F.

Term Limits

SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-30057 January 31, 1984
BRUNO O. APARRI, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and LAND AUTHORITY, the latter in substitution for REMEDIOS O.
FORTICH, as Chairman, ANGELINO M. BANZON, RAFAEL B. HILAO, VALERIANO PLANTILLA
and SEVERO YAP, as members of the Board of Directors of the defunct National Resettlement
and Rehabilitation Administration (NARRA), respondents.
Enrique D. Tayag for petitioner.
Magno B. Pablo and Cipriano A. Tan for respondent Land Authority.

MAKASIAR, J.:
This petition for certiorari seeks to review the decision of the then Court of Appeals (now
Intermediate Appellate Court under BP 129) dated September 24, 1968, affirming the decision of the
then Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court), the dispositive portion of which is as follows:
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the lower court insofar as it decrees the dismissal of
the present petition for mandamus is hereby affirmed, without pronouncement as to
costs (p. 50, rec.).
The facts of the case are as follows:
On January 15, 1960, private respondents (as members of the Board of Directors of the defunct
National Resettlement and Rehabilitation Administration created under Republic Act No. 1160,
approved June 18, 1954 NARRA) approved the following resolution:
RESOLUTION NO. 13 (Series of 1960)
RESOLVED, as it is hereby resolved, to appoint Mr. Bruno 0. Aparri, as General
Manager of the National Resettlement and Rehabilitation Administration (NARRA)
with all the rights, prerogatives and compensation appurtenant thereto to take effect
on January 16, 1960);
RESOLVED FURTHER, as it is hereby resolved, to inform the President of the
Philippines of the above appointment of Mr. Aparri (p. 2, rec.).

Pursuant thereto, private respondent Remedies O. Fortich, in her capacity as Chairman of the
NARRA Board, appointed petitioner Bruno O. Aparri as reflected in the following letter:
Manila,
Januar
y 22,
1960
Mr. Bruno O. Aparri c/o NARRA, Manila
SIR:
You are hereby appointed as GENERAL MANAGER in the National Resettlement
and Rehabilitation Administration (NARRA) with compensation at the rate of
TWELVE THOUSAND (P12,000.00) PESOS per annum the appointment to take
effect January 16,1960 . . . . REINSTATEMENT ... (p. 2, rec.).
The power of the Board of Directors of the NARRA to appoint the general manager is provided for in
paragraph (2),Section 8, Republic Act No. 1160 (approved June 18, 1954), to wit:
Sec. 8. Powers and Duties of the Board of Directors. The Board of Directors shall
have the following powers and duties: ...
2) To appoint and fix the term of office of General Manager ..., subject to the
recommendation of the Office of Economic Coordination and the approval of the
President of the Philippines, .... The Board, by a majority vote of all members, may,
for cause, upon recommendation of the Office of Economic Coordination and with the
approval of the President of the Philippines, suspend and/or remove the General
Manager and/or the Assistant General Manager (p. 46, rec., emphasis supplied).
On March 15, 1962, the same Board of Directors approved the following resolution:
RESOLUTION NO. 24 (Series of 1962)
WHEREAS, the Chairman of the Board has transmitted to the Board of Directors
the desire of the Office of the President Malacanang, Manila, to fix the term of
office of the incumbent General Manager up to the close of office hours on March 31,
1962, in accordance with the provision of Section 8, sub-section 2 of R.A. No. 1160;
NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED, as it is hereby resolved, that the Board of
Directors hereby fix, as it is hereby fixed, the term of office of the incumbent General
Manager of the National Resettlement and Rehabilitation Administration (NARRA) to
March 31, 1962 (pp. 6-7, rec., emphasis supplied).
Petitioner filed a petition for mandamus with preliminary injunction with the then Court of First
Instance of Manila on March 29, 1962. The petition prayed to annul the resolution of the NARRA
Board dated March 15, 1962, to command the Board to allow petitioner to continue in office as
General Manager until he vacates said office in accordance with law and to sentence the private
respondents jointly and severally to pay the petitioner actual damages in the sum of P95,000.00,
plus costs.

On August 8, 1963, when the case was still pending decision in the lower court, Republic Act No.
3844, otherwise known as the Agricultural Land Reform Code, took effect. The said law abolished
the NARRA (Sec. 73, R.A. 3844) and transferred its functions and powers to the Land Authority. On
October 21, 1963, the then Court of First Instance of Manila rendered judgment, finding "that this
case has become academic by reason of the approval of the Agricultural Land Reform Code
(Republic Act No. 3844) and thereby dismissing the instant petition without pronouncement as to
costs" (p. 5, rec.).
On appeal to the then Court of Appeals, the appellate tribunal speaking through then Mr. Justice
Antonio C. Lucero, affirmed the decision of the lower court. in dismissing the petition for mandamus.
Pertinent provisions of the decision are as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
In the light of the foregoing facts, it is evident that Bruno O. Aparri accepted the
position of General Manager without fixed term and his appointment is, in essence,
terminable at the pleasure of the appointing power which, in this case, is the Board of
Directors. Where, as in the case at bar, the appointing officer, that is, the Board of
Directors, had fixed the term of office of the incumbent Manager to end on March 31,
1962, the replacement of Bruno O. Aparri is not removal but by reason of the term of
his office which is one of the recognized modes of terminating official
relations.Considering that the term of office of the General Manager of the NARRA is
not fixed by law nor has it been fixed by the Board of Directors at the time of his
appointment although it had the power to do so, it is obvious that the term of office of
herein petitioner Bruno O. Aparri expired on March 31, 1962and his right to hold the
said office was thereby extinguished. In other words, Bruno O. Aparri cessation from
office invokes no removal but merely the expiration of the term of office which was
within the power of the Board of Directors to fix. Hence, Bruno O. Aparri continues
only for so long as the term of his office has not ended (Alba vs. Hon. Jose N.
Evangelists, 100 Phil. 683) [Decision of the Court of Appeals, pp. 48-49, rec.,
emphasis supplied].
The motion for reconsideration by petitioner in the then Court of Appeals was denied on January 10,
1969.
On January 20, 1969, the petitioner filed a petition for certiorari to review the decision of the then
Court of Appeals dated September 24, 1968 (pp. 1-41, rec.). The same was initially denied for lack
of merit in a resolution dated January 27, 1969 (p. 55, rec.); but on motion for reconsideration filed
on February 11, 1969, the petition was given due course (p. 66, rec.).
The only legal issue sought to be reviewed is whether or not Board Resolution No. 24 (series of
1962) was a removal or dismissal of petitioner without cause.
WE affirm. WE hold that the term of office of the petitioner expired on March 31, 1962.
A public office is the right, authority, and duty created and conferred by law, by which for a given
period, either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the creating power, an individual is invested
with some portion of the sovereign functions of the government, to be exercise by him for the benefit
of the public ([Mechem Public Offices and Officers,] Sec. 1). The right to hold a public office under
our political system is therefore not a natural right. It exists, when it exists at all only because and by
virtue of some law expressly or impliedly creating and conferring it (Mechem Ibid., Sec. 64). There is
no such thing as a vested interest or an estate in an office, or even an absolute right to hold office.

Excepting constitutional offices which provide for special immunity as regards salary and tenure, no
one can be said to have any vested right in an office or its salary (42 Am. Jur. 881).
The National Resettlement and Rehabilitation Administration (NARRA) was created under Republic
Act No. 1160 (approved June 18,1954), which provides that:
Sec. 2. NATIONAL RESETTLEMENT AND REHABILITATION ADMINISTRATION
... there is hereby created a corporation to be known as National Resettlement
and Rehabilitation Administration hereafter referred to as "NARRA" to perform under
the supervision and control of the President of the Philippines, through the Office of
Economic Coordinator all the duties and functions of the Bureau of Lands as
provided for in Commonwealth Act numbered Six Hundred and Ninety-one, as
amended, and such other duties as are hereinafter specified in this Act. It shall be
headed by a General Manager and an Assistant Manager who shall be appointed as
hereinafter provided (emphasis supplied).
Paragraph 2, Section 8 of Republic Act 1160 expressly gives to the Board of Directors of the NARRA
the power "to appoint and fix the term of office of the general manager ... subject to the
recommendation of Economic Coordination and the approval of the President of the Philippines"
(emphasis supplied).
By "appointment" is meant the act of designation by the executive officer, board or body, to whom
that power has been delegated, of the individual who is to exercise the functions of a given office
(Mechem op. cit., Sec. 102). When the power of appointment is absolute, and the appointee has
been determined upon, no further consent or approval is necessary, and the formal evidence of the
appointment, the commission, may issue at once. Where, however, the assent or confirmationof
some other officer or body is required, the Commission can issue or the appointment is complete
only when such assent or condition is obtained (People vs. Bissell, 49 Cal. 407). To constitute an
"appointment" to office, there must be some open, unequivocal act of appointment on the part of the
appointing authority empowered to make it, and it may be said that an appointment to office is made
and is complete when the last act required of the appointing authority has been performed (Molnar
vs. City of Aurora, 348 N.E. 2d 262, 38 III App. 3d 580). In either case, the appointment becomes
complete when the last act required of the appointing power is performed (State vs. Barbour, 53
Conn. 76, 55 Am. Rep. 65).
The petitioner was appointed as general manager pursuant to Resolution No. 13 (series of 1960
approved on January 15, 1960) of the Board of Directors. A careful perusal of the resolution points
out the fact that the appointment is by itself incomplete because of the lack of approval of the
President of the Philippines to such appointment. Thus, We note that Resolution No. 13 states:
xxx xxx xxx
... RESOLVED FURTHER, as it is hereby resolved, to inform the President of the
Philippines of the above appointment of Mr. Aparri (p. 2, rec.).
Presumably, the Board of Directors of the NARRA expected that such appointment be given
approval by the then President. Lacking such approval by the President as required by the law (par.
2, Sec. 8 of R.A. 1160), the appointment of petitioner was not complete. The petitioner can, at best,
be classified as a de facto officer because he assumed office "under color of a known appointment
or election, void because the officer was not eligible or because there was a want of power in the
electing body, or by reasons of some defect or irregularity in its exercise, such ineligibility, want of
power, or defect being unknown to the public" (State vs. Carroll, 38 Conn. 449, 9Am. Rep. 409).

However, such appointment was made complete upon approval of Resolution No. 24 (series of
1962-approved March 15, 1962) wherein the President submitted to the Board his "desire" to fix the
term of office of the petitioner up to the close of office hours on March 31, 1962. The questioned
resolution corrected whatever requisite lacking in the earlier Resolution No. 13 of the respondent
Board. Resolution No. 24, approved by the respondent Board and pursuant to "the desire of the
President" legally fixed the term of office of petitioner as mandated by paragraph 2, Section 8 of
Republic Act 1160.
The word "term" in a legal sense means a fixed and definite period of time which the law describes
that an officer may hold an office (Sueppel vs. City Council of Iowa City, 136 N.W. 2D 523, quoting
67 CJS OFFICERS, secs. 42, 54[1]). According to Mochem, the term of office is the period during
which an office may be held. Upon the expiration of the officer's term, unless he is authorized by law
to hold over, his rights, duties and authority as a pubic officer must ipso facto cease (Mechem, op.
cit., Secs. 396-397). In the law on Public Officers, the most natural and frequent method by which a
public officer ceases to be such is by the expiration of the term for which he was elected or
appointed. The question of when this event has occurred depends upon a number of considerations,
the most prominent of which, perhaps, are whether he was originally elected or appointed for a
definite term or for a term dependent upon some act or event ... (Mechem op. cit., Sec. 384).
It is necessary in each case to interpret the word "term" with the purview of statutes so as to
effectuate the statutory scheme pertaining to the office under examination (Barber vs. Blue, 417
P.2D 401, 51 Cal. Rptr. 865, 65 C.2d N5). In the case at bar, the term of office is not fixed by law.
However, the power to fix the term is vested in the Board of Directors subject to the recommendation
of the Office of Economic Coordination and the approval of the President of the Philippines.
Resolution No. 24 (series of 1962) speaks of no removal but an expiration of the term of office of the
petitioner. The statute is undeniably clear. It is the rule in statutory construction that if the words and
phrase of a statute are not obscure or ambiguous, its meaning and the intention of the legislature
must be determined from the language employed, and, where there is no ambiguity in the words,
there is no room for construction (Black on Interpretation of Laws, Sec. 51). The courts may not
speculate as to the probable intent of the legislature apart from the words (Hondoras vs. Soto, 8 Am.
St., Rep. 744). The reason for the rule is that the legislature must be presumed to know the meaning
of words, to have used words advisedly and to have expressed its intent by the use of such words as
are found in the statute (50 Am. Jur. p. 212).
Removal entails the ouster of an incumbent before the expiration of his term (Manalang vs.
Quitoriano, 50 O.G. 2515). The petitioner in this case was not removed before the expiration of his
term. Rather, his right to hold the office ceased by the expiration on March 31, 1962 of his term to
hold such office.
WHEREFORE, THE DECISION APPEALED FROM IS HEREBY AFFIRMED. WITHOUT COSTS.
SO ORDERED.

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 147927. February 4, 2002]

RAYMUNDO
M.
ADORMEO, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION
ELECTIONS and RAMON Y. TALAGA, JR., respondents.

ON

DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:

Before us is a petition for certiorari, with a prayer for a writ of preliminary

injunction and/or temporary restraining order, to nullify and set aside the
resolution dated May 9, 2001 of public respondent Commission on Elections
in Comelec SPA No. 01-055, which granted the motion for reconsideration and
declared private respondent Ramon Y. Talaga, Jr., qualified to run for Mayor in
Lucena City for the May 14, 2001 election. Petitioner prays that votes cast in
private respondents favor should not be counted; and should it happen that
private respondent had been already proclaimed the winner, his proclamation
should be declared null and void.
The uncontroverted facts are as follows:
Petitioner and private respondent were the only candidates who filed their
certificates of candidacy for mayor of Lucena City in the May 14,
2001 elections. Private respondent was then the incumbent mayor.
Private respondent Talaga, Jr. was elected mayor in May 1992. He served
the full term. Again, he was re-elected in 1995-1998. In the election of 1998,
he lost to Bernard G. Tagarao. In the recall election of May 12, 2000, he again
won and served the unexpired term of Tagarao until June 30, 2001.
On March 2, 2001, petitioner filed with the Office of the Provincial Election
Supervisor, Lucena City a Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel
Certificate of Candidacy and/or Disqualification of Ramon Y. Talaga, Jr., on the
ground that the latter was elected and had served as city mayor for three (3)
consecutive terms as follows: (1) in the election of May 1992, where he
served the full term; (2) in the election of May 1995, where he again served
the full term; and, (3) in the recall election of May 12, 2000, where he served
only the unexpired term of Tagarao after having lost to Tagarao in the 1998
election. Petitioner contended that Talagas candidacy as Mayor constituted a
violation of Section 8, Article X of the 1987 Constitution which provides:
Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which
shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for
more than three consecutive terms.Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length
of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for
the full term for which he was elected.

