Curbing Police Corruption

Asian Education and Development Studies
Curbing police corruption in Singapore: lessons for other Asian countries

Jon S.T. Quah
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AEDS
3,3
POLICING IN ASIA REFORMS AND

CHALLENGES
Curbing police corruption

in Singapore: lessons for
other Asian countries
186
Jon S.T. Quah

Anti-Corruption Consultant, Singapore

Abstract
Purpose The purpose of this paper is to explain why Singapore has succeeded in curbing the
problem of police corruption and to identify the six lessons which other Asian countries can learn from
Singapores experience.
Design/methodology/approach The paper analyzes the causes of police corruption in Singapore
during the British colonial period and describes the measures adopted by the Peoples Action Party
government after assuming office in June 1959 to curb police corruption. The effectiveness of these
measures is assessed by referring to Singapores perceived extent of corruption according to three
international indicators and the reported cases of police corruption from 1965 to 2011.
Findings The Singapore Police Force has succeeded in minimizing police corruption by improving
salaries and working conditions, cooperating with the Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau,
enhancing its recruitment and selection procedures, providing training and values education for its
members, and adopting administrative measures to reduce the opportunities for corruption. Other Asian
countries afflicted with rampant police corruption can learn six lessons from Singapores success.
Originality/value This paper will be of interest to those policy makers, scholars, and anti-corruption
practitioners, who are interested in learning how Singapore has succeeded in curbing police corruption.
Keywords Training, Singapore, Meritocracy, Police corruption, Salaries, Values education
Paper type Research paper
Asian Education and Development

Studies
Vol. 3 No. 3, 2014
pp. 186-222
r Emerald Group Publishing Limited
2046-3162
DOI 10.1108/AEDS-07-2014-0029
Introduction
Police corruption is one of the oldest and most persistent problems in American
policing because for as long as there have been police, there has been police corruption
and misconduct (McElreath et al., 2013, p. 187). While a great deal of research was
conducted on police corruption in the USA during the 1960s-1980s[1], much more
research is available in recent years on police corruption in other countries[2]. Indeed,
police corruption is not confined to the USA as Transparency Internationals
Global Corruption Barometer for 2010-2011 has found that the police is perceived as a
corrupt institution in these 31 countries: Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Burundi, Cameroon,
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Ghana, Kenya, Liberia, Malawi, Malaysia, Mexico,
Moldova, Mozambique, Nigeria, Pakistan, Philippines, Russia, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra
Leone, South Africa, South Sudan, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Taiwan, Uganda, Venezuela,
Vietnam, Yemen, Zambia, and Zimbabwe (Transparency International, 2010).
In Indonesia, the 2,300 respondents in the 2001 national survey identified the traffic
police as the most corrupt institution (Partnership for Governance Reform in
Indonesia, 2001, pp. 10-11). Similarly, a 1992-1993 survey of 2,243 respondents in
Bangkok and four regions identified the Police Department as the most corrupt agency
(33.7 percent), followed by the Ministry of Defense (27 percent), the Ministry of the
Interior (26 percent), and the Department of Transport (22.5 percent) (Pasuk and
Sungsidh, 1996, pp. 155-156). In Malaysia, the Royal Commission found that the
divisions in the Royal Malaysia Police (RMP) that were more susceptible to corrupt
practices were traffic police personnel, investigating officers and their supervisors,
detectives, prosecuting officers and police enquiry office personnel (Royal Malaysia
Police (RMP), 2005, p. 279). Furthermore, corruption was prevalent in the police
lockup as there were many complaints that detainees had to pay for additional food, to
receive and make telephone calls, to see family members or friends, and to be placed in
good cells. Finally, many police officers have bribed other officers to facilitate
their transfer to such gold-mine postings as the Commercial Crime Department,
Traffic Branch, Criminal Investigation Department (D7 covering secret societies,
anti-vice and gambling), Narcotics Department, Logistics Department (Procurement
and Development) and Deployment and Promotions Divisions (RMP, 2005, p. 280).
In Indonesia, the police are involved in three levels of organized corruption. The
first level is the large scale protection racket where police provide protection to paying
businesses. Second, police corruption occurs at the street level, where citizens pay
bribes to policemen to avoid arrest, citations or for filing a police report. The third level
involves the purchase of positions in the police force. As a candidate has to pay two
years salary up front to join the police force, he hopes to recoup his investment
within six months of employment (Goodpaster, 2002, p. 15). Indeed, according to
Saputra Pane, the Head of Indonesia Police Watch, a nongovernmental organization
that monitors corruption, the going rate to join the Jakarta police force, for example,
can amount to 80-90 million rupiah ($9,750-$11,000) (quoted in Allard, 2010).
Table I shows the perceived extent of police corruption in 21 Asian countries
according to Transparency Internationals Global Corruption Barometer 2010-11.
Country
Pakistan
Bangladesh
India
Malaysia
Mongolia
Sri Lanka
Taiwan
Vietnam
Cambodia
Japan
South Korea
Philippines
Thailand
Indonesia
Papua New Guinea
China
Hong Kong
Afghanistan
Nepal
Maldives
Singapore
a
Note: The score ranges from 1 (not at all corrupt) to 5 (extremely corrupt)
Source: Transparency International (2010)
Curbing police
corruption in
Singapore
187
Scorea
4.5
4.4
4.1
4.1
4.0
4.0
3.9
3.8
3.7
3.7
3.7
3.6
3.6
3.5
3.5
3.4
3.4
3.2
3.2
3.0
2.8
Table I.
Perceived extent of police
corruption in 21 Asian
countries in 2010
AEDS
3,3
188
Corruption was also rampant in Singapore during the British colonial period,
especially in the Singapore Police Force (SPF). However, police corruption is no longer
a serious problem today as reflected in Singapores ranking as the least corrupt
Asian country according to various international surveys on corruption and its lowest
score of 2.8 in Table I. Why has Singapore succeeded in curbing police corruption?
Table I also confirms that police corruption is a serious problem in Pakistan,
Bangladesh, India, Malaysia, Mongolia, Sri Lanka, Taiwan, and Vietnam, with their
scores ranging from 3.8 to 4.5. What lessons can these eight Asian countries, which are
plagued with police corruption, learn from Singapores success in minimizing police
corruption? This paper addresses these two questions by first defining police corruption
and identifying its major forms before analyzing the extent and causes of police
corruption in colonial Singapore and explaining why it is no longer a problem today.
Definition and forms of police corruption
Police corruption, according to Gerald E. Caiden (1977, p. 155), is a complex social and
organizational phenomenon which has been used differently to cover many things.
For example, it has been defined in terms of a multitude of sins, which includes
brutality, fabrication of evidence, sleeping on duty, nepotism, racism, bribery and
theft. Lawrence W. Sherman (1974, p. 5) has rejected this broad definition in favor of
equating police corruption with bribery. However, four years later, Sherman (1978,
p. 30) replaced his narrow definition of police corruption as bribery with an illegal use
of organizational power for personal gain.
While Knapp (1972, p. 65) did not define police corruption, it identified two types of
corrupt policemen: the grass-eaters and meat-eaters thus:
The overwhelming majority of those who do take payoffs are grass-eaters, who accept
gratuities and solicit five- and ten- and twenty-dollar payments from contractors, tow-truck
operators, gamblers, and the like, but do not aggressively pursue corruption payments.
Meat-eaters, probably only a small percentage of the force, spend a good deal of their
working hours aggressively seeking out situations they can exploit for financial gain,
including gambling, narcotics, and other serious offenses which can yield payments of
thousands of dollars.
In other words, the grass-eaters are those junior policemen who focus on petty
corruption and passively accepted graft or kickbacks, while the meat-eaters refer to
senior police officers who are proactive carnivores in search of grand corruption[3].
In addition to the grass-eaters and meat-eaters, there are also birds or those
police officers who avoid deviant practices because they are honest or because they
dont have any good opportunities (Punch, 2009, p. 21).
Unlike Sherman et al. (1974, p. 118) have provided a more useful definition of police
corruption as any type of proscribed behavior engaged in by a law enforcement officer
who receives or expects to receive, by virtue of his official position, an actual or potential
unauthorized material reward or gain. On the basis of their research in the USA, Roebuck
and Barker (1974, pp. 119-125) have identified these eight types of police corruption:
(1)
Corruption of authority, which occurs when a policeman receives officially

unauthorized, unearned material gain by virtue of his position as a police
officer without violating the law per se.
(2)
Kickbacks in the form of goods, services or money are accepted by police officers
from legitimate businessmen as a reward for referring business to them.
(3)
Opportunistic theft refers to those acts of confiscating money, merchandise

(including liquor and drugs) or other property by police officers in the course of
their routine duties.
(4)
Shakedowns or bribes arise when policemen witness or are aware of criminal

violations and violators, and accept bribes later for not making arrests.
(5)
Protection by police officers for those involved in illegal activities in return for
payment. The owners of such vice operations as gambling, narcotics and
prostitution, pay bribes to police officers so that they can continue their
activities without any harassment.
(6)
The fix refers to the quashing of prosecution proceedings following the

offenders arrest or the taking up of traffic tickets. Offenders rely on the
fix to avoid court action and those found guilty of traffic violations resort
to the same method to avoid blemishing their driving records.
(7)
Involvement of police officers in such direct criminal activities as burglary

and robbery.
(8)
The internal payoff occurs when police officers buy, barter or sell certain
prerogatives (work assignments, off-days, holidays, vacation periods, control
of evidence, and promotions) from or to their colleagues[4].
Police corruption in colonial Singapore

