Professional Documents
Culture Documents
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
# Footnotes
1 Record on Appeal, p. 14.
2 Art. 87 (3) of our Civil Code.
3 Arts. 774 and 777 of our Civil Code; Fule v. Fule,
46 Phil. 317; Cuevas v. Abesamis, 71 Phil. 147;
Villaluz v. Neme, L-14676, Jan. 31, 1963; Aznar v.
Duncan, L-24365, June 30, 1966; Phil. Banking
Corp. v. Lui She, L-17587, Sept. 12, 1967; Hrs. of
Pedro Reganon v. Imperial, L-24434, Jan. 17, 1968.
4 Art. 776 of our Civil Code.
5 See Hernandez v. Padua, 14 Phil. 194; Uy Coque
v. Sioca, 45 Phil. 430; Bonnevie v. Pardo, 59 Phil.
486; Government v. Serafica, 61 Phil. 93; De Vera v.
Galauran, 67 Phil. 213, 214; Atun v. Nunez, 97 Phil.
762, 765; Velarde v. Paez, 101 Phil. 376, 382;
Magdalera v. Benedicto, L-9105, Feb. 28, 1958.
They claim that some such fact may be proved either at the main
hearing or at the preliminary hearing on the motion to dismiss.
The text of Article 222 of the Civil Code is this: "No suit shall be filed
or maintained between members of the same family unless it should
appear that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made,
but that the same have failed, subject to the limitations in article
3
2035." The requirement in Article 222 has been given more teeth by
Section 1(j), Rule 16 of the Rules of Court, which states as ground
for a motion to dismiss that "(t)he suit is between members of the
same family and no earnest efforts towards a compromise have
been made."
The cumulative impact of the statute and the rule just adverted to is
that earnest efforts to reach a compromise and failure thereof must
ordinarily be alleged in the complaint. The Civil Code provision
that "(n)o suit shall be filed or maintained" simply means that the
attempt to compromise and inability to arrive thereat is a condition
precedent to the filing of the suit. As such it is a part of plaintiffs'
4
cause of action. Justice J.B.L. Reyes and Judge Puno bolstered this
view with their statement that "(t)he terms of article 222
require express allegation of an attempt to compromise and its
failure; otherwise there is no cause of action stated."
2. The foregoing, however, is but a statement of the general rule.
Future support operates outside the ambit thereof. Mucius
5
Scaevola expresses the view that no objection can be made to a
compromise "cuando el derecho es renunciable, eminentemente
privado." Scaevola, however, emphasizes: "(P)ero el derecho a la
vida no lo es." This brings us to the legal provision Scaevola
commented upon, namely, Article 1814 of the Spanish Civil Code of
1889, which reads:
Art. 1814. No puede transigir sobre el estado civil de las
personas, ni sobre las cuestiones matrimoniales, ni
6
sobre alimentos futuros.
xxx
xxx
Plaintiffs ask for support past, present and future. There is also the
prayer for alimony pendente lite. Since the present action also
revolves on the right to future support and because compromise on
14
future support is prescribed, then the conclusion is irresistible that
an attempt at compromise of future support and failure thereof is not
a condition precedent to the filing of the present suit. It need not be
alleged in the complaint. The very opening statement in Article 2035
unmistakably confirms our view. It says that "(n)o compromise upon
15
the following question shall be valid: ... (4) Future support." We
cannot afford to give a loose view to this controlling statute. We may
not disregard it. To do so is to misread the law, to write off an explicit
congressional will, to cross the line which circumscribes courts of
justice and step into legislative area.
Mendoza vs. Court of Appeals, 1967B Phild. 82, is to be read as
controlling here. In that case, the wife filed in the Court of First
Instance of Nueva Ecija an action for support against her husband
who was then employed in a hospital in the United States.
Defendant, by counsel, moved to dismiss, for the reason that the
complaint failed to state a cause of action "because it contained no
allegation that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made
before the filing of the suit, and invoking the provisions of Article 222
of the Civil Code of the Philippines." The Court of First Instance
refused to entertain the motion to dismiss. Defendant petitioned the
Court of Appeals for a writ of prohibition. The appellate court denied
the writ prayed for Defendant petitioned this Court for review. We
affirmed. In that first judicial test, this Court, speaking thru Mr. Justice
J.B.L. Reyes, held:
While we agree that petitioner's position represents a correct
statement of the general rule on the matter, we are
nevertheless constrained to hold that the Court of Appeals
and the Court of First Instance committed no error in
refusing to dismiss the complaint, for on its face, the same
involved a claim for future supportthat under Article 2035 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines can not be subject of a valid
compromise, and is, therefore, outside the sphere of
application of Article 222 of the Code upon which petitioner
relies. This appears from the last proviso of said Article 222,
already quoted....
xxx
xxx
xxx
10
11
12
13
Emphasis supplied.
