Rule 10 14

De Dios vs. Court of Appeals, 212 SCRA 519 , August 12, 1992
1. Remedial Law; Amendment; Summons; It is only when new causes of action are
alleged in an amended complaint filed before the defendant has appeared in
Court that another summons must be served on the defendant with the
amended complaint.The rule is that it is only when new causes of action are alleged in an amended
complaint filed before the defendant has appeared in court that another
summons must be served on the defendant with the amended complaint.
2. Remedial Law; Amendment; Summons; To determine whether a different cause
of action is introduced by amendments to the complaint, the court must
ascertain if the defendant shall be required to answer for a liability or legal
obligation wholly different from that which was stated in the original complaint.In determining whether a different cause of action is introduced by amendments
to the complaint, the court must ascertain if the defendant shall be required to
answer for a liability or legal obligation wholly different from that which was
stated in the original complaint. An amendment will not be considered as stating
a new cause of action if the facts alleged in the amended complaint show
substantially the same wrong with respect to the same transaction, or if what are
alleged refer to the same matter but are more fully and differently stated, or
where averments which were implied are made in express terms, and the subject
of the controversy or the liability sought to be enforced remains the same.
3. Remedial Law; Amendment; Summons; In the case at bar, the amended
complaint merely supplemented an incomplete allegation regarding the subject
property.A reading of the amended complaint in the case at bar shows that it merely
supplemented an incomplete allegation regarding the subject property. The
purpose of the amendment was merely to include the additional information that
the subject property was and is still under litigation and the contract was
entered into without the knowledge and approval of the litigants or of competent
judicial authority.
4. Remedial Law; Amendment; Summons; Trial Court was correct in holding that
when private respondent sent by registered mail a copy of the amended
complaint directly to the petitioner, he was acting in accordance with Sec. 2 of
Rule 13 of the Rules of Court, allowing direct service on a party if not
represented by counsel.The trial court was correct in holding that when the private respondent sent by
registered mail a copy of the amended complaint directly to the petitioner, he
was acting in accordance with Sec. 2 of Rule 13 of the Rules of Court, allowing
direct service on a party if not represented by counsel. At the time the amended
complaint was filed, the defendant was not yet represented by counsel, which

entered its appearance only after the private respondent had filed his amended
complaint.
Remington Industrial Sales Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, 382 SCRA
499 , May 29, 2002
1. Actions; Pleadings and Practice; Amendment of Complaints; A complaint can still
be amended as a matter of right before an answer has been filed, even if there is
a pending proceeding for its dismissal before the higher courtbefore the filing
of an answer, the plaintiff has the absolute right to amend the complaint
whether a new cause of action or change in theory is introduced.The basic issue in this case is whether or not the Court of Appeals, by granting
the extraordinary writ of certiorari, correctly ordered the dismissal of the
complaint for failure to state a cause of action, despite the fact that petitioner
exercised its right to amend the defective complaint under Section 2, Rule 10 of
the Rules of Court. Stated differently, the query posed before us is: can a
complaint still be amended as a matter of right before an answer has been filed,
even if there was a pending proceeding for its dismissal before the higher court?
Section 2, Rule 10 of the Revised Rules of Court explicitly states that a pleading
may be amended as a matter of right before a responsive pleading is served.
This only means that prior to the filing of an answer, the plaintiff has the
absolute right to amend the complaint whether a new cause of action or change
in theory is introduced. The reason for this rule is implied in the subsequent
Section 3 of Rule 10. Under this provision, substantial amendment of the
complaint is not allowed without leave of court after an answer has been served,
because any material change in the allegations contained in the complaint could
prejudice the rights of the defendant who has already set up his defense in the
answer.
2. Actions; Pleadings and Practice; Amendment of Complaints; It cannot be said
that the defendants rights are violated by changes made in the complaint if he
has yet to file an answer thereto.Conversely, it cannot be said that the defendants rights have been violated by
changes made in the complaint if he has yet to file an answer thereto. In such an
event, the defendant has not presented any defense that can be altered or
affected by the amendment of the complaint in accordance with Section 2 of
Rule 10. The defendant still retains the unqualified opportunity to address the
allegations against him by properly setting up his defense in the answer.
Considerable leeway is thus given to the plaintiff to amend his complaint once,
as a matter of right, prior to the filing of an answer by the defendant.
3. Actions; Pleadings and Practice; Amendment of Complaints; The right granted to
the plaintiff under procedural law to amend the complaint before an answer has
been served is not precluded by the filing of a motion to dismiss.The right granted to the plaintiff under procedural law to amend the complaint
before an answer has been served is not precluded by the filing of a motion to

dismiss or any other proceeding contesting its sufficiency. Were we to conclude

otherwise, the right to amend a pleading under Section 2, Rule 10 will be
rendered nugatory and ineffectual, since all that a defendant has to do to
foreclose this remedial right is to challenge the adequacy of the complaint
before he files an answer.
4. Actions; Pleadings and Practice; Amendment of Complaints; The Court finds no
practical advantage in ordering the dismissal of the complaint and for the
plaintiff to re-file the same, when he can still clearly amend the complaint as a
matter of right.In this case, the remedy espoused by the appellate court in its assailed judgment
will precisely result in multiple suits, involving the same set of facts and to which
the defendants would likely raise the same or, at least, related defenses. Plainly
stated, we find no practical advantage in ordering the dismissal of the complaint
against respondent and for petitioner to re-file the same, when the latter can still
clearly amend the complaint as a matter of right. The amendment of the
complaint would not prejudice respon- dents or delay the action, as this would, in
fact, simplify the case and expedite its disposition.
5. Actions; Pleadings and Practice; Amendment of Complaints; Where some but not
all the defendants have answered, the plaintiff may still amend its complaint
once, as a matter of right, in respect to claims asserted solely against the nonanswering defendant, but not as to claims asserted against the other
defendants.The fact that the other defendants below has filed their answers to the complaint
does not bar petitioners right to amend the complaint as against respondent.
Indeed, where some but not all the defendants have answered, the plaintiff may
still amend its complaint once, as a matter of right, in respect to claims asserted
solely against the non-answering defendant, but not as to claims asserted
against the other defendants.
Valmonte vs. Court of Appeals, 252 SCRA 92 , January 22, 1996
1. In an action in personam, personal service of summons or, if this is not possible
and he cannot be personally served, substituted service, as provided in Rule 14,
7-8 is essential for the acquisition by the court of jurisdiction over the person of
a defendant who does not voluntarily submit himself to the authority of the
court. If defendant cannot be served with summons because he is temporarily
abroad, but otherwise he is a Philippine resident, service of summons may, by
leave of court, be made by publication. Otherwise stated, a resident defendant in
an action in personam, who cannot be personally served with summons, may be
summoned either by means of substituted service in accordance with Rule 14, 8
or by publication as provided in 17 and 18 of the same Rule.
2. On the other hand, if the action is in rem or quasi in rem, jurisdiction over the
person of the defendant is not essential for giving the court jurisdiction so long
as the court acquires jurisdiction over the res. If the defendant is a nonresident

