Shifting Sexes, Moving Stories: Feminist/Constructivist Dialogues

Author(s): Stefan Hirschauer and Annemarie Mol

Source: Science, Technology, & Human Values, Vol. 20, No. 3, Special Issue: Feminist and
Constructivist Perspectives on New Technology (Summer, 1995), pp. 368-385
Published by: Sage Publications, Inc.
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ShiftingSexes, MovingStories:
Feminist/ConstructivistDialogues
Stefan Hirschauer
University of Bielefeld
Annemarie Mol
University of Limburg

How can constructivismandfeminism informand strengthenone another?The author

andso s/he addressesthisquestionin
hermaphrodite,
of thistextis a constructivist-feminist
theform of an innerdialogue.Insteadof takingsex as a characteristicof individuals,s/he
analyzes it as somethingperformed locally in ways that vary from one situation to
another.Investigatingthese performancesoffersconstructivisman interestingtheoretical opportunityand a chance to turn away from a sterile anti-epistemologicalstance.
For feminism, a radicalizednotion of the constructionof sexes opens up new political
spaces and strategies.Constructivisttexts,moreover,have thepotentialto "do"boththe
contingencyand the necessity of ourforms of life in theirvery style.

Prologue
A: Let us begin by giving the readersome informationaboutour sex, race, class,
and maybe some other things, too. We had bettermake it clear rightfrom the
startfrom which standpointwe are speaking.
B: But this isn't a statementto the police, is it?
A: Whatdo you mean?I don't like you to make fun of me.
B: I am dead serious. Why can't I just write withoutbeing asked for my identity
papers?
A: Because you can't! People readdifferentlywhen they know who is addressing
them. They want to know. And they especially want to know whetheryou are
a man or a woman.
B: Do they?Not always. It mustdependon the specific case. Do you thinkthis is
so for readers of Science, Technology, & Human Values? Let's see.
AUTHORS' NOTE: We thank the participantsof the Conference on Constructivismand
Feminism in Brunel, September 1993, especially Janet Rachel for her encouragementand
MalcolmAshmorefor his subtlety.We arealso gratefulto the anonymousreviewersof thisjournal
for theircommentsand to JohnLaw for facilitatingour submissionto the English language.
&HumanValues,Vol.20 No.3, Summer1995 368-385
Science,Technology,
Inc.
? 1995SagePublications
368

Hirschauer,Mol / Shifting Sexes

369

He: I suggest thatbefore we get started,we negotiateaboutour sexes.~

She: Only a man could ever come up with an idea like that!
He: Why? An open negotiation...
She: Listen,over andover again,women experiencethe fact thatthereis no choice
at all in these matters.And you will never get that. You have never had the
experience of being turnedinto a woman. By others. So we can'tjust freely
chat and "decide"aboutsomethinglike our sexes.
He: Do I hear a complaint in your tone of voice? You are not suddenly into
victim-talk,are you? Please, stop it! Isn't it abouttime to try somethingnew?
She: Hmm. All right.As an experiment.On one condition:thatthe outcomeof the
negotiationis thatI take the male voice.
He: That'sfine with me. Good luck.
She: I suggest thatbefore we get started,we negotiateaboutour sexes.
He: Only a woman could ever come up with an idea like that!
She: Why? It could be nice, couldn'tit?
He: Nice! Listen,you feministshave gone too far.Youhavereallystartedto believe
these theories of yours. Dissolving the sex-genderdistinction.Sociologizing
"sex"to an impossible degree.... I mean, you can't deny the biological facts
of life and claim everythingis possible, a matterof choice, something to be
negotiatedabout.
She: Do I hearconservativeundertones,even anxiety,in yourvoice? Please, don't.
Stop it. Isn't it abouttime to try somethingnew?
He: Hmm. All right.As an experiment.On one condition:thatthe outcomeof the
negotiationis thatI take the female voice.
She: That's fine with me. Good luck.

Introduction
If I write this article as a contribution to a dialogue between feminism and
constructivism, I am in the confusing situation that I must first split myself
up analytically into the two parts I will have to put together later. If constructivists and feminists are invited to write in this journal, I feel I am being
offered a choice that generates anatomical problems.
He: Do we really want to make such a confessional start?To talk aboutwho and
what we feel ourselves to be? Wejust tried to confuse our readersabout our
identity,andnow we areofferingthemyet anotherset of labels thatthey might
use to categorizeus.
She: You've missed the point. In refusing the choice between being a
constructivist andbeing a feminist,we claimto be a hybrid.And,like changing
sides in a system that has only two categories,being a hybrid also subverts
categorizations.