Emphasis supplied.
14
Emphasis supplied.
16
17
18
19
20
BARREDO, J.:
Petition for certiorari, Prohibition and mandamus, with preliminary
injunction, against the orders of respondent judge in (Civil Case No.
633-IV of the Court of First Instance of Ilocos Norte dated August 31,
1916 and October 8, 1976 denying petitioners' motion to dismiss the
complaint filed against them notwithstanding that private respondent
is the brother of petitioner Rufino Magbaleta, the husband of the
other petitioner Romana B. Magbaleta, and the suit is to have a
parcel of land, covered by a Free Patent Title in the name of Rufino,
declared to be the property of private respondent, who claims in said
Edwin and Lourdes are husband and wife who have lived together
since 1996 but formalized their union only on 28 October 1997. On
30 April 1998, Lourdes filed a petition for habeas corpus before the
RTC claiming that Edwin left their conjugal home with their daughter,
Khriza Mae Tribiana ("Khriza"). Edwin has since deprived Lourdes of
lawful custody of Khriza who was then only one (1) year and four (4)
months of age. Later, it turned out that Khriza was being held by
Edwins mother, Rosalina Tribiana ("Rosalina"). Edwin moved to
dismiss Lourdes petition on the ground that the petition failed to
allege that earnest efforts at a compromise were made before its
filing as required by Article 151 of the Family Code.
On 20 May 1998, Lourdes filed her opposition to Edwins motion to
dismiss claiming that there were prior efforts at a compromise, which
failed. Lourdes attached to her opposition a copy of the Certification
to File Action from their Barangay dated 1 May 1998.
On 18 May 1998, the RTC denied Edwins motion to dismiss and
reiterated a previous order requiring Edwin and his mother, Rosalina
to bring Khriza before the RTC. Upon denial of his motion for
reconsideration, Edwin filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for
prohibition and certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Civil
Procedure. The appellate court denied Edwins petition on 2 July
1998. The appellate court also denied Edwins motion for
reconsideration.
Hence, this petition.
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
1
The Issue
Edwin seeks a reversal and raises the following issue for resolution:
WHETHER THE TRIAL AND APPELLATE COURTS
SHOULD HAVE DISMISSED THE PETITION FOR HABEAS
CORPUS ON THE GROUND OF FAILURE TO COMPLY
WITH THE CONDITION PRECEDENT UNDER ARTICLE
151 OF THE FAMILY CODE.
The Ruling of the Court
The petition lacks merit.
Edwin argues that Lourdes failure to indicate in her petition
for habeas corpus that the parties exerted prior efforts to reach a
compromise and that such efforts failed is a ground for the petitions
dismissal under Section 1(j), Rule 16 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
4
Procedure. Edwin maintains that under Article 151 of the Family
Code, an earnest effort to reach a compromise is an indispensable
condition precedent. Article 151 provides:
No suit between members of the same family shall prosper
unless it should appear from the verified complaint or petition
that earnest efforts toward a compromise have been made,
but that the same have failed. If it is shown that no such
efforts were in fact made, the case must be dismissed.
This rule shall not apply to cases which may not be the subject of
compromise under the Civil Code.
Edwins arguments do not persuade us.
It is true that the petition for habeas corpus filed by Lourdes failed to
allege that she resorted to compromise proceedings before filing the
petition. However, in her opposition to Edwins motion to dismiss,
Lourdes attached a Barangay Certification to File Action dated 1 May
1998. Edwin does not dispute the authenticity of the Barangay
(Khriza) was only one year and four months when taken away from
the mother.
The Court of Appeals dismissed Edwins contentions by citing as an
additional ground the exception in Section 412 (b) (2) of the Local
Government Code ("LGC") on barangay conciliation, which states:
(b) Where the parties may go directly to court. the parties
may go directly to court in the following instances:
xxx
2) Where a person has otherwise been deprived of
personal
liberty
calling
for habeas
corpusproceedings;
xxx.
Under Rule 102 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, a party
may resort to a habeas corpus proceeding in two instances.
The first is when any person is deprived of liberty either
through illegal confinement or through detention. The second
instance is when custody of any person is withheld from the
person entitled to such custody. The most common case
falling under the second instance involves children who are
taken away from a parent by another parent or by a relative.
The case filed by Lourdes falls under this category.
The barangay conciliation requirement in Section 412 of the LGC
does not apply to habeas corpus proceedings where a person is
"deprived of personal liberty." In such a case, Section 412 expressly
authorizes the parties "to go directly to court" without need of any
conciliation proceedings. There is deprivation of personal liberty
warranting a petition for habeas corpus where the "rightful custody of
13
any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto." Thus, the
Court of Appeals did not err when it dismissed Edwins contentions
on the additional ground that Section 412 exempts petitions for
habeas corpus from the barangay conciliation requirement.
