
U.S. v. Mercado, 26 Phil. 127 (1913)
U.S. v. Marshall, 762 F.2d 419 (5th Cir. 1985)

c. Recalling Witnesses
People v. Rivera, 200 S 786 (1991) The discretion to recall a witness is not
properly invoked or exercisable by an applicant's mere general statement that
there is a need to recall a witness "in the interest of justice," or "in order to
afford a party full opportunity to present his case," or that, as here, "there seems
to be many points and questions that should have been asked" in the earlier
interrogation. To regard expressed generalities such as these as sufficient
ground for recall of witnesses would make the recall of witness no longer
discretionary but ministerial. Something more than the bare assertion of the
need to propound additional questions is essential before the Court's discretion
may rightfully be exercised to grant or deny recall. There must be a satisfactory
showing of some concrete, substantial ground for the recall. There must be a
satisfactory showing on the movant's part, for instance, that particularly
identified material points were not covered in the cross-examination, or that
particularly described vital documents were not presented to the witness whose
recall is prayed for, or that the cross-examination was conducted in so inept a
manner as to result in a virtual absence thereof. Absent such particulars, there
would be no foundation for a trial court to authorize the recall of any witness.
Furthermore, failure of the recalled witness to be appear is not ground to strike
out his testimony. There should have been a showing of the indispensability of his
further examination, what it was that would have been elicited, and that such
additional testimony would cause the evidence to become inadmissible. Lastly,
striking out of testimony must be upon motion. It can not be ordered motu
propio.
People v. Del Castillo, 25 SCRA 716 (1968)
Victorias Milling Co., Inc. v. Ong Su, 79 SCRA 207 (1977)

d. Leading Questions
People v. Salomon, 229 SCRA 403 (1994) A mental retardate is not for this
reason alone disqualified from being a witness. As in the case of other witnesses,
acceptance of his testimony depends on its nature and credibility or, otherwise
put, the quality of his perceptions and the manner he can make them known to
the court. In the case before us, the trial court noted that although Sylvia's
speech was slurred and it was necessary at times to ask her leading questions,
"her testimony was positive, clear, plain, coherent and credible." Her mental
condition did not vitiate her credibility.
State v. Scott, 149 P2d 152 (1944)

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e. Impeaching One's Own Witness

Becker v. Eisenstodt, 158 A.2d 706 (1960)

f. Impeachment By Bias
U.S. v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45 (1984)
U.S. v. Harvey, 547 F.2d 720 (2d Cir.1976)

g. Impeachment By Prior Inconsistent Statement

Villalon, Jr. v. IAC, 144 S 443 (1986) A party may impeach a witness by
introducing into evidence their previous testimony in his disbarment proceedings
which are inconsistent with their current testimony. An attorney may waive the
confidential nature of his own disbarment proceedings.
People v. Resabal, 50 Phil 780 (1927) To impeach a witness by prior inconsistent
statements, he must be given ample opportunity to explain the discrepancies by
a reading to him of such prior statement. Mere presentation of the statement,
without said declaration having been read to the witness while he testified, is no
ground for impeaching his testimony.
Escolin: Note that the accused now does not have the right to cross-examine the
witness during the preliminary investigation. He can only give questions to the
investigating officer to be propounded to the witness.
U.S. v. Webster, 734 F.2d 1191 (7th Cir. 1984)

h. Impeachment By Other Means

U.S. v. Mercado, 20 Phil. 127 (1913)
Mosley v. Commonwealth, 420 SW2d 679 (1967)
Coles v. Harsh, 276 P. 248 (1929)
U.S. v. Medical Therapy Services, 583 F.2d 36 (2d Cir. 1978)
Newton v. State, 127 A. 123 (Md. 1924)
State v. Oswalt, 381 P. 2d 617 (1963)

i. Exclusion of Witnesses
People v. Sandal, 54 Phil. 883 (1930)
State v. Bishop, 492 P2d 509 (1972)

j. Refreshing Recollection
State v. Peoples, 319 S.E. 2d 177 (1984)