Singapore was a British colony for almost 140 years from its founding by Stamford Raffles
in January 1819 until its attainment of self-government from the British in June 1959. In
July 1826, Singapore became part of the Straits Settlements together with Malacca and
Penang. The pre-colony phase ended in 1867 when control of the Straits Settlements
passed from the India Office to the Colonial Office. British colonial rule was briefly
interrupted by the Japanese Occupation (February 1942-August 1945). Singapore became
a crown colony in April 1946 and its constitutional status was transformed to a ministerial
form of government under the Rendel Constitution in 1955 (Quah, 2001, p. 291).
The large influx of immigrants from the neighboring countries to Singapore after its
founding in January 1819 required the establishment of a police force to maintain law
and order. As there was no budget to support the formation of a police force, Major
Farquhar, the Resident, recommended the setting up of a License Fund from the sale of
licenses for opium, arrack and gambling (Pearson, 1953, pp. 98-99). Stamford Raffles
accepted Farquhars proposal and in May 1820 Farquhar formed a police force of sorts
with his son-in-law, Francis Bernard, as the Superintendent (Turnbull, 1977, pp. 17-18).
Superintendent Bernard was assisted by a team of 11 men, consisting of a Malay
writer, a jailor, a sergeant, and eight constables (Buckley, 1965, p. 68). The SPF has
grown from 12 personnel in 1820 to 4,301 personnel in June 1959 with the attainment of
self-government from the British (Quah, 1979, p. 16).
Police corruption was rampant in Singapore during the British colonial period. An
analysis of press reports on police corruption in the Straits Times from 1845-1921
found that the five most important forms of police corruption were bribery, direct
criminal activities, opportunistic theft, corruption of authority, and protection of illegal
activities, as shown in Table II.
On September 22, 1877, the Straits Times reported on the system of bribery in the
SPF which involved not only the Indian and Malay constables but also the European
Curbing police
corruption in
Singapore
189
AEDS
3,3
190
Inspectors and Sub-Inspectors. The analysis of the 109 cases of bribery shows that
among the 60 cases with data on the ethnic group of the offenders, Malays were the
worst offenders (33 percent), followed by the Indians (9 percent), the Chinese (7 percent),
the Europeans (4 percent) and the Eurasians (2 percent). In terms of rank, the police
constables were the chief offenders (58.7 percent), followed by the peons (7.3 percent),
detectives (6.4 percent), corporals (4.6 percent), sergeants and Chinese interpreters
(3.7 percent each), inspectors (2.8 percent), and lance-corporals (1.8 percent). The four
groups who offered bribes to the policemen were the hawkers, opium shop-keepers,
rikisha-pullers, and bullock-cart drivers. However, while the amount of bribes received by
the policemen ranged from one cent to S$300, the usual amount received as bribes
by policemen was less than S$1 (Quah, 1979, pp. 18-19).
In addition to bribery, there were 42 reported cases of policemen who were
prosecuted for engaging in such direct criminal activities as theft and robbery. The
worst offenders were the 17 police constables, most of whom were Malays, who were
arrested for theft or robbery. The amount of money stolen ranged from 40 cents to
S$400. Among the property stolen by the policemen were a small pig, jewelry, brass
pots, a silver watch, a walking stick, two platinum cups worth S$4,000, and the
clothing of their colleagues (Quah, 1979, pp. 20-21).
The ten cases of opportunistic theft involved five Malays, two Europeans, one
Indian, and two policemen whose ethnic group was not reported in the Straits Times.
In terms of rank, four of the offenders were constables, two were lance-corporals, two
were peons, one was a sub-inspector, and a policeman whose rank was not recorded.
Two cases of opportunistic theft occurred when a police peon on duty at Boat Quay
robbed a sailor of S$6, and when a Malay lance-corporal stole a brooch from a lady
during his duty at the Tanglin Club. Another two Malay policemen committed
opportunistic theft in connection with gambling activities: one stole S$1 while
searching a gambling house, and the other stole a pouch containing S$3 while
arresting some robbers. Finally, two policemen were found guilty of stealing the
personal belongings of dead men (Quah, 1979, pp. 21-22).
The nine reported cases of corruption of authority involved criminal breach of trust
(CBT). For example, in September 1887, a European sub-inspector was charged with
CBT for keeping a sum of S$133.81 which was received by him for licenses. Another
European police officer was jailed for two years for CBT in his capacity as a public
servant. Apart from these CBT cases, there were other cases of abuse of authority
by policemen. On August 17, 1872, the Straits Times reported the mistreatment of
a hawker by a policeman for not complying with his order to avoid obstructing
the roadside. When the hawker did not comply because he did not understand the
policemans request, he was beaten by the policeman and dragged to the police station.
Form of police corruption
Table II.
Reported cases of police
corruption in Singapore
by form, 1845-1921
Bribery
Direct criminal activities
Opportunistic theft
Corruption of authority
Protection of illegal activities
Total
Source: Quah (1979, p. 24)
Number
109
42
10
9
2
172
63.4
24.4
5.8
5.2
1.2
100.0
Fifteen years later, in August 1887, the Straits Times highlighted several cases of
oppressive treatment of laborers by the native police constables (Quah, 1979, pp. 22-23).
Finally, the two reported cases of protection of illegal activities dealt with gambling
and a secret society. In September 1845, an Indian police sergeant was discharged
from the SPF for connivance with gambling houses for the purpose of protecting them
from police harassment in return for payment. He was caught because he was able to
buy property in spite of his low salary. The other case involved seven members
of the Red Flag Society, an Indian secret society, who testified in October 1865 that
their society had regularly paid S$10 a month to the police officer in charge of the
Telok Ayer Police Station for their cooperation and avoidance of police harassment
(Quah, 1979, p. 23).
The small number of reported cases of protection of illegal activities among
policemen is surprising in view of the prevalence of gambling and secret society
activities in Singapore during 1845-1921. However, the Straits Times had reported on
four occasions on the involvement of policemen in gambling activities in Singapore.
First, the Straits Times reported on October 17, 1846, on the SPFs participation in the
abominable gambling houses, nests of corruption and vice which serve to foster every
species of enormity. Second, on September 16, 1848, the Straits Times noted that
gambling had resumed in some major streets in Singapore, without the knowledge
of the police peons who were patrolling these streets. Third, on June 13, 1849, the
Straits Times asked why the SPF allowed gambling within 50 yards of a police station
in town and explained that the policemen were paid for their silence. Finally, the Straits
Times criticized the SPF on July 27, 1861 for not taking strong action against the
gambling houses, which had faithful emissaries in the SPF who passed information
to their owners (Quah, 1979, p. 23).
In April 1846, a European constable, Charles Cashin, was convicted of receiving
bribes from illicit gambling dens and sentenced to 18 months imprisonment and a fine
of S$1,000. Cashin revealed that for the past three years all the constables in the SPF
had received S$20 each monthly from the gambling houses, and that the constable who
had accused him of bribery had also received bribes himself. Thomas Dunman, the
Deputy Superintendent of Police, admitted in Court that it was difficult to rectify the
situation because the police were in the pay of the owners of the 191 gambling houses
in Singapore (Quah, 1979, p. 25). In his book, Some Glimpses into Life in the Far East,
John Turnbull Thomson mentioned the payment of bribes by the Chinese owners of
gambling houses in Singapore to the wife of the chief of police in order to avoid police
harassment (quoted in Moore and Moore, 1969, p. 207).
The British colonial government appointed a Commission of Inquiry in 1879 to
identify the causes of inefficiency in the SPF. The Commission found, inter alia, that
corruption existed among the European inspectors and was rife among the Malay and
Indian policemen (Braddell, 1921, pp. 250-251). In April 1886, another Commission of
Inquiry was appointed to investigate public gambling in the Straits Settlements of
Malacca, Penang and Singapore. Among the 44 witnesses who testified before the
Commission in Singapore, ten of them provided convincing proof of the SPFs
involvement with the illegal gambling houses. For example, the Chief Inspector of Police,
Craven Harry Ord, indicated that the orderlies and constables in the SPF took bribes
from the gambling house owners. However, his superior, the Inspector-General of Police,
Samuel Dunlop, believed that it was more likely for the inspectors than the constables to
receive bribes from the gambling houses (Straits Settlements, 1887, pp. 6-7, 9-10, 22,
26, and 31-32).
Curbing police
corruption in
Singapore
191
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192
Perhaps the most damning evidence was given by a gambling informer, who
explained why the gambling house owners were not afraid of the police:
The gambling was done openly: men used to sit at the door and call out, but since the end of
last year [1885] they only sit at the door. [y] The Police on their rounds can see the people at
the doors. Any one can see. These men are not afraid of the Police. [y] The gambling is
carried on day and night. [y] The reason the gambling-house keepers are not afraid of the
Police is because the Police are in their pay. I have seen it myself, and have given money to the
Inspectors. The policeman on beat where the gambling-houses are receives three cents from
each house. When a Constable relieves another on the beat he receives the same (Straits
Settlements, 1887, p. 8).
An important witness who gave evidence of police corruption was the Second
Assistant Colonial Secretary, Ernest Woodford Birch. As the Secretary to the Police
Commission from 1879-1880, he had accompanied police officers on their raids of
gambling houses. Birch told the Commission:
I have been informed by persons who should know that the Police had been bribed to shut their
eyes. I have been told by the headman of one of the houses [y] that there was a regular scale of
pay given to the Police. [y] I have heard the same thing on several occasions, notably from a
Police orderly. He said the Police were regularly subsidized. He said Inspectors got $30 a month,
Sub-Inspectors $20, and so on on a scale. [y] The Orderly gave me to understand that all the
European Officers were bribed with some exceptions (Straits Settlements, 1887, p. 5).
On the basis of the testimonies provided by the witnesses, the 1886 Commission
concluded that:
[y] there has been a systematic arrangement, both in Singapore and Penang, for corrupting
the Police Force, and that in a large degree this has been successful and has reached the
Inspector class. [y] The system in Singapore seems to be that of two or three kongsis
[cooperative groups] levying subscriptions from the gambling-houses to bribe the Police to
abstain from arresting them [y] (Straits Settlements, 1887, pp. i-ii).
It is surprising that even though the 1886 Commission of Inquiry had confirmed the
existence of widespread police corruption in gambling activities, nothing was done by
the SPF to prevent the policemen from getting involved in such activities.
Causes of police corruption during the colonial period
Low salaries
The most important cause of police corruption during the British colonial period in
Singapore was the low salaries of members of the SPF, especially those in the lower
ranks. Table III provides details of the monthly salaries for both European and local
policemen in 1887. The discrimination in monthly salary between the European and
non-European local policemen can be seen from Table III as the European officers
earned much more than their local counterparts. For example, the monthly salary
of the most junior rank of constable among the European contingent was S$40 or
nearly three times that of the monthly salary of the highest rank of sergeant (S$15)
for the local contingent.
Apart from earning less than their European counterparts, the local policemen were
not provided with rations. On the other hand, all the European officers, except for those
with the rank of Inspector 1st class, received between S$5 to S$10 worth of rations.
The lack of provisions of rations for the local policemen made life more difficult for
them with the increase in food prices (Straits Times, 1878). To make matters worse, the
local policemen had to pay for their own uniforms, which were relatively expensive in
Rank
European contingent
Inspector 1st class
Inspector 2nd class
Inspector 3rd class
Sergeant
Constable
Local contingent
Sergeant
Corporal
Constable 1st class
Constable 2nd class
Constable 3rd class
Peon 1st class
Peon 2nd class
Monthly salary
S$100 (no rations)