The petition for certiorari filed by Edwin questioning the RTCs denial
of his motion to dismiss merely states a blanket allegation of "grave
abuse of discretion." An order denying a motion to dismiss is
interlocutory and is not a proper subject of a petition for
14
certiorari. Even in the face of an error of judgment on the part of a
judge denying the motion to dismiss, certiorari will not lie. Certiorari
15
is not a remedy to correct errors of procedure. The proper remedy
against an order denying a motion to dismiss is to file an answer and
interpose as affirmative defenses the objections raised in the motion
to dismiss. It is only in the presence of extraordinary circumstances
evincing a patent disregard of justice and fair play where resort to a
16
petition for certiorari is proper.
The litigation of substantive issues must not rest on a prolonged
contest on technicalities. This is precisely what has happened in this
case. The circumstances are devoid of any hint of the slightest
abuse of discretion by the RTC or the Court of Appeals. A party must
not be allowed to delay litigation by the sheer expediency of filing a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 based on scant allegations of
grave abuse. More importantly, any matter involving the custody of a
child of tender age deserves immediate resolution to protect the
childs welfare.
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the instant petition for lack of merit.
We AFFIRM the Resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated 2 July
1998 and 18 January 1999 in CA-G.R. SP No. 48049. The Regional
Trial Court, Branch 19, Bacoor, Cavite is ordered to act with dispatch
in resolving the petition for habeas corpus pending before it. This
decision is IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.
Footnotes
1
10
11
12
13
14
16
Ibid.
10
And even if this Court passes upon the substantial issues raised by
petitioner, the instant petition likewise fails for lack of merit.
Restating its arguments in its Motion for Partial Reconsideration,
petitioner argues that what is applicable to the present case is the
18
Courts decision in De Guzman v. Genato and not in Magbaleta v.
19
Gonong, the former being a case involving a husband and wife
while the latter is between brothers.
The Court is not persuaded.
Article 151 of the Family Code provides as follows:
No suit between members of the same family shall prosper unless it
should appear from the verified complaint or petition that earnest
efforts toward a compromise have been made, but that the same
have failed. If it is shown that no such efforts were in fact made, the
case must be dismissed.
This rule shall not apply to cases which may not be the subject of
compromise under the Civil Code.
Article 222 of the Civil Code from which Article 151 of the Family
Code was taken, essentially contains the same provisions, to wit:
No suit shall be filed or maintained between members of the same
family unless it should appear that earnest efforts toward a
compromise have been made, but that the same have failed, subject
20
to the limitations in Article 2035.
The Code Commission that drafted Article 222 of the Civil Code from
which Article 151 of the Family Code was taken explains:
[I]t is difficult to imagine a sadder and more tragic spectacle than a
litigation between members of the same family. It is necessary that
every effort should be made toward a compromise before a litigation
is allowed to breed hate and passion in the family. It is known that a
23
24
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby
certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Courts Division.
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
Footnotes
SO ORDERED.
Records, p. 45.
Associate Justice
Id. at 73.
WE CONCUR:
Id. at 1.
Id. at 16.
Id. at 22.
Id. at 28.
Id. at 39.
Id. at 45-46.
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
Chairperson
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO, ROMEO J. CALLEJO, SR.
Associate Justice Associate Justice
10
Id. at 47.
11
Id. at 61.
12
Id. at 65.
13
Id. at 70.
14
Id. at 74.
15
Rollo, p. 9.
16
17
Id. at 470-472.
18
19
20
21
23
24
25
26
Sato moved for the quashal of the Information, claiming that under
Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code, his relationship to the person
allegedly defrauded, the deceased Manolita who was his mother-inlaw, was an exempting circumstance.
The prosecution disputed Satos motion in an opposition dated
March 29, 2006.
8
In an order dated April 17, 2006, the trial court granted Satos
motion and ordered the dismissal of the criminal case:
The Trial Prosecutors contention is that the death of the wife of the
accused severed the relationship of affinity between accused and his
mother-in-law. Therefore, the mantle of protection provided to the
accused by the relationship is no longer obtaining.
[W]e sustain the finding of [the trial court] that the death of Zenaida
did not extinguish the relationship by affinity between her husband,
private respondent Sato, and her mother Manolita, and does not bar
the application of the exempting circumstance under Article 332(1) of
the Revised Penal Code in favor of private respondent Sato.
10
was denied in an
15
The Information against Sato charges him with estafa. However, the
real nature of the offense is determined by the facts alleged in the
40
Information, not by the designation of the offense. What controls is
not the title of the Information or the designation of the offense but
41
the actual facts recited in the Information. In other words, it is the
recital of facts of the commission of the offense, not the
nomenclature of the offense, that determines the crime being
42
charged in the Information. It is the exclusive province of the court
43
to say what the crime is or what it is named. The determination by
the prosecutor who signs the Information of the crime committed is
44
merely an opinion which is not binding on the court.
