WHAT IS THE CONCEPT OF JURE REGALIA?

(REGALIAN DOCTRINE)
> Generally, under this concept, private title to land must be traced to some grant, express or implied, from the Spanish
Crown or its successors, the American Colonial Government, and thereafter, the Philippine Republic

> In a broad sense, the term refers to royal rights, or those rights to which the King has by virtue of his prerogatives

> The theory of jure regalia was therefore nothing more than a natural fruit of conquest
CONNECTED TO THIS IS THE STATES POWER OF DOMINUUM
> Capacity of the state to own or acquire propertyfoundation for the early Spanish decree embracing the feudal theory
of jura regalia

> This concept was first introduced through the Laws of the Indies and the Royal Cedulas

> The Philippines passed to Spain by virtue of discovery and conquest. Consequently, all lands became the exclusive
patrimony and dominion of the Spanish Crown.

> The Law of the Indies was followed by the Ley Hipotecaria or the Mortgage Law of 1893. This law provided for the
systematic registration of titles and deeds as well as possessory claims

> The Maura Law: was partly an amendment and was the last Spanish land law promulgated in the Philippines, which
required the adjustment or registration of all agricultural lands, otherwise the lands shall revert to the State
TAKE NOTE THAT THE REGALIAN DOCTRINE IS ENSHRINED IN OUR PRESENT AND PAST CONSTITUTIONS THE
1987 CONSTITUTION PROVIDES UNDER NATIONAL ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY THE FOLLOWING
> Section 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of
potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State.
With the exception of agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be alienated. The exploration, development,
and utilization of natural resources shall be under the full control and supervision of the State. The State may directly
undertake such activities, or it may enter into co-production, joint venture, or production-sharing agreements with Filipino
citizens, or corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens. Such
agreements may be for a period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years, and
under such terms and conditions as may be provided by law. In cases of water rights for irrigation, water supply fisheries,
or industrial uses other than the development of water power, beneficial use may be the measure and limit of the grant.
> The abovementioned provision provides that except for agricultural lands for public domain which alone may be
alienated, forest or timber, and mineral lands, as well as all other natural resources must remain with the State, the

exploration, development and utilization of which shall be subject to its full control and supervision albeit allowing it to
enter into coproduction, joint venture or production-sharing agreements, or into agreements with foreign-owned
corporations involving technical or financial assistance for large-scale exploration, development, and utilization
THE 1987 PROVISION HAD ITS ROOTS IN THE 1935 CONSTITUTION
WHICH PROVIDES
> Section 1. All agricultural timber, and mineral lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other
mineral oils, all forces of potential energy and other natural resources of the Philippines belong to the State, and their
disposition, exploitation, development, or utilization shall be limited to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or
associations at least sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by such citizens, subject to any existing right, grant,
lease, or concession at the time of the inauguration of the Government established under this Constitution. Natural
resources, with the exception of public agricultural land, shall not be alienated, and no license, concession, or lease for
the exploitation, development, or utilization of any of the natural resources shall be granted for a period exceeding twentyfive years, renewable for another twenty-five years, except as to water rights for irrigation, water
supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of water power, in which cases beneficial use may be the
measure and limit of the grant.
THE 1973 CONSTITUTION REITERATED THE REGALIAN DOCTRINE
AS FOLLOWS
> Section 8. All lands of public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum and other mineral oils, all forces of potential
energy, fisheries, wildlife, and other natural resources of the Philippines belong to the State. With the exception of
agricultural, industrial or commercial, residential, or resettlement lands of the public domain, natural resources shall not be
alienated, and no license, concession, or lease for the exploration, or utilization of any of the natural resources shall be
granted for a period exceeding twentyfive years, except as to water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or
industrial uses other than development of water power, in which cases, beneficial use may by the measure and the limit of
the grant.
THE REGALIAN DOCTRINE DOESN'T NEGATE NATIVE TITLE. THIS IS IN PURSUANCE TO WHAT HAS BEEN HELD
IN CRUZ V. SECRETARY OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES
> Petitioners challenged the constitutionality of Indigenous Peoples Rights Act on the ground that it amounts to an
unlawful deprivation of the States ownership over lands of the public domain and all other natural resources therein, by
recognizing the right of ownership of ICC or IPs to their ancestral domains and ancestral lands on the basis of native title.
> As the votes were equally divided, the necessary majority wasnt obtained and petition was dismissed and the laws
validity was upheld
> Justice Kapunan: Regalian theory doesnt negate the native title to lands held in private ownership since time
immemorial, adverting to the landmark case of CARINO V. LOCAL GOVERNMENT, where the US SC through Holmes
held: xxx the land has been held by individuals under a claim of private ownership, it will be presumed to have been held
in the same way from before the Spanish conquest, and never to have been public land.
> Existence of native titie to land, or ownership of land by Filipinos by virtue of possession under a claim of ownership
since time immemorial and independent of any grant from the Spanish crown as an exception to the theory of jure regalia

> Justice Puno: Carino case firmly established a concept of private land title that existed irrespective of any royal grant
from the State and was based on the strong mandate extended to the Islands via the Philippine Bill of 1902. The IPRA
recognizes the existence of ICCs/IPs as a distinct sector in the society. It grants this people the ownership and possession
of their ancestral domains and ancestral lands and defines the extent of these lands and domains
> Justice Vitug: Carino cannot override the collective will of the people expressed in the Constitution.
> Justice Panganiban: all Filipinos, whether indigenous or not, are subject to the Constitution, and that no one is exempt
from its all encompassing provisions
REGALIAN DOCTRINE
But first, a peek at the Regalian principle and the power of the executive to reclassify lands of the public domain.
The 1935 Constitution classified lands of the public domain into agricultural, forest or timber.[40] Meanwhile, the 1973
Constitution provided the following divisions: agricultural, industrial or commercial, residential, resettlement, mineral,
timber or forest and grazing lands, and such other classes as may be provided by law,[41] giving the government great
leeway for classification.[42] Then the 1987 Constitution reverted to the 1935 Constitution classification with one addition:
national parks.[43] Of these, only agricultural lands may be alienated.[44] Prior to Proclamation No. 1064 of May 22, 2006,
Boracay Island had never been expressly and administratively classified under any of these grand divisions. Boracay was
an unclassified land of the public domain.
The Regalian Doctrine dictates that all lands of the public domain belong to the State, that the State is the source of any
asserted right to ownership of land and charged with the conservation of such patrimony.[45] The doctrine has been
consistently adopted under the 1935, 1973, and 1987 Constitutions.[46]
All lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State.[47] Thus, all
lands that have not been acquired from the government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the State as part of the
inalienable public domain.[48] Necessarily, it is up to the State to determine if lands of the public domain will be disposed
of for private ownership. The government, as the agent of the state, is possessed of the plenary power as the persona in
law to determine who shall be the favored recipients of public lands, as well as under what terms they may be granted
such privilege, not excluding the placing of obstacles in the way of their exercise of what otherwise would be ordinary acts
of ownership.[49]
Our present land law traces its roots to the Regalian Doctrine. Upon the Spanish conquest of the Philippines, ownership of
all lands, territories and possessions in the Philippines passed to the Spanish Crown.[50] The Regalian doctrine was first
introduced in the Philippines through the Laws of the Indies and the Royal Cedulas, which laid the foundation that all
lands that were not acquired from the Government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the public domain.[51]
The Laws of the Indies was followed by the Ley Hipotecaria or the Mortgage Law of 1893. The Spanish Mortgage Law
provided for the systematic registration of titles and deeds as well as possessory claims.[52]
The Royal Decree of 1894 or the Maura Law[53] partly amended the Spanish Mortgage Law and the Laws of the Indies. It
established possessory information as the method of legalizing possession of vacant Crown land, under certain conditions
which were set forth in said decree.[54] Under Section 393 of the Maura Law, an informacion posesoria or possessory
information title,[55] when duly inscribed in the Registry of Property, is converted into a title of ownership only after the
lapse of twenty (20) years of uninterrupted possession which must be actual, public, and adverse,[56] from the date of its
inscription.[57] However, possessory information title had to be perfected one year after the promulgation of the Maura
Law, or until April 17, 1895. Otherwise, the lands would revert to the State.[58]
In sum, private ownership of land under the Spanish regime could only be founded on royal concessions which took
various forms, namely: (1) titulo real or royal grant; (2) concesion especial or special grant; (3) composicion con el estado
or adjustment title; (4) titulo de compra or title by purchase; and (5) informacion posesoria or possessory information title.
[59]
The first law governing the disposition of public lands in the Philippines under American rule was embodied in the
Philippine Bill of 1902.[60] By this law, lands of the public domain in the Philippine Islands were classified into three (3)
grand divisions, to wit: agricultural, mineral, and timber or forest lands.[61] The act provided for, among others, the
disposal of mineral lands by means of absolute grant (freehold system) and by lease (leasehold system).[62] It also