and he is not found in the country, summons may be served extraterritorially in

accordance with Rule 14, 17.
3. In such cases, what gives the court jurisdiction in an action in rem or quasi in
rem is that it has jurisdiction over the res, i.e. the personal status of the plaintiff
who is domiciled in the Philippines or the property litigated or attached. Service
of summons in the manner provided in 17 is not for the purpose of vesting it with
jurisdiction but for complying with the requirements of fair play or due process,
so that he will be informed of the pendency of the action against him and the
possibility that property in the Philippines belonging to him or in which he has an
interest may be subjected to a judgment in favor of the plaintiff and he can
thereby take steps to protect his interest if he is so minded.
4. Applying the foregoing rules to the case at bar, private respondents action,
which is for partition and accounting under Rule 69, is in the nature of an action
quasi in rem. Such an action is essentially for the purpose of affecting the
defendants interest in a specific property and not to render a judgment against
him.
5. As petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte is a nonresident who is not found in the
Philippines, service of summons on her must be in accordance with Rule 14, 17.
Such service, to be effective outside the Philippines, must be made either (1) by
personal service; (2) by publication in a newspaper of general circulation in such
places and for such time as the court may order, in which case a copy of the
summons and order of the court should be sent by registered mail to the last
known address of the defendant; or (3) in any other manner which the court may
deem sufficient.
6. Since in the case at bar, the service of summons upon petitioner Lourdes A.
Valmonte was not done by means of any of the first two modes, the question is
whether the service on her attorney, petitioner Alfredo D. Valmonte, can be
justified under the third mode, namely, in any . . . manner the court may deem
sufficient.
We hold it cannot. This mode of service, like the first two, must be made outside
the Philippines, such as through the Philippine Embassy in the foreign country
where the defendant resides.
7. It must be noted that the period to file an Answer in an action against a resident
defendant differs from the period given in an action filed against a nonresident
defendant who is not found in the Philippines. In the former, the period is fifteen
(15) days from service of summons, while in the latter, it is at least sixty (60)
days from notice.
8. In contrast, in the case at bar, petitioner Lourdes A. Valmonte did not appoint her
husband as her attorney-in-fact. Although she wrote private respondent s
attorney that all communications intended for her should be addressed to her
husband who is also her lawyer at the latters address in Manila, no power of
attorney to receive summons for her can be inferred therefrom. In fact the letter
was written seven months before the filing of this case below, and it appears

that it was written in connection with the negotiations between her and her
sister, respondent Rosita Dimalanta, concerning the partition of the property in
question. As is usual in negotiations of this kind, the exchange of
correspondence was carried on by counsel for the parties. But the authority
given to petitioners husband in these negotiations certainly cannot be construed
as also including an authority to represent her in any litigation.
E.B. Villarosa & Partner Co., Ltd. vs. Benito, 312 SCRA 65 , August 06,
1999
1. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Summons; Jurisdiction; The designation of
persons or officers who are authorized to accept summons for a domestic
corporation or partnership is now limited and more clearly specified in Section
11, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.The designation of persons or officers who are authorized to accept summons for
a domestic corporation or partnership is now limited and more clearly specified
in Section 11, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The rule now states
general manager instead of only manager; corporate secretary instead of
secretary; and treasurer instead of cashier. The phrase agent, or any of its
directors is conspicuously deleted in the new rule.
2. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Summons; Jurisdiction; Strict compliance with the
rules has been enjoined; The liberal construction rule cannot be invoked and
utilized as a substitute for the plain legal requirements as to the manner in which
summons should be served on a domestic corporation.It should be noted that even prior to the effectivity of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, strict compliance with the rules has been enjoined. In the case of
Delta Motor Sales Corporation vs. Mangosing, the Court held: A strict
compliance with the mode of service is necessary to confer jurisdiction of the
court over a corporation. The officer upon whom service is made must be one
who is named in the statute; otherwise the service is insufficient. x x x. The
purpose is to render it reasonably certain that the corporation will receive
prompt and proper notice in an action against it or to insure that the summons
be served on a representative so integrated with the corporation that such
person will know what to do with the legal papers served on him. In other words,
to bring home to the corporation notice of the filing of the action. x x x. The
liberal construction rule cannot be invoked and utilized as a substitute for the
plain legal requirements as to the manner in which summons should be served
on a domestic corporation. x x x. (italics supplied).
3. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Summons; Jurisdiction; Service of summons upon
persons other than those mentioned in Section 13 of Rule 14 (old rule) has been
held as improper.Service of summons upon persons other than those mentioned in Section 13 of
Rule 14 (old rule) has been held as improper. Even under the old rule, service
upon a general manager of a firms branch office has been held as improper as
summons should have been served at the firms principal office. In First

