EN BANC

[A.M. No. MTJ-92-716. October 25, 1995.]

MA. BLYTH B. ABADILLA, complainant, vs. JUDGE
JOSE C. TABILIRAN, JR., Presiding Judge, 8th
MCTC, Manukan and Jose Dalman, 9th Judicial
Region, Manukan, Zamboanga del Norte,
respondent. cdasia
SYLLABUS
1. CIVIL CODE; PERSONS AND FAMILY
RELATIONS; MARRIAGE; WHEN SANCTITY
THEREOF VIOLATED; EFFECT IN CASE AT
BAR. Contrary to his protestations that he
started to cohabit with Priscilla Baybayan only
after his first wife, Teresita Tabiliran, had long
abandoned him and the conjugal home in 1966, it
appears from the record that he had been
scandalously and openly living with said Priscilla
Baybayan as early as 1970 as shown by the fact
that he begot three children by her, namely
Buenasol, Venus and Saturn, all surnamed
Tabiliran. Buenasol was born on July 14, 1970;
Venus was born on September 7, 1971; while
Saturn was born on September 20, 1975.
Evidently, therefore, respondent and Priscilla
Baybayan had openly lived together even while
respondent's marriage to his first wife was still
valid and subsisting. The provisions of Sec. 3(w)
of the Rules of Court and Art. 390 of the Civil
Code which provide that, after an absence of
seven years, it being unknown whether or not the
absentee still lives, the absent spouse shall be
considered dead for all purposes, except for those
of succession, cannot be invoked by respondent.
By respondent's own allegation, Teresita B.
Tabiliran left the conjugal home in 1966. From
that time on up to the time that respondent
started to cohabit with Priscilla Baybayan in 1970,
only four years had elapsed. Respondent had no
right to presume therefore that Teresita B.
Tabiliran was already dead for all purposes. Thus,
respondent's actuation of cohabiting with Priscilla
Baybayan in 1970 when his marriage to Teresita
B. Tabiliran was still valid and subsisting
constitutes gross immoral conduct. It makes
mockery of the inviolability and sanctity of
marriage as a basic social institution. According
to Justice Malcolm: "The basis of human society
throughout the civilized world is that of marriage.
It is not only a civil contract, but is a new relation,
an institution on the maintenance of which the
public is deeply interested. Consequently, every
intendment of the law leans toward legalizing
matrimony." (Civil Code, 1993 Ed., Volume 1, p.
122, Ramon C. Aquino). By committing the
immorality in question, respondent violated the
trust reposed on his high office and utterly failed
to live up to the noble ideals and strict standards
of morality required of the law profession. (Imbing
v. Tiongson, 229 SCRA 690).
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2. ID.; ID.; LEGITIMATION; CONSTRUED;

WHEN NOT APPLICABLE; CASE AT BAR. An
examination
of the
birth certificates of
respondent's three illegitimate children with
Priscilla Baybayan clearly indicate that these
children are his legitimate issues. It was
respondent who caused the entry therein. It is
important to note that these children, namely,
Buenasol, Venus and Saturn, all surnamed
Tabiliran, were born in the year 1970, 1971, and
1975, respectively, and prior to the marriage of
respondent to Priscilla, which was in 1986. As a
lawyer and a judge, respondent ought to know
that, despite his subsequent marriage to Priscilla,
these three children cannot be legitimated nor in
any way be considered legitimate since at the
time they were born, there was an existing valid
marriage between respondent and his first wife,
Teresita B. Tabiliran. The applicable legal
provision in the case at bar is Article 269 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines (R.A. 386 as
amended) which provides: Art. 269. Only natural
children can be legitimated. Children born outside
of wedlock of parents who, at the time of the
conception of the former, were not disqualified by
any impediment to marry each other, are natural.
Legitimation is limited to natural children and
cannot include those born of adulterous relations
(Ramirez vs. Gmur, 42 Phil. 855). The Family Code
(Executive Order No. 209), which took effect on
August 3, 1988, reiterated the above-mentioned
provision thus: Art. 177. Only children conceived
and born outside of wedlock of parents who, at
the time of the conception of the former, were
not disqualified by any impediment to marry each
other may be legitimated.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; RATIONALE. The reasons for
this limitation are given as follows: 1) The
rationale of legitimation would be destroyed; 2) It
would be unfair to the legitimate children in
terms of successional rights; 3) There will be the
problem of public scandal, unless social mores
change; 4) It is too violent to grant the privilege
of legitimation to adulterous children as it will
destroy the sanctity of marriage; 5) It will be very
scandalous, especially if the parents marry many
years after the birth of the child. (The Family
Code, p. 252, Alicia V. Sempio Diy).
4.
LEGAL
ETHICS;
NOTARY
PUBLIC;
COMPENSATION; RULE; WHEN VIOLATED;
CASE AT BAR. Respondent himself admitted
that he prepared and notarized the documents
wherein he charged notarial fees. Though he was
legally allowed to notarize documents and charge
fees therefor due to the fact that there has been
no Notary Public in the town of Manukan, this
defense is not sufficient to justify his otherwise

corrupt and illegal acts. Section 252 of the

Notarial Law expressly provides thus: Sec. 252.
Compensation of Notaries Public No fee,
compensation, or reward of any sort, except such
as is expressly prescribed and allowed by law,
shall be collected or received for any service
rendered by a notary public. Such money
collected by notaries public proper shall belong to
them personally. Officers acting as notaries public
ex-officio shall charge for their services the fees
prescribed by law and account therefor as for
Government funds. (Notarial Law, Revised
Administrative Code of the Philippines, p. 202.)
Respondent's failure to properly account and turn
over the fees collected by him as Ex-Officio
notary to the municipal government as required
by law raises the presumption that he had put
such fund to his personal use. cdlex
5. JUDICIAL ETHICS; JUDGES; VIOLATION OF
THE CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT; CASE AT
BAR. With respect to the charge that
respondent prepared an Affidavit of Desistance in
a rape case filed before his sala for which he
collected the amount of P500.00 from the
complainant therein, respondent merely denied
the said imputation but failed to offer any
evidence to support such denial. Denial, if
unsubstantiated
by
clear
and
convincing
evidence, is a negative and self-serving evidence
which deserves no weight in law and cannot be
given greater evidentiary value over the
testimony of credible witnesses who testify on
affirmative matters (People v. Amaguin, 229 SCRA
166). It is unfortunate that respondent had failed
to adhere to, and let this remind him once again
of Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, to wit:
Canon 2 A judge should avoid impropriety and
the appearance of impropriety in all activities.
DECISION
PER CURIAM p:
"We have a list of these crooked judges whose
actuations have been found to be patently wrong
and indefensible. There ought to be no objection
or compunction in weeding them out from the
service. If they are not booted out now, it will
take from here to eternity to clean this Augeun
stable." 1
Indeed, our judicial structure is supposed to be
manned by magistrates chosen for their probity,
integrity, impartiality, dedication and learning.
And so, any judge wanting in any of these
qualities should be broomed off and out of the
bench in order to improve the judicial landscape.
Screening off the misfits, considering the great
number of judges and justices in the country at
present, is the arduous and Herculean task of this
Court. The effort if dramatized with rectitude and
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sincerity should bring about the strengthening of

the people's abiding faith in democracy and the
integrity of our courts of justice.
The herein administrative case arose from a
complaint, dated September 8, 1992, filed by Ma.
Blyth B. Abadilla, a Clerk of Court assigned at the
sala of respondent, Judge Jose C. Tabiliran, Jr., of
the 8th Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Manukan,
Zamboanga del Norte. Respondent stands
charged with "gross immorality, deceitful
conduct, and corruption unbecoming of a judge."
In her verified complaint, complainant Abadilla, in
respect to the charge of gross immorality on the
part of the respondent, contends that respondent
had scandalously and publicly cohabited with a
certain Priscilla Q. Baybayan during the existence
of his legitimate marriage with Teresita Banzuela.
Adding ignominy to an ignominious situation,
respondent allegedly shamefacedly contracted
marriage with the said Priscilla Baybayan on May
23, 1986. Complainant claims that this was a
bigamous union because of the fact that the
respondent was then still very much married to
Teresita Banzuela.
Furthermore, respondent falsely represented
himself as "single" in the marriage contract (Exh.
"A") and dispensed with the requirements of a
marriage contract by invoking cohabitation with
Baybayan for five years. cda
Of persuasive effect on the charge of immorality
is the fact that, earlier, respondent's wife filed a
complaint in the case entitled, Teresita B.
Tabiliran vs. Atty. Jose C. Tabiliran, Jr., 115 SCRA
451. Respondent stood charged therein for
abandoning the family home and living with a
certain Leonora Pillarion with whom he had a son.
In respect of the charge of deceitful conduct,
complainant claims that respondent caused to be
registered as "legitimate," his three illegitimate
children with Priscilla Baybayan, namely:
Buenasol B. Tabiliran born on July 14, 1970
Venus B. Tabiliran born on Sept. 7, 1971
Saturn B. Tabiliran born on Sept. 20, 1975
by falsely executing separate affidavits stating
that the delayed registration was due to
inadvertence, excusable negligence or oversight,
when in truth and in fact, respondent knew that
these children cannot be legally registered as
legitimate.
The following acts are alleged to have constituted
the charge of corruption:
(1) Utilizing his office time, while being a judge, in
the private practice of law by the preparation and
notarization of documents, out of which he
charged fees beyond the authorized rates allowed
as Ex-Officio Notary Public. These acts which,

