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W. G R A H A M
TRADITIONAL INTERPRETATIONS OF Aristotle hold that he posited the existence o f prime m a t t e r - - a purely i n d e t e r m i n a t e s u b s t r a t u m u n d e r l y i n g all material c o m p o s i t i o n a n d p r o v i d i n g the ultimate potentiality for all material
existence. A n u m b e r o f revisionary interpretations have a p p e a r e d in the last
thirty years which d e n y that Aristotle h a d a concept o f p r i m e matter, provoking an even l a r g e r n u m b e r o f vigorous defenses claiming that he did
have the c o n c e p t ? T h e traditionalists are clearly in the majority, but some
obstacles stand in the way o f a general acceptance o f p r i m e m a t t e r as an
Aristotelian concept. I n a recent contribution to the debate, William Charlton, an o p p o n e n t o f p r i m e matter, has pointed out that the o p p o s i n g parties
have r e a c h e d a stalemate in large m e a s u r e because most o f the relevant texts
are a m b i g u o u s ; consequently, "the question w h e t h e r or not [Aristotle] believed in p r i m e m a t t e r really comes d o w n to the question how far, if at all, it
is d e m a n d e d by his p h i l o s o p h y as a whole. "~
It seems to m e that C h a r l t o n is right to shift the focus o f the debate f r o m
questions o f textual exegesis to questions o f systematic relevance. H o w e v e r ,
within the context o f Aristotle's general theory o f change, the challenge
implicit in his s t a t e m e n t can be met, for the concept o f p r i m e m a t t e r a n d its
associated doctrine is the p r o d u c t o f a series of ontological and scientific
i Friedrich Solmsen, "Aristotle and Prime Matter," Journal of the History of Ideas 19 (a 958):
243-52 and A. R. Lacey, "The Eleatics and Aristotle on Some Problems of Change," ibid. 26
(1965): 451-68; reply to H. R. King's argument against prime matter, "Aristotle Without Prime
Matter," ibid. 17 (1956): 37o-89; H. M. Robinson, "Prime Matter in Aristotle," Phronesis 19
(1974): 168-88 and C. J. F. Williams, Aristotle De Generatione et Corrpuptione, Oxford (1982),
Appendix reply to an appendix rejecting prime matter in W. Charlton's Aristotle's Physics Books
I - H (Oxford, 197o). See also Alan Code, "The Persistence of Aristotelian Matter," Philosophical
Studies 29 0976): 357-67, who defends the traditional interpretation of matter against Barrington Jones, "Aristotle's Introduction of Matter," Philosophical Review 83 (1974): 474-5 ~ See also
Russell M. Dancy, "Aristotle's Second Thoughts on Substance," Philosophical Review 87 (1978):
372-413 9
William Charlton, "Prime Matter: A Rejoinder," Phronesis 28 (1983): a97-2a a, 197.
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According to Aristotle's theory of change, there is a substratum which underlies every change (Ph. 1. 7.19oa33ff). When a thing changes its features,
we call that accidental change and identify the substratum as substance.
When a thing comes into being or ceases to be, we call that substantial
change 3 and identify the substratum as matter. 4 The most simple bodies of
the Aristotelian cosmos are the four traditional "elements": earth, air, fire,
and water. 5 The elements are characterized by the contrary powers hot, cold,
wet, and dry. Each element has one member of the contrary pair hot-cold,
and one of the contrary pair wet-dry (Gen. Corr. 2.2-3). For Aristotle, it is a
fact that the elements are transformed into one another; for instance, water
evaporates to become air. Aristotle understands this change to be a kind of
substantial change. Accordingly, there must be a corresponding substratum
for the several contraries and this is prime matter.
In his treatise on substantial change, On Generation and Corruption, Aristo3 Aristotle uses the terms qualified and unqualified coming-to-be for accidental and substantial change. His terms are based on a syntactic criterion: do we say 'x comes to be F'
(qualified) or 'x comes to be' simpliciter (unqualified) in describing the change? See Ph. 1. 7.
t9oa31-33, Gen. Corr. 3, 317a32ft., 319 al 1-14.
4 Gen. Corr. a. 4, 32oa~-5: the substratum o f substantial change is matter in the primary
sense, t h o u g h any substratum o f change (i.e., including substance) can be called matter.
5 Aristotle is u n h a p p y with the traditional name 'element' (stoicheion) for earth, air, fire and
water, and often refers to t h e m as "the so-called elements" (Gen. Corr. 1 . 6 . 3 ~ b l f ; ~.a.3~8b3 a,
3~9aa6). He p r e f e r s to call t h e m 'perceptible bodies' (aisth~ta sOmata) because they are themselves complexes o f matter and form and hence not elementary (329a24ff). He sometimes calls
the elements 'simple bodies' (hapla sOmata), e.g., Cael. 1.1.268b~6-3o; here the epithet has
reference to the elements' simple m o v e m e n t rather than their composition (cf. Cad. 3.3.3o2b7f).
