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D. S M I T H
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Plato thinks that social roles ought to be assigned according to each individual's nature. The explicit method of determining social roles in the Republic,
~i William Jacobs, "Plato on Emancipation and the Traditional Family, Apeiron 12 0978),
p. 29.
7 Peter Tumuhy, "Aristotle, Feminism and Natural Law Theory," The N e w Scholasticism 55
(,981), p. 45 I.
469
o f w h i c h we a r e f r e q u e n t l y r e m i n d e d , c o n c e r n s i n s u r i n g t h a t e a c h p e r s o n in
t h e state be g i v e n t h a t o n e a n d o n l y o n e j o b to w h i c h his o r h e r n a t u r e is best
suited (e.g. at 433 D, w h e r e w o m e n a r e i n c l u d e d u n d e r this g e n e r a l f o r m u l a ,
as well as at 4 4 9 C - 4 5 7 C, w h e r e s o m e o f t h e details o f their e q u a l roles with
m e n a r e given). I n d e e d , it is this p r i n c i p l e t h a t Plato identifies as the s o u r c e
o f j u s t i c e in t h e state ( 4 3 9 B - 4 3 4 C, especially 433A).
B u t the a p p l i c a t i o n o f this p r i n c i p l e to w o m e n in s u c h a way as to g a i n
t h e o u t c o m e t h a t t h e y m u s t a c q u i r e a p p r o x i m a t e l y e q u a l status to m e n is
h a r d l y w h a t we w o u l d e x p e c t f r o m a n a n c i e n t A t h e n i a n . T h o u g h in t h e
h i g h l y e m o t i o n a l r h e t o r i c o f m u c h o f t h e r e c e n t literature, the i n f e r i o r
status o f w o m e n to t h a t o f m e n in A t h e n s has s o m e t i m e s b e e n o v e r s t a t e d , 8
still n o s u c h sexual e g a l i t a r i a n i s m as we find in Plato is to be f o u n d in
e i t h e r the practices o r the l i t e r a t u r e o f his day, e x c e p t in t h e t o p s y - t u r v y
w o r l d o f A r i s t o p h a n i c c o m e d y , 9 w h e r e its a p p e a r a n c e is m o r e likely to
reflect a c u l t u r a l bias a g a i n s t it t h a n in its favor. Plato h i m s e l f r e c o g n i z e s
t h e e x t r e m e n o v e l t y o f his view by labelling it o n e o f his " t h r e e waves o f
paradox"(457C).
M o r e o v e r , it is also t r u e t h a t Plato is given to f r e q u e n t slurs a g a i n s t
w o m e n a n d w h a t he d i s p a r a g i n g l y calls " w o m a n i s h " b e h a v i o r (e.g. at 469D).
T h i s , t o g e t h e r with the c u l t u r a l i m p r o b a b i l i t y o f his e g a l i t a r i a n a r g u m e n t s ,
has b e e n t a k e n as decisive e v i d e n c e t h a t Plato's position is n o t to be t a k e n
seriously o r has a p u r e l y r h e t o r i c a l c h a r a c t e r . ' " Allan B l o o m , f o r e x a m p l e ,
dismisses all o f B o o k V as a k i n d o f c o m e d y , a n d c o n c l u d e s t h a t "it is h i g h l y
i m p r o b a b l e t h a t a n y w o m a n w o u l d be c o n s i d e r e d f o r m e m b e r s h i p in t h e
h i g h e r classes. ' ' ' ' Similarly, A r l e n e S a x o n h o u s e says t h a t she " c a n n o t a c c e p t
the view t h a t S o c r a t e s wishes to e m a n c i p a t e the A t h e n i a n w o m a n . '''~ I n s t e a d ,
she u r g e s t h a t B o o k V shows n o t a n a t t e m p t to p r e s c r i b e a c c o r d i n g to nature, b u t r a t h e r t h e r e v e r s e : " . . . it shows a n a t t e m p t to d e s t r o y t h e n a t u r a l
Cf. John Gould, "Law, Custom and Myth: Aspects of the Social Position of Women,"
Journal of Hellenic Studies loo (x98o), pp. 38 ff., for a balanced assessment and replies to many
of the more excessive claims,
Cf. Aristophanes' Lysistrata, and especially his Ecclesiazousae, for examples. It is sometimes
claimed that Euripides and even Sophocles show an untraditional degree of sympathy for
women's unequal position in Athens, but I see little support in this for Zeller's surprising claim
that there was a "movement for the emancipation of women in the last third of the 5th
century..." (Cf. Eduard Zeller, Outlines of the History of Greek Philosophy, trans. L. R. Palmer
(New York, 1957), p. lo7. )
~o Cf. Allan Bloom, The Republic of Plato (New York, 1968); Arlene W. Saxonhouse, "The
Philosopher and the Female in the Political Thought of Plato," Political Theory 4 (1976), pp- 195
ft.; Sarah Pomeroy, "Feminism in Book V of Plato's Republic," Apeiron 8 0974), PP. 33 ft., for
examples. The same view is at least suggested by Dorothea Wender, "Plato: Mysogynist, Paedophile, and Feminist," Arethusa 6 (1973), pp. 75 ft.