according to the charge, amount to the private

practice of law, prejudice public interest.
Complainant submitted the following documents
in support of these allegations:
a) Affidavit of Ponciana Geromo (Annex "B"),
attesting to the fact that respondent Judge
Tabiliran prepared a Simultaneous Deed of Sale,
(Annex "C", Doc. No. 901, Page No. 77, Book No.
V, Series of 1991 of Ex-Officio Notary Public Jose
C. Tabiliran, Jr.) and collect P600.00 from the
vendees (par. 10(a) a-1 Complaint, p. 9 records);
b) Receipt prepared under instruction of the
respondent showing that he received P250.00
thru MCTC Aide Ely O. Inot for preparation and
notarization of Joint Affidavit declaring the correct
ages of Carlo Manzano, Lodmila Cinco, Kadapi
Amad, Jul Samud and Amman Eddai dated
November 12, 1991, when the legal fees therefor
should have been P10.00 only (Annex "D") (par.
10(a) a-2 Complaint, p. 9 records);
c) Another receipt (Annex "E") prepared thru the
direction of the respondent dated November 12,
1991, showing that said respondent received
from Reynaldo Subebe the sum of P150.00 for
preparation and notarization by him of a Joint
Affidavit declaring the correct age of Agata Luna,
Rosie Miranda and Jose Juneser Adrias (par. 10 (a)
a-c Complaint, p. 9 records);
d) Still another receipt (Annex "F") dated
November 12, 1991, signed by the respondent
himself showing that he received from Nelly
Baradas the sum of P50.00 for preparation and
notarization of Joint Affidavit attesting to the
correct age of one Luzviminda Jacoba (par. 10(a)
a-d Complaint, p. 9 records);
e) Another receipt (Annex "G") dated November
12, 1991, issued by the respondent, showing that
he received from Torres P. Modai the sum of
P50.00, thru the same Ely O. Inot, MCTC Aide, for
preparation of Joint Affidavit attesting to the
correct age of Flores Jalampangan (par. 10 (a) a-e
Complaint, pp. 9 & 10 records).
(2) Accepting bribes from parties-litigants in his
Court as supported by an affidavit (Annex "M")
executed by a certain Calixto Calunod, a court
aide, stating that he saw Edna Siton, complainant
in a criminal case tried by respondent, hand over
to the latter a bag of fish and squid which
respondent Judge received.
(3) Preparing an Affidavit of Desistance in a case
filed with his sala out of which he collected the
amount of P500.00 from the accused Antonio
Oriola, as supported by the affidavits of Arcelita
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Salvador, the complainant therein, and Benito

Sagario, one of the persons present when the
accused
perpetrated
the
acts
aforesaid.
(Submitted as Annexes "I" and "J", respectively.)
Complainant manifests that the commission by
the respondent of the foregoing acts renders him
unfit to occupy the exalted position of a dispenser
of justice. By the example shown by the
respondent, the public had allegedly lost
confidence in the administration of justice,
perceiving as is evident to see that the person
occupying the position of a judge lacks the
morality and probity required of one occupying
such a high office.
Respondent, in his comment, dated December
25, 1992, declared that his cohabitation with
Priscilla Baybayan is not and was neither
bigamous nor immoral because he started living
with Priscilla Baybayan only after his first wife
had already left and abandoned the family home
in 1966 and, since then, and until the present her
whereabouts is not known and respondent has
had no news of her being alive. He further avers
that 25 years had already elapsed since the
disappearance of his first wife when he married
Priscilla Baybayan in 1986.
Respondent cited Sec. 3(w), Rule 131 of the Rules
of Court and Art. 390 of the Civil Code in order to
show the legality of his acts:
"After the absence of seven years, it being
unknown whether or not the absentee still lives,
he is considered dead for all purposes except for
those of succession." (Rule 131, Sec. 3(w), Rules
of Court.)
"After an absence of seven years,
unknown whether or not the absentee
he shall be presumed dead for all
except for those of succession." (Art.
Code.)

it being
still lives,
purposes,
390, Civil

The case of Jones vs. Hortiguela, 64 Phil. 179,

where this Court held that for the purpose of the
civil marriage law, it is not necessary to have the
former spouse judicially declared an absentee is
to respondent's mind, a case in point.
He admits that he indicated in his marriage
contract that he was then "single," but he denied
the charge that he acted with deceit or false
misrepresentation, claiming that, since there
were only three words to choose from, namely:
Single, Widow or Divorced, he preferred to choose
the word "single," it being the most appropriate.
Besides, both he and Priscilla executed a joint
affidavit wherein his former marriage to Banzuela
was honestly divulged.
On the charge of corruption, respondent
submitted certifications (Annexes "4" & "5") from

the Mayor of Manukan, Zamboanga del Norte,

attesting to the fact that there was no Notary
Public in Manukan and, as such, respondent may
be allowed to notarize documents. He denied
having charged exorbitant fees. He claims that all
the amounts received by him were used to
subsidize office expenses, since the funds he had
been receiving from the municipal government
were not enough to cover expenses in
maintaining his office. Respondent submitted a
certification (Annex "6") from the Accounting
Department of the Municipal Government of
Manukan to the effect that his yearly
expenditures were more than the yearly
appropriations.
Respondent finds support in Canon 4, Rule 4.01 of
the Code of Judicial Conduct which states:
"A Judge may, with due regard to official duties,
engage in activities to improve . . . the
administration of justice."
Respondent vehemently denies the charge of
bribery claiming that it was inconceivable for him
to receive a bag full of fish and squid since his
residence was 42 kilometers from Jose Dalman
where his courtroom or office was located. It
takes one an hour and a half by bus to reach
Katipunan and so, by the time he reaches his
house, the fish and the squid should have
become rotten. In support of his denials,
respondent submitted as Annex "8", an affidavit
of Ely D. Inot, their court Interpreter who
declared:
xxx xxx xxx
"3. That last June 6, 1991, I was with the
Municipal Judge, Jose C. Tabiliran, Jr., from the
morning until we went home in the afternoon and
we in fact dined together in the local Carenderia
of Jose Dalman as it is the usual ways of the
Judge to eat lunch together with the court
personnel;
4. That when we went home in the afternoon of
that day we were also together riding in a bus,
the Lillian Express and until I drop in Roxas and
he proceeded to Katipunan where his residence
is;
5. That all the time
noticed him bringing
Bag' which he used
office;" (Annex "8",
December 17, 1992.)

during that day I did not

anything except his 'Hand
to carry in going to the
Affidavit of Ely O. Inot,

xxx xxx xxx

Finally, respondent tags as a fabricated lie the
charge that he prepared an Affidavit of
Desistance in a case pending in his sala and
thereafter charged the accused, Antonio Oriola,
the sum of P500.00 for legal services. The
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complainant, he said, was the one who induced

