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Journal of the History of Philosophy, Volume 17, Number 4, October

1979, pp. 371-381 (Article)
3XEOLVKHGE\-RKQV+RSNLQV8QLYHUVLW\3UHVV
DOI: 10.1353/hph.2008.0080

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Forms, Types, and Tokens in

Aristotle's Metaphysics
D. K. MODRAK

ARE ARISTOTELIANFORMSuniversals or p a r t i c u l a r s ? This q u e s t i o n has received m u c h

a t t e n t i o n in recent discussions. ~Besides being i n t e r e s t i n g in its o w n right, the answer
is crucial to the i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of the central b o o k s of the Metaphysics, given the
interrelatedness of Aristotle's n o t i o n s of form, s u b s t a n c e , essence, a n d definition. If,
for example, the correct answer is that forms are universals, Aristotle m a y be in difficulty, for he denies that universals are substances, a n d he identifies substance with
form. 2 T h u s , Aristotle seems to hold that (1) n o u n i v e r s a l is a substance a n d that (2)
some universals (i.e., forms) are substances. If such a c o n t r a d i c t i o n is at the heart of
his theory o f substance, it would seem to be in t r o u b l e . If we seek to avoid this difficulty by m a k i n g forms individuals as Edwin H a r t m a n does in a recent paper, ~ we
also end up with conflicting doctrines: a t h i n g ' s s u b s t a n c e or form is identical with
its essence, the f o r m u l a of which is its d e f i n i t i o n . ' If forms are particulars, then the
objects of definition would be particulars, b u t A r i s t o t l e insists that definition is of
the universal. ~
W h a t is needed, then, is an i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of f o r m s that allows them to be the
objects of knowledge and definition (i.e., universals) a n d at the same time avoids the
c o n t r a d i c t i o n m e n t i o n e d above. My p r o p o s a l is to distinguish between s u b s t a n c e
types and other universals, which I shall call universalsp, and to identify forms with
substance types. T h e c o n t r a d i c t i o n we generated a b o v e from the thesis that forms
are universals is resolved because 1 asserts that n o universalp is a substance, a n d 2
asserts that forms are s u b s t a n c e types. The o b j e c t of this paper is to show that this is
Aristotle's p o s i t i o n and that c o n s e q u e n t l y his t h e o r y of forms is m u c h more c o h e r e n t
a n d philosophically satisfying t h a n is frequently realized. Finally, I hope to show

James H. Lesher summarizes the contemporary dispute nicely in "Aristotle on Form, Substance, and
Universals: A Dilemma," Phronesis 16 (1971):169-78.
2Aristotle asserts that universals cannot be substances at 1003a7, 1038b7-12, 1038b35, 1060b21, 1087a2,
alOft, 1087a10ft., and thal what is common cannot be a substance at 1040b23. He identifiessubstance with
form at 1028a28, 1032bl-2, 1033b17, 1035b14ff., 1037a27ff., 1047a27, 1041b6, and 1050b2. If a solution is
not found, we may have to concur with Geach's assertion that "'there is hardly a statement about form in
the Metaphysics that is not (at least verbally) contradicted by some other statement" (G. E. M. Anscombe
and P. T. Geach, Three Philosophers (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1961), p. 75.
"Aristotle on the Identity of Substance and Essence," Philosophical Review 85 (1976):545-66.
' The relation of essence, or definition, to substance is discussed at 1029b20; 1030b5; 1031al, 10,18;
1031b32; and 1039a20. The relation of form to definition and essence is discussed at 1035a21, 1029bl-3,
1036a29, 1043bl, and 1044a10. (See n. 2 above on the identification of form with substance.)
' 1036a28-20, 1040al-7, 1059b25. Cf. 1018b33. See also 1060b20-23 and 1087a10, which say that the
objects of knowledge are universals.
[371]

372

H I S T O R Y OF P H I L O S O P H Y

why Aristotle's objections to Platonic forms as substances cannot be turned against

his own conception of forms.
I.
If, like Aristotle, we divide the world into substances and attributes, we are
likely to associate the former with individuals and the latter with universals.
However, we should be wary of attributing this position to Aristotle. In the Categories, he treats these as separate distinctions and divides both the substance category and the attribute category, namely the category that includes any item that is
present in a subject, into individuals and universals. He distinguishes between
primary substances, which are concrete individuals (e.g., this man), and secondary
substances, which are the genera and species of these individuals (e.g., man);
between individual attributes (e.g., this white) and universal attributes (e.g., white). 6
This conception of primary and secondary substances is not found in the Metaphysics, but Aristotle continues to hold that the s p e c i e s - n o w construed as the f o r m - - o f
the composite individual is a substance, as well as the individual3 The form, since it
is exemplified by all the members of the same species, is a universal in the ordinary
sense. Aristotle, however, distinguishes between the form, that is, the essence of a
thing, and other universals in the central books of the Metaphysics. The former is
what a thing is said to be in itself (kath'hauto); it does not imply the presence of one
thing in another as substratum. The latter is said of an underlying substratum (kath"
hupokeimenou), either incidentally (kata sumbebekos) or through a shared attribute

