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was lamenting the " weakening and general breakdown of the reason ",
the " diminution of the intelligence " in modern philosophy; and came
to a fine oratorical climax: "there is no longer anyone who thinks ... "
But a sharp Parisian pencil had noted in the margin: "Oh, but yes!
There is always Maritain!" One could not shake off the feeling that
that pencil had punctured a tyre.
Let it be remembered, however, that this Anti-Moderne was an early
book (1922). Maritain soon outlived" anti-modernity" and the laudatio
temporis actio In an article entitled "Cooperation philosophique et
justice intellectuelle", published in the Revue Thomiste, in 1946, he
wrote: "We must recognise that our contrary affirmations often bear
on different aspects of reality, and also that these are more important
than our mutual negations. Thus we will become capable of transcending
and dominating our own conceptual language ... so that, enriched by
the booty of other traditions, we may return to our own proper philosophical conceptualisation. . .. If we do not love the thought and
intellect of another as thought and as intellect, how will we take the
trouble to discover the truth amid its falsehood. The important thing
is to have respect for the intellect."
These are golden words. Mr. Mure would have written a far more
effective book had he written in their spirit. It shows little respect for
the thought and intellect of others to speak of contemporary British
analytical philosophy merely as a " Retreat from Truth "; as a " return
to our Humian vomit"; as" the return to a second childhood . . .
both otiose and tedious." J. B. Urmson in his Philosophical Analysis,
has written that "merely hostile criticism rarely has any effect in
philosophy"; and has shown that errors have been abandoned and
progress effected by analytic philosophers, not because of outside criticism but rather because of discussions within the movement. " The
objectors to analytic philosophy . . . were mostly too ignorant of the
precise doctrines of their opponents to put their objections in a form
which could have much effect upon them." Mr. Mure's polemic will
draw cheers only from his own ranks: the ranks of Tuscany will not
even understand the language. Instead of a philosophical discussion,
we have, as so often in modern philosophy, something more like a
slanging match. Philosophical discussion can take place only between
philosophers; in this case each disputant literally refuses to call the
other a philosopher; hence the dispute can only take the form of each
calling the other names.
It must, however, in fairness be granted that it was not Mr. Mure's
generation which first introduced anger into philosophical argument.
They were provoked by " angry young men" who persisted in drowning
their attempts at reasoning by ill-mannered shouts of" Nonsense". It
has been said (by Ayer himself) that the method of the Vienna Circle
"introduced a new spirit into philosophy, set a standard of logical
rigour and intellectual responsibility." But his critics have shown over
and over again that the notorious blunders of Language, Truth and Logic
were precisely logical blunders; and that its treatment of traditional
philosophy, of metaphysics, of theology and of ethics showed a quite
scandalous degree of intellectual irresponsibility. One main effect of
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that book was to introduce a new spirit of bad temper and violence,
of partisanship and of propaganda, which have made the past twenty
years a period of exceptional and unedifying bitterness in British philosophy.
The contemporary philosopher may protest that he is not a logical
positivist, and may disarmingly claim that as G. J. Warnock put it:
"The restrictive iconoclasm of Logical Positivism is quite alien to the
spirit of philosophy to-day." Yet one is often forced to the conclusion
that' logical analyst' is only' logical positivist' speit differently. Far
too often the admittedly disproved and allegedly abandoned positions
of the positivist are maintained as demonstrated truths by the analyst,
particularly on non-professional occasions; and are represented to mass
audiences as the firm and agreed findings of "modern philosophy".
As David Pole has written, in his recent book, The Later Philosophy
of Wittgenstein: "Wittgensteinians and latter-day linguistic philosophers
are apt to relapse into the bad habits of their positivist childhood and
to fall back on (the Verification Principle) in an emergency." Conclusions are being affirmed as dogmatically as ever, even though the
arguments formerly advanced for them have been exploded long ago.