On March 9, 2001, private respondent responded that he was not elected

City Mayor for three (3) consecutive terms but only for two (2) consecutive
terms. He pointed to his defeat in the 1998 election by Tagarao. Because of
his defeat the consecutiveness of his years as mayor was interrupted, and
thus his mayorship was not for three consecutive terms of three years each.
Respondent added that his service from May 12, 2001 until June 30, 2001 for
13 months and eighteen (18) days was not a full term, in the contemplation of
the law and the Constitution. He cites Lonzanida vs. COMELEC, G.R. No.
135150, 311 SCRA 602, 611 (1999), as authority to the effect that to apply
disqualification under Section 8, Article X of the Constitution, two (2)
conditions must concur, to wit: (a) that the official concerned has been elected
for three consecutive terms in the same local government post, and (b) that he
has fully served three (3) consecutive terms.
On April 20, 2001, the COMELEC, through the First Division, found private
respondent Ramon Y. Talaga, Jr. disqualified for the position of city mayor on
the ground that he had already served three (3) consecutive terms, and his
Certificate of Candidacy was ordered withdrawn and/or cancelled.
On April 27, 2001, private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration
reiterating that three (3) consecutive terms means continuous service for nine
(9) years and that the two (2) years service from 1998 to 2000 by Tagarao
who defeated him in the election of 1998 prevented him from having three
consecutive years of service. He added that Tagaraos tenure from 1998 to
2000 could not be considered as a continuation of his mayorship. He further
alleged that the recall election was not a regular election, but a separate
special election specifically to remove incompetent local officials.
On May 3, 2001, petitioner filed his Opposition to private respondents
Motion for Reconsideration stating therein that serving the unexpired term of
office is considered as one (1) term. Petitioner further contended that Article 8
of the Constitution speaks of term and does not mention tenure. The fact that
private respondent was not elected in the May 1998 election to start a term
that began on June 30, 1998 was of no moment, according to petitioner, and
what matters is that respondent was elected to an unexpired term in the recall
election which should be considered one full term from June 30, 1998 to June
30, 2001.
[1]

On May 9, 2001, the COMELEC en banc ruled in favor of private

respondent Ramon Y. Talaga, Jr.. It reversed the First Divisions ruling and
held that 1) respondent was not elected for three (3) consecutive terms
because he did not win in the May 11, 1998 elections; 2) that he was installed
only as mayor by reason of his victory in the recall elections; 3) that his victory

in the recall elections was not considered a term of office and is not included
in the 3-term disqualification rule, and 4) that he did not fully serve the three
(3) consecutive terms, and his loss in the May 11, 1998 elections is
considered an interruption in the continuity of his service as Mayor of Lucena
City.
On May 19, 2001, after canvassing, private respondent was proclaimed as
the duly elected Mayor of Lucena City.
Petitioner is now before this Court, raising the sole issue:
WHETHER OR NOT PUBLIC RESPONDENT COMELEC ACTED WITH GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF
JURISDICTION WHEN IT ISSUED ITS RESOLUTION DATED MAY 9, 2001,
DECLARING PRIVATE RESPONDENT RAMON Y. TALAGA, JR., QUALIFIED
TO RUN FOR MAYOR IN LUCENA CITY FOR THE MAY 14, 2001 ELECTIONS.
[2]

Stated differently, was private respondent disqualified to run for mayor

of Lucena City in the May 14, 2001 elections? This issue hinges on whether,
as provided by the Constitution, he had already served three consecutive
terms in that office.
[3]

Petitioner contends that private respondent was disqualified to run for city
mayor by reason of the three-term rule because the unexpired portion of the
term of office he served after winning a recall election, covering the period
May 12, 2000 to June 30, 2001 is considered a full term. He posits that to
interpret otherwise, private respondent would be serving four (4) consecutive
terms of 10 years, in violation of Section 8, Article X of 1987 Constitution and
Section 43 (b) of R.A. 7160, known as the Local Government Code.
[4]

Section 43. Term of Office.

xxx
(b) No local elective official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms in
the same position. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not
be considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which
the elective official concerned was elected.
Private respondent, in turn, maintains that his service as city mayor of
Lucena is not consecutive. He lost his bid for a second re-election in 1998 and
between June 30, 1998 to May 12, 2000, during Tagaraos incumbency, he
was a private citizen, thus he had not been mayor for 3 consecutive terms.

In its comment, the COMELEC restated its position that private

respondent was not elected for three (3) consecutive terms having lost his
third bid in the May 11, 1998 elections, said defeat is an interruption in the
continuity of service as city mayor of Lucena.
The issue before us was already addressed in Borja, Jr. vs. COMELEC,
295 SCRA 157, 169 (1998), where we held,
To recapitulate, the term limit for elective local officials must be taken to refer to
the right to be elected as well as the right to serve in the same elective
position. Consequently, it is not enough that an individual has served three
consecutive terms in an elective local office, he must also have been elected to the
same position for the same number of times before the disqualification can apply. This
point can be made clearer by considering the following case or situation:
xxx
Case No. 2. Suppose B is elected mayor and, during his first term, he is twice
suspended for misconduct for a total of 1 year. If he is twice reelected after that, can
he run for one more term in the next election?
Yes, because he has served only two full terms successively.
xxx
To consider C as eligible for reelection would be in accord with the understanding of
the Constitutional Commission that while the people should be protected from the
evils that a monopoly of political power may bring about, care should be taken that
their freedom of choice is not unduly curtailed.
Likewise, in the case of Lonzanida vs. COMELEC, 311 SCRA 602, 611
(1999), we said,
This Court held that the two conditions for the application of the disqualification must
concur: a) that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in
the same local government post and 2) that he has fully served three consecutive
terms.
Accordingly, COMELECs ruling that private respondent was not elected for
three (3) consecutive terms should be upheld. For nearly two years he was a
private citizen. The continuity of his mayorship was disrupted by his defeat in
the 1998 elections.

Patently untenable is petitioners contention that COMELEC in allowing

respondent Talaga, Jr. to run in the May 1998 election violates Article X,
Section 8 of 1987 Constitution. To bolster his case, respondent adverts to the
comment of Fr. Joaquin Bernas, a Constitutional Commission member, stating
that in interpreting said provision that if one is elected representative to serve
the unexpired term of another, that unexpired, no matter how short, will be
considered one term for the purpose of computing the number of successive
terms allowed.
[5]

[6]

As pointed out by the COMELEC en banc, Fr. Bernas comment is

pertinent only to members of the House of Representatives. Unlike local
government officials, there is no recall election provided for members of
Congress.
[7]

Neither can respondents victory in the recall election be deemed a

violation of Section 8, Article X of the Constitution as voluntary renunciation for
clearly it is not. In Lonzanida vs. COMELEC, we said:
The second sentence of the constitutional provision under scrutiny states, Voluntary
renunciation of office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption
in the continuity of service for the full term for which he was elected. The clear intent
of the framers of the constitution to bar any attempt to circumvent the three-term limit
by a voluntary renunciation of office and at the same time respect the peoples choice
and grant their elected official full service of a term is evident in this
provision. Voluntary renunciation of a term does not cancel the renounced term in the
computation of the three term limit; conversely, involuntary severance from office for
any length of time short of the full term provided by law amounts to an interruption of
continuity of service. The petitioner vacated his post a few months before the next
mayoral elections, not by voluntary renunciation but in compliance with the legal
process of writ of execution issued by the COMELEC to that effect. Such involuntary
severance from office is an interruption of continuity of service and thus, the
petitioner did not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral term.
[8]

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED. The resolution

of public respondent Commission on Elections dated May 9, 2001, in Comelec
SPA No. 01-055 is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 135150. July 28, 1999]

ROMEO LONZANIDA, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COMMISSION

ON ELECTION and EUFEMIO MULI, repondents.
DECISION
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:

This petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeks to set aside the
resolutions issued by the COMELEC First Division dated May 21, 1998 and by the COMELEC
En Banc dated August 11, 1998 in SPA 98-190 entitled, In the matter of the Petition to Disqualify
Mayoralty Candidate Romeo Lonzanida of San Antonio, Zambales. Eufemio Muli, petitioner, vs.
Romeo Lonzanida, respondent. The assailed resolutions declared herein petitioner Romeo
Lonzanida disqualified to run for Mayor in the municipality of San Antonio, Zambales in the
May 1998 elections and that all votes cast in his favor shall not be counted and if he has been
proclaimed winner the said proclamation is declared null and void.
Petitioner Romeo Lonzanida was duly elected and served two consecutive terms as
municipal mayor of San Antonio, Zambales prior to the May 8, 1995 elections. In the May 1995
elections Lonzanida ran for mayor of San Antonio, Zambales and was again proclaimed
winner. He assumed office and discharged the duties thereof. His proclamation in 1995 was
however contested by his then opponent Juan Alvez who filed an election protest before the
Regional Trial Court of Zambales, which in a decision dated January 9, 1997 declared a failure
of elections. The court ruled:

PREMISES CONSIDERED, this court hereby renders judgment declaring the results
of the election for the office of the mayor in San Antonio, Zambales last May 8, 1995
as null and void on the ground that there was a failure of election.
Accordingly, the office of the mayor of the Municipality of San Antonio, Zambales is
hereby declared vacant.
Both parties appealed to the COMELEC. On November 13, 1997 the COMELEC resolved the
election protest filed by Alvez and after a revision and re-appreciation of the contested ballots
declared Alvez the duly elected mayor of San Antonio, Zambales by plurality of votes cast in his
favor totaling 1,720 votes as against 1,488 votes for Lonzanida. On February 27, 1998 the
COMELEC issued a writ of execution ordering Lonzanida to vacate the post, which obeyed, and
Alvez assumed office for the remainder of the term.
In the May 11, 1998 elections Lonzanida again filed his certificate of candidacy for mayor
of San Antonio. On April 21, 1998 his opponent Eufemio Muli timely filed a petition to
disqualify Lonzanida from running for mayor of San Antonio in the 1998 elections on the ground
that he had served three consecutive terms in the same post. On May 13, 1998, petitioner
Lonzanida was proclaimed winner. On May 21, 1998 the First Division of the COMELEC issued
the questioned resolution granting the petition for disqualification upon a finding that Lonzanida
had served three consecutive terms as mayor of San Antonio, Zambales and he is therefore
disqualified to run for the same post for the fourth time. The COMELEC found that Lonzanidas
assumption of office by virtue of his proclamation in May 1995, although he was later unseated

before the expiration of the term, should be counted as service for one full term in computing the
three term limit under the Constitution and the Local Government Code. The finding of the
COMELEC First Division was affirmed by the COMELEC En Banc in a resolution dated August
11, 1998.
Petitioner Lonzanida challenges the validity of the COMELEC resolutions finding him
disqualified to run for mayor of San Antonio Zambales in the 1998 elections. He maintains that
he was duly elected mayor for only two consecutive terms and that his assumption of office in
1995 cannot be counted as service of a term for the purpose of applying the three term limit for
local government officials, because he was not the duly elected mayor of San Antonio in the May
1995 elections as evidenced by the COMELEC decision dated November 13, 1997 in EAC no.
6-97 entitled Juan Alvez, Protestant-Appellee vs. Romeo Lonzanida, Protestee-Appellant,
wherein the COMELEC declared Juan Alvez as the duly elected mayor of San Antonio,
Zambales. Petitioner also argues that the COMELEC ceased to have jurisdiction over the petition
for disqualification after he was proclaimed winner in the 1998 mayoral elections; as the proper
remedy is a petition for quo warranto with the appropriate regional trial court under Rule 36 of
the COMELEC Rules of Procedure.
Private respondent Eufemio Muli filed comment to the petition asking this court to sustain
the questioned resolutions of the COMELEC and to uphold its jurisdiction over the petition for
disqualification.The private respondent states that the petition for disqualification was filed on
April 21, 1998 or before the May 1998 mayoral elections. Under section 6, RA 6646 and Rule 25
of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure petitions for disqualification filed with the COMELEC
before the elections and/or proclamation of the party sought to be disqualified may still be herd
and decided by the COMELEC after the election and proclamation of the said party without
distinction as to the alleged ground for disqualification, whether for acts constituting an election
offense or for ineligibility. Accordingly, it is argued that the resolutions of the COMELEC on the
merits of the petition for disqualification were issued within the commissions jurisdiction. As
regards the merits of the case, the private respondent maintains that the petitioners assumption of
office in 1995 should be considered as service of one full term because he discharged the duties
of mayor for almost three years until March 1, 1998 or barely a few months before the next
mayoral elections.
The Solicitor-General filed comment to the petition for the respondent COMELEC praying
for the dismissal of the petition. The Solicitor-General stressed that section 8, Art. X of the
Constitution and section 43 (b), Chapter I of the Local Government Code which bar a local
government official from serving more than three consecutive terms in the same position speaks
of service of a term and so the rule should be examined in this light. The public respondent
contends that petitioner Lonzanida discharged the rights and duties of mayor from 1995 to 1998
which should be counted as service of one full term, albeit he was later unseated, because he
served as mayor for the greater part of the term. The issue of whether or not Lonzanida served as
a de jure or de facto mayor for the 1995-1998 term is inconsequential in the application of the
three term limit because the prohibition speaks of service of a term which was intended by the
framers of the Constitution to foil any attempt to monopolize political power. It is likewise
argued by the respondent that a petition for quo warranto with the regional trial court is proper
when the petition for disqualification is filed after the elections and so the instant petition for
disqualification which was filed before the elections may be resolved by the COMELEC
thereafter regardless of the imputed basis of disqualification.

The petitioner filed Reply to the comment. It is maintained that the petitioner could not have
served a valid term from 1995 to 1998 although he assumed office as mayor for that period
because he was no t lawfully elected to the said office. Moreover, the petitioner was unseated
before the expiration of the term and so his service for the period cannot be considered as one
full term. As regards the issue of jurisdiction, the petitioner reiterated in his Reply that the
COMELEC ceased to have jurisdiction to hear the election protest after the petitioners
proclamation.
The petition has merit.
Section 8, Art. X of the Constitution provides:

Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which
shall be determined by law shall be three years and no such officials shall serve for
more than three consecutive terms.Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length
of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his service for
the full term for which he was elected.
Section 43 of the Local Government Code (R.A. No. 7160) restates the same rule:

Sec. 43. Term of Office.

