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SURVEY OF RECENT SUPREME COURT DECISIONS

IN CRIMINAL LAW
By:
PROF. PEDRO T. DABU, JR.
(Author: The Revised Penal Code: A Comprehensive Reviewer)

Article 3, Criminal Intent. The uncertainty of the exact location of the coconut trees negates the
presence of the criminal intent to gain.
Magsumbol vs. People, 743 SCRA 188, November 26, 2014
Mendoza, J.
Facts: Magsumbol, Mogsino, Inanoria and Ramirez cut down the coconut trees on the property
allegedly belonging to Menandro. Later, the men turned the felled trees into coco lumber. They
were charged for theft. During the trial, Atanacio testified that he authorized the accused to cut
down the coconut trees within the boundary of his property, which was adjacent to the land
owned by Menandro. The Brgy. Captain testified also that Magsumbol, Magsino, Ramirez, and
Inanoria came to his office seeking permission to cut down the coconut trees planted on the land
of Atanacio. Nonetheless, the RTC convicted all the accused. The CA affirmed with
modification that the crime committed by the accused would not fall under the general definition
of theft under Article 308 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), but rather under paragraph (2) of the
same provision which penalizes theft of damaged property.
Issue: Whether or not the accused are guilty of the crime of theft under the second paragraph of
Article 308.
Ruling:
Art. 308. Who are liable for theft.: xxxx
Theft is likewise committed by:
1. xxxxx;
2. Any person who, after having maliciously damaged the property of another, shall
remove or make use of the fruits or object of the damage caused by him; and xxx.
To warrant a conviction under the aforecited provision for theft of damaged property, the
prosecution must prove beyond reasonable that the accused maliciously damaged the property

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belonging to another and, thereafter, removed or used the fruits or object thereof, with intent to
gain. Evidently, theft of damaged property is an intentional felony for which criminal liability
attaches only when it is shown that the malefactor acted with criminal intent or malice. Criminal
intent must be clearly established with the other elements of the crime; otherwise, no crime is
committed.10 Was criminal intent substantiated to justify the conviction of Magsumbol and his
co-accused?
It does not so appear in this case.
There is no dispute that the land co-owned by Menandro is adjacent to the land owned by
Atanacio. The prosecution claimed that the thirty three (33) cut coconut trees were planted within
the land co-owned by Menandro. The defense, on the other hand, averred that only the coconut
trees found within the land of Atanacio were felled by Magsumbol and his co-accused. The
uncertainty of the exact location of the coconut trees negates the presence of the criminal intent
to gain.
But even granting arguendo that the said coconut trees were within Menandros land, no malice
or criminal intent could be rightfully attributed to Magsumbol and his co-accused. The accused
went to Barangay KinatihanI, Candelaria, Quezon, to cut down the coconut trees belonging to
Atanacio upon the latters instruction.
If, indeed, in the course of executing Atanacios instructions, Magsumbol and his co-accused
encroached on the land co-owned by Menandro, because they missed the undetectable boundary
between the two lots, and cut down some of Menandros trees, such act merely constituted
mistake or judgmental error.
The criminal mind is indeed wanting in the situation where Magsumbol and his co-accused even
sought prior permission from Brgy. Captain Arguelles to cut down the coconut trees which was
done openly and during broad daylight effectively negated malice and criminal intent on their
part. It defies reason that the accused would still approach the barangay captain if their real
intention was to steal the coconut trees of Menandro. Besides, criminals would usually execute
their criminal activities clandestinely or through stealth or strategy to avoid detection of the
commission of a crime or a wrongdoing.
Abberatio ictus, murder, complex crime
People vs. Umawid, June 9, 2014, 725 SCRA 597
Facts: Vicente was staying with his two (2)-year old granddaughter, Maureen, at the terrace of
their house located at San Manuel. Suddenly, Umawid appeared and started attacking Vicente
with a panabas with neither reason nor provocation. While Vicente was able to evade Umawids
blows, the latter nevertheless hit Maureen on her abdomen and back, causing her instantaneous
death. Upon seeing Maureen bloodied, Umawid walked away.
Issue: Whether or not Umawid is liable for the death of Maureen when he intended to injure
Vicente.

Ruling: Yes, Umawid is criminally liable for murder. Maureens death is a case of aberratio
ictus, given that the fatal blow therefor was only delivered by mistake as it was actually Vicente
who was Umawids intended target.
In this regard, Umawids single deed actually resulted in the: (a) Attempted Murder of Vicente;
and (b) Consummated Murder of Maureen. This may be classified as species of complex crime
defined under Article 48 of the RPC, particularly, a delitocompuesto, or a compound crime
where a single act produces two (2) or more grave or less grave felonies. 30Based on the
foregoing, Umawid should have been punished for committing the complex crime of Murder and
Attempted Murder, pursuant to Article 48 in relation to Article 4(1) 31 of the RPC. However,
considering that the information in Criminal Case No. 23-0471 only charged him with the
Murder of Maureen, Umawid cannot be convicted of a complex crime because to do so would be
violative of his right to due process.
It is murder because while it was not shown that Umawid consciously employed treachery so as
to insure the death of Maureen, who was then just two (2) years old at the time, it is well to
reiterate that the killing by an adult of a minor child is treacherous, and thus, qualifies Maureens
killing to Murder.
Stages in the Commission of the Crime (Article 6)
Attempted robbery with homicide
People vs. Barra, July 10, 2013
Facts: Barra entered the house of Lagdaan, which was lit with a lamp, and poked a gun to the
victims right forehead and demanded money. When the victim stated that the money was not in
his possession, Barra shot him.
Ruling: Very clearly, the intention of the accused was to extort money from the victim. By
reason of the victims refusal to give up his personal property - his money - to Barra, the victim
was shot in the head, causing his death. The crime of robbery remained unconsummated because
the victim refused to give his money to Barra and no personal property was shown to have been
taken. It was for this reason that the victim was shot. Barra can only be found guilty of attempted
robbery with homicide, thus punishable under Article 297 of the Revised Penal Code.
Frustrated Homicide;The essential element in frustrated or attempted homicide is the intent of
the offender to kill the victim immediately before or simultaneously with the infliction of injuries.
Intent to kill is a specific intent
De Guzman vs. People, 742 SCRA 501, November 26, 2014
Facts: At about ten oclock in the evening, Alexander was fetching water below his rented house
at 443 Aglipay Street, Old Zaniga St., Mandaluyong City when suddenly Alfredo, hit him on the

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nape. When Lucila, brother of Alfredo, apologized and told the latter to just go up, Alexander
obliged and went upstairs. He took a rest for about two hours. Thereafter, at around 12:00 to
12:15 A.M., Alexander went down and continued to fetch water. While pouring water into a
container, Alfredo suddenly appeared in front of Alexander and stabbed him on his left face and
chest. Alexander was brought to the hospital. Alexander sustained two stab wounds.
Issue: Accused insisted that he should be held liable only for serious physical injuries because
the intent to kill, the necessary element to characterize the crime as homicide, was not
sufficiently established.
Ruling: The elements of frustrated homicide are: (1) the accused intended to kill his victim, as
manifested by his use of a deadly weapon in his assault; (2) the victim sustained fatal or mortal
wound but did not die because of timely medical assistance; and (3) none of the qualifying
circumstances for murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, is present.
The essential element in frustrated or attempted homicide is the intent of the offender to kill the
victim immediately before or simultaneously with the infliction of injuries. Intent to kill is a
specific intent that the State must allege in the information, and then prove by either direct or
circumstantial evidence, as differentiated from a general criminal intent, which is presumed from
the commission of a felony by dolo.8
Intent to kill, being a state of mind, is discerned by the courts only through external
manifestations, i.e., the acts and conduct of the accused at the time of the assault and
immediately thereafter. The following factors may determine the presence of intent to kill,
namely: (1) the means used by the malefactors; (2) the nature, location, and number of wounds
sustained by the victim; (3) the conduct of the malefactors before, during, or immediately after
the killing of the victim; and (4) the circumstances under which the crime was committed and the
motives of the accused. The motive of the offender and the words he uttered at the time of
inflicting the injuries on the victim may also be considered.
Alfredo wielded and used a knife in his assault on Alexander. The medical records indicate,
indeed, that Alexander sustained two stab wounds, specifically, one on his upper left chest and
the other on the left side of his face. The petitioners attack was unprovoked with the knife used
therein causing such wounds, thereby belying his submission, and firmly proving the presence of
intent to kill. There is also to be no doubt about the wound on Alexanders chest being sufficient
to result into his death were it not for the timely medical intervention.
Alfredo already performed all the acts of execution that should produce the felony of homicide
as a consequence, but did not produce it by reason of causes independent of his will, i.e., the
timely medical attention accorded to Alexander.

Conspiracy(Article 8)
Castillo vs. Prudential Life Plans, March 26, 2014, 720 SCRA 129
Facts: In the CBA of Prudentialife and its employees, the latter were granted an optical benefit
allowance to subsidize prescription eyeglasses for those who have developed vision problems in
the course of employment.
Prudentialife was flooded with requests to avail the benefit and seek reimbursement for
eyeglasses the employees supposedly purchased from a single outfit/supplier, Alavera Optical.
Suspecting fraud, Prudentialife began an investigation into the matter. Based on Prudentialifes
initial findings it was discovered that some of the eyeglasses had no grade, that the cost of
petitioners eyeglasses, as declared in their respective official receipts and reimbursement
requests, was excessive compared to similar frames and lenses being sold by other reputable
optical shops. Prudentiallife hence issued individual notices of termination against the
petitioners. Prudentialife concluded that petitioners knowingly conspired and availed of the
optical benefit allowance to obtain a refund of the maximum P2,500.00 benefit even though they
did not have vision problems.
Issue: Whether or not conspiracy is attendant in this case.
Ruling: In conspiracy, all those who in one way or another helped and cooperated in the
consummation of the crime are considered coprincipals since the degree or character of the
individual participation of each conspirator in the commission of the crime becomes immaterial.
In proving complicity, direct evidence is not necessary, as it can be clearly deduced from the acts
of the conspirators; it may be proved through a series of acts done in pursuance of a common
unlawful purpose.
It has been sufficiently shown that petitioners actually took part in the commission of the acts
complained of. By presenting the false receipt to their employer to obtain reimbursement for an
expense which they did not in fact incur, this constituted dishonesty. In addition, an eyeglass
without graded lenses could only indicate that the wearer thereof has no vision problems, which
does away with the necessity of availing of the optical benefit provision under the CBA which is
understandably reserved for those employees who have developed vision problems in the course
of employment. By availing of the benefit, the employee represents to Prudentialife that he has
developed vision problems. If this is not true, then he has committed an act of dishonesty as
well. Given the circumstances then obtaining, the same principle holds true with respect to
eyeglasses whose lenses do not match the corresponding prescription. These series of acts in
pursuance of common unlawful purpose of the employees show conspiracy.
Justifying circumstances
Self Defense
People vs. Warriner, June 16, 2014, 726 SCRA 469
Facts: VictimSta Maria was having a drinking spree with his friends, across their table; accused

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Warriner was also having a good time with his friends. At the height of their revelry, Sta Maria
noticed that Warriners group kept on giving them dagger looks, he approached their table and
confronted them. Soon thereafter he returned to his table. Warriner, did not appear to take the
matter lightly and retorted to Sta Marias companion pagsuotin mo ng helmet yan. At about 3
a.m., Warriner approached Sta Maria, without any warning. Warriner hit him in the head with a
gun, and as the latter was about to rise from his seat and face his assailant, Warriner shot Sta
Maria in the forehead. Warriner invoked self defense.
Issue: Whether or not Warriner is entitled to the justifying circumstance of self defense.
Ruling: Whenever self-defense is invoked in court, the burden shifts to the accused to prove the
elements of such claim. Warriner failed to discharge such burden. The records indicate the
absence of an unlawful aggression which could be ascribed to Sta. Maria. It was clear that Sta
Maria did not perform any act that put Warriners life or safety in actual or imminent danger.
While it was established that Sta Maria approached his assailants table and confronted them for
alleged dagger looks, he neither uttered threats nor inflicted physical harm upon Warriners
group and instead voluntarily returned to his table after the confrontation. Such was also the
situation at the time that Warriner inflicted the fatal wound upon Sta Maria. It was then evident
that Warriner was the aggressor rather than the object of the victims alleged aggression.
Defense of Relatives
Quintos vs. People, September 10, 2014, 735 SCRA 16
Facts: Accused Pedro noticed that Freddie dela Cruz, who was holding a bolo, was shouting and
demonstrating threatening attitude towards his brother,Lando. Pedro hurried over and hacked
Freddie dela Cruz to defend his brother. According to Pedro, his senses dimmed and he did not
remember how many times he hacked Freddie dela Cruz. After a few days, Freddie dela Cruz
died from his injuries. Hence the accused was charged with the crime of homicide.
Issues: Whether or not Pedro can availed of the defense of a relative.
Ruling: The Supreme Court ruled in the negative.For the accused to be entitled to exoneration
based on defense of relatives, complete or incomplete, it is essential that there be unlawful
aggression on the part of the victim, for if there is no unlawful aggression, there would be
nothing to prevent or repel.
Mere shouting, and intimidating or threatening attitude of the victim does not constitute unlawful
aggression. Unlawful aggression refers to an attack that has actually broken out or materialized
or at the very least is clearly imminent; it cannot consist in oral threats or merely a threatening
stance or posture.
Exempting circumstances
Minority

People vs. Roxas, June 4, 2014, 725 SCRA 181

De Castro, J
Facts: Accused-appellant Milan Roxas was charged with five counts of rape with force and
intimidation. AAA, the minor niece of Roxas, testified that from 1997 to 1998, Roxas, who was
18 years old, had carnal knowledge, while pointing a sharp instrument, at her. In his
defense,Roxas presented the testimony of Dr. Aglipay, the Regional Psychiatrist of the BJMP,
who said that Roxas was suffering from a mild mental retardation with a mental age of nine (9)
to ten (10) years old, hence should be exempted from criminal responsibility.
Issue: Whether or not Roxas, who was eighteen years old at the time of the commission of the
crime, be exempt from criminal liability under R.A. No. 9344 due to having a mental age of a
nine year old.
Ruling: No, Roxas is not exempted from criminal liability. There was no sufficient evidence that
the accused was imbecile. In determining the age for purposes of exemption from criminal
liability under R.A. No. 9344, Sec. 6 thereof clearly refers to the age as determined by the
anniversary of ones birth date, and not the mental age of the accused.
Minority, condemning a minor to prison would not be in violation of his rights as a child in
conflict with the law even if Republic Act No. 9344 and international agreements bestows on
children in conflict with the law the right not to be unlawfully or arbitrarily deprived of their
liberty; imprisonment as a proper disposition of a case is duly recognized, subject to certain
restrictions on the imposition of imprisonment
Hubilla vs. People, 742 SCRA 487, November 26, 2014
BERSAMIN, J.:
Hubilla was charged with homicide.After trial, the RTC rendered its judgment finding the
petitioner guilty of homicide as charged, and sentenced him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of
imprisonment for four years and one day of prisioncorreccional, as minimum, to eight years and
one day of prision mayor, as maximum; and to pay to the heirs of the victim
The CA modified the penalty by reducing the penalty to an indeterminate penalty of six months
and one day of prisioncorreccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor.
Issues: (1) Whether the sentence can still be reduced to only six years of prision correctional to
enable the petitioner to apply for probation.
(2) Whether condemning him to prison would be in violation of his rights as a child in
conflict with the law as bestowed by Republic Act No. 9344 and international agreements.