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He: Okay,I'm sorryI need to have this explainedto me. Fine. Let's go on. But it
hurtsin my privateparts... it really does.2

A few years of fieldworkin the subculturesof both science and technology

studies and women's studies allows me to present a list of attributions
circulating in each of these circles about the other. These labels are not
necessarilywrittendown in the literature,which is often less frankthan the
spoken word.
Feministsstatethatthe constructivistmainstreamin science and technology studiesis genderblind.It does not see thatmen andwomen,not "people,"
workin the laboratories.Orthat"users"also have a sex. And constmctivism
is elitist. It has no political relevance.Or it is simply far too liberal.Or, yet
again, it is not serious.
Constructivistscomplainthatfeministworkis boringandpredictable.You
always know "whodunit"rightfromthe start;the plot is fartoo flat. Feminist
epistemology, moreover,contains oddities that are the sad outcome of its
political preoccupations--for example, selective relativism. Some things
may be made, but not others.Oppressionand dominationare assumedfrom
the outset, and they are serious.
I do not plan to explore the extent to which these attributionsare true.
Instead,I want to take them as a point of departure.And move ahead.
He: Do you thinkour readerswill believe our ethnographicaccount?Maybe they
will insist that we explore further the argumentsused. And give proper
quotationsand citations.There mustbe some.
She: Of course thereare.But the readersknow perfectlywell what we are talking
about! After all, they are ethnographersand members of these tribes themselves. Moreover, they know all about the way in which footnotes are a
legitimatingpractice.3
He: I don't doubt that they do, but just knowing that something is constructed,
contingent,a powergame,does not meanthatyou can do away with it so easily.
Nobody will readus unless we show thatwe have done our homework.4
She: So this is another version of our problem, isn't it: does knowing that
somethingis "constructed"make a politicaldifferenceor not? To what extent
are constructionsmalleable?
He: Good question,but what to do here andnow? If we createfootnotes, is this a
political defeat? A loss of originality?5Or a nice, helpful gesture to our
readers?6

Even if constructivismand feminism are not always good friends,we want

to arguehere that they are not necessarily contradictory.They might even
informand strengthenone another.

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371

Sex Is Everywhere-Different
If, despite exceptions, feminists are usually right in reproachingscience
andtechnologystudiesfor forgettingaboutthe sexes, thensomethingstrange
is going on: not a lack of political correctness,but a flaw in the quality of
observation.In addition,science and technology studies are missing out on
a good opportunityfor theorizing.
There is so much "sex difference"around.How do all these intelligent
scholars manage to overlook it? If you have met people and you try to
rememberthem, you may have forgottentheir names and their addresses,
their contributionsto a funny event, and even their interestingtheoretical
arguments,howevermuchyou wantedto keep thatin yourhead.But, in each
instance,you will rememberwhetheryou met a man or a woman. Sex is the
very last thing people forgetabouteach other.To have one's sex forgottenis
tantamountto disappearingfrom someone's memory.
He:I wonderwhyso manyof theselaboratory
overlookthesexes
anthropologists
of thescientistsandtechnicians
theystudy-or thatof thesecretaries
theydo
notstudy,forthatmatter.
She:Theyalsooverlookthesex of non-humans:
skeletons,storms,nature,toilets.
sex isn'tquiteeverywhere.
But,thenagain,let'sremember:
Englishlanguage
elevators,forinstance,haveno sex.
He:Elevators?!
She:Didn'tI tellyou?I thinkthatthewayvariouslanguages
usepronouns
largely
aboutnon-human
actors.Thisideastruckme
quarrel
explainstheinternational
in theUnitedStatesin anelevator.I triedto be as sociableas thenatives.So I
thatI was
said,"Gee,he goesveryslow,doesn'the."Andnobodyunderstood
talkingabouttheelevator.In English,anelevatoris nota "he."Aftera long
while,someonesaid,"Oh,youmeanit goesslowly;yes, it does."AnEnglish
speakingelevatoris an "it."In French,elevatorshavea sex. Theyare"ils,"
whichmakesit fareasierto attribute
lazinessor activityto them.
The relevanceof having a sex is variable.The sex of an individualis harder
to forget than thatof a storm.The sex of a lover will mattermore than that
of a neighborin the train.But this relevanceis contingent.7To know about
the relevanceof sex, one has to go out and investigatethe movementsof the
bodies of male and female studentsat a bench doing laboratorywork; the
attributionof clever remarksto some people and not others;the metaphors
of war,knitting,and house cleaning.
She: But listen. Emily Martin's(1994) storydescribeshow immunologycontains
differentways of talkingaboutthe immunesystem. Oneis violent:the immune

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Science, Technology,& HumanValues

system is like a defensive armyor a secretpolice thathas to keep strangersout

or detectthemonce they areinside. And the otheris to talkof householdduties:
the mast cells thateat the dirtaway and clean the mess in every cornerof the
body.
He: You are not trying to credit science studies with that, are you? Martinis an
anthropologist.She is a feminist,isn't she? So thatstorymay be aboutscience,
but it comes rightout of feminism.
She: Aren't you creatinganatomicalproblemsfor someone else now?