(b) No local elective official shall serve for more than three consecutive terms in the
same position. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be
considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which
the elective official concerned was elected.
The issue before us is whether petitioner Lonzanidas assumption of office as mayor of San
Antonio Zambales from May 1995 to March 1998 may be considered as service of one full term
for the purpose of applying the three-term limit for elective local government officials.
The records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission show that the three-term limit which is
now embodied in section 8, Art. X of the Constitution was initially proposed to be an absolute
bar to any elective local government official from running for the same position after serving
three consecutive terms. The said disqualification was primarily intended to forestall the
accumulation of massive political power by an elective local government official in a given
locality in order to perpetuate his tenure in office. The delegates also considered the need to
broaden the choices of the electorate of the candidates who will run for office, and to infuse new
blood in the political arena by disqualifying officials from running for the same office after a
term of nine years. The mayor was compared by some delegates to the President of the Republic
as he is a powerful chief executive of his political territory and is most likely to form a political
dynasty.[1] The drafters however, recognized and took note of the fact that some local government
officials run for office before they reach forty years of age; thus to perpetually bar them from
running for the same office after serving nine consecutive years may deprive the people of
qualified candidates to choose from. As finally voted upon, it was agreed that an elective local
government official should be barred from running for the same post after three consecutive
terms. After a hiatus of at least one term, he may again run for the same office.[2]

The scope of the constitutional provision barring elective officials with the exception of
barangay officials from serving more than three consecutive terms was discussed at length in the
case of Benjamin Borja, Jr., vs. COMELEC and Jose Capco, Jr.[3] where the issue raised was
whether a vice-mayor who succeeds to the office of the mayor by operation of law upon the
death of the incumbent mayor and served the remainder of the term should be considered to have
served a term in that office for the purpose of computing the three term limit. This court pointed
out that from the discussions of the Constitutional Convention it is evident that the delegates
proceeded from the premise that the officials assumption of office is by reason of election. This
Court stated:[4]

Two ideas emerge from a consideration of the proceedings of the Constitutional

Commission. The first is the notion of service of term, derived from the concern about
the accumulation of power as a result of a prolonged stay in office. The second is the
idea of election, derived from the concern that the right of the people to choose those
whom they wish to govern them be preserved.
It is likewise noteworthy that, in discussing term limits, the drafters of the
Constitution did so on the assumption that the officials concerned were serving by
reason of election. This is clear from the following exchange in the Constitutional
Commission concerning term limits, now embodied in Art. VI sections 4 and 7 of the
Constitution, for members of Congress:
MR. GASCON. I would like to ask a question with regard to the issue after the second term. We will
allow the Senator to rest for a period of time before he can run again?
MR. DAVIDE. That is correct.
MR. GASCON. And the question that we left behind before-if the Gentlemen will rememberwas: How long will that period of rest be? Will it be one election which is three years or one term
which is six years?
MR. DAVIDE. If the Gentlemen will remember, Commissioner Rodrigo expressed the view that
during the election following the expiration of the first 12 years, whether such election will be on
the third year or on the sixth year thereafter, his particular member of the Senate can run. So it is
not really a period of hibernation for six years. That was the Committees stand.

xxxx xxxx xxxx

Second, not only historical examination but textual analysis as well supports the
ruling of the COMELEC that Art X, section 8 contemplates service by local officials
for three consecutive terms as a result of election. The first sentence speaks of the
term of office of elective local officials and bars such officials from serving for more
than three consecutive terms. The second sentence, in explaining when an elective
official may be deemed to have served his full term of office, states that voluntary
renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an
interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected.
The term served must therefore be one for which the the official concerned was

elected. The purpose of the provision is to prevent a circumvention of the limitation

on the number of terms an elective official may serve.
This Court held that two conditions for the application of the disqualification must concur: 1)
that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local
government post and 2) that he has fully served three consecutive terms. It stated:

To recapitulate, the term limit for elective local officials must be taken to refer to the
right to be elected as well as the right to serve in the same elective
position. Consequently, it is not enough that an individual has served three
consecutive terms in an elective local office, he must also have been elected to the
same position for the same number of times before the disqualification can apply.
It is not disputed that the petitioner was previously elected and served two consecutive terms
as mayor of San Antonio Zambales prior to the May 1995 mayoral elections. In the May 1995
elections he again ran for mayor of San Antonio, Zambales and was proclaimed winner. He
assumed office and discharged the rights and duties of mayor until March 1998 when he was
ordered to vacate the post by reason of the COMELEC decision dated November 13, 1997 on the
election protest against the petitioner which declared his opponent Juan Alvez, the duly elected
mayor of San Antonio. Alvez served the remaining portion of the 1995-1998 mayoral term.
The two requisites for the application of the three term rule are absent. First, the petitioner
cannot be considered as having been duly elected to the post in the May 1995 elections, and
second, the petitioner did not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral term by reason of involuntary
relinquishment of office. After a re-appreciation and revision of the contested ballots the
COMELEC itself declared by final judgment that petitioner Lonzanida lost in the May 1995
mayoral elections and his previous proclamation as winner was declared null and void. His
assumption of office as mayor cannot be deemed to have been by reason of a valid election but
by reason of a void proclamation. It has been repeatedly held by this court that a proclamation
subsequently declared void is no proclamation at all [5] and while a proclaimed candidate may
assume office on the strength of the proclamation of the Board of Canvassers he is only a
presumptive winner who assumes office subject to the final outcome of the election protest.
[6]
Petitioner Lonzanida did not serve a term as mayor of San Antonio, Zambales from May 1995
to March 1998 because he was not duly elected to the post; he merely assumed office as
presumptive winner, which presumption was later overturned by the COMELEC when it decided
with finality that Lonzanida lost in the May 1995 mayoral elections.
Second, the petitioner cannot be deemed to have served the May 1995 to 1998 term because
he was ordered to vacate his post before the expiration of the term. The respondents contention
that the petitioner should be deemed to have served one full term from May 1995-1998 because
he served the greater portion of that term has no legal basis to support it; it disregards the second
requisite for the application of the disqualification, i.e., that he has fully served three consecutive
terms. The second sentence of the constitutional provision under scrutiny states, Voluntary
renunciation of office for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the
continuity of service for the full term for which he was elected. The clear intent of the framers of
the constitution to bar any attempt to circumvent the three-term limit by a voluntary renunciation
of office and at the same time respect the peoples choice and grant their elected official full

service of a term is evident in this provision. Voluntary renunciation of a term does not cancel the
renounced term in the computation of the three term limit; conversely, involuntary severance
from office for any length of time short of the full term porvided by law amounts to an
interruption of continuity of service. The petitioner vacated his post a few months before the next
mayoral elections, not by voluntary renunciation but in compliance with the legal process of writ
of execution issued by the COMELEC to that effect. Such involuntary severance from office is
an interruption of continuity of service and thus, the petitioner did not fully serve the 1995-1998
mayoral term.
In sum, the petitioner was not the duly elected mayor and that he did not hold office for the
full term; hence, his assumption of office from May 1995 to March 1998 cannot be counted as a
term for purposes of computing the three term limit. The Resolution of the COMELEC finding
him disqualified on this ground to run in the May 1998 mayoral elections should therefore be set
aside.
The respondents harp on the delay in resolving the election protest between petitioner and
his then opponent Alvez which took roughly about three years and resultantly extended the
petitioners incumbency in an office to which he was not lawfully elected. We note that such
delay cannot be imputed to the petitioner. There is no specific allegation nor proof that the delay
was due to any political maneuvering on his part to prolong his stay in office. Moreover,
protestant Alvez, was not without legal recourse to move for the early resolution of the election
protest while it was pending before the regional trial court or to file a motion for the execution of
the regional trial courts decision declaring the position of mayor vacant and ordering the vicemayor to assume office while the appeal was pending with the COMELEC. Such delay which is
not here shown to have been intentionally sought by the petitioner to prolong his stay in office
cannot serve as basis to bar his right to be elected and to serve his chosen local government post
in the succeeding mayoral election.
The petitioners contention that the COMELEC ceased to have jurisdiction over the petition
for disqualification after he was proclaimed winner is without merit. The instant petition for
disqualification was filed on April 21, 1998 or before the May 1998 elections and was resolved
on May 21, 1998 or after the petitioners proclamation. It was held in the case of Sunga vs.
COMELEC and Trinidad[7] that the proclamation nor the assumption of office of a candidate
against whom a petition for disqualification is pending before the COMELEC does not divest the
COMELEC of jurisdiction to continue hearing the case and to resolve it on the merits.
Section 6 of RA 6646 specifically mandates that:

Sec. 6. Effects of disqualification Case.- any candidate who has been declared by final
judgment to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not
be counted. If for any reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an
election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives the winning number of
votes in such election, the court or commission shall continue with the trial and
hearing of the action, inquiry or protest and, upon motion of the complainant or any
intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the proclamation
of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.

This court held that the clear legislative intent is that the COMELEC should continue the
trial and hearing of the disqualification case to its conclusion i.e., until judgment is rendered. The
outright dismissal of the petition for disqualification filed before the election but which remained
unresolved after the proclamation of the candidate sought to be disqualified will unduly reward
the said candidate and may encourage him to employ delaying tactics to impede the resolution of
the petition until after he has been proclaimed.
The court stated:

Clearly, the legislative intent is that the COMELEC should continue the trial and
hearing of the disqualification case to its conclusion, i.e., until judgment is rendered
thereon. The word shall signified that this requirement of the law is mandatory,
operating to impose a positive duty which must be enforced. Theimplication is that the
COMELEC is left with no discretion but to proceed with the disqualification case
even after the election. Thus, in providing for the outright dismissal of the
disqualification case which remains unresolved after the election, Silvestre vs.
Duavit in effect disallows what R. A. No. 6646 imperatively requires. This amounts to
a quasi-judicial legislation by the COMELEC which cannot be countenanced and is
invalid for having been issued beyond the scope of its authority. Interpretative rulings
of quasi-judicial bodies or administrative agencies must always be in perfect harmony
with statutes and should be for the sole purpose of carrying their general provisions
into effect. By such interpretative or administrative rulings, of course, the scope of the
law itself cannot be limited. Indeed, a quasi-judicial body or an administrative agency
for that matter cannot amend an act of Congress.Hence, in case of a discrepancy
between the basic law and an interpretative or administrative ruling, the basic law
prevails.
Besides, the deleterious effect of the Silvestre ruling is not difficult to forsee. A
candidate guilty of election offenses would be undeservedly rewarded, instead of
punished, by the dismissal of thedisqualification case against him simply because the
investigating body was unable, for any reason caused upon it, to determine before the
election if the offenses were indeed committed by the candidate sought to be
disqualified. All that the erring aspirant would need to do is to employ delaying tactics
so that the disqualification case based on the commission of election offenses would
not be decided before the election. This scenario is productive of more fraud which
certainly is not the main intent and purpose of the law.
The fact that Trinidad was already proclaimed and had assumed the position of mayor
did not divest the COMELEC of authority and jurisdiction to continue the hearing and
eventually decide the disqualification case. In Aguam v. COMELEC this Court heldTime and again this Court has given its imprimatur on the principle that COMELEC is
with authority to annul any canvass and proclamation which was illegally made. The

fact that a candidate proclaimed has assumed office, we have said, is no bar to the
exercise of such power. It of course may not be availed of where there has been a
valid proclamation. Since private respondents petition before the COMELEC is
precisely directed at the annulment of the canvass and proclamation, we perceive that
inquiry into this issue is within the area allocated by the Constitution and law to
COMELEC xxx Really, were a victim of a proclamation to be precluded from
challenging the validity thereof after that proclamation and the assumption of office
thereunder, baneful effects may easily supervene.
It must be emphasized that the purpose of a disqualification proceeding is to prevent
the candidate from running or, if elected. From serving, or to prosecute him for
violation of the election laws. Obviously, the fact that a candidate has been
proclaimed elected does not signify that his disqualification is deemed condoned and
may no longer be the subject of a separate investigation.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is granted. The assailed resolutions of the COMELEC
declaring petitioner Lonzanida disqualified to run for mayor in the 1998 mayoral elections are
hereby set aside.
SO ORDERED

EN BANC
FRANCIS G. ONG, G.R. No. 163295 Petitioner,
Present:
PANGANIBAN, C.J.
PUNO,
QUISUMBING,
YNARES-SANTIAGO,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
- versus - CARPIO
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CORONA,
CARPIO MORALES,
CALLEJO, SR.,
AZCUNA,
TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO, and
GARCIA, JJ.
JOSEPH STANLEY ALEGRE and Promulgated:

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
Respondents. January 23, 2006
x---------------------x
ROMMEL G. ONG,
Petitioner,
-

versus - G.R. No. 163354

JOSEPH STANLEY ALEGRE and

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,
Respondents.
x----------------------------------------x

DECISION

GARCIA, J.:
Before the Court are these two separate petitions under Rule 65
of the Rules of Court to nullify and set aside certain issuances of
the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) en banc.
The first, docketed as G.R. No. 163295, is a petition
for certiorari with petitioner Francis G. Ong impugning the
COMELEC en banc resolution[1] dated May 7, 2004 in SPA Case No.
04-048, granting private respondent Joseph Stanley Alegre's
motion for reconsideration of the resolution dated March 31,
2004[2] of the COMELECs First Division.
The second, G.R. No. 163354, is for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus, with application for injunctive relief, filed by
petitioner Rommel Ong, brother of Francis, seeking, among other
things, to stop the COMELEC from enforcing and implementing its

aforesaid May 7, 2004 en banc resolution in SPA Case No. 04-048

pending the outcome of the petition in G.R. No. 163295.
Per its en banc Resolution of June 1, 2004, the Court ordered the
consolidation of these petitions.
The recourse stemmed from the following essential and
undisputed factual backdrop:
Private respondent Joseph
Stanley
Alegre (Alegre)
and
petitioner Francis Ong (Francis) were candidates who filed
certificates of candidacy for mayor of San Vicente, Camarines
Norte in the May 10, 2004 elections. Francis was then the
incumbent mayor.
On January 9, 2004, Alegre filed with the COMELEC Provincial
Office a Petition to Disqualify, Deny Due Course and Cancel
Certificate of Candidacy[3] of Francis. Docketed as SPA Case No.
04-048, the petition to disqualify was predicated on the threeconsecutive term rule, Francis having, according to Alegre, ran in
the May 1995, May 1998, and May 2001 mayoralty elections and
have assumed office as mayor and discharged the duties thereof
for three (3) consecutive full terms corresponding to those
elections.
To digress a bit, the May 1998 elections saw both Alegre and
Francis opposing each other for the office of mayor of San
Vicente, Camarines Norte, with the latter being subsequently
proclaimed by COMELEC winner in that contest. Alegre
subsequently filed an election protest, docketed as Election Case
No. 6850before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) at Daet, Camarines

Norte. In it, the RTC declared Alegre as the duly elected mayor in
that 1998 mayoralty contest, [4]albeit the decision came out only
on July 4, 2001, when Francis had fully served the 1998-2001
mayoralty term and was in fact already starting to serve the
2001-2004 term as mayor-elect of the municipality of San Vicente.
Acting on Alegres petition to disqualify and to cancel Francis
certificate of candidacy for the May 10, 2004 elections, the First
Division of the COMELEC rendered on March 31, 2004 a
resolution[5] dismissing the said petition of Alegre, rationalizing as
follows:
We see the circumstances in the case now before us analogous to those obtaining
in the sample situations addressed by the Highest Court in the Borja case. Herein,
one of the requisites for the application of the three term rule is not present.
Francis Ong might have indeed fully served the mayoral terms of 1995 to 1998;
1998 to 2001 and 2001 to 2004. The mayoral term however, from 1998 to 2001
cannot be considered his because he was not duly elected thereto. The [RTC] of
Daet, Camarines Norte, Branch 41 has voided his election for the 1998 term when
it held, in its decision that Stanley Alegre was the legally elected mayor in the
1998 mayoralty election in San Vicente, Camarines Norte. This disposition had
become final after the [COMELEC] dismissed the appeal filed by Ong, the case
having become moot and academic.
xxx xxx xxx
On the basis of the words of the Highest Court pronounced in the Lonzanida case
and applicable in the case at bench, Ong could not be considered as having served
as mayor from 1998 to 2001 because he was not duly elected to the post; he
merely assumed office as a presumptive winner; which presumption was later
overturned when [the RTC] decided with finality that [he] lost in the May 1998
elections. (Words in bracket and emphasis in the original).

Undaunted, Alegre filed a timely motion for reconsideration,

contending, in the main, that there was a misapplication of the
three-term rule, as applied in the cited cases of Borja vs.
Comelec and Lonzanida vs. Comelec, infra.