Arcelita Salvador (the complainant in the rape
case) to execute an affidavit (Annex "I") in
support of the charge of corruption against
respondent.
Complainant's filing of the present case was
motivated by revenge and resentment because,
earlier, respondent filed an administrative case
(A.M.
No.
P-91-597)
against
her
for
"Insubordination and Serious Misconduct." The
Supreme Court decided to reprimand her with a
warning that a repetition of her acts will be
severely dealt with. Respondent claims that the
complainant
had
nevertheless
repeatedly
continued to do acts of insubordination in the
following manner:
1) She continues to keep court records and has
kept refusing to hand them over to respondent
inspite of verbal and written orders;
2) She refused to receive a memorandum from
the Vice-Mayor requiring the Clerk of Court to
submit an Annual report;
3) She refused to prepare the said annual report
required of her as Clerk of Court;
4) She continue to refuse to obey just and lawful
orders of the Court.
On April 12, 1993, by resolution of this Court En
Banc, the herein administrative case was referred
to Executive Judge Jesus O. Angeles of the
Regional
Trial
Court,
Dipolog
City,
for
investigation, report and recommendation. Judge
Angeles found respondent guilty only on two (2)
counts of corruption: (1) for acting as notary
public and collecting fees for his services; and (2)
for preparing an affidavit of desistance in a case
pending in his Court and receiving payment for it.
In his report and recommendation dated August
3, 1993, Executive Judge Angeles found that:
ON GROSS IMMORALITY:
In contracting marriage with Priscilla Q. Baybayan
on May 23, 1986, (p. 13 of the records),
respondent did not hide the fact that he was
married to Teresita T. Banzuela, having disclosed
it in his affidavit jointly executed with Priscilla Q.
Baybayan on May 23, 1986 (p. 115 of the
records), particularly paragraph 4 thereof which
reads:
"4. That affiant Jose C. Tabiliran, Jr., was formerly
married to Teresita T . Banzuela but who left and
abandoned their family home sometime in 1965
in Katipunan, Zamboanga del Norte, and until
now at present her whereabouts is not known."
It was therefore a marriage contracted under
Article 83(2) of the Civil Code which, although

bigamous, remains valid until automatically

terminated by the recording of the affidavit of
reappearance of the absent spouse (Art. 42,
Family Code). Respondent's assertion that since
1965 to the present, his first wife Teresita T.
Banzuela had left their conjugal dwelling and did
not return, her whereabouts being unknown, was
not controverted. Living as husband and wife
pursuant to an authorized bigamous marriage,
respondent cannot be said to be acting in an
immoral and scandalous manner, and the
immoral stigma of extra-marital union since 1969
duly declared in their aforesaid joint affidavit,
may be considered cleansed by their marriage in
1986, if Art. 1395 of the Civil Code on ratification
on contracts in general is allowed to be applied, it
being ratification of marital cohabitation. Article
76 of Civil Code, now Art. 34 of the Family Code
was intended to facilitate and encourage the
marriage of persons who have been living in a
state of concubinage for more than five years
(Tolentino, Civil Code, Book I, 1974 Ed., p. 245,
cited in Ernesto L. Pineda, Family Code, 1992 Ed.,
p. 38). Indicating his civil status in the marriage
contract as "single" is hardly considered a
misrepresentation of fact, specially to the
solemnizing officer, Municipal Mayor Jacinto C.
Ruedas, Jr. to whom the aforesaid joint affidavit
was submitted.
ON DECEITFUL CONDUCT:
Respondent's children begotten with Priscilla Q.
Baybayan, namely: Buenasol B. Tabiliran, Venus
B. Tabiliran and Saturn B. Tabiliran, all of whom
were born before their marriage, were disclosed
and made known to the solemnizing officer and
the latter himself, in his affidavit dated May 23,
1986 (p. 116 of the records) which supports the
marriage contract of respondent with Priscilla Q.
Baybayan, having shown such fact.
Exhibit P which purports to be an affidavit of Lydia
T. Zanoria dated May 27, 1993, consisting of
three pages, was submitted by the complainant
for the purpose of proving her charge that the
respondent falsely executed his three separate
affidavits, namely: Exhibit K dated May 24, 1983
regarding the late registration of birth of his
daughter Buenasol B. Tabiliran; Exhibit M dated
May 28, 1988 regarding the late registration of
birth of his third child Saturn B. Tabiliran; and his
affidavit dated May 27, 1988, Exhibit O, in
reference to the late registration of birth of his
second child Venus B. Tabiliran, stating
inadvertence, excusable negligence or oversight
as the reasons for the delayed registration of
their births, without however presenting said
affiant Mrs. Zanoria, consequently denying
respondent the opportunity to cross examine her.
Her affidavit is not among those brought out in
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the pre-hearing conference, and was not

discussed during the hearing itself, submitting it
only after the investigation proper was
terminated. The supposed affiant claimed she
was the government midwife who attended to the
births of respondent's three children, denying, as
the affidavit shows, negligence, inadvertence or
oversight on her part to register their birth on
time. Not having been presented for respondent
to confront her, or an opportunity to do so,
Exhibit P cannot be considered evidence of the
charge. An affidavit is hearsay unless the affiant
is presented (People vs. Villeza, 127 SCRA 349),
or admitted by the party against whom it is
presented.
ON CORRUPTION:
1. Acting as Notary Public during office hours, and
collecting fees:
Respondent has admitted having prepared the
documents and collected fees, in the instances
specified in par. 10 of the complaint, namely: (1)
affidavit of Ponciana Geromo; (2) Joint Affidavit of
Carlo Manzano, Lodmila Cinco, Kadapi Amad, Jul
Samud and Amman Eddai; (3) Joint Affidavit of
Agata Luna, Rosie Miranda and Jose Juneser
Adrias; (4) Joint Affidavit on the correct age of
Luzviminda Jacoba; and (5) Joint Affidavit on the
correct age of Flores Jalampangan, but not
necessarily on the accuracy of the amounts
therein stated as having been collected by him
from them (please see Pre-Hearing Order of May
20, 1993 of the Investigating Judge). Seeking
justification of his acts, respondent submitted
Annexes 4 & 5 of his comments (pp. 118 and 119,
records) which are certifications of Manukan
Mayor Eugene U. Caballero attesting that in the
absence of a Notary Public in Manukan town,
respondent who is a Judge thereat was allowed
"to prepare and ligalize (sic) documents."
He declared "the fees derived from the
preparation and notarization of documents were
mostly used by respondent to buy supplies and
materials of his Office," explaining that his office
needs cannot be sustained by the appropriations
of the local government which are inadequate. On
page 120 of the records, his Annex 6 shows a
shortage in his appropriations for supplies. And
supplies from the Supreme Court can only be
obtained if secured personally but has to assume
the expenses for transportation, freight and
handling.
Respondent Judge maintains that the Code of
Judicial Conduct does not prohibit him from acting
as Notary Public, and the fees he has received
were much lower than the rates prescribed by the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, Zamboanga del

Norte Chapter, submitting Annex 3, p. 117 of the

records, to prove it.
Further justifying his act under Canon 4, Rule 4.01
of the Code of Judicial Conduct which provides
that a judge may, with due regard to official
duties, engaged in activities to improve the
administration of justice, respondent claims that
due to his efforts, he was able to secure an
extension room of his office covering a floor area
of 24 square meters, from the Sangguniang
Pampook of Region IX based in Zamboanga City,
costing P19,000.00 per certification shown in his
Annex 7 (page 121 of the records).
In the light of 1989 Code of Judicial Conduct vis-avis the power of Municipal Trial Court Judges and
Municipal Circuit Trial Court Judges to act in the
capacity of Notary Public Ex-Officio, the
Honorable Supreme Court in A.M. No. 89-11-1303,
MTC, Dec. 19, 1989, has ruled:
"MTC and MCTC Judges assigned to municipalities
or circuits with no lawyers or notaries public may,
in their capacity as notary public ex-officio
perform any act within the competency of a
regular Notary Public, provided that: (1) all
notarial fees charged be for the account of the
Government and turned-over to the municipal
treasurer (Lapea, Jr. vs. Marcos, Adm. Matter No.
1969-MJ, June 29, 1982, 114 SCRA 572); and (2)
certification be made in the notarized documents
attesting to the lack of any lawyer or notary
public in such municipality or circuit." LLpr
Although
absence
of
a
notary
public
commissioned for, and residing in Manukan town,
even in Jose Dalman which is within his circuit is
confirmed, respondent Judge while he may be
justified in so acting as notary public, did not,
however, comply with requirement No. 1 which
obliged him to charge for the account of the
Government and turn-over to the municipal
treasurer all notarial fees. And there is no way of
determining the truth of his assertion that the
notarial fees he collected were "mostly used" to
buy supplies and materials for his office, absent
any accounting.
2. Accepting Bribe from Parties-litigants:
Admitting the existence of Annex H found on
page 21 in the records, respondent, however,
denied the imputation therein contained by
affiant Calixto Calunod that he received a sando
bag full of fish and squid from a certain Edna
Siton who had a case with respondent's court as
complainant in a certain criminal case. Instead of
calling the affiant himself, complainant presented
the Court Interpreter Ely O. Inot, who "confirmed
that there was squid and fish contained in a
plastic bag which was left in Aseniero Carenderia
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by a person unknown to her and some members