U. Authentication and Proof of Documents

1. Rule 132 19-33
Sec. 19. Classes of documents. For the purpose of their presentation
in evidence, documents are either public or private.
Public documents are:
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(a) The written official acts, or records of the official acts of the
sovereign authority, official bodies and tribunals, and public officers,
whether of the Philippines, or of a foreign country;
(b) Documents acknowledged before a notary public except last wills
and testaments; and
(c) Public records, kept in the Philippines, of private documents
required by law to be entered therein.
All other writings are private. (20a)
Public documents
.1 written official acts, or records of the official acts of the sovereign authority,
official bodies and tribunals, and public officers, whether of the Philippines, or
of a foreign country;
.2 notarized documents, except last wills and testaments; and
.3 public records, kept in the Philippines, of private documents required by law
to be entered therein.
Public documents
Genuineness
presumed

and

authenticity

Private documents
Must prove
execution

genuineness

and

due

Binding against the parties and 3rd Binds only parties to the document
persons
Certain transactions are required to be
in a public document (e.g. donation of
real property)

Sec. 20. Proof of private document. Before any private document

offered as authentic is received in evidence, its due execution and
authenticity must be proved either:
(a) By anyone who saw the document executed or written; or
(b) By evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of
the maker. (cf with Rule 132, Sec. 22)
Any other private document need only be identified as that which it is
claimed to be. (21 a)
Sec. 22. How genuineness of handwriting proved. The handwriting of
a person may be proved by any witness who believes it to be the
handwriting of such person because he has seen the person write, or has
seen writing purporting to be his upon which the witness has acted or
been charged, and has thus acquired knowledge of the handwriting of
such person. Evidence respecting the handwriting may also be given by a
comparison, made by the witness or the court, with writings admitted or
treated as genuine by the party against whom the evidence is offered, or
proved to be genuine to the satisfaction of the judge. (23 a)
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Sec. 21. When evidence of authenticity of private document not

necessary. Where a private document is more than thirty years old, is
produced from a custody in which it would naturally be found if genuine,
and is unblemished by any alterations or circumstances of suspicion, no
other evidence of its authenticity need be given. (22 a)
Requisites for admissibility of private document
.1 offered as authentic due execution and authenticity must be proved
.a either by
)1
)2

anyone who saw the document executed or written; or

evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the
maker.
)a

any witness who believes it to be the handwriting of such person

because
.i

he has seen the person write, or

.ii

has seen writing purporting to be his

)i
)ii

)b

upon which the witness has acted or been charged, and

has thus acquired knowledge of the handwriting of such
person

a comparison, made by the witness or the court, with writings

.i
.ii

admitted or treated as genuine by the party against whom the

evidence is offered, or
proved to be genuine to the satisfaction of the judge

.b Unless it is an ancient document; requisites

)1
)2
)3

more than 30 years old

produced from a custody in which it would naturally be found if
genuine, and
unblemished by any alterations or circumstances of suspicion

.2 not offered as authentic identified as that which it is claimed to be

Sec. 23. Public documents as evidence. Documents consisting of
entries in public records made in the performance of a duty by a public
officer are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. All other
public documents are evidence, even against a third person, of the fact
which gave rise to their execution and of the date of the latter. (24 a)
Documents consisting of
.1 entries in public records made in the performance of a duty by a public officer
prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated.
.2 all other public documents evidence, even against a 3 rd person, of the fact
which gave rise to their execution and of the date of the latter.
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Sec. 24. Proof of official record. The record of public documents

referred to in paragraph (a) of Section 19 (official acts), when admissible
for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by
a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record, or by
his deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines,
with a certificate that such officer has the custody. If the office in which
the record is kept is in a foreign country, the certificate may be made by
a secretary of the embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice
consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the
Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept,
and authenticated by the seal of his office. (25 a)
The record of public documents of official acts may be evidenced by
.1 an official publication thereof or
.2 a copy
.a attested by
)1

the officer having the legal custody of the record, or

)2

his deputy, and

.b if the record is not kept in the Philippines

)1

accompanied by a certificate that such officer has the custody made

by
)a

secretary of the embassy or legation

)b

consul general

)c

consul

)d

vice consul, or

)e

consular agent or

)f
)2

any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the

foreign country in which the record is kept
authenticated by the seal of his office.