The above averments in the Information show that the estafa was
committed by attributing to Manolita (who participated in the
execution of the document) statements other than those in fact made
by her. Manolitas acts of signing the SPA and affixing her
thumbmark to that document were the very expression of her specific
intention that something be done about her taxes. Her signature and
thumbmark were the affirmation of her statement on such intention
as she only signed and thumbmarked the SPA (a document which
she could not have read) because of Satos representation that the
document pertained to her taxes. In signing and thumbmarking the
document, Manolita showed that she believed and adopted the
representations of Sato as to what the document was all about, i.e.,
that it involved her taxes. Her signature and thumbmark, therefore,
served as her conformity to Satos proposal that she execute a
document to settle her taxes.
Thus, by inducing Manolita to sign the SPA, Sato made it appear that
Manolita granted his daughter Wendy a special power of attorney for
the purpose of selling, assigning, transferring or otherwise disposing
of Manolitas Tagaytay properties when the fact was that Manolita
signed and thumbmarked the document presented by Sato in the
belief that it pertained to her taxes. Indeed, the document itself, the
SPA, and everything that it contained were falsely attributed to
Manolita when she was made to sign the SPA.
Moreover, the allegations in the Information that
(1) "once in the possession of the said special power of
attorney and other pertinent documents, [Sato] made Wendy
Mitsuko Sato sign the three (3) Deeds of Absolute Sale" and
True, the concurrence of all the elements of the two crimes of estafa
and falsification of public document is required for a proper
conviction for the complex crime of estafa through falsification of
46
public document. That is the ruling in Gonzaludo v. People. It
means that the prosecution must establish that the accused resorted
to the falsification of a public document as a necessary means to
commit the crime of estafa.
However, a proper appreciation of the scope and application of
Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code and of the nature of a
complex crime would negate exemption from criminal liability for the
complex crime of estafa through falsification of public documents,
simply because the accused may not be held criminally liable for
simple estafa by virtue of the absolutory cause under Article 332.
The absolutory cause under Article 332 is meant to address specific
crimes against property, namely, the simple crimes of theft, swindling
and malicious mischief. Thus, all other crimes, whether simple or
complex, are not affected by the absolutory cause provided by the
said provision. To apply the absolutory cause under Article 332 of
the Revised Penal Code to one of the component crimes of a
complex crime for the purpose of negating the existence of that
complex crime is to unduly expand the scope of Article 332. In other
words, to apply Article 332 to the complex crime of estafa through
falsification of public document would be to mistakenly treat the
crime of estafa as a separate simple crime, not as the component
crime that it is in that situation. It would wrongly consider the
indictment as separate charges of estafa and falsification of public
document, not as a single charge for the single (complex) crime of
estafa through falsification of public document.
Under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code, the State waives its
right to hold the offender criminally liable for the simple crimes of
theft, swindling and malicious mischief and considers the violation of
the juridical right to property committed by the offender against
certain family members as a private matter and therefore subject
only to civil liability. The waiver does not apply when the violation of
the right to property is achieved through (and therefore inseparably
intertwined with) a breach of the public interest in the integrity and
presumed authenticity of public documents. For, in the latter
51
RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice
Chairperson
SO ORDERED.
RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice
Chairperson
CERTIFICATION
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
Footnotes
1
WE CONCUR:
PRESBITERO J.
VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
ANTONIO EDUARDO B.
NACHURA
Associate Justice
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
JOSE C. MENDOZA
Associate Justice
Id.
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached
in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Courts Division.
Id.
Id.
22
10
23
11
Id., p. 131.
24
12
25
13
Id.
15
16
Id., p. 736.
18
26
19
21
28
29
30
37
38
40
45
32
33
47
34
35
49
36
Id.
51
52
Id.
53
Id., p. 176.
54
55
Id.
57
Id.
58
59
Id.
60
Id.
61
Id.
62
Id.
63
Article 154 of the Family Code enumerates who are the beneficiaries
of a family home: (1) The husband and wife, or an unmarried person
who is the head of a family; and (2) Their parents, ascendants,
descendants, brothers and sisters, whether the relationship be
legitimate or illegitimate, who are living in the family home and who
depend upon the head of the family for legal support.
Prof. Ernesto L. Pineda further explains the import of Art. 159 in this
manner:
Moreover, Article 159 of the Family Code provides that the family
home shall continue despite the death of one or both spouses or of
the unmarried head of the family for a period of 10 years or for as
long as there is a minor beneficiary, and the heirs cannot partition
the same unless the court finds compelling reasons therefor. This
rule shall apply regardless of whoever owns the property or
constituted the family home.
Article 159 of the Family Code applies in situations where death
occurs to persons who constituted the family home.1wphi1 Dr.