If constructiviststudies of science and technology have not explored sex as

muchas theymighthave,this couldbe changedin the future.Constructivism,
after all, is a strong tool. It can tell about the constructionof anything:
neutrinos,microbes, airplanes,scallops, genes, hormones,bicycles, and so
on. The constructionof anyobjectcan be traced.So why notthatof the sexes?
But the issue is not one of completeness.Just addingthe sexes to the list of
constructedobjects would be too easy. Aren'tthese lists losing theirappeal?
They become longer and longer each year.Every new Ph.D. student,every
new summergrant,addsanothercase. But whatis at stake?Not the neutrinos,
microbes, airplanes,scallops, genes, hormones,and bicycles that are made,
but the process of making them scientifically.Only epistemology is questioned. Each story tells in yet anotherway thatknowledgedoes not emerge
from its object, that representationis a laborious process, that facts are
artifacts,thatartifactsareput together,and thatefficiency is not the driving
force but is somethingthattakes shape along the way.
This has become so true thatrepeatingit begins to look like a formality.
So where do we go from here?Focusing on the sexes may help to shift the
attentionof constructivistsfrom methodto object. It is not the fact that the
sexes are constructedthat makes them intriguing,haunting,and important
but ratherwhat they are made to be. This is what gives them their political
relevance-but also offers theoreticalpromise.The sexes aremade to be so
many things.Therearesexes everywhere,or almostso, butthey aredifferent
everywhere, or almost so. Studying this constructin various places may
reveal links between these places-but also may revealfractures, alliances
and conflicts, resonanceand dissonance.
An Example
Anatomytells us thatthereare two sexes. Every body can be categorized
as one or the other.If you look between their legs, you may see that some
bodies have penises whereasothershave vaginas.The former,or so anatomy
tells us, fit into the category"male"andthe latterinto the category"female."

Hirschauer,Mol / ShiftingSexes

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If you are armed with some knowledge of genetics and histology and
examinethroughan electronmicroscopethe nuclei of some cells scrapedout
of the oralcavityof humans,you may see thatin some cases the nucleicontain
a structurethat looks somewhatlike the letters XY, whereasin other cases
there will be a structurethat looks like the letters XX: two classes of
chromosomes,two categories.
Endocrinologyworks differentlyagain. It tells about two kinds of hormone levels, the balances between them, and the rhythmswith which they
change. If you want to determinethe sex of individualsby endocrinological
means,you take samples of theirblood andput themthrougha chemicaltest
called "radioimmunoassay."
An importantstrandof psychiatryarguesthat sex is a question of selfidentity.You are what, deep down, you believe yourself to be. You can find
out what individualsbelieve themselves to be by interviewingthem about
their biographies and feelings or by giving them questionnairesfull of
indiscreetquestions.8
Whatkinds of relationsobtainamongthese practices?In some instances,
we find dependence:anatomyis instrumentalin making endocrinological
sex. When normalvalues for blood samples in radioimmunoassaysare set
up, the samples are classified in terms of the anatomicalsex of the donors.
Conflictmay,however,ariselater:once the normalvalues areestablished,an
individualmay be categorizedas an endocrinologicalmale even thoughs/he
has a vagina or as an endocrinologicalfemale even thoughs/he has a penis.
There are also relations of supremacy:whether one may compete in the
OlympicGamesas a womanor not dependson one's genes. Individualswith
Y chromosomescould notpass as womeneven if theyhadfemale anatomies.9
Complicatedrelationsbetweenvariousconstructionsarealso foundin the
treatmenttrajectoriesof people who wantto changethe sex attributedto them
at birth.To move officially from one side of the sex boundaryto the other,
one first has to fit into the psychiatriccategoryof the opposite sex. She has
to feel a he, and he has to make the therapistbelieve he is a she inside by
telling stories and displaying "appropriate"
appearanceand conduct. If this
is successful, then the endocrinologistslook to see whetherone is endocrinologically normal and, if so, then endocrinological sex is changed by
hormonepills. Finally, surgeonsmay complete the job with an anatomical
alterationof the genitals.
Here the variousconstructsof sex relatein a sequence, althoughnot one
that is obligatory.For some transsexuals,the psychiatric(re-)conceptionof
their sex is strongenough to define theirsex for all practicalpurposes.They
do not need hormonesand scalpels. Othersuse psychiatryonly to establish
theirrightsto another("theother")body as the symbolof theirtruesex. These

