ANG LADLAD VS.

COMELEC

sector is not among the sectors enumerated by the Constitution and RA 7941, and
that petitioner made untruthful statements in its petition when it alleged its national

Facts:

existence contrary to actual verification reports by COMELECs field personnel.

Petitioner is a national organization which represents the lesbians, gays, bisexuals,

and trans-genders. It filed a petition for accreditation as a party-list organization to
public respondent. However, due to moral grounds, the latter denied the said petition.
To buttress their denial, COMELEC cited certain biblical and quranic passages in their

Issue:
WON Respondent violated the Non-establishment clause of the Constitution;
WON Respondent erred in denying Petitioners application on moral and legal
grounds.

decision. It also stated that since their ways are immoral and contrary to public policy,
they are considered nuissance. In fact, their acts are even punishable under the

Held:

Revised Penal Code in its Article 201.

Respondent mistakenly opines that our ruling in Ang Bagong Bayani stands for the
A motion for reconsideration being denied, Petitioner filed this instant Petition on

proposition that only those sectors specifically enumerated in the law or related to

Certiorari

ROC.

said sectors (labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural communities,

Ang Ladlad argued that the denial of accreditation, insofar as it justified the exclusion

elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals)

by using religious dogma, violated the constitutional guarantees against the

may be registered under the party-list system. As we explicitly ruled in Ang Bagong

establishment of religion. Petitioner also claimed that the Assailed Resolutions

Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Commission on Elections, the enumeration of

contravened its constitutional rights to privacy, freedom of speech and assembly, and

marginalized and under-represented sectors is not exclusive. The crucial element is

equal protection of laws, as well as constituted violations of the Philippines

not whether a sector is specifically enumerated, but whether a particular organization

international obligations against discrimination based on sexual orientation.

complies with the requirements of the Constitution and RA 7941.

In its Comment, the COMELEC reiterated that petitioner does not have a concrete

Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that [n]o law shall be made

and genuine national political agenda to benefit the nation and that the petition was

respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof. At

validly dismissed on moral grounds. It also argued for the first time that the LGBT

bottom, what our non-establishment clause calls for is government neutrality in

under

Rule

65

of

the

religious matters. Clearly, governmental reliance on religious justification is

As such, we hold that moral disapproval, without more, is not a sufficient

inconsistent with this policy of neutrality. We thus find that it was grave violation of

governmental interest to justify exclusion of homosexuals from participation in the

the non-establishment clause for the COMELEC to utilize the Bible and the Koran to

party-list system. The denial of Ang Ladlads registration on purely moral grounds

justify the exclusion of Ang Ladlad. Be it noted that government action must have a

amounts more to a statement of dislike and disapproval of homosexuals, rather than

secular purpose.

a tool to further any substantial public interest.

Respondent has failed to explain what societal ills are sought to be prevented, or why
special protection is required for the youth. Neither has the COMELEC condescended

Duncan Assoc. of Detailman-PTGWO vs. Glaxo Wellcome Phils., Inc.

G.R. No. 162994, September 17, 2004
FACTS:

to justify its position that petitioners admission into the party-list system would be so
harmful as to irreparably damage the moral fabric of society.

Tecson was hired by Glaxo as a medical representative on Oct. 24, 1995. Contract of
employment signed by Tecson stipulates, among others, that he agrees to study and
abide by the existing company rules; to disclose to management any existing future

We also find the COMELECs reference to purported violations of our penal and civil
laws flimsy, at best; disingenuous, at worst. Article 694 of the Civil Code defines a
nuisance as any act, omission, establishment, condition of property, or anything else
which shocks, defies, or disregards decency or morality, the remedies for which are a
prosecution under the Revised Penal Code or any local ordinance, a civil action, or
abatement without judicial proceedings. A violation of Article 201 of the Revised Penal

relationship by consanguinity or affinity with co-employees or employees with

competing drug companies and should management find that such relationship poses
a possible conflict of interest, to resign from the company. Company's Code of
Employee Conduct provides the same with stipulation that management may transfer
the employee to another department in a non-counterchecking position or preparation
for employment outside of the company after 6 months.
Tecson was initially assigned to market Glaxo's products in the Camarines SurCamarines Norte area and entered into a romantic relationship with Betsy, an
employee of Astra, Glaxo's competition. Before getting married, Tecson's District

