CIR VS BANK OF COMMERCE

In 1994 and 1995, the respondent Bank of

Commerce derived passive income in the
form of interests or discounts from its
investments in government securities and
private commercial papers.
On several occasions during that period, it
paid 5% gross receipts tax on its income.
Included therein were the respondent
banks passive income from the said
investments amounting to P85M+, which
had already been subjected to a final tax
of 20%.
Meanwhile, CTA held in the Case ASIA
BANK CORP. VS CIR, that the 20% final
withholding tax on interest income from
banks does not form part of taxable gross
receipts for Gross Receipts Tax (GRT)
purposes. The CTA relied on Sec 4(e) of
Revenue Regulations.12-80.
Relying on the said decision, the
respondent bank filed an administrative
claim for refund with the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue on July 19, 1996. It
claimed that it had overpaid its gross
receipts tax for 1994 to 1995 by P853K+
submitted its own computation
Before the Commissioner could resolve the
claim, the respondent bank filed a petition
for review with the CTA
CIR ANSWERED:
The alleged refundable/creditable gross
receipts taxes were collected and paid
pursuant to law and pertinent BIR
implementing rules and regulations;
hence, the same are not refundable.
Petitioner must prove that the income
from which the refundable/creditable taxes
were paid from, were declared and
included in its gross income during the
taxable year under review;
That the alleged excessive payment does
automatically warrant the refund/credit
Claims for tax refund/credit are construed in
strictissimi juris against the taxpayer as it
partakes the nature of an exemption from tax
and it is incumbent upon the petitioner to
prove that it is entitled thereto under the law.
Otherwise refund will not be allowed.
CTA summarized the issues:
-

WON the final income tax withheld should

form part of the gross receipts of the
taxpayer for GRT purposes;

WON the respondent bank was entitled to

a refund of P853,842.54.

RESPONDENT BANKs contends: that for

purposes of computing the 5% gross receipts tax,
the final withholding tax does not form part of
gross receipts
CIR contends:
that the Court defined "gross receipts" as "all
receipts of taxpayers excluding those which have
been especially earmarked by law or regulation
for the government or some person other than
the taxpayer" in CIR v. Manila Jockey Club, Inc.,7
he claimed that such definition was applicable
only to a proprietor of an amusement place, not a
banking institution which is an entirely different
entity altogether. As such, according to the
Commissioner, the ruling of the Court in Manila
Jockey Club was inapplicable.
CTA HELD:
- ORDERED to REFUND in favor of
petitioner Bank of Commerce the amount
of P355k+ representing validly proven
erroneously withheld taxes from interest
income derived from its investments in
government securities for the years 1994
and 1995.
- relied on the ruling in Manila Jockey Club,
and held that the term "gross receipts"
excluded those which had been especially
earmarked by law or regulation for the
government or persons other than the
taxpayer.
CIR filed for petition for review with CA
alleging that:
- There is no provision of law which
excludes the 20% final income tax
withheld under Section 50(a) of the Tax
Code in the computation of the 5% gross
receipts tax.
- that the ruling of this Court in Manila
Jockey Club, which was affirmed in
Visayan Cebu Terminal Co., Inc. v.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue,14 is not
decisive. He averred that the factual
milieu in the said case is different,
involving as it did the "wager fund."
- The Commissioner further pointed out that
in Manila Jockey Club, the Court ruled that
the race tracks commission did not form
part of the gross receipts, and as such
were
not
subjected
to
the
20%
amusement tax.
- the issue in Visayan Cebu Terminal was
whether or not the gross receipts
corresponding to 28% of the total gross
income of the service contractor delivered
to the Bureau of Customs formed part of
the gross receipts was subject to 3% of
contractors tax under Section 191 of the
Tax Code.

