IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL

IN AND FOR THE STATE OF FLORIDA

FIFTH DISTRICT

5DCA CASE NO.: 5D09-3590

Theresa Marie MARTIN, ) in an appeal from summary denials

Petitioner/Appellant, ) of collateral relief from traffic court
)
v. ) Citrus County Circuit Court cases:
) 2009-AP-2088 & 2009-CA-3729
State of FLORIDA, )
Respondent/Appellee, ) The Honorables Yerman & Merritt,
) Fifth Judicial Circuit, at Inverness
_______________________________ ) ________________________________

Reply Brief of Appellant

On matters now coming to review from:

In the Circuit Court of the Fifth Judicial
Circuit in and for Citrus County, Florida

(Attorney for the Appellant): (Attorney for the Appellee):

Theresa M. Martin, pro se Office of the Attorney General
10918 Norwood Avenue 444 Seabreeze Blvd., 5th Floor
Port Richey, FL 34668 Daytona Beach, FL 32118

Betty Strifler, Clerk

Clerk of the Circuit Court
110 N. Apopka Avenue
Inverness, FL 34450
 Table of Contents

TABLE OF CONTENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 01

ARGUMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 03

I. Regardless of this Court’s ruling, the underlying matters shall be raised

through upcoming damages litigation in the United States District Court

. . . . . . . . . . . . 03

II. Mr. Corrente has chosen poorly, in attempting willful and reckless fraud
upon this Court, therefore also placing himself into a precarious position

. . . . . . . . . . . . 04

III. The State of Florida has conceded the vast majority of errors as claimed,
by established operation of law, unethically ‘whitewashed’ all remaining
statements, and is estopped by its unclean hands throughout these matters

. . . . . . . . . . . . 07

IV. Theresa is clearly entitled to judgment in her favor, as a matter of law

. . . . . . . . . . . . 14

V. This Court’s ruling will influence the final selection of civil defendants

. . . . . . . . . . . . 15

CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

i
 Table of Authorities

United States Cases

Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
United States v. Throckmorton, 98 U.S. 61, 25 L.Ed. 93 (1878) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

Federal Statutory Law

18 U.S.C. § 4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
18 U.S.C. § 241 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
18 U.S.C. § 242 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
18 U.S.C. § 371 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
18 U.S.C. § 1341 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
18 U.S.C. § 2722 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
18 U.S.C. § 2724 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
42 U.S.C. § 666 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

Florida State Cases

Epstein v. Epstein, 915 So. 2d 1272, 1275 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005) . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Hauer v. Thum, 67 So. 2d 643, 645 (Fla.1953) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Marin v. Seven of Five Ltd., 921 So. 2d 699, 700 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006) . . . . . . . . 13
Rodriguez v. State, 753 So. 2d 29 (Fla. 2000). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Yost v. Rieve Enters., Inc., 461 So. 2d 178 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

Florida Statutory Law

§ 112.3175, Fla. Stat. (2009) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

§ 320.07, Fla. Stat. (2009) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8, 9
§ 322.34, Fla. Stat. (2009) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
§ 454.11, Fla. Stat. (2009) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
§ 760.51, Fla. Stat. (2009) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

ii
§ 817.03, Fla. Stat. (2009) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
§ 817.034, Fla. Stat. (2009) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
§ 817.29, Fla. Stat. (2009) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
§ 817.49, Fla. Stat. (2009) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
§ 817.569, Fla. Stat. (2009) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
§ 837.06, Fla. Stat. (2009) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
§ 838.022, Fla. Stat. (2009) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
§ 839.11, Fla. Stat. (2009) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
§ 839.13, Fla. Stat. (2009) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
§ 839.24, Fla. Stat. (2009) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6, 12
§ 843.14, Fla. Stat. (2009) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
§ 876.23, Fla. Stat. (2009) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

Florida Rules of Court

Civil Rules

Fla.R.Civ.P. 1.110 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Fla.R.Civ.P. 1.140 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