Code, on the other hand, requires proof beyond reasonable doubt to support a

Manager reminded him several times of the conflict of interest but marriage took

criminal conviction. It hardly needs to be emphasized that mere allegation of violation

place in Sept. 1998. In Jan. 1999, Tecson's superiors informed him of conflict of

of laws is not proof, and a mere blanket invocation of public morals cannot replace

resign from their respective positions). Unable to comply with condition, Glaxo

the institution of civil or criminal proceedings and a judicial determination of liability or

culpability.

intrest. Tecson asked for time to comply with the condition (that either he or Betsy
transferred Tecson to the Butuan-Surigao City-Agusan del Sur sales area. After his
request against transfer was denied, Tecson brought the matter to Glaxo's Grievance
Committee and while pending, he continued to act as medical representative in the
Camarines Sur-Camarines Norte sales area. On Nov. 15, 2000, the National
Conciliation and Mediation Board ruled that Glaxo's policy was valid...

ISSUE:

Facts: Simbol, one of the employees of Star Paper Corporation met Alma Dayrit, also
an employee of the company, whom he married. prior to their marriage, the manager

Whether or not the policy of a pharmaceutical company prohibiting its employees

from marrying employees of any competitor company is valid
RULING:

of the Personnel and Administration Department, Ongsito, advised the couple that
should they get married, one of them resigned because of a company policy. Simbol
then resigned before they got married. A similar occurrence happened to Comia and
she also resigned before her marriage to Howard Comia Estrella met Luisito Zuniga,

On Equal Protection

also a co-worker, a married man got her pregnant. The company allegedly could have
terminated her services due to immorality but she opted to resign. The three

Glaxo has a right to guard its trade secrets, manufacturing formulas, marketing
strategies, and other confidential programs and information from competitors. The
prohibition against personal or marital relationships with employees of competitor
companies upon Glaxo's employees is reasonable under the circumstances because

respondents Simbol, Comia, and Estrella, on separate instances signed a Release

and

Confirmation

agreement.

Simbol and Comia allege that they did not resign voluntarily and that they were only

relationships of that nature might compromise the interests of the company. That

compelled to resign because of an illegal company policy. Estrella alleges that she

Glaxo possesses the right to protect its economic interest cannot be denied.

had a relationship with Zuniga who misrepresented himself a married but separated
man. After she got pregnant, she found out that he was not separated. She severed

It is the settled principle that the commands of the equal protection clause are

her relationship with him to avoid dismissal due to company policy. Sometime, she

addressed only to the state or those acting under color of its authority. Corollary, it has

got into an accident which necessitated her to recuperate for 21 days and

been held in a long array of US Supreme Court decisions that the equal protection
clause erects to shield against merely privately conduct, however, discriminatory or
wrongful.

necessitated to recuperate for 21 days. When she returned to work, she was denied
entry into the office. She was directed to proceed to the personnel office where she
was handed a memo which states that she was being dismissed for immoral conduct.

The company actually enforced the policy after repeated requests to the employee to

She refused to sign the memo because she was on leave for 21 days and wasnt

comply with the policy. Indeed the application of the policy was made in an impartial

given chance to explain. When she finally submitted her explanation, she was

and even-handed manner, with due regard for the lot of the employee.

nonetheless dismissed by the company. Due to her urgent need for money, she
submitted a letter of resignation in exchange for her 13Th month pay.

On Constructive Dismissal
Constructive dismissal is defined as a quitting, an involuntary resignation resorted to

The respondents filed a complaint for unfair labor practices, constructive dismissal.
The Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint for lack of merit, The NLRC affirmed the

when continued employment becomes impossible, unreasonable or unlikely; when

decision however, the CA reversed the NLRCs ruling. Hence, the petition.

there is demotion in rank, or diminution in pay; or when a clear discrimination,

Issue: Whether or not the companys policy is violative of the constitutional rights

insensibility, or disdain by an employer becomes unbearable to the employee. None

towards marriage and the family of employees and of Article 136 of the Labor Code.

of these conditions are present in the instant case.