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Ruling:
On the first issue
Neither the Revised Penal Code, nor Republic Act No. 9344, nor any other relevant law or rules
support or justify the further reduction of the maximum of the indeterminate sentence. To yield
to his insistence would be to impose an illegal penalty, and would cause the Court to deliberately
violate the law. Nowhere in Republic Act No. 9344 allows the trial and appellate courts the
discretion to reduce or lower the penalty further, even for the sake of enabling the child in
conflict with the law to qualify for probation.
Conformably with Section 9(a) of Presidential Decree 968,12 which disqualifies from probation
an offender sentenced to serve a maximum term of imprisonment of more than six years, the
petitioner could not qualify for probation.
Although Section 38 of Republic Act No. 9344 allows the suspension of the sentence of a child
in conflict with the law adjudged as guilty of a crime, the suspension is available only until the
child offender turns 21 years of age. Here,petitioner was well over 23 years of age at the time of
his conviction for homicide by the RTC on July 19, 2006. Hence, the suspension of his sentence
was no longer legally feasible or permissible.
On the second issue
A review of the provisions of Republic Act No. 9344 reveals, however, that imprisonment of
children in conflict with the law is by no means prohibited. While Section 5 (c) of Republic Act
No. 9344 bestows on children in conflict with the law the right not to be unlawfully or arbitrarily
deprived of their liberty; imprisonment as a proper disposition of a case is duly recognized,
subject to certain restrictions on the imposition of imprisonment, namely: (a) the detention or
imprisonment is a disposition of last resort, and (b) the detention or imprisonment shall be for the
shortest appropriate period of time. Thereby, the trial and appellate courts did not violate the
letter and spirit of Republic Act No. 9344 by imposing the penalty of imprisonment on the
petitioner simply because the penalty was imposed as a last recourse after holding him to be
disqualified from probation and from the suspension of his sentence, and the term of his
imprisonment was for the shortest duration permitted by the law.
A survey of relevant international agreements13 supports the course of action taken herein. The
United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Administration of Juvenile Justice (Beijing
Guidelines),14 the United Nations Guidelines for the Prevention of Juvenile Delinquency (Riyadh
Guidelines) and the United Nations Rules for the Protection of Juveniles Deprived of
Liberty15 are consistent in recognizing that imprisonment is a valid form of disposition, provided
it is imposed as a last resort and for the minimum necessary period.
However, following Section 51 of Republic Act No. 9344, the petitioner, although he has to serve
his sentence, may serve it in an agricultural camp or other training facilities to be established,
maintained, supervised and controlled by the Bureau of Corrections, in coordination with the

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Department of Social Welfare and Development, in a manner consistent with the offender childs
best interest. Such service of sentence will be in lieu of service in the regular penal institution.
Passion or Obfuscation
People vs. Oloverio, March 18, 2015
Leonen, J.
Facts: Gulane, the victim, had accused Oloverio of having an incestuous relationship with his
mother. Oliverio kept his cool and told Gulane to go home, but the latter continued to mock him
by asking in a loud voice, "How many times did you have sexual intercourse with your mother?"
He allegedly asked Gulane to go home again but the latter angrily replied, "Who are you to tell
me to go home?"While Gulane was walking, Oloverio tapped his shoulder. Gulane attempted to
draw his bolo but Oloverio stopped him by drawing his own bolo. They grappled with it, and
eventually, Oloverio ended up stabbing Gulane, which resulted in the latter's death.
Issue: Whether or not the accused is entitled to the mitigating circumstances of passion and
obfuscation
Ruling: The accused is entitled to the mitigating circumstance of passion or obfuscation. There is
passion or obfuscation when the crime was committed due to an uncontrollable burst of passion
provoked by prior unjust or improper acts, or due to a legitimate stimulus so powerful as to
overcome reason.
It has been held that "[T]here is passion and obfuscation when the crime was committed due to
an uncontrollable burst of passion provoked by prior unjust or improper acts, or due to a
legitimate stimulus so powerful as to overcome reason."
"The obfuscation must originate from lawful feelings. The turmoil and unreason which naturally
result from a quarrel or fight should not be confused with the sentiment or excitement in the
mind of a person injured or offended to such a degree as to deprive him of his sanity and selfcontrol, because the cause of this condition of mind must necessarily have preceded the
commission
of
the
offense."
Moreover, "the act producing the obfuscation must not be far removed from the commission of
the crime by a considerable length of time, during which the accused might have recovered his
normal equanimity.
There is no uniform rule on what constitutes "a considerable length of time." The provocation
and the commission of the crime should not be so far apart that a reasonable length of time has
passed during which the accused would have calmed down and be able to reflect on the
consequences of his or her actions. What is important is that the accused has not yet "recovered
his normal equanimity" when he committed the crime

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Aggravating Circumstances
Aid of armed men/homicide/warrantless arrest
People vs. Enojas, 718 SCRA 313, March 10, 2014
PO2 Gregorio and Pangilinan, while patrolling, spotted a taxi that was suspiciously parked in an
intersection. They approached the taxi and asked the driver (later indentified as Enojas) for his
documents. He complied but entertaining doubts, the policemen asked him to come with them to
the police station in their mobile car for further questioning. Enojas voluntarily went with the
policemen. On reaching a 7-11 convenience store, they stopped and PO2 Pangilinan went down
to relieve himself there. As he approached the stores door, he came upon two suspected robbers
and shot it out with them. One of the them fired at PO2 Pangilinan causing his death. PO2
Gregorio came around and engaged the suspected robbers but the latter were able to take a taxi
and fled. Meanwhile, Enojas had fled. P/InspTorred and PO2 Rosarito responded to the call of
PO2 Gregorio.
Suspecting that Enojas was involved in the attempted robbery, they searched his taxi and found a
mobile that Enojas apparently left behind. PO3 Cambi monitored its incoming calls. Posing as
Enojas, Cambi communicated with the other accused. The police then conducted an entrapment
operation that resulted in the arrest of the accused Santos and Jalandoni. Subsequently, the
police were also able to capture Enojas and Gomez.
Issues:
1. Was aid of armed men qualified the crime to murder? Was murder committed?
2. What is the effect of the use of unlicensed firerarm?
3. Was there valid warrantless arrest?
Answers:
1. In aid of armed men, the men act as accomplices only. They must not be acting in
the commission of the crime under the same purpose as the principal accused, otherwise, they are
to be regarded as co-principals or co-conspirators. Here, all of the accused were co-conspirators.
Hence, aid of armed men cannot be appreciated. The offenders are liable for homicide only.
2. The use of unlicensed firearm is a special aggravating circumstance that is not among
the circumstances mentioned in Article 248 of the RPC as qualifying a homicide to murder.

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3. A crime had been committed-the killing of PO2 Pangilinan- and the investigating
police officers had personal knowledge of facts indicating that the persons they were to arrest
had committed it. The text messages to and from the mobile phone left at the scene by accused
Enojas provided strong leads on the participation and identities of the accused.
Incidentally, text messages can be admitted under the Rules on Electronic Evidence to
criminal actions provided they are proved by the testimony of a person who was a party to the
same or has personal knowledge of them.

Treachery
People vs. Feliciano, Jr. May 5, 2014, 724 SCRA 148
Facts: On December 8, 1994, seven (7) members of the Sigma Rho fraternity were eating lunch
at the Beach House Canteen, near the Main Library of the University of the Philippines, Diliman,
when they were attacked by several masked men carrying baseball bats and lead pipes. Some of
them sustained injuries that required hospitalization. One of them, Dennis Venturina, died from
his injuries. An information for murder was filed against several members of the Scintilla Juris
fraternity. The RTC found Alvir, Feliciano, Jr., Soliva, Medalla, and Zingapan guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of murder and attempted murder and were sentenced to, among other penalties,
the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Issue: Whether or not Feliciano and several others were correctly charged with murder due to the
presence of treachery.
Ruling: Yes, For treachery to be considered, two elements must concur: (1) the employment of
means of execution that gives the persons attacked no opportunity to defend themselves or
retaliate; and (2) the means of execution were deliberately or consciously adopted. The victims in
this case were eating lunch on campus. They were not at a place where they would be reasonably
expected to be on guard for any sudden attack by rival fraternity men. The victims, who were
unarmed, were also attacked with lead pipes and baseball bats. The only way they could parry
the blows was with their arms. In a situation where they were unnamed and outnumbered, it
would be impossible for them to fight back against the attackers. The attack also happened in less
than a minute, which would preclude any possibility of the bystanders being able to help them
until after the incident. The swiftness and the suddenness of the attack gave no opportunity for
the victims to retaliate or even to defend themselves. Treachery, therefore, was present in this
case.
Criminal Participation
Conspirators versus Accomplices
People vs. Eusebio, February 25, 2013

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ABAD, J.:
On September 27, 2000 the Department of Justice charged the accused P03 Jesus Bongon, Jr.,
SP02 Romeo Isidro, Robert Sy, Jojit George Contreras, BoyetParilla, and PO 1 Ricardo P.
Eusebio of murder committed in conspiracy with each other before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of PasayCity. Since accused Sy and Parilla remained at-large, trial proceeded only with
respect to Bongon, Isidro, Contreras, and Eusebio.1
At around 6:00 p.m. on August 7, 1999 Jaime Magsino received a phone call at home, prompting
him to leave on board his motorcycle. He proceeded to the store of accused Bongon on a street in
PasayCity, stopping his motorcycle right near where Bongonstood. At this point, accused
Eusebio, Isidro, and Contreras, as well as accused Sy and Parillaappeared from a nearby alley
and took positions near Magsino. As Magsino alighted from his motorcycle, Bongon shot him
three times, causing him to fall. Eusebio and Isidro, together with Contreras, Sy, and Parilla
drew their guns and they, too, fired at the fallen victim. All six shooters approached Magsino,
turned his body over, and kicked him as they laughed.
Issue: Whether or not Eusebio, Isidro and Contreras were merely accomplices.
Ruling: Conspirators are persons who, under Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), "come
to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it." Because
witnesses are rarely present when several accused come to an agreement to commit a crime, such
agreement is usually inferred from their "concerted actions" while committing it. On the other
hand, accomplices, according to Article 18 of the RPC, are the persons who, not being included
in Article 17 [which identifies who are principals], "cooperate in the execution of the offense by
previous or simultaneous acts."
The line that separates a conspirator by concerted action from an accomplice by previous or
simultaneous acts is indeed slight. Accomplices do not decide whether the crime should be
committed; but they assent to the plan and cooperate in its accomplishment. The solution in case
of doubt is that, such doubt should be resolved in favor of the accused.
It was held that when there is doubt as to whether a guilty participant in a homicide performed
the role of principal or accomplice, the Court should favor the "milder form of responsibility."
He should be given the benefit of the doubt and can be regarded only as an accomplice. (People
vs. Jose Tamayo, 44 Phil. 38; People vs. Bantangan, 54 Phil. 834, 840; People vs. Lansang, 82
Phil. 662, 667; People vs. Ubina, 97 Phil. 515; People vs. Raganit, 88 Phil. 467; People vs.
Pastores, 40 SCRA 498; People vs. Tolentino, 40 SCRA 514). Hence, in the case at bar, the
accused Eusebio, Isidro and Contreras should be granted the benefit of doubt and should be
considered merely as accomplices and should be meted a penalty one degree lower than that to
be imposed on accused Jesus Bongon, Jr. who is unequivocally the principal.
Complex Crime

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People vs. Mores, June 26, 2013
Facts: In the gymnasium, Mores and Famor seated beside each other and they were talking to
each other. While the dancing was going on inside the gym, Mores pulled out a grenade from his
left pocket, transferred it to his right hand and then threw it on the floor as if rolling a ball.
Around 24 persons were treated at the hospital for shrapnel injuries but RamieBalasa did not
survive as he died while in the hospital.
Issue: What was the crime committed by the duo?
Ruling. Only Mores committed the complex crime of murder with multiple attempted murder.
The single act of pitching or rolling the hand grenade on the floor of the gymnasium which
resulted in the death of Ramie Balasa (Balasa) and injuries to other victims constituted a
complex crime under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code which states that when a single act
constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, the penalty for the most serious crime shall
be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period. The penalty for the most serious
crime of Murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code is reclusion perpetua to death.
Thus, applying Article 48, the death penalty should be imposed. However, pursuant to Republic
Act No. 9346, the proper sentence therefore is reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole.
Penalty: Reclusion Perpetua
People vs. Morilla, 715 SCRA 452, February 5, 2014
The Supreme Court, once again, explained that reclusion perpetua entails imprisonment for at
least 30 years after which the convict becomes eligible for pardon. It also carries with it
accessory penalties i.e. special perpetual disqualification. Life imprisonment does not appear to
have any definite extent or duration and carries no accessory penalties.
Probation Law
Suyan vs. People, July 02, 2014, 729 SCRA 1
Facts: On 22 November 1995, Suyan was convicted for violating Section 16, Article III of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6425 for which he was sentenced to suffer the penalty of six (6) years of
prisioncorreccional and to pay the costs. On even date, he filed his application for probation. The
RTC issued a Probation Order covering a period of six (6) years. However, while on probation,
Suyanwas apprehended twice for drug possession. The probation of Suyan was revoked by the
RTC.
Issue: Whether or not probation was validly revoked in this case.
Ruling: Yes it was validly revoked. Suyan has been apprehended twice for drug possession while
on probation. As probation is a mere discretionary grant, Suyan was bound to observe full
obedience to the terms and conditions pertaining to the probation order or run the risk of

14
revocation of this privilege. The Court's discretion to grant probation is to be exercised primarily
for the benefit of organized society and only incidentally for the benefit of the accused. Having
the power to grant probation, it follows that the trial court also has the power to order its
revocation in a proper case and under appropriate circumstances.

Extinction of criminal liability and civil liability arising from crime

Effect of the death of accused during trial on his civil liability arising from crime
People vs. Dadao, 714 SCRA 524
One of the accused Eddie Malogsio died during the pendency of the case on August 25, 2003,
but still the trial court convicted him in its decision dated January 31, 2005.
Held: Considering that no final judgment had been rendered against him at the time of his death,
whether or not he was guilty of the crime charged had become irrelevant because his crime and
civil liabilities arising from the crime were extinguished by his death following by analogy
People vs. Bayotas.
(N.B. People vs. Bunay, 630 SCRA 445 (2010) held that the death of the accused during the
pendency of his appeal in the Supreme Court totally extinguished his criminal liability based on
Article 89.
Prescription of Violation of RA 3019; Violations before March 16, 1982 prescribes in 10 years;
violations after said date prescribes in 15 years; reckoning period is from violation if known,
but when information is not available to the public or there is suppression of information, then
from discovery of the violation.
PCCG vs. Ombudsman, et al, 740 SCRA 368, November 12, 2014
Velasco, J.
In 1969, Resorts Hotel Corporation (RHC) with paid up capital of 1.0 million and 37.2% owned
by Rodolfo Cuenca, a known Marcos business associate, was granted loan by the DBP to pay the
balance of the purchase price of Baguio Pines Hotel and to construct an 8-storey building. In
1973, the loan was restructured and DBP granted a direct loan of P14.4 million and guaranteed
another P11.2 million. In 1974, an additional loan ofP8.9 million was granted to RHC for the
expansion of its hotel project, and P3.6 million for the cost of 10 luxury buses. In 1975, an
additional loan of P27.8 million was again granted to RHC for another expansion project, and in
1977, it again obtained P11.3 million to refinance its unpaid obligations and partly to finance
Taal Vista. To secure the loans totaling P86.9 million, RHC offered as collaterals the assets that
were acquired by these loans which included the Baguio Pines Hotel, Taal Vista Lodge, Hotel
Mindanao and the luxury buses. In 1980, 40% of the amount were converted into DBPs

15
common shareholding in RHC, and the balance of P58.4 million was restructured. The properties
were foreclosed in 1983 with arrearages of P11.97 million.
PCGG, filed an Affidavit-Complaint on January 6, 2003 with the Office of the Ombudsman,
against respondent directors and officers of RHC and the directors of DBP for violation of
Sections 3(e) and 3 (g) of Republic Act (RA) No. 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act.2
On March 8, 2012, the Ombudsman dismissed the complaint on the ground of prescription.
Issues:
(1) What is the prescriptive period for Violation of RA 3019 for violations committed
prior to March 16, 1982, 10 years as originally provided in the law or 15 years as set forth in
Batas PambansaBilang 195 which took in effect on March 16, 1982.
(2) What is the reckoning point in the computation of the prescriptive period?
Ruling:
On the first issue:
Section 11 of RA 3019 provides that all offenses punishable under said law shall prescribe in ten
(10) years. This period was later increased to fifteen (15) years with the passage ofBatas
Pambansa (BP) Blg. 195, which took effect on March 16, 1982. This does not mean, however,
that the longer prescriptive period shall apply to all violations of RA 3019. The rule is that "in the
interpretation of the law on prescription of crimes, that which is more favorable to the accused is
to be adopted. As such, the longer prescriptive period of 15 years pursuant to BP Blg. 195 cannot
be applied to crimes committed prior to the effectivity of the said amending law on March 16,
1982. Considering that the crimes were committed in 1969, 1970, 1973, 1975, and 1977, the
applicable prescriptive period thereon is the ten-year period set in RA 3019, the law in force at
that time
Second issue
Act No. 3326, Section 2 of which provides in part:
Sec. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law,
and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of
judicial proceeding for its investigation and punishment. xxx.
Based on the above, there are two reckoning points for the counting of the prescription of an
offense: 1) the day of the commission of the violation of the law; and 2) if the day when the
violation was committed be not known, then it shall begin to run from the discovery of said
violation and the institution of judicial proceedings for investigation and punishment.

16
In interpreting the meaning of the phrase "if the same be not known at the time, from the
discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceeding for its investigation," this Court has,
as early as 1992 in People v. Duque,8 held that in cases where the illegality of the activity is not
known to the complainant at the time of its commission, Act No. 3326, Section 2 requires that
prescription, in such a case, would begin to run only from the discovery thereof, i.e. discovery of
the unlawful nature of the constitutive act or acts.9
In the 199915 and 201116 cases of Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans
v. Desierto, the Court, in said separate instances, held that the prescriptive period therein began
to run not at the time the behest loans were transacted and instead, it should be counted from the
date of the discovery thereof. This is because of the impossibility for the State, the aggrieved
party, to have known the violation of RA 3019 at the time the questioned transactions were made
in view of the fact that the public officials concerned connived or conspired with the
"beneficiaries of the loans."
In the 2011 Desierto case, the "blameless ignorance" doctrine was applied considering that the
plaintiff therein had no reasonable means of knowing the existence of a cause of action.
Hence, here are the following guidelines in the determination of the reckoning point for the
period of prescription of violations of RA 3019, viz:
1. As a general rule, prescription begins to run from the date of the commission of the
offense.
2. If the date of the commission of the violation is not known, it shall be counted form the
date of discovery thereof.
3. In determining whether it is the general rule or the exception that should apply in a
particular case, the availability or suppression of the information relative to the crime
should first be determined.
If the necessary information, data, or records based on which the crime could be discovered is
readily available to the public, the general rule applies. Prescription shall, therefore, run from the
date of the commission of the crime.
Otherwise, should martial law prevent the filing thereof or should information about the violation
be suppressed, possibly through connivance, then the exception applies and the period of
prescription shall be reckoned from the date of discovery thereof.
In the case at bar, considering that, by their nature, the violations could be concealed from the
public eye by the simple expedient of suppressing their documentation,25the second mode
applies. Therefore, the running of the prescriptive period shall be counted from the date of
discovery thereof on January 4, 1993, when the Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee
reported to the President its findings and conclusions anent RHCs loans. This being the case, the
filing by the PCGG of its Affidavit-Complaint before the Office of the Ombudsman on January

17
6, 2003, a little over ten (10) years from the date of discovery of the crimes, is clearly belated.
Undoubtedly, the ten-year period within which to institute the action has already lapsed.