provided the definition by exclusion of agricultural public lands.[63] Interpreting the meaning of agricultural lands under
the Philippine Bill of 1902, the Court declared in Mapa v. Insular Government:[64]
x x x In other words, that the phrase agricultural land as used in Act No. 926 means those public lands acquired from
Spain which are not timber or mineral lands. x x x[65] (Emphasis Ours)
On February 1, 1903, the Philippine Legislature passed Act No. 496, otherwise known as the Land Registration Act. The
act established a system of registration by which recorded title becomes absolute, indefeasible, and imprescriptible. This
is known as the Torrens system.[66]
Concurrently, on October 7, 1903, the Philippine Commission passed Act No. 926, which was the first Public Land Act.
The Act introduced the homestead system and made provisions for judicial and administrative confirmation of imperfect
titles and for the sale or lease of public lands. It permitted corporations regardless of the nationality of persons owning the
controlling stock to lease or purchase lands of the public domain.[67] Under the Act, open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands for the next ten (10) years preceding July 26, 1904 was
sufficient for judicial confirmation of imperfect title.[68]
On November 29, 1919, Act No. 926 was superseded by Act No. 2874, otherwise known as the second Public Land Act.
This new, more comprehensive law limited the exploitation of agricultural lands to Filipinos and Americans and citizens of
other countries which gave Filipinos the same privileges. For judicial confirmation of title, possession and occupation en
concepto dueo since time immemorial, or since July 26, 1894, was required.[69]
After the passage of the 1935 Constitution, CA No. 141 amended Act No. 2874 on December 1, 1936. To this day, CA No.
141, as amended, remains as the existing general law governing the classification and disposition of lands of the public
domain other than timber and mineral lands,[70] and privately owned lands which reverted to the State.[71]
Section 48(b) of CA No. 141 retained the requirement under Act No. 2874 of possession and occupation of lands of the
public domain since time immemorial or since July 26, 1894. However, this provision was superseded by Republic Act
(RA) No. 1942,[72] which provided for a simple thirty-year prescriptive period for judicial confirmation of imperfect title. The
provision was last amended by PD No. 1073,[73] which now provides for possession and occupation of the land applied
for since June 12, 1945, or earlier.[74]
The issuance of PD No. 892[75] on February 16, 1976 discontinued the use of Spanish titles as evidence in land
registration proceedings.[76] Under the decree, all holders of Spanish titles or grants should apply for registration of their
lands under Act No. 496 within six (6) months from the effectivity of the decree on February 16, 1976. Thereafter, the
recording of all unregistered lands[77] shall be governed by Section 194 of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended
by Act No. 3344.
On June 11, 1978, Act No. 496 was amended and updated by PD No. 1529, known as the Property Registration Decree. It
was enacted to codify the various laws relative to registration of property.[78] It governs registration of lands under the
Torrens system as well as unregistered lands, including chattel mortgages.[79]
A positive act declaring land as alienable and disposable is required. In keeping with the presumption of State ownership,
the Court has time and again emphasized that there must be a positive act of the government, such as an official
proclamation,[80] declassifying inalienable public land into disposable land for agricultural or other purposes.[81] In fact,
Section 8 of CA No. 141 limits alienable or disposable lands only to those lands which have been officially delimited and
classified.[82]
The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State ownership of the lands of the public domain is on the person
applying for registration (or claiming ownership), who must prove that the land subject of the application is alienable or
disposable.[83] To overcome this presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be established that the land subject of the
application (or claim) is alienable or disposable.[84] There must still be a positive act declaring land of the public domain
as alienable and disposable. To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable, the applicant
must establish the existence of a positive act of the government such as a presidential proclamation or an executive
order; an administrative action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a statute.
[85] The applicant may also secure a certification from the government that the land claimed to have been possessed for
the required number of years is alienable and disposable.[86]

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. 101083 July 30, 1993

JUAN ANTONIO, ANNA ROSARIO and JOSE ALFONSO, all surnamed OPOSA, minors, and represented by their
parents ANTONIO and RIZALINA OPOSA, ROBERTA NICOLE SADIUA, minor, represented by her parents CALVIN
and ROBERTA SADIUA, CARLO, AMANDA SALUD and PATRISHA, all surnamed FLORES, minors and
represented by their parents ENRICO and NIDA FLORES, GIANINA DITA R. FORTUN, minor, represented by her
parents SIGRID and DOLORES FORTUN, GEORGE II and MA. CONCEPCION, all surnamed MISA, minors and
represented by their parents GEORGE and MYRA MISA, BENJAMIN ALAN V. PESIGAN, minor, represented by his
parents ANTONIO and ALICE PESIGAN, JOVIE MARIE ALFARO, minor, represented by her parents JOSE and
MARIA VIOLETA ALFARO, MARIA CONCEPCION T. CASTRO, minor, represented by her parents FREDENIL and
JANE
CASTRO,
JOHANNA
DESAMPARADO,
minor, represented by her parents JOSE and ANGELA DESAMPRADO, CARLO JOAQUIN T. NARVASA, minor,
represented by his parents GREGORIO II and CRISTINE CHARITY NARVASA, MA. MARGARITA, JESUS IGNACIO,
MA. ANGELA and MARIE GABRIELLE, all surnamed SAENZ, minors, represented by their parents ROBERTO and
AURORA SAENZ, KRISTINE, MARY ELLEN, MAY, GOLDA MARTHE and DAVID IAN, all surnamed KING, minors,
represented by their parents MARIO and HAYDEE KING, DAVID, FRANCISCO and THERESE VICTORIA, all
surnamed ENDRIGA, minors, represented by their parents BALTAZAR and TERESITA ENDRIGA, JOSE MA. and
REGINA MA., all surnamed ABAYA, minors, represented by their parents ANTONIO and MARICA ABAYA, MARILIN,
MARIO, JR. and MARIETTE, all surnamed CARDAMA, minors, represented by their parents MARIO and LINA
CARDAMA, CLARISSA, ANN MARIE, NAGEL, and IMEE LYN, all surnamed OPOSA, minors and represented by
their parents RICARDO and MARISSA OPOSA, PHILIP JOSEPH, STEPHEN JOHN and ISAIAH JAMES, all
surnamed QUIPIT, minors, represented by their parents JOSE MAX and VILMI QUIPIT, BUGHAW CIELO,
CRISANTO, ANNA, DANIEL and FRANCISCO, all surnamed BIBAL, minors, represented by their parents
FRANCISCO, JR. and MILAGROS BIBAL, and THE PHILIPPINE ECOLOGICAL NETWORK, INC., petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR., in his capacity as the Secretary of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources, and THE HONORABLE ERIBERTO U. ROSARIO, Presiding Judge of the
RTC, Makati, Branch 66, respondents.
Oposa Law Office for petitioners.
The Solicitor General for respondents.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