On the other hand, resp Bank was a

banking institution and not a contractor.
The petitioner insisted that the term
"gross receipts" is self-evident; it includes
all items of income of the respondent bank
regardless of whether or not the same
were allocated or earmarked for a specific
purpose, to distinguish it from net
receipts.
CA rendered judgment dismissing the
petition.
- CA
held
that
the
P17,076,850.90
representing the final withholding tax
derived
from
passive
investments
subjected to final tax should not be
construed as forming part of the gross
receipts of the respondent bank upon
which the 5% gross receipts tax should be
imposed.
- That the final withholding tax was a trust
fund for the government; hence, does not
form part of the respondents gross
receipts. The legal ownership of the
amount had already been vested in the
government.
- That subjecting the Final Withholding Tax
(FWT) to the 5% of gross receipts tax
would result in double taxation.
- In favor of resp Bank.
-

Hence the petition by CIR

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
THE 20% FINAL WITHHOLDING TAX ON BANKS
INTEREST INCOME DOES NOT FORM PART OF THE
TAXABLE GROSS RECEIPTS IN COMPUTING THE
5% GROSS RECEIPTS TAX
ISSUE: IS THERE DOUBLE TAXATION?
HELD: SC reversed the ruling of the CA that
subjecting the Final Withholding Tax (FWT) to the
5% of gross receipts tax would result in double
taxation.
- In CIR v. Solidbank CorporatioN, SC said
that the two taxes, subject of this
litigation, are different from each other.
The basis of their imposition may be the
same, but their natures are different.
-

NO DOUBLE TAXATION

Double taxation means taxing the same property

twice when it should be taxed only once; that is,
"xxx taxing the same person twice by the same
jurisdiction for the same thing." It is obnoxious
when the taxpayer is taxed twice, when it should
be but once. Otherwise described as "direct
duplicate taxation," the two taxes must be
imposed on the same subject matter, for the
same purpose, by the same taxing authority,
within the same jurisdiction, during the same

taxing period; and they must be of the same kind

or character.
First, the taxes herein are imposed on two
different subject matters. The subject
matter of the FWT is the passive income
generated in the form of interest on
deposits and yield on deposit substitutes,
while the subject matter of the GRT is the
privilege of engaging in the business of
banking.
A tax based on receipts is a tax on
business rather than on the property;
hence, it is an excise rather than a
property tax. It is not an income tax,
unlike the FWT. In fact, we have already
held that one can be taxed for engaging in
business and further taxed differently for
the income derived therefrom. Akin to our
ruling in Velilla v. Posadas, these two taxes
are entirely distinct and are assessed
under different provisions.
Second, although both taxes are national
in scope because they are imposed by the
same taxing authority the national
government under the Tax Code and
operate within the same Philippine
jurisdiction for the same purpose of raising
revenues, the taxing periods they affect
are different. The FWT is deducted and
withheld as soon as the income is earned,
and is paid after every calendar quarter in
which it is earned. On the other hand, the
GRT is neither deducted nor withheld, but
is paid only after every taxable quarter in
which it is earned.
Third, these two taxes are of different
kinds or characters. The FWT is an income
tax subject to withholding, while the GRT
is a percentage tax not subject to
withholding.
In short, there is no double taxation, because
there is no taxing twice, by the same taxing
authority, within the same jurisdiction, for the
same purpose, in different taxing periods, some
of the property in the territory. Subjecting interest
income to a 20% FWT and including it in the
computation of the 5% GRT is clearly not double
taxation.
PBCOM vs. CIR
FACTS:
Petitioner,
Philippine
Bank
of
Communications (PBCom), a commercial banking
corporation duly organized under Philippine laws,
filed its quarterly income tax returns for the first

and second quarters of 1985, reported profits,

and paid the total income tax of P5,016,954.00
by applying PBCom's tax credit memos for
P3,401,701.00 and P1,615,253.00, respectively.
Subsequently, however, PBCom suffered net loss
of P25,317,228.00, thereby showing no income
tax liability in its Annual Income Tax Returns for
the year-ended December 31, 1985. For the
succeeding year, ending December 31, 1986, the
petitioner likewise reported a net loss of
P14,129,602.00, and thus declared no tax
payable for the year.
But during these two years, PBCom earned rental
income from leased properties. The lessees
withheld and remitted to the BIR withholding
creditable taxes of P282,795.50 in 1985 and
P234,077.69 in 1986. On August 7, 1987,
petitioner requested the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, among others, for a tax credit of
P5,016,954.00 representing the overpayment of
taxes in the first and second quarters of 1985.

Thereafter, on July 25, 1988, petitioner filed a

claim for refund of creditable taxes withheld by
their lessees from property rentals in 1985 for
P282,795.50 and in 1986 for P234,077.69.