Prescription of ordinances and special penal laws

Jadewell Parking Systems Corporation vs, Judge Lidua, Sr, et al October 7, 2013
Leonen, J.
Facts: Petitioner Jadewell Parking Systems Corporation is a private parking operator duly
authorized to operate and manage the parking spaces in BaguioCity pursuant to City Ordinance
003-2000. It is also authorized under Section 13 of the City Ordinance to render any motor
vehicle immobile by placing its wheels in a clamp if the vehicle is illegally parked.
Jadewellpersonel placed a clamp to the left front wheel of the Mitsubishi Adventure with Plate
No. WRK 624 owned by Edwin Ang which was then illegally parked and left unattended at a
Loading and Unloading Zone. On May 17, 2003,Ang, et al removed the clamp and did not pay
the fine and the declamping fee. On May 23, 2003, Jadewell filed a complaint with the Office of
the City Prosecutor of Baguio City for robbery and violations of City Ordinance. The
Prosecutors Office found probable cause for violation of the City Ordinance and filed the
Information on October 2, 2003
Issue: Whether the filing of the Complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor on May 23,
2003 tolled the prescription period of the commission of the offense charged against the
respondents.
Ruling: With regard to the prescription period, Act No. 3326, as amended, is the only statute that
provides for any prescriptive period for the violation of special laws and municipal ordinances.
No other special law provides any other prescriptive period, and the law does not provide any
other distinction. When Act No. 3326 says that the period of prescription shall be suspended
"when proceedings are instituted against the guilty party." the proceedings referred to in Section
2 thereof are "judicial proceedings,".
Under the 1991 Revised Rules on Summary Procedure, violations of municipal and city
ordinance are covered by the said rules.Under Section 11 of the said Rules, the filing of criminal
cases shall be either by complaint or by information but in Metropolitan Manila and in Chartered
Cities, such cases shall be commenced only by information, except when the offense cannot be
prosecuted de officio.
As provided in the Revised Rules on Summary Procedure, only the filing of an Information tolls
the prescriptive period where the crime charged is involved in an ordinance. The respondent
judge was correct when he applied the rule in Zaldivia v. Reyes. The offense was committed on
May 7, 2003 and was discovered by the attendants of the petitioner on the same day. These
actions effectively commenced the running of the prescription period. The prescription period is

18
60 days from May 7. Hence when the Information was filed on October 2, 2003, more than 60
days had elapsed, hence, the offense had already prescribed.

Specific crimes
Violation of Domicile (Article 128): A person who appealed his conviction for less physical
injuries can be convicted of violation of domicile; double jeopardy did not attach
Geroche, et al vs. People, 742 SCRA 514, November 26, 2014
Facts: Petitioners EdigardoGeroche, Roberto Garde and GenerosoMarfil alias "Tapol" were
charged with the crime of Violation of Domicile under Article 128 of the Revised Penal Code
(RPC). Petitioners, who were not armed with search warrant, suddenly entered the house of the
private complainant by destroying the main door. The petitioners mauled him, striking with a
garand rifle, which caused his injuries. They looked for firearms but instead found and took away
his airgun. The trial court convicted the petitioners with the crime of Less Serious Physical
Injuries under the Article 265 of the RPC. They were sentenced to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment of arresto mayor maximum, that is, four (4) months and one (1) day to six (6)
months. According to the RTC, the prosecution failed to prove that petitioners are public officers,
which is an essential element of Article 128 of the RPC. Petitioners elevated the case to the CA,
which, on November 18, 2005, set aside the trial courts judgment. The CA ruled that they are
guilty of Violation of Domicile considering their judicial admissions that they were barangay
captain (in the case of Geroche) and part of the Citizen Armed Forces Geographical Unit (in the
case of Garde and Marfil).
Issue: Whether the petitioners can still be convicted for a higher crime without offending their
right against double jeopardy.
Ruling:
An appeal in a criminal case opens the entire case for review on any question including one not
raised by the parties.12 When an accused appeals from the sentence of the trial court, he or she
waives the constitutional safeguard against double jeopardy and throws the whole case open to
the review of the appellate court, which is then called upon to render such judgment as law and
justice dictate.13 Thus, when petitioners appealed the trial courts judgment of conviction for
Less Serious Physical Injuries, they are deemed to have abandoned their right to invoke the
prohibition on double jeopardy since it becomes the duty of the appellate court to correct errors
as may be found in the assailed judgment.

19
On penalty, under Article 128 of the RPC, the penalty shall be prisioncorreccional in its medium
and maximum periods (two [2] years, four [4] months and one [1] day to six [6] years) if
Violation of Domicile be committed at nighttime or if any papers or effects not constituting
evidence of a crime be not returned immediately after the search made by the offender. In this
case, petitioners barged in the house of Baleriano while they were sleeping at night and, in
addition, they took away with them his airgun.
In imposing a prison sentence for an offense punished by the RPC, the Indeterminate Sentence
Law17 requires courts to impose upon the accused an indeterminate sentence. The maximum term
of the prison sentence shall be that which, in view of the attending circumstances, could be
properly imposed under the rules of the said Code. Yet the penalty prescribed by Article 128 of
the RPC is composed of only two, not three, periods. In which case, Article 65 of the same Code
requires the division into three equal portions the time included in the penalty, forming one
period of each of the three portions. Applying the provision, the minimum, medium and
maximum periods of the penalty prescribed by Article 128 are:
Minimum 2 years, 4 months and 1 day to 3 years, 6 months and 20 days
Medium 3 years, 6 months and 21 days to 4 years, 9 months and 10 days
Maximum 4 years, 9 months and 11 days to 6 years
Thus, applying in this case, the maximum term should be within the medium period or from 3
years, 6 months and 21 days to 4 years, 9 months and 10 days, in light of the provisions of
Article 64 of the Revised Penal Code that if there are no other mitigating or aggravating
circumstances attending the commission of the crime, the penalty shall be imposed in its medium
period.
On the other hand, the minimum term shall be within the range of the penalty next lower to that
prescribed by the RPC for the crime. The penalty next lower to that prescribed by Article 128 is
arresto mayor in its maximum period to prisioncorreccional in its minimum period (or 4 months
and 1 day to 2 years and 4 months).
The foregoing considered, in view of the attending circumstances in this case, the Court hereby
sentences the petitioners to suffer the indeterminate penalty from two (2) years and four (4)
months of prisioncorreccional, as minimum, to four ( 4) years, nine (9) months and ten (10) days
of prisioncorreccional, as maximum.
Rebellion/ Political Offense Doctrine/Theory of Absorption
Ocampo vs. Abando, 715 SCRA 673, February 11, 2014
Sereno, CJ

20
On August 26, 2006, elements of the 43rd Infantry Brigade of the Philippine Army discovered a
mass grave site of the CPP/NPA/NDFP at Barangay Kaulisihan, Inopacan, Leyte. Recovered
from the grave site were 67 severely deteriorated skeletal remains believed to be victims of
Operation VD. Operation VD was allegedly ordered by Ocampo, Echanis, Baylosis and Ladlad.
Informations for multiple murder was filed. Judge Abando issued an Order finding probable
cause. Petitioner Ocampo argued that he was charged for rebellion already before the RTC of
Makati and those alleged offenses committed in furtherance of rebellion are absorbed in the latter
crime and thus petitioned for the dismissal of the Informations for multiple murder.
Issue: Whether or not the cases for multiple murder can be dismissed outright under the political
offense doctrine.
Ruling:
Under the political offense doctrine, common crimes committed in furtherance of a political
offense are divested of their character as common offenses and assume the political complexion
of the main crime of which they are mere ingredients of, and consequently, cannot be punished
separately from the principal offense, or complexed with the same, to justify the imposition of a
graver penalty.
Any ordinary act assumes a different nature by being absorbed in the crime of rebellion. Thus,
when a killing is committed in furtherance of rebellion, the killing is not homicide or murder.
Rather, the killing assumes the political complexion of rebellion as its mere ingredient and must
be prosecuted and punished as rebellion alone.
But when the political offense doctrine is asserted as a defense in the trial court, the trial court
should determine whether the act of killing was done in furtherance of a political end, and for the
political motive of the act to be conclusively demonstrated. Thus, it is not for the Supreme Court
to determine this factual matter in the instant petition.
Thus, if it is shown that the proper charge against the petitioner should have been simple
rebellion, the trial court shall dismiss the murder charges upon the filing of the Information for
simple rebellion as long as the petitioner would not be placed in double jeopardy.
N.B. Per Concurring opinion of Justice Leonen, acts committed in violation of RA 9851 (Phil
Act on Crimes Against International Humanitarian Law, Genocide and Other Crimes against
Humanity) even in the context of armed conflicts of a non-international character cannot be
deemed to be acts n connection with or in furtherance of rebellion. This is because, according to
him, RA 9851 the rule on prescription on the prosecution and execution of sentences was not
made applicable to the crimes against humanity, genocide and other crimes against humanity.
These crimes are, therefore, separable from and independent from the crime of rebellion even if
they occur on the occasion of, or connected with the armed uprising.
Falsification by making alterations or insertions

21
Tan vs. Matsuura, et al January 9, 2013
Facts: Tan charged Matsuura, his lawyer Atty. Tanjutco and the Notary Public, Atty. Cua of the
crime of falsification for allegedly writing in a blank Deed of Trust the number 28,500 as shares
and 20th day of January. Thereafter, the Deed of Trust notarized by Atty. Cua. Respondents
countered that the shareholdings covered by the Deed of Trust were offered by Tan to settle the
intra corporate dispute he had filed. Because the print and font of the deeds entries on its
covered shares and date remarkably differed from the other portions of the document, then
Acting Secretary of Justice Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez reversed the City Prosecutors office by
ruling that probable cause exist to indict the respondents for falsification.
Issue: Whether or not probable cause exist to indict respondents for falsification of private
document
Ruling:There is no probable cause for falsification against Matsuura, Tanjutco and Cua.It is not
unusual, as it is as a common practice, for parties to prepare and print instruments or contractual
agreements with specific details that are yet to be filled up upon the deeds execution. Such was
the situation in Tans case, i.e., the document had blanks when printed but was already complete
in details at the time Tan signed it to give effect thereto, especially with the legal presumption
that a person takes ordinary care of his concerns. Otherwise, Tan would not have voluntarily
affixed his signature in the subject deed. Even granting that there were insertions in the deed
after it was signed by Tan, no sufficient allegation indicates that the alleged insertions had
changed the meaning of the document, or that their details differed from those intended by the
petitioner at the time that he signed it. Tans bare allegation that "the change was without his
consent and authority" does not equate with the necessary allegation that the insertions were
false or had changed the intended meaning of the document. Again, a violation of Article 172 (2),
in relation to Article 171 (6), of the RPC requires, as one of its elements, that "the alteration or
intercalation has changed the meaning of the document. There is also no sufficient evidence to
support the element of damage that was purportedly suffered by Tan. By his voluntary act of
signing the Deed of Trust in favor of Matsuura, it can be safely inferred that the document speaks
for itself. Whether or not the same document is notarized, the Deed has the effect of a binding
contract between the parties.
Usurpation of Official Functions (Article 177)
Ruzol vs. Sandiganbayan, April 17, 2013
Facts: Ruzol was the mayor of General Nakar, Quezon from 2001 to 2004. Earlier in his term, he
organized a Multi-Sectoral Consultative Assembly composed of civil society groups, public
officials and concerned stakeholders with the end in view of regulating and monitoring the
transportation of salvaged forest products within the vicinity of General Nakar. Among those
present in the organizational meeting were Provincial Environment and Natural Resources
Officer (PENRO) Rogelio Delgado Sr. and Bishop Julio Xavier Labayen, the OCD-DD of the
Prelature of Infanta Emeritus of the Catholic Church and Chairperson of TIPAN, an

22
environmental non-government organization that operates in the municipalities of General
Nakar, Infanta and Real in Quezon province. During the said assembly, the participants agreed
that to regulate the salvaged forests products, the Office of the Mayor, through Ruzol, shall issue
a permit to transport after payment of the corresponding fees to the municipal treasurer.
Consequently, from 2001 to 2004, Mayor Ruzol issued two hundred twenty-one (221) permits to
transport salvaged forest products to various recipients. On June 2006, on the basis of the issued
Permits to Transport, 221 Informations for violation of Art. 177 of the RPC or for Usurpation of
Authority or Official Functions were filed against Ruzol before the Sandiganbayan.

Issue: Whether or not Ruzol Is Guilty of Usurpation of Official Functions

Ruling: There are two ways of committing this crime: first, by knowingly and falsely
representing himself to be an officer, agent or representative of any department or agency of the
Philippine Government or of any foreign government; or second, under pretense of official
position, shall perform any act pertaining to any person in authority or public officer of the
Philippine Government or any foreign government, or any agency thereof, without being
lawfully entitled to do so. The former constitutes the crime of usurpation of authority, while the
latter act constitutes the crime of usurpation of official functions.
The DENR is not the sole government agency vested with the authority to issue permits relevant
to the transportation of salvaged forest products, considering that, pursuant to the general welfare
clause, LGUs may also exercise such authority. Accordingly, the permits to transport issued by
the Mayor were meant to complement and not to replace the Wood Recovery Permit issued by
the DENR. In effect, Ruzol required the issuance of the subject permits under his authority as
municipal mayor and independently of the official functions granted to the DENR. There is no
showing that Ruzol made representations or false pretenses that said permits could be used in
lieu of, or at the least as an excuse not to obtain, the Wood Recovery Permit from the DENR.
Besides, Ruzol acted in good faith. The public consultation conducted by the Mayor was a sign
supporting Ruzols good intentions to regulate and monitor the movement of salvaged forest
products to prevent abuse and occurrence of untoward illegal logging. In fact, the requirement of
permits to transport w
Dangerous Drugs: immediate marking is crucial in the chain of custody
People vs. Dahil, 745 SCRA 221, January 12, 2015
Facts: When the signal that the sale had been consummated, the rest of the buy-bust team then
rushed to their location and arrested Castro and Dahil. PO2 Corpuz frisked Dahil and recovered
from his possession another five (5) plastic sachets containing marijuana while SPO1 Licu
searched the person of Castro and confiscated from him one (1) brick of suspected marijuana.
Both Castro and Dahil, together with the confiscated drugs, were then brought by the buy-bust
team to the PDEA office. There, the seized items were marked by PO2 Corpuz and SPO1Licu.

23
First, the six (6) plastic sachets of marijuana which were sold by Dahil to PO2 Corpuz were
marked with "A-1" to "A-6" and with letters "RDRC," "ADGC" and "EML." Second, the five (5)
plastic sachets recovered from Dahil were marked with "B-1" to "B-5" and with letters "RDRC,"
"ADGC" and "EML." Finally, the marijuana brick confiscated from Castro was marked "CRDRC." Sergeant dela Cruz then prepared the request for laboratory examination, affidavits of
arrest and other pertinent documents. An inventory of the seized items 7 was also prepared which
was signed by KagawadPamintuan. Thereafter, PO2 Corpuz brought the confiscated drugs to the
Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory for examination, which subsequently yielded
positive results for marijuana.
Issue: Whether or not marking was done in compliance with the law.
Ruling:
Crucial in proving the chain of custody is the marking of the seized drugs or other related items
immediately after they have been seized from the accused. "Marking" means the placing by the
apprehending officer or the poseur-buyer of his/her initials and signature on the items seized.
Marking after seizure is the starting point in the custodial link; hence, it is vital that the seized
contraband be immediately marked because succeeding handlers of the specimens will use the
markings as reference. The marking of the evidence serves to separate the marked evidence from
the corpus of all other similar or related evidence from the time they are seized from the accused
until they are disposed of at the end of the criminal proceedings, thus, preventing switching,
planting or contamination of evidence.35
It must be noted that marking is not found in R.A. No. 9165 and is different from the inventorytaking and photography under Section 21 of the said law. Long before Congress passed R.A. No.
9165, however, this Court had consistently held that failure of the authorities to immediately
mark the seized drugs would cast reasonable doubt on the authenticity of the corpus delicti.36
Hence, from the place of the seizure to the PDEA Office Region 3, the seized items were not
marked. It could not, therefore, be determined how the unmarked drugs were handled. The Court
must conduct guesswork on how the seized drugs were transported and who took custody of
them while in transit. Evidently, the alteration of the seized items was a possibility absent their
immediate marking thereof.
Still, there are cases when the chain of a custody rule is relaxed such as when the marking of the
seized items is allowed to be undertaken at the police station rather than at the place of arrest for
as long as it is done in the presence of the accused in illegal drugs cases. 38 Even a less stringent
application of the requirement, however, will not suffice to sustain the conviction of the accused
in this case. Aside from the fact that the police officers did not immediately place their markings
on the seized marijuana upon their arrival at the PDEA Office, there was also no showing that the
markings were made in the presence of the accused.