S$80 (S$5 rations)
S$60 (S$10 rations)
S$50 (S$10 rations)
S$40 (S$10 rations)
S$15
S$12
S$10
S$9
S$8
S$5
S$4
Source: Straits Times (1887) quoted in Quah (1979, p. 28)
view of their low salaries. For example, a peon (first class) had to pay S$3.50 for his
uniform from his monthly salary of S$5 (Straits Times, 1848). With such conditions
prevailing in the SPF, it is not surprising that the Straits Times observed that: It is at
once evident that the native constables and the European police of the Inspector class
are so underpaid that scandals are unavoidable (Straits Times, 1887).
The unfavorable working conditions of the local policemen were further manifested
in the lack of provision of housing accommodation, pension or medical care for them.
Hence, it was not surprising that many policemen were forced by their low salaries and
poor working conditions to be corrupt.
Another important consequence of the SPFs low salaries and unfavorable working
conditions was that it could not attract suitably qualified candidates to join its ranks.
As police work was arduous, dangerous and badly paid, it only attracted those
unemployed men in desperate financial straits, such as stranded sailors, who joined
the SPF as a temporary stopgap occupation (Turnbull, 1977, p. 59). Thus, the SPF
had to be satisfied with those who applied for employment regardless of their character
or eligibility. On December 28, 1852, the Straits Times identified the SPFs chief defect
as the absence of choice in the selection of men for the force because men turned to
the police force when they failed in other sources of employment. This weakness was
acknowledged by the Inspector-General of Police, Samuel Dunlop, in his report on the
Straits Settlements Police for 1879 thus:
The difficulty of obtaining eligible recruits on the present pay is yearly increasing, and the
Superintendents are, as a rule, obliged to take any one who presents himself, provided he is
up to the standard in height, and is known not to have been imprisoned (Straits Times, 1880).
When Dunlop was asked by the 1886 Commission of Inquiry whether he had
considered character in recruiting constables to the SPF, he admitted that he could
not get enough policemen without characters [character reports] even though the
regulations required such reports (Straits Settlements, 1887, p. 25). Consequently,
the SPF had a high turnover rate and a large number of vacancies. In November 1856,
the Deputy Superintendent of Police, George Wahab, informed the Sitting Magistrate
that the SPF experienced difficulty in filling its vacancies because those who applied
Curbing police
corruption in
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Table III.
Monthly salary in the
SPF by rank in 1887
AEDS
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194
were generally men from the jungle or servants discharged from many places through
misconduct. Those who applied to join the SPF were either sailors addicted to drink
or men of doubtful character from the colonies (Straits Times, 1856).
The problem of corruption deteriorated during the Japanese Occupation because the
rampant inflation made it difficult for civil servants to live on their low wages. The low
value of the Japanese military currency forced many civil servants to supplement their
incomes by accepting bribes or doing business on the side line to prevent their families
from starving (Yoong, 1972, p. 55). Trading in the black market seemed to be a way of
life as everyone was surviving on some sort of black marketing. Moreover, nepotism
and corruption were perfectly acceptable because everyone resorted to connections,
friends and relatives in order to get jobs (Lee, 2005, p. 142).
The Japanese Occupation bred corruption into Singaporean society, as practices of
bribery, blackmail, and extortion grew out of the violence and fear that the Japanese
used to rule their occupied territories (Lee, 2005, p. 205). According to Lee Gek Boi
(2005, p. 205):
Bribery worked wonders. From generals to the ordinary soldier, gifts and money smoothed
the way. Nothing was transparent and everything was about connections and payoffs.
Nothing was impossible with the right connections. [y] Shortages created the black market
and a culture of thievery to fuel the market. Everyone the Japanese included did black
marketing. The Japanese Occupation culture brought out the basic survival instincts in
people and produced a society where all manner of evils could be justified because it was all
about survival. [y] It would take years to undo the corruption and address the social evils
that Japanese military occupation bred in Singapore.
Conditions worsened after the Second World War and corruption spread among civil
servants as a result of their meager salaries and inflation, as well as their inadequate
supervision by their superiors, which provided them with many opportunities for
corruption with a low probability of being caught (Quah, 1982, pp. 161-162). The
Japanese Occupations worst legacy was the corruption of public and private
integrity as reflected in the flourishing gambling dens and brothels, which were
legalized by the Japanese, and the resurgence of opium smoking, universal profiteering
and bribery (Turnbull, 1977, p. 225).
Corruption became a way of life for many Singaporeans to enable them to cope with
their low salaries and rising inflation during the post-war period (Yoong, 1972, pp. 55-56).
The British Military Administration (BMA), which took over after the Japanese surrender
in August 1945, was described pejoratively as the Black Market Administration
because its junior officials were unscrupulous and requisitioned private property
arbitrarily and grossly mismanaged the distribution of rice. The BMAs financial
inefficiency and scandalous corruption was criticized publicly by the advisory council
(Turnbull, 1977, p. 225).
Ample opportunities for corruption
In addition to low salaries and poor working conditions, the lack of control over
policemen in areas that were most susceptible to corruption also provided
many opportunities for them to engage in corrupt practices. The cases of police
involvement in illegal gambling mentioned in the previous section reflected the
lack of control over those inspectors and constables who accepted bribes from
the gambling house owners.
Another reason why the local policemen had ample opportunities for corruption
was that even though they were not legally permitted to take on second jobs in addition
to their duties, their low salaries forced them to seek alternative sources of income to
supplement their meager salaries from the SPF. Those local policemen who owned
buffalo carts and food stalls were unable to perform their official duties impartially
because of a conflict of interest (Quah, 1979, p. 29).
Tee Kim Leng, a Peoples Action Party (PAP) Legislative Assemblyman for Pasir
Panjang in 1959, observed that corruption was so widespread in government
departments that even office boys requested for tips of 10 or 20 cents for handling out
application forms. According to him, as the police were corrupt, the public had to pay
officers to get them to investigate crimes and those who were rich and powerful were
able to bribe the police to get people out of jail (Yap et al., 2009, p. 175).
The SPF was not the only corrupt organization in Singapore during the colonial
period, as government agencies such as the customs, immigration, and internal
revenue departments, provided more opportunities for corruption than those public
agencies that had limited contact with members of the public, did not issue licenses or
permits, or collected fees and taxes. A former Director of the Corrupt Practices
Investigation Bureau (CPIB) noted that corruption was widespread not only in those
areas involved in licensing activity and food and price control action, but also in those
protection rackets connected with the smuggling of gold bars and opium, and
gambling (Yoong, 1972, p. 56). In the view of a former journalist, Felix Abisheganaden,
the years preceding the PAP government were the most corrupt period in Singapores
history because the bureaucracy, the police, the immigration and the politicians
themselves were corrupt (Yap et al., 2009, p. 176).
Ineffective anti-corruption measures
Singapore initiated its battle against corruption in 1871, when corruption was made
illegal with the enactment of the Penal Code of the Straits Settlements of Malacca,
Penang, and Singapore. As mentioned earlier, two Commissions of Inquiry were
appointed by the British colonial government in 1879 and 1886 to investigate the SPFs
inefficiency and public gambling in the Straits Settlements respectively. However,
nothing was done by the British colonial government to curb corruption in the Straits
Settlements even though both Commissions had documented convincingly the
prevalence of police corruption in Singapore.
The British colonial governments reliance on appointing Commissions of Inquiry to
delay the implementation of political reforms was an important feature of British
imperialism. According to K.B. Krishna (1939, p. 306), whenever British imperialism is
faced with a major or minor crisis in the colonies, it responded by appointing Royal
Commissions and conferences. However, the purpose of appointing these Commissions
was political and not to find facts. The British colonial government established
Commissions of Inquiry for three reasons. First, these Commissions served to register
the benevolent intentions of British imperialism. Second, the Commissions were used
to discredit the demands of political parties opposed to British imperialism. The third
and most important reason was that the Commissions were a delaying tactic to gain
and bide time, to carry on the same exploitation with a promise of thorough
investigation (Krishna, 1939, pp. 307-309).
The British colonial governments lack of political will in combating corruption
was reflected in the 66-year delay in enacting the first anti-corruption law, the
Prevention of Corruption Ordinance (POCO), in December 1937 after the enactment
of the Penal Code in 1871. In addition to the delay in enacting the POCO, the British
colonial government made a serious error because the POCO made the SPFs
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Anti-Corruption Branch (ACB) responsible for corruption control even though police
corruption was widespread in Singapore.
The POCO was enacted to prevent bribery and secret commissions in public and
private business. However, it was ineffective for two reasons. The first reason was
that the POCOs offenses were not seizable and limited the powers of arrest, search
and investigation of police officers as warrants were required before arrests could be
made. The second reason for the POCOs ineffectiveness was that the penalty of
imprisonment for two years and/or a S$10,000 fine for corrupt offenders did not deter
corrupt behavior. This weakness of the POCO was only rectified in 1946 when it was
amended to increase the penalty to imprisonment for three years, thus making corrupt
offenses seizable and automatically giving police officers more powers of arrest, search
and investigation (Quah, 2007, pp. 12-13).
As it was located within the SPFs Criminal Investigation Department (CID), the
ACB failed to curb corruption because its small staff of 17 personnel was inadequate to
perform its functions effectively. Since the CID was mainly concerned with the
detection and investigation of serious crimes like murder and kidnapping, the task of
corruption control was given much lower priority. This meant that the ACB had to
compete with other branches of the CID for limited personnel and other resources.
Apart from its limited staff, the ACB was also not a specialized anti-corruption agency
(ACA) because it was saddled with many functions, and corruption control was only
one of the 16 duties of the Assistant Commissioner of the CID in May 1952[5]. Hence, it
was not surprising that combating corruption was not the CIDs top priority, especially
when the police were corrupt themselves. The most important reason for the ACBs
ineffectiveness was the prevalence of police corruption. In 1950, the Commissioner
of Police, J.P. Pennefather-Evans, confirmed the existence of widespread police
corruption, which was documented by the 1879 and 1886 Commissions of Inquiry
when he reported that corruption was rife in government departments in Singapore
(Quah, 2007, pp. 14-15).
The Opium Hijacking scandal and the CPIBs formation
As the ACB was ineffective in curbing corruption in Singapore, it was not surprising
that Mrs Elizabeth Choy, a member of the Second Legislative Council, had criticized the
British colonial government for its weak and feeble attempt to fight corruption in
Singapore. In her speech to the Second Legislative Council on February 20, 1952, she
urged the government to implement quickly the ACBs proposals to amend the POCO
to allow senior police officers to investigate the bank accounts of civil servants, to
separate the ACB from the SPF, and to increase the ACBs personnel (Colony of
Singapore, 1952a, p. B68).
The catalyst or triggering mechanism[6] for the CPIBs creation was the discovery
by the British colonial government that some police officers were implicated in the
Opium Hijacking scandal in October 1951. A gang of robbers, which included three
police detectives, hijacked a shipment of 1,800 pounds of opium worth S$400,000
(US$133,333) at Punggol Beach. The ACBs investigations revealed that some senior
police officers were involved with both the hijackers and the importers of the opium.
However, these investigations resulted in the dismissal of only two senior police
officers because the ACB did not have sufficient evidence to prosecute the other officers.
The colonial government was dissatisfied with the results of the investigations and
formed another special team in April 1952 to ascertain what went wrong with the
ACBs investigations. When the special team completed its investigations in September
1952, the British colonial government decided to replace the ACB with the special team,
which became the CPIB (CPIB, 2012, p. 18; Tan, 1999, p. 59).
Thus, the Opium Hijacking scandal made the British colonial government realize
that it had made a major policy mistake in December 1937, when the ACB was
entrusted with the task of curbing corruption even though police corruption was
rampant in Singapore.
The CPIB began its operations in October 1952 with 13 personnel, comprising of
eight seconded police officers and five support staff (CPIB, 2012, p. 18). However, the
CPIB was ineffective during its first eight years because:
[y] the officers short secondment and limited time and capacity to conduct thorough
investigations, coupled with the social stigma of investigating fellow police officers,
undermined the effective operations of CPIB. Thus, corruption, especially in its syndicated
form amongst law enforcement officers, continued to thrive in the colonial society (CPIB,
2012, p. 18).
Lee Kuan Yew, Singapores first prime minister, explained in his memoirs why his
government was committed from the outset to keep Singapore free from corruption:
When the PAP government took office in 1959, we set out to have a clean administration.
We were sickened by the greed, corruption and decadence of many Asian leaders. [y]
We had a deep sense of mission to establish a clean and effective government. When we took
the oath of office [y] in June 1959, we all wore white shirts and white slacks to symbolize
purity and honesty in our personal behavior and our public life. [y] We made sure from the
day we took office in June 1959 that every dollar in revenue would be properly accounted
for and would reach the beneficiaries at the grassroots as one dollar, without being siphoned
off along the way. So from the very beginning we gave special attention to the areas where
discretionary powers had been exploited for personal gain and sharpened the instruments
that could prevent, detect or deter such practices (Lee, 2000, pp. 182-184).
Learning from the British colonial governments lack of political will in combating
corruption as reflected in the CPIBs lack of legal powers, manpower, and budget during
its first eight years, the PAP government, which assumed power in June 1959, realized
the critical importance of enhancing the CPIBs powers and providing it with the
required personnel and budget for performing its functions effectively. Accordingly,
the PAP government initiated a comprehensive anti-corruption strategy by enacting the
Prevention of Corruption Act (POCA) on June 17, 1960 to strengthen the CPIB.
The POCA eliminated the deficiencies of the POCO and gave the CPIB additional
powers to perform its functions. Apart from defining corruption explicitly in terms of the
many forms of gratification, the POCA has given the CPIB officers powers of arrest
and search of arrested persons (section 15) as well as the authority to investigate the
bank and other accounts of those suspected of committing corrupt offenses (section 17).
Section 27 enabled the CPIB to deal with offenders effectively by making all offenses
under the POCA seizable offenses. In short, the CPIB has been given a new lease of life by
the additional powers entrusted to it by the POCA (Quah, 2007, pp. 19-20).
The CPIB enforces the POCA by performing these three functions: (1) to receive and
investigate complaints concerning corruption in the public and private sectors; (2) to
investigate malpractices and misconduct by public officers; and (3) to examine the
practices and procedures in the public service to minimize opportunities for corrupt
practices (CPIB, 2004, p. 3). In addition to these functions, the CPIB is also responsible
for screening candidates selected for appointments in the Singapore Civil Service
(SCS) and statutory boards to ensure that only those candidates without any taint of
corruption or misconduct are actually recruited (Republic of Singapore, 1995, p. 638).
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Tackling police corruption in contemporary Singapore