On May 7, 2004, the COMELEC en banc issued, in SPA No. 04-048,

a resolution[6] reversing the March 31, 2004 resolution of the
COMELECs First Division and thereby (a) declaring Francis as
disqualified to run for mayor of San Vicente, Camarines Norte in
the May 10, 2004; (b) ordering the deletion of Francis name from
the official list of candidates; and (c) directing the concerned
board of election inspectors not to count the votes cast in his
favor.
The following day, May 8, Francis received a fax machine
copy of the aforecited May 7, 2004 resolution, sending him
posthaste to seek the assistance of his political party, the
Nationalist Peoples Coalition, which immediately nominated his
older brother, Rommel Ong (Rommel), as substitute candidate.
At about 5:05 p.m. of the very same day - which is past the
deadline for filing a certificate of candidacy, Rommel filed his own
certificate of candidacy for the position of mayor, as substitute
candidate for his brother Francis.
The following undisputed events then transpired:
1. On May 9, 2004, or a day before the May 10 elections, Alegre filed
a Petition to Deny Due Course to or Cancel Certificate of Rommel Ong.
2. Atty. Evillo C. Pormento, counsel for the Ong brothers, addressed a
letter to Provincial Election Supervisor (PES) of Camarines Norte Liza Z.
Cario and Acting Election Officer Emily G. Basilonia in which he appealed
that, owing to the COMELECs inaction on Alegre's petition to cancel Rommels
certificate of candidacy, the name Rommel Ong be included in the official
certified list of candidates for mayor of San Vicente, Camarines Norte. The
desired listing was granted by the PES Carino.
[7]

3. On May 10, 2004, Alegre wrote [8] to then COMELEC Commissioner

Virgilio Garcillano, Commissioner-in-Charge for Regions IV and V, seeking
clarification on the legality of the action thus taken by the PES Cario.
Responding, Commissioner Garcillano issued a Memorandum under date May
10, 2004[9] addressed to PES Liza D. Zabala-Cario, ordering her to implement

the resolution of the COMELEC en banc in SPA No. 04-048 promulgated on

May 7, 2004.[10] Said Memorandum partly stated:
The undersigned ADOPTS the recommendation of Atty. Alioden D.
Dalaig [Director IV, Law Department], which he quote your stand, "that
substitution is not proper if the certificate of the substituted candidacy is denied
due course. In the Resolution of the Commission En banc, the Certificate of
candidacy of Francis Ong was denied due course," and elaborated further that:
"x x x there is an existing policy of the Commission not to
include the name of a substitute candidate in the certified list of
candidates unless the substitution is approved by the Commission.
In view, thereof, it is recommended that 1) the substitute
certificate of candidacy of Rommel Ong Gan Ong, should be
denied due course; and 2) the election officer be directed to delete
his name from the list of candidates."
The above position of the Commission was in line with the
pronouncement of Supreme Court in Miranda vs. Abaya (311 SCRA 617) which
states:
"There can no valid substitution where a candidate is
excluded not only by disqualification but also by denial and
cancellation of his certificate of candidacy."
In view thereof, you are hereby directed to faithfully implement the said
Resolution of the Commission En Banc in SPA No. 04-048 promulgated on May
7, 2004. (Emphasis in the original; words in bracket added].
4. Owing to the aforementioned Garcillano Memorandum, it would
seem that the Chairman of the Municipal Board of Canvasser of San Vicente
issued an order enjoining all concerned not to canvass the votes cast for
Rommel, prompting the latter to file a protest with that Board.[11]
5. On May 11, 2004, the Municipal Board of Canvassers proclaimed
Alegre as the winning candidate for the mayoralty post in San Vicente,
Camarines Norte.[12]

On May 12, 2004, Francis filed before the Court a petition

for certiorari, presently docketed as G.R. No. 163295. His
brother Rommels petition in G.R. No. 163354 followed barely a
week after.

In our en banc resolution dated June 1, 2004, G.R. No.

163295 and G.R. No. 163354 were consolidated.[13]
Meanwhile, on June 4, 2004, the COMELEC issued an order
dismissing private respondent Alegres Petition to Deny Due
Course to or Cancel Certificate of Candidacy of Rommel Ong, for
being moot and academic.[14]
The issues for resolution of the Court are:
In G.R. No. 163295, whether the COMELEC acted with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
issuing its en banc resolution dated May 7, 2004 declaring
petitioner Francis as disqualified to run for Mayor of San Vicente,
Camarines Norte in the May 10, 2004 elections and consequently
ordering the deletion of his name from the official list of
candidates so that any vote cast in his favor shall be considered
stray.
In G.R. No. 163354, whether the COMELEC committed grave
abuse of discretion when it denied due course to Rommels
certificate of candidacy in the same mayoralty election as
substitute for his brother Francis.
A resolution of the issues thus formulated hinges on the question
of whether or not petitioner Franciss assumption of office as
Mayor of San Vicente, Camarines Norte for the mayoralty term
1998 to 2001 should be considered as full service for the purpose
of the three-term limit rule.

Respondent COMELEC resolved the question in the

affirmative. Petitioner Francis, on the other hand, disagrees. He
argues that, while he indeed assumed office and discharged the
duties as Mayor of San Vicente for three consecutive terms, his
proclamation as mayor-elect in the May 1998 election was
contested and eventually nullified per the decision of the RTC of
Daet, Camarines Norte dated July 4, 2001. Pressing the point,
petitioner argues, citing Lonzanida vs. Comelec[15], that a
proclamation subsequently declared void is no proclamation at all
and one assuming office on the strength of a protested
proclamation does so as a presumptive winner and subject to the
final outcome of the election protest.
The three-term limit rule for elective local officials is found in
Section 8, Article X of the 1987 Constitution, which provides:
Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials,
which shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall
serve for more than three consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office
for any length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity
of his service for the full term for which he was elected.

Section 43 (b) of the Local Government Code restates the same

rule as follows:
Sec. 43. Term of Office.
xxx xxx xxx
(b) No local elective official shall serve for more than three consecutive years in
the same position. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall
not be considered an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for
which the elective official concerned was elected.

For the three-term limit for elective local government officials to

apply, two conditions or requisites must concur, to wit: (1) that
the official concerned has been elected for three (3) consecutive
terms in the same local government post, and (2) that he has fully
served three (3) consecutive terms.[16]
With the view we take of the case, the disqualifying requisites are
present herein, thus effectively barring petitioner Francis from
running for mayor of San Vicente, Camarines Norte in the May 10,
2004 elections. There can be no dispute about petitioner Francis
Ong having been duly elected mayor of that municipality in the
May 1995 and again in the May 2001 elections and serving the
July 1, 1995- June 30, 1998 and the July 1, 2001-June 30, 2004
terms in full. The herein controversy revolves around the 19982001 mayoral term, albeit there can also be no quibbling that
Francis ran for mayor of the same municipality in the May 1998
elections and actually served the 1998-2001 mayoral term by
virtue of a proclamation initially declaring him mayor-elect of the
municipality of San Vicente. The question that begs to be
addressed,
therefore,
is
whether
or
not Franciss
assumption of office as Mayor of San Vicente, Camarines
Norte from July 1, 1998 to June 30, 2001, may be
considered as one full term service in the context of the
consecutive three-term limit rule.
We hold that such assumption of office constitutes, for
Francis, service for the full term, and should be counted as a full
term served in contemplation of the three-term limit prescribed
by the constitutional and statutory provisions, supra, barring local
elective officials from being elected and serving for more than
three consecutive term for the same position.

It is true that the RTC-Daet, Camarines Norte ruled in Election

Protest Case No. 6850,[17] that it was Francis opponent (Alegre)
who won in the 1998 mayoralty race and, therefore, was the
legally elected mayor of San Vicente. However, that disposition, it
must be stressed, was without practical and legal use and value,
having been promulgated after the term of the contested office
has expired. Petitioner Francis contention that he was only a
presumptive winner in the 1998 mayoralty derby as his
proclamation was under protest did not make him less than a duly
elected mayor. His proclamation by the Municipal Board of
Canvassers of San Vicente as the duly elected mayor in the 1998
mayoralty election coupled by his assumption of office and his
continuous exercise of the functions thereof from start to finish of
the term, should legally be taken as service for a full term in
contemplation of the three-term rule.
The absurdity and the deleterious effect of a contrary view is not
hard to discern. Such contrary view would mean that Alegre would
under the three-term rule - be considered as having served a term
by virtue of a veritably meaningless electoral protest ruling, when
another actually served such term pursuant to a proclamation
made in due course after an election.
Petitioner cites, but, to our mind, cannot seek refuge from
the Courts ruling in, Lonzanida vs. Comelec,[18] citing Borja vs.
Comelec[19]. In Lonzanida, petitioner Lonzanida was elected and
served for two consecutive terms as mayor of San Antonio,
Zambales prior to the May 8, 1995 elections. He then ran again
for the same position in the May 1995 elections, won and
discharged his duties as Mayor. However, his opponent contested
his proclamation and filed an election protest before the RTC of

Zambales, which, in a decision dated January 9, 1997, ruled that

there was a failure of elections and declared the position vacant.
The COMELEC affirmed this ruling and petitioner Lonzanida
acceded to the order to vacate the post. Lonzanida assumed the
office and performed his duties up to March 1998 only. Now,
during the May 1998 elections, Lonzanida again ran for mayor of
the same town. A petition to disqualify, under the three-term rule,
was filed and was eventually granted. There, the Court held that
Lonzanida cannot be considered as having been duly elected to
the post in the May 1995 election, and that he did not fully serve
the 1995-1998 mayoralty term by reason of involuntary
relinquishment of office. As the Court pointedly observed,
Lonzanida cannot be deemed to have served the May 1995 to
1998 term because he was ordered to vacate [and in fact
vacated] his post before the expiration of the term.
The difference between the case at bench and Lonzanida is
at once apparent. For one, in Lonzanida, the result of the
mayoralty election was declared a nullity for the stated reason
of failure of election, and, as a consequence thereof, the
proclamation of Lonzanida as mayor-elect was nullified, followed
by an order for him to vacate the office of mayor. For another,
Lonzanida did not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral term, there
being an involuntary severance from office as a result of legal
processes. In fine, there was an effective interruption of the
continuity of service.
On the other hand, the failure-of-election factor does not
obtain in the present case. But more importantly, here, there was
actually no interruption or break in the continuity of Francis
service respecting the 1998-2001 term. Unlike Lonzanida, Francis

was never unseated during the term in question; he never ceased

discharging his duties and responsibilities as mayor of San
Vicente, Camarines Norte for the entire period covering the 19982001 term.
The ascription, therefore, of grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the COMELEC en banc when it disqualified Francis from
running in the May 10, 2004 elections for the mayoralty post of
San Vicente and denying due course to his certificate of
candidacy by force of the constitutional and statutory provisions
regarding the three-term limit rule for any local elective official
cannot be sustained. What the COMELEC en banc said in its May
7, 2004 assailed Resolution commends itself for concurrence:
As correctly pointed out by Petitioner-Movant [Alegre]in applying the
ruling in the Borja and Lonzanida cases in the instant petition will be erroneous
because the factual milieu in those cases is different from the one obtaining here.
Explicitly, the three-term limit was not made applicable in the cases
of Borja and Lonzanida because there was an interruption in the continuity of
service of the three consecutive terms. Here, Respondent Ong would have served
continuously for three consecutive terms, from 1995 to 2004. His full term from
1998 to 2001 could not be simply discounted on the basis that he was not duly
elected thereto on account of void proclamation because it would have iniquitous
effects producing outright injustice and inequality as it rewards a legally
disqualified and repudiated loser with a crown of victory. (Word in bracket added;
emphasis in the original)

Given the foregoing consideration, the question of whether or not

then Commissioner Virgilio Garcillano overstepped his discretion
when he issued the May 10, 2004 Memorandum, ordering the
implementation of aforesaid May 7, 2004 COMELEC en
banc resolution even before its finality[20] is now of little moment
and need not detain us any longer.
Just as unmeritorious as Francis petition in G.R. No. 163295 is
Rommels petition in G.R. No. 163354 in which he (Rommel)
challenges the COMELEC's act of not including his name as a

substitute candidate in the official list of candidates for the May

10, 2004 elections. As it were, existing COMELEC policy [21] provides
for the non-inclusion of the name of substitute candidates in the
certified list of candidates pending approval of the substitution.
Not to be overlooked is the Courts holding in Miranda vs. Abaya,
[22]
that a candidate whose certificate of candidacy has been
cancelled or not given due course cannot be substituted by
another belonging to the same political party as that of the
former, thus:
While there is no dispute as to whether or not a nominee of a
registered or accredited political party may substitute for a candidate of
the same party who had been disqualified for any cause, this does not
include those cases where the certificate of candidacy of the person to be
substituted had been denied due course and cancelled under Section 78
of the Code.
Expressio unius est exclusio alterius. While the law enumerated
the occasions where a candidate may be validly substituted, there is no
mention of the case where a candidate is excluded not only by
disqualification but also by denial and cancellation of his certificate of
candidacy. Under the foregoing rule, there can be no valid substitution
for the latter case, much in the same way that a nuisance candidate
whose certificate of candidacy is denied due course and/or cancelled
may not be substituted. If the intent of the lawmakers were otherwise,
they could have so easily and conveniently included those persons whose
certificates of candidacy have been denied due course and/or cancelled
under the provisions of Section 78 of the Code.
xxx xxx xxx
A person without a valid certificate of candidacy cannot be
considered a candidate in much the same way as any person who has not
filed any certificate of candidacy at all can not, by any stretch of the
imagination, be a candidate at all.
xxx xxx xxx
After having considered the importance of a certificate of
candidacy, it can be readily understood why in Bautista [Bautista vs.

Comelec, G.R. No. 133840, November 13, 1998] we ruled that a person
with a cancelled certificate is no candidate at all. Applying this principle
to the case at bar and considering that Section 77 of the Code is clear and
unequivocal that only an official candidate of a registered or accredited
party may be substituted, there demonstrably cannot be any possible
substitution of a person whose certificate of candidacy has been
cancelled and denied due course.

In any event, with the hard reality that the May 10, 2004 elections
were already pass, Rommel Ongs petition in G.R. No. 163354 is
already moot and academic.
WHEREFORE, the instant petitions are DISMISSED and the
assailed en banc Resolution dated May 7, 2004 of the COMELEC,
in SPA No. 04-048 AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 154829. December 10, 2003]

ARSENIO A. LATASA, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS,

and ROMEO SUNGA, respondents.
DECISION
AZCUNA, J.:

This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court which
seeks to challenge the resolution issued by the First Division of the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) dated April 27, 2001 in SPA Case No.
01-059 entitled, Romeo M. Sunga, petitioner, versus Arsenio A. Latasa,

respondent, and the Resolution of the COMELEC en banc denying herein

petitioners Motion for Reconsideration. The assailed Resolution denied due
course to the certificate of candidacy of petitioner Arsenio A. Latasa, declaring
him disqualified to run for mayor of Digos City, Davao del Sur Province in the
May 14, 2001 elections, ordering that all votes cast in his favor shall not be
counted, and if he has been proclaimed winner, declaring said proclamation
null and void.
The facts are fairly simple.
Petitioner
Arsenio
A.
Latasa,
was
elected
mayor
of
the Municipality of Digos, Davao del Sur in the elections of 1992, 1995, and
1998. During petitioners third term, the Municipality ofDigos was declared a
component city, to be known as the City of Digos. A plebiscite conducted on
September 8, 2000 ratified Republic Act No. 8798 entitled, An Act Converting
the Municipality of Digos, Davao del Sur Province into a Component City to
be known as the City of Digos or the Charter of the City of Digos. This event
also marked the end of petitioners tenure as mayor
of
the Municipality of Digos. However, under Section 53, Article IX of the Charter,
petitioner was mandated to serve in a hold-over capacity as mayor of the new
City of Digos. Hence, he took his oath as the city mayor.
On February 28, 2001, petitioner filed his certificate of candidacy for city
mayor for the May 14, 2001 elections. He stated therein that he is eligible
therefor, and likewise disclosed that he had already served for three
consecutive terms as mayor of the Municipality of Digos and is now running
for the first time for the position of city mayor.
On March 1, 2001, private respondent Romeo M. Sunga, also a candidate
for city mayor in the said elections, filed before the COMELEC a Petition to
Deny Due Course, Cancel Certificate of Candidacy and/ or For
Disqualification against petitioner Latasa. Respondent Sunga alleged therein
that petitioner falsely represented in his certificate of candidacy that he is
eligible to run as mayor of Digos City since petitioner had already been
elected and served for three consecutive terms as mayor from 1992 to 2001.
[1]

On March 5, 2001, petitioner Latasa filed his Answer, arguing that he did
not make any false representation in his certificate of candidacy since he fully
disclosed therein that he had served as mayor of the Municipality of Digos for
three consecutive terms. Moreover, he argued that this fact does not bar him
from filing a certificate of candidacy for the May 14, 2001elections since this
will be the first time that he will be running for the post of city mayor.
[2]

Both parties submitted their position papers on March 19, 2001.

