PEOPLE vs.

BAYOT
G.R. No. 200030
April 18, 2012

Appellants death on 4 December 2004, during the pendency of his

appeal before the Court of Appeals, extinguished not only his criminal liability
for the crime of rape committed against AAA, but also his civil liability solely
arising from or based on said crime.

Appellant Nelson Bayot y Satina was charged with Rape in an Information.

Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, specifically
provides the effect of death of the accused on his criminal, as well as civil,
liability. It reads thus:

On arraignment, appellant pleaded NOT GUILTY to the crime charged. Trial

on the merits ensued thereafter.
In its 31 July 2000 Decision, the RTC convicted appellant of the crime of rape
and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay
AAA the amount of P40,000.00 as indemnity with costs. In convicting
appellant, the RTC ratiocinated that AAAs testimony as regards her ordeal
was simple and straightforward, unshaken by a rigid crossexamination. There appeared to be no inconsistency in her
testimony. Further, AAAs declaration that she was raped by appellant was
corroborated by a medical certificate showing contusion on her vagina
at 6:00 oclock quadrant of the crevice, which was explained by Dr. Rodrigo
Cubid to have been caused by forceful vaginal intrusion. The RTC negates
the sweet heart defense offered by appellant. It stated that appellants claim
of being AAAs lover was a mere devise to extricate himself from the
consequence of his dastardly lust. AAAs immediate response of reporting the
rape incident carries the stamp of truth. Moreover, if, indeed, there was such
relationship between appellant and AAA, the latter would not have pursued
this case. It bears stressing that despite appellants repeated plea for the
dismissal of the case, AAA remained steadfast in seeking justice for the
violation of her womanhood.

Art. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished.

Criminal liability is totally extinguished:
1.
By death of the convict, as to the
personal penalties; and as to pecuniary
penalties, liability therefor is extinguished only when
the death of the offender occurs before final
judgment; [Emphasis supplied].
Applying the foregoing provision, this Court, in People v. Bayotas,
which was cited in a catena of cases, had laid down the following guidelines:
1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction
extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil
liability based solely thereon. As opined by Justice
Regalado, in this regard, the death of the accused prior
to final judgment terminates his criminal liability and only
the civil liability directly arising from and based solely on
the
offense
committed, i.e.,
civil
liability ex
delicto in senso strictiore.

Aggrieved, appellant appealed the aforesaid RTC Decision to the Court of

Appeals which affirmed appellants conviction. However, in a letter dated 29
May 2006, Dr. Juanito S. Leopando, Penal Superintendent IV of the New
Bilibid Prison, informed the Court of Appeals that appellant died at
the New Bilibid Prison Hospital on 4 December 2004.Attached in his letter is
the original copy of appellants Certificate of Death.

2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives

notwithstanding the death of [the] accused, if the same
may also be predicated on a source of obligation other
than delict. Article 1157 of the Civil Code enumerates
these other sources of obligation from which the civil
liability may arise as a result of the same act or
omission:

Nonetheless, the Public Attorneys Office still appealed, on behalf of

appellant, the aforesaid Court of Appeals Decision to this Court via a Notice
of Appeal[ dated 31 May 2006, which was given due course by the Court of
Appeals per Resolution dated 19 January 2007.

a) Law

Taking into consideration appellants death, this Court will now determine its
effect to this present appeal.

b) Contracts
c) Quasi-contracts

d) x x x x x x x x x
e)

AAA P50,000.00 as indemnity and P50,000.00 as moral damages had

become ineffectual.

Quasi-delicts

3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2

above, an action for recovery therefor may be pursued
but only by way of filing a separate civil action and
subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure as amended. This separate civil
action may be enforced either against the
executor/administrator or the estate of the accused,
depending on the source of obligation upon which the
same is based as explained above.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ANASTACIO

AMISTOSO Y BROCA, Accused-Appellant.
G.R. No. 201447, August 28, 2013
Accused-appellant Anastacio Amistoso y Broca (Amistoso) was charged
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Masbate City, Branch 48, in Criminal
Case No. 10106, with the rape of his daughter, AAA, alleged to be 12 years
old at the time of the incident. The Information specifically charged Amistoso
with statutory rape under Article 266-A, paragraph (1)(d) of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended.

4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a

forfeiture of his right to file this separate civil action by
prescription, in cases where during the prosecution of
the criminal action and prior to its extinction, the privateoffended party instituted together therewith the civil
action. In such case, the statute of limitations on the civil
liability is deemed interrupted during the pendency of the
criminal case, conformably with [the] provisions of Article
1155 of the Civil Code, that should thereby avoid any
apprehension on a possible privation of right by
prescription.

After trial, on March 23, 2006, the RTC promulgated its Decision finding
Amistoso guilty, not of statutory rape, but of qualified rape under Article 266A, paragraph (1)(a), in relation to Article 266-B, paragraph (1), of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended
Accused-appellant Anastacio Amistoso is sentenced to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole. In addition to civil
indemnity in the amount of P75,000.00, he is ordered to pay the victim
P75,000.00 as moral damages and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages.

From the foregoing, it is clear that the death of the accused pending
appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability, as well as the civil
liability ex delicto. The rationale, therefore, is that the criminal action is
extinguished inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant to stand as the
accused, the civil action instituted therein for recovery of civil liability ex
delicto is ipso facto extinguished, grounded as it is on the criminal case.

Insisting upon his innocence, Amistoso appealed to the CA which affirmed

with modification the judgment of conviction against Amistoso, expressly
making him liable for interest on the amounts of damages awarded.
However, in a letter dated February 7, 2013, Ramoncito D. Roque (Roque),
Officer-in-Charge, Inmate Documents and Processing Division of the Bureau
of Corrections, informed the Court that Amistoso had died on December 11,
2012 at the New Bilibid Prison (NBP), Muntinlupa City. Roque attached to
his letter a photocopy of the Death Report signed by Marylou V. Arbatin, MD,
Medical Officer III, NBP, stating that Amistoso, 62 years old, died at about
5:00 p.m. on December 11, 2012 of Cardio Respiratory Arrest. Roques letter
was received by the Court on February 12, 2013.

