Policy Brief

|Foreign and Security Policy Program|

The Five Most Contentious

Issues on the Road to Warsaw
by Alexandra de Hoop Scheffer,
Martin Quencez, and Martin Michelot

In Brief: The transatlantic allies

have resisted some daunting
threats: the ongoing effects of the
euro crisis, the increasing influx of
asylum seekers into Europe and the
United States, energy security and
dependence on Russian gas, and
the increasing influence of populist
parties in European countries. In
this context, NATO countries face
five key strategic challenges on the
road to the Warsaw Summit in 2016
burden-sharing, NATOs political
role, divergent threat perceptions,
conflicting expectations, and
especially EU-NATO cooperation.
Indeed, the need for better
coordination of EU and NATO assets
in the current security environment
is known by all, but too-often put
aside in policy discussions.

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The 2016 NATO Summit in Warsaw will take place in

a distressing period with multiple security crises in the
European neighborhood as well as risks of political
division within the Alliance.1 Yet, in the midst of an
outstanding series of challenges, the transatlantic
partnership has also shown its unique resistance and
provided reasons for optimism. For instance, the
United States, Canada, and European allies have been
able to resist Moscows strategic objectives to divide
transatlantic unity and weaken the European project
when it destabilized Ukraine. Russia gambled that
it could exploit Europes weaknesses: the ongoing
effects of the euro crisis, the increasing influx of
asylum seekers into Europe and the United States,
energy security and dependence on Russian gas, and
the increasing influence of populist parties in European countries who respond to these threats and the
uncertain future of the U.K. in the EU, Germanys strategic restraint, and the U.S. rebalancing toward Asia.
Russias strategy has not been successful, however,
since the allies have managed to reach constructive
1 The arguments presented in this policy brief are partly based on the NATO Ambassadorial Roundtable, organized by The German Marshall Fund of the United
States in Washington, DC on October 9, 2015, in partnership with the Norwegian
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The group, composed of ambassadors to the United
States from NATO Allied countries, senior U.S. government officials, and transatlantic scholars and experts, discussed transatlantic foreign and security policy
priorities and identified potential divides among member states that could lead to
sub-optimal policies, while aiming to frame the basics of shared policies and the
necessary steps forward to prepare the 2016 NATO Warsaw Summit.

|Foreign and Security Policy Program|

agreements on sanctions on the Russian economy and

continue to coordinate their approach to the Ukrainian and Syrian conflicts, at the same time building
up state resilience to emerging hybrid threats. This
illustrates the strength of the Alliance, as transatlantic
partners continue to rely primarily on each other to
achieve their strategic goals.

Transatlantic partners continue to rely primarily on

each other to achieve their
strategic goals.
In this context, the Warsaw Summit will play a major
role in pushing participants toward consolidating the
foundations laid in 2014 in Wales and completing
the Alliances adaptation to its new strategic environment. In this brief, we argue that four challenges will
be particularly decisive for the Warsaw Summits
outcomes: burden-sharing, NATOs political role,
divergent threat perceptions, and expectations. In
addition to these four critical and contentious challenges, there is one well-known issue may be underplayed in the debates: EU-NATO cooperation. Extra
attention is particularly needed here. Indeed, the
nature of the security challenges faced by the Alliance
today and the need for improved strategic communication at the transatlantic level require more specific
listing of EUs and NATOs complementary assets.
The contemporary strategic environment provides
a unique opportunity to encourage more ambitious
cooperation between the two organizations.
1. (Un)Sustainability of the Current Transatlantic
Burden-Sharing
While the recent U.S. policy shifts have raised
concerns on the other side of the Atlantic, the United
States will not stop investing in the transatlantic