In a broader sense, this petition bears upon the right of Filipinos to a balanced and healthful ecology which the petitioners
dramatically associate with the twin concepts of "inter-generational responsibility" and "inter-generational justice."
Specifically, it touches on the issue of whether the said petitioners have a cause of action to "prevent the misappropriation
or impairment" of Philippine rainforests and "arrest the unabated hemorrhage of the country's vital life support systems
and continued rape of Mother Earth."
The controversy has its genesis in Civil Case No. 90-77 which was filed before Branch 66 (Makati, Metro Manila) of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), National Capital Judicial Region. The principal plaintiffs therein, now the principal petitioners,
are all minors duly represented and joined by their respective parents. Impleaded as an additional plaintiff is the Philippine

Ecological Network, Inc. (PENI), a domestic, non-stock and non-profit corporation organized for the purpose of, inter alia,
engaging in concerted action geared for the protection of our environment and natural resources. The original defendant
was the Honorable Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr., then Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR). His substitution in this petition by the new Secretary, the Honorable Angel C. Alcala, was subsequently ordered
upon proper motion by the petitioners. 1 The complaint 2 was instituted as a taxpayers' class suit 3 and alleges that the
plaintiffs "are all citizens of the Republic of the Philippines, taxpayers, and entitled to the full benefit, use and enjoyment of
the natural resource treasure that is the country's virgin tropical forests." The same was filed for themselves and others
who are equally concerned about the preservation of said resource but are "so numerous that it is impracticable to bring
them all before the Court." The minors further asseverate that they "represent their generation as well as generations yet
unborn." 4 Consequently, it is prayed for that judgment be rendered:
. . . ordering defendant, his agents, representatives and other persons acting in his behalf to
(1) Cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country;
(2) Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber license
agreements.
and granting the plaintiffs ". . . such other reliefs just and equitable under the premises." 5
The complaint starts off with the general averments that the Philippine archipelago of 7,100 islands has a land area of
thirty million (30,000,000) hectares and is endowed with rich, lush and verdant rainforests in which varied, rare and unique
species of flora and fauna may be found; these rainforests contain a genetic, biological and chemical pool which is
irreplaceable; they are also the habitat of indigenous Philippine cultures which have existed, endured and flourished since
time immemorial; scientific evidence reveals that in order to maintain a balanced and healthful ecology, the country's land
area should be utilized on the basis of a ratio of fifty-four per cent (54%) for forest cover and forty-six per cent (46%) for
agricultural, residential, industrial, commercial and other uses; the distortion and disturbance of this balance as a
consequence of deforestation have resulted in a host of environmental tragedies, such as (a) water shortages resulting
from drying up of the water table, otherwise known as the "aquifer," as well as of rivers, brooks and streams, (b)
salinization of the water table as a result of the intrusion therein of salt water, incontrovertible examples of which may be
found in the island of Cebu and the Municipality of Bacoor, Cavite, (c) massive erosion and the consequential loss of soil
fertility and agricultural productivity, with the volume of soil eroded estimated at one billion (1,000,000,000) cubic meters
per annum approximately the size of the entire island of Catanduanes, (d) the endangering and extinction of the
country's unique, rare and varied flora and fauna, (e) the disturbance and dislocation of cultural communities, including the
disappearance of the Filipino's indigenous cultures, (f) the siltation of rivers and seabeds and consequential destruction of
corals and other aquatic life leading to a critical reduction in marine resource productivity, (g) recurrent spells of drought as
is presently experienced by the entire country, (h) increasing velocity of typhoon winds which result from the absence of
windbreakers, (i) the floodings of lowlands and agricultural plains arising from the absence of the absorbent mechanism of
forests, (j) the siltation and shortening of the lifespan of multi-billion peso dams constructed and operated for the purpose
of supplying water for domestic uses, irrigation and the generation of electric power, and (k) the reduction of the earth's
capacity to process carbon dioxide gases which has led to perplexing and catastrophic climatic changes such as the
phenomenon of global warming, otherwise known as the "greenhouse effect."
Plaintiffs further assert that the adverse and detrimental consequences of continued and deforestation are so capable of
unquestionable demonstration that the same may be submitted as a matter of judicial notice. This notwithstanding, they
expressed their intention to present expert witnesses as well as documentary, photographic and film evidence in the
course of the trial.
As their cause of action, they specifically allege that:
CAUSE OF ACTION
7. Plaintiffs replead by reference the foregoing allegations.

8. Twenty-five (25) years ago, the Philippines had some sixteen (16) million hectares of rainforests
constituting roughly 53% of the country's land mass.
9. Satellite images taken in 1987 reveal that there remained no more than 1.2 million hectares of said
rainforests or four per cent (4.0%) of the country's land area.
10. More recent surveys reveal that a mere 850,000 hectares of virgin old-growth rainforests are left,
barely 2.8% of the entire land mass of the Philippine archipelago and about 3.0 million hectares of
immature and uneconomical secondary growth forests.
11. Public records reveal that the defendant's, predecessors have granted timber license agreements
('TLA's') to various corporations to cut the aggregate area of 3.89 million hectares for commercial logging
purposes.
A copy of the TLA holders and the corresponding areas covered is hereto attached as Annex "A".
12. At the present rate of deforestation, i.e. about 200,000 hectares per annum or 25 hectares per hour
nighttime, Saturdays, Sundays and holidays included the Philippines will be bereft of forest resources
after the end of this ensuing decade, if not earlier.
13. The adverse effects, disastrous consequences, serious injury and irreparable damage of this
continued trend of deforestation to the plaintiff minor's generation and to generations yet unborn are
evident and incontrovertible. As a matter of fact, the environmental damages enumerated in paragraph 6
hereof are already being felt, experienced and suffered by the generation of plaintiff adults.
14. The continued allowance by defendant of TLA holders to cut and deforest the remaining forest stands
will work great damage and irreparable injury to plaintiffs especially plaintiff minors and their
successors who may never see, use, benefit from and enjoy this rare and unique natural resource
treasure.
This act of defendant constitutes a misappropriation and/or impairment of the natural resource property
he holds in trust for the benefit of plaintiff minors and succeeding generations.
15. Plaintiffs have a clear and constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology and are entitled to
protection by the State in its capacity as the parens patriae.
16. Plaintiff have exhausted all administrative remedies with the defendant's office. On March 2, 1990,
plaintiffs served upon defendant a final demand to cancel all logging permits in the country.
A copy of the plaintiffs' letter dated March 1, 1990 is hereto attached as Annex "B".
17. Defendant, however, fails and refuses to cancel the existing TLA's to the continuing serious damage
and extreme prejudice of plaintiffs.
18. The continued failure and refusal by defendant to cancel the TLA's is an act violative of the rights of
plaintiffs, especially plaintiff minors who may be left with a country that is desertified (sic), bare, barren
and devoid of the wonderful flora, fauna and indigenous cultures which the Philippines had been
abundantly blessed with.
19. Defendant's refusal to cancel the aforementioned TLA's is manifestly contrary to the public policy
enunciated in the Philippine Environmental Policy which, in pertinent part, states that it is the policy of the
State