Ruling: Yes. It is significant to note that in the case at bar, respondents were hired

STAR PAPER CORPORATION VS. SIMBOL

after they were found fit for the job, but were asked to resign when they married a

G.R No. 164774 April 12, 2006

co-employee. Petitioners failed to show how the marriage of Simbol, then a

Sheeting Machine Operator, to Alma Dayrit, then an employee of the Repacking

Section, could be detrimental to its business operations. Neither did petitioners

explain how this detriment will happen in the case of Wilfreda Comia, then a
Production Helper in the Selecting Department, who married Howard Comia, then a
helper in the cutter-machine. The policy is premised on the mere fear that
employees married to each other will be less efficient. If we uphold the
questioned rule without valid justification, the employer can create policies based on
an unproven presumption of a perceived danger at the expense of an employees
right

to

security

of

tenure.

Petitioners contend that their policy will apply only when one employee marries a coemployee, but they are free to marry persons other than co-employees. The
questioned policy may not facially violate Article 136 of the Labor Code but it
creates a disproportionate effect and under the disparate impact theory, the
only way it could pass judicial scrutiny is a showing that it is reasonable
despite the discriminatory, albeit disproportionate, effect. The failure of
petitioners to prove a legitimate business concern in imposing the questioned
policy cannot prejudice the employees right to be free from arbitrary
discrimination based upon stereotypes of married persons working together in
one

company.

FACTS: THIS case portrays the peculiar story of an international flight steward who
was dismissed because of his failure to adhere to the weight standards of the airline
company.
The proper weight for a man of his height and body structure is from 147 to 166
pounds, the ideal weight being 166 pounds, as mandated by the Cabin and Crew
Administration Manual of PAL.
In 1984, the weight problem started, which prompted PAL to send him to an extended
vacation until November 1985. He was allowed to return to work once he lost all the
excess weight. But the problem recurred. He again went on leave without pay from
October 17, 1988 to February 1989.
Despite the lapse of a ninety-day period given him to reach his ideal weight, petitioner
remained overweight. On January 3, 1990, he was informed of the PAL decision for
him to remain grounded until such time that he satisfactorily complies with the weight
standards. Again, he was directed to report every two weeks for weight checks, which
he failed to comply with.
On April 17, 1990, petitioner was formally warned that a repeated refusal to report for
weight check would be dealt with accordingly. He was given another set of weight
check dates, which he did not report to.
On November 13, 1992, PAL finally served petitioner a Notice of Administrative
Charge for violation of company standards on weight requirements. Petitioner insists
that he is being discriminated as those similarly situated were not treated the same.
On June 15, 1993, petitioner was formally informed by PAL that due to his inability to
attain his ideal weight, and considering the utmost leniency extended to him which
spanned a period covering a total of almost five (5) years, his services were
considered terminated effective immediately.

our jurisdiction cannot benefit the petitioners. The protection given to labor in our

LABOR ARBITER: held that the weight standards of PAL are reasonable in view of
the nature of the job of petitioner. However, the weight standards need not be
complied with under pain of dismissal since his weight did not hamper the
performance of his duties.

jurisdiction is vast and extensive that we cannot prudently draw inferences from the

NLRC affirmed.

Lastly, the absence of a statute expressly prohibiting marital discrimination in

legislatures silence that married persons are not protected under our Constitution
and declare valid a policy based on a prejudice or stereotype. Thus, for failure of
petitioners to present undisputed proof of a reasonable business necessity, we rule

CA: the weight standards of PAL are reasonable. Thus, petitioner was legally
dismissed because he repeatedly failed to meet the prescribed weight standards. It is
obvious that the issue of discrimination was only invoked by petitioner for purposes of
escaping the result of his dismissal for being overweight.
ISSUE: WON he was validly dismissed.

that the questioned policy is an invalid exercise of management prerogative.