" Bloom, Republic of Plato, p. 383 .
'~ Saxonhouse, "Philosopher and the Female," p. 196.
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psuche?
'~' Not necessarily a smaller percentage of them than of men, however: only a small
percentage of either sex will qualify.
~" It is disturbing to see the nature of women in Saxonhouse and Bloom so completely tied
to childbearing.
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~' I am indebted to David Keyt for suggesting the relevance of Plato's theory of metempsychosis in this regard. It should be noted that on this view the soul is not necessarily a member of
any particular species, either. Another example of this lack of specification can be found in the
account in the Phaedrus (esp. 249B). The Phaedrus neither supports nor conflicts with the view
that souls are not sexed, however, as the issue is never addressed either explicitly or implicitly
there.
~ Cf. Anne Dickason, "Anatomy and Destiny: The Role of Biology in Plato's View of
Women," The PhilosophicalForum 5 (x973-4), PP. 45 ft., for example.
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(9oE). ~3 T h e s a m e c a n b e said f o r t h e o t h e r m i d d l e p e r i o d d i a l o g u e s : s u r e l y
t h e a p p r o v a l P l a t o shows i n t h e Phaedo f o r b e c o m i n g a bee, wasp, o r a n t i n
t h e n e x t life, f o r e x a m p l e , c a n n o t b e s q u a r e d with t h e v e r y n e g a t i v e a p p r a i sal o f insects i n t h e Timaeus (92A).
T h i s e v i d e n c e a l o n e s h o u l d r e s t r a i n u s f r o m e m p l o y i n g t h e Timaeus i n
i n t e r p r e t i n g t h e view P l a t o e x p r e s s e s i n t h e Republic. B u t p e r h a p s e v e n m o r e
i m p o r t a n t is t h e fact t h a t t h e i n f e r i o r s t a t u s o f w o m e n i n t h e h i e r a r c h y o r
r e i n c a r n a t i o n s we f i n d i n t h e Timaeus a c c o u n t c a n n o t be f o u n d i n t h e Repub-
lic, o r f o r t h a t m a t t e r , i n a n y d i a l o g u e f r o m t h e m i d d l e p e r i o d . I t s e e m s ,
t h e r e f o r e , m o s t u n l i k e l y t h a t Plato saw m e t e m p s y c h o s i s i n r e l e v a n t l y s i m i l a r
ways i n t h e m i d d l e a n d late p e r i o d s . H e n c e , t h e s e l a t e r a c c o u n t s d o n o t
u n d e r c u t t h e view I h a v e p r e s e n t e d o f Plato's m o t i v e s f o r t h e f e m i n i s m we
f i n d i n B o o k V o f t h e Republic24---one is a s s i g n e d o n e ' s role i n t h e state
a c c o r d i n g to n a t u r e , o n e ' s n a t u r e i n this case is o n e ' s soul, a n d o n e ' s soul is
sexless? 5
II
I h a v e a r g u e d t h a t Plato's c o n c e p t i o n o f h u m a n n a t u r e is w h a t m o t i v a t e s t h e
e q u a l i t y o f B o o k V o f t h e Republic, a n d t h a t this c o n c e p t i o n is p r i m a r i l y
p s y c h o l o g i c a l i n c h a r a c t e r . A r i s t o t l e s h a r e s two f e a t u r e s o f Plato's a p p r o a c h :
like Plato, A r i s t o t l e believes t h a t social roles m u s t b e a s s i g n e d a c c o r d i n g to
e a c h i n d i v i d u a l ' s n a t u r e , a n d like Plato, A r i s t o t l e f i n d s the r e l e v a n t n a t u r a l
f e a t u r e s o f h u m a n s to b e p s y c h o l o g i c a l . T h u s , w h e n A r i s t o t l e seeks, in t h e
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and children, he appeals in each case to the features of the soul o f each that
he finds both relevant a n d distinguishing (e.g. at Pol. 126oa12--14).