(a) to create, develop, maintain and improve conditions under which man and nature can thrive in
productive and enjoyable harmony with each other;
(b) to fulfill the social, economic and other requirements of present and future generations of Filipinos
and;
(c) to ensure the attainment of an environmental quality that is conductive to a life of dignity and wellbeing. (P.D. 1151, 6 June 1977)
20. Furthermore, defendant's continued refusal to cancel the aforementioned TLA's is contradictory to the
Constitutional policy of the State to
a. effect "a more equitable distribution of opportunities, income and wealth" and "make full and efficient
use of natural resources (sic)." (Section 1, Article XII of the Constitution);
b. "protect the nation's marine wealth." (Section 2, ibid);
c. "conserve and promote the nation's cultural heritage and resources (sic)" (Section 14, Article XIV,id.);
d. "protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology in accord with the
rhythm and harmony of nature." (Section 16, Article II, id.)
21. Finally, defendant's act is contrary to the highest law of humankind the natural law and violative
of plaintiffs' right to self-preservation and perpetuation.
22. There is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in law other than the instant action to arrest the
unabated hemorrhage of the country's vital life support systems and continued rape of Mother Earth. 6
On 22 June 1990, the original defendant, Secretary Factoran, Jr., filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint based on two (2)
grounds, namely: (1) the plaintiffs have no cause of action against him and (2) the issue raised by the plaintiffs is a
political question which properly pertains to the legislative or executive branches of Government. In their 12 July 1990
Opposition to the Motion, the petitioners maintain that (1) the complaint shows a clear and unmistakable cause of action,
(2) the motion is dilatory and (3) the action presents a justiciable question as it involves the defendant's abuse of
discretion.
On 18 July 1991, respondent Judge issued an order granting the aforementioned motion to dismiss. 7 In the said order, not
only was the defendant's claim that the complaint states no cause of action against him and that it raises a political
question sustained, the respondent Judge further ruled that the granting of the relief prayed for would result in the
impairment of contracts which is prohibited by the fundamental law of the land.
Plaintiffs thus filed the instant special civil action for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court and ask this
Court to rescind and set aside the dismissal order on the ground that the respondent Judge gravely abused his discretion
in dismissing the action. Again, the parents of the plaintiffs-minors not only represent their children, but have also joined
the latter in this case. 8
On 14 May 1992, We resolved to give due course to the petition and required the parties to submit their respective
Memoranda after the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a Comment in behalf of the respondents and the
petitioners filed a reply thereto.
Petitioners contend that the complaint clearly and unmistakably states a cause of action as it contains sufficient
allegations concerning their right to a sound environment based on Articles 19, 20 and 21 of the Civil Code (Human
Relations), Section 4 of Executive Order (E.O.) No. 192 creating the DENR, Section 3 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No.
1151 (Philippine Environmental Policy), Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution recognizing the right of the people to

a balanced and healthful ecology, the concept of generational genocide in Criminal Law and the concept of man's
inalienable right to self-preservation and self-perpetuation embodied in natural law. Petitioners likewise rely on the
respondent's correlative obligation per Section 4 of E.O. No. 192, to safeguard the people's right to a healthful
environment.
It is further claimed that the issue of the respondent Secretary's alleged grave abuse of discretion in granting Timber
License Agreements (TLAs) to cover more areas for logging than what is available involves a judicial question.
Anent the invocation by the respondent Judge of the Constitution's non-impairment clause, petitioners maintain that the
same does not apply in this case because TLAs are not contracts. They likewise submit that even if TLAs may be
considered protected by the said clause, it is well settled that they may still be revoked by the State when the public
interest so requires.
On the other hand, the respondents aver that the petitioners failed to allege in their complaint a specific legal right violated
by the respondent Secretary for which any relief is provided by law. They see nothing in the complaint but vague and
nebulous allegations concerning an "environmental right" which supposedly entitles the petitioners to the "protection by
the state in its capacity as parens patriae." Such allegations, according to them, do not reveal a valid cause of action.
They then reiterate the theory that the question of whether logging should be permitted in the country is a political
question which should be properly addressed to the executive or legislative branches of Government. They therefore
assert that the petitioners' resources is not to file an action to court, but to lobby before Congress for the passage of a bill
that would ban logging totally.
As to the matter of the cancellation of the TLAs, respondents submit that the same cannot be done by the State without
due process of law. Once issued, a TLA remains effective for a certain period of time usually for twenty-five (25) years.
During its effectivity, the same can neither be revised nor cancelled unless the holder has been found, after due notice
and hearing, to have violated the terms of the agreement or other forestry laws and regulations. Petitioners' proposition to
have all the TLAs indiscriminately cancelled without the requisite hearing would be violative of the requirements of due
process.
Before going any further, We must first focus on some procedural matters. Petitioners instituted Civil Case No. 90-777 as
a class suit. The original defendant and the present respondents did not take issue with this matter. Nevertheless, We
hereby rule that the said civil case is indeed a class suit. The subject matter of the complaint is of common and general
interest not just to several, but to all citizens of the Philippines. Consequently, since the parties are so numerous, it,
becomes impracticable, if not totally impossible, to bring all of them before the court. We likewise declare that the plaintiffs
therein are numerous and representative enough to ensure the full protection of all concerned interests. Hence, all the
requisites for the filing of a valid class suit under Section 12, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court are present both in the
said civil case and in the instant petition, the latter being but an incident to the former.
This case, however, has a special and novel element. Petitioners minors assert that they represent their generation as
well as generations yet unborn. We find no difficulty in ruling that they can, for themselves, for others of their generation
and for the succeeding generations, file a class suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations can
only be based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is
concerned. Such a right, as hereinafter expounded, considers the "rhythm and harmony of nature." Nature means the
created world in its entirety. 9 Such rhythm and harmony indispensably include, inter alia, the judicious disposition,
utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the country's forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, offshore areas and other natural resources to the end that their exploration, development and utilization be equitably
accessible to the present as well as future generations. 10 Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the
next to preserve that rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little differently,
the minors' assertion of their right to a sound environment constitutes, at the same time, the performance of their
obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the generations to come.
The locus standi of the petitioners having thus been addressed, We shall now proceed to the merits of the petition.