Professional Conduct

Rule 4-1.1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Rule 4-1.2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Rule 4-1.16 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Rule 4-3.1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Rule 4-3.3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Rule 4-3.4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Rule 4-3.5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Rule 4-4.1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Rule 4-8.2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Rule 4-8.3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Rule 4-8.4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Rule 4-5.1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

iii
 IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
IN AND FOR THE STATE OF FLORIDA
FIFTH DISTRICT

5DCA CASE NO.: 5D09-3590

Theresa Marie MARTIN, ) in an appeal from summary denials

Petitioner/Appellant, ) of collateral relief from traffic court
)
v. ) Citrus County Circuit Court cases:
) 2009-AP-2088 & 2009-CA-3729
State of FLORIDA, )
Respondent/Appellee, ) The Honorables Yerman & Merritt,
) Fifth Judicial Circuit, at Inverness
_______________________________ ) ________________________________

Reply Brief of Appellant

Summary of the Argument

All of the cards are now being played upon the table, face up, to see who really

has the better hand. Of course, all the facts and the law, i.e., the trump cards, have

always been categorically in Theresa’s favor, from the first moment that the State

of Florida chose to veer away from the written, well-established law, in regards to

literally every single facet of these issues, after swindling the underlying matters.

Having completely defrauded Theresa and her various Constitutional, statutory,

and other legal rights, at nearly every step of the way, in not only the underlying

family court case(s), as the primary circus of errors, but also within the secondary

matter of administrative suspension, and then even in these tertiary enforcements

through criminal proceedings, all state ‘administrative remedies’ have been sought.

1
 Further, the State of Florida has gotten away with its buffoonery of criminal acts

long enough to have permanently devastated Theresa and what once were her two

minor children, as years of Florida’s fraud have ticked by, and they are now adults.

Accordingly, all parameters have closed full circle, and the next guaranteed stop

is at and through the United States District Court, for satisfaction in civil damages,

federal prosecutions as are mandated by certain statutes, and other remedial relief.

No matter what ruling and decision of this Court results, that step shall follow.

Unfortunately for himself, Assistant Attorney General Corrente has apparently

chosen to completely disregard his mandated ethics duties under law, and has now

attempted great and tremendous fraud upon this Court, subjecting him to be named

as yet another co-defendant within that same impending federal court proceeding.

Regardless, and by automatic operation of law, the State has now admitted the

large majority of Appellant Theresa’s legal, Constitutional, and due process claims

in error, already entitling Theresa to judgment as a matter of law. Additionally, the

State has willfully violated its ethics duties under rule and law, by a ‘whitewash’ of

the remaining claims addressed, and, in any event, is estopped by unclean hands.

All things considered, Theresa is fully entitled to judgment in her favor, not only

from the affirmative aspects of due process violations and legal impossibility, but,

also, due to the State’s continuing and still-present disdain for honor, law and rule.

This Court’s ruling could be the key for a limited selection of civil defendants.

2
 Argument I

Regardless of this Court’s ruling, the underlying matters shall be raised

through upcoming damages litigation in the United States District Court

Even every common, uneducated prospective juror, who is otherwise ignorant to

finer points and nuances of law, would still, surely, have absolutely no hesitation,

whatsoever, in immediately finding the State of Florida, the County of Pasco, and

the County of Citrus, along with each duly-advised official, attorney and/or other

person named as co-defendants in their individual and official capacities, wholly,

completely and enormously guilty of flagrant, willful and incredibly wanton acts of

fraud, violations of civil rights, knowing breaches of oaths and abuses of power (as

applicable), and also utterly guilty of all the intentional acts that comprise the bases

for charging crimes of conspiring to commit or committing obstructions of justice,

intimidations, extortions, conversions, treason, thefts and several other penal types.

Indeed, other than time spent on determination(s) of the amounts of reasonable

and satisfactory damages to be awarded in Theresa’s favor, the Jury’s adjudication

of mere guilt and liability may take no more than ten (10) or fifteen (15) minutes,

and such findings are to be expected after such a flagrant, system-wide meltdown

against even the most basic concepts of societal norms, lawfulness, and fair play.