(kattl metochen).*

In Book Zeta, Aristotle associates forms and essences with universals when he
talks about definition and distinguishes between them when he asks whether universals are substances.* In answering the latter question Aristotle is concerned to build a
case against " t h o s e who say that the Ideas are substances" (1039a25). As Aristotle
understands their (the Platonists's) position, universals are necessarily c o m m o n
properties that presuppose the existence of individuals, for a universal is truly predicated of an individual just in case the individual participates in the appropriate form.
For example, an individual is an animal just in case that individual participates in
the form of Animal-Itself, and this individual will share this property with any other
individual who is also an animal as well as with all the species of animals. Accordingly, universals are described as things belonging universally (ton katholou huparchonton) and as things predicated in c o m m o n (ton koine kategoroumenon). ,o
Aristotle takes the Platonic conception of a universal as a c o m m o n property and
shows that so construed universals cannot b e substances. Zeta 13 sets out the differences between substances and universals: (1) A substance does not belong to many
9 la20-b9. For o u r present purposes, it is not necessary to decide whether the objects in the nonsubstance category that Aristotle describes as present in a subject but not said o f a subject are individuals,
a s J. L. A c k r i l l argues (Aristotle's "'Categories" and "'De Interpretatione'" [Oxford: O x f o r d University
Press, 1963], pp. 74-76), o r whether they are universals, as G. E. L. Owen argues ( " I n h e r e n c e , "
Phronesis 10 [1955l : 97-105).
' The locution " p r i m a r y substance" (prote ousia) is found in the Metaphysics (1032b3, 1037a3,
1037a38, 1037b3-5), but it is not used as in the Categories for the concrete individual (cf. 1037a5-bT).
i 1029b14, 1030a14, 1032a5, 1035628, 103763-4, 1038b13-1039al.
9 See 1032634 and 1036a28 on forms as objects of definition and universals. See 1028b34ff. and 103862-8
for the treatment of the universal (to katholou) as a distinct candidate for substance.
~0 1038b35, 1038b11, 1039al.

ARISTOTLE'S

METAPHYSICS

373

t h i n g s ; a u n i v e r s a l d o e s . (2) A s u b s t a n c e is n o t said o f a s u b s t r a t u m ; a u n i v e r s a l is.

(Since A r i s t o t l e a l l o w s m a t t e r t o b e t h e s u b s t r a t u m o f s u b s t a n c e , t h e i m p o r t o f t h e
p h r a s e kath" hupokeimenou h e r e mflst b e " o f a s u b s t r a t u m o f p r o p e r t i e s . " ) ~' (3) A
s u b s t a n c e is a this (tode tO; a u n i v e r s a l is a s u c h (toionde).)2 A r i s t o t l e a l s o a r g u e s
t h a t w e r e t h e u n i v e r s a l a s u b s t a n c e , t h e n q u a l i t y (poion) o r a t t r i b u t e s (pathS) w o u l d
be p r i o r to s u b s t a n c e ( 1 0 3 8 b 2 5 - 2 8 ) . T h e use o f p o i o n , pathS, a n d toionde m a k e s it
c l e a r t h a t t h e u n i v e r s a l u n d e r d i s c u s s i o n is t a k e n to be an a t t r i b u t e . ,3
T h e c o n c e p t i o n o f a u n i v e r s a l in Zeta 13 is g i v e n b y t h e c o n j u n c t i o n o f 1, 2, a n d 3.
A r i s t o t l e t h i n k s t h a t P l a t o is c o m m i t t e d to this c o n c e p t i o n o f a u n i v e r s a l a n d uses it
to a r g u e a g a i n s t h i m . S i n c e this is a special sense o f u n i v e r s a l , A r i s t o t l e ' s a r g u m e n t s
a g a i n s t i d e n t i f y i n g ( P l a t o n i c ) u n i v e r s a l s w i t h s u b s t a n c e s d o n o t r u l e o u t t h e possibility o f t h e i d e n t i f i c a t i o n o f s u b s t a n c e w i t h a n o n - P l a t o n i c u n i v e r s a l t h a t is n o t a
p r o p e r t y . W e n e e d n o t t a k e A r i s t o t l e ' s p o i n t t o be t h a t o n l y c o n c r e t e i n d i v i d u a l s are
substances.
In t h e logical treatises, A r i s t o t l e uses u n i v e r s a l (katholou) as t h e c o m p l e m e n t o f
i n d i v i d u a l (kath" hekaston). In De Interpretatione 7, h e says, " O f t h i n g s s o m e a r e
u n i v e r s a l , o t h e r s i n d i v i d u a l (I call u n i v e r s a l t h a t w h i c h is by its n a t u r e p r e d i c a t e d o f
a n u m b e r o f t h i n g s , a n d i n d i v i d u a l t h a t w h i c h is n o t ; for e x a m p l e , m a n is a u n i v e r sal, Callias a n i n d i v i d u a l ) " (17a38-41). A r i s t o t l e ' s c o n c e p t i o n o f a u n i v e r s a l h e r e is
s u c h t h a t we c o u l d revise his d e f i n i t i o n o f u n i v e r s a l to r e a d : t h e u n i v e r s a l is o f s u c h a
n a t u r e as to be e x e m p l i f i e d by m a n y t h i n g s . S i n c e t h e r e v i s e d d e f i n i t i o n s e e m s to fit
the s t a n d a r d c o n c e p t i o n o f u n i v e r s a l s , I shall use " u n i v e r s a l " f o r a n y t h i n g t h a t satisfies it. In t h e Metaphysics, A r i s t o t l e r e t a i n s t h e b r o a d n o t i o n o f u n i v e r s a l in discuss i o n s o f k n o w l e d g e a n d d e f i n i t i o n b u t a l s o i n t r o d u c e s , in a n t i - P l a t o n i s t d i s c u s s i o n s ,
a n a r r o w e r c o n c e p t i o n o f u n i v e r s a l a c c o r d i n g to w h i c h a u n i v e r s a l is t h a t w h i c h is
said o f s o m e t h i n g else a n d is a m o d i f i c a t i o n o f a s u b s t r a t u m . " T h i s c o n c e p t i o n o f a
u n i v e r s a l , w h i c h fits t h e p r o p e r t i e s o f s u b s t a n c e s b e s t , I s h a l l label universalp. '~