of the Court staff. When informed by the
carenderia owner that the stuff was intended for
Judge Tabiliran, the latter told them to cook it,
and they afterwards partook of it without the
Judge who already boarded the passenger bus."
(Record of Proceedings, p. 1, par. No. 1, dated
June 11, 1993). Being her witness, complainant is
bound by her testimony. This particular charge is,
therefore, not proved.
3. Preparing Affidavit of Desistance and Collecting
Fee for his Services:
Under this count, two affidavits both sworn before
2nd Asst. Provincial Fiscal Valeriano B. Lagula
were submitted: one by Arcelita Salvador,
complainant in an attempted rape case who was
categorical in her declaration that respondent
Judge asked and received from Pitoy Oriola,
brother of accused Antonio Oriola the amount of
P500.00 after the Judge prepared the affidavit of
desistance and motion to dismiss which he made
her sign (Annex I, p. 40 records). Benito Sagario
who was present executed another separate
affidavit, Annex J found on page 41 in the records,
confirming it. In admitting the affidavit,
respondent, however, denied the imputation,
asserting that it is false, but without confronting
them or presenting witnesses to dispute their
accusation. He could have demanded that the
affiants, including the persons they mentioned
were present in the transaction, namely: accused
Antonio Oriola, his brother Pitoy Oriola, Ignacio
Salvador, and INC Minister Antonio Calua be
required to appear for his confrontation, but
respondent chose not, contended himself only
with the explanation that it was just the
handiwork of complainant Abadilla and her
husband, a major in the military who is an active
member of the Iglesia Ni Cristo of which affiant
Arcelita Salvador also belonged, which is bare
and unsubstantiated. No other conclusion can be
drawn other than holding, as the Investigating
Judge does, that this particular charge is true.
Evidently, Judge Tabiliran wants to avoid meeting
them by way of confrontation. If he is innocent,
and is certain the charge is fabricated, he will
surely raise hell to insist that he confronts them
face to face. Clearly, his deportment betrays his
insistence of innocence.
On Respondent's Counterclaim:
It was not proven. On the contrary, the
controverting evidence shows that the records of
Criminal Case No. 2279 referred to in his Annex 9,
p. 123 of the records, were not in the possession
of complainant. Quite obviously, Ely O. Inot,
respondent's Court Interpreter tried to cover up
the fact that the same were already being kept by
Judge
Tabiliran
before
he
issued
the
memorandum, Annex 9. Complainant, who is

respondent's Clerk of Court was not, therefore, in

a position to comply with his Order.
Also, Mrs. Abadilla's failure to prepare the annual
report of the Court in 1992 as called for in
Annexes 10 and 10-A was, contrary to
respondent's claim, not by reason of her
obstinate refusal to obey her superior but, by
sheer impossibility to comply, considering that
monthly reports upon which the annual report
shall be based, were not prepared by her, not
because of her refusal to do so which is among
those included in her job description, but because
the Judge himself took the work from her for no
other reason than to establish the false
impression that the complainant is disobedient to
the Judge, and does not attend to her duties.
By and large, there is no harmony in their office.
Complainant and respondent are not in talking
terms. They are hostile to each other.
Respondent's complaint that Mrs. Abadilla spat
saliva in front of him whenever they meet each
other; destroying the Court dry seal by throwing it
at him one time she was mad; showing face; and
sticking out her tongue to him, are all puerile acts
which the undersigned cannot conclude as
sufficiently established even with the testimony
of Mrs. Ely O. Inot which is far from being definite
and
categorical,
whose
actuation
is
understandable because Judge Tabiliran, being
her superior, has moral ascendancy over her
(Record of Proceedings, June 11, 1993).
The undersigned believes that the problem is on
Judge Tabiliran, and not on Mrs. Abadilla, who has
been in the service as Clerk of Court under a
previous Judge of the same Court for quite long
without any complaint having been filed. The
evidence disputing his counterclaim tends to
show that respondent tried to build up a situation
of undesirability against his Clerk of Court whom
he wanted pulled out from her position in his
Court.
Other Matters Not Covered By The Complaint And
Comments:
The authority to investigate being confined only
to matters alleged in the complaint on the basis
of which respondent filed his comments, other
matters not therein covered which complainant
brought out by way of presenting documentary
exhibits, (from Exhibit AAA to HHH), are not
subject of this report and recommendation.
RECOMMENDATION:
The charge of GROSS IMMORALITY and
DECEITFUL CONDUCT have not been proven, but
the undersigned believes evidence is sufficient to
sustain a pronouncement of guilt on two counts
of CORRUPTION, namely: acting as notary public
and collecting fees for his services in preparing
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affidavit of desistance of a case in his Court.

Likewise, acts of oppression, deceit and false
imputation against his Clerk of Court are found
duly established.
WHEREFORE, suspension of the respondent Judge
from the service for a period of three months is
recommended.
THE FOREGOING CONSIDERED, We hold the
respondent culpable for gross immorality, he
having scandalously and openly cohabited with
the said Priscilla Baybayan during the existence
of his marriage with Teresita B. Tabiliran.
Contrary to his protestations that he started to
cohabit with Priscilla Baybayan only after his first
wife, Teresita Tabiliran, had long abandoned him
and the conjugal home in 1966, it appears from
the record that he had been scandalously and
openly living with said Priscilla Baybayan as early
as 1970 as shown by the fact that he begot three
children by her, namely Buenasol, Venus and
Saturn, all surnamed Tabiliran. Buenasol was born
on July 14, 1970; Venus was born on September
7, 1971; while Saturn was born on September 20,
1975. Evidently, therefore, respondent and
Priscilla Baybayan had openly lived together even
while respondent's marriage to his first wife was
still valid and subsisting. The provisions of Sec.
3(w) of the Rules of Court and Art. 390 of the Civil
Code which provide that, after an absence of
seven years, it being unknown whether or not the
absentee still lives, the absent spouse shall be
considered dead for all purposes, except for those
of succession, cannot be invoked by respondent.
By respondent's own allegation, Teresita B.
Tabiliran left the conjugal home in 1966. From
that time on up to the time that respondent
started to cohabit with Priscilla Baybayan in 1970,
only four years had elapsed. Respondent had no
right to presume therefore that Teresita B.
Tabiliran was already dead for all purposes. Thus,
respondent's actuation of cohabiting with Priscilla
Baybayan in 1970 when his marriage to Teresita
B. Tabilaran was still valid and subsisting
constitutes gross immoral conduct. It makes
mockery of the inviolability and sanctity of
marriage as a basic social institution. According
to Justice Malcolm: "The basis of human society
throughout the civilized world is that of marriage.
It is not only a civil contract, but is a new relation,
an institution on the maintenance of which the
public is deeply interested. Consequently, every
intendment of the law leans toward legalizing
matrimony." (Civil Code, 1993 Ed., Volume 1, p.
122, Ramon C. Aquino).
By committing the immorality in question,
respondent violated the trust reposed on his high

office and utterly failed to live up to the noble

ideals and strict standards of morality required of
the law profession. (Imbing v. Tiongson , 229
SCRA 690). LLjur
As to respondent's act of eventually marrying
Priscilla Baybayan in 1986, We are not in a
position to determine the legality thereof, absent
all the facts for a proper determination. Sufficient
for Our consideration is the finding of the
Investigating Judge, that the said marriage is
authorized under Art. 83 (2) of the Civil Code.
With respect to the charge of deceitful conduct,
We hold that the charge has likewise been duly
established. An examination of the birth
certificates (Exhs. "J", "L", & "M") of respondent's
three illegitimate children with Priscilla Baybayan
clearly indicate that these children are his
legitimate issues. It was respondent who caused
the entry therein. It is important to note that
these children, namely, Buenasol, Venus and
Saturn, all surnamed Tabiliran, were born in the
year 1970, 1971, and 1975, respectively, and
prior to the marriage of respondent to Priscilla,
which was in 1986. As a lawyer and a judge,
respondent ought to know that, despite his
subsequent marriage to Priscilla, these three
children cannot be legitimated nor in any way be
considered legitimate since at the time they were
born, there was an existing valid marriage
between respondent and his first wife, Teresita B.
Tabiliran. The applicable legal provision in the
case at bar is Article 269 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines (R.A. 386 as amended) which
provides:
ARTICLE 269. Only natural children can be
legitimated. Children born outside of wedlock of
parents who, at the time of the conception of the
former, were not disqualified by any impediment
to marry each other, are natural.
Legitimation is limited to natural children and
cannot include those born of adulterous relations
(Ramirez vs. Gmur, 42 Phil. 855). The Family Code
(Executive Order No. 209), which took effect on
August 3, 1988, reiterated the above-mentioned
provision thus:
ARTICLE 177. Only children conceived and born
outside of wedlock of parents who, at the time of
the conception of the former, were not
disqualified by any impediment to marry each
other may be legitimated.
The reasons for this limitation are given as
follows:
1) The rationale
destroyed;

of

legitimation

would

be

2) It would be unfair to the legitimate children in

terms of successional rights;