After a careful perusal of the complaint in question and a meticulous consideration and evaluation of the issues raised and
arguments adduced by the parties, We do not hesitate to find for the petitioners and rule against the respondent Judge's
challenged order for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. The pertinent
portions of the said order reads as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
After a careful and circumspect evaluation of the Complaint, the Court cannot help but agree with the
defendant. For although we believe that plaintiffs have but the noblest of all intentions, it ( sic) fell short of
alleging, with sufficient definiteness, a specific legal right they are seeking to enforce and protect, or a
specific legal wrong they are seeking to prevent and redress (Sec. 1, Rule 2, RRC). Furthermore, the
Court notes that the Complaint is replete with vague assumptions and vague conclusions based on
unverified data. In fine, plaintiffs fail to state a cause of action in its Complaint against the herein
defendant.
Furthermore, the Court firmly believes that the matter before it, being impressed with political color and
involving a matter of public policy, may not be taken cognizance of by this Court without doing violence to
the sacred principle of "Separation of Powers" of the three (3) co-equal branches of the Government.
The Court is likewise of the impression that it cannot, no matter how we stretch our jurisdiction, grant the
reliefs prayed for by the plaintiffs, i.e., to cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country and
to cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber license
agreements. For to do otherwise would amount to "impairment of contracts" abhored (sic) by the
fundamental law. 11
We do not agree with the trial court's conclusions that the plaintiffs failed to allege with sufficient definiteness a specific
legal right involved or a specific legal wrong committed, and that the complaint is replete with vague assumptions and
conclusions based on unverified data. A reading of the complaint itself belies these conclusions.
The complaint focuses on one specific fundamental legal right the right to a balanced and healthful ecology which, for
the first time in our nation's constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated in the fundamental law. Section 16, Article II of
the 1987 Constitution explicitly provides:
Sec. 16. The State shall protect and advance the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology
in accord with the rhythm and harmony of nature.
This right unites with the right to health which is provided for in the preceding section of the same article:
Sec. 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill health
consciousness among them.
While the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is to be found under the Declaration of Principles and State Policies
and not under the Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it is less important than any of the civil and political rights
enumerated in the latter. Such a right belongs to a different category of rights altogether for it concerns nothing less than
self-preservation and self-perpetuation aptly and fittingly stressed by the petitioners the advancement of which may
even be said to predate all governments and constitutions. As a matter of fact, these basic rights need not even be written
in the Constitution for they are assumed to exist from the inception of humankind. If they are now explicitly mentioned in
the fundamental charter, it is because of the well-founded fear of its framers that unless the rights to a balanced and
healthful ecology and to health are mandated as state policies by the Constitution itself, thereby highlighting their
continuing importance and imposing upon the state a solemn obligation to preserve the first and protect and advance the
second, the day would not be too far when all else would be lost not only for the present generation, but also for those to
come generations which stand to inherit nothing but parched earth incapable of sustaining life.

The right to a balanced and healthful ecology carries with it the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment.
During the debates on this right in one of the plenary sessions of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, the following
exchange transpired between Commissioner Wilfrido Villacorta and Commissioner Adolfo Azcuna who sponsored the
section in question:
MR. VILLACORTA:
Does this section mandate the State to provide sanctions against all forms of pollution
air, water and noise pollution?
MR. AZCUNA:
Yes, Madam President. The right to healthful (sic) environment necessarily carries with it
the correlative duty of not impairing the same and, therefore, sanctions may be provided
for impairment of environmental balance. 12
The said right implies, among many other things, the judicious management and conservation of the country's forests.
Without such forests, the ecological or environmental balance would be irreversiby disrupted.
Conformably with the enunciated right to a balanced and healthful ecology and the right to health, as well as the other
related provisions of the Constitution concerning the conservation, development and utilization of the country's natural
resources, 13 then President Corazon C. Aquino promulgated on 10 June 1987 E.O. No. 192, 14 Section 4 of which
expressly mandates that the Department of Environment and Natural Resources "shall be the primary government agency
responsible for the conservation, management, development and proper use of the country's environment and natural
resources, specifically forest and grazing lands, mineral, resources, including those in reservation and watershed areas,
and lands of the public domain, as well as the licensing and regulation of all natural resources as may be provided for by
law in order to ensure equitable sharing of the benefits derived therefrom for the welfare of the present and future
generations of Filipinos." Section 3 thereof makes the following statement of policy:
Sec. 3. Declaration of Policy. It is hereby declared the policy of the State to ensure the sustainable
use, development, management, renewal, and conservation of the country's forest, mineral, land, offshore areas and other natural resources, including the protection and enhancement of the quality of the
environment, and equitable access of the different segments of the population to the development and the
use of the country's natural resources, not only for the present generation but for future generations as
well. It is also the policy of the state to recognize and apply a true value system including social and
environmental cost implications relative to their utilization, development and conservation of our natural
resources.
This policy declaration is substantially re-stated it Title XIV, Book IV of the Administrative Code of 1987, 15specifically in
Section 1 thereof which reads:
Sec. 1. Declaration of Policy. (1) The State shall ensure, for the benefit of the Filipino people, the full
exploration and development as well as the judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and
conservation of the country's forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, off-shore areas and other
natural resources, consistent with the necessity of maintaining a sound ecological balance and protecting
and enhancing the quality of the environment and the objective of making the exploration, development
and utilization of such natural resources equitably accessible to the different segments of the present as
well as future generations.
(2) The State shall likewise recognize and apply a true value system that takes into account social and
environmental cost implications relative to the utilization, development and conservation of our natural
resources.

The above provision stresses "the necessity of maintaining a sound ecological balance and protecting and enhancing the
quality of the environment." Section 2 of the same Title, on the other hand, specifically speaks of the mandate of the
DENR; however, it makes particular reference to the fact of the agency's being subject to law and higher authority. Said
section provides:
Sec. 2. Mandate. (1) The Department of Environment and Natural Resources shall be primarily
responsible for the implementation of the foregoing policy.
(2) It shall, subject to law and higher authority, be in charge of carrying out the State's constitutional
mandate to control and supervise the exploration, development, utilization, and conservation of the
country's natural resources.
Both E.O. NO. 192 and the Administrative Code of 1987 have set the objectives which will serve as the bases for policy
formulation, and have defined the powers and functions of the DENR.
It may, however, be recalled that even before the ratification of the 1987 Constitution, specific statutes already paid special
attention to the "environmental right" of the present and future generations. On 6 June 1977, P.D. No. 1151 (Philippine
Environmental Policy) and P.D. No. 1152 (Philippine Environment Code) were issued. The former "declared a continuing
policy of the State (a) to create, develop, maintain and improve conditions under which man and nature can thrive in
productive and enjoyable harmony with each other, (b) to fulfill the social, economic and other requirements of present
and future generations of Filipinos, and (c) to insure the attainment of an environmental quality that is conducive to a life
of dignity and well-being." 16 As its goal, it speaks of the "responsibilities of each generation as trustee and guardian of the
environment for succeeding generations." 17 The latter statute, on the other hand, gave flesh to the said policy.
Thus, the right of the petitioners (and all those they represent) to a balanced and healthful ecology is as clear as the
DENR's duty under its mandate and by virtue of its powers and functions under E.O. No. 192 and the Administrative
Code of 1987 to protect and advance the said right.
A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the corelative duty or obligation to respect or protect the same gives
rise to a cause of action. Petitioners maintain that the granting of the TLAs, which they claim was done with grave abuse
of discretion, violated their right to a balanced and healthful ecology; hence, the full protection thereof requires that no
further TLAs should be renewed or granted.
A cause of action is defined as:
. . . an act or omission of one party in violation of the legal right or rights of the other; and its essential
elements are legal right of the plaintiff, correlative obligation of the defendant, and act or omission of the
defendant in violation of said legal right. 18
It is settled in this jurisdiction that in a motion to dismiss based on the ground that the complaint fails to state a cause of
action, 19 the question submitted to the court for resolution involves the sufficiency of the facts alleged in the complaint
itself. No other matter should be considered; furthermore, the truth of falsity of the said allegations is beside the point for
the truth thereof is deemed hypothetically admitted. The only issue to be resolved in such a case is: admitting such
alleged facts to be true, may the court render a valid judgment in accordance with the prayer in the
complaint? 20 InMilitante vs. Edrosolano, 21 this Court laid down the rule that the judiciary should "exercise the utmost care
and circumspection in passing upon a motion to dismiss on the ground of the absence thereof [cause of action] lest, by its
failure to manifest a correct appreciation of the facts alleged and deemed hypothetically admitted, what the law grants or
recognizes is effectively nullified. If that happens, there is a blot on the legal order. The law itself stands in disrepute."
After careful examination of the petitioners' complaint, We find the statements under the introductory affirmative
allegations, as well as the specific averments under the sub-heading CAUSE OF ACTION, to be adequate enough to
show, prima facie, the claimed violation of their rights. On the basis thereof, they may thus be granted, wholly or partly, the
reliefs prayed for. It bears stressing, however, that insofar as the cancellation of the TLAs is concerned, there is the need
to implead, as party defendants, the grantees thereof for they are indispensable parties.