" 1038b15; cf. 1029a23, 1049a26. M. J. Woods makes a similar argument in his insightful paper
"Problems in Metaphysics Z, Chapter 13," in J. M. E. Moravcski, ed., Aristotle (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1967). He differs from me in holding that in Zeta 13, Aristotle distinguishes
between ta katholou, which include Aristotelian forms, and ta katholou legomena, which do not, whereas
I think that Aristotle simply uses a restricted notion of universal in arguing against the Platonic
conception of substance.
" There is one passage in Zeta (1033621-26) where Aristotle speaks of the form as a such, but the
"form" that is so characterized is not the substantial form but the form as a conception in the artisan's
mind or as transmitted by the sperm. In these cases the "form" can be looked upon as a potential qualification of the artisan's materials or of an ovum. In the case of sperm, Aristotle makes this same point elsewhere by saying that the form is potentially in the sperm (1034a35, 1049a13).
,1 Cf. Pseudo-Alexander's paraphrase: "hoti ouden ton koinei kategoroumenon semainei to tode ti alia
toionde kai poion" (In Aristotelis Metaphysica Commentaria, ed. M. Hayduck [Berlin, 1891], 494.22).
See also 1049alS-bl where Aristotle says that the matter of a thing is not a this but a that (ekeininon) to
call attention to the matter of a thing being like an attribute in being demarcated by the thing it constitutes, as, for instance, the wood of this casket (cf. 1033a7).
" A t 1060b19-21, Aristotle seems to use katholou in both senses. However, this passage, like the closing
passage of Zeta 13, is designed to raise a puzzle about the intelligibility of substance: How can substance
be know if it is a this and the object of knowledge is a universal and a such? Aristotle's answer turns on
making the distinction between universal and universalp, but he exploits the ambiguity of his use of universal in formulating the puzzle.
'~ Cf. Cat. 3b10-23. In The Theory of Universals (Oxford; Oxford University Press, 1952), R. 1. Aaron
argues for a distinction between universals that are substances and universals that are qualities. He seems
to be unaware that Aristotle made a similar distinction (see pp. 217-19).

374

HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY

A r i s t o t l e ' s claim that n o universal is a s u b s t a n c e t u r n s o u t to be the claim that n o

universalp is a s u b s t a n c e . '~ This w o u l d be c o m p a t i b l e with forms being universals
a n d the s u b s t a n c e o f individuals.
!I.
Aristotle takes the form of a t h i n g to be its s t r u c t u r e or o r g a n i z a t i o n a n d its
m a t t e r to be that in which the structure is manifested: the m a t t e r of a house is the
materials o f which it is c o m p o s e d ; its form, the a r r a n g e m e n t of these materials such
that it is a house. T h e matter of a syllable is its letters; the form, the a r r a n g e m e n t of
these such that it is a syllable.'7 A l t h o u g h Aristotle f r e q u e n t l y uses artifacts, such as
b r o n z e spheres a n d houses, to illustrate the m a t t e r - f o r m d i s t i n c t i o n , he expresses
u n c e r t a i n t y as to whether the forms o f artifacts are c a p a b l e of separate existence as
full-fledged substances. '~ He decides that they are n o t . ,9 T h e p a r a d i g m cases of sensible s u b s t a n c e s are n a t u r a l things. '~ The forms of these are said to be capable of
separate existence, u n g e n e r a t e d and i n d e s t r u c t i b l e . " T h e form o f a living creature is
the o r g a n i z a t i o n o f its m a t t e r such that it is c a p a b l e of such vital f u n c t i o n s as n u t r i tion a n d r e p r o d u c t i o n . W h e n the a n i m a l ceases to be c a p a b l e o f such f u n c t i o n s it is
n o longer the same s u b s t a n c e . Aristotle insists that a dead m a n is n o t a m a n a n d for
this r e a s o n rejects the identification of form with c o n f i g u r a t i o n . 2' He opts instead for
the identification of form with the soul as the c o m p l e x o f vital c a p a c i t i e s . "
T h e form of a n y i n d i v i d u a l living thing is typical of its species; that is, the funct i o n a l o r g a n i z a t i o n as such of any two m e m b e r s of the s a m e species will be the same.
Socrates a n d Callias are the same by form, Aristotle s a y s . " His p o i n t seems to be
this: if we look at the f u n c t i o n a l o r g a n i z a t i o n of Socrates or of Callias as these are in
themselves, there will be n o c o n c e p t u a l g r o u n d s o n which to distinguish between
them.
T h e form as a type of functional o r g a n i z a t i o n is exemplified by a n u m b e r of individuals a n d as such is a universal. F o r m s , however, are n o t c o m m o n properties or
universalsp, because forms are n o t predicated of i n d i v i d u a l s . 2' Were forms
predicated of i n d i v i d u a l s , they, like a t t r i b u t e s , w o u l d p r e s u p p o s e i n d i v i d u a t i o n .
" Woods ("Problems in Metaphysics Z") recognizes that Aristotle employs a restricted notion of
universal in Zeta 13. This is an important first step, but a more detailed account of the grounds of the distinction between forms and other universals is needed. Aristotle distinguishes between these cases,
because he takes the predication of properties of substances (as indicated by katholou legomenon, koine
kategoroumenon, koinon and katholou huparchonton, legomenon kath" hupoleimenou and sometimes
katholou) and the classification of individuals according to their forms (as indicated by legomenon kath"
hauto and iegomenon hos katholou) to be two distinct operations.
" 1041b12-34, 1043a30-b23. My characterization of forms is stated for forms of particular substances
containing matter. If the prime mover of Book Lambda is a pure form--which I am inclined to
doubt-my characterization would have to be modified to fit this case.
" Aristotle uses artifacts to illustrate the distinction between matter and form at 1033a13-blS,
1036a21-28, 1041a26, 1043a7-20, and 1043b7-9. He expresses reservations about the ontological status of
these forms at 1033b20.
" 1043b21, 1060b27, 1070a15, 999bl6-20.
~0 1032al8-20, 1034a2-8, 1043623-24, De An. 412al2-16; cf. 1070a20-21.
2, 1043b17. Aristotle also makes this claim at 1033b17in a discussion of artifacts, but since he questions
the separate existence of artifact forms at b20, it seems reasonable to read b17 as a remark about substantial forms that applies to artifact forms only if they are substantial forms.
~ Part. An. 640635--641a17. Cf. 1035b25, 1036b30-32.
2~ 1035b15, 1037a5; De An. 412a20; Part. An. 641a17-20, 645b14-20,
2, 1033b31, 1034a7, Gen. An. 730635. The distinction between numerical and specific sameness is also
stated at Top. 103all, Gen. Corr. 338bl3, and 1016b32.
2~ 1049a34-36. Aristotle's denial that forms are predicated of individuals seems to conflict with our
claim that forms are universals in the De lnterpretatione sense, since Aristotle also describes universals as