Knowingly rendering unjust judgment (Article 204)

24

Disbarment complaint of AMA Land Inc vs, CA Justices Bueser, Villon and Rosario
718 SCRA 335, March 11, 2014
Facts: Ama Land Inc. (AMALI) is the owner and developer of the 37-storey condominium
project along EDSA corner Fordham Street. AMALI used Fordham Street as an access road and
staging area for the construction activities. For this reason, it needed the consent of WackWack
Residents Association, Inc. (WWRAI). The latter ignored the request of the former. Left with
no option AMALI set up its field office along Fordham Street that it enclosed with a temporary
fence. WWRAI filed an action with prayer for TRO and writ of preliminary injunction. The RTC
denied the prayer for injunction. It went to the CA. The CA issued a TRO and later on a
preliminary injunction. AMALI filed a motion for reconsideration. Then it filed a motion to
resolve and approve a counter bond. All these motions were left unresolved when the CA Tenth
Division which included Justices Bueser and Rosario required the parties to file their respective
memoranda. Later the Special Former Tenth Division promulgated as decision granting the
petition of WWRAI.
Issue: Are the respondent Justices liable for knowingly rendering an unjust judgment?
Ruling:
To commit the crime of knowingly rendering an unjust judgment under Article 204 of the RPC,
the offender must be a judge who is adequately shown to have rendered an unjust judgment, not
one who merely committed an error of judgment or taken the unpopular side a controversial
point of law. The term knowingly means sure knowledge, conscious, deliberate intention to
do an injustice. It must be shown that the judgment is not only patently contrary to law or not
supported by the evidence but that it was also made with deliberate intent to perpetrate an
injustice.
Good faith and absence of malice, corrupt motives or improper consideration are sufficient
defenses. Bad faith is the ground for liability.
But only a superior court acting by virtue of either its appellate or supervisory jurisdiction over
the judicial actions involved may make such determination/declaration.
Failure of Accountable Officer to Render Account (Article 218)
Lumauig vs. People, July 07, 2014, 729 SCRA 191
Facts: The accused was the former municipal mayor of Alfonso Lista, Ifugao. Sometime in
January 1998, Commission on Audit (COA) Auditor Florence L. Paguirigan, during her
examination of the year-end reports of the municipality, she came across a disbursement
voucher for P101,736.00 prepared for Lamauig, as cash advance for the payment of freight and
other cargo charges for 12 units of motorcycles supposed to be donated to the municipality. The
amount was covered by a check wherein the payee is Lamauig. Her further investigation of the
accounting records revealed that no payment intended for the charge was made to Royal Cargo
Agencies for the month of August 1994.

25

Lamauig admitted having obtained the cash advance of P101,736.00 during his
incumbency. This amount was intended for the payment of freight and insurance coverage of 12
units of motorcycles to be donated to the municipality by the City of Manila. However, instead
of motorcycles, he was able to secure two buses and five patrol cars. He claimed that it never
came to his mind to settle or liquidate the amount advanced since the vehicles were already
turned over to the municipality. He alleged that he was neither informed nor did he receive any
demand from COA to liquidate his cash advances. It was only in 2001 while he was claiming for
separation pay when he came to know that he still has an unliquidated cash advance. And so as
not to prolong the issue, he paid the amount of P101,736.00 to the municipal treasurer on June 4,
2001.
The Sandiganbayanconvicted him of Failure of Accountable Officer to Render Accounts under
Article 218 of the Revised Penal Code. Lamauig argued that he was neither informed nor did he
receive any demand from COA to liquidate his cash advances hence should be exonerated.
Issue: Whether or not a prior demand to liquidate is a requisite for conviction under Article 218
of the Revised Penal Code.
Ruling: A prior notice or demand for liquidation of cash advances is not a condition sine qua
non before an accountable public officer may be held liable under Article 218 of the Revised
Penal Code.
Nowhere in the provision does it require that there first be a demand before an accountable
officer is held liable for a violation of the crime. The law is very clear. Where none is provided,
the court may not introduce exceptions or conditions, neither may it engraft into the law
qualifications not contemplated. Where the law is clear and unambiguous, it must be taken to
mean exactly what it says and the court has no choice but to see to it that its mandate is obeyed.
There is no room for interpretation, but only application.
Murder: Abuse of superior strength
People vs. Tamayo, 719 SCRA 170, March 12, 2014
Facts: Erwin and his companions gave chase to Joey. Unfortunately, Joey tripped on an iron
chain and fell to the ground. It was in this position that Erwin and his companions attacked and
mauled him. Some including Erwin stabbed Joey with their knives. The assailants scampered
away afterwards.
Ruling: Since about 15 men including accused Erwin, pounced on their one helpless victim,
relentlessly bludgeoned him on the head, and stabbed him on the stomach until he was dead,
there is no question that the accused took advantage of their superior strength.

26
Rape: although laceration of the hymen is not necessary but when the offended party says that
the accused made a push and pull movement, a medical certificate showing the hymen intact
taints the credibility of the offended party.
People vs. Rondina, 727 SCRA 591, June 30, 2014
Facts: The accused was charged with the crime of rape. Sometime around noon, AAA, 14 years
old, lay awake beside a wall of their house while her 1-year-old sister was sleeping next to her.
She heard a noise coming from the kitchen, and suddenly Rondina was on top of her. Poking a
knife at her chest, he warned her not to tell her parents, stuffed her mouth with a face towel, and
quickly removed her shorts and underwear. He then inserted his penis into her vagina and made a
push and pull movement, keeping at this for a "long time." After a few days, AAA was brought
to the Eastern Visayas Regional Medical Center in Tacloban City for medical examination.
Themedical certificate showed that the hymen - intact, elastic, open; vagina - admits one (1)
examining finger with ease
Issue: Whether or not the accused had sexual intercourse with AAA without her consent
Ruling:
By its very nature, a charge of rape must be resolved by giving primordial consideration to the
credibility of the victims testimony, since conviction may be solely based thereon, provided it is
credible, natural, convincing, and consistent with human nature and the normal course of things.
So if her testimony meets the test of credibility, conviction may issue on the basis thereofThe
testimony of the victim must be scrutinized with utmost caution, and unavoidably, her own
credibility must also be put on trial.
The medical report clearly shows that AAA suffered no lacerations in her hymen, whether recent
or healed and whether deep or superficial, nor other similar injuries consistent with violent
sexual assault. AAAs hymen is described as "intact, elastic, open," and the report nowhere
indicates that she is in a non-virgin state.
It is true that the absence of lacerated wounds in AAAs vagina does not negate sexual
intercourse. Laceration of the hymen, considered the most telling and irrefutable physical
evidence of sexual assault, is not always essential to establish the consummation of the crime of
rape. In the context used in the RPC, "carnal knowledge," unlike its ordinary connotation of
sexual intercourse, does not necessarily require that the vagina be penetrated or that the hymen
be ruptured. But when the victim says that the accused inserted his penis into her vagina and
pushed and pulled inside her "for a long time," and she felt pain and blood oozed from her organ,
the stark absence of any vaginal tear or laceration will have to be medically explained, or else,
the Court is left with no inference other than that the charge of rape may have been a mere
fabrication.
Robbery/ Theft;the mere fact that an offender is an employee does not mean there is reposed in
him trust and confidence.

27

Viray vs. People, 709 SCRA 227

Viray was employed as a dog caretakerof private complainant. Viray entered the house of the
private complainant by breaking the screen door and main door to gain entry into the house.
Then he took the money and jewelry of the private complainant.
First Question: What crime was committed by Viray?
Answer: Viray committed the crime of robbery with force upon things. Robbery with force upon
things is committed when the offender entered an inhabited house by breaking door, window etc
and took personal properties thereon. These elements are present in this case.
Second Question: Viray was not charged with robbery with force upon things but with
qualified theft, can he be convicted of qualified theft?
Answer: No, Viray cannot be convicted of qualified theft. To be convicted of qualified theft, it
must be proved that there existed between the offended party and the accused such degree of
confidence or that the stolen goods have been entrusted to the custody or vigilance of the
accused.
The fact that Viray forced open the main door because he was denied access to complainants
house negates the presence of such confidence in him by the complainant. And the fact that the
accused is a laborer of the offended party does not of itself, without more, create the relation of
confidence and intimacy required by law.
Viray has committed, rather, the crime of simple theft.

Qualified Theft;In the absence of independent and reliable corroboration of the value of the
property, the courts may either apply the minimum penalty under Article 309 or fix the value of
the property taken based on the attendant circumstances of the case.
Candelaria vs. People, 744 SCRA 178, December 8, 2014
Perlas-Bernabe, J
Facts: Viron Transit Corporation ordered 14,000 liters of diesel fuel worth P497,000.00 from
Unioil, a company owned by Jessielyn Valera Lao (Lao). Candelaria, a truck driver employed by
Lao, was dispatched to deliver the diesel fuel in LaonLaan, Manila. He was assisted by his helper
Romano.
However, at around 5 oclock in the afternoon of the same day, Viron informed Lao through a
phone call that it had not yet received its order. When Lao called Candelaria on his mobile
phone, she did not receive any response. Thereafter, or at around 6 oclock in the evening of the

28
same day, Romano returned alone to Unioils office and reported that Candelaria poked a
balisong at him, prompting Lao to report the incident to the Anti Carnapping Section of the
Manila Police District (MPD), as well as to Camp Crame.
After a few days, the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) agents found the abandoned lorry
truck in Calamba, Laguna, emptied of the diesel fuel. An Information for Qualified Theft was
filed against Candelaria.
Issues: (1) Whether or not Candelaria can be convicted of the crime of Qualified Theft on the
basis of circumstantial evidence.
(2) What is the penalty for qualified theft when the prosecution failed to present evidence
on the value of the goods taken.

Ruling:
On the first issue:
The elements of Qualified Theft, punishable under Article 310 28 in relation to Article 30929 of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended, are:
(a) the taking of personal property; (b) the said property belongs to another;
(c) the said taking be done with intent to gain; (d) it be done without the owners consent;
(e) it be accomplished without the use of violence or intimidation against persons, nor of
force upon things; and (f) it be done under any of the circumstances enumerated in
Article 310 of the RPC, i.e., with grave abuse of confidence.30
In this case, there is a confluence of all the foregoing elements. It was sufficiently established
that the 14,000 liters of diesel fuel loaded into the lorry truck with plate number PTA-945 driven
by Candelaria for delivery to Viron on August 23, 2006 was taken by him, without the authority
and consent of Lao, the owner of the diesel fuel, and that Candelaria abused the confidence
reposed upon him by Lao,as his employer.
Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if: (a) there is more than one circumstance;
(b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (c) the combination of all the
circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.
Circumstantial evidence suffices to convict an accused only if the circumstances proven
constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the
accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty person; the circumstances proved must be
consistent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and, at the
same time, inconsistent with any other hypothesis except that of guilt. Corollary thereto, a

29
conviction based on circumstantial evidence must exclude each and every hypothesis consistent
with innocence.33
Here, these circumstances are enough to convict Candelaria: (a) on August 23, 2006, Viron
ordered 14,000 liters of diesel fuel from Laos Unioil; (b) as driver of Unioil, Candelaria was
given the task of delivering the same to Viron in LaonLaan, Manila; (c) Candelaria and his helper
Romano left the company premises on the same day on board the lorry truck bearing plate
number PTA-945 containing the diesel fuel; (d) at around 5 oclock in the afternoon of the same
day, Viron informed Lao that its order had not yet been delivered; (e) Candelaria failed to reply
to Laos phone calls; (f) later in the day, Romano returned to the Unioil office sans Candelaria
and reported that the latter threatened him with a weapon; (g) Lao reported the incident tothe
MPD and Camp Crame; (h) the missing lorry truck was subsequently found in Laguna, devoid of
its contents; and (i) Candelaria had not reported back to Unioil since then.34

On the second issue:

The imposable penalty for the crime of Qualified Theft depends upon the value of the thing
stolen. To prove the value of the stolen property for purposes of fixing the imposable penalty, the
prosecution must present more than a mere uncorroborated "estimate."
In the absence of independent and reliable corroboration of such estimate, the courts may either
apply the minimum penalty under Article 309 or fix the value of the property taken based on the
attendant circumstances of the case.
In People vs Dator and Merida v. People, judicial notice of the selling price of narra at the time
of the commission of its theft was not applied, as such evidence would be "unreliable and
inconclusive considering the lack of independent and competent source of such information."
However, in the more recent case of Lozano v. People, the value of the stolen magwheels was
fixed by the Supreme Court at P12,000.00 as the "reasonable allowable limit under the
circumstances,"
In this case, Candelaria has been found guilty of stealing diesel fuel. The value of diesel fuel in
this case may be readily gathered from price lists published by the Department of Energy (DOE).
In this regard, the value of diesel fuel involved herein may then be considered as a matter of
public knowledge which falls within the purview of the rules on discretionary judicial notice.
Therefore, for purposes of fixing the proper penalty for Qualified Theft in this case, the value of
the stolen property amounting to P497,000.00 must be considered. Conformably with the
provisions of Articles 309 and 310 of the RPC, the proper penalty to be imposed upon Candelaria
is reclusion perpetua,52 without eligibility for parole,53 to conform with prevailing law and
jurisprudence.54

30
Estafa or Qualified Theft; a cashiers possession of the money is only material, not juridical; if
charged with estafa should be acquitted.
Balerta vs. People, 743 SCRA 166, November 26, 2014
Facts: Balerta (petitioner) worked as one of the three cashiers in Balasan Associated Barangays
Multipurpose Cooperative (BABMPC or cooperative). As such, she receives daily
remittances, deposits to the bank, withdraws and issues loans specifically in connection with
Care Philippines account involving an amount of P1,250,000.00.13 Care Philippines entrusted
the sum to BABMPC, which in turn can release to borrowers loans ranging from P500.00
to P50,000.00.
BABMPC discovered discrepancies and fraud in Balertas records. Upon audit, BABMPC found
that "there was a discrepancy of some P185,000.00," P90,000.00 of which in the passbook, while
the rest of the amount related to the records of the cooperative kept by the petitioner. BABMPC
had sent the petitioner three letters, dated June 22, 1999, June 24, 1999 and August 30, 1999. The
first letter requested the petitioner to report to the office to explain the discrepancies. The second
letter requested the petitioner to pay BABMPC. The first two letters were brought to the
petitioners house by BABMPCs secretary, Marilyn Mombay (Mombay). Both times, the
petitioner was not at home, and it was Estela Balerta, the formers sister-in-law, who received the
letters. The last letter was sent by mail, but the petitioner refused to receive it as well. An
Information for Estafa was filed against Balerta
Issue: Whether or not a cashier possesses juridical possession over the funds he or she holds.
Ruling:
The petitioner had no juridical possession over the allegedly misappropriated funds.
Chua-Burce is instructive anent what constitutes mere material possession, on one hand, and
juridical possession, on the other, for the purpose of determining whether the first element of
estafa is present in a particular case, viz:
Have the foregoing elements been met in the case at bar? We find the first element absent. When
the money, goods, or any other personal property is received by the offender from the offended
party (1) in trust or (2) on commission or (3) for administration, the offender acquires both
material or physical possession and juridical possession of the thing received. Juridical
possession means a possession which gives the transferee a right over the thing which the
transferee may set up even against the owner. In this case, petitioner was a cash custodian who
was primarily responsible for the cash-in-vault. Her possession of the cash belonging to the bank
is akin to that of a bank teller, both being mere bank employees.
In People v. Locson, the receiving teller of a bank misappropriated the money received by him
for the bank. He was found liable for qualified theft on the theory that the possession of the teller
is the possession of the bank. We explained in Locson that

31
"The money was in the possession of the defendant as receiving teller of the bank, and the
possession of the defendant was the possession of the bank. When the defendant, with grave
abuse of confidence, removed the money and appropriated it to his own use without the consent
of the bank, there was the taking or apoderamiento contemplated in the definition of the crime of
theft."
In the subsequent case of Guzman v. Court of Appeals, a travelling sales agent misappropriated
or failed to return to his principal the proceeds of things or goods he was commissioned or
authorized to sell. He was, however, found liable for estafa under Article 315 (1) (b) of the
Revised Penal Code, and not qualified theft. In the Guzman case, we explained the distinction
between possession of a bank teller and an agent for purposes of determining criminal liability
"The case cited by the Court of Appeals (People vs. Locson, 57 Phil. 325), in support of its
theory that appellant only had the material possession of the merchandise he was selling for his
principal, or their proceeds, is not in point. In said case, the receiving teller of a bank who
misappropriated money received by him for the bank, was held guilty of qualified theft on the
theory that the possession of the teller is the possession of the bank. There is an essential
distinction between the possession by a receiving teller of funds received from third persons paid
to the bank, and an agent who receives the proceeds of sales of merchandise delivered to him in
agency by his principal. In the former case, payment by third persons to the teller is payment to
the bank itself; the teller is a mere custodian or keeper of the funds received, and has no
independent right or title to retain or possess the same as against the bank. An agent, on the other
hand, can even assert, as against his own principal, an independent, autonomous, right to retain
money or goods received in consequence of the agency; as when the principal fails to reimburse
him for advances he has made, and indemnify him for damages suffered without his fault
(Article 1915, [N]ew Civil Code; Article 1730, old)." 51 (Citations omitted, underscoring ours and
italics in the original)
In the case at bench, there is no question that the petitioner was handling the funds lent by Care
Philippines to BABMPC. However, she held the funds in behalf of BABMPC. Over the funds,
she had mere physical or material possession, but she held no independent right or title, which
she can set up against BABMPC. The petitioner was nothing more than a mere cash custodian.
Hence, the Court finds that juridical possession of the funds as an element of the crime of estafa
by misappropriation is absent in the instant case.
Qualified Theft
People vs. Cahilig, July 30, 2014, 731 SCRA 414
Facts: Cahilig worked as cashier at Wyeth Philippines Employees Savings and Loan
Association, Inc. (WPESLAI) from December 1992 until 7 November 2001. She was tasked with
handling, managing, receiving, and disbursing the funds of the WPESLAI.
It was discovered that from 31 May 2000 to 31 July 2001, Cahilig made withdrawals from the
funds of WPESLAI and appropriated the same for her personal benefit. Cahilig would prepare
disbursement vouchers, to be approved by the WPESLAI president and Board of Directors, in
order to withdraw funds from one of WPESLAIs bank accounts then transfer these funds to its