8|Family

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3) There will be the problem of public scandal,

unless social mores change;
4) It is too violent to grant the privilege of
legitimation to adulterous children as it will
destroy the sanctity of marriage;
5) It will be very scandalous, especially if the
parents marry many years after the birth of the
child. (The Family Code, p. 252, Alicia V. Sempio
Diy).
It is clear, therefore, that no legal provision,
whether old or new, can give refuge to the
deceitful actuations of the respondent.
It is also erroneous for respondent to state that
his first wife Teresita disappeared in 1966 and has
not been heard from since then. It appears that
on December 8, 1969, Teresita filed a complaint
against respondent entitled, Tabiliran vs. Tabiliran
(A.C. No. 906) which was decided by this Court in
1982. In the said case, respondent was sued for
abandonment of his family home and for living
with another woman with whom he allegedly
begot a child. Respondent was, however,
exonerated because of the failure of his wife to
substantiate the charges. However, respondent
was reprimanded for having executed a "Deed of
Settlement of Spouses To Live Separately from
Bed," with a stipulation that they allow each of
the other spouse to live with another man or
woman as the case may be, without the objection
and intervention of the other. It was also in the
same case where respondent declared that he
has only two children, namely, Reynald Antonio
and Jose III, both surnamed Tabiliran, who are his
legitimate issues. Thus, his statements in his
affidavits marked as Exhs. "M-4" and "O-4" that
Saturn and Venus are his third and second
children respectively, are erroneous, deceitful,
misleading and detrimental to his legitimate
children.
With respect to the charge of corruption, We
agree with the findings of the Investigating Judge
that respondent should be found culpable for two
counts of corruption: (1) acting as Notary Public;
and (2) collecting legal fees in preparing an
Affidavit of Desistance of a case in his court.
Respondent himself admitted that he prepared
and notarized the documents (Annexes "C", "D",
"E", "F" and "G") wherein he charged notarial
fees. Though he was legally allowed to notarize
documents and charge fees therefor due to the
fact that there has been no Notary Public in the
town of Manukan, this defense is not sufficient to
justify his otherwise corrupt and illegal acts.
Section 252 of the Notarial Law expressly
provides thus:
SECTION 252. Compensation of Notaries Public.
No fee, compensation, or reward of any sort,

except such as is expressly prescribed and

allowed by law, shall be collected or received for
any service rendered by a notary public. Such
money collected by notaries public proper shall
belong to them personally. Officers acting as
notaries public ex-officio shall charge for their
services the fees prescribed by law and account
therefor as for Government funds. (Notarial Law,
Revised Administrative Code of the Philippines, p.
202.) LLcd
Respondent's failure to properly account and turn
over the fees collected by him as Ex-Officio
notary to the municipal government as required
by law raises the presumption that he had put
such fund to his personal use.
With respect to the charge that respondent
prepared an Affidavit of Desistance in a rape case
filed before his sala for which he collected the
amount of P500.00 from the complainant therein,
respondent merely denied the said imputation
but failed to offer any evidence to support such
denial. Denial, if unsubstantiated by clear and
convincing evidence, is a negative and selfserving evidence which deserves no weight in law
and cannot be given greater evidentiary value
over the testimony of credible witnesses who
testify on affirmative matters (People v. Amaguin,
229 SCRA 166). It is unfortunate that respondent
had failed to adhere to, and let this remind him
once again of Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct, to wit:
Canon 2
A judge should avoid impropriety and
appearance of impropriety in all activities.

the

WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Judge

Jose C. Tabiliran, Jr. guilty of gross immorality,
deceitful
conduct
and
corruption
and,
consequently, orders his dismissal from the
service. Such dismissal shall carry with it
cancellation of eligibility, forfeiture of leave
credits
and
retirement
benefits,
and
disqualification from re-employment in the
government-service, all without prejudice to
criminal or civil liability.
SO ORDERED. Llibris
Narvasa, C.J ., Feliciano, Padilla, Regalado,
Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug,
Kapunan, Mendoza, Francisco and Hermosisima,
Jr., JJ., concur.
Panganiban, J., took no part.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-18753. March 26, 1965.]
VICENTE B. TEOTICO, petitioner-appellant, vs.
ANA DEL VAL CHAN, ETC., oppositor-appellant.
Antonio Gonzales for petitioner-appellants.
9|Family

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cases

J. C. Zulueta, G.D. David & N.J. Quisumbing for

oppositor-appellee.
SYLLABUS
1. CITIZENSHIP; NATURALIZATION; ALIEN
WIFE OF CITIZEN NOT AUTOMATICALLY
CITIZEN BUT MUST PROVE COMPLIANCE
WITH REQUIREMENTS. The alien wife of a
Filipino citizen does not automatically become a
Philippine
citizen
upon
her
husband's
naturalization. She must first prove that she has
all the qualifications required by Section 2 and
none of the disqualifications enumerated in
Section 4 of the Naturalization Law before she
may be deemed a Philippine citizen.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; REASON FOR RULE; POLICY
OF SELECTIVE ADMISSION TO PHILIPPINE
CITIZENSHIP. The rule laid down by this Court
in this and in other cases heretofore decided is
believed to be in line with the national policy of
selective admission to Philippine citizenship
which after all is a privilege granted only to those
who are found worthy thereof, and not
indiscriminately to anybody at all on the basis
alone of marriage to a man who is a citizen of the
Philippines, irrespective of moral character,
ideological belief, and identification with Filipino
ideals, customs and traditions.
DECISION
BAUTISTA ANGELO, J p:
Maria Mortera y Balsalobre Vda. de Aguirre died
on July 14, 1955 in the City of Manila leaving
properties worth P600,000.00. She left a will
written in Spanish which she executed at her
residence in No. 2 Legarda St., Quiapo, Manila.
She affixed her signature at the bottom of the will
and on the left margin of each and every page
thereof in the presence of Pilar Borja, Pilar G.
Sanchez, and Modesto Formilleza, who in turn
affixed their signatures below the attestation
clause and on the left margin of each and every
page of the will in the presence of the testatrix
and of each other. Said will was acknowledged
before Notary Public Niceforo S. Agaton by the
testatrix and her witnesses.
In said will the testatrix made the following
preliminary statement: that she was possessed of
the full use of her mental faculties; that she was
free from illegal pressure or influence of any kind
from the beneficiaries of the will and from any
influence of fear or threat; that she freely and
spontaneously executed said will and that she
had neither ascendants nor descendants of any
kind such that she could dispose of all her estate.
Among the many legacies and devises made in
the will was one of P20,000.00 to Rene A. Teotico,

married to the testatrix's niece named Josefina

Mortera. To said spouses the testatrix left the
usufruct of her interest in the Calvo building,
while the naked ownership thereof she left in
equal parts to her grandchildren who are the
legitimate children of said spouses. The testatrix
also instituted Josefina Mortera as her sole and
universal heir to all the remainder of her
properties not otherwise disposed of in the will.
On July 17, 1955, Vicente B. Teotico filed a
petition for the probate of the will before the
Court of First Instance of Manila which was set for
hearing on September 3, 1955 after the requisite
publication and service to all parties concerned.
Ana del Val Chan, claiming to be an adopted child
of Francisca Mortera, a deceased sister of the
testatrix, as well as an acknowledged natural
child of Jose Mortera, a deceased brother of the
same testatrix, filed on September 2, 1955 an
opposition to the probate of the will alleging the
following grounds: (1) said will was not executed
as required by law; (2) the testatrix was
physically and mentally incapable to execute the
will at the time of its execution; and (3) the will
was executed under duress, threat or influence of
fear.
Vicente B. Teotico filed a motion to dismiss the
opposition alleging that the oppositor had no
legal personality to intervene. The probate court,
after due hearing, allowed the oppositor to
intervene as an adopted child of Francisco
Mortera, and on June 17, 1959, the oppositor
amended her opposition by alleging the
additional ground that the will is inoperative as to
the share of Dr. Rene Teotico because the latter
was the physician who took care of the testatrix
during her last illness.
After the parties had presented their evidence,
the probate court rendered its decision on
November 10, 1960 admitting the will to probate
but declaring the disposition made in favor of Dr.
Rene Teotico void with the statement that the
portion to be vacated by the annulment should
pass to the testatrix's heirs by way of intestate
succession.
Petitioner Teotico, together with the universal heir
Josefina
Mortera,
filed
a
motion
for
reconsideration of that part of the decision which
declares the portion of the estate to be vacated
by the nullity of the legacy made to Dr. Rene
Teotico as passing to the legal heirs, while the
oppositor filed also a motion for reconsideration
of the portion of the judgment which decrees the
probate of the will. On his part, Dr. Rene Teotico
requested leave to intervene and to file a motion
10 | F a m i l y