HELD: YES

Corollarily, the issue as to whether respondents Simbol and Comia resigned

A reading of the weight standards of PAL would lead to no other conclusion than
that they constitute a continuing qualification of an employee in order to keep
the job. The dismissal of the employee would thus fall under Article 282(e) of the
Labor Code.

voluntarily has become moot and academic.

ARMANDO
G.
YRASUEGUI,
PHILIPPINE AIRLINES, INC., respondents.
G.R. No. 168081, October 17, 2008 (569 SCRA 467)
VERSION 1:

petitioners,

vs.

In the case at bar, the evidence on record militates against petitioners claims that
obesity is a disease. That he was able to reduce his weight from 1984 to 1992 clearly
shows that it is possible for him to lose weight given the proper attitude,
determination, and self-discipline. Indeed, during the clarificatory hearing on
December 8, 1992, petitioner himself claimed that [t]he issue is could I bring my
weight down to ideal weight which is 172, then the answer is yes. I can do it now.

Petitioner has only himself to blame. He could have easily availed the assistance of
the company physician, per the advice of PAL.
In fine, We hold that the obesity of petitioner, when placed in the context of his work
as flight attendant, becomes an analogous cause under Article 282(e) of the Labor
Code that justifies his dismissal from the service. His obesity may not be unintended,
but is nonetheless voluntary. As the CA correctly puts it, [v]oluntariness basically
means that the just cause is solely attributable to the employee without any external
force influencing or controlling his actions. This element runs through all just causes
under Article 282, whether they be in the nature of a wrongful action or omission.
Gross and habitual neglect, a recognized just cause, is considered voluntary although
it lacks the element of intent found in Article 282(a), (c), and (d).
NOTES:
The dismissal of petitioner can be predicated on the bona fide occupational
qualification defense. Employment in particular jobs may not be limited to persons of
a particular sex, religion, or national origin unless the employer can show that sex,
religion, or national origin is an actual qualification for performing the job. The
qualification is called a bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ). In short, the test
of reasonableness of the company policy is used because it is parallel to BFOQ.
BFOQ is valid provided it reflects an inherent quality reasonably necessary for
satisfactory job performance.
The business of PAL is air transportation. As such, it has committed itself to safely
transport its passengers. In order to achieve this, it must necessarily rely on its
employees, most particularly the cabin flight deck crew who are on board the aircraft.
The weight standards of PAL should be viewed as imposing strict norms of discipline
upon its employees.
The primary objective of PAL in the imposition of the weight standards for cabin crew
is
flight
safety.
Separation pay, however, should be awarded in favor of the employee as an act of
social justice or based on equity. This is so because his dismissal is not for serious
misconduct. Neither is it reflective of his moral character.
VERSION 2:
Facts: Complainant was an international flight steward who was dismissed because
of his failure to adhere to the weight standards of the company.
Issue: Was the dismissal valid?
Held: SC upheld the legality of dismissal. Separation pay, however, should be
awarded in favor of the employee as an act of social justice or based on equity. This
is so because his dismissal is not for serious misconduct. Neither is it reflective of his
moral character.
The obesity of petitioner, when placed in the context of his work as flight attendant,
becomes an analogous cause under Article 282(e) of the Labor Code. His
obesity may not be unintended, but is nonetheless voluntary. [V]oluntariness
basically means that the just cause is solely attributable to the employee without any
external force influencing or controlling his actions. This element runs through all just
causes under Article 282, whether they be in the nature of a wrongful action or
omission. Gross and habitual neglect, a recognized just cause, is considered
voluntary although it lacks the element of intent found in Article 282(a), (c), and (d).