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differences are linked to legal constructionsof the sexes, which may vary
from country to country.A transsexualwoman in Germanywho wants to
change sex legally and who wants to have a new official name has to have
majorsurgery.No legal females with penises are allowed. Dutch law does
not rely on anatomybut on the person'sability to procreate.In the Netherlands, a woman may have a penis as long as she does not produce fertile
semen. Juridicalmales, meanwhile,may have any organthey wish in both
countries-as long as they are unableto get pregnant.'?
She: Do you thinkour readerswill catchthe politicalsignificanceof these
aretoospecial.
examples?Theymightthinkhybridsandtranssexuals
He:I don'tknow.Maybeyouareright.Insofarastheyaresexnormals,theymight
findit easierto recognizethepoliticalnatureof a differentmedicaljudgment
butthatexisteduntilveryrecentlyin SouthAfrica.
thatis disappearing
atbirth,do you?
She:Youmeanracialdetermination
He: Yes. Try and list the differencesand similaritiesbetweenrace and sex
determination!
So who are we made to be? What are the alternatives?There are links and
fractures:between anatomy and endocrinology,the law and chromosome
determination,a therapeuticsession andthe act of childbirth.Sexes aremade
in so many ways, and because they may clash or reinforceone another,the
picture becomes astonishinglycomplicated.It makes no sense even to try
clusteringthese ways of defining sex into large domains such as "science"
and "society,"or "biology"and "sociology,"or "public"and "private."
Because the constructionsof the sexes areso diverse,it is also difficultto
make a single factor,such as "patriarchy,"
responsiblefor them all.ll Even if
there are patternsin the diversity.Even if there is not only dissonance but
resonanceas well. How should we explain this theoretically?Are the sexes
not a good subject for those who want to try to articulatealliances and
frictions between a variety of practiceswithout framingtheir questions in
termsof how science and society influenceone another?

What Is Made, Can Change

The radicalconstructivistcritiquesuggests thattoo many feminists cling
too much to theoreticalpositions that seem to offer security in politically
insecureplaces. But this is strange,as it implies that,for the sake of security,
feministsembracea conservativestrategyandgive up ratherthandevelop an
enormouspolitical potential.

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Most feminist strategiesassume some constructivism,but all too often in

a weak form.n2They assertthateven if the individuals'sex is given with their
bodies, their genderis constructed.This constructionhappeneda long time
ago, in the darkages of early childhood.It was a once-in-a-lifetimeexperience, beyond words, foreverafterout of reach.Psychoanalysisis mobilized
againstanatomical,genetic,endocrinological,andotherbiological strategies
for defining sex. Biology is marginalized,not challenged.The factualstatus
of a person's gender is restatedin the deploymentof psychoanalyticterms:
you weren't born a woman,but you became one, and now you are one.13
Duringthe 1950s, turninggenderedsouls into substitutesfor sexed bodies
might have been a good idea, but the sex-gender distinction is no longer
necessary.Insteadof marginalizingbiology, constructivismhas the theoretical and practical tools to open it up and to show that anatomy,genetics,
endocrinology,andso on do not add up to form a solid biology, becausethey
also clash. Biology is no longer a safe place for non-feministsto hide and
count their well-establishedfacts aboutthe sexes.
Moreover,weak constructivismtreatshistory as a time, now past, when
things were still unstable,whereasnow they areblack-boxedand stabilized.
But one may look at historyas a chain of events thatnever comes to an end.
At any time, unexpectedcontingencies may divert the process of the constructionof the sexes into a new directionand make its outcome difficult to
predict. Therefore, individuals never safely "contain"their sex, and we
cannot treat it as an independentvariablethat explains others. Instead, we
can ask how sexes mightvaryor, if they do not, whatkindof workis put into
keeping them stable or, again, how the process of making sexes is kept
going-for if it were not, the sexes might disappearaltogether.T4
If one believed thatindividualscontainedtheir sex, one might think that
male scientists seek objective knowledge because their mothersforced the
futurescientists to become independentfrom them when they were babies,
or that an insecure search for autonomyleads men to make machines that
allow them to dominatethe world aroundthem.15But such explanationsare
abandonedin radicalconstructivism.Look at thatscientist or engineerover
there.Is this person a man?Nothing is certain.Maybe he is a man because
he became an engineeror becausescientistsconstituteeach otheras males in
theirhomosocial culture.'6But maybe she is not because she was never any
good at playing football.Or maybe,when s/he is a biologist, he is more male
than a sociologist but she is less so than a physicist. And, then again, our
scientist/engineermay have no sex at all. To escape from the position of the
potentialobjectof male heterosexualdesire-at least while working--he/she
has managedto neutralizehimself/herself.Or s/he is neutralizedby behaving
as the servantof an instrumentand thus turnedinto an object.