ARISTOTLE'S METAPHYSICS

375

However, the form individuates in that the form constitutes the i n d i v i d u a l . The form
is the s u b s t a n c e of the i n d i v i d u a l ; it makes it the k i n d of thing it is. 2~ In the one
passage where Aristotle speaks of the p r e d i c a t i o n of forms, he makes m a t t e r the subs t r a t u m . 2' Elsewhere he distinguishes between being a s u b s t r a t u m for attributes
(pathS) a n d being a s u b s t r a t u m for a n actuality (entelecheia) (1038b4-6). The form
as s u b s t a n c e is not said o f a s u b s t r a t u m (me k a t h ' h u p o k e i m e n o u ) . 2s Since form is
predicated o f m a t t e r a n d matter as sheer potentiality is u n i n d i v i d u a t e d , forms are
n o t predicated of individuals a n d hence c a n n o t be universalsp. For similar reasons,
the form is n o t a such, because it constitutes the i n d i v i d u a l a n d hence is ontologically
p r i o r to the i n d i v i d u a l ' s attributes.
F o r m s are universals but n o t universalsp. F o r this reason, the r e l a t i o n s h i p between
a thing a n d the form that constitutes it is not the same as the r e l a t i o n s h i p between a
t h i n g and its properties, for Aristotle. T h e type of f u n c t i o n a l o r g a n i z a t i o n an individual exhibits a c c o u n t s for its h a v i n g certain properties in c o m m o n with other
m e m b e r s o f the same species, b u t its o r g a n i z a t i o n is not a c o m m o n p r o p e r t y . 29
Aristotle frequently compares the a r r a n g e m e n t of the letters of a syllable to the form
of a thing. This suggests that the r e l a t i o n s h i p between a n A r i s t o t e l i a n form as a type
of f u n c t i o n a l o r g a n i z a t i o n a n d the i n d i v i d u a l s that are so organized is like the relat i o n s h i p between a word a n d its occurrences; that is, it is like the relationship
between type a n d token, which we m i g h t want to treat as a special case o f the relat i o n s h i p between universal a n d p a r t i c u l a r . 3~Aristotle does n o t talk a b o u t types a n d
t o k e n s . H e m a k e s the same distinction by distinguishing between the f o r m u l a of the
essence in m a t t e r (logos syn tei hylet) a n d the f o r m u l a in itself (logos haplos). 3, The
former is a particular, organized b o d y , for example, Socrates; the latter is the type of
o r g a n i z a t i o n exemplified b y this b o d y .
Aristotle says that the letters are parts of the f o r m u l a of a syllable, but particular
waxen letters or p a r t i c u l a r m o v e m e n t s in air are not parts of the f o r m u l a
(1035a10-15). T h a t is, cat, as the a r r a n g e m e n t of the letters c, a, t, is the simple forpredicated of many there. This di~culty is resolvable on the recognition that Aristotle uses "predicated
of" as equivalent to "exemplified by" in the De lnterpretatione. In the Metaphysics where Aristotle is
concerned with the ontological implications of predication, he distinguishes between the predication of
universalspof many distinct things and the predication of forms of matter (cf. 1038b4-6).
26 1032bl-2, 1033b17, 1037a27-32, 104163-9, 1050b2.
~' 1049a34-36. Aristotle says the form is predicated of material substance (ousia hylikt), so one might
think that ousia hylik~ means substance containing matter. There are good reasons for rejecting this view:
(l) ousia hylik~ is not used elsewhere for the composite of matter and form; (2) Aristotle distinguishes
between matter as substratum and the composite as substratum elsewhere (1029a2-5, 1029a23-24,
1038b4-6); and (3) ousia hylik~ seems well suited to express Aristotle's view that matter is substance
(1042a32).
zs 1029a23, 1043a6, 1049a34-36. Cf. 1037b3-4.
~' For an interesting treatment of form as functional organization, see Joan Kung's paper, "Two Uses
of 'That-for-the-Sake-of-Which' in Aristotle's Biology," delivered at the APA Western Division, 75th
Annual Meeting. Cf. Wilfrid Sellar's argument that the form for which the common name stands determines the common attributes of species members but is not identical to these attributes ("Substance
and Form in Aristotle," Journal of Philosophy 54 [1957]:688-99).
~~The relationship between type and token would seem to be a special case because the instantiation of
the universal is constitutive of the individual in a very strong sense. Cf. An. Post. 100al5-bl where
Aristotle says that although we perceive the individual, perception is of the universal, e.g., of man. Having arrived at this interpretation independently, I was pleased to find that M. J. Woods also says that a
form is like a word (type) in his suggestive paper "Substance and Essence in Aristotle," P.A.S. 75
(1974-75):167-80. Unfortunately, he does not develop this important insight.
J~ I039621-23;cf. 1033al--4;1035a22-23. Aristotle makes it clear that Iogos syn tei hylei refers to a concrete substance at 1039b21 and not to a universal t'fiat mentions matter by saying that substance as Iogos
sun tei hylei is subject to generation and destruction.