The simple fact of the matter is that knowingly “pulling a fast one” over every

aspect of written law, to swap child custody to a convicted molester, will never fly,

3
and neither will such fantastic “fruit of the poisonous tree” screw-ups by just about

every single official, employee and/or agent having been directly involved in these

matters, including the apparent total incompetence and utter inability of each same

person to be able to read clear statutory law and follow it, even when it pertained to

their own well established duties, and some even unable to use a simple calculator.

But, the worst overall fact is that every such person was faced with the obvious,

inescapable, flagrant error of basing everything they were doing upon an award of

child custody somehow mistakenly given to a four-time convicted child molester,

and yet, not a single one of these official personnel performed even *one* iota of

correction, whatsoever, despite their clear legal duties otherwise, while several of

the same persons did also carry out willful, affirmative acts in conspiracy thereto.

In other words, the experience of Theresa is that the entire, system-wide chain of

command, at every level, throughout the judicial and executive branches of Florida

and its certain County government(s), is all utterly incompetent, in every manner,

and there is absolutely no question regarding filing suit in the U.S. District Court.

Argument II

Mr. Corrente has chosen poorly, in attempting willful and reckless fraud

upon this Court, therefore also placing himself into a precarious position

Having hoped for fairness and ethics, Mr. Corrente has shattered his legal duty

thereto, by affirmatively acting to either further and/or conceal manifest injustices.

4
 As detailed further within Argument III, infra, Mr. Corrente’s abominable acts

committed within these matters comprise, at minimum, willful violations against:

1) the Florida Rules of Professional Conduct, including at least Rule 4-1.1

Competence; Rule 4-1.2 Objectives and scope of representation, specifically (d)

Criminal or Fraudulent Conduct; Rule 4-1.16 Declining or Terminating

Representation, specifically (a)(1), (a)(4) and (a)(5) thereunder; Rule 4-3.1

Meritorious Claims and Contentions; Rule 4-3.3 Candor Toward the Tribunal,

specifically (a) False Evidence, Duty to Disclose, and (b) Criminal or

Fraudulent Conduct; Rule 4-3.4 Fairness to Opposing Party and Counsel; Rule

4-3.5 Impartiality and Decorum of the Tribunal, specifically (a) Influencing

Decision Maker; Rule 4-4.1 Truthfulness in Statements to Others; Rule 4-8.2

Judicial and Legal Officials, specifically (a) Impugning Qualifications and

Integrity of Judges or Other Officers; Rule 4-8.3 Reporting Professional

Misconduct, specifically (a) and (b) thereunder; and, Rule 4-8.4 Misconduct,

specifically (a), (b), (c), (d) and (f) thereunder; as well as also implicating his

boss in this matter, Florida Attorney General Bill McCollum, under Rule 4-5.1

Responsibilities of Partners, Managers, and Supervisory Lawyers;

2) the State of Florida penal code, including, but limiting space in example,

F.S. § 817.03 Making false statement to obtain property or credit; F.S. §

817.034 Florida Communications Fraud Act; F.S. § 817.29 Cheating; F.S. §

5
 817.49 False reports of commission of crimes; F.S. § 817.569 Criminal use of a

public record or public records information; F.S. § 837.06 False official

statements; F.S. § 838.022 Official misconduct; F.S. § 839.11 Extortion by

officers of the state; F.S. § 839.13 Falsifying records; F.S. § 839.24 Penalty for

failure to perform duty required of officer; F.S. § 843.0855 Criminal actions

under color of law or through use of simulated legal process; F.S. § 843.14

Compounding felony; F.S. § 876.23 Subversive activities unlawful; etc., and,

3) the United States penal Code, including, but limiting space in example,

18 U.S.C. § 4; 18 U.S.C. § 241; 18 U.S.C. § 242; 18 U.S.C. § 371; 18 U.S.C. §

1341; 18 U.S.C. § 2722; and, etc., etc., etc… See also, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2724.