The PAP governments comprehensive anti-corruption strategy is based on this logic
of corruption control: as corruption is caused by both the incentives and opportunities
to be corrupt, attempts to eradicate corruption must be designed to minimize or
remove the conditions of both the incentives and opportunities that make individual
corrupt behavior irresistible (Quah, 1989, p. 842). As police corruption was rampant
during the colonial period, it was not surprising that substantial efforts were made to
reduce the opportunities for corruption in the SPF as part of the PAP governments
strategy for minimizing corruption.
Improving salaries and working conditions

As low salaries and unfavorable working conditions contributed to the widespread
police corruption during the British colonial period, these two aspects had to be
improved to redress the problem. When Singapore attained self-government from
the British in June 1959, the SPF had 4,301 personnel (Quah, 1979, p. 16). If the SPF
during the colonial period is compared with its counterpart today, it is obvious
that the contemporary SPF is in a better condition. Apart from being larger, the SPF
today enjoys more favorable working conditions than its colonial counterpart.
The most important difference is that salaries in the SPF have gradually improved
since the Second World War. In 1951, the Police Pay Committee recommended
new pay scales and allowances for policemen below the rank of Inspector. For example,
recruits to the SPF in 1951 received a monthly salary of S$450, unlike their
counterparts who were only paid a low monthly salary of S$4 in 1887 (Colony of
Singapore, 1951, p. 4). Two decades later, the Lee Soo Ann Salary Review Committee
of 1971 suggested between 20 and 25 percent pay rises for junior police officers.
It also recommended that the salary increases should be accompanied with free
medical aid, instead of paying a certain percentage of ones salary for such treatment.
Furthermore, free accommodation should be provided for married personnel, and
dialect and educational allowances should be reintroduced (Straits Times, 1971, p. 15).
The government accepted the Committees recommendations and implemented these
in April 1972.
With the improvement in their salaries and working conditions, members
of the SPF today are not allowed to keep other jobs, unlike their colonial counterparts.
Table IV provides details of the current salary scales of entry rank junior and
senior officers in the SPF. Compared to the low monthly salaries of the police officers
in 1887 shown in Table III, the monthly salaries of Corporals, Sergeants, Inspectors,
and Assistant Superintendents of Police (ASPs) in the SPF are much more attractive
in 2014.
Table IV.
Salary scales of entry
rank junior and senior
SPF officers in 2014
Entry rank
Educational requirements
Corporal
Sergeant
Inspector
Assistant superintendent of Police
O levels
A levels/diploma
Bachelors degree in any discipline
Bachelors degree in any discipline
Note: aUS$ 1 S$1.24127 on July 18, 2014 (www.xe.com/currencyconverter)

Source: Compiled from information provided in SPF (2014a)
Monthly salary scalea

S$1,790-S$2,060
S$1,920-S$2,430
S$3,180-S$4,010
S$3,710-S$4,470
Joint CPIB-SPF task force

In December 1966, the Political Secretary to the Minister of Culture described the SPF
as an efficient, small and honest force. Referring to the subject of corruption, he
stated that the Government wants every citizen and every Government officer to be
clear of corruption because we will not forgive anybody who is involved in corrupt
practices (Straits Times, 1966). Ten years later, members of the SPF were reminded
by Police Life, the SPFs newsletter, to show the public that corruption did not pay
(Straits Times, 1976b). In short, unlike the British colonial period, corruption is
no longer tolerated or condoned by both the PAP government and population in
contemporary Singapore.
In December 1976, the SPF and the CPIB established a joint task force to weed
out corrupt elements and practices in the SPF. This task force had two objectives:
to identify existing corruption hazards and devise measures to prevent them; and
to examine the policy aspects which might have an impact on the prevention of
corruption. The task force reiterated that no form of corruption would be tolerated and
corrupt officers would be severely punished or prosecuted in court. Those policemen
found to be living beyond their means would be watched by the task force because,
if these officers knew that they were under surveillance, their chances of being corrupt
would be reduced (Straits Times, 1976a). As the SPF maintains a high standard of
discipline, any policeman found guilty of misconduct has to face disciplinary action.
Improving the SPFs recruitment and selection procedures
Knapp (1972, pp. 31-32) had recommended these two approaches to reduce the
susceptibility of police officers to corruption: the improvement of screening and
selection methods and standards; and the reliance on training to change the attitudes
of police officers. As discussed in this and the following sub-section, the SPF has
relied on both approaches to minimize police corruption.
The British colonial government introduced meritocracy in Singapore in January
1951 when the Public Service Commission (PSC) was established to accelerate
localization in the SCS and to ensure that recruitment and promotion were based on
merit and not patronage. The PSC relies on interviews to select qualified candidates to
the SCS. To qualify for appointment to the SCS in general, and the SPF in particular,
candidates must satisfy these six criteria: citizenship, age, education, experience,
medical fitness, and character (meaning no criminal conviction, no record of
corruption, and not a security risk). Candidates for Divisions I and II appointments to
the SCS and SPF who meet these criteria are interviewed by the PSC members and the
relevant personnel boards.
Arising from the PSCs heavy workload, the Constitution of Singapore was amended in
March 1990 to help the PSC cope by increasing the number of its members from 11 to 15
and by establishing the Educational Service Commission (ESC) and the Police and Civil
Defense Services Commission (PCDSC). This move was designed to reduce the PSCs
workload as the ESC would be responsible for appointing and promoting 21,000 teachers,
and the PCDSC would take care of the appointment and promotion of 10,000 police,
narcotics, prisons, and civil defense officers, thus leaving the PSC to deal with the
remaining 34,000 civil servants (Quah, 2010a, p. 84). However, as shown in Table V, the
establishment of the ESC and PCDSC did not reduce the PSCs workload significantly
because the PSC interviewed 9,993 candidates (67.4 percent) for appointment during
1990-1994, in contrast to the 4,254 candidates (28.7 percent) interviewed by the ESC,
and the 573 candidates (3.9 percent) interviewed by the PCDSC.
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As the creation of the ESC and PCDSC did not alleviate significantly the PSCs
workload in appointing candidates to the SCS during 1990-1994, the ESC and PCDSC
were dissolved and amalgamated into a single PSC on April 1, 1998 (Public Service
Commission, 1999, p. 9).
To enhance the SCSs ability to compete with the private sector for talented
personnel, the public personnel management system was further decentralized in
January 1995 with the establishment of a system of 31 personnel boards. Unlike
the ESC and PCDSC, the 31 personnel boards have reduced considerably the
PSCs workload from 1995 to 2010 as the PSC considered 1,724 candidates for
appointment, 308 candidates for promotion, completed 832 disciplinary cases, and
granted 2,305 scholarships and training awards during this period (Quah, 2013a,
p. 409). In short, the PSC serves as the gatekeeper to the SCS by ensuring fairness
and impartiality in recruiting and selecting candidates for appointment to Divisions
I and II on the basis of merit.
The entry requirements for a senior police officer are the same as those for a junior
police officer, except for the educational requirement of a Bachelors degree in any
discipline. Male Singapore citizens are also required to have completed their full-time
national service and be physically fit. Candidates interested in applying for the SPF
scholarships must be Singapore citizens or permanent residents who intend to become
citizens, with strong leadership qualities, good GCE A levels or equivalent, good
record of extra-curricular activities in school, and an excellent record in the Officer
Cadet School. Letters of appointment are only issued to successful candidates if they
pass their medical examination and security screening (by the Internal Security
Department, the CPIB, and the Criminal Record Office) and after their educational
certificates and relevant documents are verified.
The former Commissioner of Police, Khoo Boon Hui (2005, p. 4) revealed that
applicants to the SPF are subjected to integrity-based psychological assessment,
stringent screening and interviews to ensure that the right persons are selected for the
Force. As there are many difficulties surrounding selection and the use of psychological
testing, the SPF has wisely relied on psychological testing as an additional method for
recruiting and selecting candidates because psychological tests can provide useful and
objective information about a candidate and can help identify those most and least suited
to the complex job of law enforcement (Ainsworth, 1995, pp. 130, 145).
Training of SPF officers
During the first six decades of the SPFs existence (1820-1880), there was no formal
training for police officers, except for drill and physical education. Training began in
Table V.
Workloads of the PSC,
ESC and PCDSC,
1990-1994
Year
PSC
ESC
PCDSC
Total
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
Total
2,604
2,602
2,235
1,289
1,263
9,993
(67.4%)
655
6
1,160
1,272
1,161
4,254
(28.7%)
30
102
139
147
155
573
(3.9%)
3,289
2,710
3,534
2,708
2,579
14,820
(100%)
Source: Quah (2010a, p. 85)
the SPF with the introduction of classes for police constables and inspectors during
1881-1904. From 1905-1922, training was conducted at the Police Training School
(PTS) in Malacca for the police forces in the Straits Settlements. To avoid the
inconvenience of sending the SPF recruits to Malacca for training, a Police Depot
was established in Singapore in 1923 to take care of training efforts in the SPF
until 1942. The Police Depot was renamed the PTS after the Second World War
(Quah, 1976, pp. 103-104).
The Japanese invasion of Singapore claimed many casualties and reduced the size
of the SPF from 4,173 personnel in 1942 to 3,204 personnel in 1948 (Quah, 1979, p. 16).
Consequently, to cope with the SPFs serious shortage of manpower during the
immediate postwar period, the PTS launched a crash training program in December
1945 by organizing these courses: refresher and promotion courses for detectives and
uniformed men; training courses for recruits and regular members of the Singapore
Harbor Board Police; and the six-month training courses for SPF recruits (Quah, 1976,
p. 104). In 1955, the six-month basic training course for recruits to the SPF was
increased to eight months and the recruits were instructed in 22 subjects[7]. In 1957,
the length of the basic training course for recruits was further extended by another
month to nine months and the curriculum of the training program was reduced to
include instruction in only 13 subjects[8].
When Singapore attained independence on August 9, 1965, the withdrawal of the
Malaysian Police Reserve Units resulted in another serious manpower shortage in
the SPF. Accordingly, the PTS was expanded to take in 850 constables for training
by December 1965 (Quah, 1976, p. 107). In 1968, the SPF was reviewed to improve its
performance in law enforcement in a modern and independent Singapore. To enhance
the SPFs training efforts, the British police adviser, I.S. Proud, had recommended the
transformation of the PTS into a Police Academy. The PAP government accepted
Prouds recommendation and the Police Academy was officially opened on August 2,
1969 (Quah, 1976, p. 108).
Today, recruits to the SPF are required to attend a residential six-month Police
Officers Basic Course (POBC) at the Home Team Academy (HTA). The POBC is
designed to equip new officers with the skills, knowledge and values required for
police work. These trainees undergo physical training and are taught criminal law,
community policing, on-scene investigation, police defensive tactics, and weaponry. In
contrast, senior police officers have to attend a nine-month basic residential training
program at the HTA to equip them with the knowledge and skills to perform their
duties. In addition to both physical and classroom training, the senior police officers are
also required to attend a Leadership Program. As all trainees are paid their full
monthly salaries during the training period, they are bonded for two years on the
completion of their basic training. All new junior and senior officers are confirmed after
one years probation (SPF, 2014a, b).
Values education
In 1999, the CPIB initiated Operation Restricted Zone to investigate an illegal oney-lender,
Chua Tiong Tiong, who was nicknamed Ah Long San[9]. The CPIBs investigations
resulted in the arrest and conviction of Chua for ten years and the charging of 17 police
officers in court for corruption. Ten of them were cultivated by Chua and one of them,
ASP Hassan Ahmad, who had known him since 1994, had borrowed S$20,000
from him to complete his legal education in England. Hassan joined the SPF after
graduating from the University of Buckingham and remained in close contact with
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Chua. Hassan was sentenced to 18 months imprisonment and fined S$8,000 after being
found guilty of corruption and for using his position as an ASP to provide information
on police investigations involving Chuas brother (CPIB, 2012, p. 75).
The Ah Long San case is important because it was the triggering factor
responsible for introducing values education in the SPF in 1999[10]. The values
education component included in the basic training courses for both junior and senior
police officers consists of 40 hours of instruction in the code of conduct, police
regulations, and government instruction manuals. Case studies of police officers found
guilty of corruption are also included in the training. Khoo Boon Hui, the former
Commissioner of Police, has highlighted values education as an important measure
adopted by the SPF to combat corruption thus:
Recruits are then put through integrity-based lessons during their basic training to build
resilience to corruption. Such training continues throughout their career to ensure that our
core values, including loyalty and integrity, are inculcated in each of our officers. Officers with
a strong sense of loyalty take pride in being officers of the [Singapore] Police Force. With the
interest of the Force at heart, officers with the right values not only have the will to resist
corruption, they are also able to keep fellow officers in check against misdemeanors. Regular
in-service training at front line units, which are more susceptible to corruption, is conducted.
Case studies of actual cases of police officers charged in court for criminal offenses and
corruption form part of our continuous integrity training program (Khoo, 2005, p. 4).
To reinforce the values training of police officers in Singapore and to enhance their
awareness of disciplinary-related issues including corruption, an annual Ethics
Seminar has been conducted by the SPF since 2002. This seminar is usually attended
by 300 police officers, including all the directors, commanders and ground supervisors.
During the inaugural Ethics Seminar on March 7, 2002, the SPFs Manpower
Department launched a values handbook entitled Guide to Ethical Decisions, which was
designed to provide a set of general rules of conduct for officers of the SPF[11]
(Singapore Police Force (SPF), 2002, pp. 2-3). This pocket-sized handbook is based on
the six guiding principles of ethos, the law, honor, conflict of interest, consequence, and
scrutiny. These guiding principles are defined in the form of questions (see Table VI)
and illustrated with six scenarios based on actual cases to encourage desired behavior.
Each guiding principle is first defined and illustrated with a scenario based on an
actual case. For example, Table VII shows how the two guiding principles of honor and
consequence are defined and explained and illustrated with the respective two
scenarios involving Cpl. Jims misconduct with an unlicensed masseuse, and Sgt.
Guiding principles Questions
Ethos
The Law
Honor
Conflict of interest
Consequence
Table VI.
Guiding principles
for Singapore police
officers in making
ethical decisions
Scrutiny
Is the decision or conduct in line with the SPFs mission, vision and core values?
Is the action or decision in accordance with the law and approved guidelines?
Does your decision or action bring dishonor to the SPF?
Does the outcome of the decision highlight a conflict of interest or lead
to private gain?
What will be the consequences of the action or decision to yourself,
your colleagues, the SPF and above all, your family?
Would you be able to justify your decision to police management and would
it withstand public scrutiny?
Source: SPF (2002, pp. 4-5)
Guiding principle 3 Honor

