1

Topic 3: Kepler, Einstein, and Simplicity

This essay aims to compare how Kepler and Einstein used the idea of simplicity in developing and
propounding their methods of inquiry. In doing so, the paper will consider how this use reflects each
authors view regarding the nature of the world, including what these imply both about the degree
to which we can understand it, and what the correct approach should be, in order to achieve the
best possible understanding.1 The first two sections discuss the role of simplicity in each authors
account: the source of the concept, the motivation for using it, and what this use entails about
world (and, therefore, the methodology of the enquiry). The third section involves a comparison
of each, highlighting the role of mathematics, and how the latter supports the use of simplicity by
both Kepler and Einstein.
The source of Keplers notion of simplicity is neither novel nor controversial, being essentially
the principle of parsimony. He introduces it by saying that "the most accepted axiom in the natural sciences [is] that Nature makes use of the fewest possible means. . . " (Kepler, 127). With this
statement, Kepler ascribes simplicity to the world itselfthe first of two roles carried out by the
conceptdeeming the former an intrinsic feature of the latter. His motivation for doing so, in part,
stems from his desire to undermine the Ptolemaic model, which "treats the individual planets separately and assigns causes to the motions of each in its own orb," and advance the heliocentric model,
which "deduces from a single common cause [viz., is simpler] those characteristics . . . common to
their motions" (p. 126). That is, he attacks the Ptolemaic view by pointing to the inadequacy
of a theory that posits "as many theories of the sun . . . as there are planets, when . . . a single
. . . theory suffices for the same task" (Kepler, 127). Further, his attribution of simplicity onto
the world appears again when he discusses the force responsible for heavenly motions, stating that
"the celestial machine is to be likened . . . to a clockwork. . . , insofar as . . . the . . . movements are
carried out by means of a single, quite simple magnetic force, as in . . . a clockwork all motions [are
caused] by a simple weight" (Kepler, 124, emphasis mine). Therefore, because the physical world
is simple, and the Ptolemaic model is complex, the latter cannot truly explain the former; therefore,
the simpler heliocentric theory is better at explaining planetary motion.
In addition to this metaphysical role, i.e., that of satisfying the axiom of parsimony, simplicity
plays a secondary, possibly more pivotal role, for Kepler: together with mathematics, it serves as
1

Given the importance of mathematics for both authors, it will be discussed jointly with the notion of simplicity.

the guarantor of our capacity to understand the world. That is, the assumption that nature is
simple undergirds Keplers conviction that we can understand it to the most fundamental level.
This idea is evidenced partly by the clockwork imagery above, in which the (observed/known)
simplicity of a clockwork is seen as analogous to the simplicity of the (not yet fully known) heavenly
motions.2 Kepler, then, explicitly affirms our capacity to understand the world when he states
"[t]hose laws [which govern the material world] lie within the power of understanding of the human
mind" (Kepler, 124), and this capacity, in turn, is intimately related to its3 mathematical structure:
"God, . . . founded everything . . . according to the norm of quantity . . . [and] has endowed man
with a mind which can comprehend these norms" (Kepler 123). For Kepler, the world is both simple
and fundamentally mathematical, and our mind is purposefully equipped to understand its basis, to
the point that "the purer our mathematics, the better our understanding of the world" (Andersen).
The close connection between simplicity, mathematics, and our capacity to understand the world,
then, segues into Einsteins account, which invokes these three concepts, but with different relations
standing between them.
For Einstein, contra Kepler, simplicity is not a feature of the world itself, but rather, (a desideratum) of the mathematics used to explain and understand it. The source of Einsteins simplicity
is, also unlike Keplers, somewhat novel (very likely part of his own contributions),4 as it was not
a purely axiomatic notion, like the principle of parsimony. Further, his motivation stems from a
general principle that he makes explicit as a working assumption: "the supreme goal of all theory
is to make the irreducible [non-inferential] basic elements as simple and as few as possible, without
surrendering . . . a single datum of experience" (Einstein, 301, emphasis mine).5 In other words,
Einsteins notion of simplicity applies to the explanatory dimensions of a theory (namely, the terms
used and the laws that relate them), and not the world itself. This is best exemplified by his statement "in Nature is actualized the ideal of mathematical simplicity," such that "pure mathematical
2

While this idea does not appear explicitly in many passages, it seems reasonable to believe that Kepler is relying
on the implicit assumption that the world is simple enough that we can, through mathematics, come to understand
it. Without this assumption, the world could still be mathematical, and God could have given us the faculty to
understand some of it, but not necessarily enough to understand all of it, which is his claim.
3
The worlds.
4
From the passage alone it is difficult to determine previous work he may have relied on, so, for the purpose of the
essay, Ill assume it was of Einsteins own devising.
5
Again, the Einstein piece had much less context than the Kepler, so, it is not as straightforward to determine a
nice, clean parallel to Keplers response to the Ptolemaic model. However, given the language of this quote, I believe
it presents a pretty strong candidate, if not the strongest, as a motivation.