Pending the investigation of the respondent

Commissioner of Internal Revenue, petitioner
instituted a Petition for Review on November 18,
1988 before the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA). The
petition was docketed as CTA Case No. 4309
entitled: "Philippine Bank of Communications vs.
Commissioner of Internal Revenue."
The CTA decided in favor of the BIR on the ground
that the Petition was filed out of time as the same
was filed beyond the two-year reglementary
period. A motion for Reconsideration was denied
and the appeal to Court of Appeals was likewise
denied. Thus, this appeal to Supreme Court.

Issues:
a) Whether or not Revenue Regulations No. 7-85
which alters the reglementary period from two (2)
years to ten (10) years is valid.
b) Whether or not the petition for tax refund had
already prescribed.

Ruling: RR 7-85 altering the 2-year prescriptive

period imposed by law to 10-year prescriptive
period is invalid.

Administrative
issuances
are
merely
interpretations and not expansions of the
provisions of law, thus, in case of inconsistency,
the law prevails over them. Administrative
agencies have no legislative power.

When the Acting Commissioner

Revenue issued RMC 7-85,

of

Internal

changing the prescriptive period of two years to

ten years on claims of excess quarterly income
tax payments, such circular created a clear
inconsistency with the provision of Sec. 230 of
1977 NIRC. In so doing, the BIR did not simply
interpret the law; rather it legislated guidelines
contrary to the statute passed by Congress.

It bears repeating that Revenue memorandumcirculars are considered administrative rulings (in
the sense of more specific and less general
interpretations of tax laws) which are issued from
time to time by the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue. It is widely accepted that the
interpretation placed upon a statute by the
executive officers, whose duty is to enforce it, is
entitled to great respect by the courts.
Nevertheless,
such
interpretation
is
not
conclusive and will be ignored if judicially found
to be erroneous. Thus, courts will not
countenance
administrative
issuances
that
override, instead of remaining consistent and in
harmony with, the law they seek to apply and
implement.

Further, fundamental is the rule that the State

cannot be put in estoppel by the mistakes or
errors of its officials or agents. As pointed out by
the respondent courts, the nullification of RMC
No. 7-85 issued by the Acting Commissioner of
Internal
Revenue
is
an
administrative
interpretation which is not in harmony with Sec.
230 of 1977 NIRC, for being contrary to the
express provision of a statute. Hence, his
interpretation could not be given weight for to do
so would, in effect, amend the statute.

By implication of the above, claim for refund had

already prescribed.
Since the petition had been filed beyond the
prescriptive period, the same has already
prescribed. The fact that the final adjusted return
show an excess tax credit does not automatically
entitle taxpayer claim for refund without any
express intent.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The

decision of the Court of Appeals appealed from is
AFFIRMED, with COSTS against the petitioner.

SISON VS ANCHETA
GR No. L-59431, 25 July 1984
Facts: Section 1 of BP Blg 135 amended the Tax
Code and petitioner Antero M. Sison, as taxpayer,
alleges that "he would be unduly discriminated
against by the imposition of higher rates of tax
upon his income arising from the exercise of his
profession vis-a-vis those which are imposed
upon fixed income or salaried individual
taxpayers. He characterizes said provision as
arbitrary
amounting
to
class
legislation,
oppressive and capricious in character. It
therefore violates both the equal protection and
due process clauses of the Constitution as well
asof the rule requiring uniformity in taxation.
Issue: Whether or not the assailed provision
violates the equal protection and due process
clauses of the Constitution while also violating
the rule that taxes must be uniform and
equitable.
Held: The petition is without merit.
On due process - it is undoubted that it may be
invoked where a taxing statute is so arbitrary that
it finds no support in the Constitution. An obvious
example is where it can be shown to amount to
the confiscation of property from abuse of power.
Petitioner alleges arbitrariness but his mere
allegation does not suffice and there must be a
factual foundation of such unconsitutional taint.
On equal protection - it suffices that the laws
operate equally and uniformly on all persons
under similar circumstances, both in the
privileges conferred and the liabilities imposed.
On the matter that the rule of taxation shall be
uniform and equitable - this requirement is met
when the tax operates with the same force and
effect in every place where the subject may be
found." Also, :the rule of uniformity does not call
for perfect uniformity or perfect equality, because
this is hardly unattainable." When the problem of

classification became of issue, the Court said:

"Equality and uniformity in taxation means that
all taxable articles or kinds of property of the
same class shall be taxed the same rate. The
taxing power has the authority to make
reasonable and natural classifications for
purposes of taxation..." As provided by this Court,
where
"the
differentation"
complained
of
"conforms to the practical dictates of justice and
equity" it "is not discriminatory within the
meaning of this clause and is therefore uniform."

COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS V CAMPOS

RUEDA & CTA
Facts: Campos Rueda imported 46 cartons or
27,000 pieces of Tungsol flashers. Before the
goods arrived at the port of Manila, Campos
Rueda filed with the Collector of Customs of
Manila a request for value information for the
declaration of the imported flashers under Tariff
Heading No. 85.09 of the Tariff and Customs Code
at 30% ad valorem duty, for classification
purpose. The Customs appraiser however, reclassified the goods under Tariff Heading No.
85.19 of the Tariff and Customs Code at 50% ad
valorem.
When the goods arrived at the port of Manila,
Campos Rueda immediately filed a Customs
Import Entry and Internal Revenue Declaration
under Tariff Heading No. 85.19 of the Tariff and
Customs Code at 50% ad valorem but, under
protest and paid duties and taxes on the goods,
also under protest. It then filed a timely protest
against the re-classification resulting in the
payment of additional customs duty and advance
sales tax and prayed for the refund of the said.
The Collector of Customs dismissed the protest.
Campos Rueda appealed to the Commissioner but
was denied, and then appealed to CTA which
modified the Commissioners decision by ordering
the refund to Campos Rueda of the sum of the
additional customs duty but not the advance
sales tax. The Commissioner now appeals via
petition for review the said decision.
Issue: W/N Campos Rueda should pay 30% or
50% ad valorem duty
Held: 30%. TH No 85.09 of the Tariff and
Customs Code provides:
85.09. Electrical lighting and signalling equipment
and electrical windscreen wipers, defrosters and
demisters, for cycles or motor vehicles ad val.
30%.

On the other hand, the same Code provides

under TH No. 85.19:
85.19. Electrical apparatus for making and
breaking electrical circuits, for the protection of
electrical circuits, or for making connections to or
in electric circuits (for example, switches, relays,
fuses, lighting arresters, surge suppressors,
plugs,
lamp-holders
and
junction
boxes);
resistors,
fixed
or
variable
(including
potentiometers), other than heating resistors,
printed circuits, switch boards (other than
telephone switchboards) and control panels:

City of Ormoc as well as its Treasurer, Municipal

Board and Mayor alleging that the ordinance is
unconstitutional for being violative of the equal
protection clause and the rule of uniformity of
taxation. The court rendered a decision that
upheld the constitutionality of the ordinance.
Hence, this appeal.

In finding for Campos Rueda, CTA found that it

has adduced sufficient evidence to establish the
general purpose or predominating use to which
flashers are applied, and for which petitioner
imported them, is precisely as electrical
equipment for signalling purposes for motor
vehicles; that is, to signal or indicate a right or
left hand turn by means of electrical flashes in
front and at the rear of motor vehicles and not
merely
as
electrical
apparatus
as
the
Commissioner claims.

Held: Yes. Equal protection clause applies only to

persons or things identically situated and does
not bar a reasonable classification of the subject
of legislation, and a classification is reasonable
where 1) it is based upon substantial distinctions;
2) these are germane to the purpose of the law;
3) the classification applies not only to present
conditions, but also to future conditions
substantially identical to those present; and 4)
the classification applies only to those who
belong to the same class. A perusal of the
requisites shows that the questioned ordinance
does not meet them, for it taxes only centrifugal
sugar produced and exported by the Ormoc
Sugar Company, Inc. and none other. The taxing
ordinance should not be singular and exclusive as
to exclude any subsequently established sugar
central for the coverage of the tax.

It is the predominating use to which articles are

generally applied or used that determines their
character for the purpose of fixing the duty, and
not the specific or special use which any
particular importer may make of the articles
imported.
Parts of machines, apparatus of appliances which
are suitable for use solely or principally with a
particular kind of machine or with a number of
machines falling within a specific heading, as a
rule, are to be classified with the machines in the
same heading. Also, the law does not provide that
an article imported for electrical lighting and
signalling equipment for motor vehicles falling
under Tariff Heading No. 85.09, if imported alone,
shall be classified under Tariff Heading No. 85.19
as electrical apparatus for making and breaking
electrical circuits that provision should not be
read into the law per the circular of the former
Acting Customs Collector. Petition denied. CTA
decision affirmed.
Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. v. Treasurer of
Ormoc City [G.R. No. 23794 February 17,
1968]
Facts: The Municipal Board of Ormoc City passed
Ordinance No. 4 imposing on any and all
productions of centrifugal sugar milled at the
Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc., in Ormoc City a
municipal tax equivalent to one per centum (1%)
per export sale to USA and other foreign
countries. Payments for said tax were made,
under protest, by Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc.
Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. filed before the Court
of First Instance of Leyte a complaint against the

Issue: Whether or not constitutional limits on the

power of taxation, specifically the equal
protection clause and rule of uniformity of
taxation, were infringed?