Procedure in obtaining copy of foreign official acts

.1 get a copy from the legal custodian
.2 have the legal custodian attest that the copy is correct
.3 have the Philippine consul certify that the person in #2 is the legal custodian
of a copy of official act
Sec. 25. What attestation of copy must state. Whenever a copy of a
document or record is attested for the purpose of evidence, the
attestation must state, in substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the
original, or a specific part thereof, as the case may be. The attestation
must be under the official seal of the attesting officer, if there be any, or

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if he be the clerk of a court having a seal, under the seal of such court.
(26 a)
Attestation of copy must
.1 state the copy is a correct copy of the original, or a specific part thereof, as
the case may be
.2 be under the official seal of the attesting officer, if there be any, or if he be the
clerk of a court having a seal, under the seal of such court
Sec. 26. Irremovability of public record. Any public record, an official
copy of which is admissible in evidence, must not be removed from the
office in which it is kept, except upon order of a court where the
inspection of the record is essential to the just determination of a
pending case. (27 a)
GR: Any public record, an official copy of which is admissible in evidence, must
not be removed from the office in which it is kept
Exception: upon order of a court where the inspection of the record is essential
to the just determination of a pending case
Sec. 27. Public record of a private document. An authorized public
record of a private document may be proved by the original record, or by
a copy thereof, attested by the legal custodian of the record, with an
appropriate certificate that such officer has the custody. (28a)
Public record of a private document may be proved by
.1 the original record, or
.2 a copy thereof
.a attested by the legal custodian of the record
.b with an appropriate certificate that such officer has the custody
Sec. 28. Proof of lack of record. A written statement signed by an
officer having the custody of an official record or by his deputy that after
diligent search no record or entry of a specified tenor is found to exist in
the records of his office, accompanied by a certificate as above provided,
is admissible as evidence that the records of his office contain no such
record or entry. (29)
Proof of lack of record
.1 A written statement
.a signed by an officer having the custody of an official record or by his
deputy
.b that after diligent search no record or entry of a specified tenor is found to
exist in the records of his office,
.2 accompanied by a certificate that such officer is supposed to have custody
If a notarized document is lost, get certifications of loss from

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.1 notary public
.2 bureau of archives
.3 clerk of court who commissioned the notary public
Sec. 29. How judicial record impeached. Any judicial record may be
impeached by evidence of: (a) want of jurisdiction in the court or judicial
officer, (b) collusion between the parties, or (c) fraud in the party
offering the record, in respect to the proceedings. (30 a)
Any judicial record may be impeached by evidence of
.1 want of jurisdiction in the court or judicial officer
.2 collusion between the parties, or
.3 fraud in the party offering the record, in respect to the proceedings
Sec. 30. Proof of notarial documents. Every instrument duly
acknowledged or proved and certified as provided by law, may be
presented in evidence without further proof, the certificate of
acknowledgment being prima facie evidence of the execution of the
instrument or document involved. (31 a)
Every instrument duly acknowledged or proved and certified as provided by law
.1 may be presented in evidence without further proof
.2 the certificate of acknowledgment being prima facie evidence of the execution
of the instrument or document involved
Sec. 31. Alterations in document, how to explain. The party
producing a document as genuine which has been altered and appears to
have been altered after its execution, in a part material to the question in
dispute, must account for the alteration. He may show that the alteration
was made by another, without his concurrence, or was made with the
consent of the parties affected by it, or was otherwise properly or
innocently made, or that the alteration did not change the meaning or
language of the instrument. If he fails to do that the document shall not
be admissible in evidence. (32 a)
The party producing a document as genuine which has been altered and appears
to have been altered after its execution, in a part material to the question in
dispute
.1 must account for the alteration, either as
.a made by another, without his concurrence, or
.b made with the consent of the parties affected by it, or
.c otherwise properly or innocently made, or
.d the alteration did not change the meaning or language of the instrument
.2 If he fails to do that the document shall not be admissible in evidence

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Sec. 32. Seal. There shall be no difference between sealed and

unsealed private documents insofar as their admissibility as evidence is
concerned. (33 a)
Sec. 33. Documentary evidence in an unofficial language. Documents
written in an unofficial language shall not be admitted as evidence,
unless accompanied with a translation into English or Filipino. To avoid
interruption of proceedings, parties or their attorneys are directed to
have such translation prepared before trial. (34 a)
Documents written in an unofficial language
.1 shall not be admitted as evidence, unless accompanied with a translation into
English or Filipino
.2 parties or their attorneys are directed to have such translation prepared
before trial.