32
other bank account. The withdrawal was done by means of a check payable to Cahilig, in her
capacity as WPESLAI cashier. This procedure for transferring funds from one bank account to
another was said to be standard practice at WPESLAI. However, Cahilig did not actually transfer
the funds. Instead, she made it appear in her personal WPESLAI ledger that a deposit was made
into her account and then she would fill out a withdrawal slip to simulate a withdrawal of said
amount from her capital contribution. Cahilig was charged with several counts of qualified theft.
Issue: Whether or not Cahilig is guilty of the crime of qualified theft.
Ruling: Yes, Cahilig is liable for qualified theft. The elements of qualified theft, committed with
grave abuse of confidence, are as follows: 1. taking of personal property; 2. that the said property
belongs to another; 3. that the said taking be done with intent to gain; 4. that it be done without
the owners consent; 5. that it be accomplished without the use of violence or intimidation
against persons, nor of force upon things; 6. that it be done with grave abuse of confidence.
It is clear that all the elements of Qualified Theft are present in these cases.
Cahilig took money from WPESLAI and its depositors by taking advantage of her position. Her
intent to gain is clear in the use of a carefully planned and deliberately executed scheme to
commit the theft.
Grave abuse of confidence, as an element of Qualified Theft, "must be the result of the relation
by reason of dependence, guardianship, or vigilance, between the appellant and the offended
party that might create a high degree of confidence betweenthem which the appellant abused."9
Cahiligs position was one reposed with trust and confidence, considering that it involves
"handling, managing, receiving, and disbursing" money from WPESLAIs depositors and other
funds of the association.Cahiligs responsibilities as WPESLAI cashier required prudence and
vigilance over the money entrusted into her care.
However, instead of executing her duties, she deliberately misled the board of directors into
authorizing disbursements for money that eventually ended up in her personal account, a fact that
Cahilig did not deny.
Forcible Abduction with rape (Article 342)
People vs Almaro, July 18, 2014, 730 SCRA 190
Facts: On 26 May 1998, Amaro was charged with the crime of forcible abduction with rape.
While the victim was walking on her way home from school, she passed by Boots & Maya store.
She met a man, whom she later identified in court as the Amaro, who asked her to buy cigarettes.
After buying the cigarettes and handing it to Amaro, the latter gave her bread and banana cue.
After eating them, she suddenly became dizzy and passed out. AAA was brought to the house of
Amaro. When she regained consciousness, she saw Amaro naked. Amaro then undressed her,

33
kissed her on the lips and neck, and inserted his penis into her vagina, causing her to feel pain.
AAA cried but Amaro covered her mouth with his hand. AAA was detained for six (6) days and
was raped five (5) times by Amaro. AAA clarified that Amaros penis touched the outer portion
of her vagina.
Issue: Whether or not Amaro is guilty of forcible abduction with rape
Ruling: Yes, Amaro is guilty of the crime of forcible abduction with rape.
The elements of the crime of forcible abduction, as defined in Article 342 of the Revised Penal
Code, are: (1) that the person abducted is any woman, regardless of her age, civil status, or
reputation; (2) that she is taken against her will; and (3) that the abduction is with lewd designs.
On the other hand, rape under Article 266A is committed by having carnal knowledge of a
woman by: (1) force or intimidation, or (2) when the woman is deprived of reason or is
unconscious, or (3) when she is under twelve years of age.
All these elements are present in this case. The victim, AAA was a seven (7) yearold girl who
was taken against her will by Amaro who told her that he knew her mother and that he would
bring her home. At her tender age, AAA could have easily been deceived by Amaro. The
employment of deception suffices to constitute the forcible taking, especially since the victim is
an unsuspecting young girl. It is the taking advantage of their innocence that makes them easy
culprits of deceiving minds. The presence of lewd designs in forcible abduction is established by
the actual rape of the victim. The fact of sexual intercourse is corroborated by the medical
findings that the victim suffered from laceration on the upper and lower part of the introitus.
Amaro was properly charged of the complex crime of forcible abduction with rape. AAAs
abduction was a necessary means to commit rape. Sexual intercourse with AAA was facilitated
and ensured by her abduction.
Bigamy (Article 349): Accuseds argument that since his marriage to Josefa was invalid, the
fourth element of bigamy is lacking is specious. It should be recognized as written into the law
itself that such a marriage, although void ab initio, may still produce legal consequences.
Among these legal consequences is incurring criminal liability for bigamy. To hold otherwise
would render the State's penal laws on bigamy completely nugatory.
Lasanas vs. People, 727 SCRA 98, June 23, 2014
Facts: On February 16, 1968,the marriage of accused Noel Lasanas and Socorro Patingo was
solemnized by a Municipal Judge without the benefit of a marriage license and without any
affidavit of cohabitation to excuse the lack of the marriage license. On August 27, 1980, Lasanas
and Patingo reaffirmed their marriage vows in a religious and again no marriage license or
affidavit of cohabitation was submitted. In 1982, Lasanas and Patingo separated de facto because
of irreconcilable differences. On December 27, 1993, accused Lasanas contracted marriage with
JosefaEslaban in a religious ceremony solemnized by a priest. Their marriage certificate reflected
the civil status of the accused as single. On July 26, 1996, the accused filed a complaint for

34
annulment of marriage and damages against Socorro. In October 1998, Socorro charged the
accused with bigamy in the Office of the City Prosecutor of Iloilo City. After due proceedings,
the accused was formally indicted for bigamy under the information filed on October 20, 1998
Issue: Whether or not bigamy is committed when the second marriage is void because of the
existence of the first marriage.
Ruling
The elements of the crime of bigamy are (1) that the offender has been legally married (2) that
the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his/her spouse is absent, the absent spouse
could not yet be presumed dead (3) that he or she contracts a second or subsequent marriage and
(4) the second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity.
The first and second elements of bigamy were present in view of the absence of a judicial
declaration of nullity of marriage between the accused and Socorro. The requirement of securing
a judicial declaration of nullity of marriage prior to contracting a subsequent marriage was made
necessary even before the existence Article 40 of the Family Code. It was held before that
parties to a marriage should not be allowed to assume that their marriage is void even if such be
the fact but must first secure a judicial declaration of the nullity of their marriage before they can
be allowed to marry again.
The crime of bigamy was consummated from the moment he contracted the second marriage
without his marriage to Socorro being first judicially declared null and void, because at the time
of the celebration of the second marriage, his marriage to Socorro was still deemed valid and
subsisting due to such marriage not being yet declared null and void by a court of competent
jurisdiction.
Considering that the accuseds subsequent marriage to Josefa was an undisputed fact, the third
element of bigamy was established.
Accuseds argument that since his marriage to Josefa was invalid, the fourth element of bigamy
is lacking is specious. It should be recognized as written into the law itself that such a marriage,
although void ab initio, may still produce legal consequences. Among these legal consequences
is incurring criminal liability for bigamy. To hold otherwise would render the State's penal laws
on bigamy completely nugatory.
But please compare it with the following case:
Go-Bangayan vs. Bangayan, Jr., 700 SCRA 702, July 3, 2013
Facts: Benjamin married Azucena Alegre on 10 September 1973 in Caloocan City. In 1979,
Benjamin developed a romantic relationship with Sally Go-Bangayan. In December 1981,
Azucena left for the United States of America. So in February 1982, Benjamin and Sally lived

35
together as husband and wife. Sallys father was against the relationship. On 7 March 1982, in
order to appease her father, Sally brought Benjamin to an office in Santolan, PasigCity where
they signed a purported marriage contract. Sally, knowing Benjamins marital status, assured him
that the marriage contract would not be registered. Benjamin and Sallys cohabitation produced
two children, Bernice and Bentley. The relationship of Benjamin and Sally ended in 1994. She
then filed criminal actions for bigamy and falsification of public documents against Benjamin,
using their simulated marriage contract as evidence. Benjamin, in turn, filed a petition for
declaration of a non-existent marriage and/or declaration of nullity of marriage before the trial
court on the ground that his marriage to Sally was bigamous and that it lacked the formal
requisites to a valid marriage. The trial court ruled that the marriage between Benjamin and
Sally was not bigamous. The trial court ruled that the second marriage was void not because of
the existence of the first marriage but because of other causes, particularly, the lack of a marriage
license. Hence, bigamy was not committed in this case.
Issue: Whether or not the marriage of Benjamin and Sally is bigamous
Ruling:
The Supreme Court sustained the trial court ruling that the marriage of Benjamin and Sally was
not bigamous. It further said that [f]or bigamy to exist, the second or subsequent marriage must
have all the essential requisites for validity except for the existence of a prior marriage. In this
case, there was really no subsequent marriage. Benjamin and Sally just signed a purported
marriage contract without a marriage license. The supposed marriage was not recorded with the
local civil registrar and the National Statistics Office. In short, the marriage between Benjamin
and Sally did not exist. They lived together and represented themselves as husband and wife
without the benefit of marriage.
Bigamy
Fujiki vs. Marinay, June 26, 2013
Facts: Fujiki is a Japanese national who married Maria Paz GalelaMarinay (Marinay) in the
Philippines on 23 January 2004. After the marriage, Fujiki went back to Japan and eventually,
they lost contact with each other. In 2008, Marinay met another Japanese, Maekara. Without the
first marriage being dissolved, Marinay and Maekara were married on 15 May 2008 in Quezon
City, Philippines. Maekara brought Marinay to Japan. But Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and
they were able to reestablish their relationship. In 2010, Fujiki helped Marinay obtain a judgment
from a family court in Japan which declared the marriage between Marinay and Maekara void on
the ground of bigamy. On 14 January 2011, Fujiki filed a petition in the RTC entitled: "Judicial
Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage)." The RTC
immediately issued an Order dismissing the petition since under (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) only
the husband or the wife can file a petition for declaration of nullity of void marriage.
The Issues

36
(1) Whether the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of
Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) is applicable.
(2) Whether a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a petition to recognize a foreign
judgment nullifying the subsequent marriage between his or her spouse and a foreign citizen on
the ground of bigamy.
(3) Whether the Regional Trial Court can recognize the foreign judgment in a proceeding for
cancellation or correction of entries in the Civil Registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
Ruling
On issue No. 1
The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) does not apply in a petition to recognize a foreign judgment
relating to the status of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country. In
Juliano-Llave v. Republic,30 March 2011, 646 SCRA 637, it was held that the rule in A.M. No.
02-11-10-SC that only the husband or wife can file a declaration of nullity or annulment of
marriage "does not apply if the reason behind the petition is bigamy."
To hold that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applies to a petition for recognition of foreign judgment
would mean that the trial court and the parties should follow its provisions, including the form
and contents of the petition, the service of summons, the investigation of the public prosecutor,
the setting of pre-trial, the trial and the judgment of the trial court. This is absurd because it will
litigate the case anew. It will defeat the purpose of recognizing foreign judgments, which is "to
limit repetitive litigation on claims and issues."
On issues numbers 2 and 3
Since the recognition of a foreign judgment only requires proof of fact of the judgment, it may
be made in a special proceeding for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry
under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. Rule 1, Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides that "[a]
special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular
fact." Under Rule 108, Section 1 of the Rules of Court any person interested in any act, event,
order or decree concerning the civil status of persons which has been recorded in the civil
register, may file a verified petition for the cancellation or correction of any entry relating
thereto, with the Regional Trial Court of the province where the corresponding civil registry is
located. (Emphasis supplied)
Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to recognize the Japanese Family Court judgment
nullifying the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy because the
judgment concerns his civil status as married to Marinay. For the same reason he has the
personality to file a petition under Rule 108 to cancel the entry of marriage between Marinay and
Maekara in the civil registry on the basis of the decree of the Japanese Family Court. There is no

37
doubt that the prior spouse has a personal and material interest in maintaining the integrity of the
marriage he contracted and the property relations arising from it. There is also no doubt that he is
interested in the cancellation of an entry of a bigamous marriage in the civil registry, which
compromises the public record of his marriage. The interest derives from the substantive right of
the spouse not only to preserve (or dissolve, in limited instances) his most intimate human
relation, but also to protect his property interests that arise by operation of law the moment he
contracts marriage. These property interests in marriage include the right to be supported "in
keeping with the financial capacity of the family" and preserving the property regime of the
marriage.
Bigamy
Capili vs. People, July 3, 2013
PERALTA, J.:
Facts: On June 28, 2004, Capili was charged with the crime of bigamy before the Regional Trial
Court of Pasig for contracting a second marriage with Shirley G. Tismo while being previously
united in lawful marriage with Karla Y. Medina-Capili. Capili thereafter filed a Motion to
Suspend Proceedings alleging that: (1) there is a pending civil case for declaration of nullity of
the second marriage before the RTC of Antipolo City filed by Karla Y. Medina-Capili; (2) in the
event that the marriage is declared null and void, it would exculpate him from the charge of
bigamy; and (3) the pendency of the civil case for the declaration of nullity of the second
marriage serves as a prejudicial question in the instant criminal case. The RTC suspended the
proceedings. In the interim, the RTC of Antipolo City (handling the civil case) rendered a
decision declaring the voidness or incipient invalidity of the second marriage between Capili and
Tismo on the ground that a subsequent marriage contracted by the husband during the lifetime of
the legal wife is void from the beginning. Thereafter, Capili filed a Motion To Dismiss praying
for the dismissal of the criminal case for bigamy filed against him on the ground that the second
marriage between him and Tismo had already been declared void by the RTC.
Issue: Whether or not the declaration of the nullity of the second marriage is a bar for the
prosecution of the accused for bigamy.
Ruling: The elements of the crime of bigamy are: (1) the offender has been legally married; (2)
the marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent
spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the Civil Code; (3) that he contracts a
second or subsequent marriage; and (4) that the second or subsequent marriage has all the
essential requisites for validity.
In the present case, all the elements of the crime of bigamy were present when the Information
was filed on June 28, 2004. The second marriage between Capili and Tismo was contracted on
December 8, 1999 during the subsistence of a valid first marriage between Capili and Karla Y.
Medina-Capili contracted on September 3, 1999. Thus, the subsequent judicial declaration of the
second marriage for being bigamous in nature does not bar the prosecution of Capili for the
crime of bigamy.

38

Jurisprudence is replete with cases holding that the accused may still be charged with the crime
of bigamy, even if there is a subsequent declaration of the nullity of the second marriage, so long
as the first marriage was still subsisting when the second marriage was celebrated.
In Jarillo v. People, September 29, 2009, 601 SCRA 236, the Court affirmed the accuseds
conviction for bigamy ruling that the crime of bigamy is consummated on the celebration of the
subsequent marriage without the previous one having been judicially declared null and void.
Performance of Illegal Marriage Ceremony (Article 352)
Ronulo vs. People, July 02, 2014, 728 SCRA 675
Facts: Joey Umadac and Claire Bingayen were scheduled to marry each other on March 29, 2003
at the Sta. Rosa Catholic Parish Church of San Nicolas, Ilocos Norte. However, on the day of the
wedding, the supposed officiating priest, Fr. Mario Ragaza, refused to solemnize the marriage
upon learning that the couple failed to secure a marriage license. As a recourse, Joey, who was
then dressed in barong tagalong, and Claire, clad in a wedding gown, together with their parents,
sponsors and guests, proceeded to the Aglipayan Church. They requested Ronulo, an Aglipayan
priest, to perform a ceremony to which the latter agreed despite having been informed by the
couple that they had no marriage license. An information for violation of Art. 352 of the RPC, as
amended, was filed against Ronulo.
Issue: Was the blessing performed by Ronulo, an Aglipayan priest, constitute illegal marriage
ceremony and for which he may be convicted for performance of illegal ceremony under Article
352 of the RPC?
Ruling: Yes,Ronulo is guilty of violating Art. 352 of the RPC. Article 352 of the RPC, as
amended, penalizes an authorized solemnizing officer who shall perform or authorize any illegal
marriage ceremony. The elements of this crime are as follows: (1) authority of the solemnizing
officer; and (2) his performance of an illegal marriage ceremony.
In the present case, Ronulo admitted that he has authority to solemnize a marriage. Thus, the
only issue to be resolved is whether the alleged blessing by Ronulo s tantamount to the
performance of an illegal marriage ceremony.
While Article 352, does not define a marriage ceremony and what constitutes its illegal
performance, yet Articles 3 (3) and 6 of the Family Code are clear on these matters. Article 6 of
the Family Code provides that [n]o prescribed form or religious rite for the solemnization of the
marriage is required. It shall be, necessary however, for the contracting parties to appear
personally before the solemnizing officer and declare in the presence of not less than two
witnesses of legal age that they take each other as husband and wife.