The foregoing considered, Civil Case No. 90-777 be said to raise a political question. Policy formulation or determination
by the executive or legislative branches of Government is not squarely put in issue. What is principally involved is the
enforcement of a right vis-a-vis policies already formulated and expressed in legislation. It must, nonetheless, be
emphasized that the political question doctrine is no longer, the insurmountable obstacle to the exercise of judicial power
or the impenetrable shield that protects executive and legislative actions from judicial inquiry or review. The second
paragraph of section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution states that:
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which
are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government.
Commenting on this provision in his book, Philippine Political Law, 22 Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz, a distinguished member
of this Court, says:
The first part of the authority represents the traditional concept of judicial power, involving the settlement
of conflicting rights as conferred as law. The second part of the authority represents a broadening of
judicial power to enable the courts of justice to review what was before forbidden territory, to wit, the
discretion of the political departments of the government.
As worded, the new provision vests in the judiciary, and particularly the Supreme Court, the power to rule
upon even the wisdom of the decisions of the executive and the legislature and to declare their acts
invalid for lack or excess of jurisdiction because tainted with grave abuse of discretion. The catch, of
course, is the meaning of "grave abuse of discretion," which is a very elastic phrase that can expand or
contract according to the disposition of the judiciary.
In Daza vs. Singson, 23 Mr. Justice Cruz, now speaking for this Court, noted:
In the case now before us, the jurisdictional objection becomes even less tenable and decisive. The
reason is that, even if we were to assume that the issue presented before us was political in nature, we
would still not be precluded from revolving it under the expanded jurisdiction conferred upon us that now
covers, in proper cases, even the political question. Article VII, Section 1, of the Constitution clearly
provides: . . .
The last ground invoked by the trial court in dismissing the complaint is the non-impairment of contracts clause found in
the Constitution. The court a quo declared that:
The Court is likewise of the impression that it cannot, no matter how we stretch our jurisdiction, grant the
reliefs prayed for by the plaintiffs, i.e., to cancel all existing timber license agreements in the country and
to cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber license
agreements. For to do otherwise would amount to "impairment of contracts" abhored (sic) by the
fundamental law. 24
We are not persuaded at all; on the contrary, We are amazed, if not shocked, by such a sweeping pronouncement. In the
first place, the respondent Secretary did not, for obvious reasons, even invoke in his motion to dismiss the nonimpairment clause. If he had done so, he would have acted with utmost infidelity to the Government by providing undue
and unwarranted benefits and advantages to the timber license holders because he would have forever bound the
Government to strictly respect the said licenses according to their terms and conditions regardless of changes in policy
and the demands of public interest and welfare. He was aware that as correctly pointed out by the petitioners, into every
timber license must be read Section 20 of the Forestry Reform Code (P.D. No. 705) which provides:
. . . Provided, That when the national interest so requires, the President may amend, modify, replace or
rescind any contract, concession, permit, licenses or any other form of privilege granted herein . . .

Needless to say, all licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by executive action. It is not a contract, property
or a property right protested by the due process clause of the Constitution. In Tan vs. Director of Forestry, 25 this
Court held:
. . . A timber license is an instrument by which the State regulates the utilization and disposition of forest
resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. A timber license is not a contract within the purview
of the due process clause; it is only a license or privilege, which can be validly withdrawn whenever
dictated by public interest or public welfare as in this case.
A license is merely a permit or privilege to do what otherwise would be unlawful, and is not a contract
between the authority, federal, state, or municipal, granting it and the person to whom it is granted; neither
is it property or a property right, nor does it create a vested right; nor is it taxation (37 C.J. 168). Thus, this
Court held that the granting of license does not create irrevocable rights, neither is it property or property
rights (People vs. Ong Tin, 54 O.G. 7576).
We reiterated this pronouncement in Felipe Ysmael, Jr. & Co., Inc. vs. Deputy Executive Secretary: 26
. . . Timber licenses, permits and license agreements are the principal instruments by which the State
regulates the utilization and disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. And
it can hardly be gainsaid that they merely evidence a privilege granted by the State to qualified entities,
and do not vest in the latter a permanent or irrevocable right to the particular concession area and the
forest products therein. They may be validly amended, modified, replaced or rescinded by the Chief
Executive when national interests so require. Thus, they are not deemed contracts within the purview of
the due process of law clause [See Sections 3(ee) and 20 of Pres. Decree No. 705, as amended. Also,
Tan v. Director of Forestry, G.R. No. L-24548, October 27, 1983, 125 SCRA 302].
Since timber licenses are not contracts, the non-impairment clause, which reads:
Sec. 10. No law impairing, the obligation of contracts shall be passed.

27

cannot be invoked.
In the second place, even if it is to be assumed that the same are contracts, the instant case does not involve a law or
even an executive issuance declaring the cancellation or modification of existing timber licenses. Hence, the nonimpairment clause cannot as yet be invoked. Nevertheless, granting further that a law has actually been passed
mandating cancellations or modifications, the same cannot still be stigmatized as a violation of the non-impairment clause.
This is because by its very nature and purpose, such as law could have only been passed in the exercise of the police
power of the state for the purpose of advancing the right of the people to a balanced and healthful ecology, promoting their
health
and
enhancing
the
general
welfare.
In Abe
vs.
Foster
Wheeler
Corp. 28 this Court stated:
The freedom of contract, under our system of government, is not meant to be absolute. The same is
understood to be subject to reasonable legislative regulation aimed at the promotion of public health,
moral, safety and welfare. In other words, the constitutional guaranty of non-impairment of obligations of
contract is limited by the exercise of the police power of the State, in the interest of public health, safety,
moral and general welfare.
The reason for this is emphatically set forth in Nebia vs. New York, 29 quoted in Philippine American Life Insurance Co. vs.
Auditor General, 30 to wit:
Under our form of government the use of property and the making of contracts are normally matters of
private and not of public concern. The general rule is that both shall be free of governmental interference.
But neither property rights nor contract rights are absolute; for government cannot exist if the citizen may

at will use his property to the detriment of his fellows, or exercise his freedom of contract to work them
harm. Equally fundamental with the private right is that of the public to regulate it in the common interest.
In short, the non-impairment clause must yield to the police power of the state.

