Values and Culture

Essay on Simon Blackburn, Being Good and

Peter
Berger and Anton Zijderveld, In Praise of
Doubt: How to Have Convictions Without
Becoming a Fanatic

Kynan Rendiprawiro
B00064230

10 September 2011

1. Berger/ Zijdervelt
The basic elements of ethics and politics of moderation
according to Berger/ Zijdervelt are based on the human freedom
and dignity. As for ethics of moderation one can take steps to the

Max Webers two type of ethics: ethic of attitude and ethic of

responsibility. And for politics of moderation Berger and Zijdervelt
believe that one must resist to fanaticism without being a fanatic
(B/Z, p.148). There is a big possibility that one become fanatic to
one perspective to resist other perspective. Therefore, one must be
more flexible to possibilities. Politics of moderation itself depends on
a balance between a core certainty and many possibilities of action,
none of which has the equality of certainty (B/Z, p.150).

When we practice the steps that we should take to achieve

ethics and politics of moderation in capital punishment for instance,
we might form a perspective from ethic of responsibility that there is
no humane way of executing people, innocent or not (B/Z, p.162).
With an attitude that capital punishment is intrinsically an assault on
human

dignity,

ethic

of

attitude

suggest

that

the

recent

developments should be rejected in principle, and that death

penalty should be solemnly declared to be in opposition to the basic
values of American democracy (B/Z, p.162).

In addition of those two ethics perspective, one can commit to

resist the capital punishment, but without forcing ones opinion to
get through straight away and end up being a fanatic. One must be
open to possibilities that maybe in the future there will be no more
capital punishment or maybe if capital punishment still exists, it is

not a Reason for one to be a fundamentalist to oppose the capital

punishment.

One must take every step with moderation. In this case of

capital punishment, one cannot be just pro-capital punishment or
anti-capital punishment. One must believe that everyone has the
same right to live and no one has the right to take it away no matter
how bad was the mistake that someone has done. There is no
justification for killing people, if the criminal has to be killed because
he killed someone, then the line between criminal and justice is very
thin. Thus, if one, say, resists to capital punishment, it must not
because of the sense of fair or unfair type of punishment but more
to humanity reason. By killing someone that doesnt mean that the
problem in the big picture will be solved.

2. Blackburn

Common point of view is a one of the foundations that can

avoid us from the threat of ethics. The author believes that common
point of view is necessary to the business of giving and receiving for
action, or for attitudes in general. He thinks that with common point
of view people would view an issue not just from me perspective
alone but rather from a shared perspective of others too. Otherwise,
people would not come to an understanding to achieve a solution in
one mind (B, p.129).

Although it is hard to achieve, we are capable of the common

point of view as the author describes.
If we are discussing which car to choose, we can expect shared
standard derived from what we want from a car: comfort, reliability,
economy, power and so forth. If you advance a reason for the choice
that I do not share, we can go on to deploy general standards for
whether such factor should itself count as a reason. There is no
guarantee that we will come to the same conclusion, of course, but
there is a guarantee that we might do so. (B, p.130)
With the given capability, author believes that it is enough to make
a conversation rational option, better than imposition of one solution
on everyone, by force or violence.

The foundation of this common point of view according to

Blackburn is to view things from others perspective as well.
However, this foundation is limited to the difficulty of people putting
themselves on someone elses position as individual has their own
concerns to put before others concerns. This is what make common
point of view seems like a myth.

Finally, from confidence restored Blackburn sees that from our

own self-understanding we can set our standards in the surrounding
climate of ideas of how to live without being lost in that climate of
ideas. And the standards can energize us to defend ourselves when

those standards are belittled or threatened (B, p.133). Blackburn

explains the idea.
We can cringe at the complacency of nineteenth-century European
thought, with its self-satisfied belief that it represented the march of
progress or civilization away from primitive or savage ways of the
rest of the world. We can wonder whether contemporary obsession
with rights, to the exclusion of any thought about the capacities of
the people with the rights, is entirely healthy. And we can certainly
be on the alert for traces of complacency in ourselves. (B, p.134135)
After all, we should be aware of our surrounding climate of ideas,
but we must not get caught up with it as we must set our own
standards of how to live our own life.