Definition and
Every officer can play a role in maintaining the integrity and public image of the
explanation
SPF. The 2001 World Competitiveness Report listed Singapore as the third safest
country in the world to live in. The Corruption Perceptions Index 2001 ranked
Singapore 4th out of 99 nations in terms of being corrupt-free. The SPF remains
one of the most honest police forces in the world and we can take pride in that.
Indeed this recognition is one of our most cherished assets. A high standard of
personal conduct is expected of SPF officers at all times. A police officer must
accept that discipline is necessary to preserve the integrity of the SPF and to
inspire honor within us
Scenario 3
Cpl. Jim got acquainted with a lady, Nikita, through the internet and the latter
offered him a massage for a fee. Cpl. Jim agreed and they met at a hotel. After
massaging for about 10 minutes, Cpl. Jim whipped out his police security pass,
identified himself as a police officer and told Nikita that she had committed an
offense for providing an unlicensed massage service. Nikita pleaded with Cpl.
Jim not to arrest her and offered the massage free. However, a dispute broke out
and Nikita called for the police. Departmental action was taken against Cpl. Jim
for conduct prejudicial to good order and discipline. He was subsequently
dismissed from the SPF. The misconduct of the officer adversely affected the
honor of SPF
Guiding principle 5 Consequence
Definition and
Police officers regardless of rank and status had been taken to task whenever
explanation
they breached any laws. These officers have been made to answer for their
actions. Many have paid a very high price for their misdeeds. Officers who have
been convicted for criminal charges and serious misconduct are liable to be
removed from office. They would stand to lose in financial and emotional terms.
They would also lose their self-esteem. Cases of officers involved in corrupt,
criminal acts and acts of serious misconduct will continue to be highlighted in
the media. This would not only bring shame upon the officer but also to his
family and the SPF. Officers must think of the consequences to themselves, their
family and SPF in whatever decisions they make
Scenario 5
Sgt. James was attached to the Height Permits Section of the Traffic Police,
granting approvals to motorists applying for height permits. Sgt. James obtained
loans ranging from S$300 to S$2,000 from three of the applicants of height
permits as he was in financial difficulties. As a consequence, Sgt. James was
charged in court for four counts of corruption, for obtaining loans from persons
with whom he had official dealings with. He was sentenced to a total of 12
months imprisonment and ordered to pay a fine of S$2,900 by the court
Source: SPF (2002, pp. 13-14, 19-20)
James offense of obtaining loans from three persons with whom he had official
dealings. As police officers might have to make decisions on their own without getting
advice from their superiors or peers, reference to these six guiding principles will help
them to ensure that their decisions are ethical (SPF, 2002, p. 3).
Administrative measures
The SPF has also adopted several administrative measures to minimize the opportunities
for corruption and to socialize its members to resist such opportunities. The first measure
requires all police officers in sensitive and vulnerable posts, such as investigators, field
intelligence officers, traffic enforcement officers, and anti-vice and gambling suppression
officers, to be rotated every three or four years to reduce the opportunities for corruption.
According to the CPIBs Assistant Director, Wong Pong Yen, the SPFs system of rotating
Curbing police
corruption in
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203
Table VII.
Guiding principles of
honor and consequence
AEDS
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204
the duties of its officers ensures that they do not remain in a particular department
for too long in order to prevent them from forming relationships with criminals
(CPIB, 2012, p. 76).
The Public Service Division (PSD) announced on September 30, 2013 that, from
January 2014, those civil servants in positions that are vulnerable to bribery and
exploitation would be rotated every five years, and those officers involved in
transactional work are required to take at least a block leave of five consecutive
days during a calendar year to enable those officers covering their work to scrutinize
their work processes and procedures. These new measures apply to those civil servants
responsible for finance and procurement and their colleagues in regulatory roles where
the risk of bribery is high (Chang, 2013, p. A6).
A second administrative measure requires all police officers to submit their credit status
reports from the Consumer Credit Bureau for the assessment of their debt situation. Those
officers who are indebted may be removed from their positions. Furthermore, like other
civil servants in Singapore, all police officers are required to make an annual declaration of
indebtedness for unsecured debts of more than three months of their monthly salary. Those
officers who fail to submit an honest declaration of their unsecured debts are investigated
and are liable to be disciplined. Some police officers were dismissed or retired in the
public interest in the past for not declaring their debts as required (Khoo, 2005, pp. 4-5).
The former Commissioner of Police, Khoo Boon Hui, explained that these administrative
measures are necessary to select the right people to join the [Police] Force, to educate our
officers on ethical conduct from the early days of their careers and to prevent indebted
officers from turning to bribes to overcome their financial woes (Khoo, 2005, p. 5).
In 2002, random testing of police officers for drug abuse was also introduced to deter
them from an unacceptable lifestyle, which is likely to lead to corruption and criminal
behavior (Khoo, 2005, p. 5). The final restriction on police officers is that they must
declare their visits to the two casinos in Singapore. To avoid a conflict of interest, those
police officers with direct dealings with the casinos on law enforcement matters are
banned from visiting the casinos to avoid a conflict of interests (Lau, 2013). This
measure was highlighted recently after the CPIBs Assistant Director, Edwin Yeo, was
charged in court on July 24, 2013, for misappropriating more than S$1.7 million from
the CPIB from 2008 to 2012 to fund his gambling habit at the Marina Bay Sands Casino
(Singh, 2013, p. A1). Arising from Yeos arrest, from October 1, 2013, all civil servants in
Singapore who visit the two local casinos more than four times a month, including
those with an annual pass (which allows them unlimited access) are required to declare
such visits to their superiors within seven days (Chang, 2013, p. A6).
Evaluating the effectiveness of measures for curbing police corruption
How effective are the measures initiated by the SPF for curbing corruption among
its members? To answer this question, it is necessary to examine Singapores
performance on these three international indicators: Transparency Internationals
Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) from 1995-2013; World Banks Control of
Corruption indicator from 1996-2012; and Political and Economic Risk Consultancy
(PERC) annual survey of corruption from 1995-2014; and the number of reported
police corruption cases in Singapore from 1965-2012.
International indicators
Table VIII shows first, that Singapore has been consistently ranked as the least corrupt
country in Asia from 1995 to 2014. In 2010, Singapore was jointly ranked first with
Year
CPI rank and score
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
3rd (9.26)
7th (8.80)
9th (8.66)
7th (9.1)
7th (9.1)
6th (9.1)
4th (9.2)
5th (9.3)
5th (9.4)
5th (9.3)
5th (9.4)
5th (9.3)
4th (9.3)
4th (9.2)
3rd (9.2)
1st (9.3)
5th (9.2)
5th (87)
5th (86)
na
PERC rank and score