Appellants appeal was still pending and no final judgment had been
rendered against him at the time of his death. Thus, whether or not appellant
was guilty of the crime charged had become irrelevant because even
assuming that appellant did incur criminal liability and civil liability ex delicto,
these were totally extinguished by his death, following the provisions of
Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal Code and this Courts ruling in People
v. Bayotas.

Yet, on February 22, 2013, the Public Attorneys Office (PAO), which
represented Amistoso and which was apparently also unaware of its clients
demise, still filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Courts Decision dated
January 9, 2013. In a Resolution dated March 20, 2013, the Court required

The appealed Decision dated 9 May 2006 of the Court of Appeals

in CA-G.R. CEB-CR-H.C. No. 00269 finding appellant guilty of the crime of
rape, sentencing him to reclusion perpetua, and ordering him to pay

Roque to submit a certified true copy of Amistosos Death Certificate within

10 days from notice and deferred action on the Motion for Reconsideration
filed by the PAO pending compliance with the Courts former directive. In a
letter dated June 20, 2013, and received by the Court on June 25, 2013, PIS
Lansangan finally provided the Court with a certified true copy of Amistosos
Death Certificate.

separate civil action and subject to Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure as amended. This separate civil action may be enforced
either against the executor/administrator or the estate of the accused,
depending on the source of obligation upon which the same is based as
explained above.
4. Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to
file this separate civil action by prescription, in cases where during the
prosecution of the criminal action and prior to its extinction, the privateoffended party instituted together therewith the civil action. In such case, the
statute of limitations on the civil liability is deemed interrupted during the
pendency of the criminal case, conformably with provisions of Article 1155 of
the Civil Code, that should thereby avoid any apprehension on a possible
privation of right by prescription. (Citations omitted.)

Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code provides:

ART. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. Criminal liability is
totally extinguished:cralawlibrary
1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to
pecuniary penalties, liability therefore is extinguished only when the death of
the offender occurs before final judgment

Given the foregoing, it is clear that the death of the accused pending appeal
of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability, as well as his civil
liability ex delicto. Since the criminal action is extinguished inasmuch as
there is no longer a defendant to stand as the accused, the civil action
instituted therein for recovery of civil liability ex delicto is ipso
facto extinguished, grounded as it is on the criminal case.

In People v. Bayotas, the Court laid down the rules in case the accused dies
prior to final judgment:
1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes
his criminal liability as well as the civil liability based solely thereon.
As opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard, the death of the
accused prior to final judgment terminates his criminal liability
and only the civil liability directly arising from and based solely on the
offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso strictiore.

Undeniably, Amistosos death on December 11, 2012 preceded the

promulgation by the Court of its Decision on January 9, 2013. When
Amistoso died, his appeal before the Court was still pending and unresolved.
The Court ruled upon Amistosos appeal only because it was not immediately
informed of his death. Amistosos death on December 11, 2012 renders the
Courts Decision dated January 9, 2013, even though affirming Amistosos
conviction, irrelevant and ineffectual. Moreover, said Decision has not yet
become final, and the Court still has the jurisdiction to set it aside.

2. Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the

death of accused, if the same may also be predicated on a source of
obligation other than delict. Article 1157 of the Civil Code
enumerates these other sources of obligation from which the civil
liability may arise as a result of the same act or omission:

WHEREFORE, the Court RESOLVES to:

a) Law

(1) NOTE PIS Lansangans letter dated June 20, 2013 providing the Court
with a certified true copy of Amistosos Death Certificate;

b) Contracts
c) Quasi-contracts

(2) SET ASIDE its Decision dated January 9, 2013 and DISMISS Criminal
Case No. 10106 before the RTC of Masbate City, Branch 48 by reason of
Amistosos death on December 11, 2012; and

d) x x x
e) Quasi-delicts

(3) NOTE WITHOUT ACTION the Motion for Reconsideration of the Courts
Decision dated January 9, 2013 filed by the PAO given the Courts actions in
the preceding paragraphs.

3. Where the civil liability survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an

action for recovery therefor may be pursued but only by way of filing a

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. BENJIE

CONSORTE y FRANCO, Accused-Appellant.
G.R. No. 194068

In People v. Brillantes, the Court, citing People v. Bayotas, clarified that:

1. Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his
criminal liability as well as the civil liability based solely thereon.1wphi1 As
opined by Justice Regalado, in this regard, "the death of the accused prior to
final judgment terminates his criminal liability and only the civil liability directly
arising from and based solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex
delicto in senso strictiore."

November 26, 2014

For the resolution of the Court is the Motion for Reconsideration of our
Decision dated 9 July 2014, which affirmed the conviction of accused
appellant Benjie Consorte y Franco for the murder of Elizabeth Palmar.

In the case at bar, accused-appellant died before final judgment, as in fact,

his motion for reconsideration is still pending resolution by the Court. As
such, it therefore becomes necessary for us to declare his criminal liability as
well as his civil liability ex delicto to have been extinguished by his death
prior to final judgment.

Accused-appellant raises the incredibility of his identification as the

perpetrator of the crime. He avers that despite the alleged positive
identification made by Rolando Visbe (Visbe), the testimony of prosecution
witness Aneline Mendoza clearly shows the impossibility of the
same. Moreover, further casting doubt on the alleged identification of
accused appellant is Visbes unbelievable and inconsistent statements on
how such identification was made. Meanwhile, in a Letter dated 21
September 2014, the Officer-in Charge of the New Bilibid Prison (NBP)
informed the Court that accused appellant died on 14 July 2014, as
evidenced by the attached Death Certificate issued by NBP Medical Officer
III Ruth B. Algones, M.D.

WHEREFORE, the criminal and civil liability ex delicto of accused appellant

Benjie Consorte y Franco are declared EXTINGUISHED by his death prior to
final judgment. The judgment or conviction against him is therefore SET
ASIDE.

Owing to this development, the Court now addresses the effect of death
pending accused-appellants appeal with regard to his criminal and civil
liabilities.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. CLEMENTE

BAUTISTA, Respondent.