477
tle notes two problems for an account o f substantial change: (1) if the substratum out o f which a substance comes to be is not itself a substance,
accidents will i n h e r e in non-substance; (2) if the substratum is nothing at all,
something has c o m e to be out o f nothing. 6 Problem (1) is a general problem
for any substantial c h a n g e and is easily solved; I shall ignore it. Problem (2)
does not arise for the change o f substances (call them complex substances)
above the level o f the elements. For in a given case o f substantial change o f a
complex thing, a n o t h e r thing can be identified as its substratum. A bronze
statue comes to be out o f bronze. Bronze is less thing-like than a bronze
statue, but it is nevertheless thing-like, so that in this case we find a substratum for change.
But in the t r a n s f o r m a t i o n o f elements (henceforth "elemental change")
problem (2) is not resolved, for no substratum is verifiable (cf. Gen. Corr.
1.4). T h e contraries that, by being present in prime matter, constitute the
elements, are ex hypothesi basic and the matter they reside in is irreducible.
(Why Aristotle analyzes the elements in this way I shall explain later.) For
every f e a t u r e F, p r i m e m a t t e r is not-F. But because it is devoid o f all characteristics o f its own, p r i m e m a t t e r is indistinguishable f r o m p u r e indeterminacy. Aristotle identifies p u r e indeterminacy with the concept o f nothingness o f the Presocratic (specifically: Eleatic) tradition (Gen. Corr. 1.3.317b2831). T h e r e is evidence that indeterminacy is just what Parmenides had in
mind as the p a r a d i g m case o f nothingness, 7 and Aristotle seems to accept the
paradigm. H e also shares with the Eleatics an a b h o r r e n c e o f ex nihilo creation. How t h e n can Aristotle escape the charge that his elements are
created out o f nothing? For it appears that the something which Aristotle
posits as u n d e r l y i n g elemental change is really no thing at all. I shall call this
difficulty the p a r a d o x o f p r i m e matter, s
In a preliminary discussion in the GC, Aristotle advances a distinction
that provides a tentative solution to the problem: "Perhaps the solution is
that their m a t t e r is in one sense the same but in a n o t h e r sense different. For
that which underlies them, whatever its nature may be qua underlying them,
is the same: but its actual being is not the same" (1.3.319b~- 4, O x f o r d tr.). 9
Aristotle confirms the solution later in the treatise: " O u r own doctrine is that
although t h e r e is a m a t t e r o f the perceptible bodies (a matter out o f which
the so-called 'elements' come-to-be) it has no separate existence, but is always
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S~
uneducated
pale
Socrates
S~
educated
pale
Socrates
We notice that one element changes in the description and two remain the
same. The first item in the list has a negative, or more precisely, privative
description in S~ and a positive description in S,. What items are relevant to
explaining the change? The ordinary-language report of the change suggests the answer. We say, "Socrates, who was uneducated, has now become
educated" or "the uneducated man became educated." Paleness does not
1o 317bt3s
THE
PARADOX
OF PRIME
MATTER
479
enter into such a report, and we may fairly conclude that it is irrelevant to
accounting for the change. As to what does enter into the report, we note
that there are two adjectives, one privative and the other a corresponding
positive adjective, and a noun. This survey suggests that in the case before us
the change consists in a change of features in a thing which remains the
same. Call the privative adjective a description of a privation, and call the
thing a substratum.
What is interesting in the foregoing anlaysis relative to the Eleatic challenge is that it provides the basis for an answer to that challenge. T h e
change in question is a case of what-is (what is educated) coming to be out of
what-is-not (what is uneducated, i.e., not educated). But what we have is a
counterexample to the implicit inference from (a) 'What-is comes to be from
what-is-not' to (b) 'Something comes to be from nothing'. For in this case
what-is has not come to be out of nothing but out of something else, namely
a certain man. T h e r e was a something present all the time, something underlying the change, namely the substratum. Now we are in a position to see
that the Eleatic challenge involves a fallacy: to make the move from (a) to (b)
in the present case is to confuse privation and substratum. For in (a) 'what-isnot' refers to the privation, whereas in (b) 'nothing', which is taken as synonymous with 'what-is-not' refers to the substratum.