3"/6

HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY

m u l a ; as t h e a r r a n g e m e n t o f the letters c, a, t, which are ink m a r k s o n this page, it is

the f o r m u l a in m a t t e r . S i m i l a r l y , the f o r m u l a o f the essence o f a living t h i n g also
c o n t a i n s a reference to s o m e m a t t e r , which is so o r g a n i z e d , but not to the p a r t i c u l a r
m a t t e r . 32 K n o w l e d g e p e r t a i n s to the simple f o r m u l a , b e c a u s e its o b j e c t s m u s t always
r e m a i n the s a m e , a n d living things a r e subject to g e n e r a t i o n a n d c o r r u p t i o n as are
w o r d - t o k e n s . 33
Since m e m b e r s o f the s a m e species exhibit t h e s a m e t y p e o f f u n c t i o n a l o r g a n i z a tion, that is, a r e t h e s a m e b y form (eiderS, A r i s t o t l e needs s o m e g r o u n d s for distinguishing b e t w e e n i n d i v i d u a l s o f the s a m e species. H e says t h a t t h e y differ in
m a t t e r , e' It is n o t i m m e d i a t e l y o b v i o u s w h y A r i s t o t l e h o l d s this view. In the first
place, if the s t a t e m e n t that the t w o i n d i v i d u a l s are the s a m e by f o r m m e a n s t h a t they
exhibit the s a m e t y p e o f f u n c t i o n a l o r g a n i z a t i o n , then since t h e y a r e m a d e up o f the
s a m e t y p e o f m a t t e r , o n e c o u l d say that they are the s a m e b y m a t t e r as well. 35
S e c o n d l y , the f o r m i n d i v i d u a t e s in the sense t h a t it is r e s p o n s i b l e for t h e t h i n g ' s
existing as an i n d i v i d u a l . A r i s t o t l e ' s reason for saying that i n d i v i d u a l s differ b y
m a t t e r seems to be this: t h o s e characteristics by which we d i s t i n g u i s h b e t w e e n individuals o f the s a m e t y p e are characteristics t h a t d e p e n d u p o n their h a v i n g m a t t e r , t h a t
is, s p a t i a l - t e m p o r a l l o c a t i o n , m a g n i t u d e , s h a p e , d e n s i t y , a n d so o n . Since at least
s o m e o f these c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s seem to be p r o p e r t i e s o f t h e m a t t e r o f t h e i n d i v i d u a l ,
they c o u l d p r o v i d e a basis for saying, for instance, t h a t m y m a t t e r differs f r o m y o u r s
o r that y o u a n d I differ in m a t t e r . T h e r e a r e no c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s a s s o c i a t e d with m y
form as such t h a t w o u l d allow us to distinguish m y f o r m f r o m y o u r s .
T o w h a t e v e r extent it m a k e s sense to s p e a k o f o u r h a v i n g different f o r m s , it is in
virtue o f o u r m a t t e r . M y f o r m differs from y o u r s in being the o r g a n i z a t i o n o f a different h u m a n b o d y . T h e r e are no characteristics b e l o n g i n g to the o r g a n i z a t i o n as such
t h a t w o u l d a l l o w us to distinguish m y f u n c t i o n a l o r g a n i z a t i o n f r o m y o u r s , a l t h o u g h
we can d i s t i n g u i s h b e t w e e n the o r g a n i z a t i o n o f h u m a n b o d i e s a n d o f b o v i n e b o d i e s
on the basis o f o r g a n i z a t i o n . This also explains w h y A r i s t o t l e d i s t i n g u i s h e s between
the species a n d g e n e r a o f living things; once we arrive at the species we c a n d r a w no
further d i s t i n c t i o n s in t e r m s o f t h e f u n c t i o n a l o r g a n i z a t i o n . '~
Since, if f o r m s a r e i n d i v i d u a l s , they c a n n o t be identified with t h e f u n c t i o n a l
o r g a n i z a t i o n o f living things, we s h o u l d c o n s i d e r t h o s e p a s s a g e s t h a t seem to suggest
that forms a r e i n d i v i d u a l s . T h e least a m b i g u o u s o f these p a s s a g e s is f o u n d at
1071a27-28:
And of things in the same species, these are different not by species [eider] but because the
[cause] of one individual differs from that of another, as your matter and the form and the
moving principle and my matter."
" 1035b27, 1036b3-5.
" 1036a6, 1036a29, 1040al-7, 1059b25, 999a26-29.
1, 1034a6, 1035b31.
~' Unlike artifacts, biological individuals share their type of material as well as their type of organization with the other members of their species. However, Aristotle may think that any being that was
organized as a human being would be a human irrespective of the type of material that was so organized
(see 1036b3-5).
~' 1018b5, 1038a26.
" Reading allou allo for allo with Ross. However, his translation of "he se hyle kai to eidos kai to
kinesan and he eme" as "your matter and form and moving cause being different from mine" is misleading.

