[This case is the resolution of an MR filed by the petitioners Daclag.

Facts of
the 1st case are as follows.]
Maxima Macahilig is one of the 7 children of Candido (+) and Gregoria (+) who e
xecuted a a Deed of Extra-Judicial partitition with the heirs of her now decease
d siblings.
In 1982, Maxima entered into She later executed a Statement of Conformity, conf
irming
1. the proper execution of the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition,
2. that five parcels [one of which being Parcel One, the lot in question] of lan
d in the deed were declared in her name for taxation purposes, although said lan
ds were actually the property of her deceased parents Candido and Gregoria Macah
ilig;
In 1984, Maxima sold Parcel One to spouses Adelino and Rogelia Daclag (petitione
rs) as evidenced by a Deed of Sale
Objecting to the sale, Macahilig heirs filed a complaint for recovery of possess
ion and ownership, cancellation of documents and damages against Maxima and the
buyers contending that Maxima had no right to sell the land in question. Respond
ents alleged that they were the lawful owners and previous possessors of the one
half northern portion of Parcel One by virtue of a Deed of Extra-judicial Parti
tion; that since they were all residents of Caloocan City, their land was posses
sed by their first cousin, Penicula Divison Quijano, Maxima's daughter, as tenan
t thereon, as she was also in possession of the one half southern portion as ten
ant of the heirs of Mario Macahilig; that sometime in 1983, upon request of Maxi
ma and out of pity for her as she had no share in the produce of the land, Penic
ula allowed Maxima to farm the land; that without their knowledge, Maxima illega
lly sold on May 23, 1984, the entire riceland to petitioners, who are now in pos
session of the land, depriving respondents of its annual produce
Petitioners objected the action as Rogelia had been the registered owner of the
entire riceland since 1984 as evidenced by OCT No. P-13873; her title had become
incontrovertible after one year from its issuance; they purchased the subject l
and in good faith and for value from co-defendant Maxima who was in actual physi
cal possession of the property and who delivered and conveyed the same to them;
they were now in possession and usufruct of the land since then up to the presen
t; respondents were barred by laches for the unreasonable delay in filing the ca
se
The Supreme Court eventually held that reconveyance of the subject land to resp
ondents is proper, respondent Macahilig heirs being the true owners. Respondents
had sufficiently established that Parcel One, was not owned by Maxima at the ti
me she sold the land to petitioners.
An action for reconveyance prescribes in 10 years, the point of reference being
the date of registration of the deed or the date of issuance of the certificate
of title over the property. Records show that while the land was registered in t
he name of petitioner Rogelia in 1984 after the sale, the instant complaint for
reconveyance was filed by the respondents in 1991, and was thus still within the
ten-year prescriptive period.
In Ong v. Olasiman in which a claim of good faith was raised by petitioner who b
ought an unregistered land, we held:
Finally, petitioners' claim of good faith does not lie too as it is irrelevant:
The issue of good faith or bad faith of the buyer is relevant only where the sub
ject of the sale is registered land and the purchaser is buying the same from th
e registered owner whose title to the land is clean x x x in such case the purch
aser who relies on the clean title of the registered owner is protected if he is
a purchaser in good faith for value. Since the properties in question are unreg
istered lands, petitioners as subsequent buyers thereof did so at their peril. T
heir claim of having bought the land in good faith, i.e., without notice that so
me other person has a right to or interest in the property, would not protect th
em if it turns out, as it actually did in this case, that their seller did not o
wn the property at the time of the sale.

[Resolution of the MR]

We have earlier ruled that respondents' action for reconveyance had not prescrib
ed, since it was filed within the 10-year prescriptive period. However, a review
of the factual antecedents of the case shows that respondents' action for recon
veyance was not even subject to prescription. The deed of sale executed by Maxim
a in favor of petitioners was null and void, since Maxima was not the owner of t
he land she sold to petitioners, and the one-half northern portion of such land
was owned by respondents. Being an absolute nullity, the deed is subject to atta
ck anytime, in accordance with Article 1410 of the Civil Code that an action to
declare the inexistence of a void contract does not prescribe. An action for rec
onveyance based on a void contract is imprescriptible.
when there is a showing of such illegality, the property registered is deemed to
be simply held in trust for the real owner by the person in whose name it is re
gistered, and the former then has the right to sue for the reconveyance of the p
roperty