2. Cases
a. Proof of private documents
Buag v. CA, 158 SCRA 299 (1988) The authenticity and due execution of a
private document is not proven by testimony that the party thumbmarked it. The
circumstances of the presence of the witness during the execution must be
related. There must be proof that the party understood it, considering he was
illiterate (implied from the thumbmarking). There must be showing that the
document was duly read, explained and translated to the illiterate party.

b. Ancient documents
Bartolome v. IAC, 183 SCRA 102 (1990) Where the offerors witness testified that
the document had a missing 4th page, the document can not qualify as an ancient
document because it is blemished by alteration or circmstance of suspicion. An
incomplete document is akin to an altered document, more so if the missing page
contains the signature of the parties to the document. Proof of the documents
authenticity and due execution is therefore necessary.
Heirs of Lacsa v. CA, 197 SCRA 234 (1991) Lack of signatures on the first pages
of a document alone is not a blemish that would disqualify a document from
being an ancient document. Allegations that the pages had been substituted
should be proven in order to disqualify the document from being an ancient
document, more so if the documents were shown to be exact copies of the
original on file with the Register of Deeds. Proof of their due execution and
authenticity is no longer required.
de Leon: Note that the document was actually a public record because it had
been registered with the Registry of Deeds. Therefore, the court did not have to
determine whether the document was in fact an ancient document because it
was in the first place a public document whose authenticity and due execution
need not be proven. The problem with this case is it is now authority to say that
private documents whose first pages are not signed by the parties can qualify as
ancient documents. Keep in mind that crucial to the ruling in Lacsa was the fact
that the document presented matches the one on file in the Registry of Deeds.
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Had there been no matching copy in the Registry of Deeds, I submit that the
document can not qualify as an ancient document.

c. Proof of foreign judgments

Pacific Asia Overseas v. NLRC, 161 SCRA 122 (1988) To be enforceable, the
foreign judgment must be proven as a public document of a written official act or
record of an act of an official body or tribunal of a foreign country. The offeror
must submit an attestation issued by the proper foreign official having legal
custody of the original judgment that the copy is a faithful reproduction of the
original, which attestation must be authenticated by a Philippine Consular officer
having jurisdiction in that country.
Zalamea v. CA, 228 SCRA 23 (1993) Foreign laws do not prove themselves nor
can the courts take judicial notice of them. Like any other fact, they must be
alleged and proved. Written law may be evidenced by an official publication
thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody of the
record, or by his deputy, and accompanied with a certificate that such officer has
custody. The certificate may be made by a secretary of an embassy or legation,
consul general, consul, vice-consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the
foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the
record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office. Mere testimony of a
witness is not sufficient to prove foreign law.

d. Documents in unofficial language

Pacific Asia Overseas v. NLRC, 161 SCRA 122 (1988) A document written in an
unofficial language should be translated into either English or Filipino. The
translator should be identified either as an official interpreter of the court, or as
a competent translator of both languages. The translation should be either sworn
to as an accurate translation of the original, or agreed upon by the parties.
People v. Monleon, 74 SCRA 263 (1976) Affidavits written in an unofficial
language and not accompanied with a translation are inadmissible in evidence.
Escolin: The NIRC provides that all notarial documents which dont have the
required documentary stamp tax will not be admitted in evidence.
Salison v. People, 253 SCRA 758 (1996)
IBM Phils., Inc. v. NLRC, G.R. No. 117221, April 13, 1999

V. Offer and Objection

1. Rule 132 34-40
Sec. 34. Offer of evidence. The court shall consider no evidence
which has not been formally offered. The purpose for which the evidence
is offered must be specified. (35)
The court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered.
The purpose for which the evidence is offered must be specified.