Article 89 (1) of the Revised Penal Code is illuminating:

G.R. No. 168641

April 27, 2007

Art. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. Criminal liability is

totally extinguished:
On August 16, 1999, private complainant filed with the Office of the City
Prosecutor (OCP) a Complaint for slight physical injuries against herein
respondent and his co-accused. After conducting the preliminary
investigation, Prosecutor Jessica Junsay-Ong issued a Joint Resolution
dated November 8, 1999 recommending the filing of an Information against
herein respondent. Such recommendation was approved by the City
Prosecutor, represented by First Assistant City Prosecutor Eufrocino A. Sulla,

(1) By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to

pecuniary penalties, liability therefor is extinguished only when the death of
the offender occurs before final judgment;
xxxx

but the date of such approval cannot be found in the records. The
Information was, however, filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of
Manila, Branch 28 only on June 20, 2000.

Petitioner now comes before this Court seeking the reversal of the foregoing
CA Decision. The Court gives due course to the petition notwithstanding the
fact that petitioner did not file a Motion for Reconsideration of the decision of
the CA before the filing of herein petition. It is not a condition sine qua non for
the filing of a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. 5

Respondent sought the dismissal of the case against him on the ground that
by the time the Information was filed, the 60-day period of prescription from
the date of the commission of the crime, that is, on June 12, 1999 had
already elapsed. The MeTC ruled that the offense had not yet prescribed.

The Court finds merit in the petition.

ISSUE :

Whether the prescriptive period began to run anew after the investigating
prosecutors recommendation to file the proper criminal information against
respondent was approved by the City Prosecutor.

Respondent elevated the issue to the RTC via a Petition for Certiorari, but
the RTC denied said petition and concurred with the opinion of the MeTC.

Respondent then filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA. On June 22, 2005,
the CA rendered its Decision wherein it held that, indeed, the 60-day
prescriptive period was interrupted when the offended party filed a Complaint
with the OCP of Manila on August 16, 1999. Nevertheless, the CA concluded
that the offense had prescribed by the time the Information was filed with the
MeTC.

RULING :
No. Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code provides thus:
Art. 91. Computation of prescription of offenses. - The period of prescription
shall commence to run from the day on which the crime is discovered by the
offended party, the authorities, or their agents, and shall be interrupted by the
filing of the complaint or information, and shall commence to run again
when such proceedings terminate without the accused being convicted
or acquitted, or are unjustifiably stopped for any reason not imputable
to him.

In the case on hand, although the approval of the Joint Resolution of ACP
Junsay-Ong bears no date, it effectively terminated the proceedings at the
OCP. Hence, even if the 10-day period for the CP or ACP Sulla, his
designated alter ego, to act on the resolution is extended up to the utmost
limit, it ought not have been taken as late as the last day of the year 1999.
Yet, the information was filed with the MeTC only on June 20, 2000, or
already nearly six (6) months into the next year. To use once again the
language of Article 91 of the RPC, the proceedings at the CPO was
"unjustifiably stopped for any reason not imputable to him (the
accused)" for a time very much more than the prescriptive period of
only two (2) months. The offense charged had, therefore, already
prescribed when filed with the court on June 20, 2000.

The term of prescription shall not run when the offender is absent from the
Philipppine Archipelago.

The proceedings against respondent was not terminated upon the City
Prosecutor's approval of the investigating prosecutor's recommendation that
an information be filed with the court. The prescriptive period remains tolled
from the time the complaint was filed with the Office of the Prosecutor until
such time that respondent is either convicted or acquitted by the proper
court.

ASIDE and the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila in Civil Case
No. 02-103990 is hereby REINSTATED.

ABELLANA vs. PEOPLE

FACTS :
The Office of the Prosecutor miserably incurred some delay in filing the
information but such mistake or negligence should not unduly prejudice the
interests of the State and the offended party. As held in People v. Olarte, it is
unjust to deprive the injured party of the right to obtain vindication on account
of delays that are not under his control. All that the victim of the offense may
do on his part to initiate the prosecution is to file the requisite complaint.

In 1985, petitioner extended a loan to private respondents spouses Diaga and

Saapia Alonto (spouses Alonto), secured by a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage over
Lot Nos. 6471 and 6472 located in Cebu City. Subsequently, or in 1987, petitioner
prepared a Deed of Absolute Sale conveying said lots to him. The Deed of Absolute
Sale was signed by spouses Alonto in Manila. However, it was notarized
in Cebu City allegedly without the spouses Alonto appearing before the notary
public. Thereafter, petitioner caused the transfer of the titles to his name and sold the
lots to third persons.
On August 12, 1999, an Information was filed charging petitioner with Estafa through
Falsification of Public Document.

The constitutional right of the accused to a speedy trial cannot be invoked by

the petitioner in the present petition considering that the delay occurred not in
the conduct of preliminary investigation or trial in court but in the filing of the
Information after the City Prosecutor had approved the recommendation of
the investigating prosecutor to file the information.

During arraignment, petitioner entered a plea of not guilty. After the termination of the
pre-trial conference, trial ensued.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

The Office of the Solicitor General does not offer any explanation as to the
delay in the filing of the information. The Court will not be made as an
unwitting tool in the deprivation of the right of the offended party to vindicate
a wrong purportedly inflicted on him by the mere expediency of a prosecutor
not filing the proper information in due time.

In its Decision dated May 21, 2003, the RTC noted that the main issue for resolution
was whether petitioner committed the crime of estafa through falsification of public
document. Based on the evidence presented by both parties, the trial court found
that petitioner did not intend to defraud the spouses Alonto; that after the latter failed
to pay their obligation, petitioner prepared a Deed of Absolute Sale which the
spouses Alonto actually signed; but that the Deed of Absolute Sale was notarized
without the spouses Alonto personally appearing before the notary public. From
these, the trial court concluded that petitioner can only be held guilty of Falsification
of a Public Document by a private individual under Article 172(1) in relation to Article
171(2) of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) and not estafa through falsification of
public document as charged in the Information.