1st
1st
1st
1st
1st
1st
1st
1st
1st
1st
1st
1st
2nd
2nd
1st
1st
1st
1st
1st
1st
(1.20)
(1.09)
(1.05)
(1.43)
(1.55)
(0.71)
(0.83)
(0.90)
(0.38)
(0.50)
(0.65)
(1.30)
(1.20)c
(1.13)c
(0.92)
(0.99)
(0.37)
(0.67)
(0.74)
(1.60)
Control of corruption
percentile rank
na
96.6
na
96.1
na
96.6
na
98.5
98.0
98.5
98.0
97.6
98.1
98.1
98.1
98.6
96.7
97.1
na
na
Notes: aThe CPI score from 1995 to 2011 ranges from 0 (highly corrupt) to 10 (very clean). The CPI
score for 2012-2013 ranges from 0 (highly corrupt) to 100 (very clean); bthe PERC score ranges from
0 (least corrupt) to 10 (most corrupt); cAustralia was first in 2007-2008 but Singapore was still the least
corrupt Asian country
Sources: Compiled from www.transparency.org; PERC (2001, 2008, p. 7; 2012, p. 4; 2013, p. 6; 2014,
p. 1); and http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#reports
Denmark and New Zealand with a score of 9.3 among the 178 countries included in the
CPI for that year. Singapore retained its ranking as the fifth least corrupt country in the
CPI from 2011 to 2013. Second, PERCs annual surveys of corruption from 1995 to 2014
also confirm Singapores status as the least corrupt Asian country. Third, it can be seen
from Table VIII that for the World Banks Control of Corruption indicator from 1996 to
2012, Singapore has the highest percentile rank among all the Asian countries included
in the surveys.
Transparency Internationals Global Corruption Barometer assesses, among other
things, the perceived extent of corruption in various national institutions and sectors,
including the police. It can be seen from Table IX that the perceived extent of police
corruption in Singapore is low, with its scores ranging from 1.7 in 2004 to 2.8 in 2010.
Number of reported police corruption cases
Singapores success in combating police corruption is also reflected in the decrease in
the number of reported police corruption cases after independence. Table X indicates
that there were 67 reported cases of police corruption in Singapore during 1965-1977,
with the protection of illegal activities being the most important form, followed by the
fix, bribery, direct criminal activities, opportunistic theft, and corruption of authority.
Similarly, the number of reported cases of police corruption in Singapore, as shown
in Table XI, has also declined to 75 from 1996 to 2011, with 1996 and 2009 having ten
Curbing police
corruption in
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205
Table VIII.
Singapores performance
on three international
indicators, 1995-2014
AEDS
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cases each for both years, and 1999, with 13 cases because of the Ah Long San
scandal. This means that there was an average of five reported police corruption cases
per year during 1996-2011. In terms of the SPFs size, these 75 cases constituted only
0.74 percent of its personnel during this period.
A recent study of corruption cases investigated by the CPIB from 2008 to 2012,
which was commissioned by the Prime Ministers Office, found that an average of 80
percent of the cases investigated by the CPIB came from the private sector, with the
remaining 20 percent originating from the public sector. Indeed, Table XII shows that
the number of public sector corruption cases investigated by the CPIB ranges from 31
in 2011 to 49 in 2009, with an average of 39 cases during 2008-2012. However, the
number of private sector corruption cases has decreased from 194 in 2008 to 144 in
2012. Among the 197 public sector corruption cases investigated by the CPIB from
2008 to 2012, 51 percent involved front-line officers with enforcement powers from the
Home Team[12], Housing and Development Board, National Environment Agency,
Ministry of Manpower, and Urban Redevelopment Authority. This implies that the
number of police corruption cases investigated by the CPIB during 2008-2012 is also
small (Ministry of Home Affairs, 2013).
Six lessons for other Asian countries
Singapores experience shows that it is possible to minimize police corruption if the
incumbent government has the political will to implement the required reforms. As
police corruption is a serious problem in many Asian countries, what lessons can these
countries learn from Singapores success story in curbing police corruption?
Table IX.
Perceived extent of police
on the Global Corruption
Barometer, 2004-2010
Year
Scorea
2004
2005
2006
2007
2009
2010
1.7
2.0
1.9
2.0
nab
2.8
Notes: aScore ranges from 1 (not at all corrupt) to 5 (extremely corrupt); bThe perceived extent of
police corruption was excluded in 2009
Sources: Transparency International (2004, p.18; 2005, p. 18; 2006, p. 21; 2007, p. 22; 2010)
Form of police corruption
Table X.
by form, 1965-1977
Protection of illegal activities

The fix
Bribery
Direct criminal activities
Opportunistic theft
Corruption of authority
Total
Source: Quah (1979, p. 36)
Number
33
14
8
5
4
3
67
49.3
20.9
11.9
7.5
6.0
4.5
100.0
Year
Reported cases
No. of cases as a percentage

of the SPFs personnel
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
Total
10
3
8
13
4
5
na
5
3
1
1
7
1
10a
1b
3c
75
0.12
0.04
0.10
0.16
0.05
0.06
na
0.03
0.02
0.006
0.007
0.051
0.006
0.065
0.006
0.019
0.74
207
Notes: aThis includes a national service officer; bThis is a volunteer police officer; cThis includes
a national service officer
Source: Data provided by courtesy of the SPFs Manpower Department
Sector
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
Total
Average
Public sector cases
45
(18.8%)
194
(81.2%)
239
(100%)
49
(20.9%)
185
(79.1%)
234
(100%)
37
(18.0%)
169
(82.0%)
206
(100%)
31
(22.5%)
107
(77.5%)
138
(100%)
35
(19.6%)
144
(80.4%)
179
(100%)
197
(19.8%)
799
(80.2%)
996
(100%)
39
(20%)
160
(80%)
199
(100%)
Private sector cases

Total
Curbing police
corruption in
Singapore
Source: Ministry of Home Affairs (2013)
Leadership and political will

In his analysis of corruptive influences in local government police management
in the USA, Patrick V. Murphy (1982, p. 61) identified the attitude of the police
chief as an important cause of police corruption because even a personally honest
police chief would shield from public exposure their corrupt colleagues for fear that he
would lose his job if the public perceived that his whole department was corrupt.
Many police chiefs were either friends of the corrupt officers or tolerated corrupt
behavior among their colleagues. Indeed, police chiefs had not been concerned with
how they could combat corruption within their departments because they were
unable or unwilling to deal with corruption among their colleagues seriously
(Murphy, 1982, p. 62).
Similarly, Gerald E. Caiden (1977, p. 169) highlighted the importance of bold
leadership in the effective control of police corruption in the USA. After the exposure
of corruption within a police department, the lead had to come from the top because
Table XI.
corruption in Singapore,
1996-2011
Table XII.
Corruption cases
investigated by the CPIB
by sector, 2008-2012
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the police chiefs task was to impress on all that corruption would not be tolerated by
implementing these measures: strict accountability, internal investigation, regularized
discipline, spot checks, staff shuffles, revamped reward structures, and elimination of
known soldiering, payoffs, and fraternalization with underground figures.
Leadership and commitment can make a considerable difference in combating
police corruption because there is considerable evidence from the organizational
literature that the top person, with his or her team, is vital to the success of institutional
change (Punch, 2009, pp. 239-240). Following the advice of James S. Bowman (1983,
p. 95), public sector managers (including police chiefs) should not only be committed
to curbing corruption in their organizations, but also communicate their commitment
to their subordinates by explaining why they should not engage in unethical practices
and why training programs, codes of ethics, and professional ethics would be
developed and supported. To ensure fundamental change in their organizations, those
managers who do not support these policies should be asked to resign. On the basis of
their analysis of past police scandals in the USA and other countries, David Bayley and
Roberto Perito (2011, p. 10) have concluded that for police corruption reforms to
succeed, there must be leadership from the top because reform starts at the top as
it does not percolate up from the bottom. Indeed, according to them: If the top
leadership in the police does not visibly and persistently lead reform, then change
will not occur.
The SPFs success in curbing corruption also reflects Singapores effectiveness in
minimizing corruption. Corruption was rampant during the colonial period because of
the British colonial governments lack of political will and its reliance on the ineffective
ACB and POCO. Police corruption was widespread because of the low salaries of
policemen, their unfavorable working conditions, and the ample opportunities for
corruption. Hence, it was not surprising that the poorly-staffed and funded ACB, which
was part of the CID in the SPF, failed in its efforts to curb corruption in the SPF and
other government departments in Singapore.
The PAP government learnt from the mistakes of the British colonial government in
curbing corruption and demonstrated its political will by enacting the POCA in June
1960 to enhance the CPIBs ability in corruption control. As the SPF was perhaps the
most corrupt institution in Singapore then, the government not only focussed its
efforts on combating police corruption but also initiated measures to improve the
salaries and working conditions in the SPF.
Why is political will or the commitment of the political leaders so important in
ensuring the success of an anti-corruption strategy? According to Ian Senior (2006,
pp. 184, 187), the principal people who can change a culture of corruption if they wish
to do so are politicians because they make the laws and allocate the funds that enable
the laws to be enforced. Consequently, corrupt political leaders will not be concerned
with minimizing corruption but in maintaining their power instead.
Singapore succeeded in curbing corruption because of the political will of its first
prime minister, Lee Kuan Yew, and his colleagues to build a clean and effective
government. As the police was corrupt during the colonial period, the British rectified
their mistake by transferring the function of corruption control from the ACB
to the CPIB in October 1952. As the CPIB was inadequately staffed and funded,
the PAP government strengthened the CPIB from 1960 onwards with more personnel,
budget and legal powers to enhance its effectiveness. At the same time, measures
were initiated to address these major causes of corruption in the SPF: low salaries,
unfavorable working conditions and ample opportunities for corruption.
In sum, the first lesson for combating police corruption effectively in other Asian
countries is the commitment of their political leaders and police chiefs or
commissioners to corruption control. As the police are a reflection of society,
measures to minimize police corruption can only succeed if there is also a nation-wide
anti-corruption effort embracing the civil service and other public agencies too, and not
only the police. The SPF was corrupt during the British colonial period because
corruption was a way of life then. However, the PAP governments commitment to
fighting corruption after it assumed power in June 1959 has transformed the SPF into a
clean and effective organization because of the improvement in its salaries and
working conditions as well as its enhanced recruitment and selection procedures, and
its improved training program and values education.
Reliance on comprehensive anti-corruption measures
The logic of corruption control requires effective anti-corruption strategies to reduce the
incentives and opportunities for corrupt behavior and the costs of noncorrupt behavior,
and increase incentives and opportunities for noncorrupt behavior and the costs of
corrupt behavior (Gardiner and Lyman, 1989, p. 827). This means that corruption can
only be curbed if comprehensive measures are initiated to rectify the various causes
which contribute to the incentives and opportunities for corrupt behavior.
Gerald E. Caiden (1977, p. 168) has acknowledged that in the USA, effective police
control required a combination of reducing opportunity, cutting down the potential
gains, strengthening norms of honesty, and tracking the miscreants. Similarly, in
Singapore, the SPF has succeeded in minimizing police corruption through the
implementation of its comprehensive anti-corruption measures, which include the
improvement of the salaries and working conditions of its members, working closely
with the CPIB in a joint task force, improving its recruitment and selection procedures,
enhancing its training program with the introduction of values education in 2002 to
promote ethical decision making by its officers, and initiating several administrative
measures to reduce their opportunities for corruption.
In other words, the second lesson which other Asian countries can learn from the
SPFs success in curbing police corruption is the importance of adopting a
comprehensive strategy instead of relying on incremental or piecemeal measures.
Meritocracy and quality control of personnel
Recruitment is the process of attracting and selecting qualified candidates with the
necessary skills and talent to apply for advertised positions in the civil service,
including the police. Peter G. Richards (1963, p. 11) has identified four methods for
recruiting persons to positions of public responsibility, including civil servants:
chance, heredity, competition, and patronage. As chance and heredity are seldom
relied on today, the remaining options are patronage or merit. Patronage refers to the
power vested in political leaders and elected officials to make partisan appointments
and to confer licenses, contracts, franchises, honors, and other benefits on political
supporters, friends, and relatives (Chandler and Plano, 1988, p. 291). The power
to select stems from law, tradition, political, or social influence. However, unlike
selection by competitive interview, a post filled by patronage is not subject to
public advertisement, which is the common pre-condition of competitive interview
(Richards, 1963, p. 16).
Patronage originated in England in the fiftteenth century as there was no general
pattern of organization and the [civil] service was based on patronage, absence of
Curbing police
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accepted appointment criteria, and of a standard payment pattern (Barber, 1972, p. 60).
During the eighteenth century, the system of patronage allowed politicians to find secure
jobs (sometimes sinecures posts with no real duties) for friends and acquaintances
(Pyper, 1991, p. 8). Government departments were largely independent fiefdoms with
different recruitment methods, ample opportunities for patronage and corruption, and
reliance on favoritism rather than competence for determining promotion (Pyper, 1995,
p. 6). In short, patronage was essential to the maintenance of the Constitution to prevent
conflict between the Crown and Parliament (Richards, 1963, p. 20).
The consequences of the reliance on patronage in eighteenth century England were
described by Hilton M. Power (1967, pp. 119-120) in these words:
English society in the eighteenth century was exemplified by corruption, privilege and
inefficiency. In so far as administration existed it was exercised through a system of
patronage with offices granted or sold by the aristocracy, much in the same fashion as they
conducted their large landed estates. Though many government or administrative services
were efficient, there was an overwhelming tendency to provide places for the friends, relatives
or retainers of the privileged landed aristocracy and frequently the appointee was far from
qualified either mentally or physically to occupy what was often a sinecure.
Charles Trevelyan was appointed by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Gladstone, to