39
Here, Ronulo admitted that the parties appeared before him and this fact was testified to by the
witnesses and that the contracting parties personally declared that they take each other as
husband and wife.
Libel:A written letter containing libelous matter cannot be classified as privileged when it is
published and circulated among the public
Alejandro Almendras vs. Alexis Almendras, 745 SCRA 674, January 14, 2015
SERENO, CJ:
Facts: Alejandro Almendras (Alejandro) sent letters with similar contents on 7 February 1996 to
House Speaker Jose de Venecia, Jr., and on 26 February 1996 to Dr. NemesioPrudente, President
of Oil Carriers, Inc. The controversial portion of the first and second letters reads as follows:
This is to notify your good self and your staff that one ALEXIS "DODONG" C.
ALMENDRAS, a brother, is not vested with any authority to liaison or transact
any business with any department, office, or bureau, public or otherwise, that has
bearing or relation with my office, mandates or functions. x xx.
Note worthy to mention, perhaps, is the fact that Mr. Alexis "Dodong" C.
Almendras, a reknown blackmailer, is a bitter rival in the just concluded election
of 1995 who ran against the wishes of my father, the late Congressman Alejandro
D. Almendras, Sr. He has caused pain to the family when he filed cases against us:
his brothers and sisters, and worst against his own mother.
I deemed that his act of transacting business that affects my person and official
functions is malicious in purpose, done with ill motive and part of a larger plan of
harassment activities to perforce realise his egoistic and evil objectives.
May I therefore request the assistance of your office in circulating the above
information to concerned officials and secretariat employees of the House of
Representatives.3
x xxx
These letters were allegedly printed, distributed, circulated and published by Alejandro, assisted
by Atty. Roberto Layug, in Digos, Davao del Sur and Quezon City, with evident bad faith and
manifest malice to destroy respondent Alexis C. Almendras good name. Hence, the latter filed
an action for damages arising from libel and defamation against Alejandro in the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 19, Digos City.
(2) Whether or not the letters are libelous in nature;
(3) Whether or not the letters fall within the purview of privileged communication; and

40
Alejandros letters are libelous in nature and do not fall within the purview of privileged
communication.
For an imputation to be libelous under Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code, the following
requisites must be present: (a) it must be defamatory; (b) it must be malicious; (c) it must be
given publicity; and (d) the victim must be identifiable.21
Consequently, under Article 354, every defamatory imputation is presumed to be malicious, even
if true, if no good intention and justifiable motive is shown. As an exception to the rule, the
presumption of malice is done away with when the defamatory imputation qualifies as privileged
communication.22 In order to qualify as privileged communication under Article 354, Number
1,23 the following requisites must concur: (1) the person who made the communication had a
legal, moral, or social duty to make the communication, or at least, had an interest to protect,
which interest may either be his own or of the one to whom it is made; (2) the communication is
addressed to an officer or a board, or superior, having some interest or duty in the matter, and
who has the power to furnish the protection sought; and (3) the statements in the communication
are made in good faith and without malice.24
In determining whether a statement is defamatory, the words used are to be construed in their
entirety and should be taken in their plain, natural, and ordinary meaning as they would naturally
be understood by the persons reading them, unless it appears that they were used and understood
in another sense.25 In the instant case, the letters tag respondent as a "reknown black mailer," a
vengeful family member who filed cases against his mother and siblings, and with nefarious
designs. Even an impartial mind reading these descriptions would be led to entertain doubts on
the persons character, thereby affecting that persons reputation.
Malice can also be presumed inasmuch as the letters are not privileged in nature. Alejandros
contention that he has the legal, moral or social duty to make the communication cannot be
countenanced because he failed to communicate the statements only to the person or persons
who have some interest or duty in the matter alleged, and who have the power to furnish the
protection sought by the author of the statement. A written letter containing libelous matter
cannot be classified as privileged when it is published and circulated among the
public.26 Examination of the letters would reveal that Alejandro himself intended for the letters to
be circulated (and they were so) when he said that:
May I therefore request the assistance of your office in circulating the above information to
concerned officials and secretariat employees of the House of Representatives.27
This lack of selectivity on his part is indicative of malice and is anathema to his claim of
privileged communication because such publication created upon the minds of the readers a
circumstance which brought discredit and shame to respondents reputation.28
Lastly, having duly proved that all the elements of libel are present in this case, we rule that the
damages awarded by the trial court and affirmed by the appellate court must be modified and
equitably reduced.

41
In awarding damages in libel cases, the court is given ample discretion to determine the amount,
depending upon the facts of the particular case.29 Article 2219 of the Civil Code expressly
authorizes the recovery of moral damages in cases of libel, slander or any other form of
defamation. However, "while no proof of pecuniary loss is necessary in order that moral
damages may be awarded, x xx it is nevertheless essential that the claimant should satisfactorily
show the existence of the factual basis of damages and its causal connection to defendants
acts."30 Considering that respondent sufficiently justified his claim for damages (i.e. he testified
that he was "embarrassed by the said letters [and] ashamed to show his face in [sic] government
offices"31), we find him entitled to moral and exemplary damages.
However, we equitably reduce the amounts 32 awarded because even though the letters were
libellous, respondent has not suffered such grave or substantial damage to his reputation to
warrant receiving P5,000,000 as moral damages and P100,000.00 as exemplary damages. In fact,
he was able to successfully secure an elected position in recent years. Accordingly, we reduce the
award of moral damages from P5,000,000 to P100,000 and exemplary damages from P100,000
to P20,000.
Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Falsification of Public Document (Article 365)
Sevilla vs. People, August 13, 2014, 732 SCRA 687
Facts: In his Personal Data Sheet (PDS), Sevilla, a newly elected councilor, stated in answer to
Question No. 25 therein, he that no criminal case is pending against him. The truthis that, as the
accused fully well knew, he is an accused in a criminal case for Assault upon an Agent of a
Person in Authority pending before the MeTC of Malabon City. The PDS was prepared byEditha
Mendoza, a member of his staff. Since he did not have an office yet, he just stayed in his house,
he was informed by Mendoza that he needs to accomplish his PDS and submit the same to the
Personnel Office of the City of Malabon before five oclock that afternoon. He then instructed
Mendoza to copy the entries in the previous copy of his PDS which he filed with the personnel
office. After the PDS was filled up and delivered to him by Mendoza, Sevilla just signed the
same without checking the veracity of the entries therein. That he failed to notice that, in answer
to the question of whether he has any pending criminal case, Mendoza checked the box
corresponding to the no answer.
The SandiganbayanconvictedSevillaof the crime of Falsification of Public Documents through
Reckless Imprudence (sic). The reckless signing of the PDS without verifying the data therein
makes him criminally liable for his act.
Issue: Whether or notSevilla can be convicted of the felony of Reckless Imprudence Resulting to
Falsification of public document, notwithstanding that the charge against him in the Information
was for the intentional felony of falsification of public document under Art. 171(4) of the RPC.
Ruling:
Yes, Sevilla can be convicted of the crime of Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Falsification of
public document. At the outset, it bears stressing that the Sandiganbayans designation of the

42
felony supposedly committed by Sevilla is inaccurate. The Sandiganbayan convicted Sevilla of
reckless imprudence, punished under Art. 365 of the RPC, which resulted into the falsification of
a public document. However, the Sandiganbayan designated the felony committed as
falsification of public document through reckless imprudence. The foregoing designation implies
that reckless imprudence is not a crime in itself but simply a modality of committing it. Quasioffenses under Art. 365 of the RPC are distinct and separate crimes and not a mere modality in
the commission of a crime.
Indeed, the notion that quasi-offenses, whether reckless or simple, are distinct species of crime,
separately defined and penalized under the framework of our penal laws, is nothing new. In truth,
criminal negligence in [the RPC] is treated as a mere quasi-offense, and dealt with separately
from willful offenses. Thus, the proper designation of the felony should be reckless imprudence
resulting to falsification of public documents and not falsification of public documents through
reckless imprudence. The rules on variance between allegation and proof are laid down under
Secs. 4 and 5, Rule 120 of the Rules of Court. Accordingly, in case of variance between the
allegation and proof, a defendant may be convicted of the offense proved when the offense
charged is included in or necessarily includes the offense proved.
There is no dispute that a variance exists between the offense alleged against Sevilla and that
proved by the prosecution. Parenthetically, the question that has to be resolved then is whether
reckless imprudence resulting to falsification of public document is necessarily included in the
intentional felony of falsification of public document under Art. 171(4) of the RPC. While a
criminal negligent act is not a simple modality of a willful crime, but a distinct crime in itself,
designated as a quasi-offense, in [the RPC], it may however be said that a conviction for the
former can be had under an information exclusively charging the commission of a willful
offense, upon the theory that the greater includes the lesser offense.
Thus, Sevillas claim that his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him was violated when the Sandiganbayan convicted him of reckless
imprudence resulting to falsification of public documents, when the Information only charged the
intentional felony of falsification of public documents, is untenable. To stress, reckless
imprudence resulting to falsification of public documents is an offense that is necessarily
included in the willful act of falsification of public documents, the latter being the greater
offense. As such, he can be convicted of reckless imprudence resulting to falsification of public
documents notwithstanding that the Information only charged the willful act of falsification of
public documents.

Special Penal Laws

Violence Against Women and their Children (RA 9262);foreign national can be held
criminally liable under R.A. No. 9262 for his unjustified failure to support his minor child if he
fails to prove that under the laws of his country he has no obligation to support his minor child.

43
Del Socorro vs. Van Wilsem, 744 SCRA 516, December 16, 2014
Peralta, J
This is a novel case. The case poses the question of whether an alien who divorced his wife
Filipina wife may be held liable for violation of the VAWC law for his refusal to support his
child and his former wife.
Norma A. Del Socorro and Ernst Johan Brinkman Van Wilsem contracted marriage in Holland on
September 25, 1990. On January 19, 1994, they were blessed with a son named Roderigo Norjo
Van Wilsem, who at the time of the filing of the instant petition was sixteen (16) years of age.
Unfortunately, their marriage bond ended on July 19, 1995 by virtue of a Divorce Decree issued
by the appropriate Court of Holland.4 At that time, their son was only eighteen (18) months
old.5 Thereafter, Norma and her son came home to the Philippines. Despite demands, Van
Wilsem refused to support their son. In the meanwhile, Van Wilsem came to the Philippines and
remarried in Pinamungahan, Cebu, and since then, have been residing thereat. Upon complaint of
Norma, an Information for violation of RA 9262 was filed. On February 19, 2010, the RTC-Cebu
issued an Order dismissing the criminal case on the ground that the facts charged in the
information do not constitute an offense with respect to VamWilsem is an alien.
Issues:
1. Whether or not a foreign national has an obligation to support his minor child under
Philippine law; and
2. Whether or not a foreign national can be held criminally liable under R.A. No. 9262
for his unjustified failure to support his minor child.
Ruling:
On the first issue:
To determine whether or not a person is criminally liable under R.A. No. 9262, it is imperative
that the legal obligation to support exists.
Article 195 of the Family Code, which provides the parents obligation to support his child does
not apply. Article 15 of the New Civil Code stresses the principle of nationality. In other words,
insofar as Philippine laws are concerned, specifically the provisions of the Family Code on
support, the same only applies to Filipino citizens. By analogy, the same principle applies to
foreigners such that they are governed by their national law with respect to family rights and
duties.
The obligation to give support to a child is a matter that falls under family rights and duties.
Since Van Wilsem is a citizen of Holland or the Netherlands, he is subject to the laws of his
country, not to Philippine law, as to whether he is obliged to give support to his child, as well as
the consequences of his failure to do so. Thus, Van Wilsem is not obliged to support Normas son

44
under Article195 of the Family Code as a consequence of the Divorce Covenant obtained in
Holland.
doctrine of processual presumption shall govern
This does not, however, mean that Van Wilsem is not obliged to support petitioners son
altogether.
In international law, the party who wants to have a foreign law applied to a dispute or case has
the burden of proving the foreign law.40 In the present case, Van Wilsem hastily concludes that
being a national of the Netherlands, he is governed by such laws on the matter of provision of
and capacity to support.41 While Van Wilsem pleaded the laws of the Netherlands in advancing
his position that he is not obliged to support his son, he never proved the same. It is incumbent
upon him to plead and prove that the national law of the Netherlands does not impose upon the
parents the obligation to support their child (either before, during or after the issuance of a
divorce decree), because foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts
are not authorized to take judicial notice of them. Like any other fact, they must be alleged and
proved.
In view of Van Wilsems failure to prove the national law of the Netherlands in his favor, the
doctrine of processual presumption shall govern. Under this doctrine, if the foreign law
involved is not properly pleaded and proved, our courts will presume that the foreign law is the
same as our local or domestic or internal law.
Thus, since the law of the Netherlands as regards the obligation to support has not been properly
pleaded and proved in the instant case, it is presumed to be the same with Philippine law, which
enforces the obligation of parents to support their children and penalizing the non-compliance
therewith.
But even if the national law of Van Wilsem states that parents have no obligation to support their
children or that such obligation is not punishable by law, said law would still not find
applicability.
When the foreign law, judgment or contract is contrary to a sound and established public policy
of the forum, the said foreign law, judgment or order shall not be applied. Here, it would be of
great injustice to the child to be denied of financial support when the latter is entitled thereto.
Additionally, prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have
for their object public order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by
laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign
country.
As to the effect of the divorce on the Filipino wife, the Court ruled that she should no longer be
considered married to the alien spouse. Further, she should not be required to perform her marital
duties and obligations.

45
Second issue
Based on the foregoing legal precepts, Van Wilsem may be made liable under Section 5(e) and (i)
of R.A. No. 9262 for unjustly refusing or failing to give support to petitioners son, to wit:
SECTION 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children.- The crime of violence
against women and their children is committed through any of the following acts:
x xxx
(e) Attempting to compel or compelling the woman or her child to engage in conduct which the
woman or her child has the right to desist from or desist from conduct which the woman or her
child has the right to engage in, or attempting to restrict or restricting the woman's or her child's
freedom of movement or conduct by force or threat of force, physical or other harm or threat of
physical or other harm, or intimidation directed against the woman or child. This shall include,
but not limited to, the following acts committed with the purpose or effect of controlling or
restricting the woman's or her child's movement or conduct:
x xxx
(2) Depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her children of financial support legally
due her or her family, or deliberately providing the woman's children insufficient financial
support; x xxx
(i) Causing mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation to the woman or her
child, including, but not limited to, repeated verbal and emotional abuse, and denial of financial
support or custody of minor childrenof access to the woman's child/children.51
Under the aforesaid special law, the deprivation or denial of financial support to the child is
considered an act of violence against women and children.
Furthermore, considering that Van Wilsem is currently living in the Philippines, the Generality
Principle in criminal law, in relation to Article 14 of the New Civil Code, applies to the instant
case, which provides that: "[p]enal laws and those of public security and safety shall be
obligatory upon all who live and sojourn in Philippine territory, subject to the principle of public
international law and to treaty stipulations."
On this score, it is indisputable that the alleged continuing acts of Van Wilsem in refusing to
support his child with Norma is committed here in the Philippines as all of the parties herein are
residents of the Province of Cebu City.
Finally, the act of denying support to a child under Section 5(e)(2) and (i) of R.A. No. 9262 is a
continuing offense,53 which started in 1995 but is still ongoing at present. Accordingly, the crime
charged in the instant case has clearly not prescribed.

46
Violence Against Women and their Children (RA 9262);acts of violence may be committed
even after the dating relationship had ceased.
Dabalos vs. RTC Branch 59, Angeles City, 688 SCRA 64, January 7, 2013
Davalos was charged with violation of Section 5 (a) of RA 9262. The accused was the boyfriend
of the complainant. On July 13, 2009 accused pulled complainants hair, punched her back,
shoulder and left eye. Allegedly, these demeaned and degraded complainants intrinsic worth
and dignity as a human being. Dabalos claimed that on July 13, 2009, he was no longer in a
dating relationship with private respondent. Complainant admitted that her relationship with
Davalos had indeed ended prior to the subject incident. Complainant narrated that on July 13,
2009, she sought payment of the money she had lent to Dabalos but the latter could not pay. She
then inquired from Dabalos of he was responsible for spreading rumors about her which he
admitted. Thereupon, complainant slapped Dabalos. Dabalos then inflicted on her the physical
injuries mentioned above.
Issue: Whether or not the acts of violence are covered by RA 9262 when the acts were not due to
their dating relationship.
Ruling:
While it is required that the offender has or had a sexual or dating relationship with the offended
woman, but for RA 9262 to be applicable, it is not indispensable that the acts of violence be the
consequence of such relationship. Nowhere in the law can such limitation be inferred. When the
law does not distinguish, neither shall we. It is immaterial whether the relationship had ceased
for as long as there is sufficient evidence showing the past or present existence of such
relationship between the offender and the victim when the physical harm was committed.
Trafficking In Persons (RA 9208 as amended by RA 10364)
People vs. Casio, 744 SCRA 113, December 3, 2014
Leonen, J.
Facts: AAA, a minor, worked as a house helper in 2007. In 2008, she stopped working as a house
helper and moved to Cebu City. There she met Gee Ann. When Gee Ann learned that she was no
longer a virgin, she offered her work. She had sex with her first customer of which she was paid
P700. Eventually Gee Ann brought her to accused at Barangay Kamayagan as there were
customers in this area. On May 2, 2008, accused Casio solicited her services for a customers.
That was the first time that she was pimped by the accused. Accused brought her, BBB and a
certain Jocelyn to Queensland Motel. AAA and BBB were told to go to Room 24. There, the
police rushed in and told her and BBB to go to another room where they met by the DSWD
personnel.
Issue: Whether or not the accused can be convicted of trafficking in persons when AAA
admitted that she works as a prostitute.