The Court will not tolerate the prosecutors apparent lack of a sense of
urgency in fulfilling their mandate. Under the circumstances, the more
appropriate course of action should be the filing of an administrative
disciplinary action against the erring public officials.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby GRANTED. The Decision of the Court

of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 72784 is hereby REVERSED and SET

On appeal, petitioner raised the issue of whether an accused who was acquitted of
the crime charged may nevertheless be convicted of another crime or offense not

specifically charged and alleged and which is not necessarily included in the crime or
offense charged. The CA, in its Decision dated February 22, 2006, ruled in the
negative. It held that petitioner who was charged with and arraigned for estafa
through falsification of public document under Article 171(1) of the RPC could not be
convicted of Falsification of Public Document by a Private Individual under Article
172(1) in relation to Article 171(2). The CA observed that the falsification committed
in Article 171(1) requires the counterfeiting of any handwriting, signature or rubric
while the falsification in Article 171(2) occurs when the offender caused it to appear in
a document that a person participated in an act or proceeding when in fact such
person did not so participate. Thus, the CA opined that the conviction of the
petitioner for an offense not alleged in the Information or one not necessarily
included in the offense charged violated his constitutional right to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him. [ Nonetheless, the CA affirmed the
trial courts finding with respect to petitioners civil liability.

but because it caused damage to another. Viewing things

pragmatically, we can readily see that what gives rise to the civil
liability is really the obligation and moral duty of everyone to repair
or make whole the damage caused to another by reason of his
own act or omission, done intentionally or negligently, whether or
not the same be punishable by law. x x x
Simply stated, civil liability arises when one, by reason of his own act or
omission, done intentionally or negligently, causes damage to another. Hence, for
petitioner to be civilly liable to spouses Alonto, it must be proven that the acts he
committed had caused damage to the spouses.
Based on the records of the case, we find that the acts allegedly committed
by the petitioner did not cause any damage to spouses Alonto.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied in the Resolution
dated August 15, 2006.

First, the Information charged petitioner with fraudulently making it appear

that the spouses Alonto affixed their signatures in the Deed of Absolute Sale thereby
facilitating the transfer of the subject properties in his favor. However, after the
presentation of the parties respective evidence, the trial court found that the charge
was without basis as the spouses Alonto indeed signed the document and that their
signatures were genuine and not forged.

Hence, petitioner comes before us through the present Petition for Review
on Certiorari.
ISSUE :

Second, even assuming that the spouses Alonto did not personally appear
before the notary public for the notarization of the Deed of Absolute Sale, the same
does not necessarily nullify or render void ab initio the parties transaction. Such nonappearance is not sufficient to overcome the presumption of the truthfulness of the
statements contained in the deed. To overcome the presumption, there must be
sufficient, clear and convincing evidence as to exclude all reasonable controversy as
to the falsity of the [deed]. In the absence of such proof, the deed must be
upheld. And since the defective notarization does not ipso facto invalidate the Deed
of Absolute Sale, the transfer of said properties from spouses Alonto to petitioner
remains valid. Hence, when on the basis of said Deed of Absolute Sale, petitioner
caused the cancellation of spouses Alontos title and the issuance of new ones under
his name, and thereafter sold the same to third persons, no damage resulted to the
spouses Alonto.

Whether petitioner Felixberto A. Abellana could still be held civilly liable

notwithstanding his acquittal.
RULING :
It is an established rule in criminal procedure that a judgment of acquittal shall state
whether the evidence of the prosecution absolutely failed to prove the guilt of the
accused or merely failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In either case,
the judgment shall determine if the act or omission from which the civil liability might
arise did not exist. When the exoneration is merely due to the failure to prove the
guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, the court should award the civil
liability in favor of the offended party in the same criminal action. In other words, the
extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of civil liability unless
the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which
the civil [liability] might arise did not exist.

Moreover, we cannot sustain the alternative sentence imposed upon the petitioner,
to wit: to institute an action for the recovery of the properties of spouses Alonto or to
pay them actual and other kinds of damages. First, it has absolutely no basis in view
of the trial courts finding that the signatures of the spouses Alonto in the Deed of
Absolute Sale are genuine and not forged. Second, [s]entences should not be in the
alternative. There is nothing in the law which permits courts to impose sentences in
the alternative. While a judge has the discretion of imposing one or another penalty,

In Banal v. Tadeo, Jr., the Court elucidated on the civil liability of the accused despite
his exoneration in this wise:
While an act or omission is felonious because it is punishable by
law, it gives rise to civil liability not so much because it is a crime

he cannot impose both in the alternative. He must fix positively and with certainty the
particular penalty.

On 2 March 1998, Assistant City Prosecutor Ruben Catubay recommended

the suspension of the criminal proceedings pending the outcome of the civil
action respondent filed against private complainant with the RTC of
Valenzuela City. The recommendation was approved by the City Prosecutor
of Quezon City.

In view of the above discussion, there is therefore absolutely no basis for the trial
court and the CA to hold petitioner civilly liable to restore ownership and possession
of the subject properties to the spouses Alonto or to pay them P1,103,000.00
representing the value of the properties and to pay them nominal damages,
exemplary damages, attorneys fees and litigation expenses.

Aggrieved, private complainant raised the matter before the Department of

Justice (DOJ).

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The February 22, 2006 Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 78644 and its August 15, 2006 Resolution
are AFFIRMED insofar as they set aside the conviction of the petitioner for the crime
of falsification of public document. The portion which affirmed the imposition of civil
liabilities on the petitioner, i.e., the restoration of ownership and possession, the
payment of P1,103,000.00 representing the value of the property, and the payment
of nominal and exemplary damages, attorneys fees and litigation expenses,
is DELETED for lack of factual and legal basis.

On 5 January 1999, then Secretary of Justice Serafin P. Cuevas reversed the

resolution of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City and ordered the filing of
informations for violation of BP Blg. 22 against respondent in connection with
her issuance of City Trust Check No. 127219. The estafa and violation of BP
Blg. 22 charges involving the seven other checks included in the affidavitcomplaint filed on 16 September 1997 were, however, dismissed.
Consequently, two counts for violation of BP Blg. 22, both dated 18
November 1999, were filed against respondent Ma.Theresa Pangilinan on 3
February 2000 before the Office of the Clerk of Court, Metropolitan Trial
Court (MeTC), Quezon City.

PEOPLE vs. PANGILINAN

G.R. No. 152662
June 13, 2012

On 17 June 2000, respondent filed an Omnibus Motion to Quash the

Information and to Defer the Issuance of Warrant of Arrest before MeTC,
Branch 31, Quezon City. She alleged that her criminal liability has been
extinguished by reason of prescription.

