International Phenomenological Society

MacIntyre and the Indispensability of Tradition

Author(s): J. B. Schneewind
Source: Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 51, No. 1 (Mar., 1991), pp. 165-168
Published by: International Phenomenological Society
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2107831
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Research
PhilosophyandPhenomenological
Vol. LI,No. 1, March1991

MacIntyreand the Indispensability

of Tradition
J. B. SCHNEE WIND

TheJohnsHopkinsUniversity

In After Virtue(1981) AlasdairMacIntyreused the historyof thought

aboutmoralityas an aid in diagnosingwhat he took to be the disastrous
condition of modern Western society. In Whose Justice? Which
Rationality? (Notre Dame, 1988; abbreviatedhereafteras WJ; page
referencesgiven in text) he claims thatwe must drawon the historyof
ethics for an additionalpurpose:to find solutionsto the moralproblems
whose insolubility is a mark of the chaotic condition of our present
culture.He indicatestheseproblemsonly briefly(WJ,p. 1) andoffersno
solution to them. He claims, however, to have accomplished what
Descarteswas right in thinkingthe most difficulttask of philosophy:to
findout "howto begin".
We, whoeverwe are,can only beginenquiryfromthe vantagepointaffordedby our relationshipto some specificsocial andintellectualpastthroughwhichwe have affiliatedourselvesto someparticular
traditionof enquiry,extendingthe historyof thatenquiryintothe
present... (WJ,p. 401)

The claim is thatunless we deliberatelyreasonfromwithina tradition"as Aristotelian, as Augustinian, as Thomist, as Humean, as postEnlightenmentliberal,or as somethingelse" (WJ, p. 402)-we cannot
reasonat all.
has two
MacIntyre'sposition, which I shall label "traditionalism,"
components.First, we must understandthe resourcesof our traditionin
orderto use them in producingour own solutionsto particularcurrent
problems,and in arguingthat the solutions our traditionprovides are
superiorto those providedby othertraditions.Second,becauseours is a
world in which there are many conflictingoutlooks, controversyover
particularissues mustescalateto the level of a warof traditions:"it is no

SYMPOSIUM165
MACINTYRE

longer possible to speak except out of one particular tradition in a way

which will involve conflict with rival traditions."(WJ, p. 401)
Has Macintyre supported his traditionalism? Has he shown that we
must begin within an historically specific and already constituted
tradition, and that our arguments cannot be fully resolved until one
traditionmakes its rivals capitulate? I think not.
First, MacIntyre allows that traditions have beginnings. Aristotle and
Augustine and Aquinas, he holds, were founders of traditions. Why then
might there not be among us today those who are originating new lines of
thought?Their views may some day come to be seen as having starteda tradition; but even if this occurs, it will not be right to describe an initiatoras
working within the tradition she starts.
Second, MacIntyreallows that those who, as he puts it, "inhabita social
and intellectual tradition in good working order" (WJ, p. 7) need not
articulatetheir presuppositionsor think of themselves as working within a
traditionratherthan as simply conducting inquiry. It is only later thinkers,
consciously theorizing about traditions, who take this view of what the
earlier members of a traditionwere doing. These later writers, such as John
Henry Newman, can use "a sharp antithesis between tradition and
something else ... which was unavailable to the earlier inhabitants"of the
tradition. (WJ, p. 8) But if a tradition,like an epistemological crisis, "may
only be recognized for what it is in retrospect" (WJ, p. 363) then we
ourselves may be in the position of early members of what will eventually
be describedby some historianas a tradition.If we are, we are reasoningin a
tradition-specific way without being aware of it. But then we are not
consciously calling on "our tradition"for our resources.
Since in controversyabout particularissues we could be either initiating
a traditionor using the resources of one without knowing that we are doing
so, MacIntyre has not shown that we are now forced to begin discussing
particularmoral issues by deliberate use of the resources of some already
identified, historically constituted tradition. Why might he think that he
has shown this?
MacIntyre holds that all rational discussion is situated within a shared
frameworkof beliefs and standards,which cannot be transcendedin favor
of some eternal or absolute standpoint untouched by change. I am in
considerable sympathy with this anti-foundationalist or pragmatist
outlook, but I do not see that it has any force to move us toward
traditionalism. Perhaps MacIntyre supposes that because the framework
within which disagreement takes place is itself a result of historical
development, any use of it counts as carrying on a tradition. But if the
existence of any set of shared beliefs shows that those holding them are