31

Finally, it is difficult to imagine, as the trial court did, how the non-impairment clause could apply with respect to the prayer
to enjoin the respondent Secretary from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber licenses for,
save in cases of renewal, no contract would have as of yet existed in the other instances. Moreover, with respect to
renewal, the holder is not entitled to it as a matter of right.
WHEREFORE, being impressed with merit, the instant Petition is hereby GRANTED, and the challenged Order of
respondent Judge of 18 July 1991 dismissing Civil Case No. 90-777 is hereby set aside. The petitioners may therefore
amend their complaint to implead as defendants the holders or grantees of the questioned timber license agreements.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Cruz, Padilla, Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Regalado, Romero, Nocon, Bellosillo, Melo and Quiason, JJ., concur.
Narvasa, C.J., Puno and Vitug, JJ., took no part.
Separate Opinion
FELICIANO, J., concurring
I join in the result reached by my distinguished brother in the Court, Davide, Jr., J., in this case which, to my mind, is one
of the most important cases decided by this Court in the last few years. The seminal principles laid down in this decision
are likely to influence profoundly the direction and course of the protection and management of the environment, which of
course embraces the utilization of all the natural resources in the territorial base of our polity. I have therefore sought to
clarify, basically to myself, what the Court appears to be saying.
The Court explicitly states that petitioners have the locus standi necessary to sustain the bringing and, maintenance of
this suit (Decision, pp. 11-12). Locus standi is not a function of petitioners' claim that their suit is properly regarded as
a class suit. I understand locus standi to refer to the legal interest which a plaintiff must have in the subject matter of the
suit. Because of the very broadness of the concept of "class" here involved membership in this "class" appears to
embrace everyone living in the country whether now or in the future it appears to me that everyone who may be
expected to benefit from the course of action petitioners seek to require public respondents to take, is vested with the
necessary locus standi. The Court may be seen therefore to be recognizing a beneficiaries' right of action in the field of
environmental protection, as against both the public administrative agency directly concerned and the private persons or
entities operating in the field or sector of activity involved. Whether such beneficiaries' right of action may be found under
any and all circumstances, or whether some failure to act, in the first instance, on the part of the governmental agency
concerned must be shown ("prior exhaustion of administrative remedies"), is not discussed in the decision and
presumably is left for future determination in an appropriate case.
The Court has also declared that the complaint has alleged and focused upon "one specific fundamental legal right the
right to a balanced and healthful ecology" (Decision, p. 14). There is no question that "the right to a balanced and healthful
ecology" is "fundamental" and that, accordingly, it has been "constitutionalized." But although it is fundamental in
character, I suggest, with very great respect, that it cannot be characterized as "specific," without doing excessive violence
to language. It is in fact very difficult to fashion language more comprehensive in scope and generalized in character than
a right to "a balanced and healthful ecology." The list of particular claims which can be subsumed under this rubic appears
to be entirely open-ended: prevention and control of emission of toxic fumes and smoke from factories and motor
vehicles; of discharge of oil, chemical effluents, garbage and raw sewage into rivers, inland and coastal waters by vessels,

oil rigs, factories, mines and whole communities; of dumping of organic and inorganic wastes on open land, streets and
thoroughfares; failure to rehabilitate land after strip-mining or open-pit mining; kaingin or slash-and-burn farming;
destruction of fisheries, coral reefs and other living sea resources through the use of dynamite or cyanide and other
chemicals; contamination of ground water resources; loss of certain species of fauna and flora; and so on. The other
statements pointed out by the Court: Section 3, Executive Order No. 192 dated 10 June 1987; Section 1, Title XIV, Book
IV of the 1987 Administrative Code; and P.D. No. 1151, dated 6 June 1977 all appear to be formulations of policy, as
general and abstract as the constitutional statements of basic policy in Article II, Section 16 ("the right to a balanced
and healthful ecology") and 15 ("the right to health").
P.D. No. 1152, also dated 6 June 1977, entitled "The Philippine Environment Code," is, upon the other hand, a
compendious collection of more "specific environment management policies" and "environment quality standards" (fourth
"Whereas" clause, Preamble) relating to an extremely wide range of topics:
(a) air quality management;
(b) water quality management;
(c) land use management;
(d) natural resources management and conservation embracing:
(i) fisheries and aquatic resources;
(ii) wild life;
(iii) forestry and soil conservation;
(iv) flood control and natural calamities;
(v) energy development;
(vi) conservation and utilization of surface and ground water
(vii) mineral resources
Two (2) points are worth making in this connection. Firstly, neither petitioners nor the Court has identified the particular
provision or provisions (if any) of the Philippine Environment Code which give rise to a specific legal right which petitioners
are seeking to enforce. Secondly, the Philippine Environment Code identifies with notable care the particular government
agency charged with the formulation and implementation of guidelines and programs dealing with each of the headings
and sub-headings mentioned above. The Philippine Environment Code does not, in other words, appear to contemplate
action on the part of private persons who are beneficiaries of implementation of that Code.
As a matter of logic, by finding petitioners' cause of action as anchored on a legal right comprised in the constitutional
statements above noted, the Court is in effect saying that Section 15 (and Section 16) of Article II of the Constitution are
self-executing and judicially enforceable even in their present form. The implications of this doctrine will have to be
explored in future cases; those implications are too large and far-reaching in nature even to be hinted at here.
My suggestion is simply that petitioners must, before the trial court, show a more specific legal right a right cast in
language of a significantly lower order of generality than Article II (15) of the Constitution that is or may be violated by
the actions, or failures to act, imputed to the public respondent by petitioners so that the trial court can validly render
judgment granting all or part of the relief prayed for. To my mind, the Court should be understood as simply saying that
such a more specific legal right or rights may well exist in our corpus of law, considering the general policy principles

found in the Constitution and the existence of the Philippine Environment Code, and that the trial court should have given
petitioners an effective opportunity so to demonstrate, instead of aborting the proceedings on a motion to dismiss.
It seems to me important that the legal right which is an essential component of a cause of action be a specific, operable
legal right, rather than a constitutional or statutory policy, for at least two (2) reasons. One is that unless the legal right
claimed to have been violated or disregarded is given specification in operational terms, defendants may well be unable to
defend themselves intelligently and effectively; in other words, there are due process dimensions to this matter.
The second is a broader-gauge consideration where a specific violation of law or applicable regulation is not alleged or
proved, petitioners can be expected to fall back on the expanded conception of judicial power in the second paragraph of
Section 1 of Article VIII of the Constitution which reads:
Section 1. . . .
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which
are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been agrave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government. (Emphasis supplied)
When substantive standards as general as "the right to a balanced and healthy ecology" and "the right to health"
are combined with remedial standards as broad ranging as "a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction," the result will be, it is respectfully submitted, to propel courts into the uncharted ocean of
social and economic policy making. At least in respect of the vast area of environmental protection and
management, our courts have no claim to special technical competence and experience and professional
qualification. Where no specific, operable norms and standards are shown to exist, then the policy making
departments the legislative and executive departments must be given a real and effective opportunity to
fashion and promulgate those norms and standards, and to implement them before the courts should intervene.
My learned brother Davide, Jr., J., rightly insists that the timber companies, whose concession agreements or TLA's
petitioners demand public respondents should cancel, must be impleaded in the proceedings below. It might be asked
that, if petitioners' entitlement to the relief demanded is not dependent upon proof of breach by the timber companies of
one or more of the specific terms and conditions of their concession agreements (and this, petitioners implicitly assume),
what will those companies litigate about? The answer I suggest is that they may seek to dispute the existence of the
specific legal right petitioners should allege, as well as the reality of the claimed factual nexus between petitioners' specific
legal rights and the claimed wrongful acts or failures to act of public respondent administrative agency. They may also
controvert the appropriateness of the remedy or remedies demanded by petitioners, under all the circumstances which
exist.
I vote to grant the Petition for Certiorari because the protection of the environment, including the forest cover of our
territory, is of extreme importance for the country. The doctrines set out in the Court's decision issued today should,
however, be subjected to closer examination.