Given such initial presuppositions, one might expect Plato and Aristotle
to reach similar conclusions, and in most cases they do. Both have similar
views concerning slaves, barbarians, children and artisans, a m o n g others.
But with r e g a r d to w o m e n their values are wholly incompatible. Unlike
Plato, Aristotle finds w o m e n fit only to be subjects o f male rule (Pol.
1254b13-14).
As we might expect, Aristotle's only explicit rationale for this is psychological. W o m e n , according to Aristotle, have the deliberative part of the
soul (to bouletikon), but in contrast to m e n it is not sovereign (akuron Pol.
126oa13). But w o m e n are not like natural slaves either, who wholly lack the
deliberate part (Pol. 126oa12), or children who have it only in an i m m a t u r e
way (Pol. 126oa13--14). Since w o m e n have the deliberative part, they are
ruled by m e n in a "constitutional" fashion, that is, as citizens rule other
citizens, or equals rule equals (Pol. 1 2 5 9 a 4 o - b l ). But since women's deliberative part is not sovereign, this rule is p e r m a n e n t , unlike other examples
of constitutional rule (Pol. 1259b4 - 1o).
W. W. F o r t e n b a u g h ~6 conjectures that the lack of sovereignty in women's
deliberative part is the p r o d u c t of its susceptibility to being overruled by the
emotional part of the soul (to orektikon). Since n a t u r e makes d i f f e r e n t things
for different purposes (Pol. 1954bl-3), and women are psychologically different f r o m men, they have functions different from those of men, contrary
to Plato's view in the Republic. A n d since virtue is relative to function for
Aristotle (Pol. 126oa14-17), a woman's virtue is d i f f e r e n t from a man's,
contrary to Plato's view in the Meno.
W h e n Aristotle says that in w o m e n the deliberative part is without sovereignty, the adjective expressing this is "akuron," which has decidedly political
connotations. For a law or sentence to be akuron is for it to be cancelled,
annulled, or set aside. O f persons, to be akuron is to lack rights or powers.
Aristotle frequently uses the adjective opposite to this (kurios) in Book III of
the Politics to refer to the s u p r e m e power of the state. For example, in
democratic states the people are kurios, while in oligarchic ones only a few
are (Pol. 1278b1~--13). So to employ Aristotle's metaphor, a woman's deliberative part is either annulled, cancelled, or set aside, or it is lacking in rights
or powers. F o r t e n b a u g h views the relevant issue to be intra-personal in
nature, rather t h a n inter-personal. ~7 T h a t is, it is not just that women's
~6 W . W . F o r t e n b a u g h , "Aristotle o n Slaves a n d W o m e n , " Articles on Aristotle 2, J. B a r n e s et
al., eds. ( L o n d o n : 1978), p. a38 ff.
~7 Ibid., p. ]38 .