FACTS :
On 16 September 1997, Virginia C. Malolos (private complainant) filed an
affidavit-complaint for estafa and violation of Batas Pambansa (BP) Blg. 22
against Ma. Theresa Pangilinan (respondent) with the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Quezon City. The complaint alleges that respondent issued
nine (9) checks with an aggregate amount of Nine Million Six Hundred FiftyEight Thousand Five Hundred Ninety-Two Pesos (P9,658,592.00) in favor of
private complainant which were dishonored upon presentment for payment.

The presiding judge of MeTC, Branch 31, Quezon City granted the motion in
an Order dated 5 October 2000.
On 26 October 2000, private complainant filed a notice of appeal. In a
Decision dated 27 July 2001, the presiding judge of RTC, Branch 218,
Quezon City reversed the 5 October 2000 Order of the MeTC.

On 5 December 1997, respondent filed a civil case for accounting, recovery

of commercial documents, enforceability and effectivity of contract and
specific performance against private complainant before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Valenzuela City.

Dissatisfied with the RTC Decision, respondent filed with the Supreme Court
a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
In a Decision dated 12 March 2002, the CA reversed the 27 July 2001
Decision of RTC, Branch 218, Quezon City, thereby dismissing Criminal
Case Nos. 89152 and 89153 for the reason that the cases for violation of BP
Blg. 22 had already prescribed.

Five days thereafter or on 10 December 1997, respondent filed a Petition to

Suspend Proceedings on the Ground of Prejudicial Question before the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City, citing as basis the pendency of
the civil action she filed with the RTC of Valenzuela City.

The OSG sought relief to this Court in the instant petition for
review. According to the OSG, while it admits that Act No. 3326, as amended

by Act No. 3585 and further amended by Act No. 3763 dated 23 November
1930, governs the period of prescription for violations of special laws, it is the
institution of criminal actions, whether filed with the court or with the Office of
the City Prosecutor, that interrupts the period of prescription of the offense
charged. It submits that the filing of the complaint-affidavit by private
complainant Virginia C. Malolos on 16 September 1997 with the Office of the
City Prosecutor of Quezon City effectively interrupted the running of the
prescriptive period of the subject BP Blg. 22 cases.

with the aforecited law. The running of the prescriptive period, however,
should be tolled upon the institution of proceedings against the guilty person.
In the old but oft-cited case of People v. Olarte, this Court ruled that
the filing of the complaint in the Municipal Court even if it be merely for
purposes of preliminary examination or investigation, should, and thus,
interrupt the period of prescription of the criminal responsibility, even if the
court where the complaint or information is filed cannot try the case on the
merits. This ruling was broadened by the Court in the case of Francisco,
et.al. v. Court of Appeals, et. al. when it held that the filing of the complaint
with the Fiscals Office also suspends the running of the prescriptive period of
a criminal offense.

ISSUE :
Whether the filing of the affidavit-complaint for estafa and violation of BP Blg.
22 against respondent with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City
on 16 September 1997 interrupted the period of prescription of such offense.

We follow the factual finding of the CA that sometime in the latter part
of 1995 is the reckoning date of the commencement of presumption for
violations of BP Blg. 22, such being the period within which herein
respondent was notified by private complainant of the fact of dishonor of the
checks and the five-day grace period granted by law elapsed.

RULING :
The Court find that the CA reversively erred in ruling that the offense
committed by respondent had already prescribed. Indeed, Act No. 3326
entitled An Act to Establish Prescription for Violations of Special Acts and
Municipal Ordinances and to Provide When Prescription Shall Begin, as
amended, is the law applicable to BP Blg. 22 cases. Appositely, the law
reads:
SECTION 1. Violations penalized by special acts shall,
unless otherwise provided in such acts, prescribe in
accordance with the following rules: (a) xxx; (b) after four years
for those punished by imprisonment for more than one month,
but less than two years; (c) xxx.

The affidavit-complaints for the violations were filed against

respondent on 16 September 1997. The cases reached the MeTC of Quezon
City only on 13 February 2000 because in the meanwhile, respondent filed a
civil case for accounting followed by a petition before the City Prosecutor for
suspension of proceedings on the ground of prejudicial question. The matter
was raised before the Secretary of Justice after the City Prosecutor approved
the petition to suspend proceedings. It was only after the Secretary of Justice
so ordered that the informations for the violation of BP Blg. 22 were filed with
the MeTC of Quezon City.
Clearly, it was respondents own motion for the suspension of the
criminal proceedings, which motion she predicated on her civil case for
accounting, that caused the filing in court of the 1997 initiated proceedings
only in 2000.

SECTION 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day

of the commission of the violation of the law, and if the same
be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the
institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and
punishment.

As laid down in Olarte, it is unjust to deprive the injured party of the

right to obtain vindication on account of delays that are not under his
control. The only thing the offended must do to initiate the prosecution of the
offender is to file the requisite complaint.

The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings

are instituted against the guilty person, and shall begin to run
again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not
constituting jeopardy.

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the instant petition

is GRANTED. The 12 March 2002 Decision of the Court of Appeals is
hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The
Department
of
Justice
is ORDERED to re-file the informations for violation of BP Blg. 22 against the
respondent.

Since BP Blg. 22 is a special law that imposes a penalty of

imprisonment of not less than thirty (30) days but not more than one year or
by a fine for its violation, it therefor prescribes in four (4) years in accordance

order of April 30, 1999, the case was transferred to the RTC pursuant to
Supreme Court Circular No. 11-99.
DR. ENCARNACION C. LUMANTAS, M.D., Petitioner, vs. HANZ CALAPIZ,
REPRESENTED BY HIS PARENTS, HILARIO CALAPIZ, JR. and HERLITA
CALAPIZ,Respondent.
G.R. No. 163753

At the trial, the Prosecution presented several witnesses, including Dr. Rufino
Agudera as an expert witness and as the physician who had operated on
Hanz twice to repair the damaged urethra. Dr. Agudera testified that Hanz
had been diagnosed to have urethral stricture and cavernosal injury left
secondary to trauma that had necessitated the conduct of two operations to
strengthen and to lengthen the urethra. Although satisfactorily explaining that
the injury to the urethra had been caused by trauma, Dr. Agudera could not
determine the kind of trauma that had caused the injury.