Accordingly, and unless this Honorable Court can move affirmatively to correct

manifest injustice, thereby mitigating Mr. Corrente’s injuries herein, it would seem

that his choice to attempt fraud upon this Court will result as very unwise, indeed.

Of course, any reasonable person holding an office of public trust is expected to

choose the side of the written law, and precisely not to sully the higher example of

purity, integrity and respect of the law that society must demand in such a person.

But, frankly, any attorney with nearly thirty (30) years of experience, and over a

dozen years of experience as Board Certified in and for criminal appeals, has no

plausible excuse for the commission of any form of criminal conduct, whatsoever,

and Mr. Corrente’s career, and future, are now within the hands of this wise Court.

6
 Argument III

The State of Florida has conceded the vast majority of errors as claimed,

by established operation of law, unethically ‘whitewashed’ all remaining

statements, and is estopped by its unclean hands throughout these matters

The State opened its Answer Brief with the following sentence and statement:

“Appellant’s statement of the case and facts is substantially accurate for the

purposes of this appeal, with the following additions and emphasis:” (emphasis)

Pursuant to its own affirmative, legally-binding admissions, and doubly-backed

by automatic operation of law, would the State have failed to deny or address the

same averments, in any manner (see, e.g.; Florida Rules of Civil Procedure: Rule

1.110(c) and (e); also Rule 1.140(b), (g) and (h); and, etc.), the State has, therefore,

affirmatively admitted the absolute, legal truth of the following facts not denied:

1) Theresa was twice awarded as custodial parent to her then-minor children;

2) Without appeal, the two family court judgments both became res judicata;

3) Theresa’s ex-husband, the convicted child molester, could not, and cannot,

possibly have obtained any lawful form of child custody in the courts of Florida;

4) Accordingly, any such orders or schemes contrary to law are, in fact, fraud,

void and/or voidable, also unenforceable, and exist only as “the poisonous tree”;

5) There can be, nor are, any lawful or enforceable rights or interests therein,

and all such subsequent actions are legal nullities, as fruit of the poisonous tree;

7
 6) Accordingly, all relevant actions taken by the State of Florida, its officials,

employees, and/or agents, based upon that “poisonous tree”, particularly all of

the matters of ostensible “child support” enforcement taken as against Theresa,

including garnishments against her income and tax returns, and all matters of

ostensible “child support arrears”, including administrative suspension of her

driver’s license, are each and every one, complete and utter nullities of the law,

legally exist only as violations of Theresa’s constitutional and due process rights

to her life, liberty, and property, and equate directly to various civil and criminal

violations of the law, present and ongoing today, by various Florida personnel;

7) That validity of suspension is, in fact, not only an element of the criminal

charge as originally alleged by the State, but is, indeed, the major key element,

subjected to all manner of due process procedures, before the State can convict;

8) That the State, itself, fraudulently charged Theresa with an utterly bogus,

second misdemeanor, under F.S. § 320.07(3C), second or subsequent offence;

9) That certain officials and actors of the State criminally violated federal law,

by totally erasing the ex-husband’s entire $10K+ child support debt, in willful

violations of 42 U.S.C. § 666(a)(9)(c), i.e., the federal Bradley Amendment;

10) That both Judge Yerman and Judge Merritt feloniously and tortiously did

deny, inhibit and prevent Theresa’s statutorily-mandated, full and pauper access

to transcripts of the trial court proceedings, in attempted obstructions of justice;

8
 11) That the trial court and reviewing court both unlawfully violated Theresa’s

absolutely-established, constitutional rights to confront her State accusers within

the criminal trial, as pertained to any Florida State or local governmental action

to enforce any aspect of “child support” enforcement against her. See Pointer v.