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cases

for reconsideration with regard to that portion of

the decision which nullified the legacy made in
his favor.
The motions for reconsideration above adverted
to having been denied, both petitioner and
oppositor appealed from the decision, the former
from that portion which nullifies the legacy in
favor of Dr. Rene Teotico and declares the
vacated portion as subject of succession in favor
of the legal heirs, and the latter from that portion
which admits the will to probate. And in this
instance both petitioner and oppositor assign
several error which, stripped of non-essentials,
may be boiled down to the following: (1) Has
oppositor Ana del Val Chan the right to intervene
in this proceeding?; (2) Has the will in question
been duly admitted to probate?; and (3) Did the
probate court commit an error in passing on the
intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will and
in determining who should inherit the portion to
be vacated by the nullification of the legacy made
in favor of Dr. Rene Teotico?
These issues will be discussed separately.
1. It is a well-settled rule that in order that a
person may be allowed to intervene in a probate
proceeding he must have an interest in the
estate, or in the will, or in the property to be
affected by it either as executor or as a claimant
of the estate (Ngo The Hua vs. Chung Kiat Hua, et
al., L-17091, September 30, 1963); and an
interested party has been defined as one who
would be benefitted by the estate such as an heir
or one who has a claim against the estate like a
creditor (Idem.). On the other hand, in Saguinsin
vs. Lindayag, et al., L-17750, December 17, 1962,
this Court said:
"According to Section 2, Rule 80 of the Rules of
Court, a petition for letters of administration must
be filed by an 'interested person.' An interested
party has been defined in this connection as one
who would be benefitted by the estate, such as
an heir, or one who has a claim against the
estate, such as a creditor (Intestate Estate of Julio
Magbanwa 40 O.G., 1171). And it is well settled in
this jurisdiction that in civil actions as well as
special proceedings, the interest required in order
that a person may be a party thereto must be
material and direct, and not merely indirect or
contingent. (Trillana vs. Crisostomo, G. R. No. L3370, August 22, 1951; Rapinosa vs. Barrion, 70
Phil. 311)."
The question now may be asked: Has oppositor
any interest in any of the provisions of the will,
and, in the negative, would she acquire any right

to the estate in the event that the will is denied

probate?
Under the terms of the will, oppositor has no right
to intervene because she has no interest in the
estate either as heir, executor, or administrator,
nor does she have any claim to any property
affected by the will, because it nowhere appears
therein any provision designating her as heir,
legatee or devisee of any portion of the estate.
She has also no interest in the will either as
administratrix or executrix. Neither has she any
claim against any portion of the estate because
she is not a co-owner thereof, and while she
previously had an interest in the Calvo building
located in Escolta, she had already disposed of it
long before the execution of the will.
In the supposition that the will is denied probate,
would the oppositor acquire any interest in any
portion of the estate left by the testatrix? She
would acquire such right only if she were a legal
heir of the deceased, but she is not under our
Civil Code. It is true that oppositor claims to be an
acknowledged natural child of Jose Mortera, a
deceased brother of the deceased, and also an
adopted daughter of Francisca Mortera, a
deceased sister of the testatrix, but such claim
cannot give her any comfort for, even if it be true,
the law does not give her any right to succeed to
the estate of the deceased sister of both Jose
Mortera and Francisca Mortera. And this is so
because being an illegitimate child she is
prohibited by law from succeeding to the
legitimate relatives of her natural father. Thus,
Article 992 of our Civil Code provides: "An
illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab
intestato from the legitimate children and
relatives of his father or mother; . . ." And the
philosophy behind this provision is well expressed
in Grey vs. Fabie, 68 Phil., 128, as follows:
"'Between the natural child and the legitimate
relatives of the father or mother who
acknowledged it, the Code denies any right of
succession. They cannot be called relatives and
they have no right to inherit. Of course, there is a
blood tie, but the law does not recognize it. In
this, article 943 is based upon the reality of the
facts and upon the presumptive will of the
interested
parties;
the
natural
child
is
disgracefully looked down upon by the legitimate
family; the legitimate family is, in turn, hated by
the natural child; the latter considers the
privileged condition of the former and the
resources of which it is thereby deprived; the
former, in turn, sees in the natural child nothing
but the product of sin, a palpable evidence of a
blemish upon the family. Every relation is
ordinarily broken in life; the law does no more
11 | F a m i l y

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them recognize this truth, by avoiding further

grounds of resentment.' (7 Manresa, 3d ed., p.
110.)"
The oppositor cannot also derive comfort from
the fact that she is an adopted child of Francisca
Mortera because under our law the relationship
established by adoption is limited solely to the
adopter and the adopted does not extend to the
relatives of the adopting parents or of the
adopted child except only as expressly provided
for by law. Hence, no relationship is created
between the adopted and the collaterals of the
adopting parents. As a consequence, the adopted
is an heir of the adopter but not of the relatives of
the adopter.
"The relationship established by the adoption,
however, is limited to the adopting parent, and
does not extend to his other relatives, except as
expressly provided by law. Thus, the adopted
child cannot be considered as a relative of the
ascendants and collaterals of the adopting
parents, nor of the legitimate children which they
may have after the adoption, except that the law
imposes certain impediments to marriage by
reason of adoption. Neither are the children of the
adopted considered as descendants of the
adopter. The relationship created is exclusively
between, the adopter and the adopted, and does
not extend to the relatives of either." (Tolentino,
Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. 1, p. 652)
"Relationship by adoption is limited to adopter
and adopted, and does not extend to other
members of the family of either; but the adopted
is prohibited to marry the children of the adopter
to avoid scandal." (An Outline of Philippines Civil
law by Justice Jose B. L, Reyes and Ricardo C.
Puno, Vol. 1, p. 313; See also Caguioa, Comments
and Cases on Civil law, 1955, Vol. 1, pp. 312-313;
Paras, Civil Code of the Philippines, 1959 ed., Vol.
1, p. 515)
It thus appears that the oppositor has no right to
intervene either as testamentary or as legal heir
in this probate proceeding contrary to the ruling
of the court a quo.
2. The next question to be determined is whether
the will Exhibit A was duly admitted to probate.
Oppositor claims that the same should not have
been admitted not only because it was not
properly attested to but also because it was
procured thru pressure and influence and the
testatrix affixed her signature by mistake
believing that it contained her true intent.
The claim that the will was not properly attested
to is contradicted by the evidence of record. In

this respect it is fit that we state briefly the

declarations of the instrumental witnesses.
Pilar Borja testified that the testatrix was in
perfect state of health at the time she executed
the will for she carried her conversation with her
intelligently;
that
the
testatrix
signed
immediately above the attestation clause and on
each and every page thereof at the left-hand
margin in the presence of the three instrumental
witnesses and the notary public; that it was the
testatrix herself who asked her and the other
witnesses to act as such; and that the testatrix
was the first one to sign and later she gave the
will to the witnesses who read and signed it.
Pilar G. Sanchez also testified that she knew the
testatrix since 1945; that it was the testatrix
herself who asked her to be a witness to the will;
that the testatrix was the first one to sign and she
gave the will later to the witnesses to sign and
afterwards she gave it to the notary public; that
on the day of the execution of the will the
testatrix was in the best of health.
Modesto Formilleza also testified that he was
asked by the testatrix to be one of the witnesses
to the will; that he read and understood the
attestation clause before he signed the
document, and that all the witnesses spoke either
in Spanish or in Tagalog. He finally said that the
instrumental witnesses and the testatrix signed
the will at the same time and place and identified
their signatures.
This evidence which has not been successfully
refuted proves conclusively, that the will was duly
executed because it was signed by the testatrix
and her instrumental witnesses and the notary
public in the manner provided for by law.
The claim that the will was procured by improper
pressure and influence is also belied by the
evidence. On this point the court a quo made the
following observation:
"The circumstance that the testatrix was then
living under the same roof with Dr. Rene Teotico is
no proof adequate in law to sustain the
conclusion that there was improper pressure and
undue influence. Nor is the alleged fact of
isolation of the testatrix from the oppositor and
her witnesses, for their supposed failure to see
personally the testatrix, attributable to the
vehemence of Dr. Rene Teotico to exclude
visitors, took place years after the execution of
the will on May 17, 1951. Although those facts
may have some weight to support the theory of
the oppositor, yet they must perforce yield to the
weightier fact that nothing could have prevented
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the testatrix, had she really wanted to, from