I t looks as though many modern philosophers are more interested in,
and more certain of, their conclusions than their arguments. They
could take to themselves a sentence of Russell: "The finding of arguments for a conclusion given in advance is not philosophy but special
pleading." Russell wrote this about St. Thomas Aquinas. He did not,
of course, know what Thomism was, nor could he be bothered to find
out. He had concluded in advance that traditional philosophy, and
particularly metaphysics, was nothing but "two millennia of muddleheadedness. "
One can sympathise with the mood of exasperation in which Mure
writes: "No age but ours could have taken Mr. Russell's account of
the great thinkers in his major pot-boiler, The History of Western
Philosophy, for serious historical scholarship." For one who has respect
for the history of thought and who knows the meaning of metaphysics,
nothing is so exasperating as the couldn't-care-less cartoons presented,
in much contemporary philosophical writing, as classical philosophy or
as metaphysics. Schoolroom stereotypes, called" Plato", " Descartes",
the "official doctrine" or the "classic philosophers" are put up for
smart undergraduates to knock down with the gaiety of schoolboys
playing skittles. 'Metaphysics' has become a bad word; 'classic' a
term of disrepute. A Pelican philosopher, writing on Hume, has recently
introduced his book to the great public as showing how" the huge and
fantastic edifice of Ancient Metaphysics was already crumbling when
Hume, with a few shrewd blows, demolished it." So the propaganda
campaign against traditional philosophy goes on; repeating, with the
artfulness of an advertising' plug', that metaphysics is muddle, meaningless, fantastic, lest any non-conforming undergraduate be tempted to
find out for himself what it really meant and means; and declaring, in
the spirit of Henry Ford, that the history of philosophy is bunk, so that
no student who wishes to be modern would waste his time on it.
Can we blame Mure, and other philosophers outside the contemporary
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fact that there are stilI too many Oxford cliches which he has not yet
begun to criticise. The most important of these, one which is presupposed to much of his argument, is his conception of philosophy as having
" no destinations". "Philosophy is travel, but not arrival; search, but
not discovery; enquiry but not knowledge." This is not to be taken
in any dramatic existentialist sense, of philosophy as fa pensee interrogative, or as the metaphysical passion of man pour qui, dans son Etre,
if est question du Neant de son Etre. It has, instead, the tedious meaning
that philosophy deals only with "meta-questions"; that is to say,
philosophy does not arrive at knowledge, discover truths, utter propositions nor answer questions; it only dissolves the" problems and puzzles"
that arise when non-philosophers claim to have knowledge or to establish
truths, propositions and answers. "Philosophy has no subject-matter."
This is the currently agreed interpretation of Wittgenstein's dictum
that" philosophy is not a theory but an activity." It is to be hoped
that Wittgenstein meant something not quite so shallow. This is, anyhow, one of the most unquestioned of Oxford beliefs. It has the curious
sequel that Oxford philosophers contend that philosophy has no beliefs
and has no tendency to support or to disprove any" first-order" beliefs.
Philosophy, we are told, is "ideologically neutral". G. J. Warnock
has made one of the latest apologies for this point of view, in English
Philosophy since 1900. He has a sentence which deserves fame: "For
my own part I am inclined to think that they only need feel strongly
hostile to contemporary philosophy who have cause to fear or to dislike
a clear intellectual air and a low temperature of argument". When
this sentence is graven in appropriate bronze, let it have added, in lieu
of date, the words: "Published twelve months precisely after the controversy which followed Miss G. E. M. Anscombe's broadcast: 'Does
Oxford Moral Philosophy Corrupt Youth?' ". Perhaps, however, the
clear air and cool temperature are available only for "their sort" of
philosophers.
It is time that the claim of ideological neutrality was dropped. It
has long since been shatteringly refuted. As Mr. Stuart Hampshire said
in a symposium on "Philosophy and Beliefs" in The Twentieth Century,
in June 1955: "If you deal with a religious opponent by saying 'We
can't argue this, we are just made differently '-or if you say, 'We must
settle all moral questions for ourselves' -to assert or accept these as
truisms is itself a challenge to certain moral principles and religious
beliefs. . .. If we say, 'There is philosophy on the one side: my
attitudes on the other', we make philosophy a private game, or part
of the syllabus, and at the same time we trivialise our beliefs by calling
them' attitudes '."
Particularly untenable, in the light of recent discussion, is the claim,
which Mr. Mayo reiterates, that moral philosophy does not enunciate
moral principles nor affect moral practice. Moral philosophers, according
to his jargon, are doing top-tier thinking about moral problems;
moralists, who guide conduct, are middle-tier thinkers about morality;
moral agents, who perform morally, are too busy doing morals to think
about it at all. Moral-philosophical thinking is, therefore, twice removed
from moral reality. Was it Russell who spoke of " an idea so foolish
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" absolutist" ethics. If they did, it is hard to see how they could quote
and endorse, as Mr. Mayo does, these words of Mill: "Christian
morality (so-called) has all the characters of a reaction; it is in great
part a protest against Paganism. Its ideal is negative rather than
positive; passive rather than active; innocence rather than nobleness;
abstinence from evil rather than energetic pursuit of the Good; in its
precepts (as has been well said) 'Thou shalt not' predominates unduly
over 'Thou shalt ' .. " Whatever exists of magnanimity, highmindedness, personal dignity, even the sense of honour, is derived from the
purely human, not the religious part of our education, and never could
have grown out of a standard of ethics in which the only worth, professedly recognised, is that of obedience".