Integrated Bonding Ins. Co., Inc. vs. Dizon, it was held that the service of
summons on the general manager of the insurance firms Cebu branch was
improper; default order could have been obviated had the summons been served
at the firms principal office.
4. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Summons; Jurisdiction; Court rules that the
service of summons upon the branch manager of petitioner at its branch office
at Cagayan de Oro, instead of upon the general manager at its principal office at
Davao City is improper; Trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of
the petitioner.Accordingly, we rule that the service of summons upon the branch manager of
petitioner at its branch office at Cagayan de Oro, instead of upon the general
manager at its principal office at Davao City is improper. Consequently, the trial
court did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner.
5. Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Summons; Jurisdiction; The inclusion in a motion
to dismiss of other grounds aside from lack of jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant shall not be deemed a voluntary appearance.Before, the rule was that a party may challenge the jurisdiction of the court over
his person by making a special appearance through a motion to dismiss and if in
the same motion, the movant raised other grounds or invoked affirmative relief
which necessarily involves the exercise of the jurisdiction of the court, the party
is deemed to have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court. This
doctrine has been abandoned in the case of La Naval Drug Corporation vs. Court
of Appeals, et al., which became the basis of the adoption of a new provision in
the former Section 23, which is now Section 20 of Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules.
Section 20 now provides that the inclusion in a motion to dismiss of other
grounds aside from lack of jurisdiction over the person of the defendant shall not
be deemed a voluntary appearance. The emplacement of this rule clearly
underscores the purpose to enforce strict enforcement of the rules on summons.
Accordingly, the filing of a motion to dismiss, whether or not belatedly filed by
the defendant, his authorized agent or attorney, precisely objecting to the
jurisdiction of the court over the person of the defendant can by no means be
deemed a submission to the jurisdiction of the court. There being no proper
service of summons, the trial court cannot take cognizance of a case for lack of
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. Any proceeding undertaken by the
trial court will consequently be null and void.
Millenium Industrial Commercial Corporation vs. Tan, 326 SCRA 563 ,
February 28, 2000
1. Actions; Pleadings and Practice; Summons; Parties; Service of summons upon a
defendant corporation must be made on a representative so integrated with the
corporation sued as to make it a priori presumable that he will realize his
responsibilities and know what he should do with any legal papers received by
him.-

Summons is the means by which the defendant in a case is notified of the

existence of an action against him and, thereby, the court is conferred
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. If the defendant is a corporation,
Rule 14, 13 requires that service of summons be made upon the corporations
president, manager, secretary, cashier, agent, or any of its directors. The
rationale of the rule is that service must be made on a representative so
integrated with the corporation sued as to make it a priori presumable that he
will realize his responsibilities and know what he should do with any legal papers
received by him.
2. Actions; Pleadings and Practice; Summons; Words and Phrases; Doctrine of
Substantial Compliance; Requisites.In Porac Trucking, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, this Court enumerated the requisites
for the application of the doctrine of substantial compliance, to wit: (a) there
must be actual receipt of the summons by the person served, i.e., transferring
possession of the copy of the summons from the Sheriff to the person served; (b)
the person served must sign a receipt or the sheriffs return; and (c) there must
be actual receipt of the summons by the corporation through the person on
whom the summons was actually served. The third requisite is the most
important for it is through such receipt that the purpose of the rule on service of
summons is attained.
3. Actions; Pleadings and Practice; Summons; It is not allowable to merely infer
actual receipt of summons by the corporation through the person on whom the
summons was servedfor there to be substantial compliance, actual receipt of
summons by the corporation through the person served must be shown.In this case, there is no dispute that the first and second requisites were fulfilled.
With respect to the third, the appellate court held that petitioners filing of a
motion to dismiss the foreclosure suit is proof that it received the copy of the
summons and the complaint. There is, however, no direct proof of this or that
Lynverd Cinches actually turned over the summons to any of the officers of the
corporation. In contrast, in our cases applying the substantial compliance rule,
there was direct evidence, such as the admission of the corporations officers, of
receipt of summons by the corporation through the person upon whom it was
actually served. The question is whether it is allowable to merely infer actual
receipt of summons by the corporation through the person on whom summons
was served. We hold that it cannot be allowed. For there to be substantial
compliance, actual receipt of summons by the corporation through the person
served must be shown. Where a corporation only learns of the service of
summons and the filing of the complaint against it through some person or
means other than the person actually served, the service of summons becomes
meaningless. This is particularly true in the present case where there is serious
doubt if Lynverd Cinches, the person on whom service of summons was effected,
is in fact an employee of the corporation. Except for the sheriffs return, there is
nothing to show that Lynverd Cinches was really a draftsman employed by the
corporation.

4. Actions; Pleadings and Practice; Summons; Receipt by a defendant corporation

of the summons and complaint cannot be inferred from the fact that it filed a
Motion to Dismiss the case.Respondent casts doubt on petitioners claim that it came to know about the
summons and the complaint against it only after it learned that there was a
pending foreclosure of its mortgage. There is nothing improbable about this
claim. Petitioner was in default in the payment of its loan. It had received
demand letters from respondent. Thus, it had reason to believe that a
foreclosure suit would be filed against it. The appellate court was, therefore, in
error in giving weight to respondents claims. Receipt by petitioner of the
summons and complaint cannot be inferred from the fact that it filed a Motion to
Dismiss the case.
5. Actions; Pleadings and Practice; Summons; Jurisdiction; Estoppel; Voluntary
appearance is a waiver of the defense of lack of jurisdiction over the person of
the defendant, but the assertion of affirmative defenses shall not be construed
as an estoppel or as a waiver of such defense.Our decision in La Naval Drug Corporation v. Court of Appeals settled this
question. The rule prior to La Naval was that if a defendant, in a motion to
dismiss, alleges grounds for dismissing the action other than lack of jurisdiction,
he would be deemed to have submitted himself to the jurisdiction of the court.
This rule no longer holds true. Noting that the doctrine of estoppel by jurisdiction
must be unequivocal and intentional, we ruled in La Naval: Jurisdiction over the
person must be seasonably raised, i.e., that it is pleaded in a motion to dismiss
or by way of an affirmative defense. Voluntary appearance shall be deemed a
waiver of this defense. The assertion, however, of affirmative defenses shall not
be construed as an estoppel or as a waiver of such defense.
6. Actions; Pleadings and Practice; Summons; Jurisdiction; Estoppel; The rule that,
in a motion to dismiss, the allegation of grounds other than lack of jurisdiction
over the person of the defendant, including a prayer for such other reliefs as
may be deemed appropriate and proper amounted to voluntary appearance
must be deemed superseded by the ruling in La Naval Drug Corporation vs.
Court of Appeals (236 SCRA 78 [1994]) that estoppel by jurisdiction must be
unequivocal and intentional.We turn to the effect of petitioners prayer for other reliefs in its Motion to
Dismiss. In De Midgely v. Fernandos, it was held that, in a motion to dismiss, the
allegation of grounds other than lack of jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant, including a prayer for such other reliefs as may be deemed
appropriate and proper amounted to voluntary appearance. This, however,
must be deemed superseded by the ruling in La Naval that estoppel by
jurisdiction must be unequivocal and intentional. It would be absurd to hold that
petitioner unequivocally and intentionally submitted itself to the juris- diction of
the court by seeking other reliefs to which it might be entitled when the only
relief that it can properly ask from the trial court is the dismissal of the complaint
against it.