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Policy Brief

partnership. It is based on a unique relationship of

trust between the United States, Canada, and their
European allies, and the U.S. public understands and
values the historic bond that link transatlantic partners. U.S. leadership continues to be very involved in
finding solutions to European security challenges and
common concerns regarding the future of the European neighborhoods. The transatlantic relationship is
still the cornerstone of the international order, and the
United States is committed to protecting it.
Nonetheless, political and financial constraints will
continue to limit U.S. engagement in European
security and NATO in the short and mid-term. The
legacy of the Afghanistan and Iraq interventions and
the economic crisis has reduced the U.S. appetite for
costly military interventions. In parallel, the economic
development of East and South Asia will attract U.S.
investments and strategic focus in the 21st century.
Questions over the efficiency of military tools and
limited resources frame the terms of the transatlantic
strategic partnership, and neither the Ukrainian crisis,
the Russian intervention in Syria, nor the Paris attacks
of November 13 constitute a game-changer from the
U.S. perspective.
The U.S. commitment toward Europes security will
therefore persist, but Europeans will have more
responsibilities in their own defense. While the United
States has partially rebalanced in Europe, committing more of a presence and offering assurances that
a NATO enhanced rapid reaction force could be
deployed to counter any Article 5 aggression, European partners continue to rely on their soft power
assets (development aid, diplomacy, economic tools) to
achieve their foreign policy objectives. On the diplomatic front, French and German leadership in Ukraine
has been critical, but the United States remains the
main security provider in Central and Eastern Europe.
For Washington, the current division of labor, with
the United States remaining responsible for the bulk
of the military burden and Europe not addressing
this concern, is not sustainable. This asymmetry

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has limited the scope of responses to new security

challenges, which require the right mix of both soft
and hard power. It is important to preserve NATOs
military superiority the Alliance represents 55
percent of global defense expenditures by investing
in (advanced) hard power capabilities. Without proper
investments, the technological gap between the United
States and Europe may increase. Continued joint trainings and live exercises are also central to the credibility
of NATOs reassurance and deterrence measures.
Most European countries expect Washington to
approach the defense spending issue in a more
nuanced way, and take into account other key
aspects beyond military assurance that defense
budgets do not reflect, such as national resilience
against hybrid warfare, the soft power tools that the
EU commits to failed-state situations, or the fact that
some have spent significant resources deploying their
troops in sub-Saharan Africa or as part of the coalition against the self-proclaimed Islamic State group
(ISIS). However, the pressure coming from traditional
hardliners in the U.S. Congress will remain strong
and become increasingly audible as we approach the
Warsaw Summit and discuss the implementation of
the Wales spending pledge. European allies need to
move away from what is perceived in Washington as
unhelpful assumptions about the U.S. role in Europes
security. Because the United States responded quickly
to Russian President Vladimir Putins aggression in
Crimea, European allies may have assumed that the
United States was back and that they could let go
of their commitments. For this reason, the 2 percent

European allies need to

move away from what is perceived in Washington as unhelpful assumptions about
the U.S. role in Europes
security.

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Policy Brief

GDP goal remains an important means of pressure for

Washington.
2. Divergence on the Role of NATO as Political
and Communication Platforms
NATOs relevance and efficiency stem from its pragmatic and flexible approach to security crises, but
this approach is ill-suited as a platform for theoretical
debates. The debates about the East and South division, or about whether NATO troops should be made
permanent in the East and Baltic region, do not necessarily reinforce transatlantic solidarity. NATO is a
remarkable problem-solving tool for its member states
when it works on concrete issues. The use of NATO
as a political platform, however, remains controversial
among transatlantic partners. While some countries
prefer to emphasize the military nature of the alliance,
others would like to debate more strategic and political
issues between NATO members, including issues that
require risk assessment and planning. How bad could
the refugee crisis get? What would a NATO mission
look like in Yemen if the situation gets worse? What do
we want the future of Ukraine to look like? What kind
of relationship do we want with Russia?
While some Allies may agree that NATO was probably not the best forum to discuss these strategic issues
because of the technocratic dimension of the discussions held within NATO, U.S. officials have suggested
revamping NATOs ministerial meetings by ensuring
that their agendas allow for making important decisions about the future of the Alliance and also creating
incentives for open information-sharing. NATOs
strength lies in its ability to implement the security
policies necessary to achieve its strategic objectives.
While a few member states, notably France, consider
the EU a more appropriate framework for these
strategic discussions, the creation of a new, smaller
and more efficient forum within NATO is also up for
debate. This lack of agreement hinders coordination
between partners. For instance, the different models
of intervention, illustrated by the operations in Iraq,

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Libya, and Syria, need to be discussed at the transatlantic level, but it is not clear which institutional
vehicle should be used. Clarifying the strategic and
political role of NATO and building the necessary fora
to address the issues that cannot be resolved by the
Alliance is essential for a functioning partnership.
Moreover, the transatlantic partnership is challenged
by deep internal ideological divisions, including
regarding the role of NATO as an instrument of public
diplomacy. The question of counter-propaganda may,
however, be crucial as we approach January 2016 and
the renewal of European sanctions against Russia.
Some European countries want to roll back sanctions
if Russia is less active in Syria and Ukraine. This could
lead to fragmentation in the EU and in the transatlantic alliance. Indeed, internal divisions fostered by
the rise of Euroskeptic and radicalized political parties
directly threaten the future of the transatlantic partnership. The propaganda of revisionist powers such as

Internal divisions fostered by

the rise of Euroskeptic and
radicalized political parties
directly threaten the future
of the transatlantic partnership.
Russia and ISIS fuel and are fueled by these extremist
national movements, which in turn weaken European
unity. At a time when more cohesion and solidarity is
needed to build transatlantic resilience, national initiatives, such as a possible Brexit, call into question the
stability of this partnership.
3. Addressing Transatlantic Perception Gaps
Facing issues ranging from the migrant crisis to the
annexation of Crimea, Alliance frontline countries

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Policy Brief

now spread from the Mediterranean to the Baltic

States and the Black Sea. Nordic countries such as
Norway and Iceland are also facing a Northern flank
with growing competition in the Arctic region and
concern regarding Russian activities in the Baltic Sea.
The increasing fluidity of the geopolitical context
makes prioritizing threats a very complex process,
especially given the diverging threat perceptions
between Allies. Eastern countries are focused on
Russian actions, while countries closer to the Southern
border of Europe see a real, existential threat coming
from Syria and the refugee crisis. Transatlantic allies
do agree, however, that a geographical division of labor
in the Alliance would be a threat to NATOs unity.
The number of crises in the European neighborhoods
requires a comprehensive response. Transatlantic
powers simply cannot be made to choose between the
Eastern and Southern challenges. The compounding
effect of security issues in Ukraine, Syria, Iraq, Libya,
and the Sahel region cannot be overestimated, and
each crisis must be stabilized. The divergence of priorities between partners needs to be overcome rapidly.
The refugee crisis can help reconcile competing
interests between the Eastern flank and Southern
flank as it directly and immediately affects European
populations. Some countries have shown commitment in both the East and South. For instance, France
is militarily engaged in the Sahel, Iraq, and Syria, but
it has also reinforced its air presence in the Baltic area
through cooperation with Norway. Italy, despite an
acute refugee crisis, has led an eight-month Baltic air
policing mission and has offered to lead the Very High
Readiness Joint Task Force (VJTF) on a rotational
basis. Denmark and Norway have also acted as central
players on three different fronts: East, North, and
South.
Similarly, the question of the future enlargement of the
Alliance is affected by strong perception gaps. There is
a general consensus that transatlantic partners cannot
afford to adopt an inward-looking perspective, as it

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would worsen the power vacuum in the European

neighborhood. However, some disagreements remain
among member states regarding NATOs enlargement policy. For the United States and some European
allies such as Germany and France, the integration of
Montenegro would constitute a first signal that NATO
is not overwhelmed by surrounding security issues.
France also maintains that keeping the door open to
Ukraine will inevitably lead to Russian reactions, and
that NATO allies will have to be ready to engage in
escalation there.
The question of cooperation with the Alliances
neighbors is all the more relevant today as the aggravation of the refugee crisis has become an existential
challenge for the transatlantic partnership. Although
it is not primarily a security issue, there are certainly
security implications that cannot be overlooked and
that may restructure European budgets. It has triggered increased tensions between European Allies and
called solidarity among partners into question. The
United States needs to understand both the priority
given to this crisis by European policymakers and its
implications on European strategies in the Middle East
and North Africa.
4. Managing Strategic Expectations Toward NATO
The story of NATO is one of deep and slow changes.
Despite significant budget cuts, it remains the strongest military alliance in the world, and its conventional
superiority deters any direct military actions against
its members. The credibility of Article 5 has not been
damaged by Russian foreign policy in Ukraine, but
rather confirmed it. Similarly, while NATO solidarity
is often unsatisfying in a crisis situation because its
reaction time is limited, it is useful in the long term to
protect the core interests of the transatlantic partners.
In this context, reinforcing meetings in the framework
of Article 4, whereby Allies can consult together
whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial
integrity, political independence or security of any of
the Parties is threatened, could strengthen solidarity

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Policy Brief

and give Allies another avenue through which to

share security assessments. This is especially important given that the International Security Assistance
Force (ISAF) mission in Afghanistan, which was the
cornerstone of NATO collective efforts in the 2000s,
will soon come to an end even as minds are focused
elsewhere on the short-term divisive crises in the
neighborhoods. The evolution of the Alliance will be
incremental; the Warsaw Summit will not trigger a
philosophical revolution but instead focus on capabilities and threats. Transatlantic partners must account
for NATOs strategic culture in their expectations of
the Alliance. Otherwise its apparently slow process
may lead to frustrations and disappointments.

The Warsaw Summit will not

trigger a philosophical revolution but instead focus on
capabilities and threats.
Similarly, the limits of NATOs scope of action should
also be assessed on the road to the Warsaw Summit.
The challenge posed by hybrid warfare tactics,
although it includes a strong military component,
cannot be dealt with by NATO alone and requires a
more comprehensive transatlantic response. Transatlantic resilience is based on the political, economic,
and normative power of transatlantic partners and
the EU as much as on their defense capabilities. The
multiple crises in the Middle East and North Africa
stem from fundamental political instability, and a
strategy to address them cannot rely primarily on the
use of NATO forces. That said, operations outside
NATO such as the French-led operation in Mali have
shown positive results and proved that alternative
frameworks can be successful. The discussions of
NATOs limits should be held internally, not publicly,
as the Alliance tends to over-communicate its weaknesses and divisions.

|Foreign and Security Policy Program|

Finally, the geographic scope of NATOs responsibilities should also be discussed. For instance, whereas
the Eastern and Southern European neighborhoods
are at the heart of NATOs reflection for the future of
the Alliance, transatlantic engagement in Afghanistan
remains an open question. The longest operation in
NATOs history has failed to provide the conditions for
a secure and stable Afghanistan. The Warsaw Summit
is likely to continue the shift toward collective defense
that began at the Wales Summit in 2014, but the future
of NATO crisis management operations should also
be addressed. NATOs challenges are global by nature,
even though this belief is not shared by all allies,
and the priority given to collective defense does not
overshadow the Alliances responsibilities beyond its
immediate neighborhoods. There is now an identified
need to do more on maritime capabilities, to confront
Russia in Syria and in the East but also given the
tensions in the South China Sea. There is a broader
need for the Alliance to conceptualize its threats and
have clear escalation and de-escalation doctrines.
These four issues are the overarching contentious
issues on the road to Warsaw. The current debates on
the future of NATO largely address these challenges as
priorities for the success of the forthcoming summit.
However, there is a fifth issue that is just as critical, but
that remains generally under-recognized at the transatlantic level. Given the acute multiple pressures facing
Europe currently, now is the moment to make progress
on this particular issue.
5. The Need for Enhanced EU-NATO Cooperation
The need to improve the EU-NATO relationship is
both a well-worn issue and particularly prescient in
the current transatlantic strategic environment. The
relevance of institutional cooperation is highlighted by
three worrying trends in the transatlantic partnership.
First, transatlantic security has tended to become
highly transactional, which weakens the credibility of
the Alliance. In times of crisis, each country is tempted

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Transatlantic security has

tended to become highly
transactional.
to think of its relationship with partners in terms of
individual costs and benefits, rather than emphasizing
collective interests and common values. Transatlantic
security cooperation is not a given, and the Warsaw
summit should push for more, including a way to
coordinate with the EU on security matters. The
promotion of cooperation principles by the transatlantic strategic community and policymakers remains
essential in order to face contemporary political,
economic, and security threats. As the Alliance faces
increasingly complex security challenges, enhancing
EU-NATO cooperation should be a priority. The
pervasive use of hybrid warfare tactics in the Ukrainian conflict constitutes the most outstanding illustration of this need. Indeed, hybrid warfare tactics
and cyber threats require strengthening transatlantic
resilience, which can only be achieved by effective
coordination of the EU and NATOs complementary
strengths.
In May 2015, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg and EU High Representative Federica Mogherini
committed to increasing the cooperation between
the two organizations in order to address this specific
security challenge. This effort should be pursued
and reaffirmed in Warsaw. Similarly, the handling
of failed states in the European neighborhoods, for
instance in the aftermath of the 2011 Libya operation,
provides unique opportunities for the two institutions
to cooperate and use their political, economic, police,
and military tools in a coordinated manner. Recent
crises have highlighted the transatlantic partners lack
of ability to anticipate and design relevant responses to
strategic challenges. EU-NATO cooperation is paramount to improving the scenario-planning work of
both the United States and European powers.

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Second, transatlantic security cooperation suffers from

misunderstandings and mixed messages, and the EU
has a role to play in fostering a constructive dialogue
with the United States. Indeed, Europes internal
divisions stem from a lack of clear leadership among
European powers, as Germany, France, and the U.K.
all seem headed in different directions and sometimes appear to disagree on the fundamentals of the
European project. Washingtons political leadership
in defining converging interests and opportunities for
the transatlantic partnership could help overcome any
future European blockage, but it is not clear whether
Europeans would be comfortable with this. The
consistent and credible reassurance measures taken by
the United States in Central and Eastern Europe are
crucial to preventing any further European priority
gap between frontline countries of the Eastern front
and the Southern front. On the other hand, Europeans
need to be able to express common and clear expectations to Washington on the future of NATO and the
European project, and the EU appears to be the sole
vehicle for a coordinated European message. These
expectations also need to be realistic, as U.S. engagement in European security cannot be the same as it
was in the 1990s in scope and nature. In return, any
such plan requires clarity on the part of the United
States as to the nature of their long-term strategic
priorities and the way they plan future engagement
in Europe and the Middle East and their cooperation with the European Union. The question of the
continued global responsibility of the United States
is very timely.
Finally, the transatlantic partnership needs to change
its mindset about security issues in order to adapt to
contemporary threats, and NATO alone cannot lead
this process. Transatlantic allies agree that they need to
learn anew to think in geopolitical terms when dealing
with Russia. The United States and Europe emphasize
the need to play by the same rules as the players that
challenge them on the global stage, which includes
the understanding and use of geopolitics as a framework for strategic interests. Recent Russian operations

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The transatlantic partnership

needs to change its mindset
about security issues in order to adapt to contemporary
threats.
in Eastern Europe and in Syria have highlighted the
failure of transatlantic powers to anticipate Moscows
foreign policy. The use of military force has also been
particularly destabilizing for the transatlantic normative framework, especially for the EUs normative
model and the NATO structure and forces that have
arguably, since 1989, not been prepared for (or have
even thought through) the challenges that it faces
today in its European neighborhoods. The NATO
Warsaw Summit will be an opportunity to send a clear
message to Russia by extending the implementation of
reassurance policies decided in Wales, and by demonstrating increased military preparedness and enhanced
capabilities, despite decreasing defense budgets in
Europe. The key message is that transatlantic powers
have been able to undergo the necessary adaptation in
order to adequately answer the dual challenges they
are faced with.
The question of EU-NATO cooperation is neither new
nor completely absent from strategic debates, but it
is particularly relevant in the contemporary security
environment and, more worryingly, often neglected
as the political will to take on structural blockages
is missing. If not overcome, the political obstacles
to effective and advantageous institutional cooperation could prevent the transatlantic partnership from
finding the appropriate responses to current security
challenges. The 2016 Warsaw Summit provides the
Alliance with an opportunity to put this issue on the
front burner, since the EU has also engaged in the
drafting process of the EU Global Strategy on Foreign
and Security Policy. The unique complexity of todays

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|Foreign and Security Policy Program|

strategic threats requires, more than ever, the use of

all transatlantic political, economic and military tools,
and a better coordination of efforts between NATO
and the EU.

The views expressed in GMF publications and commentary

are the views of the author alone.

About the Authors

Dr. Alexandra de Hoop Scheffer is a senior transatlantic fellow
and the director of the Paris office of The German Marshall
Fund of the United States. Martin Quencez is a program officer in GMFs Paris office. Martin Michelot is a non-resident
fellow at GMFs Paris office, and director of research the
Europeun Institute for European Policy in Prague.

About the Foreign and Security Policy Program

The Foreign and Security Program (FSP) at GMF comprises a
stream of activities furthering objective analysis and debate on
geopolitical questions of transatlantic concern. The program
spans regional and functional issues, from NATO affairs to
energy security, including challenges and opportunities in
Europes East, the strategic environment in the Mediterranean,
and the role of Turkey as a transatlantic partner.

About GMF
The German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF)
strengthens transatlantic cooperation on regional, national,
and global challenges and opportunities in the spirit of the
Marshall Plan. GMF does this by supporting individuals and
institutions working in the transatlantic sphere, by convening
leaders and members of the policy and business communities,
by contributing research and analysis on transatlantic topics,
and by providing exchange opportunities to foster renewed
commitment to the transatlantic relationship. In addition,
GMF supports a number of initiatives to strengthen democracies. Founded in 1972 as a non-partisan, non-profit organization through a gift from Germany as a permanent memorial
to Marshall Plan assistance, GMF maintains a strong presence
on both sides of the Atlantic. In addition to its headquarters
in Washington, DC, GMF has offices in Berlin, Paris, Brussels,
Belgrade, Ankara, Bucharest, and Warsaw. GMF also has
smaller representations in Bratislava, Turin, and Stockholm.

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