Texas, 380 U.S. 400, 404 (1965) (declaring that the right of cross-examination is

one of the safeguards essential to a fair trial). Again, confronting the messenger

does not meet the due process requirement; cross-examining the messenger is

insufficient. See Rodriguez v. State, 753 So. 2d 29 (Fla. 2000);

12) That Theresa’s public defender was strictly, categorically, and manifestly

ineffective, under the requirements of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668

(1984), for: (a) failing to challenge, whatsoever, the State’s facially-fatal charge

made under F.S. § 320.07(3C); (b) failing to proffer any defense, either existing

or prepared, whatsoever, when asked by the trial court in open hearing; and, (c),

even all the strict errors listed within the Initial Brief, at 24-25, under ¶¶ (a)-(g);

13) That Theresa had affirmatively stated, during plea sentencing hearing, that

she was only taking the plea because she believed she could not get a fair trial;

14) That Theresa had been affirmatively coerced under extreme and manifest

duress to “take” the plea bargain, constituting wholly unlawful process, various

criminal acts by Citrus County personnel, and necessitating immediate vacating

or reversal of the instant conviction, all as one or more strict matters of law;

9
 15) That the trial court illegally and unconstitutionally sentenced Theresa to a

term of probation time that exceeded the maximum aggregate jail time, and that

the trial court further illegally placed Theresa’s probation with “the department”;

16) Theresa was utterly denied any fair, competent and meaningful review on

lower appeal, particularly admitting that Judge Merritt did, in fact, know and/or

then also willfully commit each and every item listed in the Initial Brief, at 34-

36, ¶¶ (a)-(t), and in the Initial Brief, at 36-37, ¶¶ 1)-17); and, accordingly also,

17) That Theresa is entitled to various manner of relief, including vacating

conviction and sentence, reimbursement of all costs and direct expenses, and,

via power of writ(s), to further compel DOR and DMV remediation actions.

Now, if none of these violations amount to what Mr. Corrente keeps fictitiously

referring to as “[no] basis to find a departure of the essential requirements of law”,

then, simply said, even basic due process no longer exists in the State of Florida.

As if clearly not already more than enough facts, evidence, law, mandated duties

and truth, all categorically in Theresa’s legal and equitable favor, the State, via its

flagrantly-unethical counsel, Mr. Corrente, has acted in affirmative bad faith to try

and ‘whitewash’ the few issues that were weakly, even fraudulently, ‘addressed’...

For example, the State, via counsel, opens with admitting Theresa’s statements

of fact and of the case are, in fact, “substantially accurate” in these matters, and

even adds additional facts in support of Theresa’s Record, yet then did also turn

10
around and directly contradicted itself, by stating: “Appellant raises 8 issues in her

initial brief, none of which are supported by the record.” (Answer Brief, at 6).

Several times, the State, via counsel, fraudulently attempts to treat a non-fact as

a fact, in “quoting” the trial court as “explaining” something to Appellant Theresa,

as if opposing counsel’s conclusory and bald statements are somehow “the law”, as

existing against Theresa’s favor, when the actual truth of law is directly opposite.

For example, State’s counsel fraudulently states, and misleads as a “fact”, that

“[t]he trial explained that Appellant could not challenge a Pasco Circuit Court

Order in Citrus County Court. (S1 18-19)” (Answer Brief, at 1). However, the trial

court was actually acting in gross incompetence by its unconstitutional violations

against due process procedure, and counsel Corrente had been already served with

plenty of direct authority to the contrary, in that fraud vitiates all judgments, and in

that collateral attacks against any such void and/or voidable judgment may also be

raised by the affected party, in any court, and at any time, all as even confirmed by

the appellate decisions of *this* Court. (Initial Brief, at 14-15, and at 17-18).

Likewise, at other times in his Answer Brief, State’s counsel has affirmatively

mislead this Court again, in falsely substituting the implication of a legal “fact”, by

improperly using the word “explained” as a conclusory statement in reference to

the trial court judge, when, each time, in fact, the trial court judge was actually and

flagrantly violating Theresa’s Constitutional, due process, and/or statutory rights.