subsequently revoking her 1951 will if it did not in
fact reflect and express her own testamentary
dispositions. For, as testified to by the oppositor
and her witnesses, the testatrix was often seen at
the Escolta, in Quiapo and in Sta. Cruz, Manila,
walking and accompanied by no one. In fact, on
different occasions, each of them was able to talk
with her."
We have examined the evidence on the matter
and we are fully in accord with the foregoing
observation. Moreover, the mere claim that
Josefina Mortera and her husband Rene Teotico
had the opportunity to exert pressure on the
testatrix simply because she lived in their house
several years prior to the execution of the will
and that she was old and suffering from
hypertension in that she was virtually isolated
from her friends for several years prior to her
death is insufficient to disprove what the
instrumental witnesses had testified that the
testatrix freely and voluntarily and with full
consciousness of the solemnity of the occasion
executed the will under consideration. The
exercise of improper pressure and undue
influence must be supported by substantial
evidence and must be of a kind that would
overpower and subjugate the mind of the
testatrix as to destroy her free agency and make
her express the will of another rather than her
own (Coso vs. Deza, 42 Phil., 596). The burden is
on the person challenging the will that such
influence was exerted at the time of its execution,
a matter which here was not done, for the
evidence presented not only is sufficient but was
disproved by the testimony the instrumental
witnesses.
3. The question of whether the probate court
could determine the intrinsic validity of the
provisions of a will has been decided by this Court
in a long line of decisions among which the
following may be cited:
"Opposition to the intrinsic validity or legality of
the provisions of the will cannot be entertained in
probate proceeding because its only purpose is
merely to determine if the will has been executed
in accordance with the requirements of the law."
(Palacios vs. Palacios, 58 O.G. 220)
". . . The authentication of a will decides no other
questions than such as touch upon the capacity
of the testator and the compliance with those
requisites or solemnities which the law prescribes
for the validity of wills. It does not determine nor
even by implication prejudge the validity or
efficiency of the provisions; these may be
impugned
as
being
vicious
or
null,

notwithstanding its authentication. The questions

relating to these points remain entirely
unaffected, and may be raised even after the will
has been authenticated. . . .
"From the fact that the legalization of a will does
not validate the provisions therein contained, it
does not follow that such provisions lack of
efficiency, or fail to produce the effects which the
law recognizes when they are not impugned by
anyone. In the matter of wills it is a fundamental
doctrine that the will of the testator is the law
governing the interested parties, and must be
punctually complied with in so far as it is not
contrary to the law or to public morals."
(Montaano vs. Suesa, 14 Phil., pp. 676, 679-680)
"To establish conclusively as against everyone,
and once for all, the facts that a will was
executed with the formalities required by law and
that the testator was in a condition to make a
will, is the only purpose of the proceedings under
the new code for the probate of a will. (Sec. 625.)
The judgment in such proceedings determines
and can determine nothing more. In them the
court has no power to pass upon the validity of
any provisions made in the will. It can not decide,
for example, that a certain legacy is void and
another one valid." Castaeda vs. Alemany, 3
Phil., 426, 428)
Pursuant to the foregoing precedents the
pronouncement made by the court a quo
declaring invalid the legacy made to Dr. Rene
Teotico in the will Exhibit A must be set aside as
having been made in excess of its jurisdiction.
Another reason why said pronouncement should
be set aside is that the legatee was not given an
opportunity to defend the validity of the legacy
for he was not allowed to intervene in this
proceeding.
As
a
corollary,
the
other
pronouncements, touching on the disposition of
the estate in favor of some relatives of the
deceased should also be set aside for the same
reason.
WHEREFORE, with the exception of that portion of
the decision which declares that the will in
question has been duly executed and admitted
the same to probate, the rest of the decision is
hereby set aside. This case is ordered remanded
to the court a quo for further proceedings. No
pronouncement as to costs.
Bengzon, C.J., Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera,
Paredes, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., and
Zaldivar, JJ., concur.
Dizon, J., took no part.
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FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. Nos. 168992-93. May 21, 2009.]
IN RE: PETITION FOR ADOPTION OF
MICHELLE P. LIM, MONINA P. LIM, petitioner.
IN RE: PETITION FOR ADOPTION OF MICHAEL
JUDE P. LIM, MONINA P. LIM, petitioner.
DECISION
CARPIO, J p:
The Case
This is a petition for review on certiorari filed by
Monina P. Lim (petitioner) seeking to set aside the
Decision 1 dated 15 September 2004 of the
Regional Trial Court, General Santos City, Branch
22 (trial court), in SPL. PROC. Case Nos. 1258 and
1259, which dismissed without prejudice the
consolidated petitions for adoption of Michelle P.
Lim and Michael Jude P. Lim.
The Facts
The following facts are undisputed. Petitioner is
an optometrist by profession. On 23 June 1974,
she married Primo Lim (Lim). They were childless.
Minor children, whose parents were unknown,
were entrusted to them by a certain Lucia Ayuban
(Ayuban). Being so eager to have a child of their
own, petitioner and Lim registered the children to
make it appear that they were the children's
parents. The children 2 were named Michelle P.
Lim (Michelle) and Michael Jude P. Lim (Michael).
Michelle was barely eleven days old when
brought to the clinic of petitioner. She was born
on 15 March 1977. 3 Michael was 11 days old
when Ayuban brought him to petitioner's clinic.
His date of birth is 1 August 1983. 4
The spouses reared and cared for the children as
if they were their own. They sent the children to
exclusive schools. They used the surname "Lim"
in all their school records and documents.
Unfortunately, on 28 November 1998, Lim died.
On 27 December 2000, petitioner married Angel
Olario (Olario), an American citizen. TcICEA
Thereafter, petitioner decided to adopt the
children by availing of the amnesty 5 given under
Republic Act No. 8552 6 (RA 8552) to those
individuals who simulated the birth of a child.
Thus, on 24 April 2002, petitioner filed separate
petitions for the adoption of Michelle and Michael
before the trial court docketed as SPL PROC. Case
Nos. 1258 and 1259, respectively. At the time of
the filing of the petitions for adoption, Michelle
was 25 years old and already married, while
Michael was 18 years and seven months old.
Michelle and her husband gave their consent to
the adoption as evidenced by their Affidavits of
Consent. 7 Michael also gave his consent to his
adoption as shown in his Affidavit of Consent. 8

Petitioner's husband Olario likewise executed an

Affidavit of Consent 9 for the adoption of Michelle
and Michael.
In the Certification issued by the Department of
Social Welfare and Development (DSWD),
Michelle was considered as an abandoned child
and the whereabouts of her natural parents were
unknown. 10 The DSWD issued a similar
Certification for Michael. 11
The Ruling of the Trial Court
On 15 September 2004, the trial court rendered
judgment dismissing the petitions. The trial court
ruled that since petitioner had remarried,
petitioner should have filed the petition jointly
with her new husband. The trial court ruled that
joint adoption by the husband and the wife is
mandatory citing Section 7 (c), Article III of RA
8552 and Article 185 of the Family Code.
Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration of
the decision but the motion was denied in the
Order dated 16 June 2005. In denying the motion,
the trial court ruled that petitioner did not fall
under any of the exceptions under Section 7 (c),
Article III of RA 8552. Petitioner's argument that
mere consent of her husband would suffice was
untenable because, under the law, there are
additional requirements, such as residency and
certification of his qualification, which the
husband, who was not even made a party in this
case, must comply.
As to the argument that the adoptees are already
emancipated and joint adoption is merely for the
joint exercise of parental authority, the trial court
ruled that joint adoption is not only for the
purpose of exercising parental authority because
an emancipated child acquires certain rights from
his parents and assumes certain obligations and
responsibilities.
Hence, the present petition. DEAaIS
Issue
Petitioner appealed directly to this Court raising
the sole issue of whether or not petitioner, who
has remarried, can singly adopt.
The Court's Ruling
Petitioner contends that the rule on joint adoption
must be relaxed because it is the duty of the
court and the State to protect the paramount
interest and welfare of the child to be adopted.
Petitioner argues that the legal maxim "dura lex
sed lex" is not applicable to adoption cases. She
argues that joint parental authority is not
necessary in this case since, at the time the
petitions were filed, Michelle was 25 years old
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and already married, while Michael was already