ARISTOTLE'S METAPHYSICS

377

This passage is n o t decisive. It may suggest that your form a n d m o v i n g principle are
different from m i n e , but it definitely emphasizes the peculiarity of our bodies by
using possessive p r o n o u n s with m a t t e r (hyle) only. j~ In a n o t h e r passage, Aristotle
uses the phrase, p a r t i c u l a r f o r m u l a ( h o d e ho logos), for the form of an i n d i v i d u a l . ' 9
In these passages, Aristotle is concerned with p a r t i c u l a r i n d i v i d u a l s ; since the analysis of a concrete i n d i v i d u a l yields a form a n d some m a t t e r , Aristotle uses adjectives
like idion a n d h o d e to indicate that he is talking a b o u t the o r g a n i z a t i o n of this
i n d i v i d u a l or of that i n d i v i d u a l . This does not indicate that the form is a particular. ~176
A n o t h e r passage, which is cited by p r o p o n e n t s of i n d i v i d u a l forms, is 1039b25,
where Aristotle says that it is not (a) the being of house (to oikiai einaO that is generated, but (b) the being of this house (to teide tei oikiai [einat]). T h e c o n s t r u c t i o n used
here, to einai with the dative, is frequently used by Aristotle for essence, so it is n o t
u n r e a s o n a b l e to take b to m e a n the essence of a p a r t i c u l a r h o u s e as distinguished
from a the universal essence. However, since Aristotle says that b is g e n e r a t e d - a
point which he makes a b o u t the c o m p o s i t e of m a t t e r a n d form in the immediately
preceding lines a n d e l s e w h e r e - h e might m e a n by b n o t the essence of a p a r t i c u l a r
house b u t simply its being an object in the world. E v e n if we take b to assert the
existence o f a particular essence of an artifact, we c a n n o t generalize from b to an
a r g u m e n t for i n d i v i d u a l forms since the essences of artifacts are n o t substances
(I043b23). O n e might speculate that A r i s t o t l e ' s reservations a b o u t the metaphysical
status of the forms of artifacts m a y in part turn o n his r e c o g n i t i o n that the essence of
a n artifact-type, for example, a house, u n d e r d e t e r m i n e s the o r g a n i z a t i o n of its
tokens so that there m a y be some basis for d i s t i n g u i s h i n g between the o r g a n i z a t i o n
of this h o u s e a n d the o r g a n i z a t i o n of that house.
P e r h a p s the strongest a r g u m e n t against forms as i n d i v i d u a l s is A r i s t o t l e ' s insistence u p o n distinguishing between the actuality, or s u b s t a n c e , of a composite and
the c o m p o s i t e itself. For example, he distinguishes b e t w e e n the circle as the actuality
of a b r o n z e circle and the bronze circle a n d between " b e i n g a m a n " and " m a n . '''~
The i n d i v i d u a t i o n of forms would require that they c o n t a i n m a t t e r , as H a r t m a n
recognizes, but then the distinction between the f o r m a n d the composite is
threatened. "2 T h e c o m p o s i t e , like the form, need not c o n t a i n a n y particular bit of
~' It might be argued that the identification of form with soul, which makes it the principle of motion of
a living thing, supports the view that the form of a living thing is peculiar to it. Against this, one should
notice that the form is the principle of motion qua the principle of organization of an organism that is
capable of nutrition, growth, self-movement, and so on.
)' 1035b27-30. Aristotle uses idion eidos (particular form) at 1071a14, but here it clearly refers to the
species-form. This is obvious from his describing the matter of a human being as fire and earth; he would
not take the particular matter of a person to be fire and earth.
,a To argue on the basis of these passages that Aristotelian forms are particulars confuses the fact that
Aristotle sometimes finds it convenient to talk about the form of this thing with the position that the form
is thereby particular. This is equally true of the significanceof the phrases to ti en einai Kalliai (!022a27),
to soi einai (1029b14-15), and Sokralei einai (1032a8). The first is part of a definition of kath" hauto, the
second occurs in a preliminary discussion of essence, and the third is mentioned in connection with a
sophistical objection. Given their contexts, all at'e neutral with respect to whether essences are peculiar to
individuals. (I think this is also the correct analysis of the distinction Aristotle makes between the being of
the circle and of this circle at Cael. 278a7-11.) Nor need we agree with Hartman that since Aristotle
identifies a thing's form with its substance, he is thereby committed to particular forms. For the form is
the substance of a thing because the form as a principle of organization makes it the kind of tiling it is,
even though the same organization is exemplified by all the other members of its species.
" 1036al-7, 1043b2.
,2 Aristotelian substance has properties such as indivisibility and indestructibility that the composite

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HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY

matter over time. One might distinguish between composite and individual form by
saying that the former, and not the latter, must contain the particular bit of matter it
contains at any given m o m e n t . However, to maintain the distinction in this way
would be problematic for the p r o p o n e n t o f individual forms, because the
individuation o f forms by matter would seem to require that the form also contain
matter that is peculiar to it at any given m o m e n t .
M o r e o v e r , we need not posit individual forms to avoid a clash between the doctrine that substance is peculiar to that o f which it is the substance and the doctrine
that forms are substances. "~ T h e former doctrine should not be interpreted as a claim
about substance-tokens; rather, it is the claim that substance-types are peculiar to
particular species. As such, it is compatible with the doctrine that forms are
substances.
Iii.
Having characterized the Aristotelian form and its relationship to the thing
of which it is the form, it is now time to reconsider the relation o f the predicates such
as " m a n " - - w h i c h seem to refer to f o r m s - - t o the subjects of which they are predic a t e d - which n a m e individuals. The names both of species and o f c o m m o n properties are predicated o f individuals; species-forms are not predicated o f individuals,
but c o m m o n properties are. Thus, we need some analysis o f statements o f the form
" S o c r a t e s is a m a n " that distinguishes these statements from other statements
having the same grammatical form, which predicate c o m m o n properties, or genera,
of individuals."
First, let us consider W o o d s ' s claim that statements predicating species m e m b e r ship o f individuals are identity statements. '5 On the standard analysis, an identity
statement o f the form A = B is true if and only if A and B denote the same entity.
" S o c r a t e s is the h u s b a n d of X a n t i p p e " is true because the proper name " S o c r a t e s "
and the definite description " t h e h u s b a n d o f X a n t i p p e " pick out the same entity.
This condition is also satisfied by the statement " S o c r a t e s is this m a n " if "this m a n "
picks out Socrates. It is not satisfied by the statement " S o c r a t e s is a m a n " because
the indefinite description " a m a n " does not pick out a u n i q u e individual. For this
reason, treating statements o f this f o r m as identity statements and treating identity
in the usual way as a symmetrical and transitive relation would have paradoxical
results; for example, the true statements " S o c r a t e s is a m a n " and "Callias is a m a n "
would entail the statement " S o c r a t e s is identical to Callias," which is false.
F r o m W o o d s ' s sketchy remarks, it appears that he thinks there, is some sense in
which the latter s t a t e m e n t - - t h a t Socrates is identical to C a l l i a s - i s true for Aristotle. W e might reconstruct his interpretation of Aristotle's position as follows:
" S o c r a t e s " picks out the f o r m that constitutes the concrete individual Socrates, but