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It is all a matterof empiricaldetail. The sex of an individualmay vary

from one site, and from one moment, to the next. It is something to go out
andinvestigate,not somethingon whichto foundan epistemology,especially
not a feministone. If this radicalmovementmeansthatsecurityhas been lost,
then somethingmore interestinghas been gained. The sex of individualsis
turnedfrom a matterof fact into a contestedperformance,from a historical
given into something that is open to change, from something on which to
found a politics to somethingthatis intrinsicallypolitical itself.
He: Some readerscould misreadus here, for to say that the sex of individualsis
an interestingvariabledoes not mean it can be chosen at will.
She: Indeed. There may be resistance. We needed to negotiate a little at the
beginning.
He: Yeah,but thatis not the whole story.Some aspectsof the constructionof two
sexes are prettydense. The habitof distinguishingbetween two categories of
personsis incorporatedinto institutionsandmaterialities,andthis maystabilize
the constructto such an extent thatit is not open to negotiationor individual
strategiesat all.17
She: Sure,but thatdoes not force us to fix a historyand assume its stability.Let's
separatethe idea of historicalcontingencyand political strugglefrom thatof
materialstabilityandengineeringcontrol.18Forinstance,nobody orchestrated
the pulling down of the Berlin Wall, but it fell. And even if nobody was in
command,some political activitiesare likely to have helped.19

I am not advocatingnow thatfeministsgo out andinvestigatehow individuals

areput into sex categories.It is notjust thatan individualmay,at any specific
time and place, be put into one category,the other, or neither.These very
categoriesarenot stable.If life historiesmay be full of open ends, shifts, and
changes, the same holds truefor the historyof categories.
The example of hermaphroditismshows nicely the instability of sex
categories over time. Hermaphroditismis an old Greek notion, suggesting
the existence of a double sex. It is lost. Since the eighteenth century,
anatomistshave conceptuallypolarized the sexes, leaving no space for a
double sex.20It became inconceivablethatpersonsor bodies could integrate
both sexes. Therefore,people who previously would have been called hermaphroditeswere given the statusof a male, a female, or someone between
the two sexes. In the lattercase, they could not be both, but were in between:
an intersex. With this change, the law changed, too. Western European
countrieslost a legal practice common up to the nineteenthcentury:that
people whose sex could not be decidedat birthwere to decide abouttheirsex
themselvesat the age of 18 in a courtof law, swearingto remaintrueto their
choice thereafter.21

Mol/ ShiftingSexes
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377

So individualsmay move from one categoryto the other,and categories

may change.But belongingto a categoryis not alwaysthe same thing either.
Whereasdisciplinessuch as anatomyandgeneticsdecide the sex of individuals by looking at them one by one, it is not always decided that way. Other
disciplines deal with bodies, but not with individualbodies.
Take anemia. There is nothing inherentlysexed about this disease. In
hematology textbooks, anemiais defined as a hemoglobinlevel too low to
providean adequatesupplyof oxygen to the tissues. Put in these pathophysiological terms,a normalhemoglobinlevel differsfromone personto the next
and has no sex. In currentmedical practice, however, anemia is not approachedin a pathophysiologicalway but by means of statistics. Statistics
turnsanemiainto a sexed disease. Statisticalpracticebuildson the anatomical
differentiationbetweenthe sexes andclustershemoglobinlevels of hundreds
of people identified anatomicallyas either males or females. Two curves
emerge.The medianandcut-offpoint of the firstarea little higherthanthose
of the second. Thus "men"have a higher normalhemoglobinlevel than do
"women."22

No individual'ssex can be determinedby such statisticaltechniques.The

sex generatedin this way is not one of bodies but is one of populations.
Individualsrelateto it becausetheirnormalityis often assessedby comparing
theirhemoglobinlevels to some populationvalue or other.As a result, what
it means to be a woman is informedby the statisticalknowledge that the
populationof womenhas a lower hemoglobinvaluethandoes the population
of men.23
Thereis no stableandnon-politicalplace left. All variables-the individual, the category,the way of fitting into a category--may vary. The entity
that is given a sex also varies; it need not even be human. It may be an
institution,a word, a writingstyle, or an object. Takescientific concepts or
tools. Maybe statistics, hermeneutics, and semiotics are, indeed, "male
traditions."Maybe it is worthwhile to ask for "female alternatives."But
maybe one could also try to change his or her sex. Could the tools of
theoreticaltraditionsbe feminized one by one by being used differently?
Personally,I must admit,I often have a hardtime telling whethera particular
argument,concept, or theory is "male"or not. But I do believe that the sex
of such entities is not inherentand thatit can always be changed.24
There was a time when science was male business. No woman could be
expectedto observeobjectively.25
Later,methodwas saidto be strongenough
to delete the subjectmakingthe observation,andsex was saidto be irrelevant.
Science was neuter.However,feministspointedout thatthe picturesaccompanyingsuch storiesshow mainlymale faces. Behindthe neutralfacade,they
found science to be a male institution.Whatto do? It is possible to conclude