[3]

On April 27, 2001, respondent COMELECs First Division issued a

Resolution, the dispositive portion of which reads, as follows:
Wherefore, premises considered, the respondents certificate of candidacy should be
cancelled for being a violation of the three (3)-term rule proscribed by the 1987
Constitution and the Local Government Code of 1991.
[4]

Petitioner filed his Motion for Reconsideration dated May 4, 2001, which
remained unacted upon until the day of the elections, May 14, 2001. On May
16, 2001, private respondent Sunga filed an Ex Parte Motion for Issuance of
Temporary Restraining Order Enjoining the City Board of Canvassers From
Canvassing or Tabulating Respondents Votes, and From Proclaiming Him as
the Duly Elected Mayor if He Wins the Elections. Despite this, however,
petitioner Latasa was still proclaimed winner on May 17, 2001, having
garnered the most number of votes. Consequently, private respondent Sunga
filed, on May 27, 2001, a Supplemental Motion which essentially sought the
annulment of petitioners proclamation and the suspension of its effects.
[5]

[6]

[7]

On July 1, 2001, petitioner was sworn into and assumed his office as the
newly elected mayor of Digos City. It was only on August 27, 2002 that the
COMELEC en banc issued a Resolution denying petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration.
Hence, this petition.
It cannot be denied that the Court has previously held in Mamba-Perez v.
COMELEC that after an elective official has been proclaimed as winner of the
elections, the COMELEC has no jurisdiction to pass upon his
qualifications. An opposing partys remedies after proclamation would be to file
a petition for quo warranto within ten days after the proclamation.
[8]

On the other hand, certain peculiarities in the present case reveal the fact
that its very heart is something which this Court considers of paramount
interest. This Court notes from the very beginning that petitioner himself was
already entertaining some doubt as to whether or not he is indeed eligible to
run for city mayor in the May 14, 2001 elections. In his certificate of candidacy,
after the phrase I am eligible, petitioner inserted a footnote and indicated:
*

Having served three (3) term[s] as municipal mayor and now running for the first
time as city mayor.
[9]

Time and again, this Court has held that rules of procedure are only tools
designed to facilitate the attainment of justice, such that when rigid application
of the rules tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice, this Court

is empowered to suspend their operation. We will not hesitate to set aside

technicalities in favor of what is fair and just.
[10]

The spirit embodied in a Constitutional provision must not be attenuated

by a rigid application of procedural rules.
The present case raises a novel issue with respect to an explicit
Constitutional mandate: whether or not petitioner Latasa is eligible to run as
candidate for the position of mayor of the newly-created City
of Digos immediately after he served for three consecutive terms as mayor of
the Municipality of Digos.
As a rule, in a representative democracy, the people should be allowed
freely to choose those who will govern them. Article X, Section 8 of the
Constitution is an exception to this rule, in that it limits the range of choice of
the people.
Section 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials,
which shall be determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve
for more than three consecutive terms.Voluntary renunciation of the office for any
length of time shall not be considered as an interruption in the continuity of his
service for the full term for which he was elected.
An examination of the historical background of the subject Constitutional
provision reveals that the members of the Constitutional Commission were as
much concerned with preserving the freedom of choice of the people as they
were with preventing the monopolization of political power. In fact, they
rejected a proposal set forth by Commissioner Edmundo Garcia that after
serving three consecutive terms or nine years, there should be no further reelection for local and legislative officials. The members, instead, adopted the
alternative proposal of Commissioner Christian Monsod that such officials be
simply barred from running for the same position in the succeeding election
following the expiration of the third consecutive term:
[11]

MR. MONSOD: Madam President, I was reflecting on this issue earlier and I asked
to speak because in this draft Constitution, we are recognizing peoples power. We
have said that now there is a new awareness, a new kind of voter, a new kind of
Filipino. And yet at the same time, we are prescreening candidates among whom they
will choose. We are saying that this 48-member Constitutional Commission has
decreed that those who have served for a period of nine years are barred from running
for the same position.

The argument is that there may be other positions. But there are some people who are
very skilled and good at legislation, and yet are not of a national stature to be
Senators. They may be perfectly honest, perfectly competent and with integrity. They
get voted into office at the age of 25, which is the age we provide for
Congressmen. And at 34 years old we put them into pasture.
Second, we say that we want to broaden the choices of the people. We are talking here
only of congressional or senatorial seats. We want to broaden the peoples choice but
we are making prejudgment today because we exclude a certain number of people. We
are, in effect, putting an additional qualification for office that the officials must have
not have served a total of more than a number of years in their lifetime.
Third, we are saying that by putting people to pasture, we are creating a reserve of
statesmen, but the future participation of these statesmen is limited. Their skills may
be only in some areas, but we are saying that they are going to be barred from running
for the same position.
Madam President, the ability and capacity of a statesman depend as well on the dayto-day honing of his skills and competence, in intellectual combat, in concern and
contact with the people, and here we are saying that he is going to be barred from the
same kind of public service.
I do not think it is in our place today to make such a very important and momentous
decision with respect to many of our countrymen in the future who may have a lot
more years ahead of them in the service of their country.
If we agree that we will make sure that these people do not set up structures that will
perpetuate them, then let us give them this rest period of three years or whatever it
is. Maybe during that time, we would even agree that their fathers or mothers or
relatives of the second degree should not run. But let us not bar them for life after
serving the public for number of years.
[12]

The framers of the Constitution, by including this exception, wanted to

establish some safeguards against the excessive accumulation of power as a
result of consecutive terms. As Commissioner Blas Ople stated during the
deliberations:
x x x I think we want to prevent future situations where, as a result of continuous
service and frequent re-elections, officials from the President down to the municipal
mayor tend to develop a proprietary interest in their positions and to accumulate these
powers and perquisites that permit them to stay on indefinitely or to transfer these
posts to members of their families in a subsequent election. x x x
[13]

An elective local official, therefore, is not barred from running again in for
same local government post, unless two conditions concur: 1.) that the official
concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms to the same local
government post, and 2.) that he has fully served three consecutive terms.
[14]

In the present case, petitioner states that a city and a municipality have
separate and distinct personalities. Thus they cannot be treated as a single
entity and must be accorded different treatment consistent with specific
provisions of the Local Government Code. He does not deny the fact that he
has already served for three consecutive terms as municipal mayor.However,
he asserts that when Digos was converted from a municipality to a city, it
attained a different juridical personality. Therefore, when he filed his certificate
of candidacy for city mayor, he cannot be construed as vying for the same
local government post.
For a municipality to be converted into a city, the Local Government Code
provides:
SECTION 450. Requisites for Creation. - (a) A municipality or a cluster of barangays
may be converted into a component city it has an average annual income, as certified
by the Department of Finance, of at least Twenty million pesos (20,000,000.00) for
the last two (2) consecutive years based on 1991 constant prices, and if it has either of
the following requisites:
(i) a contiguous territory of at least one hundred (100) square kilometers,
as certified by the Land Management Bureau; or,
(ii) a population of not less than one hundred fifty thousand (150,000)
inhabitants, as certified by the National Statistics Office.
Provided, That, the creation thereof shall not reduce the land area, population, and
income of the original unit or units at the time of said creation to less than the
minimum requirements prescribed herein.
(b) The territorial jurisdiction of a newly-created city shall be properly identified by
metes and bounds. The requirement on land are shall not apply where the city
proposed to be created is composed of one (1) or more island. The territory need not
be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands.
(c) The average annual income shall include the income accruing to the general fund,
exclusive of special funds, transfers, and non-recurring income.
[15]

Substantial differences do exist between a municipality and a city. For one,

there is a material change in the political and economic rights of the local
government unit when it is converted from a municipality to a city and
undoubtedly, these changes affect the people as well. It is precisely for this
reason why Section 10, Article X of the Constitution mandates that no
province, city, municipality, or barangay may be created, divided, merged,
abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, without the approval by a
majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected.
[16]

As may be gleaned from the Local Government Code, the creation or

conversion of a local government unit is done mainly to help assure its
economic viability. Such creation or conversion is based on verified indicators:
Section 7. Creation and Conversion. --- As a general rule, the creation of a local
government unit or its conversion from one level to another shall be based on
verifiable indicators or viability and projected capacity to provide services, to wit:
(a) Income. --- It must be sufficient, based on acceptable standards, to provide for all
essential government facilities and services and special functions commensurate with
the size of its population, as expected of the local government unit concerned;
(b) Population. --- It shall be determined as the total number of inhabitants within the
territorial jurisdiction of the local government unit concerned; and
(c) Land Area. --- It must be contiguous, unless it comprises two (2) or more islands
or is separated by a local government unit independent of the others; properly
identified by metes and bounds with technical descriptions; and sufficient to provide
for such basic services and facilities to meet the requirements of its populace.
Compliance with the foregoing indicators shall be attested to by the Department of
Finance (DOF), the National Statistics Office (NSO), and the Lands Management
Bureau (LMB) of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR).

[17]

On the other hand, Section 2 of the Charter of the City of Digos provides:
Section 2. The City of Digos --- The Municipality of Digos shall be converted into a
component city to be known as the City of Digos, hereinafter referred to as the City,
which shall comprise the present territory of the Municipality of Digos, Davao del Sur
Province. The territorial jurisdiction of the City shall be within the present metes and
bounds of the Municipality of Digos. x x x
Moreover, Section 53 of the said Charter further states:

Section 53. Officials of the City of Digos. --- The present elective officials of
the Municipality of Digos shall continue to exercise their powers and functions until
such a time that a new election is held and the duly-elected officials shall have already
qualified and assumed their offices. x x x.
As seen in the aforementioned provisions, this Court notes that the
delineation of the metes and bounds of the City of Digos did not change even
by an inch the land area previously covered by the Municipality of Digos. This
Court
also
notes
that
the
elective
officials
of
the Municipality of Digos continued to exercise their powers and functions until
elections were held for the new city officials.
True, the new city acquired a new corporate existence separate and
distinct from that of the municipality. This does not mean, however, that for the
purpose of applying the subject Constitutional provision, the office of the
municipal mayor would now be construed as a different local government post
as that of the office of the city mayor. As stated earlier, the territorial
jurisdiction of the City of Digos is the same as that of the
municipality. Consequently, the inhabitants of the municipality are the same as
those in the city. These inhabitants are the same group of voters who elected
petitioner Latasa to be their municipal mayor for three consecutive
terms. These are also the same inhabitants over whom he held power and
authority as their chief executive for nine years.
This Court must distinguish the present case from previous cases ruled
upon this Court involving the same Constitutional provision.
In Borja, Jr. v. COMELEC, the issue therein was whether a vice-mayor
who became the mayor by operation of law and who served the remainder of
the mayors term should be considered to have served a term in that office for
the purpose of the three-term limit under the Constitution. Private respondent
in that case was first elected as vice-mayor, but upon the death of the
incumbent mayor, he occupied the latters post for the unexpired term. He was,
thereafter, elected for two more terms. This Court therein held that when
private respondent occupied the post of the mayor upon the incumbents death
and served for the remainder of the term, he cannot be construed as having
served a full term as contemplated under the subject constitutional
provision. The term served must be one for which [the official concerned] was
elected.
[18]

It must also be noted that in Borja, the private respondent therein, before
he assumed the position of mayor, first served as the vice-mayor of his local
government unit. The nature of the responsibilities and duties of the vice-

mayor is wholly different from that of the mayor. The vice-mayor does not hold
office as chief executive over his local government unit. In the present case,
petitioner, upon ratification of the law converting the municipality to a city,
continued to hold office as chief executive of the same territorial
jurisdiction. There were changes in the political and economic rights of Digos
as local government unit, but no substantial change occurred as to petitioners
authority as chief executive over the inhabitants of Digos.
In Lonzanida v. COMELEC, petitioner was elected and served two
consecutive terms as mayor from 1988 to 1995. He then ran again for the
same position in the May 1995 elections, won and discharged his duties as
mayor. However, his opponent contested his proclamation and filed an
election protest before the Regional Trial Court, which ruled that there was a
failure of elections and declared the position of mayor vacant. The COMELEC
affirmed this ruling and petitioner acceded to the order to vacate the
post. During the May 1998 elections, petitioner therein again filed his
certificate of candidacy for mayor. A petition to disqualify him was filed on the
ground that he had already served three consecutive terms. This Court ruled,
however, that petitioner therein cannot be considered as having been duly
elected to the post in the May 1995 elections, and that said petitioner did not
fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral term by reason of involuntary
relinquishment of office.
[19]

In the present case, petitioner Latasa was, without a doubt, duly elected
as mayor in the May 1998 elections. Can he then be construed as having
involuntarily relinquished his office by reason of the conversion of Digos from
municipality to city? This Court believes that he did involuntarily relinquish his
office as municipal mayor since the said office has been deemed abolished
due to the conversion. However, the very instant he vacated his office as
municipal mayor, he also assumed office as city mayor. Unlike
in Lonzanida, where petitioner therein, for even just a short period of time,
stepped down from office, petitioner Latasa never ceased from acting as chief
executive of the local government unit. He never ceased from discharging his
duties and responsibilities as chief executive of Digos.
In Adormeo v. COMELEC, this Court was confronted with the issue of
whether or not an assumption to office through a recall election should be
considered as one term in applying the three-term limit rule. Private
respondent, in that case, was elected and served for two consecutive terms
as mayor. He then ran for his third term in the May 1998 elections, but lost to
his opponent. In June 1998, his opponent faced recall proceedings and in the
recall elections of May 2000, private respondent won and served for the
unexpired term. For the May 2001 elections, private respondent filed his
[20]

certificate of candidacy for the office of mayor. This was questioned on the
ground that he had already served as mayor for three consecutive terms.This
Court held therein that private respondent cannot be construed as having
been elected and served for three consecutive terms. His loss in the May
1998 elections was considered by this Court as an interruption in the
continuity of his service as mayor. For nearly two years, private respondent
therein lived as a private citizen. The same, however, cannot be said of
petitioner Latasa in the present case.
Finally, in Socrates v. COMELEC, the principal issue was whether or not
private respondent Edward M. Hagedorn was qualified to run during the recall
elections. Therein respondent Hagedorn had already served for three
consecutive terms as mayor from 1992 until 2001 and did not run in the
immediately following regular elections. On July 2, 2002, the barangay officials
of Puerto Princesa convened themselves into a Preparatory Recall Assembly
to initiate the recall of the incumbent mayor, Victorino Dennis M.
Socrates. On August 23, 2002, respondent Hagedorn filed his certificate of
candidacy for mayor in the recall election. A petition for his disqualification
was filed on the ground that he cannot run for the said post during the recall
elections for he was disqualified from running for a fourth consecutive
term. This Court, however, ruled in favor of respondent Hagedorn, holding that
the principle behind the three-term limit rule is to prevent consecutiveness of
the service of terms, and that there was in his case a break in such
consecutiveness after the end of his third term and before the recall election.
[21]