Arturo M. Tolentino comments on the effect of death of one or both
spouses or the unmarried head of a family on the continuing
existence of the family home:
Upon the death of the spouses or the unmarried family head who
constituted the family home, or of the spouse who consented to the
constitution of his or her separate property as family home, the
property will remain as family home for ten years or for as long as
there is a minor beneficiary living in it. If there is no more
beneficiary left at the time of death, we believe the family home
will be dissolved or cease, because there is no more reason for
its existence. If there are beneficiaries who survive living in the
family home, it will continue for ten years, unless at the
expiration of the ten years, there is still a minor beneficiary, in
The family home shall continue to exist despite the death of one or
both spouses or of the unmarried head of the family. Thereafter, the
length of its continued existence is dependent upon whether there
is still a minor-beneficiary residing therein. For as long as there
is one beneficiary even if the head of the family or both spouses
are already dead, the family home will continue to exist (Arts.
153, 159). If there is no minor-beneficiary, it will subsist until 10
years and within this period, the heirs cannot partition the same
except when there are compelling reasons which will justify the
partition. This rule applies regardless of whoever owns the property
15
or who constituted the family home. (Emphasis supplied)
The rule in Article 159 of the Family Code may thus be expressed in
this wise: If there are beneficiaries who survive and are living in the
family home, it will continue for 10 years, unless at the expiration of
10 years, there is still a minor beneficiary, in which case the family
home continues until that beneficiary becomes of age.
It may be deduced from the view of Dr. Tolentino that as a general
rule, the family home may be preserved for a minimum of 10 years
following the death of the spouses or the unmarried family head who
constituted the family home, or of the spouse who consented to the
constitution of his or her separate property as family home. After 10
years and a minor beneficiary still lives therein, the family home shall
be preserved only until that minor beneficiary reaches the age of
majority. The intention of the law is to safeguard and protect the
Id. at 59.
Id. at 80.
Id. at 44-49.
Id. at 21.
Id. at 26.
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby
certified that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in
consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Courts Division.
V.
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
ARTEMIO
Chief Justice
ARTEMIO V. PANGANIBAN
Chief Justice
Chairperson
MA. ALICIA AUSTRIAMARTINEZ
Associate Justice
10
11
Id.
12
13
14
PANGANIBAN
15
Footnotes
17
- versus -
18
20
Id. at 948.
21
22
24
Promulgated:
November 25,
x----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
Id. at 240-241.
[1]
SECOND DIVISION
JOSE E. HONRADO,
Petitioner,
COURT OF APPEALS,
HON. ROGELIO M. PIZARRO,
in his official capacity as Presiding
Judge of the Regional Trial Court,
Quezon City, Branch 222;
THE CLERK OF COURT OF
THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,
as Ex-Officio Sheriff of the RTC of
Quezon City; MR. NERY G. ROY,
in his official capacity as Sheriff IV of
2005
the RTC of Quezon City; and PREMIUM
AGRO-VET PRODUCTS, INC.,
Respondents.
2)
3)
SO ORDERED.
[2]
and there was no showing that its present value does not exceed the
[14]
amount allowed by law under Article 157 of the Family Code.
property or move for the lifting thereof, the same cannot be deemed
a waiver of his right to claim the exemption of his family home. He
avers that his right cannot be waived, for it would be contrary to
public policy. He claims that the policy of the State, in conferring
such exemption, is to allow a particular family to occupy, use and
enjoy their family home, which must remain with the person
constituting it and his heirs. Moreover, the waiver must be shown
by overt acts and it cannot be presumed from the mere failure to
[24]
assert the claim for exemption within a reasonable time.
adduced evidence to prove the value of the property and that it is,
indeed, a family home.
Moreover, the petitioner set the hearing of his motion on May
10, 2002 at 8:30 a.m. The private respondent opposed the motion,
but the petitioner did not file any reply thereto. Moreover, the
petitioner never informed the Court that the RTC of Calamba,
Laguna, had rendered judgment in SP Case No. 489-1998-C earlier
on April 29, 2002. It was only on November 25, 2002 that the
petitioner revealed to the RTC of Quezon City that there was such a
case and a decision had already been rendered. The petitioner has
not justified why he concealed such matters for such considerable
period of time.
While it is true that the family home is constituted on a house
and lot from the time it is occupied as a family residence and is
exempt from execution or forced sale under Article 153 of the Family
Code, such claim for exemption should be set up and proved to the
Sheriff before the sale of the property at public auction. Failure to do
so would estop the party from later claiming the exemption. As this
[28]
Court ruled in Gomez v. Gealone:
Although the Rules of Court does not
prescribe the period within which to claim the
exemption, the rule is, nevertheless, well-settled that
the right of exemption is a personal privilege granted
to the judgment debtor and as such, it must be
claimed not by the sheriff, but by the debtor himself
at the time of the levy or within a reasonable period
thereafter;
In the absence of express
provision it has variously held that claim
(for exemption) must be made at the time
of the levy if the debtor is present, that it
must be made within a reasonable time, or
promptly, or before the creditor has taken
any step involving further costs, or before
advertisement of sale, or at any time
before sale, or within a reasonable time
REYNATO S. PUNO
Associate Justice
Chairman
DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice
On leave
MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
petition
SO ORDERED.