TAN V DEL ROSARIO

Facts: 1.
Two consolidated cases assail the
validity of RA 7496 or the Simplified Net Income
Taxation Scheme ("SNIT"), which amended
certain provisions of the NIRC, as well as the
Rules and Regulations promulgated by public
respondents pursuant to said law.
2.
Petitioners posit that RA 7496 is
unconstitutional as it allegedly violates the
following provisions of the Constitution:
-Article VI, Section 26(1) Every bill passed by
the Congress shall embrace only one subject
which shall be expressed in the title thereof.
- Article VI, Section 28(1) The rule of taxation
shall be uniform and equitable. The Congress
shall evolve a progressive system of taxation.
- Article III, Section 1 No person shall be
deprived of . . . property without due process of
law, nor shall any person be denied the equal
protection of the laws.
3. Petitioners contended that public respondents
exceeded their rule-making authority in applying
SNIT to general professional partnerships.
Petitioner contends that the title of HB 34314,
progenitor of RA 7496, is deficient for being

merely entitled, "Simplified Net Income Taxation

Scheme for the Self-Employed and Professionals
Engaged in the Practice of their Profession"
(Petition in G.R. No. 109289) when the full text of
the title actually reads,
'An Act Adopting the Simplified Net Income
Taxation Scheme For The Self-Employed and
Professionals Engaged In The Practice of Their
Profession, Amending Sections 21 and 29 of the
National Internal Revenue Code,' as amended.
Petitioners also contend it violated due process.
5. The Solicitor General espouses the position
taken by public respondents.
6. The Court has given due course to both
petitions.
ISSUE: Whether or not the tax law
unconstitutional for violating due process

is

NO. The due process clause may correctly be

invoked only when there is a clear contravention
of inherent or constitutional limitations in the
exercise of the tax power. No such transgression
is so evident in herein case.
1. Uniformity of taxation, like the concept of
equal protection, merely requires that all subjects
or objects of taxation, similarly situated, are to be
treated alike both in privileges and liabilities.
Uniformity does not violate classification as long
as: (1) the standards that are used therefor are
substantial
and
not
arbitrary,
(2)
the
categorization is germane to achieve the
legislative purpose, (3) the law applies, all things
being equal, to both present and future
conditions, and (4) the classification applies
equally well to all those belonging to the same
class.
2. What is apparent from the amendatory law is
the legislative intent to increasingly shift the
income tax system towards the schedular
approach in the income taxation of individual
taxpayers and to maintain, by and large, the
present global treatment on taxable corporations.
The Court does not view this classification to be
arbitrary and inappropriate.
ISSUE 2: Whether or not public respondents
exceeded their authority in promulgating the RR
No. There is no evident intention of the law,
either before or after the amendatory legislation,
to place in an unequal footing or in significant
variance
the
income
tax
treatment
of
professionals who practice their respective
professions individually and of those who do it
through a general professional partnership.