January 15, 2014

The acquittal of the accused does not necessarily mean his absolution from
civil liability.
FACTS :

In his defense, the petitioner denied the charge. He contended that at the
time of his examination of Hanz on January 16, 1995, he had found an
accumulation of pus at the vicinity of the appendix two to three inches from
the penis that had required immediate surgical operation; that after
performing the appendectomy, he had circumcised Hanz with his parents
consent by using a congo instrument, thereby debunking the parents claim
that their child had been cauterized; that he had then cleared Hanz on
January 27, 1995 once his fever had subsided; that he had found no
complications when Hanz returned for his follow up check-up on February 2,
1995; and that the abscess formation between the base and the shaft of the
penis had been brought about by Hanzs burst appendicitis.

On January 16, 1995, Spouses Hilario Calapiz, Jr. and Herlita Calapiz
brought their 8-year-old son, Hanz Calapiz (Hanz), to the Misamis Occidental
Provincial Hospital, Oroquieta City, for an emergency appendectomy. Hanz
was attended to by the petitioner, who suggested to the parents that Hanz
also undergo circumcision at no added cost to spare him the pain. With the
parents consent, the petitioner performed the coronal type of circumcision on
Hanz after his appendectomy. On the following day, Hanz complained of pain
in his penis, which exhibited blisters. The parents noticed that the child
urinated abnormally after the petitioner forcibly removed the catheter, but the
petitioner dismissed the abnormality as normal. On January 30, 1995, Hanz
was discharged from the hospital over his parents protestations, and was
directed to continue taking antibiotics.

Ruling of the RTC

On February 8, 1995, Hanz was confined in a hospital because of the

abscess formation between the base and the shaft of his penis. Presuming
that the ulceration was brought about by Hanzs appendicitis, the petitioner
referred him to Dr. Henry Go, an urologist, who diagnosed the boy to have a
damaged urethra. Thus, Hanz underwent cystostomy, and thereafter was
operated on three times to repair his damaged urethra.

The RTC acquitted the petitioner of the crime charged for insufficiency of the
evidence. It held that the Prosecutions evidence did not show the required
standard of care to be observed by other members of the medical profession
under similar circumstances. Nonetheless, the RTC ruled that the petitioner
was liable for moral damages because there was a preponderance of
evidence showing that Hanz had received the injurious trauma from his
circumcision by the petitioner.

When his damaged urethra could not be fully repaired and reconstructed,
Hanzs parents brought a criminal charge against the petitioner for reckless
imprudence resulting to serious physical injuries. On April 17, 1997, the
information was filed in the Municipal Trial Court in Cities of Oroquieta City
(MTCC), to which the latter pleaded not guilty on May 22, 1998. Under the

10

Ruling of the CA

contemplated in Rule 111 of the Rules of Court. The second instance is an

acquittal based on reasonable doubt on the guilt of the accused. In this case,
even if the guilt of the accused has not been satisfactorily established, he is
not exempt from civil liability which may be proved by preponderance of
evidence only.

On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC, sustaining the award of moral

damages. It opined that even if the petitioner had been acquitted of the crime
charged, the acquittal did not necessarily mean that he had not incurred civil
liability considering that the Prosecution had preponderantly established the
sufferings of Hanz as the result of the circumcision.

The Rules of Court requires that in case of an acquittal, the judgment shall
state "whether the evidence of the prosecution absolutely failed to prove the
guilt of the accused or merely failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable
doubt. In either case, the judgment shall determine if the act or omission from
which the civil liability might arise did not exist."

The petitioner moved for reconsideration, but the CA denied the motion on
April 28, 2004.8
Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE :

Conformably with the foregoing, therefore, the acquittal of an accused does

not prevent a judgment from still being rendered against him on the civil
aspect of the criminal case unless the court finds and declares that the fact
from which the civil liability might arise did not exist.

Whether the CA erred in affirming the petitioners civil liability despite his
acquittal of the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in serious physical
injuries.

Although it found the Prosecutions evidence insufficient to sustain a

judgment of conviction against the petitioner for the crime charged, the RTC
did not err in determining and adjudging his civil liability for the same act
complained of based on mere preponderance of evidence. In this connection,
the Court reminds that the acquittal for insufficiency of the evidence did not
require that the complainants recovery of civil liability should be through the
institution of a separate civil action for that purpose.

RULING :
It is axiomatic that every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly
liable. Nevertheless, the acquittal of an accused of the crime charged does
not necessarily extinguish his civil liability. In Manantan v. Court of Appeals,
the Court elucidates on the two kinds of acquittal recognized by our law as
well as on the different effects of acquittal on the civil liability of the accused,
viz:

Every person is entitled to the physical integrity of his body.1wphi1 Although

we have long advocated the view that any physical injury, like the loss or
diminution of the use of any part of ones body, is not equatable to a
pecuniary loss, and is not susceptible of exact monetary estimation, civil
damages should be assessed once that integrity has been violated. The
assessment is but an imperfect estimation of the true value of ones body.
The usual practice is to award moral damages for the physical injuries
sustained. In Hanzs case, the undesirable outcome of the circumcision
performed by the petitioner forced the young child to endure several other

Our law recognizes two kinds of acquittal, with different effects on the civil
liability of the accused. First is an acquittal on the ground that the accused is
not the author of the act or omission complained of. This instance closes the
door to civil liability, for a person who has been found to be not the
perpetrator of any act or omission cannot and can never be held liable for
such act or omission. There being no delict, civil liability ex delicto is out of
the question, and the civil action, if any, which may be instituted must be
based on grounds other than the delict complained of. This is the situation

11

procedures on his penis in order to repair his damaged urethra. Surely, his
physical and moral sufferings properly warranted the amount of P50,000.00
awarded as moral damages.

saw a woman crossing EDSA heading towards the island near the flyover
and that the latter was bumped by a Nissan Vanette bearing plate number
UPN-172. The prosecution also offered the testimonies of (a) Marla, who
testified as to the civil damages sustained by her family as a result of her
mothers death; (b) Dr. Paul Ortiz (Dr. Ortiz), who presented his findings on
the autopsy conducted upon the body of Marina Oliva; and (c)Police Senior
Inspector Lauro Gomez (PSI Gomez), who conducted the investigation
following the incident and claimed that Marina Olivawas hit by the vehicle
being driven by Daluraya, albeit he did not witness the incident.