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Sec. 35. When to make offer. As regards the testimony of a witness,

the offer must be made at the time the witness is called to testify.
Documentary and object evidence shall be offered after the
presentation of a party's testimonial evidence. Such offer shall be done
orally unless allowed by the court to be done in writing.(n)
When to make offer
.1 testimony the time the witness is called to testify
.2 documentary and object after the presentation of a party's testimonial
evidence
Offer of evidence shall be done orally unless allowed by the court to be done in
writing.
Sec. 36. Objection. Objection to evidence offered orally must be made
immediately after the offer is made.
Objection to a question propounded in the course of the oral
examination of a witness shall be made as soon as the grounds therefor
shall become reasonably apparent.
An offer of evidence in writing shall be objected to within three (3)
days after notice of the offer unless a different period is allowed by the
court.
In any case, the grounds for the objections must be specified.(36 a)
When objection to evidence offered must be made
.1 orally immediately after the offer is made.
.2 in writing within 3 days after notice of the offer, unless a different period is
allowed by the court.
.3 a question propounded in the course of the oral examination as soon as the
grounds therefor shall become reasonably apparent.
The grounds for the objections should always be specified.
Grounds for objection
.1 Hearsay
.2 argumentative
.3 leading
.4 misleading
.5 incompetent
.6 irrelevant
.7 best evidence rule
.8 parole evidence rule

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.9 question has no basis

.10
Sec. 37. When repetition of objection unnecessary. When it becomes
reasonably apparent in the course of the examination of a witness that
the questions being propounded are of the same class as those to which
objection has been made, whether such objection was sustained or
overruled, it shall not be necessary to repeat the objection, it being
sufficient for the adverse party to record his continuing objection to such
class of questions. (37 a)
Requisites for a proper continuing objection
.1 in the course of the examination of a witness
.2 objection has been made
.3 reasonably apparent that the questions being propounded are of the same
class as those to which objection has been made
.4 adverse party records his continuing objection to such class of questions
Sec. 38. Ruling. The ruling of the court must be given immediately
after the objection is made, unless the court desires to take a reasonable
time to inform itself on the question presented; but the ruling shall
always be made during the trial and at such time as will give the party
against whom it is made an opportunity to meet the situation presented
by the ruling.
The reason for sustaining or overruling an objection need not be
stated. However, if the objection is based on two or more grounds, a
ruling sustaining the objection on one or some of them must specify the
ground or grounds relied upon. (38 a)
The ruling of the court on an objection
.1 must be given immediately after the objection is made
.2 unless the court desires to take a reasonable time to inform itself on the
question presented; but the ruling shall always be made
.a during the trial and
.b at such time as will give the party against whom it is made an opportunity
to meet the situation presented by the ruling.
GR: The reason for sustaining or overruling an objection need not be stated.
Exception: If the objection is based on two or more grounds, a ruling sustaining
the objection on one or some of them must specify the ground or grounds relied
upon.
Escolin: The parties may ask for the ground for the ruling, even if the rules does
not require the judge to so state.

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Sec. 39. Striking out answer.

before the adverse party had the
the same, and such objection is
sustain the objection and order
record.

Should a witness answer the question

opportunity to voice fully its objection to
found to be meritorious, the court shall
the answer given to be stricken off the

On proper motion, the court may also order the striking out of answers
which are incompetent, irrelevant, or otherwise improper. (n)
Requisites for Striking out an answer
.1 witness answers the question before the adverse party had the opportunity to
voice fully its objection
.2 objection is found to be meritorious
.3 court order that the answer given to be stricken off the record.
On proper motion, the court may also order the striking out of answers which are
incompetent, irrelevant, or otherwise improper.
Sec. 40. Tender of excluded evidence. If documents or things offered
in evidence are excluded by the court, the offeror may have the same
attached to or made part of the record. If the evidence excluded is oral,
the offeror may state for the record the name and other personal
circumstances of the witness and the substance of the proposed
testimony. (n)
If documents or things offered in evidence are excluded by the court, the offeror
may
.1 have the same attached to or made part of the record, if the evidence is object
or documentary
.2 If the evidence excluded is oral, the offeror may state for the record
.a the name and other personal circumstances of the witness and
.b the substance of the proposed testimony.