REYNATO
S.
PUNO
Associate Justice
Chairman, Second Division
[19]
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and
the Division Chairmans Attestation, it is hereby certified that the
conclusions in the above decision were reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Courts Division.
On leave.
Penned by Associate Justice Eliezer R. de los Santos, with
Associate Justices Ruben T. Reyes and Arturo D. Brion
concurring; Rollo, pp. 32-38.
[2]
Rollo, p. 42.
[3]
Id. at 46.
[4]
Id. at 43.
[5]
Id. at 47.
[6]
Id. at 49-50.
[7]
Id. at 56.
[8]
Rollo, pp. 53-54.
[9]
Ibid.
[10]
Id. at 56.
[11]
Id. at 86-88.
[12]
Id. at 57-58.
[13]
Id. at 60-68.
[14]
Rollo, p. 64.
[15]
Id. at 69.
[16]
Id. at 70-73.
[17]
Id. at 82-85.
[18]
Id. at 89.
[1]
Rollo, p. 38.
Id. at 37-38.
[21]
Id. at 40.
[22]
Id. at 18.
[23]
Rollo, pp. 19-20.
[24]
Rollo, pp. 21-23.
[25]
Rollo, pp. 37-38.
[26]
People v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 144332, 10 June 2004, 431
SCRA 610.
[27]
Id. at 617.
[28]
G.R. No. 58281, 13 November 1991, 203 SCRA 474.
[29]
Gomez v. Gealone, supra. (Emphasis supplied)
[20]
Santiago, J. (Chairperson),
- versus -
Austria-Martinez,
*
Tinga,
Nachura,
and
Peralta, JJ
.
Promulgated:
1.
2.
cost.
SO ORDERED.
Aggrieved, plaintiff-appellants filed an appeal
before the Court of Appeals assailing the abovedecision. Said appeal was docketed as CA-G.R. CV
No. 55207.
On December 23, 1998, the Court of
Appeals, through the then Second Division,
rendered a Decision reversing the assailed decision
and decreed as follows:
WHEREFORE, the judgment
herein appealed from is hereby
REVERSED, and judgment is
hereby rendered declaring the
plaintiffs-appellants to be entitled to
the possession of Lot No. 7777 of
the Molave Townsite, subject to the
rights of the defendants-appellees
under Article (sic) 448, 546, 547 and
548 of the New Civil Code.
The records of this case are
hereby ordered remanded to the
court
of
origin
for
further
proceedings to determine the rights
of the defendants-appellees under
the aforesaid article (sic) of the New
Civil Code, and to render judgment
thereon in accordance with the
evidence and this decision.
No pronouncement as to
costs.
SO ORDERED.
Owner
(sq.m.)
Lot No.
Area
Improvement
Appraised Value
Virginia
Cabang
7777
ing
P21,580.65
Jovencio
Capuno 7777
g
18,663.75
Amelito
Mata
7777
ng
5,658.10
32.55
15.75
14.00
Build
Buildin
Buildi
Toilet
Defendant-appellees thereafter filed a
petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court before the Supreme Court docketed
as G.R. No. 139601. On October 18, 1999, the
Supreme Court issued a Resolution denying the
petition for late filing and lack of appropriate service.
1,500.00
Thereafter,
upon
verbal
request
of
defendant-appellees, the court a quo in its Order
declared that the tie point of the survey should be
the BLLM (Bureau of Lands Location Monument)
and authorized the official surveyor of the Bureau of
Lands to conduct the survey of the litigated property.
Plants
Trees
2,164.00
TOTAL
6.50
&
P49,56
3.
4.
5.
6.
[18]
It bears stressing that the purpose for which the records of the
case were remanded to the court of origin was for the enforcement of
[6]
the appellate courts final and executory judgment in CA-G.R. CV
No.
55207
which,
among
others,
declared
herein
respondents entitled to the possession of Lot No. 7777 of the
Molave Townsite subject to the provisions of Articles
[7]
[8]
[9]
[10]
448, 546, 547 an 548 of the Civil Code. Indeed, the decision
explicitly decreed that the remand of the records of the case was for
the court of origin [t]o determine the rights of the defendantsappellees under the aforesaid article[s] of the New Civil
Code, and to render judgment thereon in accordance with the
evidence and this decision.
[23]
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above decision were
reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Courts Division.