Ramos vs. Ramos, 399 SCRA 43 , March 11, 2003

1. Judgments; A decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and
unalterable; Exceptions.It is well settled that a decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable
and unalterable. A final judgment may no longer be modified in any respect,
even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact or law;
and whether it will be made by the court that rendered it or by the highest court
in the land. The only exceptions to this rule are the correction of (1) clerical
errors, (2) the socalled nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any
party, and (3) void judgments. To determine whether the CA Decision of
September 28, 1995 is void, the failure to implead and to serve summons upon
petitioners will now be addressed.
2. Courts; Actions; Jurisdiction; Summons; Words and Phrases; Action in
Personam, Action Quasi in Rem, and Action in Rem, Distinguished; The rules
on the service of summons differ depending on the nature of the action.To be able to rule on this point, the Court needs to determine whether the action
is in personam, in rem or quasi in rem. The rules on the service of summons
differ depending on the nature of the action. An action in personam is lodged
against a person based on personal liability; an action in rem is directed against
the thing itself instead of the person; while an action quasi in rem names a
person as defendant, but its object is to subject that persons interest in a
property to a corresponding lien or obligation.
Teh vs. Court of Appeals, 401 SCRA 576 , April 24, 2003
1. Actions; Summons; Although the plaintiff should resort to other means to
determine the correct address of a defendant when it is informed by the sheriff
that he failed to serve the summons on the defendant, the plaintiff is not entirely
to blame for such failure where the defendants address was incorrectly
indicated on the General Information Sheets of his co-defendant-corporations, of
which he was president.The Court agrees with the appellate courts ruling that there was no abuse of
discretion on the part of the trial court when the latter denied the petitioners
motion to dismiss the complaint and ordered the issuance of an alias summons
to be served upon him. Although the respondent should have resorted to other
means to determine the correct address of the petitioner when it was informed
by the sheriff that he failed to serve the summons on the petitioner, the
respondent is not entirely to blame for such failure because the petitioners
address as indicated by Wood Based Panels, Inc., and Sinrimco, Inc. on their
respective General Information Sheets, was incorrect.
2. Actions; Motions to Dismiss; Under Section 3, Rule 16 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, after hearing the motion to dismiss, a judge has discretion to either
dismiss the action, deny the motion to dismiss or order the amendment of the
pleading.-

Moreover, the trial court was merely exercising its discretion under Rule 16,
Section 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure when it denied the petitioners
motion to dismiss. Under said rule, after hearing the motion, a judge may
dismiss the action, deny the motion to dismiss or order the amendment of the
pleading. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss based on its finding that
the issues alleged by the respondent in its complaint could not be resolved fully
in the absence of the petitioner. In its desire to resolve completely the issues
brought before it, the trial court deemed it fitting to properly acquire jurisdiction
over the person of the petitioner by ordering the issuance of alias summons on
the petitioner. Evidently, the trial court acted well within its discretion. The Court
of Appeals did not, therefore, err in dismissing the petition for certiorari filed
before it.
Santos, Jr. vs. PNOC Exploration Corporation, 566 SCRA 272 , September
23, 2008
1. Section 14, Rule 14 (on Summons) of the Rules of Court provides:
SEC. 14. Service upon defendant whose identity or whereabouts are unknown. In
any action where the defendant is designated as an unknown owner, or the
like, or whenever his whereabouts are unknown and cannot be
ascertained by diligent inquiry, service may, by leave of court, be
effected upon him by publication in a newspaper of general circulation
and in such places and for such times as the court may order. (emphasis
supplied)
Since petitioner could not be personally served with summons despite diligent
efforts to locate his whereabouts, respondent sought and was granted leave of
court to effect service of summons upon him by publication in a newspaper of
general circulation. Thus, petitioner was properly served with summons by
publication.
2. Petitioner invokes the distinction between an action in rem and an action in
personam and claims that substituted service may be availed of only in an action
in rem. Petitioner is wrong. The in rem/in personam distinction was significant
under the old rule because it was silent as to the kind of action to which the rule
was applicable. Because of this silence, the Court limited the application of the
old rule to in rem actions only.
This has been changed. The present rule expressly states that it applies [i]n any
action where the defendant is designated as an unknown owner, or the like, or
whenever his whereabouts are unknown and cannot be ascertained by diligent
inquiry. Thus, it now applies to any action, whether in personam, in rem or quasi
in rem.
3. Service of summons by publication is proved by the affidavit of the printer, his
foreman or principal clerk, or of the editor, business or advertising manager of
the newspaper which published the summons. The service of summons by
publication is complemented by service of summons by registered mail to the
defendants last known address. This complementary service is evidenced by an
affidavit showing the deposit of a copy of the summons and order for publication