Mill is, unfortunately, not the last to have played the dodge of taking
all that is un-Christian in the lives of Christian people, calling this
Christianity, and condenming Christianity because of it; and, on the
other hand, selecting all that humanity has learned from Christianity
of "magnanimity, highmindedness, personal dignity and honour",
labelling this human, and claiming it for humanism against Christianity.
(Mrs. Margaret Knight is the latest example of this, claiming, in effect,
that Christianity should be scrapped and people should begin, instead,
to love one another!). How could Mill have been ignorant of the fact
that the precept of Christian ethics is the positive precept: "Thou shalt
love thy neighbour as thyself". How could modern liberals permit
themselves to say that observance of this precept is unreflective routine,
static conformism? The Sermon on the Mount will stand for all time
as a paradigm of moral progress, as compared with Jewish interpretation
of the Decalogue. It contains within itself the conditions of all conceivable moral progress, because it shows that the prohibitions of the
Decalogue are all founded on the positive precepts: Thou shalt love
thy neighbour as a brother in God; thou shalt respect him as a person,
an absolute value, with absolute rights, and thou shalt never do him
injustice or evil for any cause whatever. By no amount of moral progress will men ever come to the end of loving their fellow-men as they
love themselves. Absolutism in ethics is the very definition and condition
of moral progressivism.
If Mr. Mayo and others can speak of "absolutist morality" as
"tribal morality" and unreflecting conformism, it is because they are
misled by their long habit of representing morality as "keeping the
rules ", and of understanding moral rules as like the rules of a university
or club, the rules of the road or the rules of games. They forget that
every moral rule is, or is connected with a rule which enjoins love of
other persons; and therefore one can't keep moral rules passively,.
unreflectingly, effortlessly. Mr. Mayo is surely very mistaken when he
says that the good man conforms to moral principles without needing
to think of them; and that" moral principles operate only when they
are thought about, which is to say that they are either created or recreated by reflection on certain special occasions". We cannot attend
to persons without thought-that is what thoughtfulness means-and
every moral principle is referable to attending to persons. In that sense:
every moral action is a "special occasion". Nor can" absolutist"
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ethics permit of, much less cause-as Sartre never ceases to accuse it
of causing-smugness and self-righteousness: it is never possible to feel
that one has perfectly done justice to another as a person. Neither
can" absolutism" engender fanaticism: its spirit enjoins humility at
one's own failures, sympathy at the failures of others. The" rule" of
Christian ethics is a " golden rule ", which can never just be "kept ",
but can and must be always better kept. The essence of Christian
ethics-an absolutist and metaphysical ethics par excellence-is contained in the formula: "the moral rule is: Be ye perfect". How far
Mr. Mayo is from understanding moral rules is shown by this sentence:
"What do we mean by saying that the rule has been observed? I
suggest that we merely mean that it has not been broken".
One of the greatest defects of his ethics is that love has no place in
it, either as a precept or as a virtue. Love is indeed emplicitly excluded
from it: "Love is a personal relation which has nothing to do with
reasons. Morality has everything to do with reasons." Personal relations generally have nothing to do with morality: "they cannot be
controlled by morality because they cannot be controlled at all. . . .
They exist or occur; they are lived, experienced and they change; but
they are not controlled ". The term " personal relations " seems to be
employed in an unusual sense; but, if we were to protest that this
doctrine is frankly immoral, we are forestalled: immoral consequences
could not follow from a philosophical statement. And why?-Because
" it follows from Hume's principle (No moral conclusion can be drawn
from non-moral premises) that an analysis of morality cannot itself have
moral consequences, and cannot therefore have immoral ones either."
Which only proves that people who merely reproduce Hume, without
critically reflecting on the problems concealed by his sophistry, are, what
Miss Anscombe says Hume seems, "mere sophists ".