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deliberations are set aside by society or by men but that they are set aside or
cancelled by the emotional or alogical part of their souls. In short, women
are too susceptible to being overcome by their emotions and thus require the
steadier rule of men. Fortenbaugh offers a number of cases from other
Greek works as paradigms for this, especially Medea in Euripides' play. '~s
Fortenbaugh's conjecture is plausible enough, I think, but there may be
more to be said for the inter-personal effects o f nature, so construed, than
Fortenbaugh allows. For Aristotle, human beings are the union of body
and soul, where the soul is the form of the body (De An. 412a16--21). That
a given h u m a n has a female body, therefore, is of vital import, especially
with regard to the procreative function: women not only carry the fetus
and give birth, they also suckle the young child. All o f these roles are
reserved for women by nature. And since nature makes nothing for more
than one special function, the extra-household functions of politics would
presumably be reserved for men, whose role in procreation is of relatively
brief duration. On this view, women require the deliberative part for their
roles in the rearing of children and the maintenance of the household; but
that part of the soul is akuron for the practice of politics, for to make
women participate in such activities goes against nature, which reserves one
function for each thing. As a woman's function in the household is clearly
given by nature, for Aristotle, to add to this function others outside the
household is to make her like a Delphic knife, that is, one thing with many
functions, which is contrary to nature (Pol. 1252bt-3). Hence, that a
woman's deliberative part is akuron undoubtedly has important civic ramifications quite apart from those psychological ones Fortenbaugh proposes,
though the two are entirely consistent.
Fortenbaugh and others ~9 suggest that the reason Aristotle believes this is
that he views women as in some sense biologically deficient. According to
Fortenbaugh, the proper understanding of Aristotle's view is to be found in
the common link between female and deficient offspring both in Politics
1335at 2 - t 5, as well as a n u m b e r of biological works, especially Generation of
Animals, where the lack o f heat affects semen (766a18-~2) in such a way as
to produce female or deficient offspring (767b23; cf. also 737a27-28). T h u s
women are deficient not only in bodily strength, but in the powers o f deliberation, both (as Fortenbaugh would have it) as those powers apply to the
mastery of their own emotions, and (the addition I have suggested) as they
apply to political activities.
'~ Ibid.
'~'~ Cf. for example, Wender "Plato." It is odd that Fortenbaugh so vigorously attacks
Wender's article, though their conjectures are quite similar on this point. O f course, W e n d e r is
critical of Aristotle, whereas Fortenbaugh is inclined to d e f e n d him, at least on logical grounds.
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F o r t e n b a u g h is less t h a n explicit as to how precisely the biological deficiency explains the psychological deficiency Aristotle sees in w o m e n , t h o u g h
plainly t h e r e is a c o n n e c t i o n to be made. T h i s is easy e n o u g h to imagine,
however, if we see what is c o m m o n to the biology and the psychology. In
r e p r o d u c t i o n , o n Aristotle's account, the f o r m o f the child comes f r o m the
father's semen, and the m a t t e r f r o m the m o t h e r ' s catamenia. In the biological
c o n c e p t i o n o f a female, the f o r m takes an i m p e r f e c t hold on the matter, and
thus fails to achieve conversion in sex as the female m a t t e r is given h u m a n
form. But since the soul is the f o r m o f the body, a n d the g e n e r a t i o n o f a
female is o n e o f f o r m incompletely m a s t e r i n g material, the psychological
deficiency Aristotle finds in females could be e x p l a i n e d in terms o f the soul's
i m p e r f e c t mastery o f the body. This, then, we might well assume?" is why
the highest, or deliberative, part o f the soul lacks sovereignty in w o m e n .
T h e h u m a n is, for Aristotle, a combination o f soul and body. Both the
souls and bodies o f w o m e n d i f f e r in n a t u r e f r o m those o f men, the soul
lacking sovereignty in its deliberative part, and the body having a d i f f e r e n t
role in the activities a n d relationships in the h o u s e h o l d , such as r e p r o d u c t i o n
and child-rearing. H a v i n g d i f f e r e n t natures, w o m e n should serve in different social capacities t h a n men, as n a t u r e makes d i f f e r e n t things for d i f f e r e n t
functions. Unlike Plato, Aristotle does not believe the soul to be essentially
sexless; the souls o f w o m e n a n d m e n are as d i f f e r e n t by n a t u r e as their
bodies are. Also unlike Plato, t h e r e f o r e , Aristotle does not restrict the natural d i f f e r e n c e s a n d inferiorities o f w o m e n to merely physical capacities,
such as strength. As their bodies are too weak for some purposes, so their
souls are too weak for others, each weakness an effect o f the same basic
causes, which o c c u r in the r e p r o d u c t i v e process. H e n c e , what is an u n n a t u r a l
d o m i n a t i o n in P l a t o - - t h a t o f m e n over w o m e n - - b e c o m e s a natural one in
Aristotle.
IIl
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