in the post office, postage prepaid, directed to the defendant by registered mail
to his last known address.
The rules, however, do not require that the affidavit of complementary service
be executed by the clerk of court. While the trial court ordinarily does the
mailing of copies of its orders and processes, the duty to make the
complementary service by registered mail is imposed on the party who resorts to
service by publication.
4. If the defendant fails to file his answer on time, he may be declared in default
upon motion of the plaintiff with notice to the said defendant. In case he is
declared in default, the court shall proceed to render judgment granting the
plaintiff such relief as his pleading may warrant, unless the court in its discretion
requires the plaintiff to submit evidence. The defaulting defendant may not take
part in the trial but shall be entitled to notice of subsequent proceedings.
5. As is readily apparent, the September 11, 2003 order did not limit itself to
permitting respondent to present its evidence ex parte but in effect issued an
order of default. But the trial court could not validly do that as an order of
default can be made only upon motion of the claiming party.[15] Since no motion
to declare petitioner in default was filed, no default order should have been
issued.
6. To pursue the matter to its logical conclusion, if a party declared in default is
entitled to notice of subsequent proceedings, all the more should a party who
has not been declared in default be entitled to such notice. But what happens
if the residence or whereabouts of the defending party is not known or he
cannot be located? In such a case, there is obviously no way notice can be
sent to him and the notice requirement cannot apply to him. The law does
not require that the impossible be done. Nemo tenetur ad impossibile. The
law obliges no one to perform an impossibility. Laws and rules must be
interpreted in a way that they are in accordance with logic, common sense,
reason and practicality.
Mason vs. Court of Appeals, 413 SCRA 303 , October 13, 2003
1. Remedial Law; Summons; Jurisdiction; Question of whether the substantial
compliance rule is still applicable under Section 11, rule 14 of the 1997 Rule of
Civil Procedure has been settled in Villarosa which applies squarely to the instant
case.The question of whether the substantial compliance rule is still applicable under
Section 11, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure has been settled in
Villarosa which applies squarely to the instant case. In the said case, petitioner
E.B. Villarosa Partner Co. Ltd. (hereafter Villarosa) with principal office address at
102 Juan Luna St., Davao City and with branches at 2492 Bay View Drive, Tambo,
Paraaque, Metro Manila and Kolambog, Lapasan, Cagayan de Oro City, entered
into a sale with development agreement with private respondent Imperial
Development Corporation. As Villarosa failed to comply with its contractual
obligation, private respondent initiated a suit for breach of contract and
damages at the Regional Trial Court of Makati. Summons, together with the

complaint, was served upon Villarosa through its branch manager at Kolambog,
Lapasan, Cagayan de Oro City. Villarosa filed a Special Appearance with Motion
to Dismiss on the ground of improper service of summons and lack of
jurisdiction. The trial court denied the motion and ruled that there was
substantial compliance with the rule, thus, it acquired jurisdiction over Villarosa.
The latter questioned the denial before us in its petition for certiorari. We
decided in Villarosas favor and declared the trial court without jurisdiction to
take cognizance of the case. We held that there was no valid service of summons
on Villarosa as service was made through a person not included in the
enumeration in Section 11, Rule 14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which
revised the Section 13, Rule 14 of the 1964 Rules of Court. We discarded the trial
courts basis for denying the motion to dismiss, namely, private respondents
substantial compliance with the rule on service of summons, and fully agreed
with petitioners assertions that the enumeration under the new rule is
restricted, limited and exclusive, following the rule in statutory construction that
expressio unios est exclusio alterius. Had the Rules of Court Revision Committee
intended to liberalize the rule on service of summons, we said, it could have
easily done so by clear and concise language. Absent a manifest intent to
liberalize the rule, we stressed strict compliance with Section 11, Rule 14 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
2. Remedial Law; Summons; Jurisdiction; Doctrine of substantial compliance must
be deemed overturned by Villarosa, which is the later case.Neither can herein petitioners invoke our ruling in Millenium to support their
position for said case is not on all fours with the instant case. We must stress
that Millenium was decided when the 1964 Rules of Court were still in force and
effect, unlike the instant case which falls under the new rule. Hence, the cases
cited by petitioners where we upheld the doctrine of substantial compliance
must be deemed overturned by Villarosa, which is the later case.
3. Remedial Law; Summons; Jurisdiction; The service of summons is a vital and
indispensable ingredient of due process.At this juncture, it is worth emphasizing that notice to enable the other party to
be heard and to present evidence is not a mere technicality or a trivial matter in
any administrative or judicial proceedings. The service of summons is a vital and
indispensable ingredient of due process. We will deprive private respondent of its
right to present its defense in this multi-million peso suit, if we disregard
compliance with the rules on service of summons.
Jose vs. Boyon, 414 SCRA 216 , October 23, 2003
1. Remedial Law; Actions; Summons; Jurisdictions; Generally, trial courts acquire
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant by the service of summons.In general, trial courts acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant by
the service of summons. Where the action is in personam and the defendant is in
the Philippines, such service may be done by personal or substituted service,