Many modern moral philosophers, both analysts and existentialists,
seem to regard the morality of rules as a " closed morality" in Bergson's
sense, which can become an " open morality" only by brave and above
all " sincere" "commitment" to new, anti-traditional, and yet "more
moral" rules. The situation has changed since A. D. Lindsay wrote
The Two Moralities (1940), contrasting the morality of " my station and
its duties", with the morality of " the challenge to perfection, or the
morality of grace, or ... the Sermon on the Mount." Nowadays perfection and grace are" metaphysical ", and the Sermon on the Mount
is "myth"; and the only hope for a "higher morality" is to
" transcend" "my station and its duties" towards, e.g., the higher
fidelity, which is adultery, the purer personal relationship, which is
homosexuality, the more perfect parenthood, which is artificial insemination, the more abounding mercy, which is mercy-killing.
The whole thing is a great muddle and a noxious form of cant.
Bergson does not plead for ouverture outside and beyond traditional
morality, but for an ouverture in or to traditional morality. No saint
or mystic ever got "outside" or "beyond" loving his neighbour as
himself. The saints and the mystics have realised "the challenge to
perfection" within" their station and its duties". There is only one
morality, and it is ouverture, opening the door of the ego towards other
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responsibility
is not a human attribute." The theory, of course,
has origins more remote than Prichard, and is already latent in " Hume'iil
principle". Miss Anscombe finds the theory of rootless " oughtness "
the cause of most of the muddle and error in British moral philosophy
since Hume. As the term" morally ought" is used by modem moral
philosophers, it suggests that an action, over and above the complete
factual description of it, must have some additional, special, moral
(non-factual) quality before we can call it " morally wrong" (or right).
This is why we can have such absurdities as Mr. Mayo's looking for
reasons to prove that it was " wrong" for Hitler to persecute the Jews.
It is as though " moral wrongness " had to be specially proved over and
above plain "wrongness". This is why Miss Anscombe bluntly urges
that, in the interests of clarity, the words" morally wrong ", etc. should
be banished provisionally from ethical discussion. "It would be a
great improvement", she says, "if, instead of 'morally wrong' one
always named a genus such as 'untruthful', 'unchaste', 'unjust '. We
should no longer ask whether doing something was 'wrong', passing
directly from some description of an action to this notion; we should
ask whether, e.g., it was unjust; and the answer would sometimes be
clear at once."
This correlates interestingly with Mr. Mayo's plea for the reintroduction into ethical language of" disposition-words" or, simply, the names
of virtues and vices. Because of the exclusion of these, much recent
ethics, he says, has proceeded as though morality was concerned only
with what one does, not with what one is; and as though" people
might well have no moral qualities at all except the possession of
principles and the will (and capacity) to act accordingly". This is an
interesting return to Aristotelian ethical concepts: it is interesting that
Prichard had "an extreme sense of dissatisfaction" with Aristotle's
Ethics.
Mr. Mayo introduces these concepts in the precise context of the
, classic' problem of how 'Reason' can control 'Passion'. (The
inverted commas are by Mayo and are an unmistakable sign that he
has been Ryled.) His treatment has merits, but is marred by the shallow
way in which he dismisses the alleged "obsolete metaphysics" of soul
which has been read into the experience of moral struggle. After Ryle,
he distinguishes two types of metaphysical 'myth': the Parts of the
Soul or 'para-political myth' of Plato; and the' para-mechanical myth'
of the Cartesians. He dismisses them both in favour of 'perfectly
unembarrassed' language, which in effect is a statement of the experience
of moral struggle with a refusal to give any account of the nature of
man who has this experience. Of the whole section, the kindest thing
we can say is that the Ryle treatment has made it virtually impossible
for Ryle's pupils ever to see Plato or Descartes 'straight' again, or to
think responsibly about the problems Plato or Descartes wrestled with.
But let us give Mr. Mayo credit for the sub-heading: "Towards a
New Humanism ", and the chapter-title: "Moral Principles and Moral
Man"; and indeed for the whole approach of his Part III. Mr. Mayo,
the analyst, and Mr. Mure, the idealist, both conclude that what is
lacking in current ethics is a doctrine of practical intell~ct or rational
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will. Mr. Mayo writes: "We must be able to show that (a moral
theory) can answer the double question: How can morality have an
intellectual aspect? and, How can morality have a practical, dynamic
aspect?" A Thomist cannot refrain from pointing out that St. Thomas
has a vital contribution to make here and that Thomism can help
contemporary philosophers to fill this lack.