18 years of age. Parental authority is not
anymore necessary since they have been
emancipated having attained the age of majority.
We deny the petition.
Joint Adoption by Husband and Wife
It is undisputed that, at the time the petitions for
adoption were filed, petitioner had already
remarried. She filed the petitions by herself,
without being joined by her husband Olario. We
have no other recourse but to affirm the trial
court's decision denying the petitions for
adoption. Dura lex sed lex. The law is explicit.
Section 7, Article III of RA 8552 reads:
SEC. 7. Who May Adopt. The following may
adopt:
(a) Any Filipino citizen of legal age, in possession
of full civil capacity and legal rights, of good
moral character, has not been convicted of any
crime involving moral turpitude, emotionally and
psychologically capable of caring for children, at
least sixteen (16) years older than the adoptee,
and who is in a position to support and care for
his/her children in keeping with the means of the
family. The requirement of sixteen (16) year
difference between the age of the adopter and
adoptee may be waived when the adopter is the
biological parent of the adoptee, or is the spouse
of the adoptee's parent;
(b) Any alien possessing the same qualifications
as above stated for Filipino nationals: Provided,
That his/her country has diplomatic relations with
the Republic of the Philippines, that he/she has
been living in the Philippines for at least three (3)
continuous years prior to the filing of the
application for adoption and maintains such
residence until the adoption decree is entered,
that he/she has been certified by his/her
diplomatic or consular office or any appropriate
government agency that he/she has the legal
capacity to adopt in his/her country, and that
his/her government allows the adoptee to enter
his/her country as his/her adopted son/daughter:
Provided, further, That the requirements on
residency and certification of the alien's
qualification to adopt in his/her country may be
waived for the following:
(i) a former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a
relative within the fourth (4th) degree of
consanguinity or affinity; or
(ii) one who seeks to adopt the legitimate
son/daughter of his/her Filipino spouse; or
(iii) one who is married to a Filipino citizen and
seeks to adopt jointly with his/her spouse a
relative within the fourth (4th) degree of

consanguinity or affinity of the Filipino spouses;

or
(c) The guardian with respect to the ward after
the termination of the guardianship and
clearance of his/her financial accountabilities.
IcHTED

such residency until the adoption decree is

entered; (4) he has legal capacity to adopt in his
own country; and (5) the adoptee is allowed to
enter the adopter's country as the latter's
adopted child. None of these qualifications were
shown and proved during the trial.

Husband and wife shall jointly adopt, except in

the following cases:

These requirements on residency and certification

of the alien's qualification to adopt cannot
likewise be waived pursuant to Section 7. The
children or adoptees are not relatives within the
fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity of
petitioner or of Olario. Neither are the adoptees
the legitimate children of petitioner.

(i) if one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate

son/daughter of the other; or
(ii) if one spouse seeks to adopt his/her own
illegitimate son/daughter: Provided, however,
That the other spouse has signified his/her
consent thereto; or
(iii) if the spouses are legally separated from each
other.
In case husband and wife jointly adopt, or one
spouse adopts the illegitimate son/daughter of
the other, joint parental authority shall be
exercised by the spouses. (Emphasis supplied)
The use of the word "shall" in the above-quoted
provision means that joint adoption by the
husband and the wife is mandatory. This is in
consonance with the concept of joint parental
authority over the child which is the ideal
situation. As the child to be adopted is elevated
to the level of a legitimate child, it is but natural
to require the spouses to adopt jointly. The rule
also insures harmony between the spouses. 12
The law is clear. There is no room for ambiguity.
Petitioner, having remarried at the time the
petitions for adoption were filed, must jointly
adopt. Since the petitions for adoption were filed
only by petitioner herself, without joining her
husband, Olario, the trial court was correct in
denying the petitions for adoption on this ground.
Neither does petitioner fall under any of the three
exceptions enumerated in Section 7. First, the
children to be adopted are not the legitimate
children of petitioner or of her husband Olario.
Second, the children are not the illegitimate
children of petitioner. And third, petitioner and
Olario are not legally separated from each other.
The fact that Olario gave his consent to the
adoption as shown in his Affidavit of Consent
does not suffice. There are certain requirements
that Olario must comply being an American
citizen. He must meet the qualifications set forth
in Section 7 of RA 8552 such as: (1) he must
prove that his country has diplomatic relations
with the Republic of the Philippines; (2) he must
have been living in the Philippines for at least
three continuous years prior to the filing of the
application for adoption; (3) he must maintain
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Effects of Adoption
Petitioner contends that joint parental authority is
not anymore necessary since the children have
been emancipated having reached the age of
majority. This is untenable.
Parental authority includes caring for and rearing
the children for civic consciousness and efficiency
and the development of their moral, mental and
physical character and well-being. 13 The father
and the mother shall jointly exercise parental
authority over the persons of their common
children. 14 Even the remarriage of the surviving
parent shall not affect the parental authority over
the children, unless the court appoints another
person to be the guardian of the person or
property of the children. 15
It is true that when the child reaches the age of
emancipation that is, when he attains the age
of majority or 18 years of age 16 emancipation
terminates parental authority over the person
and property of the child, who shall then be
qualified and responsible for all acts of civil life.
17 However, parental authority is merely just one
of the effects of legal adoption. Article V of RA
8552 enumerates the effects of adoption, thus:
ARTICLE V
EFFECTS OF ADOPTION
SEC. 16. Parental Authority. Except in cases
where the biological parent is the spouse of the
adopter, all legal ties between the biological
parent(s) and the adoptee shall be severed and
the same shall then be vested on the adopter(s).
SEC. 17. Legitimacy. The adoptee shall be
considered the legitimate son/daughter of the
adopter(s) for all intents and purposes and as
such is entitled to all the rights and obligations
provided by law to legitimate sons/daughters
born to them without discrimination of any kind.
To this end, the adoptee is entitled to love,
guidance, and support in keeping with the means
of the family.

SEC. 18. Succession. In legal and intestate

succession, the adopter(s) and the adoptee shall
have reciprocal rights of succession without
distinction from legitimate filiation. However, if
the adoptee and his/her biological parent(s) had
left a will, the law on testamentary succession
shall govern.
Adoption has, thus, the following effects: (1)
sever all legal ties between the biological
parent(s) and the adoptee, except when the
biological parent is the spouse of the adopter; (2)
deem the adoptee as a legitimate child of the
adopter; and (3) give adopter and adoptee
reciprocal rights and obligations arising from the
relationship of parent and child, including but not
limited to: (i) the right of the adopter to choose
the name the child is to be known; and (ii) the
right of the adopter and adoptee to be legal and
compulsory heirs of each other. 18 Therefore,
even if emancipation terminates parental
authority, the adoptee is still considered a
legitimate child of the adopter with all the rights
19 of a legitimate child such as: (1) to bear the
surname of the father and the mother; (2) to
receive support from their parents; and (3) to be
entitled to the legitime and other successional
rights. Conversely, the adoptive parents shall,
with respect to the adopted child, enjoy all the
benefits to which biological parents are entitled
20 such as support 21 and successional rights. 22
DSETac
We are mindful of the fact that adoption statutes,
being humane and salutary, hold the interests
and welfare of the child to be of paramount
consideration. They are designed to provide
homes, parental care and education for
unfortunate, needy or orphaned children and give
them the protection of society and family, as well
as to allow childless couples or persons to
experience the joys of parenthood and give them
legally a child in the person of the adopted for the
manifestation of their natural parental instincts.
Every reasonable intendment should be sustained
to promote and fulfill these noble and
compassionate objectives of the law. 23 But, as
we have ruled in Republic v. Vergara: 24
We are not unmindful of the main purpose of
adoption statutes, which is the promotion of the

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welfare of the children. Accordingly, the law

should be construed liberally, in a manner that
will sustain rather than defeat said purpose. The
law must also be applied with compassion,
understanding and less severity in view of the
fact that it is intended to provide homes, love,
care and education for less fortunate children.
Regrettably, the Court is not in a position to
affirm the trial court's decision favoring adoption
in the case at bar, for the law is clear and it
cannot be modified without violating the
proscription against judicial legislation. Until such
time however, that the law on the matter is
amended, we cannot sustain the respondentspouses' petition for adoption. (Emphasis
supplied)
Petitioner, being married at the time the petitions
for adoption were filed, should have jointly filed
the petitions with her husband. We cannot make
our own legislation to suit petitioner.
Petitioner, in her Memorandum, insists that
subsequent events would show that joint
adoption could no longer be possible because
Olario has filed a case for dissolution of his
marriage to petitioner in the Los Angeles Superior
Court.
We disagree. The filing of a case for dissolution of
the marriage between petitioner and Olario is of
no moment. It is not equivalent to a decree of
dissolution of marriage. Until and unless there is a
judicial decree for the dissolution of the marriage
between petitioner and Olario, the marriage still
subsists. That being the case, joint adoption by
the husband and the wife is required. We
reiterate our ruling above that since, at the time
the petitions for adoption were filed, petitioner
was married to Olario, joint adoption is
mandatory.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM
the Decision dated 15 September 2004 of the
Regional Trial Court, General Santos City, Branch
22 in SPL. PROC. Case Nos. 1258 and 1259. Costs
against petitioner.
SO ORDERED. HcTSDa
Puno, C.J., Corona, Leonardo-de Castro and
Bersamin, JJ., concur.