2. Cases
a. When evidence considered offered
People v. Franco, 269 SCRA 211 (1997) The court shall consider no evidence,
even an extra-judicial confession, which has not been formally offered. Mere fact
that evidence has been identified and marked in the course of the examination of
a witness, without the contents being recited in his testimony, does not mean
that it has been formally offered as evidence. Identification of documentary
evidence is done in the course of the trial and is accompanied by the marking of
the evidence as an exhibit, while the formal offer of documentary evidence is
done only when the party rests its case.
Philippine Bank of Commerce v. CA, 195 SCRA 567 (1991) Where the
genuineness and due execution of documents of an instrument attached to a
complaint are deemed admitted by failure to specifically deny it under oath, such
instruments are considered as evidence although they were not formally offered.
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Escolin: cf Rule 8, Sec. 8

Sec. 8. How to contest such documents. When an action or defense is founded upon a
written instrument, copied in or attached to the corresponding pleading as provided in the
preceding section, the genuineness and due execution of the instrument shall be deemed
admitted unless the adverse party, under oath, specifically denies them, and sets forth what
he claims to be the facts; but the requirement of an oath does not apply when the adverse
party does not appear to be a party to the instrument or when compliance with an order for
an inspection of the original instrument is refused. (8a)

Tabuena v. CA, 196 SCRA 650 (1991) Mere fact that a document is marked as an
exhibit does not mean it has been offered as evidence. Marking at the pre-trial
was only for the purpose of identifying them at that time. However, if an exhibit
has been duly identified by testimony duly recorded and has itself been
incorporated into the records (i.e. recital of the contents of the exhibit).

b. When objection make

People v. Java, 227 SCRA 668 (1993) Objection to testimony on the ground of
lack of a formal offer of the testimony should be done when the witness was
called to testify.
Catuira v. CA, 236 SCRA 398 (1994) Failure to object upon the time a witness is
called to testify on the ground that there was no formal offer of the testimony is a
waiver of the objection. Objection on such ground after the witness has testified
is too late.
Interpacific Transit, Inc. v. Aviles, 186 SCRA 385 (1990) Objection to
documentary evidence must be made at the time it is formally offered (i.e. when
the party rests its case) as an exhibit and not before. Objection prior to that time
(e.g. identification of the evidence) is premature. Mere identification and
marking is not equivalent to a formal offer of the evidence. A party may decide to
not offer evidence already identified and marked.
de Leon: Note that the court also said that there was no continuing objection
because continuing objections are applicable when there is a single objection to
a class of evidence. This ruling is no longer applicable because the new rules on
evidence is now clear that continuing objections are applicable only to
testimonial evidence.
de Leon: Does this mean that party may remain silent when inadmissible
evidence is being identified and marked, and then object when it is formally
offered? Interpacific Transit was explicit when it said What really matters is the
objection to the document at the time it is formally offered as an exhibit.
de Leon: What if after an exhibit has been identified, marked, and its contents
recited, the offeror decides not to formally offer it into evidence. Is the court
authorized to consider such exhibit on the strength of the ruling in Tabuena? I
would say yes because the recital of the contents of the exhibit is now part of
the testimony of the witness which has been formally offered.
People v. Cario, 165 SCRA 664 (1988)
De los Reyes v. IAC, 176 SCRA 394 (1989)
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People v. Yatco, 97 Phil. 940 (1955)

PHILAMGEN v. Sweet Lines, Inc., 212 SCRA 194 (1992)
Sheraton Palace v. Quijano, (C.A.) 64 O.G. 9116
Vda. de Oate v. Court of Appeals, 250 SCRA 283 (1995)

W.