11
 Accordingly, Mr. Corrente, counsel for the State, has not only violated his “due

diligence” aspects of ethics rules, but has also improperly presented false argument

for purposes of fraud, delay, and/or to otherwise mislead and confuse the tribunal.

Moreover, having duly received service of both arguments and complaints along

with actual, officially-documented proof, via the Record herein, of manifest crimes

against Theresa’s civil, constitutional and due process rights, by both Yerman and

Merritt, Mr. Corrente’s mandated legal duties, were and are, in fact, as Assistant

Attorney General, to cause an immediate investigation against Yerman and Merritt,

pursuant to the requirements of F.S. § 760.51, instead of fraudulently misleading

this Court, and attempting to obstruct justice herein, in a scheme to further criminal

concealment of the same acts. See also F.S. § 112.3175(1)(b)2 and F.S. § 839.24.

Accordingly, not only have Mr. Corrente and the State of Florida increased their

direct criminal culpability herein, but they have violated direct conflicts of interest.

See Argument II, supra, for references to some of Mr. Corrente’s violations of

the Rules of Professional Conduct. (Reply Brief, at 4-6). See also F.S. § 454.11.

Regardless, the State is already estopped from seeking any judgment in its favor,

because these issues were all created by its own utterly unclean hands, as its own

choosing to consistently disregard not only its own written laws, but all other duly

advised authorities provided to each and every involved agent and entity along the

way, both in underlying Pasco County matters, and herein, lower and again now…

12
 The alternatively-titled legal doctrines of “unclean hands” and “clean hands” are

one and the same. It is the well-established principle that a party who has acted

unethically or in bad faith in relation to a lawsuit will not win the suit or be granted

equitable relief by the court. The unclean hands doctrine may be asserted by a

defendant who claims that the plaintiff acted with unclean hands with respect to the

matter in litigation. See Yost v. Rieve Enters., Inc., 461 So. 2d 178 (Fla. 1st DCA

1984) ("There is no bar to applying the doctrine of unclean hands to a case in

which both the plaintiff and the defendant are parties to a fraudulent transaction

perpetrated on a third party."); see also Hauer v. Thum, 67 So. 2d 643, 645 (Fla.

1953) ("It would matter not that the [defendants] were parties to the fraudulent

transaction nor that the fraud was perpetrated upon a third party."); Marin v. Seven

of Five Ltd., 921 So. 2d 699, 700 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006) ("Generally, the conduct

constituting the unclean hands must be connected with the matter in litigation.")

The in pari delicto doctrine is a corollary of the unclean hands doctrine which

also requires “that no one shall be permitted to profit from his own fraud or

wrongdoing” Yost, supra, 461 So. 2d 178, at 184. The Fourth District in Epstein v.

Epstein, 915 So. 2d 1272, 1275 (Fla. 4th DCA 2005), aptly described the doctrine:

The clean hands doctrine "applies not only to fraudulent and illegal transactions,
but to any unrighteous, unconscientious, or oppressive conduct by one seeking
equitable interference in his own behalf." . . . He who has acted in bad faith,
resorted to trickery or deception, or been guilty of fraud, injustice, or unfairness
will appeal in vain to a court of conscience, even though in his wrongdoing he
may have kept himself strictly 'within the law.' Id. (citations omitted).

13
 Argument IV

Theresa is clearly entitled to judgment in her favor, as a matter of law

Although the State of Florida, vis-à-vis Citrus County, initially had what looked

like a prima facie case against Theresa for driving on a suspended license, the issue

of validity became not only one of the ‘must’ elements to be proven by the State,

but actually became the key and pivotal element to the entire case, for both parties.

In fact, the criminal charging statute, itself, F.S. § 322.34(2), expressly includes

the key element of the validity of administrative action, within its own written

language: “… canceled, suspended, or revoked as provided by law …”

Also, the State has now also made legally-binding admissions of all facts in the

direct support of agreeing that the administrative suspension of Theresa’s driver’s

license over “child support arrears” was void ab initio, due to manifest fraud upon

Florida law, as well as upon Theresa’s constitutional, civil and due process rights.