Many years have gone by since Hanz suffered the injury. Interest of 6% per
annum should then be imposed on the award as a sincere means of
adjusting the value of the award to a level that is not only reasonable but just
and commensurate. Unless we make the adjustment in the permissible
manner by prescribing legal interest on the award, his sufferings would be
unduly compounded. For that purpose, the reckoning of interest should be
from the filing of the criminal information on April 17, 1997, the making of the
judicial demand for the liability of the petitioner.

After the prosecution rested its case, Daluraya filed an Urgent Motion to
Dismiss (demurrer) asserting, inter alia, that he was not positively identified
by any of the prosecution witnesses as the driver of the vehicle that hit the
victim, and that there was no clear and competent evidence of how the
incident transpired.
The MeTC Ruling

WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on February

20, 2003, with the modification that legal interest of 6% per annum to start
from April 17, 1997 is imposed on the award of:P50,000.00 as moral
damages; and ORDERS the petitioner to pay the costs of suit.

It granted Dalurayas demurrer and dismissed the case for insufficiency of

evidence. It found that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses were
wanting in material details and that they failed to sufficiently establish that
Daluraya
committed
the
crime
imputed
upon
him.
The MeTC found that: (a) Marla merely testified on the damages sustained
by her family but she failed to identify Daluraya as the driver of the vehicle
that hit her mother; (b) Serrano also did not identify Daluraya as the driver of
the said vehicle; (c) Dr. Ortiz merely testified on the autopsy results; and (d)
PSI Gomez, while he did investigate the incident, likewise declared that he
did
not
witness
the
same.

ANTONIO L. DALURAYA, Petitioner, v. MARLA OLIVA, Respondent. G.R.

No. 210148, December 08, 2014
FACTS :

Marla moved for reconsideration, which the MeTC. Aggrieved, Marla

appealed to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 76 (RTC),
insisting that the MeTC failed to make any finding as to the civil liability of
Daluraya, which finding was not precluded by the dismissal of the criminal
aspect of the case.

On January 4, 2006, Daluraya was charged in an Information for Reckless

Imprudence Resulting in Homicide in connection with the death of Marina
Oliva. Records reveal that sometime in the afternoon of January 3, 2006,
Marina Oliva was crossing the street when a Nissan Vanette, bearing plate
number UPN-172 and traversing EDSA near the Quezon Avenue flyover in
Quezon City, ran her over. While Marina Oliva was rushed to the hospital to
receive medical attention, she eventually died, prompting her daughter,
herein respondent Marla Oliva (Marla), to file a criminal case for Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in Homicide against Daluraya, the purported driver of
the
vehicle.

The RTC Ruling

The RTC dismissed the appeal and affirmed the MeTCs ruling, declaring that
the act from which the criminal responsibility may spring did not at all exist.
Marla filed a motion for reconsideration which, although filed beyond the
reglementary period, was nonetheless accepted. However, the RTC found
the same without merit and thus, sustained the factual findings and rulings of

During the proceedings, the prosecution presented as witness Shem Serrano

(Serrano), an eye-witness to the incident, who testified that on said date, he

12

the

MeTC

in

its

Order dated

May

10,

2012.
In Dayap v. Sendiong, the Court explained further:

Dissatisfied, Marla elevated the case to the CA via petition for review,
maintaining that Daluraya must be held civilly liable.

The acquittal of the accused does not automatically preclude a judgment

against him on the civil aspect of the case. The extinction of the penal action
does not carry with it the extinction of the civil liability where: (a) the acquittal
is based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence is required;
(b) the court declares that the liability of the accused is only civil; and (c) the
civil liability of the accused does not arise from or is not based upon the
crime of which the accused is acquitted. However, the civil action based
on delictmay be deemed extinguished if there is a finding on the final
judgment in the criminal action that the act or omission from which the
civil liability may arise did not exist or where the accused did not
commit
the
acts
or
omission
imputed
to
him.

The CA Ruling
The CA granted the petition and reversed the RTC Decision, ordering
Daluraya to pay Marla the amounts of p152,547.00 as actual damages,
P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, and P50,000.00 as moral damages. In so
ruling, the CA held that the MeTCs Order showed that Dalurayas acquittal
was based on the fact that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. As such, Daluraya was not exonerated from civil liability.
Daluraya filed a motion for reconsideration, which the CA denied in a
Resolution dated November 22, 2013,hence, this petition.

Thus, if demurrer is granted and the accused is acquitted by the court, the
accused has the right to adduce evidence on the civil aspect of the
case unless the court also declares that the act or omission from which
the civil liability may arise did not exist. This is because when the
accused files a demurrer to evidence, he has not yet adduced evidence both
on the criminal and civil aspects of the case. The only evidence on record is
the evidence for the prosecution. What the trial court should do is issue an
order or partial judgment granting the demurrer to evidence and acquitting
the accused, and set the case for continuation of trial for the accused to
adduce evidence on the civil aspect of the case and for the private
complainant to adduce evidence by way of rebuttal. Thereafter, the court
shall render judgment on the civil aspect of the case.

ISSUE :
Whether or not the CA was correct in finding Daluraya civilly liable for Marina
Olivas death despite his acquittal in the criminal case for Reckless
Imprudence Resulting in Homicide on the ground of insufficiency of evidence.
RULING

Every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable. The acquittal of
an accused of the crime charged, however, does not necessarily extinguish
his civil liability. In Manantan v. CA, the Court expounded on the two kinds of
acquittal recognized by our law and their concomitant effects on the civil
liability of the accused, as follows:

In case of an acquittal, the Rules of Court requires that the judgment state
whether the evidence of the prosecution absolutely failed to prove the guilt
of the accused or merely failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In
either case, the judgment shall determine if the act or omission from which
the
civil
liability
might
arise
did
not
exist.