Justice
son, Third Division
CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate
Chairper
SO ORDERED.
CONSUELO YNARESSANTIAGO
Associate Justice
WE CONCUR:
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the
Division Chairpersons Attestation, it is hereby certified that the
conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation
before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Courts Division.
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
[1]
[22]
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 165950
xxx
xxx
Case No. 02-1029. The reason therefor is that the right sought to be
protected by the petitioner in this case through the writ of preliminary
injunction is merely contingent and not in esse. It bears stressing that
the existing written contract between petitioner and respondent was
admittedly one of loan restructuring; there is no mention whatsoever
or even a slightest reference in that written contract to a supposed
agreement of dacion en pago. In fine, it is still necessary for
petitioner to establish in the main case its rights on the alleged
dacion en pago before those rights become in esse or actual and
existing. Only then can the injunctive writ be properly issued. It
cannot be the other way around. Otherwise, it will be like putting the
24
cart before the horse. [emphasis supplied.]
In the case at bar, respondents failed to show that they have a right
to be protected and that the acts against which the writ is to be
directed are violative of the said right. On the face of their clear
admission that they were unable to settle their obligations which
were secured by the mortgage, petitioner has a clear right to
25
foreclose the mortgage. Foreclosure is but a necessary
26
consequence of non-payment of a mortgage indebtedness. In a
real estate mortgage when the principal obligation is not paid when
due, the mortgagee has the right to foreclose the mortgage and to
have the property seized and sold with the view of applying the
27
proceeds to the payment of the obligation.
This Court has denied the application for a Writ of Preliminary
Injunction that would enjoin an extrajudicial foreclosure of a
mortgage, and declared that foreclosure is proper when the debtors
are in default of the payment of their obligation. Where the parties
stipulated in their credit agreements, mortgage contracts and
promissory notes that the mortgagee is authorized to foreclose the
mortgaged properties in case of default by the mortgagors, the
mortgagee has a clear right to foreclosure in case of default, making
28
the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction improper. In these
cases, unsubstantiated allegations of denial of due process and
prematurity of a loan are not sufficient to defeat the mortgagees
29
unmistakable right to an extrajudicial foreclosure.
We cannot agree with respondents position that petitioners act of
initiating extrajudicial foreclosure proceeding while they negotiated
ROBERTO A. ABAD
Associate Justice
ATTESTATION
I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached
in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Courts Division.
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division
CERTIFICATION
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution and the
Division Chairpersons Attestation, I certify that the conclusions in the
above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case
was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Courts Division.
No costs.
RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
SO ORDERED.
MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
Associate Justice
Footnotes
WE CONCUR:
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
Id. at 57.
Id. at 322.
Id. at 112-113.
Id. at 57-59.
Id. at 60-96.
Id. at 98-99.
Id. at 100-101.
10
11
12
Id. at 108-109.
Id. at 27-28.
Id. at 30-33.
13
Id. at 34-40.
14
15
16
Id. at 223-227.
17
Id. at 228-230.
18
20
23
24
Id. at 413-415.
25
31
G.R. No. 161004, April 14, 2008, 551 SCRA 183, 189.
32
SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 185064, January 16, 2012]
SPOUSES ARACELI OLIVA-DE MESA AND ERNESTO S. DE
MESA, PETITIONER, VS. SPOUSES CLAUDIO D. ACERO, JR.
AND MA. RUFINA D. ACERO, SHERIFF FELIXBERTO L.
SAMONTE AND REGISTRAR ALFREDO SANTOS,
RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
33
REYES, J.:
Nature of the Petition
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules
of Court filed by the Spouses Araceli Oliva-De Mesa (Araceli) and
Ernesto S. De Mesa (Ernesto), assailing the Court of Appeals (CA)
[1]
[2]
Decision dated June 6, 2008 and Resolution dated October 23,
2008 in CA-G.R. CV No. 79391 entitled Spouses Araceli Oliva-De
Mesa and Ernesto De Mesa v. Spouses Claudio Acero, Jr., et al.
The Antecedent Facts
This involves a parcel of land situated at No. 3 Forbes Street, Mount
Carmel Homes Subdivision, Iba, Meycauayan, Bulacan, which was
formerly covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-76.725
(M) issued by the Register of Deeds of Meycauayan, Bulacan and
registered under Aracelis name. The petitioners jointly purchased
the subject property on April 17, 1984 while they were still merely
cohabiting before their marriage. A house was later constructed on
the subject property, which the petitioners thereafter occupied as
their family home after they got married sometime in January 1987.
On July 22, 1999, the MTC rendered a Decision, giving due course
to Spouses Aceros complaint and ordering the petitioners and
Juanito to vacate the subject property. Finding merit in Spouses
Aceros claims, the MTC dismissed the petitioners' claim of
ownership over the subject property. According to the MTC, title to
the subject property belongs to Claudio as shown by TCT No. T221755 (M).