My analysis A1 embodies a hypothesis concerning the interpretation of
Aristotle's analysis o f change in Physics 1.7. Privation is to be understood as what
is referred to by a privative adjective in a report of a change and substratum as
what is referred to by the subject of the sentence. T h e analysis is motivated by
the Eleatic challenge as Aristotle understands it and is successful in replying to
it (see Ph. 1.8). However, it is not e n o u g h for Aristotle to reveal the fallaciousness of the Eleatic challenge in general. He must show that the challenge is not
valid for the description of any type of change. So far we have considered only
an example of accidental change. What of substantial change? Here is a case in
which it is not clear whether there is a substratum and hence whether the same
move can be m a d e to d e f e n d against the Eleatic objector.
Consider a n o t h e r analysis o f change, A~. A lump o f bronze is taken and
cast into the shape o f a man. T h e bronze is used as a statue. A state description of the change might be as follows:
A2:
S~
unformed
brown
bronze
S~
formed
brown
bronze
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" It has been suggested to me that the Ph. a analysis is merely an analysis of predication
and not of physical change. I see no basis in the text for invoking this distinction, Indeed
Aristotle here as in other places seems to take for granted that language (when properly
understood) directly mirrors reality.
'~ At this point the traditionalist wishes to say: what is important about matter is not its
actual nature but its potentiality. Yet Aristotle in Ph. a clearly presupposes that the Eleatic
challenge can be met without appeal to the potentiality-actuality distinction, which provides an
alternative solution (191b27-29). Accordingly I wish to examine how matter provides the basis
for a solution independently of any other scheme, I shall deal with potentiality below,
481
~s 7.19ob24_26" Contrary to his usual practice (see note 4 above), Aristotle conflates substantial individuals and stuffs (man and gold) in the passage. In fact, Aristotle consistently uses
hyl~ to in Ph. I refer to sustratum in general (see D. Graham, "Aristotle's Discovery of Matter,"
Archiv fi~r Geschichte der Philosophie 66 [a 984]: 37-5 l, 49). One might object that his confusion
here nullifies the claim that matter is significantly like ousia. However, the point of the argument is that matter, whether substance or stuff, is the source of determinacy in contrast to the
privation. Furthermore, it is not clear that when Aristotle says that matter is countable (arithm~t~,
19ob25) he means that instances of matter can be counted--which is clearly false for stuffs
unless they are already individuated by some prior form. He may simply be saying that we can
count matter as a principle distinct from privation. Thus there is no obviously fallacious reasoning behind his identifying matter as substance-like.
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A3:
S~
cold
moist
prime matter
S~
warm
moist
prime matter
Cold has been exchanged for warm, or, u n d e r another description, notwarm has been exchanged for warm. Aristotle notes that although both
air and water are translucent, the translucence itself cannot be the subject
of a change f r o m air to water: if it were the change would reduce to
alteration (Gen. Corr. 1.4.319b21-24). This observation supports our
analysis of the bronze case and tells us what the subject is not. But we still
wish to know what it is. Do the principles of change e n u m e r a t e d above
suggest a positive account of the subject, prime matter? If (1) holds,
prime matter must be a real something. But Aristotle has given us no
grounds to think that it is. He attributes no properties to prime matter
apart from the simple powers. As far as we know, prime matter per se is
completely characterless, and hence it has no principle of determinacy in
its own nature and cannot qualify as ousia. Since it has no characters of its
own, prime matter cannot fulfill (2) by having a subset of features which
explain elemental change. A n d since (1) and (2) are not fulfilled, prime
matter cannot (3) be identified as the proper subject of the change by
virtue of the features it has in its own nature.
Does Aristotle's solution resolve the problem of prime matter? We are
now in a position to see that it cannot. According to Aristotle's solution,
prime matter is something because it is always characterized by some pair of
basic powers. But Aristotle's theory of change entails that the matter in
question itself be something, and relative to a change of powers, the matter
is prime matter itself devoid 0fthe powers. In the state description above, one
power remained the same, but this will not help to characterize prime matter
since the persistence of moistness is no more relevant to explaining a change
from coldness to hotness than paleness is to explaining education or brownness is to explaining the production of a statue. Aristotle is right to claim
that prime matter is never f o u n d without the simple powers, but it is equally
t r u e - - a n d equally irrelevant--that bronze is never found without some
shape. T h e point is that the presence of some shape or other in the bronze
cannot account for the kind of determinacy that bronze has qua bronze. We
must explain the aptness of bronze to receive different shapes by investigating those characteristics that constitute bronze. T h e shape itself will be incidental to bronze qua b r o n z e - - a n accident or supervenient characteristic.