following the procedures laid out in Sections 6 and 7 of Rule 14 of the Revised
Rules of Court.
2. Remedial Law; Actions; Summons; Jurisdictions; Substituted Service; Personal
service of summons is preferred to substituted service; Only if the former cannot
be made promptly can the process server resort to the latter; Circumstances
which must be indicated in the proof of summons; Failure to comply faithfully,
strictly and fully with all the foregoing requirements of substituted service
renders the service of summons ineffective.As can be gleaned from the above-quoted Sections, personal service of
summons is preferred to substituted service. Only if the former cannot be made
promptly can the process server resort to the latter. Moreover, the proof of
service of summons must (a) indicate the impossibility of service of summons
within a reasonable time; (b) specify the efforts exerted to locate the defendant;
and (c) state that the summons was served upon a person of sufficient age and
discretion who is residing in the address, or who is in charge of the office or
regular place of business, of the defendant. It is likewise required that the
pertinent facts proving these circumstances be stated in the proof of service or
in the officers return. The failure to comply faithfully, strictly and fully with all
the foregoing requirements of substituted service renders the service of
summons ineffective.
3. Remedial Law; Actions; Summons; Jurisdictions; Substituted Service; A general
statement that such efforts were made will not suffice for purposes of complying
with the rules of substituted service of summons.The Return of Summons shows that no effort was actually exerted and no
positive step taken by either the process server or petitioners to locate and
serve the summons personally on respondents. At best, the Return merely states
the alleged whereabouts of respondents without indicating that such information
was verified from a person who had knowledge thereof. Certainly, without
specifying the details of the attendant circumstances or of the efforts exerted to
serve the summons, a general statement that such efforts were made will not
suffice for purposes of complying with the rules of substituted service of
summons.
4. Remedial Law; Actions; Summons; Jurisdictions; Extraterritorial Service;
Extraterritorial service of summons or summons by publication applies only
when the action is in rem or quasi in rem.It must be noted that extraterritorial service of summons or summons by
publication applies only when the action is in rem or quasi in rem. The first is an
action against the thing itself instead of against the defendants person; in the
latter, an individual is named as defendant, and the purpose is to subject that
individuals interest in a piece of property to the obligation or loan burdening it.
5. Remedial Law; Actions; Summons; Jurisdictions; Extraterritorial Service; An
action for specific performance is an action in personam.-

In the instant case, what was filed before the trial court was an action for specific
performance directed against respondents. While the suit incidentally involved a
piece of land, the ownership or possession thereof was not put in issue, since
they did not assert any interest or right over it. Moreover, this Court has
consistently declared that an action for specific performance is an action in
personam.

Dole Philippines, Inc. (Tropifresh Division) vs. Quilala, 557 SCRA 433 , July
09, 2008
1. Well-settled is the rule that service of summons on a domestic corporation is
restricted, limited and exclusive to the persons enumerated in Section 11, Rule
14 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, following the rule in statutory
construction that expressio unios est exclusio alterius. Service must therefore be
made on the president, managing partner, general manager, corporate
secretary, treasurer, or in-house counsel.
2. Under Section 20 of the same Rule, a defendants voluntary appearance in the
action is equivalent to service of summons. As held previously by this Court, the
filing of motions seeking affirmative relief, such as, to admit answer, for
additional time to file answer, for reconsideration of a default judgment, and to
lift order of default with motion for reconsideration, are considered voluntary
submission to the jurisdiction of the court.
Manotoc vs. Court of Appeals, 499 SCRA 21 , August 16, 2006
1. Jurisdiction over the defendant is acquired either upon a valid service of
summons or the defendants voluntary appearance in court. When the defendant
does not voluntarily submit to the courts jurisdiction or when there is no valid
service of summons, any judgment of the court which has no jurisdiction over
the person of the defendant is null and void. In an action strictly in personam,
personal service on the defendant is the preferred mode of service, that is, by
handing a copy of the summons to the defendant in person. If defendant, for
excusable reasons, cannot be served with the summons within a reasonable
period, then substituted service can be resorted to. While substituted service of
summons is permitted, it is extraordinary in character and in derogation of the
usual method of service. Hence, it must faithfully and strictly comply with the
prescribed requirements and circumstances authorized by the rules. Indeed,
compliance with the rules regarding the service of summons is as much
important as the issue of due process as of jurisdiction.
2. The party relying on substituted service or the sheriff must show that defendant
cannot be served promptly or there is impossibility of prompt service. Section 8,
Rule 14 provides that the plaintiff or the sheriff is given a reasonable time to
serve the summons to the defendant in person, but no specific time frame is
mentioned. Reasonable time is defined as so much time as is necessary under
the circumstances for a reasonably prudent and diligent man to do,
conveniently, what the contract or duty requires that should be done, having a
regard for the rights and possibility of loss, if any[,] to the other party.

Under the Rules, the service of summons has no set period. However, when the
court, clerk of court, or the plaintiff asks the sheriff to make the return of the
summons and the latter submits the return of summons, then the validity of the
summons lapses. The plaintiff may then ask for an alias summons if the service
of summons has failed. What then is a reasonable time for the sheriff to effect a
personal service in order to demonstrate impossibility of prompt service? To the
plaintiff, reasonable time means no more than seven (7) days since an
expeditious processing of a complaint is what a plaintiff wants. To the sheriff,
reasonable time means 15 to 30 days because at the end of the month, it is a
practice for the branch clerk of court to require the sheriff to submit a return of
the summons assigned to the sheriff for service. The Sheriffs Return provides
data to the Clerk of Court, which the clerk uses in the Monthly Report of Cases to
be submitted to the Office of the Court Administrator within the first ten (10)
days of the succeeding month. Thus, one month from the issuance of summons
can be considered reasonable time with regard to personal service on the
defendant.
3. Sheriffs are asked to discharge their duties on the service of summons with due
care, utmost diligence, and reasonable promptness and speed so as not to
prejudice the expeditious dispensation of justice. Thus, they are enjoined to try
their best efforts to accomplish personal service on defendant. On the other
hand, since the defendant is expected to try to avoid and evade service of
summons, the sheriff must be resourceful, persevering, canny, and diligent in
serving the process on the defendant. For substituted service of summons to be
available, there must be several attempts by the sheriff to personally serve the
summons within a reasonable period [of one month] which eventually resulted in
failure to prove impossibility of prompt service. Several attempts means at least
three (3) tries, preferably on at least two different dates. In addition, the sheriff
must cite why such efforts were unsuccessful. It is only then that impossibility of
service can be confirmed or accepted.
4. The sheriff must describe in the Return of Summons the facts and circumstances
surrounding the attempted personal service. The efforts made to find the
defendant and the reasons behind the failure must be clearly narrated in detail
in the Return. The date and time of the attempts on personal service, the
inquiries made to locate the defendant, the name/s of the occupants of the
alleged residence or house of defendant and all other acts done, though futile, to
serve the summons on defendant must be specified in the Return to justify
substituted service. The form on Sheriffs Return of Summons on Substituted
Service prescribed in the Handbook for Sheriffs published by the Philippine
Judicial Academy requires a narration of the efforts made to find the defendant
personally and the fact of failure. Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 5
dated November 9, 1989 requires that impossibility of prompt service should be
shown by stating the efforts made to find the defendant personally and the
failure of such efforts, which should be made in the proof of service.
5. If the substituted service will be effected at defendants house or residence, it
should be left with a person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein.
A person of suitable age and discretion is one who has attained the age of full
legal capacity (18 years old) and is considered to have enough discernment to

understand the importance of a summons. Discretion is defined as the ability to

make decisions which represent a responsible choice and for which an
understanding of what is lawful, right or wise may be presupposed. Thus, to be
of sufficient discretion, such person must know how to read and understand
English to comprehend the import of the summons, and fully realize the need to
deliver the summons and complaint to the defendant at the earliest possible
time for the person to take appropriate action. Thus, the person must have the
relation of confidence to the defendant, ensuring that the latter would receive or
at least be notified of the receipt of the summons. The sheriff must therefore
determine if the person found in the alleged dwelling or residence of defendant
is of legal age, what the recipients relationship with the defendant is, and
whether said person comprehends the significance of the receipt of the
summons and his duty to immediately deliver it to the defendant or at least
notify the defendant of said receipt of summons. These matters must be clearly
and specifically described in the Return of Summons.
6. If the substituted service will be done at defendants office or regular place of
business, then it should be served on a competent person in charge of the place.
Thus, the person on whom the substituted service will be made must be the one
managing the office or business of defendant, such as the president or manager;
and such individual must have sufficient knowledge to understand the obligation
of the defendant in the summons, its importance, and the prejudicial effects
arising from inaction on the summons. Again, these details must be contained in
the Return.
7. A meticulous scrutiny of the aforementioned Return readily reveals the absence
of material data on the serious efforts to serve the Summons on petitioner
Manotoc in person. There is no clear valid reason cited in the Return why those
efforts proved inadequate, to reach the conclusion that personal service has
become impossible or unattainable outside the generally couched phrases of on
many occasions several attempts were made to serve the summons x x x
personally, at reasonable hours during the day, and to no avail for the reason
that the said defendant is usually out of her place and/or residence or premises.
Wanting in detailed information, the Return deviates from the rulingin Domagas
v. Jensen and other related cases that the pertinent facts and circumstances on
the efforts exerted to serve the summons personally must be narrated in the
Return. It cannot be determined how many times, on what specific dates, and at
what hours of the day the attempts were made. Given the fact that the
substituted service of summons may be assailed, as in the present case, by a
Motion to Dismiss, it is imperative that the pertinent facts and circumstances
surrounding the service of summons be described with more particularity in the
Return or Certificate of Service.
8. Apart from the allegation of petitioners address in the Complaint, it has not been
shown that respondent Trajano or Sheriff Caelas, who served such summons,
exerted extraordinary efforts to locate petitioner. Certainly, the second
paragraph of the Complaint only states that respondents were informed, and so
[they] allege about the address and whereabouts of petitioner. Before resorting
to substituted service, a plaintiff must demonstrate an effort in good faith to
locate the defendant through more direct means.[32] More so, in the case in

hand, when the alleged petitioners residence or house is doubtful or has not
been clearly ascertained, it would have been better for personal service to have
been pursued persistently.
9. In the case Umandap v. Sabio, Jr.,[33] it may be true that the Court held that a
Sheriffs Return, which states that despite efforts exerted to serve said process
personally upon the defendant on several occasions the same proved futile,
conforms to the requirements of valid substituted service. However, in view of
the numerous claims of irregularities in substituted service which have spawned
the filing of a great number of unnecessary special civil actions of certiorari and
appeals to higher courts, resulting in prolonged litigation and wasteful legal
expenses, the Court rules in the case at bar that the narration of the efforts
made to find the defendant and the fact of failure written in broad and imprecise
words will not suffice. The facts and circumstances should be stated with more
particularity and detail on the number of attempts made at personal service,
dates and times of the attempts, inquiries to locate defendant, names of
occupants of the alleged residence, and the reasons for failure should be
included in the Return to satisfactorily show the efforts undertaken. That such
efforts were made to personally serve summons on defendant, and those
resulted in failure, would prove impossibility of prompt personal service.
Moreover, to allow sheriffs to describe the facts and circumstances in inexact
terms would encourage routine performance of their precise duties relating to
substituted service for it would be quite easy to shroud or conceal carelessness
or laxity in such broad terms. Lastly, considering that monies and properties
worth millions may be lost by a defendant because of an irregular or void
substituted service, it is but only fair that the Sheriffs Return should clearly and
convincingly show the impracticability or hopelessness of personal service.
10.Granting that such a general description be considered adequate, there is still a
serious nonconformity from the requirement that the summons must be left with
a person of suitable age and discretion residing in defendants house or
residence. Thus, there are two (2) requirements under the Rules: (1) recipient
must be a person of suitable age and discretion; and (2) recipient must reside in
the house or residence of defendant. Both requirements were not met. In this
case, the Sheriffs Return lacks information as to residence, age, and discretion of
Mr. Macky de la Cruz, aside from the sheriffs general assertion that de la Cruz is
the resident caretaker of petitioner as pointed out by a certain Ms. Lyn Jacinto,
alleged receptionist and telephone operator of Alexandra Homes. It is doubtful if
Mr. de la Cruz is residing with petitioner Manotoc in the condominium unit
considering that a married woman of her stature in society would unlikely hire a
male caretaker to reside in her dwelling. With the petitioners allegation that
Macky de la Cruz is not her employee, servant, or representative, it is necessary
to have additional information in the Return of Summons. Besides, Mr. Macky de
la Cruzs refusal to sign the Receipt for the summons is a strong indication that
he did not have the necessary relation of confidence with petitioner. To protect
petitioners right to due process by being accorded proper notice of a case
against her, the substituted service of summons must be shown to clearly
comply with the rules.

11.The court a quo heavily relied on the presumption of regularity in the

performance of official duty. It reasons out that [t]he certificate of service by the
proper officer is prima facie evidence of the facts set out herein, and to
overcome the presumption arising from said certificate, the evidence must be
clear and convincing.
The Court acknowledges that this ruling is still a valid doctrine. However, for the
presumption to apply, the Sheriffs Return must show that serious efforts or
attempts were exerted to personally serve the summons and that said efforts
failed. These facts must be specifically narrated in the Return. To reiterate, it
must clearly show that the substituted service must be made on a person of
suitable age and discretion living in the dwelling or residence of defendant.
Otherwise, the Return is flawed and the presumption cannot be availed of. As
previously explained, the Return of Sheriff Caelas did not comply with the
stringent requirements of Rule 14, Section 8 on substituted service.
In the case of Venturanza v. Court of Appeals,1 it was held that x x x the
presumption of regularity in the performance of official functions by the
sheriff is not applicable in this case where it is patent that the sheriffs
return is defective (emphasis supplied). While the Sheriffs Return in the
Venturanza case had no statement on the effort or attempt to personally serve
the summons, the Return of Sheriff Caelas in the case at bar merely described
the efforts or attempts in general terms lacking in details as required by the
ruling in the case of Domagas v. Jensen and other cases. It is as if Caelas Return
did not mention any effort to accomplish personal service. Thus, the substituted
service is void.
12.On the issue whether petitioner Manotoc is a resident of Alexandra Homes, Unit
E-2104, at No. 29 Meralco Avenue, Pasig City, our findings that the substituted
service is void has rendered the matter moot and academic. Even assuming that
Alexandra Homes Room 104 is her actual residence, such fact would not make
an irregular and void substituted service valid and effective.
Pascual vs. Pascual, 607 SCRA 288 , December 04, 2009
1. In a case where the action is in personam and the defendant is in the Philippines,
the service of summons may be done by personal or substituted service as laid
out in Sections 6 and 7 of Rule 14 of the Revised Rules of Court. The provisions
state:
Section 6. Service in person on defendant. - Whenever practicable, the summons
shall be served by handing a copy thereof to the defendant in person, or, if he
refuses to receive and sign for it, by tendering it to him.
Section 7. Substituted service. - If, for justifiable causes, the defendant cannot
be served within a reasonable time as provided in the preceding section, service
may be effected (a) by leaving copies of the summons at the defendant's
residence with some person of suitable age and discretion then residing therein,
1

or (b) by leaving the copies at defendants office or regular place of business with
some competent person in charge thereof.
A plain and simple reading of the above provisions indicates that personal
service of summons should and always be the first option, and it is only when
the said summons cannot be served within a reasonable time can the process
server resort to substituted service.
2. The above Return of Summons does not show or indicate the actual exertion or
any positive steps taken by the officer or process server in serving the summons
personally to the defendant. As in Jose v. Boyon, this Court ruled that:
The Return of Summons shows no effort was actually exerted and no positive
step taken by either the process server or petitioners to locate and serve the
summons personally on respondents. At best, the Return merely states the
alleged whereabouts of respondents without indicating that such information
was verified from a person who had knowledge thereof. Certainly, without
specifying the details of the attendant circumstances or of the efforts exerted to
serve the summons, a general statement that such efforts were made will not
suffice for purposes of complying with the rules of substituted service of
summons.
3. Petitioner further states that the presumption of regularity in the performance of
official functions must be applied to the present case. He expounds on the fact
that as between the process server's return of substituted service, which carries
with it the presumption of regularity and the respondent's self-serving assertion
that she only came to know of the case against her when she received a copy of
the petitioner's motion to declare her in default, the process server's return is
undoubtedly more deserving of credit. The said argument, however, is only
meritorious, provided that there was a strict compliance with the procedure for
serving a summons. In the absence of even the barest compliance with the
procedure for a substituted service of summons outlined in the Rules of Court,
the presumption of regularity in the performance of public functions does not
apply.
4. Applying the above disquisitions, the jurisdiction over the person of the
respondent was never vested with the RTC, because the manner of substituted
service by the process server was apparently invalid and ineffective. As such,
there was a violation of due process. Jurisdiction over the defendant is acquired
either upon a valid service of summons or the defendants voluntary appearance
in court. When the defendant does not voluntarily submit to the courts
jurisdiction or when there is no valid service of summons, any judgment of the
court which has no jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is null and void.
5. Petitioner also raises the issue of the impropriety of the remedy resorted to by
the respondent which is the filing of a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court, claiming that the said remedy is inappropriate because there are
still other plain, speedy and adequate remedies available, such as an ordinary

appeal, the Decision of the RTC having attained its finality. The question,
however, is whether the said Decision has indeed attained finality. The
importance of the doctrine of the finality of judgment has always been
emphasized by this Court. In Pasiona, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, this Court has
expounded on the said doctrine.
The said doctrine, however, is applicable only when the judgment or decision is
valid. In the present case, as earlier pronounced, and as ruled by the CA, the
judgment in question is void, the RTC not having acquired jurisdiction over the
person of the respondent. It is a well-entrenched principle that a void judgment
can never become final. As ruled by this Court in Metropolitan Bank & Trust
Company v. Alejo In Leonor v. Court of Appeals and Arcelona v. Court of Appeals,
we held thus:
A void judgment for want of jurisdiction is no judgment at all. It cannot
be the source of any right nor the creator of any obligation. All acts performed
pursuant to it and all claims emanating from it have no legal effect. Hence, it can
never become final and any writ of execution based on it is void: x x x it may be
said to be a lawless thing which can be treated as an outlaw and slain at sight, or
ignored wherever and whenever it exhibits its head
Thus, from the above discussion, the Decision of the RTC, not having attained its
finality due to its being void, the Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65, filed by the
respondent with the CA, was proper.