does not have. In addition, an account of the relationship between the form as composite and the form as
object of knowledge, and definition, i.e., as universal, is then needed; but Hartman fails to provide it.
Charlton also identifies the form with the composite and consequently faces similar dififlculties in his
commentary on the Physics.
~ See n. 2 above.
" T o facilitate the following discussion, I shall use the phrase "predication of species-membership" for
the predication of the name of a species of the name of an individual. This usage should not be understood
as a retraction of the claim that forms are not predicated of individuals.
,5 "Substance and Essence."

A R I S T O T L E ' S METAPHYSICS

379

this form is simply the human form. `+ Similarly, " a m a n " picks out this form.
Socrates is identical to Callias if we take the identity sign to mean "is the same form
a s " ; he is not identical to Callias if we take the identity sign to mean "is the same
concrete individual as. '''7 This solution is not completely satisfactory, for it makes
Socrates and Callias the same substance. 's More precisely, Socrates and Callias are
the same substance-type, but the substances with which they are identical as individuals are substance-tokens.
A more satisfactory analysis of "Socrates is a m a n " makes the predication of " a
m a n " indicative of the type of functional organization that Socrates exemplifies. '9
This statement is not an identity statement, but it is a special case of predication, for
its sole function is to classify a token under its type. This is not true of the predication of the name of a c o m m o n property. This difference allows Aristotle to distinguish between the ontological implications of true statements of either form: the
former do not imply that species-forms are predicated of individuals, but the latter
imply that properties are predicated of individuals. In Zeta 10, Aristotle says that
" m a n and horse and terms which are thus applied to individuals, but universally, are
not substance but something composed of this particular formula and this particular
matter treated as universal. ''5~ To predicate the composite as universal is to recognize that the individual manifests the type of organization that is characteristic of its
species. Since the form determines the composite, the term that classifies the composite according to its form represents the composite qua universal. This is not true
of the predication of a universalp, which involves the predication of one thing of
another, so what is taken as universal in this ease is not the thing itself but one of its
attributes.
The classification of a token under its type is quite useful. Having classified
Socrates as a man, we are able to answer the question, What is he? by giving the
formula that expresses his essence. This formula states what it is to exist as a man. It
is the Iogos haplos of which Socrates as a logos syn tei hylei is a token. When Aristotle distinguishes between " m a n " and "being a m a n " (1043b2-4), he is distinguishing between the classification of a token under its type and the analysis of the token
as a substance. The latter is the function of the essential definition. A similar distinction does not apply in the case of " s o u l " and " b e i n g a soul," because " s o u l "
cannot be used to classify a token under a substance type; rather, it names the substance that the definition expresses.S'
'+ Here I am giving what I believe Woods's answer to this difficulty would be on the basis of what he
says.
" 1034aa5-7 could be cited in support of this reading: " A n d when we have the whole, such and such a
form in this flesh and in these bones, this is Callias or Socrates; and they are different in virtue of their
m a t t e r . . , but the same in f o r m . "
" Aristotle finds holding different concrete individuals to be the same substance troublesome (999b20,
1060b29). His solution is to distinguish between the form as the type of organization and the particular
bodies that are so organized.
'+ Woods recognizes that the relation of the Aristotelian form to an individual is like the relation
between a word-token and its type ("Substance and Essence," p. 179) yet he does not recognize, or is
unwilling to credit Aristotle with the recognition, that this is not the relationship between objects expressed by identity statements.
s01035b28-31. That hos katholou should be read with synolon (pace W. D. Ross in his commentary on
Aristotle's Metaphysics, 2 : 199) is clear from 1037a6-7 where Aristotle uses to ex amphoin hos katholou in
the same sense.
+' 1036al, 1043b2-4. Cf. 1035bl, 1037a27, De An. 429b10.

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O n e m i g h t o b j e c t to assigning a special function to s t a t e m e n t s p r e d i c a t i n g speciesm e m b e r s h i p . It m i g h t be a r g u e d t h a t s t a t e m e n t s o f the f o r m " S o c r a t e s is w h i t e " o r