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that science has to be made (more) female. One version of epistemology

arguesthatif morewomenbecome scientistsandmorefemininemethodsare
used, truthand objectivitywould finally be attained.26
Constructivists,meanwhile,havemadeanothermove. Theyhave said that
a scientist such as Pasteur did not use complicated argumentsif people
disagreed with him. He simply said they had not done their washing up
Thusthey beganto portrayscience more as ad hoc bricolageand
properly!27
tinkeringandless as grandtheoryandthinking.Science is not a matterof the
mindbut is, first andforemost,a matterof the body,a mundaneandmaterial
matter,full of local idiosyncrasiesand spontaneousmoves.28In the greatlist
of dichotomies,all of these qualitiesbelong to "women."Nobody ever said
it in so many words, but in constructivismscience is portrayedas a woman.
She: Somethingironicis going on here,andI am not very surewhetherour author
is keeping his or her neutrality-I mean, not thatof an intersex,of course, but
of a constructivist-feministhermaphrodite.
He: Yes. The rhetoricalstrategyis a bit dangerous.But it mightbe a good way to
drawthe constructivistsin.
She: How? By showing themthatdeep down they have been concernedaboutsex
all along?
He: That'sit. If you can't beat them, tell them they havejoined you.
She: Boy, you are wicked.
He: Don't boy me!
She: So you do not like female power,do you? But we shouldnot pretendwe are
a tension-freezone, should we?

Intellectual Politics
Let me puttogetherthe two points I have madeso far.Forconstructivism,
the topic of the sexes is a theoreticalopportunityto turnfrom a persistent
anti-epistemologicalorientationto a fresh analysis of the frictions, resonances, and alliances among sites and situations.And if feminism takes the
constructionof the sexes more seriously, then empiricalawareness of the
enormousvariationof every dimensionof sex will increaseandnew political
possibilitieswill emerge.Onepossibilitywould be alteringthe sex of science
by analyzingit as a mundanematerialpractice.
But don't these suggestionsconceal a bigger gap between feminism and
constructivism:the gap between doing politics and doing theory?Political
radicals often suspect theoreticalradicals of political quietism. They use
"relativism"as a termof abuse,portrayingrelativistsas failedpoliticalactors

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379

and suggesting that those who have not failed can "revealthe truth"and
"changethe world."This suggestionpresupposesthatthereis a place where
all knowledge might come together and from which effective, progressive
ordersmay be issued.
Talkingaboutpolitics, I preferto be more precise. I do not want to claim
too much.I have a traditionalargumentfor this:thereis, indeed,such a thing
as the specificity of tasks. The engagementof a politician, a transsexual,a
theorist,a writerof novels--all these differ.None may be outside politics,
but their political styles are not the same. Nor should one try to melt their
variousmeritsinto a single heroicfigure,thatof the "universalintellectual."29
So if the feminist constructivism/constructivist
feminism thatI advocate
seems to take intellectualwork ratherfar from what is relevantin everyday
life, I am not too worried.The drawbackof exposing volatility in theoryis
that it may leave the world as it is. But are revelations of the sadness of
everyday lives so much more revolutionary?It may very well be that one
contributesjust as much to keeping the world the way it is by putting too
much "lived reality" into one's theories. There is a danger that critical
commentsmay be no morethana way of flagging values with which nobody
would thinkof disagreeing.All this does is reaffirmthe place of moralityin
this world as the constantcompanionof misery.
There is a gap between the politics of constructivismand feminism, but
there is a similarity, too. When it comes to interweaving political and
theoreticalradicalism,feminist theory and constructiviststudies of science
andtechnologysharea commonproblem.Both risk gettingstuckin mimicking theirobjects. Like theirobjects, many "applied"science and technology
studies tell the truthor try to solve problemsefficiently.They find facts, but
they love little and certainly never state their hatredsexplicitly. They are
formal and accurate,not committedand passionate.Many feminist studies
of sex and gendersufferalong with the women they go out to liberate.Their
theories are sad, reflectingthe unpromisingpolitical situationof womenand, quite unwillingly,therebyreinforcingit.
He: WhatI would like to mimic is the volatilityof the objects.Thatyou need not
be the same from one day to the next. Thatyou may arguefor one thinghere
and now and for anotherlateron or elsewhere.
She: What do you want? Good old liberal freedom to think? Or some fancy
postmodernversion of it, like "beinguntrustworthy"?
He: I just wonder whetherintellectualsshould not insist more on their right to
change theirmindscontinuouslyinsteadof raisingthe consciousnessof others.
The right to be, let's say, "inauthentic."
She: I will make you stick to that, then, shall I?