work with Stafford Northcote to review the recruitment method employed by the
British Civil Service (BCS) in the nineteenth century (Hennessy, 1990, pp. 36-37).
The Northcote-Trevelyan Report, which was completed in February 1854, criticized the
selection of civil servants by patronage and recommended that entrance to the BCS
should be on the basis of merit, through the institution of competitive public
examinations. The implementation of the Northcote-Trevelyan reforms resulted in the
establishment of the Civil Service Commission (CSC) on May 21, 1855 and the
introduction of open examinations in the BCS in 1870. The Northcote-Trevelyan
reforms transformed the BCS by introducing meritocracy as the system of patronage
was replaced by the reliance on merit in the recruitment of qualified candidates as
civil servants. Peter Hennessy (1990, p. 41) has described the Northcote-Trevelyan
Report as a charter for meritocracy because the recruitment of talent and promotion
on the basis of merit removed from Whitehall patronage, inefficiency and narrow
departmentalism in one go.
The British introduced meritocracy to its colonies in Africa and Asia with the
introduction of the PSCs. The PSC is the adapted version of the CSC in the former
British colonies and was formed to insulate the civil service from politics and to
accelerate its localization (Sinker, 1953, p. 206). With the advent of self-government and
the increasing control of the civil service in the hands of the local population, the PSC
was established in the British colonies to insulate appointments, promotions, and
discipline in the civil service from politics. As mentioned above, the PSC was formed in
January 1951 in Singapore to accelerate the pace of localization in the SCS and to
ensure that recruitment and promotion was based on merit and not patronage. As the
localization of the SCS was completed with the attainment of self-government in
Singapore in June 1959, the primary aim of keeping politics out of the SCS remains
relevant today as the purpose of the PSCs program as stated in the national budget is
to meet the staffing requirements of the government in accordance with the merit
principle (Republic of Singapore, 1980, p. 78).
The introduction of meritocracy in Britain during the nineteenth century replaced
patronage in the BCS and was an important reason for its subsequent success in
minimizing corruption. Similarly, the establishment of the PSC in January 1951 and the
creation of the CPIB in October 1952 were two important reforms introduced by the
British colonial government in Singapore which enabled the PAP government to
maintain meritocracy by decentralizing the PSC to enhance its effectiveness and to
empower the CPIB through the POCA to curb corruption effectively (Quah, 2010b).
The SPF has relied on meritocracy rather than patronage in recruiting eligible
candidates. Furthermore, the substantive improvement in the salaries and working
conditions of police officers has enabled the SPF to attract better candidates today,
unlike the situation during the colonial period, when it had no choice but to accept
candidates of lower caliber. The SPF has four attractive scholarship schemes which
enable it to attract excellent candidates by offering them scholarships to pursue their
undergraduate studies at universities abroad or in Singapore[13]. Successful
candidates are required to serve the SPF on a six-year bond after graduation. With
more qualified candidates joining it, the SPF ensures the quality control of its personnel
by providing training and values education to its officers to enable them to perform
their duties effectively and to prevent them from engaging in corrupt practices.
In short, the third lesson is that the SPF has succeeded in curbing corruption among its
members by relying on meritocracy to recruit more qualified candidates to join its ranks,
and on training and values education to enhance their job performance and integrity.
Improve salaries and working conditions to prevent police corruption
In June 2002, Thailands police chief, General Sant Sarutanond, admitted that Thai
policemen are undereducated and underpaid and that is the reason why they are
corrupt. Thai commissioned police officers were paid a starting monthly salary of 6,000
baht (US$260) when they should be paid a monthly salary of 20,000 baht (US$850) to
cover their living expenses in large cities (Straits Times, 2002). More recently, Nanan
Sukarna, the National Police Deputy Chief in Indonesia has identified the inadequate
salaries of his police officers as a major cause of police corruption and posed this
question: How should we ask them to not stay clear of corruption if their salary is not
enough to pay for their childrens school? (quoted in Oktavinanda, 2012).
Transparency Internationals Global Corruption Barometer 2010-11 has identified
the police in Pakistan as the most corrupt among the 21 Asian countries surveyed.
This finding is not surprising in view of the low salaries and unfavorable working
conditions of its police officers. According to Zubair Nawaz Chattha and Sanja Kutnjak
Ivkovic (2004, pp. 184-185):
[y] the extent of police misconduct in Pakistan is also related to the lack of resources to
provide a suitable salary package and good working conditions for police officers. [y] Low
salaries and lack of health care and fulfillment of their basic needs keep police officers
depressed and disturbed. [y] The officers level of stress, related to their long hours and low
salary, is further exacerbated by the strain of miserable living conditions: Police officers are
housed either in the old government quarters or in small houses in the slums.
Hence, it is not surprising that public officials in many countries have identified the
comparative low wages of police officers as an important cause of police corruption
(Andvig and Fjeldstad, 2008, p. 27).
On the other hand, police corruption is not a serious problem in Finland because of
the low level of corruption in the country and the effectiveness of its anti-corruption
measures (Puonti et al., 2004, pp. 106-110). However, Puonti et al. (2004, pp. 111-112)
have warned that the relatively low monthly salaries of between US$1,300 and
US$1,700 for new police officers in Finland could weaken their resistance to corruption
by lowering their moral standards and make accepting bribes more attractive.
Curbing police
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211
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212
The SPFs experience in combating police corruption confirms the importance of

providing its officers with adequate salaries and favorable working conditions to
prevent them from being corrupt. As low salaries and unfavorable working conditions
were responsible to a large extent for the widespread police corruption in Singapore
during the colonial period, the SPF succeeded in curbing police corruption by
improving its officers salaries and working conditions.
Thus, the fourth lesson to be learnt by other Asian countries is that it is unrealistic
to expect police officers to be honest if they are poorly paid with unfavorable
working conditions. In other words, police officers should be paid adequate salaries
and provided with favorable working conditions to prevent them from being corrupt.
While such salary reforms are expensive, it can be argued that failure to implement
these reforms would be more costly for these countries in the long run because of their
inability to curb police corruption.
Punish the corrupt cops and reward the honest cops
Corruption thrives in those Asian countries where the public perceives it as a low risk,
high reward activity because corrupt offenders are unlikely to be caught and
punished. Similarly, widespread police corruption can be attributed to the low
probability of detection and punishment of corrupt police officers. If corrupt police
officers avoid detection and are not punished, their colleagues would be tempted to
commit such offenses too, thereby increasing the extent of police corruption.
In his comparative study of anti-corruption measures in Hong Kong, India, and
Indonesia, Leslie Palmier (1985, p. 272) has concluded that bureaucratic corruption
results from the balance between opportunities, salaries and policing: At one extreme,
with few opportunities, good salaries, and effective policing, corruption will be
minimal; at the other, with many opportunities, poor salaries, and weak policing, it
will be considerable. Policing or the detection and punishment of corrupt offenders
constitute an important determinant of corruption. As policing is very poor in
Indonesia, and insufficient in India, it is not surprising that corruption is a more
serious problem in these two countries than in Hong Kong, where there is strong
policing against corruption (Palmier, 1985, p. 280).
Another comparative analysis of reported corruption cases by Ahmad and
Brookins (2004, p. 24) found that only 4 percent of the 91 cases in Sri Lanka resulted in
official punitive action, followed by 10 percent of the 77 cases in Bangladesh, and 15
percent of the 119 cases in India. Consequently, they concluded that as corrupt
offenders are not punished, this general leniency may well contribute to the continued
levels of corruption and could serve to lead to its spread into areas heretofore
unmarked by corruption (Ahmad and Brookins, 2004, p. 29). In the case of India, the
combined effect of poor evidence and judicial delay makes corruption a low-risk
activity because 12 percent of the defendants in Orissa die before their case comes to
trial; the evidence base collapses and memories blur, making prosecution an
impossible task (Menon, 2006, p. 345).
To minimize corruption and deter those police officers who are not involved in
corrupt practices from doing so, honest and incorruptible officers must be recognized
and rewarded instead of being punished. Indeed, the lack of punishment of corrupt
police officers sends the wrong signal to their honest colleagues and the public by
making a mockery of the anti-corruption laws and encouraging them to be corrupt
because of the low probability of being detected and punished. The case of Frank
Serpico, a New York Police Department (NYPD) detective, is instructive because he
was punished for refusing to accept bribes and had to flee to Switzerland to avoid
being killed by his corrupt colleagues, who put a contract on his life. Serpico attributed
his lack of support from other honest police officers in the NYPD to the absence of any
real department incentives for cops to be honest, from the police academy up through
the ranks to the police commissioner (Maas, 1973, p. 400).
In the SPF, corrupt police officers are charged in court if there is sufficient evidence
for court prosecution. Those officers found guilty can be fined up to S$100,000 or
sentenced to imprisonment for up to five years, or both. However, if there is insufficient
evidence for court prosecution, corrupt officers who are convicted of departmental
charges are punished, depending on the severity of their offenses, with one of more
of these penalties: dismissal from the SPF; reduction in rank; stoppage or deferment of
salary increment; fine or reprimand; or retirement from the SPF in the public interest
(Ali, 2000, pp. 6-7).
In addition to punishing corrupt police officers, the SPF has reinforced the
importance of the values education introduced in 2002 by recognizing and publicizing
those honest police officers who have refused to accept bribes in performing their
duties. Traffic police officers are vulnerable because of the many opportunities for
corruption provided by those motorists who offer bribes to avoid being booked for
traffic offenses. For example, Sgt Mark Chow stopped a truck driver on March 14, 2004
for using his mobile phone while driving. Chow refused the bribe of S$500 from the
driver and arrested him for bribery, for driving while operating a mobile phone, and for
driving with an expired license. On April 12, 2004, Staff Sgt Muhammad Adil bin Lawi
stopped a car for speeding and the driver, who had been drinking, offered him a bribe
of S$150. Adil rejected the bribe and arrested the driver for bribery (Koo, 2004, p. 8).
On May 12, 2004, two female citizens from China were arrested by two police
officers from the Rochor Neighborhood Police Center: one for overstaying in Singapore
with an expired travel visa; and the other for being an illegal immigrant without any
travel documents. Both women offered bribes to the officers and one of them persisted
in offering a bribe of S$246 even after three warnings by the officers. The officers
arrested both women and referred them to the CPIB for further investigation (Singh,
2004, p. 9). Perhaps, the most impressive example of honesty and incorruptibility
among police officers in Singapore was highlighted by the former Commissioner of
Police, Khoo Boon Hui, when he revealed that Station Inspector Somasundaram had
rejected a bribe of S$100,000 (US$60,000) offered to him by a person under investigation
for harboring illegal immigrants (Khoo, 2005, p. 1).
The above examples of police officers rejecting bribes and the small number of
reported police corruption cases in Singapore from 1996 to 2011 (Table XI) show
clearly that the SPFs values education has been effective in persuading its officers to
abhor corruption and resist the many opportunities for corruption that are inherent in
police work. In short, the fifth lesson for other Asian countries is that the SPF has
controlled corruption effectively among its officers by punishing those who are corrupt
and rewarding and recognizing honest police officers too.
Dont rely on police to curb corruption
As mentioned above, the British colonial government relied on the ACB to curb
corruption even though police corruption was rampant in Singapore when the POCO
was enacted in December 1937. The folly of this decision was exposed by the
Opium Hijacking scandal of October 1951, which involved the robbery of 1,400 pounds
of opium worth S$400,000 by three police detectives. This triggering event led to the
Curbing police
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214
Table XIII.
Indias performance on
five indicators, 2011-2013
establishment one year later of the CPIB, which is responsible to a large extent for
Singapores success in curbing corruption.
The same pattern of corruption control was also observed in Hong Kong when the
British colonial government made the ACB responsible for curbing corruption in 1948
even though there was widespread police corruption. The ACB was upgraded into the
Anti-Corruption Office (ACO) in May 1971. However, the ACOs inability to curb
police corruption was revealed when a corruption suspect, Chief Superintendent of
Police, Peter Godber, escaped to Britain on June 8, 1973 to avoid arrest. The resulting
public outcry forced Governor Murray MacLehose to form the ICAC in February 1974
(Quah, 2011, pp. 237-239, 251-253).
In other words, Singapore and Hong Kong have succeeded in curbing corruption
by rejecting the British colonial governments method of relying on the police for
corruption control and relying instead on such independent anti-corruption agencies
(ACAs) as the CPIB and ICAC, respectively. Singapore has taken 15 years (1937-1952)
while Hong Kong has taken 26 years (1948-1974) to learn this important lesson
(Quah, 2004, pp. 1-2).
It seems obvious that the police should not be given the responsibility for
corruption control if police corruption is rampant in a country. However, the British
colonial government did not realize this and also ignored the possibility of a conflict of
interest in making the ACB responsible for corruption control in Singapore and
Hong Kong. While Singapore and Hong Kong have succeeded in combating corruption
by replacing the ACB with the CPIB, and the ACO with the ICAC, India has still not
learnt this important lesson with its continued reliance on the Central Bureau of
Investigation (CBI), which was formed in April 1963 as part of the police and as the
lead ACA in the country.
The CBI is a police agency as its Director is the Inspector General of Police.
It is responsible for performing these functions: first, combating corruption in public
life, and curbing economic and violent crimes through meticulous investigation
and prosecution; second, fighting cyber and high technology crime; and third, playing
a leading role in curbing national and transnational organized crime (Central Bureau
of Investigation, 2010, p. iv). However, the CBI has been ineffective in curbing
corruption, judging from Indias poor performance on five international indicators,
as shown in Table XIII.
The CBIs ineffectiveness can be attributed to its two weaknesses. First, as mentioned
above, Indias continued reliance on the ineffective CBI as the lead ACA, confirms that its
government is unaware of the ineffectiveness of the British colonial governments method
of relying on the police to curb corruption. It is indeed surprising that as police corruption
in rampant in India, its government has continued to rely on the CBI for the past
five decades in spite of its ineffectiveness. The CBIs second weakness is that, as a police
Indicator
Rank
Score
Corruption Perceptions Index 2012