Oposa vs. Factoran Case Digest (G.R. No. 101083, July 30, 1993)
FACTS:
The plaintiffs in this case are all minors duly represented and joined by their parents. The first complaint was filed as a
taxpayer's class suit at the Branch 66 (Makati, Metro Manila), of the Regional Trial Court, National capital Judicial Region
against defendant (respondent) Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Reasources (DENR). Plaintiffs
alleged that they are entitled to the full benefit, use and enjoyment of the natural resource treasure that is the country's
virgin tropical forests. They further asseverate that they represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn and
asserted that continued deforestation have caused a distortion and disturbance of the ecological balance and have
resulted in a host of environmental tragedies.
Plaintiffs prayed that judgement be rendered ordering the respondent, his agents, representatives and other persons
acting in his behalf to cancel all existing Timber License Agreement (TLA) in the country and to cease and desist from
receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new TLAs.
Defendant, on the other hand, filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the complaint had no cause of action against
him and that it raises a political question.
The RTC Judge sustained the motion to dismiss, further ruling that granting of the relief prayed for would result in the
impairment of contracts which is prohibited by the Constitution.
Plaintiffs (petitioners) thus filed the instant special civil action for certiorari and asked the court to rescind and set aside the
dismissal order on the ground that the respondent RTC Judge gravely abused his discretion in dismissing the action.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether or not the plaintiffs have a cause of action.
(2) Whether or not the complaint raises a political issue.
(3) Whether or not the original prayer of the plaintiffs result in the impairment of contracts.
RULING:
First Issue: Cause of Action.
Respondents aver that the petitioners failed to allege in their complaint a specific legal right violated by the respondent
Secretary for which any relief is provided by law. The Court did not agree with this. The complaint focuses on one
fundamental legal right -- the right to a balanced and healthful ecology which is incorporated in Section 16 Article II of the
Constitution. The said right carries with it the duty to refrain from impairing the environment and implies, among many
other things, the judicious management and conservation of the country's forests. Section 4 of E.O. 192 expressly

mandates the DENR to be the primary government agency responsible for the governing and supervising the exploration,
utilization, development and conservation of the country's natural resources. The policy declaration of E.O. 192 is also
substantially re-stated in Title XIV Book IV of the Administrative Code of 1987. Both E.O. 192 and Administrative Code of
1987 have set the objectives which will serve as the bases for policy formation, and have defined the powers and
functions of the DENR. Thus, right of the petitioners (and all those they represent) to a balanced and healthful ecology is
as clear as DENR's duty to protect and advance the said right.
A denial or violation of that right by the other who has the correlative duty or obligation to respect or protect or respect the
same gives rise to a cause of action. Petitioners maintain that the granting of the TLA, which they claim was done with
grave abuse of discretion, violated their right to a balance and healthful ecology. Hence, the full protection thereof requires
that no further TLAs should be renewed or granted.
After careful examination of the petitioners' complaint, the Court finds it to be adequate enough to show, prima facie, the
claimed violation of their rights.
Second Issue: Political Issue.
Second paragraph, Section 1 of Article VIII of the constitution provides for the expanded jurisdiction vested upon the
Supreme Court. It allows the Court to rule upon even on the wisdom of the decision of the Executive and Legislature and
to declare their acts as invalid for lack or excess of jurisdiction because it is tainted with grave abuse of discretion.

Third Issue: Violation of the non-impairment clause.

The Court held that the Timber License Agreement is an instrument by which the state regulates the utilization and
disposition of forest resources to the end that public welfare is promoted. It is not a contract within the purview of the due
process clause thus, the non-impairment clause cannot be invoked. It can be validly withdraw whenever dictated by public
interest or public welfare as in this case. The granting of license does not create irrevocable rights, neither is it property or
property rights.
Moreover, the constitutional guaranty of non-impairment of obligations of contract is limit by the exercise by the police
power of the State, in the interest of public health, safety, moral and general welfare. In short, the non-impairment clause
must yield to the police power of the State.
The instant petition, being impressed with merit, is hereby GRANTED and the RTC decision is SET ASIDE.

Oposa et al. v. Fulgencio S. Factoran, Jr. et al (G.R. No. 101083)

Date of the Ruling:

Jul 30 1993
Forum:
Supreme Court of the Philippines
Nature of the Case:
Class action seeking the cancellation and non-issuance of timber licence agreements which allegedly infringed the
constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology (Section 16); non-impairment of contracts; Environmental law;
judicial review and the political question doctrine; inter-generational responsibility; Remedial law: cause of action and
standing; Directive principles; Negative obligation on State
Summary:
An action was filed by several minors represented by their parents against the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources to cancel existing timber license agreements in the country and to stop issuance of new ones. It was claimed

that the resultant deforestation and damage to the environment violated their constitutional rights to a balanced and
healthful ecology and to health (Sections 16 and 15, Article II of the Constitution). The petitioners asserted that they
represented others of their generation as well as generations yet unborn.
Finding for the petitioners, the Court stated that even though the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is under the
Declaration of Principles and State Policies of the Constitution and not under the Bill of Rights, it does not follow that it is
less important than any of the rights enumerated in the latter: [it] concerns nothing less than self-preservation and selfperpetuation, the advancement of which may even be said to predate all governments and constitutions. The right is
linked to the constitutional right to health, is fundamental, constitutionalised, self-executing and judicially
enforceable. It imposes the correlative duty to refrain from impairing the environment.
The court stated that the petitioners were able to file a class suit both for others of their generation and for succeeding
generations as the minors' assertion of their right to a sound environment constitutes, at the same time, the performance
of their obligation to ensure the protection of that right for the generations to come.
Significance of the Case:
This case has been widely-cited in jurisprudence worldwide, particularly in cases relating to forest/timber licensing.
However, the approach of the Philippino Supreme Court to economic, social and cultural rights has proved somewhat
inconsistent, with some judgments resulting in the enforcement of such rights (e.g., Del Rosario v Bangzon, 180 SCRA
521 (1989); Manila Prince Hotel v Government Service Insurance System, G. R. No. 122156 (3 February, 1997) but at
least one instance in which the Court made a statement that economic, social and cultural rights are not real rights
(see, Brigido Simon v Commission on Human Rights, G. R. No. 100150, 5 January 1994).