Bronze is a real something, and moreover a something that is apt to receive
shapes, in virtue of characteristics that constitute bronze qua bronze, not due
to supervenient characteristics that themselves need to be accounted for.
T H E P A R A D O X OF P R I M E M A T T E R
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~4 Panayot Butchvarov pointed out the metaphysical problem to me, See his Being Qua
Being (Bloomington, 1979), 165-69 .
THE
PARADOX
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MATTER
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2.
3.
Contrasting the four elements with the fifth element, Cohen suggests
that the four elements possess the potentiality for rectilinear motion
(178).
Prime matter is essentially spatially extended. (179)
Prime matter is capable of motion and rest. (ibid.)
Attributes (l) and (3) are problematic because they are potentialities. But
as I have argued, potentialities presuppose actual attributes of some kind.
For Aristotle, a potentiality is a consequential attribute that follows from
some actual attribute. What, then, are those actual attributes? We do not
know. Contemporary philosophers of science account for dispositional properties on the basis of underlying structural properties. For instance, salt has
the dispositional property (potentiality) of being soluble in water; this property can be explained by the crystal structure of NaC1, the ionic bonding,
the structure of H20, etc. Obviously Aristotle cannot take this line, because it
undermines the claim that the four elements are the ultimate bodies of the
(sublunar) universe. Whatever the attributes in question, they cannot be
structural (i.e., formal) attributes.
But perhaps there are mysterious attributes that do account for the po-
486
,6 ,,Matter, Elements and Substance in Aristotle," Journal of the History of Philosophy 8 (1970):
963-88, esp. 277ff.
THE
PARADOX
OF PRIME
MATTER
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,7 The most interesting kind of revisionary account would be one attributing not just
extendedness but a certain quantity of extension to prime matter. This quantity could then
form the basis of a law of conservation of matter. Note, however, how difficult the law would be
for Aristotle to conceive; since two elements are heavy and two are light, and of each pair one is
extremely heavy/light while the other is moderately heavy/light, the quantity in question have to
be determined independently of weight. Thus Aristotle would have to come up with a concept
of mass; yet the modern notion of mass as a measure of inertia would be extraordinarily difficult
to handle in Aristotelian physics.
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THE
PARADOX
OF PRIME
MATTER
489
2, My interpretation of Aristotle's concept of matter is developed further in Graham, "Aristotle's Discovery" (note t3). Versions of this paper were read at the Iowa Philosophical Society
(Nov., 1981), the Conference on Aristotle's Metaphysicsand Epistemology(Florida State U.,Jan.,
1983) and the 17th World Congress of Philosophy (Montreal, Aug., 1983), at which I received
helpful suggestions. I also received constructive criticisms from two anonymous referees. The
themes of this paper are dealt with further in my Aristotle's Two Systems (Oxford, 1987).
Appendix
Deduction of
T h e Paradox o f Prime Matter
1. T h e r e is a substratum for every change. (Ph. :-7- 19oa33f, b l - 3 )
2. In a change the new state o f affairs comes to be directly from the
substratum and indirectly from the privation. (Ph. :.9.192a3:f; 8.
19xba5f)
. A substratum is real (0us/a). (Cat. 5 . 2 b 1 5 - : 7 ; cf. Ph. :.9.192asf)
4. A Privation is not real. (Ph. 1.9.192a5f)
"~1765 " In a change the new state of affairs comes to be directly from something real and only indirectly from something not real. (2,3) (Ph. x.8.
191b13-16)
6. T h e r e is substantial change. (fact)
9". 7- T h e r e is a substratum for substance. (1,6) (Ph. a.7.19obl-3)
8. T h e substratum for substance is matter. (def.) (Gen. Corr. 1.4.32oa2f)
9". 9. Matter is real. (3,8) (ousian pOs [einai] t~n hyl~n: Ph. 1.9.192a5f)
:o. T h e r e is elemental change. (fact) (Cael. 3.6)
11. T h e elements are the most basic substances. (fact) (Cael. 3.3)
.'a2. T h e r e is a substratum for elemental change. (1,1o) (Gen. Corr. 1.3.
3 1 9 b 2 - 4 ; 2.1.3~9a24-~6)
.'.13. T h e substratum for elemental change is matter. (8,11,12) (Gen. Corr.
~.l.329a24f)
14. T h e substratum for elemental change is prime matter. (def.) (cf. ibid.,
329a29 f)
.'.x 5. Prime matter is real. (9,13,14)
16. Prime matter has no characteristics of its own. (cf. a l) (ibid., 329a25 f)
17. What has no characteristics is not real. (assumption) (m~den: ibid.,
x.3.317b27-3x)
9"a8. Prime matter is not real. (16,17)
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