It is evident that in the abovementioned cases, there exists a rest period or

a break in the service of the local elective official. In Lonzanida, petitioner
therein was a private citizen a few months before the next mayoral
elections. Similarly, in Adormeo and Socrates, the private respondents therein
lived as private citizens for two years and fifteen months respectively.Indeed,
the law contemplates a rest period during which the local elective official steps
down from office and ceases to exercise power or authority over the
inhabitants of the territorial jurisdiction of a particular local government unit.
This Court reiterates that the framers of the Constitution specifically
included an exception to the peoples freedom to choose those who will govern
them in order to avoid the evil of a single person accumulating excessive
power over a particular territorial jurisdiction as a result of a prolonged stay in
the same office. To allow petitioner Latasa to vie for the position of city mayor
after having served for three consecutive terms as a municipal mayor would
obviously defeat the very intent of the framers when they wrote this
exception. Should he be allowed another three consecutive terms as mayor of
the City of Digos, petitioner would then be possibly holding office as chief

executive over the same territorial jurisdiction and inhabitants for a total of
eighteen consecutive years. This is the very scenario sought to be avoided by
the Constitution, if not abhorred by it.
Finally, respondent Sunga claims that applying the principle in Labo v.
COMELEC, he should be deemed the mayoralty candidate with the highest
number of votes. On the contrary, this Court held in Labo that the
disqualification of a winning candidate does not necessarily entitle the
candidate with the highest number of votes to proclamation as the winner of
the elections. As an obiter, the Court merely mentioned that the rule would
have been different if the electorate, fully aware in fact and in law of a
candidates disqualification so as to bring such awareness within the realm of
notoriety, would nonetheless cast their votes in favor of the ineligible
candidate. In such case, the electorate may be said to have waived the
validity and efficacy of their votes by notoriously misapplying their franchise or
throwing away their votes, in which case, the eligible candidate obtaining the
next higher number of votes may be deemed elected. The same, however,
cannot be said of the present case.
[22]

This Court has consistently ruled that the fact that a plurality or a majority
of the votes are cast for an ineligible candidate at a popular election, or that a
candidate is later declared to be disqualified to hold office, does not entitle the
candidate who garnered the second highest number of votes to be declared
elected. The same merely results in making the winning candidates election a
nullity. In the present case, moreover, 13,650 votes were cast for private
respondent Sunga as against the 25,335 votes cast for petitioner Latasa.
The second placer is obviously not the choice of the people in that particular
election. In any event, a permanent vacancy in the contested office is thereby
created which should be filled by succession.
[23]

[24]

[25]

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to

costs.
SO ORDERED
EN BANC
G.R. No. 201716

January 8, 2013

MAYOR ABELARDO ABUNDO, SR., Petitioner,

vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and ERNESTO R. VEGA, Respondents.
DECISION

VELASCO, JR., J.:

The Case
In this Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65, petitioner Abelardo Abundo, Sr. (Abundo) assails and
seeks to nullify (1) the February 8, 2012 Resolution1 of the Second Division, Commission on
Elections (COMELEC), in EAC (AE) No. A-25-2010 and (2) the May 10, 2012 Resolution 2 of the
COMELEC en banc affirming that divisions disposition. The assailed issuances, in turn, affirmed the
Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Virac, Catanduanes, Branch 43, dated August 9, 2010,
in Election Case No. 55 declaring Abundo as ineligible, under the three-term limit rule, to run in the
2010 elections for the position of, and necessarily to sit as, Mayor of Viga, Catanduanes.
The antecedent facts are undisputed.
For four (4) successive regular elections, namely, the 2001, 2004, 2007 and 2010 national and local
elections, Abundo vied for the position of municipal mayor of Viga, Catanduanes. In both the 2001
and 2007 runs, he emerged and was proclaimed as the winning mayoralty candidate and
accordingly served the corresponding terms as mayor. In the 2004 electoral derby, however, the Viga
municipal board of canvassers initially proclaimed as winner one Jose Torres (Torres), who, in due
time, performed the functions of the office of mayor. Abundo protested Torres election and
proclamation. Abundo was eventually declared the winner of the 2004 mayoralty electoral contest,
paving the way for his assumption of office starting May 9, 2006 until the end of the 2004-2007 term
on June 30, 2007, or for a period of a little over one year and one month.
Then came the May 10, 2010 elections where Abundo and Torres again opposed each other. When
Abundo filed his certificate of candidacy3 for the mayoralty seat relative to this electoral contest,
Torres lost no time in seeking the formers disqualification to run, the corresponding
petition,4 docketed as SPA Case No. 10-128 (DC), predicated on the three-consecutive term limit
rule. On June 16, 2010, the COMELEC First Division issued a Resolution 5 finding for Abundo, who in
the meantime bested Torres by 219 votes6 and was accordingly proclaimed 2010 mayor-elect of
Viga, Catanduanes.
Meanwhile, on May 21, 2010, or before the COMELEC could resolve the adverted disqualification
case Torres initiated against Abundo, herein private respondent Ernesto R. Vega (Vega) commenced
a quo warranto7 action before the RTC-Br. 43 in Virac, Catanduanes, docketed as Election Case No.
55, to unseat Abundo on essentially the same grounds Torres raised in his petition to disqualify.
The Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
By Decision8 of August 9, 2010 in Election Case No. 55, the RTC declared Abundo ineligible to serve
as municipal mayor, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, Decision is, hereby, rendered GRANTING the petition and declaring Abelardo
Abundo, Sr. ineligible to serve as municipal mayor of Viga, Catanduanes.
SO ORDERED.9
In so ruling, the trial court, citing Aldovino, Jr. v. COMELEC, 10 found Abundo to have already served
three consecutive mayoralty terms, to wit, 2001-2004, 2004-2007 and 2007-2010, and, hence,
disqualified for another, i.e., fourth, consecutive term. Abundo, the RTC noted, had been declared
winner in the aforesaid 2004 elections consequent to his protest and occupied the position of and

actually served as Viga mayor for over a year of the remaining term, i.e., from May 9, 2006 to June
30, 2007, to be exact. To the RTC, the year and a month service constitutes a complete and full
service of Abundos second term as mayor.
Therefrom, Abundo appealed to the COMELEC, his recourse docketed as EAC (AE) No. A-25-2010.
The Ruling of the COMELEC
On February 8, 2012, in EAC (AE) No. A-25-2010, the COMELECs Second Division rendered the
first assailed Resolution, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the Regional Trial Court Branch 73, Virac,
Catanduanes is AFFIRMED and the appeal is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.11
Just like the RTC, the COMELECs Second Division ruled against Abundo on the strength of
Aldovino, Jr. and held that service of the unexpired portion of a term by a protestant who is declared
winner in an election protest is considered as service for one full term within the contemplation of the
three-term limit rule.
In time, Abundo sought but was denied reconsideration by the COMELEC en banc per its equally
assailed Resolution of May 10, 2012. The fallo of the COMELEC en bancs Resolution reads as
follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the motion for reconsideration is DENIED for lack of merit. The
Resolution of the Commission (Second Division) is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.12
In affirming the Resolution of its Second Division, the COMELEC en banc held in essence the
following: first, there was no involuntary interruption of Abundos 2004-2007 term service which
would be an exception to the three-term limit rule as he is considered never to have lost title to the
disputed office after he won in his election protest; and second, what the Constitution prohibits is for
an elective official to be in office for the same position for more than three consecutive terms and not
to the service of the term.
Hence, the instant petition with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or
preliminary injunction.
Intervening Events
In the meantime, following the issuance by the COMELEC of its May 10, 2012 Resolution denying
Abundos motion for reconsideration, the following events transpired:
1. On June 20, 2012, the COMELEC issued an Order 13 declaring its May 10, 2012 Resolution
final and executory. The following day, June 21, 2012, the COMELEC issued an Entry of
Judgment.14
2. On June 25, 2012, Vega filed a Motion for Execution15 with the RTC-Br. 43 in Virac,
Catanduanes.

3. On June 27, 2012, the COMELEC, acting on Vegas counsels motion 16 filed a day earlier,
issued an Order17 directing the bailiff of ECAD (COMELEC) to personally deliver the entire
records to said RTC.
On June 29, 2012, the COMELEC ECAD Bailiff personally delivered the entire records of the
instant case to, and were duly received by, the clerk of court of RTC-Br. 43.
4. On June 29, 2012, or on the same day of its receipt of the case records, the RTC-Br. 43 in
Virac, Catanduanes granted Vegas Motion for Execution through an Order 18 of even date.
And a Writ of Execution19 was issued on the same day.
5. On July 2, 2012, Sheriff Q. Tador, Jr. received the Writ of Execution and served the same
at the office of Mayor Abundo on the same day via substituted service.
6. On July 3, 2012, the Court issued a TRO20 enjoining the enforcement of the assailed
COMELEC Resolutions.
7. On July 4, 2012, Vega received the Courts July 3, 2012 Resolution 21 and a copy of the
TRO. On the same day, Vice-Mayor Emeterio M. Tarin and First Councilor Cesar O.
Cervantes of Viga, Catanduanes took their oaths of office22 as mayor and vice-mayor of Viga,
Catanduanes, respectively.
8. On July 5, 2012, Vega received a copy of Abundos Seventh (7th) Most Extremely Urgent
Manifestation and Motion23 dated June 28, 2012 praying for the issuance of a TRO and/or
status quo ante Order. On the same day, Vice-Mayor Emeterio M. Tarin and First Councilor
Cesar O. Cervanteswho had taken their oaths of office the day beforeassumed the
posts of mayor and vice-mayor of Viga, Catanduanes. 24
9. On July 6, 2012, Vega interposed a Motion (To Admit Attached Manifestation) 25 and
Manifestation with Leave to Admit26 dated July 5, 2012 stating that the TRO thus issued by
the Court has become functus officio owing to the execution of the RTCs Decision in
Election Case No. 55.
10. On July 10, 2012, Vega filed his Comment/Opposition with Leave to the Petitioners
Prayer for the Issuance of a Status Quo Ante Order 27 reiterating the argument that since
Vice-Mayor Emeterio M. Tarin and First Councilor Cesar O. Cervantes already assumed the
posts of Mayor and Vice-Mayor of Viga, Catanduanes, then a Status Quo Ante Order would
serve no purpose.
11. On July 12, 2012, Abundo filed his Most Urgent Manifestation and Motion to Convert the
July 3, 2012 TRO into a Status Quo Ante Order (In View of the Unreasonable and
Inappropriate Progression of Events).28
It is upon the foregoing backdrop of events that Abundo was dislodged from his post as incumbent
mayor of Viga, Catanduanes. To be sure, the speed which characterized Abundos ouster despite the
supervening issuance by the Court of a TRO on July 3, 2012 is not lost on the Court. While it is not
clear whether Vice-Mayor Tarin and First Councilor Cervantes knew of or put on notice about the
TRO either before they took their oaths of office on July 4, 2012 or before assuming the posts of
mayor and vice-mayor on July 5, 2012, the confluence of events following the issuance of the
assailed COMELEC en banc irresistibly tends to show that the TROissued as it were to maintain

the status quo, thus averting the premature ouster of Abundo pending this Courts resolution of his
appealappears to have been trivialized.
On September 11, 2012, Vega filed his Comment on Abundos petition, followed not long after by
public respondent COMELECs Consolidated Comment. 29
The Issues
Abundo raises the following grounds for the allowance of the petition:
6.1 The Commission En Banc committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction when it declared the arguments in Abundos motion for reconsideration
as mere rehash and reiterations of the claims he raised prior to the promulgation of the
Resolution.
6.2 The Commission En Banc committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction when it declared that Abundo has consecutively served for three terms
despite the fact that he only served the remaining one year and one month of the second
term as a result of an election protest.30
First Issue:
Arguments in Motion for Reconsideration Not Mere Reiteration
The COMELEC en banc denied Abundos motion for reconsideration on the basis that his arguments
in said motion are mere reiterations of what he already brought up in his appeal Brief before the
COMELEC Second Division. In this petition, petitioner claims otherwise.
Petitioners assertion is devoid of merit.
A comparison of Abundos arguments in the latters Brief vis--vis those in his Motion for
Reconsideration (MR) reveals that the arguments in the MR are elucidations and amplications of the
same issues raised in the brief. First, in his Brief, Abundo raised the sole issue of lack of jurisdiction
of the RTC to consider the quo warranto case since the alleged violation of the three-term limit has
already been rejected by the COMELEC First Division in SPA Case No. 10-128 (DC), while in his
MR, Abundo raised the similar ground of the conclusiveness of the COMELECs finding on the issue
of his qualification to run for the current term. Second, in his Brief, Abundo assailed RTCs reliance
on Aldovino, Jr., while in his MR, he argued that the Courts pronouncement in Aldovino, Jr., which
dealt with preventive suspension, is not applicable to the instant case as it involves only a partial
service of the term. Abundo argued in his Brief that his situation cannot be equated with the case of
preventive suspension as held in Aldovino, Jr., while in his MR, he argued before that the almost two
years which he did not sit as mayor during the 2004-2007 term is an interruption in the continuity of
his service for the full term.
Thus, COMELEC did not err in ruling that the issues in the MR are a rehash of those in the Brief.
Core Issue:
Whether or not Abundo is deemed to have served three consecutive terms

The pivotal determinative issue then is whether the service of a term less than the full three years by
an elected official arising from his being declared as the duly elected official upon an election protest
is considered as full service of the term for purposes of the application of the three consecutive term
limit for elective local officials.
On this core issue, We find the petition meritorious. The consecutiveness of what otherwise would
have been Abundos three successive, continuous mayorship was effectively broken during the
2004-2007 term when he was initially deprived of title to, and was veritably disallowed to serve and
occupy, an office to which he, after due proceedings, was eventually declared to have been the
rightful choice of the electorate.
The three-term limit rule for elective local officials, a disqualification rule, is found in Section 8, Article
X of the 1987 Constitution, which provides:
Sec. 8. The term of office of elective local officials, except barangay officials, which shall be
determined by law, shall be three years and no such official shall serve for more than three
consecutive terms. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered
as an interruption in the continuity of his service for the full term for which he was elected. (Emphasis
supplied.)
and is reiterated in Sec. 43(b) of Republic Act No. (RA) 7160, or the Local Government Code (LGC)
of 1991, thusly:
Sec. 43. Term of Office.
xxxx
(b) No local elective official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms in the same
position. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be considered as an
interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which the elective official concerned was
elected. (Emphasis Ours.)
To constitute a disqualification to run for an elective local office pursuant to the aforequoted
constitutional and statutory provisions, the following requisites must concur:
(1) that the official concerned has been elected for three consecutive terms in the same local
government post; and
(2) that he has fully served three consecutive terms.31
Judging from extant jurisprudence, the three-term limit rule, as applied to the different factual milieus,
has its complicated side. We shall revisit and analyze the various holdings and relevant
pronouncements of the Court on the matter.
As is clearly provided in Sec. 8, Art. X of the Constitution as well as in Sec. 43(b) of the LGC,
voluntary renunciation of the office by the incumbent elective local official for any length of time shall
NOT, in determining service for three consecutive terms, be considered an interruption in the
continuity of service for the full term for which the elective official concerned was elected. In
Aldovino, Jr., however, the Court stated the observation that the law "does not textually state that
voluntary renunciation is the only actual interruption of service that does not affect continuity of
service for a full term for purposes of the three-term limit rule." 32

As stressed in Socrates v. Commission on Elections, 33 the principle behind the three-term limit rule
covers only consecutive terms and that what the Constitution prohibits is a consecutive fourth term.
Put a bit differently, an elective local official cannot, following his third consecutive term, seek
immediate reelection for a fourth term,34albeit he is allowed to seek a fresh term for the same
position after the election where he could have sought his fourth term but prevented to do so by
reason of the prohibition.
There has, in fine, to be a break or interruption in the successive terms of the official after his or her
third term. An interruption usually occurs when the official does not seek a fourth term, immediately
following the third. Of course, the basic law is unequivocal that a "voluntary renunciation of the office
for any length of time shall NOT be considered an interruption in the continuity of service for the full
term for which the elective official concerned was elected." This qualification was made as a
deterrent against an elective local official intending to skirt the three-term limit rule by merely
resigning before his or her third term ends. This is a voluntary interruption as distinguished from
involuntary interruption which may be brought about by certain events or causes.
While appearing to be seemingly simple, the three-term limit rule has engendered a host of disputes
resulting from the varying interpretations applied on local officials who were elected and served for
three terms or more, but whose terms or service was punctuated by what they view as involuntary
interruptions, thus entitling them to a, but what their opponents perceive as a proscribed, fourth term.
Involuntary interruption is claimed to result from any of these events or causes: succession or
assumption of office by operation of law, preventive suspension, declaration of the defeated
candidate as the winner in an election contest, declaration of the proclaimed candidate as the losing
party in an election contest, proclamation of a non-candidate as the winner in a recall election,
removal of the official by operation of law, and other analogous causes.
This brings us to an examination of situations and jurisprudence wherein such consecutive terms
were considered or not considered as having been "involuntarily interrupted or broken."
(1) Assumption of Office by Operation of Law
In Borja, Jr. v. Commission on Elections and Jose T. Capco, Jr.35 (1998) and Montebon v.
Commission on Elections36 (2008), the Court delved on the effects of "assumption to office by
operation of law" on the three-term limit rule. This contemplates a situation wherein an elective local
official fills by succession a higher local government post permanently left vacant due to any of the
following contingencies, i.e., when the supposed incumbent refuses to assume office, fails to qualify,
dies, is removed from office, voluntarily resigns or is otherwise permanently incapacitated to
discharge the functions of his office.37
In Borja, Jr., Jose T. Capco, Jr. (Capco) was elected vice-mayor of Pateros on January 18, 1988 for
a term ending June 30, 1992. On September 2, 1989, Capco became mayor, by operation of law,
upon the death of the incumbent mayor, Cesar Borja. Capco was then elected and served as mayor
for terms 1992-1995 and 1995-1998. When Capco expressed his intention to run again for the
mayoralty position during the 1998 elections, Benjamin U. Borja, Jr., who was then also a candidate
for mayor, sought Capcos disqualification for violation of the three-term limit rule.
Finding for Capco, the Court held that for the disqualification rule to apply, "it is not enough that an
individual has served three consecutive terms in an elective local office, he must also have been
elected to the same position for the same number of times before the disqualification can
apply."38 There was, the Court ruled, no violation of the three-term limit, for Capco "was not elected to
the office of the mayor in the first term but simply found himself thrust into it by operation of
law"39 when a permanent vacancy occurred in that office.