TIU VS. CA (GR. NO. 127410 JANUARY 20,

1999)
Facts: Congress, with the approval of the
President, passed into law RA 7227 entitled "An
Act Accelerating the Conversion of Military
Reservations Into Other Productive Uses, Creating
the Bases Conversion and Development Authority
for this Purpose, Providing Funds Therefor and for
Other Purposes." Section 12 thereof created the
Subic Special Economic Zone and granted there
to special privileges. President Ramos issued
Executive Order No. 97, clarifying the application
of the tax and duty incentives. The President
issued Executive Order No. 97-A, specifying the
area within which the tax-and-duty-free privilege
was operative. The petitioners challenged before
this Court the constitutionality of EO 97-A for
allegedly being violative of their right to equal
protection of the laws. This Court referred the
matter to the Court of Appeals. Proclamation No.
532 was issued by President Ramos. It delineated
the exact metes and bounds of the Subic Special
Economic and Free Port Zone, pursuant to Section
12 of RA 7227. Respondent Court held that "there
is no substantial difference between the
provisions of EO 97-A and Section 12 of RA 7227.
In both, the 'Secured Area' is precise and welldefined as '. . . the lands occupied by the Subic
Naval Base and its contiguous extensions as
embraced, covered and defined by the 1947
Military Bases Agreement between the Philippines
and the United States of America, as
amended . . .'"
Issue: Whether or not Executive Order No. 97-A
violates the equal protection clause of the
Constitution
Held: No. The Court found real and substantive
distinctions between the circumstances obtaining
inside and those outside the Subic Naval Base,
thereby justifying a valid and reasonable
classification. The fundamental right of equal
protection of the laws is not absolute, but is
subject to reasonable classification. If the
groupings are characterized by substantial
distinctions that make real differences, one class
may be treated and regulated differently from
another. The classification must also be germane
to the purpose of the law and must apply to all
those belonging to the same class. Classification,
to be valid, must (1) rest on substantial
distinctions, (2) be germane to the purpose of the
law, (3) not be limited to existing conditions only,
and (4) apply equally to all members of the same
class. The Supreme Court believed it was
reasonable for the President to have delimited
the application of some incentives to the confines
of the former Subic military base. It is this specific
area which the government intends to transform
and develop from its status quo ante as an

abandoned naval facility into a self-sustaining

industrial and commercial zone, particularly for
big foreign and local investors to use as
operational bases for their businesses and
industries.
AMERICAN BIBLE SOCIETY
MANILA, [G.R. NO. L-9637

VS.

CITY

OF

Facts: Plaintiff-appellant is a foreign, non-stock,

non-profit, religious, missionary corporation duly
registered and doing business in the Philippines
through its Philippine agency established in
Manila in November, 1898. The defendant
appellee is a municipal corporation with powers
that are to be exercised in conformity with the
provisions of Republic Act No. 409, known as the
Revised Charter of the City of Manila.
During the course of its ministry, plaintiff sold
bibles and other religious materials at a very
minimal profit.
On May 29 1953, the acting City Treasurer of the
City of Manila informed plaintiff that it was
conducting the business of general merchandise
since November, 1945, without providing itself
with the necessary Mayor's permit and municipal
license, in violation of Ordinance No. 3000, as
amended, and Ordinances Nos. 2529, 3028 and
3364, and required plaintiff to secure, within
three days, the corresponding permit and license
fees, together with compromise covering the
period from the 4th quarter of 1945 to the 2nd
quarter of 1953, in the total sum of P5,821.45
(Annex A).
Plaintiff now questions the imposition of such
fees.
Issue: Whether or not the said ordinances are
constitutional and valid (contention: it restrains
the free exercise and enjoyment of the religious
profession and worship of appellant).

Held: Section 1, subsection (7) of Article III of the

Constitution, provides that:
(7) No law shall be made respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free
exercise thereof, and the free exercise and
enjoyment of religious profession and worship,
without discrimination or preference, shall forever
be allowed. No religion test shall be required for
the exercise of civil or political rights.
The provision aforequoted is a constitutional
guaranty of the free exercise and enjoyment of
religious profession and worship, which carries
with it the right to disseminate religious
information.
It may be true that in the case at bar the price
asked for the bibles and other religious
pamphlets was in some instances a little bit
higher than the actual cost of the same but this
cannot mean that appellant was engaged in the
business
or
occupation
of
selling
said
"merchandise" for profit. For this reason. The
Court believe that the provisions of City of Manila
Ordinance No. 2529, as amended, cannot be
applied to appellant, for in doing so it would
impair its free exercise and enjoyment of its
religious profession and worship as well as its
rights of dissemination of religious beliefs.
With respect to Ordinance No. 3000, as amended,
the Court do not find that it imposes any charge
upon the enjoyment of a right granted by the
Constitution, nor tax the exercise of religious
practices.
It seems clear, therefore, that Ordinance No.
3000 cannot be considered unconstitutional,
however inapplicable to said business, trade or
occupation of the plaintiff. As to Ordinance No.
2529 of the City of Manila, as amended, is also
not applicable, so defendant is powerless to
license or tax the business of plaintiff Society.