Indeed, the actual facts of the matter herein are that Theresa has essentially done

nothing wrong, at all, and that it is the State of Florida, itself, that has horrifically

“unclean hands” throughout the entire history of these proceedings, both within the

twin underlying Pasco County matters of family court and child support processes,

(“the poisonous tree”), then also by administrative suspension, then yet again, by

criminal charges, and then even yet again, by the State’s affirmative acts of fraud

committed within this appeal (by its counsel). Each of these State actions is flatly

14
null and void, completely fraudulent, many are also direct criminal acts, and in no

way are any of these acts protected from any attack, either direct and/or collateral.

Indeed, the State has admitted all facts in support of Theresa’s actual innocence.

“There is no question of the general doctrine that fraud vitiates the most solemn

contracts, documents, and even judgments.” United States v. Throckmorton, 98

U.S. 61, 68, 25 L.Ed. 93 (1878). Accordingly, the State of Florida gets nothing.

Argument V

This Court’s ruling will influence the final selection of civil defendants

Theresa already has ample defendants for federal suit, and is in no need to name

multiple others... This Court is asked to simply grant her full justice, deal with Mr.

Corrente’s actions, itself, and, so, allow Theresa to focus her attentions elsewhere.

Conclusion

Accordingly, Theresa is absolutely entitled to all the relief that she seeks herein,

enumerated and provided previously unto the Court. See Initial Brief, at 44-45.

WHEREFORE, your undersigned hopeful Appellant, Theresa M. Martin, prays

and moves this Honorable Court to simply grant her true and lawful justice and

equity, and so now moves for all appropriate relief deemed wise and proper herein.

Respectfully submitted,

_______________________
Theresa M. Martin

15
 IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
IN AND FOR THE STATE OF FLORIDA
FIFTH DISTRICT

5DCA CASE NO.: 5D09-3590

Theresa Marie MARTIN, ) in an appeal from summary denials

Petitioner/Appellant, ) of collateral relief from traffic court
)
v. ) Citrus County Circuit Court cases:
) 2009-AP-2088 & 2009-CA-3729
State of FLORIDA, )
Respondent/Appellee, ) The Honorables Yerman & Merritt,
) Fifth Judicial Circuit, at Inverness
_______________________________ ) ________________________________

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify: that on this __29__ day of March, 2010, a true and complete

copy of the foregoing reply brief of appellant, by depositing the same in the United

States mail, first class postage preaffixed, has been duly served upon:

(Attorney for the Appellee):

Carmen F. Corrente
Office of the Attorney General
444 Seabreeze Blvd., 5th Floor
Daytona Beach, FL 32118
/s/ Theresa M. Martin
____________________________
Theresa M. Martin

Appellant pro se
Theresa M. Martin
10918 Norwood Avenue
Port Richey, FL 34668
727-857-4193
amothersfight@yahoo.com
 IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
IN AND FOR THE STATE OF FLORIDA
FIFTH DISTRICT

5DCA CASE NO.: 5D09-3590

Theresa Marie MARTIN, ) in an appeal from summary denials

Petitioner/Appellant, ) of collateral relief from traffic court
)
v. ) Citrus County Circuit Court cases:
) 2009-AP-2088 & 2009-CA-3729
State of FLORIDA, )
Respondent/Appellee, ) The Honorables Yerman & Merritt,
) Fifth Judicial Circuit, at Inverness
_______________________________ ) ________________________________

CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE

I hereby certify that the lettering contained within this reply brief is Times New

Roman 14-point font and complies with the font requirements of Florida Rule of

Appellate Procedure 9.210(a)(2).

/s/ Theresa M. Martin

____________________________
Theresa M. Martin

Appellant pro se
Theresa M. Martin
10918 Norwood Avenue
Port Richey, FL 34668
727-857-4193
amothersfight@yahoo.com