Weight & Sufficiency of Evidence

1. Rule 133
Sec. 1. Preponderance of evidence, how determined. In civil cases,
the party having the burden of proof must establish his case by a
preponderance of evidence. In determining where the preponderance or
superior weight of evidence on the issues involved lies, the court may
consider all the facts and circumstances of the case, the witnesses'
manner of testifying, their intelligence, their means and opportunity of
knowing the facts to which they are testifying, the nature of the facts to
which they testify, the probability or improbability of their testimony,
their interest or want of interest, and also their personal credibility so far
as the same may legitimately appear upon the trial. The court may also
consider the number of witnesses, though the preponderance is not
necessarily with the greater number. (1 a)
MEMORIZE!
In civil cases, the party having the burden of proof must establish his case by a
preponderance of evidence.
In determining where the preponderance or superior weight of evidence on the
issues involved lies, the court may consider
.1 all the facts and circumstances of the case
.2 the witnesses' manner of testifying
.3 their intelligence
.4 their means and opportunity of knowing the facts to which they are testifying
.5 the nature of the facts to which they testify
.6 the probability or improbability of their testimony
.7 their interest or want of interest
.8 their personal credibility so far as the same may legitimately appear upon the
trial.
.9 number of witnesses, though the preponderance is not necessarily with the
greater number.
An cause of action on the ground of reformation of instrument must be proven by
clear and convincing evidence.
Sec. 2. Proof beyond reasonable doubt. In a criminal case, the
accused is entitled to an acquittal, unless his guilt is shown beyond
reasonable doubt. Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not mean such a
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degree of proof as, excluding possibility of error, produces absolute

certainty. Moral certainty only is required, or that degree of proof which
produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind. (2 a)
MEMORIZE!
In a criminal case, the accused is entitled to an acquittal, unless his guilt is
shown beyond reasonable doubt.
Proof beyond reasonable doubt
.1 does not mean such a degree of proof as, excluding possibility of error,
produces absolute certainty.
.2 Moral certainty only is required, or that degree of proof which produces
conviction in an unprejudiced mind.
A defense of self-defense must be proven by clear and convincing evidence.
Sec. 3. Extrajudicial confession, not sufficient ground for conviction.
An extrajudicial confession made by an accused, shall not be sufficient
ground for conviction, unless corroborated by evidence of corpus delicti.
(3)
An extrajudicial confession made by an accused, shall not be sufficient ground
for conviction, unless corroborated by evidence of corpus delicti.
Sec. 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient. Circumstantial
evidence is sufficient for conviction if;
(a) There is more than one circumstance;
(b) The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a
conviction beyond reasonable doubt. (5)
Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if
.1 There is more than one circumstance
.2 The facts from which the inferences are derived are proven, and
.3 The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction
beyond reasonable doubt.
Sec. 5. Substantial evidence. In cases filed before administrative or
quasi-judicial bodies, a fact may be deemed established if it is supported
by substantial evidence, or that amount of relevant evidence which a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion. (n)
MEMORIZE!
In cases filed before administrative or quasi-judicial bodies, a fact may be
deemed established if it is supported by substantial evidence
Substantial evidence that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion

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Sec. 6. Power of the court to stop further evidence. The court may
stop the introduction of further testimony upon any particular point
when the evidence upon it is already so full that more witnesses to the
same point cannot be reasonably expected to be additionally persuasive.
But this power should be exercised with caution. (6)
Sec. 7. Evidence on motion. When a motion is based on facts not
appearing of record the court may hear the matter on affidavits or
depositions presented by the respective parties, but the court may direct
that the matter be heard wholly or partly on oral testimony or
depositions. (7)
When a motion is based on facts not appearing of record
.1 the court may hear the matter on affidavits or depositions presented by the
respective parties
.2 but the court may direct that the matter be heard wholly or partly on oral
testimony or depositions.

2. Cases
People v. Cruz, 134 SCRA 512 (1985)
Facts: In a prosecution for arson committed in Davao City, there were no
eyewitnesses. However, there was evidence as to the presence of the accused at
the scene of the crime before and at the time the fire started, that he moved out
hurriedly and running away from the burning premises, that he had previously
manifested resentment against the owner of the premises and even hinted that
he would burn the owners house, that he abandoned his job, left Davao City
without leaving a word to anyone, and went into hiding in Manila, that he
concealed his identity by disguising himself with long hair, long moustache, and
colored eyeglasses, that he exhibited indifference and unperturbed attitude
towards the fate suffered by the victims, that he did not even condole with the
bereaved family and relatives or pay them a visit, that he did not attend the wake
or the funeral, and that he had a serious misunderstanding and strained
relationship with the owner of the burned premises.
Held: There are enough circumstantial evidence to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt.
U.S. v. Lasada, 18 Phil. 90 (1910)
People. v. Abendan, 82 Phil. 711 (1948)
People v. Solayao, 262 SCRA 255 (1996)
People v. Lorenzo, 240 SCRA 624 (1995)

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