PERC survey on corruption 2013
Control of corruption 2011
Ease of doing business rank 2013
Public trust of politicians 2012
94th
17th
35.1
132nd
106
36/100
8.95/10.0
0.56
na
2.2/7.0
Source: Quah (2013b, p. 236)
No. of countries
176
17
215
185
144
agency, it is concerned not only with fighting corruption but also with economic crime,
organized crime and terrorism. With the current international emphasis on combating
terrorism and especially after the November 26, 2008 terrorist attack in Mumbai, it will
be difficult for the CBI to focus exclusively on its anti-corruption activities because of the
competing demands on its limited resources (Quah, 2011, pp. 104-105).
In short, the final lesson for Asian countries like India, where police corruption in
widespread, is to rely on external ACAs such as the CPIB in Singapore or the ICAC in
Hong Kong to curb corruption, instead of the CBI or police, because the golden rule is
that the police cannot and should not be responsible for investigating their own
deviance and crimes (Punch, 2009, p. 245).
Conclusion
Singapores effectiveness in curbing corruption in general and police corruption in
particular shows that it is possible for other Asian countries to combat police
corruption effectively if these three pre-conditions exist: first, both the political and
police leadership in the countries must be committed to corruption control; second,
adoption of a comprehensive anti-corruption strategy in the police force by recruiting
qualified candidates on the basis of merit instead of patronage, providing those
recruited with training in skills required for police work and values education,
providing adequate salaries and favorable working conditions for police officers,
punishing corrupt offenders and recognizing those honest police officers who rejected
bribes for performing their duties, and implementing several administrative measures
to reduce the opportunities for corruption; and third, reliance on an independent ACA
like the CPIB or ICAC to curb police corruption instead of the police force to avoid
a conflict of interest.
As police corruption is a serious problem with multiple causes in many Asian
countries today, their policy makers should realize that it cannot be resolved easily or
overnight. Accordingly, Maurice Punch (2009, p. 238) has wisely advocated a cautious
approach because there is no magic bullet, no quick fix, and no single measure that
works. Indeed, the evidence recommends the reliance instead on a multi-pronged
approach, to sustain the effort and anticipate recidivism.
Finally, as curbing police corruption also requires making changes on many fronts,
David Bayley and Robert Perito (2011, p. 10) have astutely suggested that efforts to
reduce police corruption should be based on analyses of differences in the who, what, and
when of local corruption because different contexts will require different solutions.
Accordingly, policy makers in those Asian countries plagued with police corruption
should take into account the significant contextual differences between Singapore and
their own countries in their assessment of the suitability and feasibility of implementing
relevant Singapore-style reforms to minimize police corruption in their countries.
Notes
1. For studies on police corruption in the USA, see: Beigel and Beigel (1977), Bracey (1976),
Brannon (1962), Deutsch (1955), Goldstein (1975), McAlary (1987), Meyer (1973), Price (1975),
Sherman (1974, 1978, 1985), and Smith (1965).
2. See for example: Aaron (1966), Aldous (1997), Bayley (1969), Gregg (2004), Holmes (2013),
Jiao (2010), Judge (1974), Lamboo et al. (2008), Lee (1981), Lo (2008), Miller (2003), Punch
(2009), and Klockars et al. (2004), which has chapters on police integrity in Austria, Quebec,
Croatia, Britain, Finland, Hungary, Japan, Netherlands, Pakistan, Poland, Slovenia, South
Africa, Sweden and the USA.
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216
3. For the distinction between petty and grand corruption, see Quah (2011, pp. 10-11).
4. For a more detailed analysis see Barker and Roebuck (1973).
5. The other 15 duties of the CIDs Assistant Commissioner were: secret societies; gambling
promoters; fraud (commercial crime); anti-vice (traffickers); pawnshops; second-hand dealers;
narcotics (traffickers); criminal records; banishment; naturalization; missing persons;
fingerprints; photography; Police Gazette; and house-to-house and street collections (Colony
of Singapore, 1952b, p. 31).
6. Larry N. Gerton (1997, p. 23) has defined a triggering mechanism as a critical event (or set of
events) that converts a routine problem into a widely shared, negative public response.
7. These subjects were: Penal Code, Criminal Procedure Code, Evidence Ordinance, Police
General Orders, general ordinances, Highway Code, traffic control, weapon training,
unarmed combat, physical training, swimming, recreational training, first aid, map reading,
arithmetic, geography, history, English, civics, general knowledge, drill, and riot drill (See
Morris, 1956, p. 10).
8. These subjects included: law, police procedure, drill, weapon training, unarmed combat,
physical training, recreational training, civics, general knowledge, Malay, English,
arithmetic, and history (See Blades. 1958, p. 18).
9. For more details of the Ah Long San case, see CPIB (2012, pp. 74-76).
10. This was revealed to me in an interview with a senior police officer from the SPFs
Manpower Department on September 30, 2005.
11. I was invited to make a presentation on Can Ethics Prevent Police Corruption? at this
inaugural Ethics Seminar.
12. The Home Team refers to these six agencies under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Home
Affairs, namely: the Central Narcotics Bureau, Immigration and Checkpoints Authority, Internal
Security Department, Singapore Civil Defense Force, SPF, and Singapore Prison Service.
13. The four types of scholarships are: SPF Overseas Scholarship, Singapore Merit Scholarship,
Singapore Government Scholarship Police, and Local Merit Scholarship Police. For details of
these scholarships, see SPF (2014b).
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pp. 59-75.
About the author
Dr Jon S.T. Quah, Ph.D. was a Professor of Political Science at the National University of
Singapore until his retirement in June 2007. He is now an Anti-Corruption Consultant based
in Singapore. His most recent books are Minimizing Corruption in China: Is this an Impossible
Dream? (Baltimore, MD: Carey School of Law, University of Maryland, 2013) and Curbing
Corruption in Asian Countries: An Impossible Dream? (Bingley: Emerald Group Publishing,
2013). Dr Jon S.T. Quah can be contacted at: jonstquah@gmail.com
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1. Jon S.T. Quah. 2015. Lee Kuan Yews enduring legacy of good governance in Singapore, 1959-2015. Asian
Education and Development Studies 4:4, 374-393. [Abstract] [Full Text] [PDF]

Curbing Police Corruption

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Curbing Police Corruption

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Asian Education and Development Studies

Curbing police corruption in Singapore: lessons for other Asian countries

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POLICING IN ASIA REFORMS AND

Curbing police corruption

Jon S.T. Quah

Anti-Corruption Consultant, Singapore

Asian Education and Development

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Corruption of authority, which occurs when a policeman receives officially

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Opportunistic theft refers to those acts of confiscating money, merchandise

Shakedowns or bribes arise when policemen witness or are aware of criminal

The fix refers to the quashing of prosecution proceedings following the

Involvement of police officers in such direct criminal activities as burglary

Police corruption in colonial Singapore

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S$100 (no rations)

Source: Straits Times (1887) quoted in Quah (1979, p. 28)

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Tackling police corruption in contemporary Singapore

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Improving salaries and working conditions

Note: aUS$ 1 S$1.24127 on July 18, 2014 (www.xe.com/currencyconverter)

Monthly salary scalea

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Joint CPIB-SPF task force

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Source: Quah (2010a, p. 85)

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Source: SPF (2002, pp. 4-5)

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Guiding principle 3 Honor

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CPI rank and score

PERC rank and score

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Form of police corruption

Protection of illegal activities

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No. of cases as a percentage

Public sector cases

Private sector cases

Source: Ministry of Home Affairs (2013)

Leadership and political will

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Charles Trevelyan was appointed by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Gladstone, to

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The SPFs experience in combating police corruption confirms the importance of