47

Ruling:
The elements of trafficking in persons can be derived from its definition under Section 3(a) of
Republic Act No. 9208, thus:
(1) The act of "recruitment, transportation, transfer or harbouring, or receipt of persons
with or without the victims consent or knowledge, within or across national borders."
(2) The means used which include "threat or use of force, or other forms of coercion,
abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power or of position, taking advantage of the
vulnerability of the person, or, the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve
the consent of a person having control over another; and
(3) The purpose of trafficking is exploitation which includes "exploitation or the
prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labor or services,
slavery, servitude or the removal or sale of organs."63
Knowledge or consent of the minor is not a defense under Republic Act No. 9208. As defined
under Section 3(a) of Republic Act No. 9208, trafficking in persons can still be committed even
if the victim gives consent.
As defined in Section 3 of the law:
a. Trafficking in Persons - refers to the recruitment, transportation, transfer or harboring,
or receipt of persons with or without the victim's consent or knowledge, within or across
national borders by means of threat or use of force, or other forms of coercion, abduction,
fraud, deception, abuse of power or of position, taking advantage of the vulnerability of
the persons, or, the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a
person having control over another person for the purpose of exploitation which includes
at a minimum, the exploitation or the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual
exploitation, forced labor or services, slavery, servitude or the removal or sale of organs.
(underlining for emphasis)
The victims consent is rendered meaningless due to the coercive, abusive, or deceptive means
employed by perpetrators of human trafficking. Even without the use of coercive, abusive, or
deceptive means, a minors consent is not given out of his or her own free will.
Republic Act No. 9208 further enumerates the instances when the crime of trafficking in persons
is qualified.
SEC. 6. Qualified Trafficking in Persons. The following are considered as qualified
trafficking:
a. When the trafficked person is a child;

48
b. When the adoption is effected through Republic Act No. 8043, otherwise known as the
"Inter-Country Adoption Act of 1995" and said adoption is for the purpose of prostitution,
pornography, sexual exploitation, forced labor, slavery, involuntary servitude or debt
bondage;
c. When the crime is committed by a syndicate, or in large scale. Trafficking is deemed
committed by a syndicate if carried out by a group of three (3) or more persons
conspiring or confederating with one another. It is deemed committed in large scale if
committed against three (3) or more persons, individually or as a group;
d. When the offender is an ascendant, parent, sibling, guardian or a person who exercise
authority over the trafficked person or when the offense is committed by a public officer
or employee;
e. When the trafficked person is recruited to engage in prostitution with any member of
the military or law enforcement agencies;
f. When the offender is a member of the military or law enforcement agencies; and
g. When by reason or on occasion of the act of trafficking in persons, the offended party
dies, becomes insane, suffers mutilation or is afflicted with Human Immuno Deficiency
Virus (HIV) or the Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS).
Section 3 (b) of Republic Act No. 9208 defines "child" as a person below eighteen (18) years of
age or one who is over eighteen (18) but is unable to fully take care of or protect himself/herself
from abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation, or discrimination because of a physical or mental
disability or condition.74
Based on the definition of trafficking in persons and the enumeration of acts of trafficking in
persons, accused performed all the elements in the commission of the offense when she peddled
AAA and BBB and offered their services to decoys PO1 Veloso and PO1 Luardo in exchange for
money. The offense was also qualified because the trafficked persons were minors.
[T]he act of "sexual intercourse" need not have been consummated for the mere "transaction"
i.e. that solicitation for sex and the handing over of the "bust money" of Php.1,000.00 already
consummated the said act.75
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------N.B. On January 28, 2013, Republic Act No. 1036464 was approved, otherwise known as the
"Expanded Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2012." Section 3(a) of Republic Act No. 9208 was
amended by Republic Act No. 10364 as follows:
SEC. 3. Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9208 is hereby amended to read as follows:
"SEC. 3. Definition of Terms. As used in this Act:

49
"(a) Trafficking in Persons refers to the recruitment, obtaining, hiring, providing, offering,
transportation, transfer, maintaining, harboring, or receipt of persons with or without the victims
consent or knowledge, within or across national borders by means of threat, or use of force, or
other forms of coercion, abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power or of position, taking
advantage of the vulnerability of the person, or, the giving or receiving of payments or benefits
to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person for the purpose of
exploitation which includes at a minimum, the exploitation or the prostitution of others or other
forms of sexual exploitation, forced labor or services, slavery, servitude or the removal or sale of
organs.
"The recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring, adoption or receipt of a child for the
purpose of exploitation or when the adoption is induced by any form of consideration for
exploitative purposes shall also be considered as trafficking in persons even if it does not
involve any of the means set forth in the preceding paragraph. (Emphasis supplied)
Under Republic Act No. 10364, the elements of trafficking in persons have been expanded to
include the following acts:
(1) The act of "recruitment, obtaining, hiring, providing, offering, transportation, transfer,
maintaining, harboring, or receipt of persons with or without the victims consent or
knowledge, within or across national borders;"
(2) The means used include "by means of threat, or use of force, or other forms of
coercion, abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power or of position, taking advantage of
the vulnerability of the person, or, the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to
achieve the consent of a person having control over another person"
(3) The purpose of trafficking includes "the exploitation or the prostitution of others or
other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labor or services, slavery, servitude or the
removal or sale of organs" (Emphasis supplied

Child Abuse (RA 7610, Section 3, b, 2)

Rosaldes vs. People, October 8, 2014, 737 SCRA 592
Facts: On February 13, 1996, seven year old Michael Ryan Gonzales (Michael) then a Grade 1
pupil, was hurriedly entering his classroom when he accidentally bumped the knee of his teacher,
Petitioner FelinaRosaldes, who was then asleep on a bamboo sofa roused from sleep, she asked
Michael to apologize to her. When Michael did not obey but instead proceeded to his seat, she
went to Michael and pinched him on his thigh. Then, she held him up by his armpits and pushed
him to the floor. As he fell, Michaels body hit a desk. As a result, he lost consciousness. She
proceeded to pick Michael up by his ears and repeatedly slammed him down on the floor. After
the incident, she proceeded to teach her class. During lunch break, Michael went home crying
and told his mother about the incident. His mother and his aunt reported the incident to their

50
Brgy. Captain. Michael was also examined by a doctor and the incident was reported to the
Police Station. Eventually, Rosaldes was criminally charged for child abuse.
Issue: Whether or notRosaldes shall be held liable with the crime of child abuse.
Ruling: Rosaldes is guilty of the crime charged. In the crime of child abuse, the maltreatment
may consist of an act by deeds or by words that debases, degrades or demeans the intrinsic
worth and dignity of a child as a human being. Such act, as settled, need not be habitual.
Although a school teacher could duly discipline her pupil, the infliction of the physical injuries
on the child was unnecessary, violent and excessive. The Family Code has even expressly
banned the infliction of corporal punishment by a school administrator, teacher or individual
engaged in child care exercising special parental authority (i.e., in loco parentis). Hence, a school
teacher may be convicted of the said crime and, all the more when her propensity for violence
has been established clearly by the prosecution.
But mere laying of hands upon a minor is not necessarily child abuse
Bongalon vs. People, 694 SCRA 12, March 20, 2013
BERSAMIN, J.:
Not every instance of the laying of hands on a child constitutes the crime of child abuse under
Section 10 (a) of Republic Act No. 7610.1 Only when the laying of hands is shown beyond
reasonable doubt to be intended by the accused to debase, degrade or demean the intrinsic
worth and dignity of the child as a human being should it be punished as child abuse. Otherwise,
it is punished under the Revised Penal Code.
Facts: On May 11, 2002, Jayson Dela Cruz (Jayson) and Roldan, his older brother, both minors,
joined the evening procession for the Santo Nio at Oro Site in Legazpi City; that when the
procession passed in front of Bongalon house, the latters daughter Mary Ann Rose, also a minor,
threw stones at Jayson and called him "sissy"; that Bongalon confronted Jayson and Roldan and
called them names like "strangers" and "animals"; that Bongalon struck Jayson at the back with
his hand, and slapped Jayson on the face. Jayson underwent medical treatment at the Bicol
Regional Training and Teaching Hospital and the doctors attested that Jayson suffered the
following contusions, to wit: (1) contusion .5 x 2.5 scapular area, left; and (2) +1x1 cm.
contusion left zygomatic area and contusion .5 x 2.33 cm. scapular area, left. The Prosecutors
Office charged Bongalon with child abuse an act in violation of Section 10(a) of Republic Act
No. 7610.
Issue: Whether or not the act of laying hands with a minor is automatically equivalent to child
abuse.

51
Ruling: The law under which the petitioner was charged, tried and found guilty of violating is
Section 10 (a), Article VI of Republic Act No. 7610, which relevantly states:
Section 10. Other Acts of Neglect, Abuse, Cruelty or Exploitation and other
Conditions Prejudicial to the Childs Development.
(a) Any person who shall commit any other acts of child abuse, cruelty or
exploitation or be responsible for other conditions prejudicial to the childs
development including those covered by Article 59 of Presidential Decree No.
603, as amended, but not covered by the Revised Penal Code, as amended, shall
suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period.
x xxx
Child abuse, the crime charged, is defined by Section 3 (b) of Republic Act No. 7610, as
follows:
Section 3. Definition of terms.
x xxx
(b) "Child Abuse" refers to the maltreatment, whether habitual or not, of the
child which includes any of the following:
(1) Psychological and physical abuse, neglect, cruelty, sexual abuse and
emotional maltreatment;
(2) Any act by deeds or words which debases, degrades or demeans the intrinsic
worth and dignity of a child as a human being;
(3) Unreasonable deprivation of his basic needs for survival, such as food and
shelter; or
(4) Failure to immediately give medical treatment to an injured child resulting
in serious impairment of his growth and development or in his permanent
incapacity or death.
x xxx
Not every laying of hands on a minor is child abuse. To be a child abuse, the laying of hands
must be coupled with an intention to debase the "intrinsic worth and dignity" of a minor as a
human being, or to humiliate or embarrass the minor.
Here, the records showed the laying of hands on Jayson to have been done at the spur of the
moment and in anger, indicative of his being then overwhelmed by his fatherly concern for the
personal safety of his own minor daughters who had just suffered harm at the hands of Jayson

52
and Roldan. With the loss of his self-control, he lacked that specific intent to debase, degrade or
demean the intrinsic worth and dignity of a child as a human being that was so essential in the
crime of child abuse.
It is not trite to remind that under the well-recognized doctrine of pro reo every doubt is resolved
in favor of the accused.
Considering that Jaysons physical injury required five to seven days of medical attention, the
accused is liable for slight physical injuries under Article 266 (1) of the Revised Penal Code, to
wit:
Article 266. Slight physical injuries and maltreatment. The crime of slight
physical injuries shall be punished:
1. By arrestomenor when the offender has inflicted physical injuries which
shall incapacitate the offended party for labor from one to nine days, or shall
require medical attendance during the same period.
x xxx
The penalty for slight physical injuries is arrestomenor, which ranges from one day to 30 days of
imprisonment. In imposing the correct penalty, however, the mitigating circumstance of passion
or obfuscation under Article 13 (6) of the Revised Penal Code, should be considered because the
accused lost his reason and self-control, thereby diminishing the exercise of his will power.
Passion or obfuscation may lawfully arise from causes existing only in the honest belief of the
accused. It is relevant to mention, too, that in passion or obfuscation, the offender suffers a
diminution of intelligence and intent. With his having acted under the belief that Jayson and
Roldan had thrown stones at his two minor daughters, and that Jayson had burned Cherrlyns
hair, the accused is entitled to the mitigating circumstance of passion. Arrestomenor is prescribed
in its minimum period (i.e., one day to 10 days) in the absence of any aggravating circumstance
that offset the mitigating circumstance of passion. Accordingly, with the Indeterminate Sentence
Law being inapplicable due to the penalty imposed not exceeding one year, the accused shall
suffer a straight penalty of 10 days of arrestomenor.
Sexual Abuse
People vs Baraga, June 4, 2014, 725 SCRA 293
Facts: Accused Baraga was charged with violation of Section 5(b), Article III of RA 7610. AAA
the victim in this case is Baragas 12 year old daughter. On April 2, 2007, AAA was at their
house when Baraga sat beside her and touched her vagina. On August 19, 2007, while AAA was
at home, Baraga again touched AAAs vagina.
Issue: Whether or not Baraga is guilty of violating Section 5(b), Article III of RA 7610.
Ruling: Yes Baraga is guilty of sexual abuse under Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610.

53
This crime has three elements: (1) the accused commits an act of sexual intercourse or lascivious
conduct; (2) the said act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other
sexual abuse; and (3) the child is below 18 years old.
Baragas criminal liability was sufficiently established under Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No.
7610. First, Baraga, on two instances, on April 2, 2007 and on August 19, 2007, intentionally
touched AAAs vagina. Second, Baraga used his moral ascendancy and influence over his
daughter AAA to consummate his lascivious design. Third, AAA was less than 18 years of age
when the said incidents happened.

Child abuse
Meaning of the phrasesubjected to other sexual abuse
Caballo vs. People,June 10, 2013
Perlas-Bernabe J.:
Facts: After spending time together, AAA, then 17 years old and Caballo eventually became
sweethearts. In the last week of March of 1988, Caballo persuaded AAA to have sexual
intercourse with him. This was followed by several more of the same in April 1998, in the first
and second weeks of May 1998, on August 31, 1998 and in November 1998, all of which
happened in SurigaoCity, except the one in August which occurred in Cebu. In June 1998, AAA
became pregnant and later gave birth on March 8, 1999. AAA gave in to the sexual desires of
Caballo due to promises of marriage and his assurance that he would not get her pregnant due to
the use of the "withdrawal method."
Issue: What is the meaning of the phrase "due to the coercion or influence of any adult" which
would thereby classify the victim as a "child exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse" as
found in Section 5, Article III of RA 7610?
Ruling:
The elements of the offense punished under Section 5 of Article III, RA 7610 are the following:
(a) The accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct;
(b) The said act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual
abuse; and
(c) The child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of age.