166

J. B. SCHNEEWI

operating within a-tradition,the claim that we must start from a tradition

is extremely weak. No historical argumentsare needed to establish it. One
need only point out that since we must share some beliefs with anyone we
understand,we necessarily "startfrom a tradition"whenever we engage in
conversation. The anti-foundationalist or pragmatist who grants that
historical processes were involved in shaping the framework available to
participantsin a particulardiscussion is not forced to the conclusion that
the participants must be appealing to and constrained by some specific
historical tradition.
This is not only because innovations may possibly provide acceptable
solutions. It is also because we share a substantialcommon vocabularyand
set of assumptions which cannot be said to have come from any single,
specific historical tradition.These common assumptions go beyond matters
of simple fact and pure logic. They enable us to agree on many mattersconcerned with how to live peacefully together. It is possible, as MacIntyre
says, that what we agree on is "insufficient to resolve" our disagreements
(WJ, p. 351), but we cannot know this a priori. We can only find out by
trying, in particularcases, to see how far our agreements will take us. But
this means that in embarking on discussion of controversial issues it is
advisable to start from what is common. Beginning from what we know to
be uniqueto some special traditionwould only make a divisive issue harder
to resolve.
Saying this is not saying that there is, some set of startingpoints beyond
our historically conditioned commonalities which is always and
everywhere sufficient to lead to the rational settlement of any conceivable
issue. It is simply leaving open the possibility that with respect to any
particularissue either sharedbeliefs or new ideas may enable us to reach a
generally accepted resolution. To say that what serves this purpose in one
context must serve it in all is to assume that no issue is satisfactorily
settled unless there is a more or less comprehensive principle or theory
backing the settlement. But this is an assumption one need not make. On
practicalmattersa common understandingmay come from different people
for differentreasons, and still be adequatefor the purposes at hand. We do
not have to win the kind of dialectical victory MacIntyre describes in
chapter 18-the surrender of adherents of one tradition to the superior
decisiveness, inclusiveness, and explanatory power of another. In the
Rushdie affair, for instance, it is not necessary that Islam admit the total
superiorityof Western views. It would suffice if for whatever reason the
order to murderRushdie were formally rescinded and the faithful urged to
leave him alone. More progress toward resolving importantdisputes may

167
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MACINTYRE

be achieved if total views are ignored than if disputants always insist on

making converts of their opponents.
MacIntyre would not be happy with this. For him particular solutions
must add up to a coherent theory if they are to be acceptable. This assumption leads him to one of his more startlingassertions-that
the rival claims to truth of contending traditions depend for their vindication upon the adequacy ... of the histories which the resources of each of those traditionsin conflict enable their
historiansto write. (WJ, p. 403)

The historian is MacIntyre's non-foundationalist replacement for a

timeless criterion of truth because only the historian can see whether
particular issues have been resolved in a way that fits into a coherent
general theory. But the historian's verdict is useless. If we must wait for it
in order to know the solution to a problem, then that knowledge will have
no role in the actual give and take of life. What solves a problem now is
what the parties to the dispute agree solves it. If later concerned parties,
including historians of traditions, think their solution inadequate, they can
reopen the dispute. But their later resolution will itself always be open to
reiterationof the same process.
Out of the piecemeal settlement of substantial numbers of disputes
there sometimes emerges a general outlook which is articulated in classic
writings and thus generates a tradition.It is also possible for relative peace
and stability to be achieved without this. In either case recognized
traditionsdo not constitute the whole of the resources we have for starting
discussions. MacIntyrehas failed to show that the historical study of those
traditions, to which his book is largely devoted, has anything special to
offer toward the resolution of the current issues whose "interminability"
he took as his starting point. Only the genuine use of the resources of a
given tradition, showing that it actually yields a practical solution we can
all accept, could do this. And even then those outside the tradition would
not accept the solution because it was generated by the tradition. They
would accept it because it struckthem as reasonable.

168 J. B. SCIHNEEW