construction enables us to discover the concepts and the laws connecting them" (Einstein, 302, emphasis mine). The emphasis on "ideal" intends to highlight at least three possible interpretations
of the word.6 The first use could be "ideal" as in "standard of perfection," such that, it is not
that nature is physically simple, but that it exhibits (or satisfies) the perfection of mathematical
simplicity (and therefore, it is explainable by relatively few/basic terms and laws, regardless of how
complex the world in fact is). Another use could be "ideal" as in "existing in the mind," like the
mathematical constructions which he conceives as "free inventions [of the human spirit]" (Einstein,
302). Finally, he could be using the word in both senses simultaneously, such that there is a harmony
between the mathematical simplicity attainable through the (correct) exercise of human reason, and
nature exhibiting a corresponding perfection.7 In addition, he further develops this motivation when
he states: "[i]t is essential . . . that we . . . arrive at these constructions . . . by . . . searching for the
mathematically simplest concepts and their connections" (Einstein, 303), therefore, again, Einsteins
guiding principle is not that the world is simple, but that in pursuing the "supreme goal" of any
theory, we should do so by striving for mathematical simplicity. As he so eloquently states, such a
"paucity of the mathematically existent simple [terms] and the relations between them, [underlies]
the justification for the theorists hope that he may comprehend reality in its depths" (Einstein,
303). Ultimately, then, Einstein propounds a method that aims for mathematically simple concepts
and laws to explain the world, and when we adhere to such a method, we can be confident in the
truth of our understanding.
Before comparing the differences between the notion of simplicity as used by Kepler and Einstein,
it is worth noting more general similarities between their accounts. First, for both Kepler and
Einstein, proper scientific enquiry is grounded in mathematics: Kepler exhibits this idea mainly
through his use of geometry to determine the orbits of the planets,8 while Einsteins most prominent
6

Though pinpointing exactly what Einstein meant would probably require reading other works, if it is possible at

all.
7

In the text, he develops this idea with several examples. Because I dont understand these well enough to discuss
them meaningfully in my paper, I will simply summarize them as him presenting very complicated problems on the
one hand, and how searching for the mathematically simplest relations on the other, led to the correct solutions at
the end of the enquiry.
8
In one of the readings not covered in class, Keplers commitment to mathematics is shown to be so unshakeable,
that even after arriving at the most accurate construction of Marss orbit at the time, accurate to 1/8th of a degree,
he rejected it (Kepler, 133). Granted, he was also committed to the accuracy of Brahes data, but if we grant that
assumption, Kepler was convinced that the math "had to work out" perfectly, otherwise, the entire endeavour was
misguided. One cant help but sympathize with him when he states "[w]ho would have thought it possible? This
hypothesis, so closely in agreement with the . . . observations, is nonetheless false" (Kepler, 133).

References

example is his conviction regarding pure mathematical constructions, and how these are the key to
understanding Nature. Secondly, for both, it is simplicity, joined with mathematics, that guarantees
our ability to understand the world: in Keplers account, this is evidenced through his appeal to
parsimony, and his notion of congruence between creation founded on mathematics, and reason as
the faculty to perceive it; for Einstein, the search for answers through mathematical simplicity is
what renders "thought competent [enough] to comprehend the real" (Einstein, 302). In contrast
with these two important similarities, however, lies the metaphysical difference behind each authors
understanding of simplicity: as stated earlier, Kepler attributes simplicity to the world, making an
a priori claim about its nature, thereby affirming the epistemic virtue of parsimony in a theory;
Einstein, on the other hand, makes no claim at all about the world, instead, he points at simplicity
as the guiding principle when devising mathematically-grounded theories about it. Despite this
singular, but nonetheless significant difference, simplicity is ultimately an epistemic virtue for both
authors, one inextricably tied to mathematics, that serves as the cornerstone for their scientific
endeavours.9

References

[Kepler]

Kepler, Johannes. Correspondence (Johannes Keplers Universe: Its Physics and

Metaphysics). Trans. Gerald Holton Philosophy of Science: An Historical Anthology. Ed. Timothy McGrew, Ed. Marc Alspector-Kelly and Ed. Fritz Allhoff.
1st ed. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009. 123-124. Print.

[Astronomia]

Kepler, Johannes. "Astronomia Nova." Trans. William H. Donahue Philosophy

of Science: An Historical Anthology. Ed. Timothy McGrew, Ed. Marc AlspectorKelly and Ed. Fritz Allhoff. 1st ed. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009. 125-132.
Print.

[New Astronomy] Kepler, Johannes. Astronomia Nova (Johannes Keplers New Astronomy) Trans
and Ed. William H. Donahue and Owen Gingerich Philosophy of Science: An
Historical Anthology. Ed. Timothy McGrew, Ed. Marc Alspector-Kelly and Ed.
Fritz Allhoff. 1st ed. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009. 133. Print.
[Einstein]

Einstein, Albert. "On the Method of Theoretical PHysics." Philosophy of Science:

An Historical Anthology. Ed. Timothy McGrew, Ed. Marc Alspector-Kelly and
Ed. Fritz Allhoff. 1st ed. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009. 300-303. Print.

Stated colloquially, great minds think alike.