o f the f o r m " S o c r a t e s is an a n i m a l " c o u l d also be a n a l y z e d on a t y p e - t o k e n m o d e l .
Let us first c o n s i d e r " S o c r a t e s is w h i t e " : on the suggested i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , " S o c r a t e s " picks o u t a white thing, which is a t o k e n o f the p r o p e r t y white. Several c o n s i d e r a t i o n s c o u n t a g a i n s t this r e a d i n g . First, " S o c r a t e s , " strictly s p e a k i n g , refers to
a p a r t i c u l a r b o d y o r g a n i z e d in a c e r t a i n way. Since this b o d y is a white thing, it is
t r u e to say " S o c r a t e s is w h i t e , " b u t this does not m a k e the referrent o f " S o c r a t e s " a
p a r t i c u l a r white t h i n g except i n c i d e n t a l l y (kata s u m b e b e k o s ) . 52 S e c o n d , A r i s t o t l e
m a k e s the d i s t i n c t i o n b e t w e e n s u b s t a n c e a n d p r o p e r t y f u n d a m e n t a l in his m e t a p h y s i c s , which l e a d s h i m to insist u p o n the difference between t h e r e l a t i o n o f a subs t a n c e t o k e n a n d its t y p e a n d the r e l a t i o n o f an i n d i v i d u a l to its p r o p e r t i e s : " " F o r
these [species] are t h o u g h t to i m p l y n o t merely t h a t the s u b j e c t p a r t i c i p a t e s in the
a t t r i b u t e a n d has it as an affection, o r has it by a c c i d e n t " (1030a13-14).
T h e p r e d i c a t i o n o f s p e c i e s - m e m b e r s h i p also differs from the p r e d i c a t i o n o f a genus
o f either a species o r a n i n d i v i d u a l . T h e s t a t e m e n t " S o c r a t e s is a n a n i m a l " c a n n o t be
a n a l y z e d on the t y p e - t o k e n m o d e l , b e c a u s e " a n i m a l " does n o t fully i n d i c a t e the t y p e
o f f u n c t i o n a l o r g a n i z a t i o n t h a t d e t e r m i n e s S o c r a t e s ' being; r a t h e r , it p o i n t s to cert a i n c o m m o n features o f different t y p e s o f o r g a n i z a t i o n . Since the n a m e s o f g e n e r a
are p r e d i c a t e d o n the basis o f c o m m o n a t t r i b u t e s , A r i s t o t l e classifies g e n e r a with
universal t e r m s . 2 ' T h a t is, S o c r a t e s a n d Bucephalus are b o t h called a n i m a l s in virtue
o f having c e r t a i n c o m m o n a t t r i b u t e s , b u t Socrates is said to be a m a n a n d B u c e p h a lus a h o r s e in virtue o f w h a t each is.
IV.
P r e s u m a b l y , A r i s t o t l e d o e s n o t t h i n k t h a t his c o n c e p t i o n o f f o r m s is v u l n e r a b l e to the o b j e c t i o n s he raises a g a i n s t P l a t o n i c forms. H o w e v e r , o n s o m e r e a d i n g s
o f t h e M e t a p h y s i c s , these o b j e c t i o n s c a n be used against his o w n a c c o u n t . A q u i c k
e x a m i n a t i o n o f these in light o f the p r e s e n t i n t e r p r e t a t i o n will s h o w that A r i s t o t l e is
n o t in difficulty here. A l t h o u g h he raises a n u m b e r o f o b j e c t i o n s to P l a t o n i s m , these
seem to r e d u c e to t w o serious p r o b l e m s . (1) T h e T h i r d M a n A r g u m e n t s h o w s t h a t if
the p r e d i c a t i o n o f a universal o f a p a r t i c u l a r requires the s e p a r a t e existence o f an
ideal e x e m p l i f i c a t i o n o f this universal, then an infinite regress will r e s u l t . " (2) A
s e c o n d a r g u m e n t s h o w s that if each universal, which an i n d i v i d u a l i n s t a n t i a t e s , is a
s u b s t a n c e , then i n d i v i d u a l s will be m a d e up o f a n u m b e r o f different s u b s t a n c e s :
" S o c r a t e s will be several a n i m a l s - - h i m s e l f a n d m a n a n d a n i m a l " (1003a10). 56 T h e
,2 103(Ya2-6, 1030b20; 1031a20. One passage (1031b25) suggests that Aristotle thinks that the relationship of the white of a particular object to the property white fits the type-token pattern.
"The importance of the distinction between substance and property is clear from Aristotle's discussion
of essence and definition. Essence belongs primarily to substance (1030a29), and definitions of things in
the nonsubstance categories are inferior because they require an additional determinant (1031al-4).
" Species names are predicated not on the basis of common attributes but on the basis of the kind of
thing the object is. Aristotle typically groups genera with common predicates (402b8, 1014b9-15,
1038b16-34, 1042a21). Cf. Part. An. 639b7. The predication of a genus name of an individual serves to
classify it according to some of its essential properties; in this respect the predication of a genus name
resembles the predication of a species name and differs from the predication of an incidental property like
whiteness.
" For a clear statement of the Third Man Argument, see Plato, Parm. 132a-e. Aristotle mentions the
TMA at 990bl7, 1039a2, 1059b8, and 1079a13. An argument along similar lines is given at 1031b28.
s, Cf. 1038h29ff., 1039a30-33.

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381

Aristotelian distinction between substance-types and -tokens blocks the regress of

the Third Man Argument. Forms as substance-types are distinct from concrete individuals, or substance-tokens, but substance-types cannot be meaningfully classified
as tokens of substance-types. ~' Socrates is not two s u b s t a n c e s - - a concrete individual
and a species form. He is a substance-token that exemplifies a substance-type.
V.
To sum up, the Aristotelian form is a universal in the sense in which a wordtype is a universal. Aristotle distinguishes between the relation that obtains between
substance-types and substance-tokens and the relationship that obtains between
properties of substances, that is, universalsp and substances. Similarly, he distinguishes between the predication of species-names of individuals, which classify
substance tokens under their respective types, and the predication of universalp
terms of individuals, which attribute properties to these individuals. This position !s
quite coherent, given the sharp distinction Aristotle draws between substance and
property and his belief in natural kinds. To whatever extent it involves conceptual
difftculties, I suspect these are rooted in the latter doctrines, but to explore this issue
would take another paper. '~

Rice University

s, Cf. 1040b32-34.
~* I would like to express my gratitude to Joan Kung, Bill Tait, Manley Thompson, Rob McKay,
Richard Kraut, A. W. H. Adkins, John Cooper, lan Mueller and Alan Code for their helpful comments
on earlier drafts of this paper.