54
Sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct under the coercion or influence of any adult exists when
there is some form of compulsion equivalent to intimidation which subdues the free exercise of
the offended partys free will. Section 2(g) of the Rules on Child Abuse Cases conveys that
sexual abuse involves the element of influence which manifests in a variety of forms. It is
defined as:
The employment, use, persuasion, inducement, enticement or coercion of a
child to engage in or assist another person to engage in, sexual intercourse or
lascivious conduct or the molestation, prostitution, or incest with children.
To note, the term "influence" means the "improper use of power or trust in any way that deprives
a person of free will and substitutes anothers objective." Meanwhile, "coercion" is the "improper
use of x xx power to compel another to submit to the wishes of one who wields it."
Caballos actuations may be classified as "coercion" and "influence" within the purview of
Section 5, Article III of RA 7610.
First, AAA was a minor incapable of fully understanding or knowing the import of her actions
and in consequence, remained vulnerable to the cajolery and deception of adults. Second,
Caballo's actions effectively constitute overt acts of coercion and influence. Caballo repeatedly
assured AAA of his love for her, and even, promised to marry her. In addition, he also guaranteed
that she would not get pregnant since he would be using the "withdrawal method" for safety.
Irrefragably, these were meant to influence AAA to set aside her reservations and eventually give
into having sex with him, with which he succeeded.
B.P. 22; The fact that the issuer of the check had already paid the value of the dishonored check
after having received the subpoena from the Office of the Prosecutor should have forestalled the
filing of the Information in court.
Lim vs. People, 742 SCRA 684, November 26, 2014
Facts: Lim (petitioner) issued Bank of Commerce Check Nos. 0013813 and 0013814, dated June
30, 1998 and July 15, 1998, respectively, payable to CASH, in the amount of One Hundred
Thousand Pesos (PI00,000.00) for each check. He gave the checks to Mr. Willie Castor (Castor)
as his campaign donation to the latter's candidacy in the elections of 1998. It was Castor who
ordered the delivery of printing materials and used petitioner's checks to pay for the same.
Claiming that the printing materials were delivered too late, Castor instructed petitioner to issue
a "Stop Payment" order for the two checks. Thus, the checks were dishonored by the bank
because of said order and during trial, when the bank officer was presented on the witness stand,
he admitted that said checks were drawn against insufficient funds (DAIF). Private complainant
Magna B. Badiee sent two demand letters to petitioner, dated July 20, 1998 and July 23, 1998
and, subsequently, private complainant filed a complaint against petitioner before the Office of
the Prosecutor. After the lapse of more than one month from receipt of the demand letters, and
after receiving the subpoena from the Office of the Prosecutor, petitioner issued a replacement

55
check dated September 8, 1998 in the amount of Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000.00).
Private complainant Magna B. Badiee was able to encash said replacement check.
Nevertheless, on March 19, 1999, or six (6) months after petitioner had paid the amount of the
bounced checks, two Informations were filed against him before the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Manila (MeTC).
Issue: Whether or not an issuer of a bounced check can still be convicted if he paid the value of
the check, after the 5 day notice, but during the preliminary investigation of the case in the
Prosecutors Office.
Ruling:
In Griffith, the Court acquitted the accused therein due to the fact that two years before the filing
of the Information for violation of B.P. No. 22, the accused had, in effect, paid the complainant
an amount greater than the value of the bounced checks.
Generally, only the full payment of the value of the dishonored check during the five-day grace
period would exculpate the accused from criminal liability under B.P. Blg. 22 but in case the
creditor had collected more than a sufficient amount to cover the value of the checks representing
rental arrearages, holding the debtor's president to answer for a criminal offense under B.P. Blg.
22 two years after the said collection is no longer tenable nor justified by law or equitable
considerations. Thus, although payment of the value of the bounced check, if made beyond the 5day period provided for in B.P. Blg. 22, would normally not extinguish criminal liability, but
where, even if all the elements of the crime or offense are present, the conviction of the accused
would prove to be abhorrent to society's sense of justice, then the issuer of the check should be
acquitted. The fact that the issuer of the check had already paid the value of the dishonored check
after having received the subpoena from the Office of the Prosecutor should have forestalled the
filing of the Information in court. The spirit of the law which, for B.P. Blg. 22, is the protection
of the credibility and stability of the banking system, would not be served by penalizing people
who have evidently made amends for their mistakes and made restitution for damages even
before charges have been filed against them. In effect, the payment of the checks before the
filing of the informations has already attained the purpose of the law.
It should be emphasized as well that payment of the value of the bounced check after the
information has been filed in court would no longer have the effect of exonerating the accused
from possible conviction for violation of B.P. Blg. 22. Since from the commencement of the
criminal proceedings in court, there is no circumstance whatsoever to show that the accused had
every intention to mitigate or totally alleviate the ill effects of his issuance of the unfunded
check, then there is no equitable and compelling reason to preclude his prosecution. In such a
case, the letter of the law should be applied to its full extent.
Furthermore, to avoid any confusion, the Court's ruling in this case should be well differentiated
from cases where the accused is charged with estafa under Article 315, par. 2(d) of the Revised
Penal Code, where the fraud is perpetuated by postdating a check, or issuing a check in payment
of an obligation when the offender had no funds in the bank, or his funds deposited therein were

56
not sufficient to cover the amount of the check. In said case of estafa, damage and deceit are the
essential elements of the offense, and the check is merely the accused's tool in committing fraud.
In such a case, paying the value of the dishonored check will not free the accused from criminal
liability. It will merely satisfy the civil liability of the crime but not the criminal liability.
In fine, the Court holds that herein petitioner must be exonerated from the imposition of penalties
for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 as he had already paid the amount of the dishonored checks six (6)
months before the filing of Informations with the court. Such a course of action is more in
keeping with justice and equity.
Cybercrime Law
Disni Jr. vs Secretary of Justice, April 22, 2014, 723 SCRA 109
Facts: This case involves consolidated petitions seeking to declare several provisions of Republic
Act (R.A.) 10175, the Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012, unconstitutional and void. Petitioners
claim that the means adopted by the cybercrime law for regulating undesirable cyberspace
activities violate certain constitutional rights. The government asserts that the law merely seeks
to reasonably put order into cyberspace activities, punish wrongdoings, and prevent hurtful
attacks on the system.
Issue: Constitutionality of several provisions of the Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012 declaring
several acts as punishable.
Ruling:
1. The provision making Cybersex as a punishable act, Section 4(c)(1) to wit:
The willful engagement, maintenance, control, or operation, directly or indirectly, of any
lascivious exhibition of sexual organs or sexual activity, with the aid of a computer system, for
favor or consideration.
isconstitutional. Petitioners argument that the above violates the freedom of expression clause
of the Constitution was not given credence. Their express fear that private communications of
sexual character between husband and wife or consenting adults, which are not regarded as
crimes under the penal code, would now be regarded as crimes when done "for favor" in
cyberspace is misplaced.
The Court will not declare Section 4(c)(1) unconstitutional where it stands a construction that
makes it apply only to persons engaged in the business of maintaining, controlling, or operating,
directly or indirectly, the lascivious exhibition of sexual organs or sexual activity with the aid of
a computer system as Congress has intended.
2. The provision declaringCyberlibel as a punishable act, under Section 4(c)(4) of the
Cybercrime Law is alsoconstitutional. Petitioners assail the constitutionality of both the penal
code provisions on libel as well as Section 4(c)(4) of the Cybercrime Prevention Act on

57
cyberlibel. Section 4(c)(4) merely incorporated the provision of libel punishable under the RPC
but with a penalty one degree higher. Petitioners peddle the view that both the penal code and the
Cybercrime Prevention Act violate the countrys obligations under the International Covenant of
Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). They point out that in Adonis v. Republic of the Philippines,
the United Nations Human Rights Committee (UNHRC) cited its General Comment 34 to the
effect that penal defamation laws should include the defense of truth.
But General Comment 34 does not say that the truth of the defamatory statement should
constitute an all-encompassing defense. As it happens, Article 361 recognizes truth as a
defense but under the condition that the accused has been prompted in making the
statement by good motives and for justifiable ends.
Besides, the UNHRC did not actually enjoin the Philippines, as petitioners urge, to decriminalize
libel. It simply suggested that defamation laws be crafted with care to ensure that they do not
stifle freedom of expression.
The Court agreed with the Solicitor General that libel is not a constitutionally protected speech
and that the government has an obligation to protect private individuals from defamation.
Indeed, cyberlibel is actually not a new crime since Article 353, in relation to Article 355 of the
Penal Code, already punishes it. In effect, Section 4(c)(4) above merely affirms that online
defamation constitutes similar means for committing libel.
Cyberlibel brings with it certain intricacies, unheard of when the Penal Code provisions on libel
were enacted. The culture associated with internet media is distinct from that of print.
3. The provision declaring aiding or abetting libel on the cyberspace as a punishable
act under section 5(a) is a nullity. The Supreme Court explained that, The terms aiding or
abetting constitute broad sweep that generates chilling effect on those who express themselves
through cyberspace posts, comments, and other messages. Its vagueness raises apprehension on
the part of internet users because of its obvious chilling effect on the freedom of expression.
The Supreme Court however also stated thatif the "Comment" does not merely react to the
original posting but creates an altogether new defamatory story, then that should be considered
an original posting published on the internet.
4. The provision declaring Unsolicited Commercial Transactions (Spam) as
punishable, Sec 4(c)(3) is unconstitutional. Petitioners argue that spams are a nuisance that
wastes the storage and network capacities of internet service providers, reduces the efficiency of
commerce and technology, and interferes with the owners peaceful enjoyment of his property.
Transmitting spams amounts to trespass to ones privacy since the person sending out spams
enters the recipients domain without prior permission. However, The Supreme Court ruled that
Unsolicited Commercial Transactions or SPAM are legitimate forms of expression..
The Supreme Court in declaring this provision unconstitutional stated that, the government
presents no basis for holding that unsolicited electronic ads reduce the "efficiency of computers."

58
Secondly, people, before the arrival of the age of computers, have already been receiving such
unsolicited ads by mail. These have never been outlawed as nuisance since people might have
interest in such ads. What matters is that the recipient has the option of not opening or reading
these mail ads. That is true with spams. Their recipients always have the option to delete or not
to read them.
To prohibit the transmission of unsolicited ads would deny a person the right to read his emails,
even unsolicited commercial ads addressed to him. Commercial speech is a separate category of
speech which is not accorded the same level of protection as that given to other constitutionally
guaranteed forms of expression but is nonetheless entitled to protection
5. The provision relating to Child Pornography., which states as punishable The
unlawful or prohibited acts defined and punishable by Republic Act No. 9775 or the Anti-Child
Pornography Act of 2009 (ACPA), committed through a computer system: Provided, That the
penalty to be imposed shall be one degree higher than that provided for in Republic Act No.
9775 isconstitutional.The Supreme Court explained that It seems that the above merely
expands the scope of the Anti-Child Pornography Act of 2009to cover identical activities in
cyberspace. In theory, nothing prevents the government from invoking the ACPA when
prosecuting persons who commit child pornography using a computer system. Actually, ACPAs
definition of child pornography already embraces the use of "electronic, mechanical, digital,
optical, magnetic or any other means." Notably, no one has questioned this ACPA provision.
Of course, the law makes the penalty higher by one degree when the crime is committed in
cyberspace. But no one can complain since the intensity or duration of penalty is a legislative
prerogative and there is rational basis for such higher penalty.
6. Section 19 which empowers the Department of Justice to restrict or block access to
computer data, isunconstitutional, as it stifles freedom of expression and violates the right
against unreasonable searches and seizures.. Section 19 states: Sec. 19. Restricting or Blocking
Access to Computer Data. When a computer data is prima facie found to be in violation of the
provisions of this Act, the DOJ shall issue an order to restrict or block access to such computer
data.
Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides that the right to be secure in ones papers
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose
shall be inviolable. Further, it states that no search warrant shall issue except upon probable
cause to be determined personally by the judge. Here, the Government, in effect, seizes and
places the computer data under its control and disposition without a warrant. The Department of
Justice order cannot substitute for judicial search warrant.
The content of the computer data can also constitute speech. In such a case, Section 19 operates
as a restriction on the freedom of expression over cyberspace. Certainly not all forms of speech
are protected. Legislature may, within constitutional bounds, declare certain kinds of expression
as illegal. But for an executive officer to seize content alleged to be unprotected without any
judicial warrant, it is not enough for him to be of the opinion that such content violates some law,
for to do so would make him judge, jury, and executioner all rolled into one.

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Anti-Fencing
Ong vs. People, April 10, 2013
Sereno, CJ
Facts: Private complainant was the owner of forty-four (44) Firestone truck tires, described as
T494 1100 by 20 by 14. Private complainant marked the tires using a piece of chalk before
storing them in his warehouse. On February 17, 1995, private complainant learned from his
caretaker that thirty-eight (38) truck tires were stolen from the warehouse, the gate of which was
forcibly opened. Private complainant went around and he chanced upon Jong's Marketing, a store
selling tires in Paco, Manila, owned and operated by Ong. Private complainant inquired and
bought one tire and he recognized as one of the tires stolen from his warehouse, based on the
chalk marking and the serial number thereon. He informed the police and the police conducted a
buy bust operation. When the poseur buyer was able to was able to buy one tire- T494 1100 by
20 by 14 Firestone truck tire, he asked for more and Ong instructed his helpers to bring out
twelve (12) more tires from his warehouse. After the twelve (12) truck tires were brought in,
private complainant entered the store, inspected them and found that they were the same tires
which were stolen from him, based on their serial numbers. Private complainant then gave the
prearranged signal to the buy-bust team. The buy-bust team went inside Ongs store and seized
the tires. For his part, Ong averred that on 18 February 1995, a certain Ramon Go offered to sell
thirteen (13) Firestone truck tires allegedly from Dagat-dagatan, CaloocanCity, for P3,500 each.
Ong bought all the tires for P45,500, for which he was issued a Sales Invoice dated 18 February
1995 and with the letterhead Gold Link Hardware & General Merchandise (Gold Link).
Issue: Whether or not Ong is liable for violation of P.D. 1612
Ruling:
The essential elements of the crime of fencing are as follows: (1) a crime of robbery or theft has
been committed; (2) the accused, who is not a principal or on accomplice in the commission of
the crime of robbery or theft, buys, receives, possesses, keeps, acquires, conceals, sells or
disposes, or buys and sells, or in any manner deals in any article, item, object or anything of
value, which has been derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft; (3) the accused
knew or should have known that the said article, item, object or anything of value has been
derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft; and (4) there is, on the part of one
accused, intent to gain for oneself or for another.
All the elements of Fencing are present in this case.
Ong knew or should have known that the said article, item, object or anything of value has been
derived from the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft. The words "should know" denote the
fact that a person of reasonable prudence and intelligence would ascertain the fact in
performance of his duty to another or would govern his conduct upon assumption that such fact
exists. Ong, who was in the business of buy and sell of tires for the past twenty-four (24) years,
ought to have known the ordinary course of business in purchasing from an unknown seller.

60
Admittedly, Go approached Ong and offered to sell the thirteen (13) tires and he did not even ask
for proof of ownership of the tires. The entire transaction, from the proposal to buy until the
delivery of tires happened in just one day. His experience from the business should have given
him doubt as to the legitimate ownership of the tires considering that it was his first time to
transact with Go and the manner it was sold is as if Go was just peddling the thirteen (13) tires in
the streets.
Moreover, Ong knew the requirement of the law in selling second hand tires. Section 6 of P.D.
1612 requires stores, establishments or entities dealing in the buying and selling of any good,
article, item, object or anything else of value obtained from an unlicensed dealer or supplier
thereof to secure the necessary clearance or permit from the station commander of the Integrated
National Police in the town or city where that store, establishment or entity is located before
offering the item for sale to the public.
In his defense, Ong argued that he relied on the receipt issued to him by Go. Logically, and for
all practical purposes, the issuance of a sales invoice or receipt is proof of a legitimate
transaction and may be raised as a defense in the charge of fencing; however, that defense is
disputable. In this case, the validity of the issuance of the receipt was disputed, and the
prosecution was able to prove that Gold Link and its address were fictitious. Ong failed to
overcome the evidence presented by the prosecution and to prove the legitimacy of the
transaction. Thus, he was unable to rebut the prima facie presumption under Section 5 of P.D.
1612.
Finally, there was evident intent to gain for himself, considering that during the buy-bust
operation, Ong was actually caught selling the stolen tires in his store, Jong Marketing.
Fencing is malumprohibitum, and P.D. 1612 creates a prima fqcie presumption of fencing from
evidence of possession by the accused of any good, article, item, object or anything of value,
which has been the subject of robbery or theft; and prescribes a higher penalty based on the value
of the 25 property.

Carnapping with homicide

People vs. Mallari,

April 1, 2013

Facts: As the group (composing the accused) was departing from a restaurant, a Toyota FX taxi
with plate number PXT-143 passed-by. Mallari flagged it down, talked to the driver, and boarded
the same together with Ramos and Posadas. They proceeded south. Mallari killed the driver and
then they took the Toyota FX. They dumped the dead body somewhere in Atimonan, Quezon.
They took the vehicle to Tubod, Lanao del Norte.
Issue: What was the crime committed by the trio?

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Ruling: The trio committed the special complex crime of carnapping with homicide. Section 2
of RA 6539 defines carnapping as "the taking, with intent to gain, of a motor vehicle belonging
to another without the latters consent, or by means of violence against or intimidation of
persons, or by using force upon things."To prove the special complex crime of carnapping
with homicide, there must be proof not only of the essential elements of carnapping, but also that
it was the original criminal design of the culprit and the killing was perpetrated "in the course of
the commission of the carnapping or on the occasion thereof." Here, Mallari took the Toyota FX
taxi; his original criminal design was carnapping; he killed the driver, Medel; and the killing
was perpetrated "in the course of the commission of the carnapping or on the occasion thereof."
Syndicated estafa (PD 1689)
Galvez vs. Court of Appeals, February 20, 2013
Facts: In 1999, Radio Marine Network Inc. (RMSI) claiming to do business under the name
SmartnetPhilippines and/or Smartnet Philippines, Inc. (SPI), applied for an Omnibus Credit Line
for various credit facilities with Asia United Bank (AUB). RMSI was represented by the
following officers and directors occupying the following positions: Gilbert Guy - Exec. VPres./Director; Philip Leung - Managing Director; Katherine Guy Treasurer; Rafael Galvez Executive Officer; Eugenio Galvez, Jr. - Chief Financial Officer/Comptroller Satisfied with the
credit worthiness of RMSI, AUB granted it a P250 Million Omnibus Credit Line, under the name
of Smartnet Philippines, RMSIs Division. Thereafter, the same officers again applied for loan
for Smartnert Philippines, Inc.Believing that SPI is the same as Smartnet Philippines - the
division of RMSI - AUB granted to it an Irrevocable Letter of Credit in the total sum of
$29,300.00 in favor of Rohde & Schwarz Support Centre Asia Ptd. Ltd.,. When this latter
account remained unpaid, AUB demanded payment. RMSI denied liability contending that the
transaction was incurred solely by SPI, a corporation which belongs to the Guy Group of
Companies, but which has a separate and distinct personality from RMSI.
Issue: Whether or not Galvez, et al may be charged and tried for syndicated estafa under
Presidential Decree No. 1689 simply because the commercial bank with whom they transacted
business is covered by the said decree.
Ruling: While Presidential Decree No. 1689 also covers commercial banks, but to be within the
ambit of the Decree, the swindling must be committed through the association, the bank in this
case, which operate on funds solicited from the general public. Stated otherwise, when the entity
soliciting funds from the general public is the victim and not the means through which the estafa
is committed, or that the offenders are not owners or employees who used the association to
perpetrate the crime, then syndicated estafa under the PD is not committed. In which case,
Article 315 (2)(a) of the Revised Penal Code applies. (Galvez vs. Court of Appeals, February 20,
2013)