The Court arrived at a parallel conclusion in the case of Montebon. There, Montebon had been
elected for three consecutive terms as municipal councilor of Tuburan, Cebu in 1998-2001, 20012004, and 2004-2007. However, in January 2004, or during his second term, Montebon succeeded
and assumed the position of vice-mayor of Tuburan when the incumbent vice-mayor retired. When
Montebon filed his certificate of candidacy again as municipal councilor, a petition for disqualification
was filed against him based on the three-term limit rule. The Court ruled that Montebons assumption
of office as vice-mayor in January 2004 was an interruption of his continuity of service as councilor.
The Court emphasized that succession in local government office is by operation of law and as such,
it is an involuntary severance from office. Since the law no less allowed Montebon to vacate his post
as councilor in order to assume office as vice-mayor, his occupation of the higher office cannot,
without more, be deemed as a voluntary renunciation of his position as councilor.
(2) Recall Election
With reference to the effects of recall election on the continuity of service, Adormeo v. Commission
on Elections40(2002) and the aforementioned case of Socrates (2002) provide guidance.
In Adormeo, Ramon Talaga, Jr. (Talaga) was elected and served as mayor of Lucena City during
terms 1992-1995 and 1995-1998. During the 1998 elections, Talaga lost to Bernard G. Tagarao.
However, before Tagaraos 1998-2001 term ended, a recall election was conducted in May 2000
wherein Talaga won and served the unexpired term of Tagarao until June 2001. When Talaga ran for
mayor in 2001, his candidacy was challenged on the ground he had already served as mayor for
three consecutive terms for violation of the three term-limit rule. The Court held therein that the
remainder of Tagaraos term after the recall election during which Talaga served as mayor should not
be considered for purposes of applying the three-term limit rule. The Court emphasized that the
continuity of Talagas mayorship was disrupted by his defeat during the 1998 elections.
A similar conclusion was reached by the Court in Socrates. The petitioners in that case assailed the
COMELEC Resolution which declared Edward Hagedorn qualified to run for mayor in a recall
election. It appeared that Hagedorn had been elected and served as mayor of Puerto Princesa City
for three consecutive terms: in 1992-1995, 1995-1998 and 1998-2001. Obviously aware of the threeterm limit principle, Hagedorn opted not to vie for the same mayoralty position in the 2001 elections,
in which Socrates ran and eventually won. However, midway into his term, Socrates faced recall
proceedings and in the recall election held, Hagedorn run for the formers unexpired term as mayor.
Socrates sought Hagedorns disqualification under the three-term limit rule.
In upholding Hagedorns candidacy to run in the recall election, the Court ruled:
x x x After Hagedorn ceased to be mayor on June 30, 2001, he became a private citizen until the
recall election of September 24, 2002 when he won by 3,018 votes over his closest opponent,
Socrates.
From June 30, 2001 until the recall election on September 24, 2002, the mayor of Puerto Princesa
was Socrates. During the same period, Hagedorn was simply a private citizen. This period is clearly
an interruption in the continuity of Hagedorns service as mayor, not because of his voluntary
renunciation, but because of a legal prohibition. 41
The Court likewise emphasized in Socrates that "an elective local official cannot seek immediate
reelection for a fourth term. The prohibited election refers to the next regular election for the same
office following the end of the third consecutive term and, hence, any subsequent election, like recall
election, is no longer covered x x x."42

(3) Conversion of a Municipality into a City

On the other hand, the conversion of a municipality into a city does not constitute an interruption of
the incumbent officials continuity of service. The Court said so in Latasa v. Commission on
Elections43 (2003).
Latasa is cast against the ensuing backdrop: Arsenio A. Latasa was elected and served as mayor of
the Municipality of Digos, Davao del Sur for terms 1992-1995, 1995-1998, and 1998-2001. During
his third term, Digos was converted into a component city, with the corresponding cityhood law
providing the holdover of elective officials. When Latasa filed his certificate of candidacy as mayor
for the 2001 elections, the Court declared Latasa as disqualified to run as mayor of Digos City for
violation of the three-term limit rule on the basis of the following ratiocination:
This Court believes that (Latasa) did involuntarily relinquish his office as municipal mayor since the
said office has been deemed abolished due to the conversion. However, the very instant he vacated
his office as municipal mayor, he also assumed office as city mayor. Unlike in Lonzanida, where
petitioner therein, for even just a short period of time, stepped down from office, petitioner Latasa
never ceased from acting as chief executive of the local government unit. He never ceased from
discharging his duties and responsibilities as chief executive of Digos.
(Emphasis supplied.)
(4) Period of Preventive Suspension
In 2009, in the case Aldovino Jr., the Court espoused the doctrine that the period during which a
local elected official is under preventive suspension cannot be considered as an interruption of the
continuity of his service. The Court explained why so:
Strict adherence to the intent of the three-term limit rule demands that preventive suspension should
not be considered an interruption that allows an elective officials stay in office beyond three terms. A
preventive suspension cannot simply be a term interruption because the suspended official
continues to stay in office although he is barred from exercising the functions and prerogatives of the
office within the suspension period. The best indicator of the suspended officials continuity in office
is the absence of a permanent replacement and the lack of the authority to appoint one since no
vacancy exists.44 (Emphasis supplied.)
(5) Election Protest
With regard to the effects of an election protest vis--vis the three-term limit rule, jurisprudence
presents a more differing picture. The Courts pronouncements in Lonzanida v. Commission on
Elections45 (1999), Ong v. Alegre46 (2006), Rivera III v. Commission on Elections 47 (2007) and Dizon v.
Commission on Elections48 (2009), all protest cases, are illuminating.
In Lonzanida, Romeo Lonzanida was elected and had served as municipal mayor of San Antonio,
Zambales in terms 1989-1992, 1992-1995 and 1995-1998. However, his proclamation relative to the
1995 election was protested and was eventually declared by the RTC and then by COMELEC null
and void on the ground of failure of elections. On February 27, 1998, or about three months before
the May 1998 elections, Lonzanida vacated the mayoralty post in light of a COMELEC order and writ
of execution it issued. Lonzanidas opponent assumed office for the remainder of the term. In the
May 1998 elections, Lonzanida again filed his certificate of candidacy. His opponent, Efren Muli, filed
a petition for disqualification on the ground that Lonzanida had already served three consecutive

terms in the same post. The Court, citing Borja Jr., reiterated the two (2) conditions which must
concur for the three-term limit to apply: "1) that the official concerned has been elected for three
consecutive terms in the same local government post and 2) that he has fully served three
consecutive terms."49
In view of Borja, Jr., the Court ruled that the foregoing requisites were absent in the case of
Lonzanida. The Court held that Lonzanida cannot be considered as having been duly elected to the
post in the May 1995 elections since his assumption of office as mayor "cannot be deemed to have
been by reason of a valid election but by reason of a void proclamation." And as a corollary point, the
Court stated that Lonzanida did not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral term having been ordered to
vacate his post before the expiration of the term, a situation which amounts to an involuntary
relinquishment of office.This Court deviated from the ruling in Lonzanida in Ong v. Alegre 50 owing to a
variance in the factual situations attendant.
In that case, Francis Ong (Ong) was elected and served as mayor of San Vicente, Camarines Norte
for terms 1995-1998, 1998-2001, and 2001-2004. During the 1998 mayoralty elections, or during his
supposed second term, the COMELEC nullified Ongs proclamation on the postulate that Ong lost
during the 1998 elections. However, the COMELECs decision became final and executory on July 4,
2001, when Ong had fully served the 1998-2001 mayoralty term and was in fact already starting to
serve the 2001-2004 term as mayor-elect of the municipality of San Vicente. In 2004, Ong filed his
certificate of candidacy for the same position as mayor, which his opponent opposed for violation of
the three-term limit rule.
Ong invoked the ruling in Lonzanida and argued that he could not be considered as having served
as mayor from 1998-2001 because he was not duly elected to the post and merely assumed office
as a "presumptive winner." Dismissing Ongs argument, the Court held that his assumption of office
as mayor for the term 1998-2001 constitutes "service for the full term" and hence, should be counted
for purposes of the three-term limit rule. The Court modified the conditions stated in Lonzanida in the
sense that Ongs service was deemed and counted as service for a full term because Ongs
proclamation was voided only after the expiry of the term. The Court noted that the COMELEC
decision which declared Ong as not having won the 1998 elections was "without practical and legal
use and value" promulgated as it was after the contested term has expired. The Court further
reasoned:
Petitioner Francis Ongs contention that he was only a presumptive winner in the 1998 mayoralty
derby as his proclamation was under protest did not make him less than a duly elected mayor. His
proclamation as the duly elected mayor in the 1998 mayoralty election coupled by his assumption of
office and his continuous exercise of the functions thereof from start to finish of the term, should
legally be taken as service for a full term in contemplation of the three-term rule.
The absurdity and the deleterious effect of a contrary view is not hard to discern. Such contrary view
would mean that Alegre would under the three-term rule - be considered as having served a term
by virtue of a veritably meaningless electoral protest ruling, when another actually served such term
pursuant to a proclamation made in due course after an election. 51 (Emphasis supplied.)
The Court did not apply the ruling in Lonzanida and ruled that the case of Ong was different, to wit:
The difference between the case at bench and Lonzanida is at once apparent. For one, in
Lonzanida, the result of the mayoralty election was declared a nullity for the stated reason of "failure
of election", and, as a consequence thereof, the proclamation of Lonzanida as mayor-elect was
nullified, followed by an order for him to vacate the office of mayor. For another, Lonzanida did not
fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral term, there being an involuntary severance from office as a result

of legal processes. In fine, there was an effective interruption of the continuity of service. 52 (Emphasis
supplied.)
Ongs slight departure from Lonzanida would later find reinforcement in the consolidated cases of
Rivera III v. Commission on Elections53 and Dee v. Morales.54 Therein, Morales was elected mayor of
Mabalacat, Pampanga for the following consecutive terms: 1995-1998, 1998-2001 and 2001-2004.
In relation to the 2004 elections, Morales again ran as mayor of the same town, emerged as
garnering the majority votes and was proclaimed elective mayor for term commencing July 1, 2004
to June 30, 2007. A petition for quo warranto was later filed against Morales predicated on the
ground that he is ineligible to run for a "fourth" term, having served as mayor for three consecutive
terms. In his answer, Morales averred that his supposed 1998-2001 term cannot be considered
against him, for, although he was proclaimed by the Mabalacat board of canvassers as elected
mayor vis--vis the 1998 elections and discharged the duties of mayor until June 30, 2001, his
proclamation was later nullified by the RTC of Angeles City and his closest rival, Anthony Dee,
proclaimed the duly elected mayor. Pursuing his point, Morales parlayed the idea that he only served
as a mere caretaker.
The Court found Morales posture untenable and held that the case of Morales presents a factual
milieu similar with Ong, not with Lonzanida. For ease of reference, the proclamation of Francis Ong,
in Ong, was nullified, but after he, like Morales, had served the three-year term from the start to the
end of the term. Hence, the Court concluded that Morales exceeded the three-term limit rule, to wit:
Here, respondent Morales was elected for the term July 1, 1998 to June 30, 2001. He assumed the
position. He served as mayor until June 30, 2001. He was mayor for the entire period
notwithstanding the Decision of the RTC in the electoral protest case filed by petitioner Dee ousting
him (respondent) as mayor. To reiterate, as held in Ong v. Alegre, such circumstance does not
constitute an interruption in serving the full term.
xxxx
Respondent Morales is now serving his fourth term. He has been mayor of Mabalacat continuously
without any break since July 1, 1995. In just over a month, by June 30, 2007, he will have been
mayor of Mabalacat for twelve (12) continuous years. 55 (Emphasis supplied.)
The Court ruled in Rivera that the fact of being belatedly ousted, i.e., after the expiry of the term,
cannot constitute an interruption in Morales service of the full term; neither can Morales, as he
argued, be considered merely a "caretaker of the office" or a mere "de facto officer" for purposes of
applying the three-term limit rule.
In a related 2009 case of Dizon v. Commission on Elections, 56 the Court would again find the same
Mayor Morales as respondent in a disqualification proceeding when he ran again as a mayoralty
candidate during the 2007 elections for a term ending June 30, 2010. Having been unseated from
his post by virtue of this Courts ruling in Rivera, Morales would argue this time around that the threeterm limit rule was no longer applicable as to his 2007 mayoralty bid. This time, the Court ruled in his
favor, holding that for purposes of the 2007 elections, the three-term limit rule was no longer a
disqualifying factor as against Morales. The Court wrote:
Our ruling in the Rivera case served as Morales involuntary severance from office with respect to
the 2004-2007 term. Involuntary severance from office for any length of time short of the full term
provided by law amounts to an interruption of continuity of service. Our decision in the Rivera case
was promulgated on 9 May 2007 and was effective immediately. The next day, Morales notified the
vice mayors office of our decision. The vice mayor assumed the office of the mayor from 17 May