Our law recognizes two kinds of acquittal, with different effects on the civil
liability of the accused. First is an acquittal on the ground that the accused is
not the author of the act or omission complained of. This instance closes the
door to civil liability, for a person who has been found to be not the
perpetrator of any act or omission cannot and can never be held liable for
such act or omission. There being no delict, civil liability ex delicto is out of
the question, and the civil action, if any, which may be instituted must be
based on grounds other than the delict complained of. This is the situation
contemplated in Rule 111 of the Rules of Court. The second instance is an
acquittal based on reasonable doubt on the guilt of the accused. In this case,
even if the guilt of the accused has not been satisfactorily established, he is
not exempt from civil liability which may be proved by preponderance of
evidence only.33

A punctilious examination of the MeTCs Order, which the RTC sustained, will
show that Dalurayas acquittal was based on the conclusion that the act or
omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist, given that the
prosecution was not able to establish that he was the author of the crime
imputed against him. Such conclusion is clear and categorical when the
MeTC declared that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses are
wanting in material details and they did not sufficiently establish that the
accused precisely committed the crime charged against him. Furthermore,
when Marla sought reconsideration of the MeTCs Order acquitting Daluraya,
said court reiterated and firmly clarified that the prosecution was not able to

13

establish that the accused was the driver of the Nissan Vanette which
bumped Marina Oliva and that there is no competent evidence on hand
which proves that the accused was the person responsible for the death of
Marina
Oliva.

physical injuries with the City Prosecutors Office of Manila against the
attending physicians.

Clearly, therefore, the CA erred in construing the findings of the MeTC, as

affirmed by the RTC, that Dalurayas acquittal was anchored on reasonable
doubt, which would necessarily call for a remand of the case to the court a
quo for the reception of Dalurayas evidence on the civil aspect. Records
disclose that Dalurayas acquittal was based on the fact that the act or
omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist in view of the
failure of the prosecution to sufficiently establish that he was the author of the
crime ascribed against him. Consequently,his civil liability should be deemed
as non-existent by the nature of such acquittal.

The case was initially filed in the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, but was
transferred to the RTC pursuant to Section 5 of Republic Act No. 8369 (The
Family Courts Act of 1997), where it was docketed as Criminal Case No. 01190889.

Judgment of the RTC

DR. FERNANDO P. SOLIDUM, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
G.R. No. 192123

On July 19, 2004, the RTC rendered its judgment finding Dr. Solidum guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of reckless imprudence resulting to serious
physical injuries. Accordingly, the bond posted by the accused for his
provisional liberty is hereby CANCELLED.

March 10, 2014

FACTS :
Upon motion of Dr. Anita So and Dr. Marichu Abella to reconsider their
solidary liability, the RTC excluded them from solidary liability as to the
damages.Accordingly, the bond posted by the accused for his provisional
liberty is hereby cancelled.

Gerald Albert Gercayo (Gerald) was born on June 2, 1992 with an

imperforate anus. Two days after his birth, Gerald underwent colostomy. On
May 17, 1995, Gerald, then three years old, was admitted at the Ospital ng
Maynila for a pull-through operation. Dr. Leandro Resurreccion headed the
surgical team, and was assisted by Dr. Joselito Luceo, Dr. Donatella Valea
and Dr. Joseph Tibio. The anesthesiologists included Dr. Marichu Abella, Dr.
Arnel Razon and petitioner Dr. Fernando Solidum (Dr. Solidum). During the
operation, Gerald experienced bradycardia, and went into a coma. His coma
lasted for two weeks, but he regained consciousness only after a month. He
could no longer see, hear or move.

Decision of the CA

On January 20, 2010, the CA affirmed the conviction of Dr. Solidum.

Dr. Solidum filed a motion for reconsideration, but the CA denied his motion
on May 7, 2010.22
Hence, this appeal.

Agitated by her sons helpless and unexpected condition, Ma. Luz Gercayo
(Luz) lodged a complaint for reckless imprudence resulting in serious

ISSUE :

14

Whether or not the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies in this case?

imprudence beyond reasonable doubt. Gaid v. People, G.R. No. 171636

defined negligence as the failure to observe for the protection of the interests
of another person that degree of care, precaution, and vigilance that the
circumstances justly demand, whereby such other person suffers injury.

Whether the CA correctly affirmed the conviction of Dr. Solidum for criminal
negligence?

The following are the elements of medical negligence: (1) the duty owed by
the physician to the patient, as created by the physician-patient relationship,
to act in accordance with the specific norms or standards established by his
profession; (2) the breach of the duty by the physician failing to act in
accordance with the applicable standard of care; (3) the causation, i.e., there
must be a reasonably close and causal connection between the negligent act
or omission and the resulting injury; and (4) the damages suffered by the
patient.

HELD:

The Court of Appeals decision is overruled.

TORTS: applicability of the Doctrine of Res Ipsa Loquitur
The Court held that the application the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur in the
case at bar is inappropriate. Res ipsa loquitur is literally translated as he
thing or the transaction speaks for itself.Jarcia, Jr. v. People, G.R. No.
187926 laid down that, here the thing which causes injury is shown to be
under the management of the defendant, and the accident is such as in the
ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have the
management use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence
of an explanation by the defendant, that the accident arose from want of
care.Hence, the requisites for the doctrine to apply are as follows: (1) the
accident was of the kind that does not ordinarily occur unless someone is
negligent; (2) the instrumentality or agency that caused the injury was under
the exclusive control of the person charged; and (3) the injury suffered must
not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution of the person
injured.

Most medical malpractice cases are highly technical, therefore, witnesses

with special medical qualifications must impart the knowledge necessary to
render a fair and just verdict. In the case at bar, there were no witnesses with
special medical qualifications in anesthesia presented. Hence, it is difficult to
assess whether the first three elements of medical negligence were present.
CRIMINAL LAW: subsidiary liability pursuant to Article 103 of the
Revised Penal Code
Ospital ng Maynila could not be held civilly liable because it was not a party
to the case. To hold it so would be to deny it due process of law.
Furthermore, before it can be held subsidiary liable, the conditions therefor
must first be established:(1) it must be a corporation engaged in any kind of
industry; (2) defendant must be shown to be an employee of the corporation
engaged in industry for profit; and (3) defendant must be insolvent.

Elements 2 and 3 were present in the case at bar. However, the first element
was undeniably wanting.

Applying the conditions in the case at bar, Ospital ng Maynila cannot be held
subsidiary liable because: (1) Ospital ng Maynila, being a public hospital,
was not engaged in industry conducted for profit but purely in charitable and
humanitarian work; (2) Dr. Solidumwas not an employee of Ospital ng
Maynila but a consultant; and (3) Dr. Solidum was not insolvent.

TORTS: elements of medical negligence

The Prosecution failed to prove the existence of the elements of reckless

15