The rediscovery by Mr. Mayo of traditional themes, spurned since
the damnatio memoriae of the idealists, is quite remarkable. It is an
event in British philosophy when a writer on ethics declares: "Ethical
theories both influence, and are influenced by, other ways of thinking
and, in particular, the way in which philosophers of a particular school
or generation tend to think about human beings-their way of answering
the old-fashioned but perennial question: 'What is the nature of man
and what is man's place in the Universe?' " . . . "Morality is something that satisfies the human predicament. We cannot live except by
principles. "
The last time we heard that in English was from the so-long-laughed-at
Idealists. F. H. Bradley, in Ethical Studies (1876) wrote: "If I am
asked why I am to be moral, I can say no more than this, that what I
can not doubt is my own being now, and that, since in that being is
involved a self, which is to be here and now, and yet in this here and
now is not, I therefore can not doubt that there is an end which I am
to make real; and morality, if not equivalent to, is at all events included
in this making real of myself. If it is absurd to ask for the further
reason of my knowing and willing my own existence, then it is equally
absurd to ask for the further reason of what is involved therein. The
only rational question here is, not Why? but What? What is the self
that I know and will? What is its true nature and what is implied
therein?" As Mr. Mure has shown, this is, in essence, the ethical
doctrine of "incomplete self-transcendence" of Plato and especially
Aristotle. We may compare Miss Anscombe's remark that, between
Plato and Aristotle and to-day, "philosophically there is a huge gap,
at present unfillable as far as we are concerned, which needs to be filled
in by an account of human nature, human action, the type of characteristic a virtue is and above all of human' flourishing '."
One can understand her pessimism. For the gap is " metaphysics"
and metaphysics is now a word for closuring enquiry and discussion.
The way of most analytic philosophers with metaphysical problems is
to look them squarely in the face, call them "metaphysical" in a
reproving tone of voice, and pass on to another subject. Professor
D. J. O'Connor, in his The Philosophy of Education, last year told
"students of education in universities and training colleges who would
otherwise have no formal contact with philosophy" that philosophy
" though it does not give us the answer (to the question of' the meaning
of life' or ' the meaning of existence ') does give us a reason for ceasing
to ask the question." So the Revolution in Philosophy, like so many
revolutions, has turned into a Restoration; in this case the Restoration
of the Pre-Socratics; or is it the Sophists? The unexamined life is
once again the life to live, and teach.
What is the reason for this avoidance of all metaphysical, and there-
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fore of all ultimate and deep questions in British philosophy and ethics'~
Surely it would .. argue a certain provinciality of mind" not to see
that this quite insularly British phenomenon is due, above all, to the
decline of religion and theology in modern Britain. Who could be so
naive as to think that one could entirely remove religion, as well as
the whole sphere of personal relations, including sexual behaviour, from
ethics, and leave ethics unchanged? Who could suppose that one could
exclude religious questions from philosophy and leave the philosophy
of human nature unchanged, or have any phiiOsophy of human nature
at all? Man is a religious questioner. Religious statements are answers
to questions that arise from "the human predicament", to questions
that define human nature. To cease to ask these questions is to cease
to understand man.
Sartre is profounder than the positivists when he defines man as the
passion for God; more logical than the logical analysts when he says
that if (or "since") God does not exist, man is absurd. The anti
religious scurrilities of Sartre are not, to the present reviewer, more
nauseating than such debonair disinvolvement as that of G. J. Warnock:
" Finally, there are, no doubt, in our 'climate of thought' many factors
of a more general kind that are in some way unfriendly to the metaphysical temperament. One might perhaps hazard the idea that metaphysical speculation has often arisen from, and often too been a substitute for, religious or theological doctrine. If so, it could be expected
to show some decline in a period when very many people neither have,
nor appear to be much oppressed by the want of, any serious religious
convictions. It is not obvious that, if this were so, it ought to be
deplored. It is, on the other hand, quite dear how undesirable it would
be for philosophers to pretend to suffer from cosmic anxieties by which
they were in fact not seriously troubled at all" (English Philosophy
since 7900).
Mr. Mure sees no hope of a revival of philosophy-" a new and
genuinely positive development of speculative thinking "-except in "a
new and genuine advance of the human spirit, which will not in its first
shape be philosophical." This will not be seen in Britain until the
religious question is again at least understood and taken seriously by
philosophers.
The Queen's University, Belfast
C. B.
DALY
10. The Computer and the Brain. JOHN VON NEUMANN. London: Oxford University Press. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1958.
Pp. 82. Price $3.
The recent death of Hungarian-born John von Neumann deprived
America of its leading expert on computer-design. This small book is
a posthumous editing of notes he had made for the 1956 Silliman
Lectures at Yale. In it he compares the components and mode of
activity of recent electronic computers with the known physiological
and anatomical details of the human brain. It is a fascinating topic,
but let it be said right away that for the reader who is not already