Thus, on April 26, 1990, Claudio filed with the Prosecutor's Office of
Malolos, Bulacan a complaint for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg.
22 (B.P. 22) against the petitioners. After preliminary investigation,
an information for violation of B.P. 22 was filed against the
petitioners with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, Bulacan.
[3]
[6]
The MTC also stated that from the time a Torrens title over the
subject property was issued in Claudios name up to the time the
complaint for ejectment was filed, the petitioners never assailed the
validity of the levy made by Sheriff Samonte, the regularity of the
public sale that was conducted thereafter and the legitimacy of
Claudios Torrens title that was resultantly issued.
The petitioners appealed the MTCs July 22, 1999 Decision to the
RTC. This appeal was, however, dismissed in a Decision dated
November 22, 1999 due to the petitioners failure to submit their
Memorandum. The petitioners sought reconsideration of the said
decision but the same was denied in an Order dated January 31,
2000.
[7]
[11]
before the courts and the registration of the courts order with the
Registry of Deeds of the area where the property is
located.Meanwhile, extrajudicial constitution is governed by Articles
240 to 242 of the Civil Code and involves the execution of a public
instrument which must also be registered with the Registry
ofProperty.Failure to comply with either one of these two modes of
constitution will bar a judgment debtor from availing of the privilege.
On the other hand, for family homes constructed after the effectivity
of the Family Code on August 3, 1988, there is no need to
constitute extrajudicially or judicially, and the exemption is
effective from the timeit was constituted and lasts as long as any of
its beneficiaries under Art. 154 actually resides therein. Moreover,
the family home should belong to the absolute community or
conjugal partnership, or if exclusively by one spouse, its constitution
must have beenwithconsent of the other, and its
valuemustnotexceed certain amounts depending upon the area
where it is located. Further, the debts incurred for which the
exemption does not apply as provided under Art. 155 for which the
family home is made answerable must have been incurred after
[21]
August 3, 1988. (citations omitted)
[22]
are AFFIRMED.
In this case, it is undisputed that the petitioners allowed a
considerable time to lapse before claiming that the subject property
is a family home and its exemption from execution and forced sale
under the Family Code. The petitioners allowed the subject property
to be levied upon and the public sale to proceed. One (1) year
lapsed from the time the subject property was sold until a Final Deed
of Sale was issued to Claudio and, later, Aracelis Torrens title was
cancelled and a new one issued under Claudios name, still, the
petitioner remained silent. In fact, it was only after the respondents
filed a complaint for unlawful detainer, or approximately four (4)
years from the time of the auction sale, that the petitioners claimed
that the subject property is a family home, thus, exempt from
execution.
For all intents and purposes, the petitioners negligence or omission
to assert their right within a reasonable time gives rise to the
presumption that they have abandoned, waived or declined to assert
it. Since the exemption under Article 153 of the Family Code is a
personal right, it is incumbent upon the petitioners to invoke and
prove the same within the prescribed period and it is not the sheriffs
duty to presume or raise the status of the subject property as a
family home.
The petitioners negligence or omission renders their present
assertion doubtful; it appears that it is a mere afterthought and
artifice that cannot be countenanced without doing the respondents
injustice and depriving the fruits of the judgment award in their favor.
Simple justice and fairness and equitable considerations demand
that Claudios title to the property be respected. Equity dictates that
the petitioners are made to suffer the consequences of their
unexplained negligence.
WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing disquisitions, the
petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision dated June 6, 2008 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 79391, which affirmed the
Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 22,
in Civil Case No. 1058-M-99 and dismissed the complaint for
declaration of nullity of TCT No. 221755 (M) and other documents,
and the October 23, 2008 Resolution denying reconsideration,
SO ORDERED.
*
Id. at 42-43.
[3]
Id. at 65-68.
[4]
Id. at 74-75.
[5]
Id. at 76.
[6]
Id. at 77-80.
[7]
Id. at 293-313.
[8]
Id. at 288.
[10]
Id. at 44-55.
[11]
Id. at 156-163.
[12]
Id. at 170-172.
[13]
Supra note 1.
[14]
Supra note 2.
[15]
[16]
Cruz v. Caraos, G.R. No. 138208, April 23, 2007, 521 SCRA 510,
522.
[18]
[19]
Id. at 446-448.
[20]
[21]
Id. at 186-189.
[22]
[23]
Id. at 502.
[24]
[25]
[26]
Id. at 666-667.
[27]
[28]
Id. at 386.
[29]
Cabang v. Basay, G.R. No. 180587, March 20, 2009, 582 SCRA
172, 184, citing A. Tolentino, Commentaries and Jurisprudence on
the Civil Code of the Philippines, Vol. 1 (1990 ed.), p. 508.
[30]
[31]