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Constructivismrisks becoming too formalistic,feminism too gloomy. I do

not doubt anyone's political intentions, but I worry about their political
effects. Hybridizationmay be wise. When constructivismbecomes concerned,it holds a promisefor feminism.When nothingis beyond construction,politics neverhits on a boundarythatsays "donot enter,this is forbidden
terrain."It neverhas to stop shorton the fringesof a field thathas been closed
off by scientific objectivityor the linearflow of passing time. Politics may
be tracked down everywhere. In other words, the political potential of
constructivismis thatit may demonstratequite radicallythe contingencyof
our forms of life. So how could we, the writersof analyticaltexts, explore
this potential?How can the demonstrationof contingencymove beyond the
merenegationof facticity?How mightwe do contingencyin writing?I have
some suggestions.
The first possibility is to write corrosive stories that do not submit to a
theoryby testinga hypothesisanddo not submitto a policy by findingproof:
by performingthe same patternof dominanceeverywhere.Corrosivestories
do not try to make their readers change their minds by critical means.
Instead they try, by seduction, to alter their readers' senses. They make
one see, hear, feel, and smell differently.What are the writing styles that
might have the sensualquality needed to do this? How might we get under
the readers'skin?
It certainly will not be any good writing from a single standpointor
"speakingfor"themarginalizedby carryingthe moralweightof the suffering
of others.Insteadof writingin a righteousway, it seems more promisingto
try to articulateambivalence,to addresspolitical sentimentsnot by loudly
advocatingthe truthin a single voice but by staging several voices of those
involved. And instead of having each of these affirm its standpoints, it
might be betterto show what theirquestions are, what they think or worry
about. Texts about the multiple construction of the sexes may have
consequences only if they take risks. If they do not seek to control what
they achieve. Perhapsthey will move the world only if they themselves are
also moving.
Finally,contingencycan hardlybe achievedif the statusquo is confronted
with normsandvalues thatcome fromoutside.It seems wiser to tryto dissect
selves and self-representationsfrom the inside. Do not comment;interrupt.
Get into your objects,andbecome partof them.Go native,and do not worry
thatit might take away your voice. You will be one voice among many;the
natives are divided amongthemselves.Come out and make somethingnew.
Thinkof constructionin apositive way.Do not be constructivist;be constructive. Make! Make stories-with so many enemies, allies, and surprised
bystandersinscribedin them that they are strongenough to stand up when

Hirschauer,Mol / Shifting Sexes

381

you reintroducethem to thefield you studied.They may then enhancethis

field's own reflexivity.And change it.
Having dethroned epistemology, constructivistsmay take part in any
number of political fights. But constmuctivismmay also develop its own
agenda(s)in a politics of knowledge.Which is what I have suggestedhere.
In mingling with the world, feminism needs a wide varietyof strategies,
each one specific to its site and task. But in those places where a governing
knowledge needs to be contested and reshaped, it helps to be proudly
heretical,unstable,and of many sexes. It helps to move from one sex, one
identity,and one languageto another.

Epilogue
She: Do you thinkwe might still say somethingaboutlanguage?About the fact
that we cannot write in Germanor Dutch and still be "international"?
About
the imperialismimplicatedin that?
He: But thatis a completely differentpolitical problem!
She: Are you sure?Let me confess thatI find shiftingfrom my own languageinto
English far more difficult thancrossing the boundarybetween the sexes. And
the way this master language dominates us reminds me of the virtues of
old-fashioned theories that point at the patriarchalpower of so-called male
institutions.
He: Oh, well, yes, sure.You areright.Languagepolitics mighthold some lessons
for feminists.
She: Heh, there you go again, man. Only thinkingabout yourself. Not only for
feminists,but for constructivists,too. You never seem to learn.
He: You are severe, very severe. Can I be the woman now for a while, please?

Notes
1. In English, one has inevitablyto choose between framingthe differencebetween men
and women in a biological or a psychosocial way, between talkingsex or talkinggender(for a
twentieth-centuryhistoryof this dichotomy,see Haraway1991). As I make clear later,I do not
wantto go along with this (for more extensive arguments,see Mol 1991 and Hirschauer1993).
The Germanword Geschlechtandthe Dutch wordgeslacht do not force me to choose. Because
the English languagedoes, I go for the most disturbingoption and write sex whereverI can.
2. For an attemptto make readershurtin theirprivateparts,see Hirschauer(1991).
3. One can presumethatthey have readthis in Science in Action where Latour(1987, 33)
phrasesit so beautifully:"Apaperthatdoes not have referencesis like a child withoutan escort
walkingat night in a big city it does not know: isolated,lost, anythingmay happento it."
4. The first version of this article had no footnotes. For one of the reviewers, this was a
reasonto discardit: "By not groundingthe piece in the scholarlyliterature,it just does not meet

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minimal standardsof a journalarticle.Thus, as such, the piece becomes impossible to review

seriously."
5. Anotherreviewer,after all, wrote, "Theauthors'cute decision to eschew references in
favor of a mere listing of 'literature'(meaningthatbooks and articlesare detachedfrom places
wheretheir contentsare used) serves to heightenthe appearanceof originality."
6. Whereasconstructivistsseem to avoid having their unease printed,feminist criticisms
of gender blindness in science studies can be found, for instance, in Delamont (1987), Keller
(1988), Harding(1991), and Star (1992). For an affirmativeversion of selective relativismas
"having it both ways," see Harding(1993). For non-feminist intellectualstrands criticizing
see the debatesin thisjournalbetweenLynchand
constructivismas being"elitist"or "unpolitical,"
Fuhrmann(1991) and Lynch(1992), Winner(1993) and Elam (1994), and the essay of Martin
(1993).
7. At least it is for meteorologistsandbisexuals.For the latter,see the life storiesreported
in Wolff (1977). A good and early example of a study showing the shifts and layers in the
attributionof gender(in theircase, to natureand culture)is Bloch and Bloch (1980).
8. For a more detaileddescriptionof these methodsof sex determination,see Hirschauer
(forthcoming).
9. For an early version of the argumentthat the relationsbetween these performancesof
the sexes show such complexities,see Mol (1985).
10. For an extensive analysisof treatmentprogramsfor transsexuals,see Hirschauer(1993).
Also see Orobiode Castro(1993) and King (1993).
11. For an insightfulhistory of the term patriarchy,tracingits articulationin nineteenthcenturyMarxism,anthropology,and psychoanalysisand underminingits present-dayfeminist
value, see Coward(1983).
12. The constructivismof feminism differs greatly from one country to another.In the
Netherlands,for instance,feministsabsorbedFoucaultduringthe early 1980s. In Germany,they
hardly did and now are startingto embrace Butler.It seems as if, in Britain,psychoanalysis
survived betterthan did constructivismafter the journal M/S stopped appearing.It would be
interestingto comparethese differentpatternsof feministsensitivityto constructivismwith the
sensitivitiesto feminismin circles of science andtechnology studiesin differentcountries.
13. This is an allusion, indeed,to De Beauvoir(1949).
14. I am elaboratingherethe notionof sex as an ongoingaccomplishmentthatwas introduced
by Garfinkel(1967). A late, postmodernecho of this positionis Butler(1990).
15. Admittedly, I go a bit fast here. For more extended and subtle versions, see the
contributionsto Hardingand Hintikka(1983); for a more recent position, see Harding(1991);
and, regardingtechnology,see Cockburn(1985).
16. A good example of a non-individualisticperspectiveon homosocialepistemic cultures
is Shapin's (1988) analysis of the rootingof knowledge claims in the conventionsregulating
relationsamong "gentlemen"in seventeenth-century
England.
17. The relationshipbetweencontingencyandstabilityof the constructionof two sexes-that
is, the relationbetween"undoinggender"andthe institutionalreproductionof the difference-is
tackled in Hirschauer(1994).
18. On the topic of materialinstability,see also Law andMol (forthcoming).
19. For the use of the metaphorof the Berlin Wall as a symbol of boundariesthat seemed
solid and yet melted, see Latour(1992).
20. For one of the versions of this history, see Laqueur(1990). For a slightly different
historicalaccount,see Jordanova(1989).
21. A more extensive version of this historyis presentedin Hirschauer(1993, 69 ff.).

Hirschauer,Mol / Shifting Sexes

383

22. Some of the various ways in which anemia may be performedand the complicated
relationsbetween them are discussed in Mol and Berg (1994).
23. Some preprintedlab forms make it more complicated.They first separateout children,
without sex. And for adults,they have three boxes or categoriesin which a doctor may put a
cross: men, women, pregnants.
24. I agreewith Hawkesworth(1989), who recommendsthatfeminism,insteadof criticizing
the masculine characterof intellectualtraditions,should actively use and change the multiple
and always contestedtraditionsfor its own purpose.
25. Thereare several good books documentingthis history(see, e.g., Schiebinger1989).
26. This position not only essentializes gender as a trait of scientists but, moreover,
essentializes "method"as a core of science (see Richardsand Schuster1989). Harding's(1993)
"Mertonian"suggestionto understandtraditionalobjectivityof science in termsof moralvalues
such as fairness,honesty,and detachmentis anotherversionof this essentialism.
27. The example is fromLatour(1984).
28. See Knorr-Cetina(1981).
29. As Foucault(1977) has called this hero;he was asked and yet refusedto be.

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Stefan Hirschaueris a Lecturerin Sociology at the Universityof Bielefeld, Germany

(P O. 100131, D-33501 Bielefeld).His researchfocuses on the social constructionof sex
and gender.He has recentlypublishedDie soziale KonstruktionderTranssexualit/trThe
Social Constructionof Transsexuality](Frankfurt,1993). He is currentlyengaged in a
study on prenatalsex determinationby mothers,midwives,and doctors.
AnnemarieMol is a Constantijnand ChristiaanHuygens Fellow of the Netherlands
Organizationfor ScientificResearch.She is affiliatedwiththe Departmentof Philosophy
of the Universityof Limburg(P.O. 1600, 6200 MD Maastricht,Netherlands)and the
Departmentof InternalMedicineof the Universityof Utrecht.Her researchfocuses on
the co-existenceof differentontologies and normativelogics withinWesternmedicine.