Employment in particular jobs may not be limited to persons of a particular sex,

religion, or national origin unless the employer can show that sex, religion, or national
origin is an actual qualification for performing the job.
Bona fide occupational qualification (BFOQ)
The Constitution, the Labor Code, and RA No. 7277 or the Magna Carta for Disabled
Persons contain provisions similar to BFOQ.
Argument that BFOQ is a statutory defense must fail
Meiorin Test (US jurisprudence) in determining whether an employment policy is
justified:
(1) the employer must show that it adopted the standard for a purpose rationally
connected to the performance of the job;
2) the employer must establish that the standard is reasonably necessary to the
accomplishment of that work-related purpose; and
(3) the employer must establish that the standard is reasonably necessary in order to
accomplish the legitimate work-related purpose.
In Star Paper Corporation v. Simbol, this Court held that in order to justify a BFOQ,
the employer must prove:
(1) the employment qualification is reasonably related to the essential operation of the
job involved; and
(2) that there is factual basis for believing that all or substantially all persons meeting
the qualification would be unable to properly perform the duties of the job.
In short, the test of reasonableness of the company policy is used because it is
parallel to BFOQ. BFOQ is valid provided it reflects an inherent quality reasonably
necessary for satisfactory job performance.
The weight standards of PAL are reasonable. A common carrier, from the nature of its
business and for reasons of public policy, is bound to observe extraordinary diligence
for the safety of the passengers it transports.
The primary objective of PAL in the imposition of the weight standards for cabin crew
is flight safety. It cannot be gainsaid that cabin attendants must maintain agility at all
times in order to inspire passenger confidence on their ability to care for the
passengers when something goes wrong.
Exceptionally, separation pay is granted to a legally dismissed employee as an act
social justice, or based on equity. Provided the dismissal:
Entitled to separation pay, even if terminated for just cause
(1)
was
not
for
serious
misconduct;
(2) does not reflect on the moral character of the employee.

and

Thus, he was granted separation pay equivalent to one-half (1/2) months pay for
every year of service.
Obergefell vs Hodges

The landmark case of Obergefell vs Hodges upheld the rights of same-sex couples to
marry. The US Supreme Court held that the Fourteenth Amendment requires a State
to license a marriage between two people of the same sex based on the following
principles and premises:
(1) The fundamental liberties protected by the Fourteenth Amendments Due Process
Clause extend to certain personal choices central to individual dignity and autonomy,
including
intimate
choices
defining
personal
identity
and
beliefs.
(2) Four principles and traditions demonstrate that the reasons marriage is
fundamental under the Constitution apply with equal force to same-sex couples.
(a) The first premise of this Courts relevant precedents is that the right to personal
choice regarding marriage is inherent in the concept of individual autonomy.
(b) A second principle in this Courts jurisprudence is that the right to marry is
fundamental because it supports a two-person union unlike any other in its
importance to the committed individuals. The intimate association protected by this
right was central to Griswold v. Connecticut, which held the Constitution protects the
right
of
married
couples
to
use
contraception.
(c) A third basis for protecting the right to marry is that it safeguards children and
families and thus draws meaning from related rights of childrearing, procreation, and
education.
(d) Finally, this Courts cases and the Nations traditions make clear that marriage is a
keystone of the Nations social order. States have contributed to the fundamental
character of marriage by placing it at the center of many facets of the legal and social
order. There is no difference between same- and opposite-sex couples with respect to
this principle, yet same-sex couples are denied the constellation of benefits that the
States have linked to marriage and are consigned to an instability many opposite-sex
couples would find intolerable. It is demeaning to lock same-sex couples out of a

central institution of the Nations society, for they too may aspire to the transcendent
purposes
of
marriage.
The limitation of marriage to opposite-sex couples may long have seemed natural and
just, but its inconsistency with the central meaning of the fundamental right to marry is
now
manifest.
(3) The right of same-sex couples to marry is also derived from the Fourteenth
Amendments guarantee of equal protection. The Due Process Clause and the Equal
Protection Clause are connected in a profound way. Rights implicit in liberty and
rights secured by equal protection may rest on different precepts and are not always
coextensive, yet each may be instructive as to the meaning and reach of the other.
(4) The right to marry is a fundamental right inherent in the liberty of the person, and
under the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment
couples
of
the
same-sex
may not be deprived of that right and that liberty. Same-sex couples may exercise
the
fundamental
right
to
marry.
(5) While the Constitution contemplates that democracy is the appropriate process for
change, individuals who are harmed need not await legislative action before asserting
a
fundamental
right.