2007 up to 30 June 2007. The assumption by the vice mayor of the office of the mayor, no matter
how short it may seem to Dizon, interrupted Morales continuity of service. Thus, Morales did not
hold office for the full term of 1 July 2004 to 30 June 2007. 57 (Emphasis supplied)
To summarize, hereunder are the prevailing jurisprudence on issues affecting consecutiveness of
terms and/or involuntary interruption, viz:
1. When a permanent vacancy occurs in an elective position and the official merely assumed
the position pursuant to the rules on succession under the LGC, then his service for the
unexpired portion of the term of the replaced official cannot be treated as one full term as
contemplated under the subject constitutional and statutory provision that service cannot be
counted in the application of any term limit (Borja, Jr.). If the official runs again for the same
position he held prior to his assumption of the higher office, then his succession to said
position is by operation of law and is considered an involuntary severance or interruption
(Montebon).
2. An elective official, who has served for three consecutive terms and who did not seek the
elective position for what could be his fourth term, but later won in a recall election, had an
interruption in the continuity of the officials service. For, he had become in the interim, i.e.,
from the end of the 3rd term up to the recall election, a private citizen (Adormeo and
Socrates).
3. The abolition of an elective local office due to the conversion of a municipality to a city
does not, by itself, work to interrupt the incumbent officials continuity of service (Latasa).
4. Preventive suspension is not a term-interrupting event as the elective officers continued
stay and entitlement to the office remain unaffected during the period of suspension,
although he is barred from exercising the functions of his office during this period (Aldovino,
Jr.).
5. When a candidate is proclaimed as winner for an elective position and assumes office, his
term is interrupted when he loses in an election protest and is ousted from office, thus
disenabling him from serving what would otherwise be the unexpired portion of his term of
office had the protest been dismissed (Lonzanida and Dizon). The break or interruption need
not be for a full term of three years or for the major part of the 3-year term; an interruption for
any length of time, provided the cause is involuntary, is sufficient to break the continuity of
service (Socrates, citing Lonzanida).
6. When an official is defeated in an election protest and said decision becomes final after
said official had served the full term for said office, then his loss in the election contest does
not constitute an interruption since he has managed to serve the term from start to finish. His
full service, despite the defeat, should be counted in the application of term limits because
the nullification of his proclamation came after the expiration of the term (Ong and Rivera).
The Case of Abundo
Abundo argues that the RTC and the COMELEC erred in uniformly ruling that he had already served
three consecutive terms and is, thus, barred by the constitutional three-term limit rule to run for the
current 2010-2013 term. In gist, Abundo arguments run thusly:

1. Aldovino, Jr. is not on all fours with the present case as the former dealt with preventive
suspension which does not interrupt the continuity of service of a term;
2. Aldovino, Jr. recognizes that the term of an elected official can be interrupted so as to
remove him from the reach of the constitutional three-term limitation;
3. The COMELEC misinterpreted the meaning of "term" in Aldovino, Jr. by its reliance on a
mere portion of the Decision and not on the unified logic in the disquisition;
4. Of appropriate governance in this case is the holding in Lonzanida 58 and Rivera III v.
Commission on Elections.59
5. The COMELEC missed the point when it ruled that there was no interruption in the service
of Abundo since what he considered as an "interruption" of his 2004-2007 term occurred
before his term started; and
6. To rule that the term of the protestee (Torres) whose proclamation was adjudged invalid
was interrupted while that of the protestant (Abundo) who was eventually proclaimed winner
was not so interrupted is at once absurd as it is illogical.
Both respondents Vega and the COMELEC counter that the ratio decidendi of Aldovino, Jr. finds
application in the instant case. The COMELEC ruled that Abundo did not lose title to the office as his
victory in the protest case confirmed his entitlement to said office and he was only unable to
temporarily discharge the functions of the office during the pendency of the election protest.
We note that this present case of Abundo deals with the effects of an election protest, for which the
rulings in Lonzanida, Ong, Rivera and Dizon appear to be more attuned than the case of Aldovino
Jr., the interrupting effects of the imposition of a preventive suspension being the very lis mota in the
Aldovino, Jr. case. But just the same, We find that Abundos case presents a different factual
backdrop.
Unlike in the abovementioned election protest cases wherein the individuals subject of
disqualification were candidates who lost in the election protest and each declared loser during the
elections, Abundo was the winner during the election protest and was declared the rightful holder of
the mayoralty post. Unlike Mayor Lonzanida and Mayor Morales, who were both unseated toward
the end of their respective terms, Abundo was the protestant who ousted his opponent and had
assumed the remainder of the term.
Notwithstanding, We still find this Courts pronouncements in the past as instructive, and consider
several doctrines established from the 1998 case of Borja, Jr. up to the most recent case of Aldovino
Jr. in 2009, as potent aids in arriving at this Courts conclusion.
The intention behind the three-term limit rule was not only to abrogate the "monopolization of political
power" and prevent elected officials from breeding "proprietary interest in their position" 60 but also to
"enhance the peoples freedom of choice."61 In the words of Justice Vicente V. Mendoza, "while
people should be protected from the evils that a monopoly of power may bring about, care should be
taken that their freedom of choice is not unduly curtailed." 62
In the present case, the Court finds Abundos case meritorious and declares that the two-year period
during which his opponent, Torres, was serving as mayor should be considered as an interruption,
which effectively removed Abundos case from the ambit of the three-term limit rule.

It bears to stress at this juncture that Abundo, for the 2004 election for the term starting July 1, 2004
to June 30, 2007, was the duly elected mayor. Otherwise how explain his victory in his election
protest against Torres and his consequent proclamation as duly elected mayor. Accordingly, the first
requisite for the application of the disqualification rule based on the three-term limit that the official
has been elected is satisfied.
This thus brings us to the second requisite of whether or not Abundo had served for "three
consecutive terms," as the phrase is juridically understood, as mayor of Viga, Catanduanes
immediately before the 2010 national and local elections. Subsumed to this issue is of course the
question of whether or not there was an effective involuntary interruption during the three three-year
periods, resulting in the disruption of the continuity of Abundos mayoralty.
The facts of the case clearly point to an involuntary interruption during the July 2004-June 2007
term.
There can be no quibbling that, during the term 2004-2007, and with the enforcement of the decision
of the election protest in his favor, Abundo assumed the mayoralty post only on May 9, 2006 and
served the term until June 30, 2007 or for a period of a little over one year and one month.
Consequently, unlike Mayor Ong in Ong and Mayor Morales in Rivera, it cannot be said that Mayor
Abundo was able to serve fully the entire 2004-2007 term to which he was otherwise entitled.
A "term," as defined in Appari v. Court of Appeals,63 means, in a legal sense, "a fixed and definite
period of time which the law describes that an officer may hold an office." 64 It also means the "time
during which the officer may claim to hold office as a matter of right, and fixes the interval after which
the several incumbents shall succeed one another."65 It is the period of time during which a duly
elected official has title to and can serve the functions of an elective office. From paragraph (a) of
Sec. 43, RA 7160,66 the term for local elected officials is three (3) years starting from noon of June 30
of the first year of said term.
In the present case, during the period of one year and ten months, or from June 30, 2004 until May
8, 2006, Abundo cannot plausibly claim, even if he wanted to, that he could hold office of the mayor
as a matter of right. Neither can he assert title to the same nor serve the functions of the said
elective office. The reason is simple: during that period, title to hold such office and the
corresponding right to assume the functions thereof still belonged to his opponent, as proclaimed
election winner. Accordingly, Abundo actually held the office and exercised the functions as mayor
only upon his declaration, following the resolution of the protest, as duly elected candidate in the
May 2004 elections or for only a little over one year and one month. Consequently, since the legally
contemplated full term for local elected officials is three (3) years, it cannot be said that Abundo fully
served the term 2004-2007. The reality on the ground is that Abundo actually served less.
Needless to stress, the almost two-year period during which Abundos opponent actually served as
Mayor is and ought to be considered an involuntary interruption of Abundos continuity of service. An
involuntary interrupted term, cannot, in the context of the disqualification rule, be considered as one
term for purposes of counting the three-term threshold. 67
The notion of full service of three consecutive terms is related to the concepts of interruption of
service and voluntary renunciation of service. The word interruption means temporary cessation,
intermission or suspension.68 To interrupt is to obstruct, thwart or prevent.69 When the Constitution
and the LGC of 1991 speak of interruption, the reference is to the obstruction to the continuance of
the service by the concerned elected official by effectively cutting short the service of a term or giving
a hiatus in the occupation of the elective office. On the other hand, the word "renunciation" connotes
the idea of waiver or abandonment of a known right. To renounce is to give up, abandon, decline or

resign.70 Voluntary renunciation of the office by an elective local official would thus mean to give up
or abandon the title to the office and to cut short the service of the term the concerned elected official
is entitled to.
In its assailed Resolution, the COMELEC en banc, applying Aldovino, Jr., 71 held:
It must be stressed that involuntary interruption of service which jurisprudence deems an exception
to the three-term limit rule, implies that the service of the term has begun before it was interrupted.
Here, the respondent did not lose title to the office. As the assailed Resolution states:
In the case at bar, respondent cannot be said to have lost his title to the office. On the contrary, he
actively sought entitlement to the office when he lodged the election protest case. And respondentappellants victory in the said case is a final confirmation that he was validly elected for the mayoralty
post of Viga, Catanduanes in 2004-2007. At most, respondent-appellant was only unable to
temporarily discharge the functions of the office to which he was validly elected during the pendency
of the election protest, but he never lost title to the said office. 72(Emphasis added.)
The COMELECs Second Division, on the other hand, pronounced that the actual length of service
by the public official in a given term is immaterial by reckoning said service for the term in the
application of the three-term limit rule, thus:
As emphasized in the case of Aldovino, "this formulationno more than three consecutive termsis
a clear command suggesting the existence of an inflexible rule." Therefore we cannot subscribe to
the argument that since respondent Abundo served only a portion of the term, his 2004-2007 "term"
should not be considered for purposes of the application of the three term limit rule. When the
framers of the Constitution drafted and incorporated the three term limit rule, it is clear that reference
is to the term, not the actual length of the service the public official may render. Therefore, ones
actual service of term no matter how long or how short is immaterial. 73
In fine, the COMELEC ruled against Abundo on the theory that the length of the actual service of the
term is immaterial in his case as he was only temporarily unable to discharge his functions as mayor.
The COMELECs case disposition and its heavy reliance on Aldovino, Jr. do not commend
themselves for concurrence. The Court cannot simply find its way clear to understand the poll bodys
determination that Abundo was only temporarily unable to discharge his functions as mayor during
the pendency of the election protest.
As previously stated, the declaration of being the winner in an election protest grants the local
elected official the right to serve the unexpired portion of the term. Verily, while he was declared
winner in the protest for the mayoralty seat for the 2004-2007 term, Abundos full term has been
substantially reduced by the actual service rendered by his opponent (Torres). Hence, there was
actual involuntary interruption in the term of Abundo and he cannot be considered to have served the
full 2004-2007 term.
This is what happened in the instant case. It cannot be overemphasized that pending the favorable
resolution of his election protest, Abundo was relegated to being an ordinary constituent since his
opponent, as presumptive victor in the 2004 elections, was occupying the mayoralty seat. In other
words, for almost two years or from July 1, 2004the start of the termuntil May 9, 2006 or during
which his opponent actually assumed the mayoralty office, Abundo was a private citizen warming his
heels while awaiting the outcome of his protest. Hence, even if declared later as having the right to
serve the elective position from July 1, 2004, such declaration would not erase the fact that prior to

the finality of the election protest, Abundo did not serve in the mayors office and, in fact, had no
legal right to said position.
Aldovino Jr. cannot possibly lend support to respondents cause of action, or to COMELECs
resolution against Abundo. In Aldovino Jr., the Court succinctly defines what temporary inability or
disqualification to exercise the functions of an elective office means, thus:
On the other hand, temporary inability or disqualification to exercise the functions of an elective post,
even if involuntary, should not be considered an effective interruption of a term because it does not
involve the loss of title to office or at least an effective break from holding office; the office holder,
while retaining title, is simply barred from exercising the functions of his office for a reason provided
by law.74
We rule that the above pronouncement on preventive suspension does not apply to the instant case.
Verily, it is erroneous to say that Abundo merely was temporarily unable or disqualified to exercise
the functions of an elective post. For one, during the intervening period of almost two years,
reckoned from the start of the 2004-2007 term, Abundo cannot be said to have retained title to the
mayoralty office as he was at that time not the duly proclaimed winner who would have the legal
right to assume and serve such elective office. For another, not having been declared winner yet,
Abundo cannot be said to have lost title to the office since one cannot plausibly lose a title which, in
the first place, he did not have. Thus, for all intents and purposes, even if the belated declaration in
the election protest accords him title to the elective office from the start of the term, Abundo was not
entitled to the elective office until the election protest was finally resolved in his favor.
1wphi1

Consequently, there was a hiatus of almost two years, consisting of a break and effective interruption
of his service, until he assumed the office and served barely over a year of the remaining term. At
this juncture, We observe the apparent similarities of Mayor Abundos case with the cases of Mayor
Talaga in Adormeo and Mayor Hagedorn in Socrates as Mayors Talaga and Hagedorn were not
proclaimed winners since they were non-candidates in the regularelections. They were proclaimed
winners during the recall elections and clearly were not able to fully serve the terms of the deposed
incumbent officials. Similar to their cases where the Court deemed their terms as involuntarily
interrupted, Abundo also became or was a private citizen during the period over which his opponent
was serving as mayor. If in Lonzanida, the Court ruled that there was interruption in Lonzanidas
service because of his subsequent defeat in the election protest, then with more reason, Abundos
term for 2004-2007 should be declared interrupted since he was not proclaimed winner after the
2004 elections and was able to assume the office and serve only for a little more than a year after
winning the protest.
As aptly stated in Latasa, to be considered as interruption of service, the "law contemplates a rest
period during which the local elective official steps down from office and ceases to exercise power or
authority over the inhabitants of the territorial jurisdiction of a particular local government
unit."75 Applying the said principle in the present case, there is no question that during the pendency
of the election protest, Abundo ceased from exercising power or authority over the good people of
Viga, Catanduanes.
Consequently, the period during which Abundo was not serving as mayor should be considered as a
rest period or break in his service because, as earlier stated, prior to the judgment in the election
protest, it was Abundos opponent, Torres, who was exercising such powers by virtue of the still then
valid proclamation.
As a final note, We reiterate that Abundos case differs from other cases involving the effects of an
election protest because while Abundo was, in the final reckoning, the winning candidate, he was the

one deprived of his right and opportunity to serve his constituents. To a certain extent, Abundo was a
victim of an imperfect election system. While admittedly the Court does not possess the mandate to
remedy such imperfections, the Constitution has clothed it with enough authority to establish a
fortress against the injustices it may bring.
In this regard, We find that a contrary ruling would work damage and cause grave injustice to
Abundoan elected official who was belatedly declared as the winner and assumed office for only a
short period of the term. If in the cases of Lonzanida and Dizon, this Court ruled in favor of a losing
candidateor the person who was adjudged not legally entitled to hold the contested public office
but held it anywayWe find more reason to rule in favor of a winning candidate-protestant who, by
popular vote, deserves title to the public office but whose opportunity to hold the same was halted by
an invalid proclamation.
Also, more than the injustice that may be committed against Abundo is the injustice that may
likewise be committed against the people of Viga, Catanduanes by depriving them of their right to
choose their leaders. Like the framers of the Constitution, We bear in mind that We "cannot arrogate
unto ourselves the right to decide what the people want" 76 and hence, should, as much as possible,
"allow the people to exercise their own sense of proportion and rely on their own strength to curtail
the power when it overreaches itself."77 For democracy draws strength from the choice the people
make which is the same choice We are likewise bound to protect.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is PARTLY GRANTED. Accordingly, the assailed February 8,
2012 Resolution of the Commission on Elections Second Division and May 10, 2012 Resolution of
the Commission on Elections en banc in EAC (AE) No. A-25-2010 and the Decision of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Virac, Catanduanes, Branch 43, dated August 9, 2010, in Election Case No. 55,
are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Petitioner Abelardo Abundo, Sr. is DECLARED ELIGIBLE for the position of Mayor of Viga,
Catanduanes to which he was duly elected in the May 2010 elections and is accordingly ordered
IMMEDIATELY REINSTATED to said position. Withal, Emeterio M. Tarin and Cesar O. Cervantes are
ordered to immediately vacate the positions of Mayor and Vice-Mayor of Viga, Catanduanes,
respectively, and shall revert to their original positions of Vice-Mayor and First Councilor,
respectively, upon receipt of this Decision.
The TRO issued by the Court on July 3, 2012 is hereby LIFTED.
This Decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED