China-Pakistan Economic Corridor: Prospects and Issues

Printer-friendly version
Brig Vinod Anand, Senior Fellow, VIF

While connectivity as a principle cannot be faulted with it is the geopolitical

implications of such projects, for instance the China-Pakistan economic corridor that
has raised concerns amongst Indias strategic and security establishment. Firstly,
there is the question of infrastructure or for that matter any other developmental
projects in an area which is considered disputed not only by India but also by
Pakistan. China has been against Asian Development Bank funds being given to
developmental projects in Arunachal Pradesh which it considers disputed; Beijing
has also objected to Japanese funds being utilised for such projects in Arunachal
Pradesh. Therefore, China in essence is following double standards.

Secondly, construction of multimodal corridors very near to India-POK Line of Actual

Control and international border would provide improved access and connectivity to
a number of Pakistan based terrorist groups operating against India. Development
of roads, communication networks would enable the terrorists to set up more bases
and expand their activities. Evidently, such improved connectivity would lead to
increased infiltration of undesirable elements across the LOC and IB to India.
Naturally, such a state of affairs would have adverse impact on India-Pakistan and
India-China bilateral relationship. This would not be conducive to peace and stability
in the region.

The presence of PLA troops, from Construction Corps in the POK for maintenance
and construction activity also has military implications. The Indian Defence Forces
have been envisioning the possibilities of having to fight a two-front war given the
nature of cooperation between China and Pakistan and presence of PLA soldiers in
POK indicates that this could well come about. Thus, such activities would only add
to Indias resolve to continue strengthening its deterrence capabilities against such
a likely scenario. Chinas activities in the disputed areas would also have adverse
implications for stability in the region.

At the strategic level this corridor is perceived as realization of Chinas long term
strategic objective of gaining access to the Indian Ocean through building a
Strategic Land Bridge or Continental bridge from Xinjiang to Gwadar. The other

strategic land bridge for connecting to Indian Ocean is through Myanmar. Some of
the arguments like Chinas need for avoiding the Malacca Dilemma are well known.

Further, development of Gwadar port and its operation by China needs to be seen
as part of the broader Chinese Grand Maritime Strategy which has been under way
for some years. Though Gwadar would be an economic hub mainly catering to
commercial interests that would be mutually useful to Pakistan and China yet the
much talked about commercial activity has not taken off as yet. The development of
roads and communication networks to the hinterland has also not taken place in
any meaningful way.

According to The Dawn, a Pakistan there is a controversy about the route of the
road links between the deep-water port of Gwadar and the mountain border
crossing of Khunjerab. The original plan was to link Quetta and then parts of Khyber
Pakhtunkhwa (KP) which has been changed to connect to existing road network in
Sindh and Punjab thus raising concerns of Baluchistan and KP provinces. Evidently,
neither China nor Pakistan wants to invest in developing new routes as the costs
would be heavy. It is also surprising that the depiction of the route is missing from
the website of Pakistans Planning Commission. Similarly, the website of Pakistan
National Highway Authority does not explain the route or the road projects
connected with the China- Pakistan economic corridor. In first week of February the
Senators from Baluchistan and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa walked out of the National
Assembly proceedings during the discussions because the government needed to
show transparency on the route and nature of deal with the Chinese.

According to Ayesha Siddiqa, a well known Pakistani analyst the Chinese model for
countries like Pakistan and Sri Lanka is to exploit their need for investment in
infrastructure development. There are huge projects conceived, such as the new
seaport near Colombo, as well as power plants and roads that make the country
appear modern, but at an extremely high cost. Beijing has the kind of capital it can
invest in such places where it is guaranteed higher returns. She opines that the
relationship is based on a collusion of interests between the ruling elite of the
recipient state and the government in China.

Nevertheless, the CPEC including the Gwadar port, over the long term, provides the
potential to China to exercise its ever expanding military influence. The Chinese
economic and military power has grown and along with its overall comprehensive
naval power it has begun to look for securing its interests in the far flung areas

extending from the Pacific to Indian Ocean Region and beyond even to the
Mediterranean. Docking of Chinese submarines in Sri Lanka also reflected PLA
Navys increasing presence in the Indian Ocean region.

There is also the geopolitical reality of unfolding Afghanistan scenario. Once the US
forces have extricated their resources and equipment from Afghanistan, Pakistan
would like the American influence to diminish over a period of time, this in a sense
will counter balance American maritime influence something which both China and
Pakistan would welcome.

However, besides the difficulties of terrain and weather in the Northern

mountainous areas for construction and maintenance of roads, pipelines and hydro
projects the internal security situation would also present many challenges to
realization of the economic corridor. Gilgit and Baltistan through which the corridor
will pass have groups that object to construction of such projects because of several
reasons.

The people of Gilgit-Baltistan have been demanding full legislative powers for the
region. Pakistan has been rejecting the demand as according to Islamabad it would
stand in contradiction to the international agreement regarding the disputed
territory. The Gilgit-Baltistan United Front is against the accords signed with China;
their argument is that Gilgit-Baltistan is a disputed territory and, therefore, any
accord without the consent of the indigenous people cannot be accepted. Their view
is that Pakistans Nawaz Sharif is not a representative of Gilgit-Baltistan and hence
he has no right to impose his economic interests onto the region. Gilgit-Baltistan has
also initiated the movement against the inclusion of the anti-terrorism law that is
against the mandate of the United Nations Commission on India and Pakistan
(UNCIP) and consider it illegal and against the indigenous people.

Further, over the years Pakistan has also been working on changing the
demographic profile of largely Shia populated Gilgit Baltistan by settling Sunni
Muslims in the area. This has created tensions between the two Muslim sects thus
creating more instability in the region. Recently, the frequency of attacks by Sunni
extremist groups against the Shias has increased with concomitant impact on GilgitBaltistan.

Turbulence in Baluchistan, dominance of radicalized Pashtoons in Karachi which

control most of the road transportation and expanding signature of terrorist outfits
are some of the factors which would have negative impact on development
activities. Many insurgent groups of Baluchistan have objected to development of
Gwadar and exploitation of their natural resources by Pakistans central
government. The insurgency has been acquiring some momentum of late.

The planned off shoots of the corridor to Afghanistan are also likely to be beset with
the problems of instability and terrorism which show no sign of abating. Society in
Pakistan has become so radicalized and extremist ideologies so rooted in the DNA of
Pakistan that one wonders very much whether the current dispensation and their
ways of working can bring Pakistan back from the abyss it is staring into.

On the other hand despite the grand announcement of investing US dollars 40

billion or so by China in Pakistan for various projects, Beijing would be very careful
in sinking money in Pakistan. There is also a perspective that China is unlikely to
gain much from Pakistan given the dysfunctional nature of the state. While Pakistan
military might have promised China that it would be able to control the terrorist and
extremist groups that might cause harm to China in Xinjiang it is also well
understood that Pakistan has not been able to control such groups. Many strategists
have surmised that Pakistan is more unstable than Afghanistan and most of the
problems in Afghanistan are due to Pakistans interference and support to Afghan
Taliban.

While some portions of CPEC may become a reality it is unlikely that project would
be realized as envisioned in its original form. Meanwhile India needs to continue to
oppose robustly Chinas developmental and other activities in the disputed areas of
POK. Indias also needs to strengthen its maritime presence in Indian Ocean region
and take suitable countermeasures through a variety of means to neutralize the
geostrategic implications of Gwadar port.