PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs.

PABLITO ANDAYA y
REANO, Accused-Appellant.

The CA summed up the versions of the parties, as follows:

G.R. No. 183700

SPO2 Delfin Alea testified that at about 8:00 o'clock in the evening of
December 16, 2002, their asset who was conducting surveillance of Pablito
Andaya in Barangay San Jose Sico, Batangas City, arrived at their station.
Said asset reported that he had arranged to buy shabu from Pablito. A team
composed of SPO1 Aguila, SPO1 Cabungcal, Eric de Chavez, PO1 Lindberg
Yap, Edwalberto Villar and asset Bagsit was constituted to conduct a buybust. Two (2) pieces of P100.00 bills both duly marked "X" were recorded in
the police blotter. Alea gave the marked bills to the asset. Upon reaching the
designated place, the team members alighted from their vehicles and
occupied different positions where they could see and observe the asset. The
asset knocked on the door of Pablito's house. Pablito came out. Pablito and
the asset talked briefly. The asset gave Pablito the marked money. The asset
received something from appellant. The pre-arranged signal signifying
consummation of the transaction was given. The team members approached
Pablito and the asset, introduced themselves as police officers and arrested
accused. He was brought to the police station. The arrival of the team was
recorded in the police blotter. The merchandise handed by accused to the
asset was sent to the Regional Crime Laboratory in Camp Vicente Lim,
Canlubang, Laguna. The specimen was positive for methampethamine
Hydrochloride (shabu), a dangerous drug.

October 13, 2014

FACTS :

The non-presentation of the confidential informant as a witness does not

ordinarily weaken the State's case against the accused. However, if the
arresting lawmen arrested the accused based on the pre-arranged signal
from the confidential informant who acted as the poseur buyer, his
nonpresentation must be credibly explained and the transaction established
by other ways in order to satisfy the quantum of proof beyond reasonable
doubt because the arresting lawmen did not themselves participate in the
buy-bust transaction with the accused.

Antecedents

Jupri Delantar, a Forensic Chemical Officer in Camp Vicente Lim, Laguna,

conducted the examination. The merchandise tested positive for shabu.

On February 7, 2003, an information for violation of Section 5 of Republic Act

No. 91651 (RA 9165) was filed charging Pablito Andaya y Reano (Andaya).

Accused-appellant denied the charge. He stated that at about 9: 15 in the

evening of December 16, 2002 he was at home watching TV with his family
when police officers arrived. When he opened the door, a police officer poked
his gun at him. Somebody else held a long firearm. Pablito was handcuffed
and brought outside. He refused to negotiate and asked for a warrant. The
policemen searched the house, turned over the beddings and uncovered
their furniture. No gun nor shabu was found. Pablito was brought to the

Upon arraignment, Andaya pleaded not guilty to the charge. Thereafter, trial
on the merits ensued.

police station and detained. After three (3) days he was released. He
received a subpoena from the Public Prosecutor afterwards.
WON the Prosecution's nonpresentation of the confidential informant was
adverse to the Prosecution, indicating that his guilt was not proved beyond
reasonable doubt.
His wife Crisanta, corroborated appellants' testimony. She added having told
her husband about the loss of their cellphone and the money in his wallet.
She was asked to produce P5,000.00 which she was unable to do. She was
able to raise only P2,000.00.

RULING

Judgment of the RTC

To secure the conviction of the accused who is charged with the illegal sale
of dangerous drugs as defined and punished by Section 5, Article II of
Republic Act No. 9165 (Comprehensive Drugs Act of 2002), the State must
establish the concurrence of the following elements, namely: (a) that the
transaction or sale took place between the accused and the poseur buyer;
and ( b) that the dangerous drugs subject of the transaction or sale is
presented in court as evidence of the corpus delicti.

On February 21, 2006, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 4, in Batangas City
(R TC) rendered its judgment convicting Andaya as charged, and meted him
the penalty of life imprisonment.

We reiterate that a buy-bust operation is a valid and legitimate form of

entrapment of the drug pusher. In such operation, the poseur buyer transacts
with the suspect by purchasing a quantity of the dangerous drug and paying
the price agreed upon, and in turn the drug pusher turns over or delivers the
dangerous drug subject of their agreement in exchange for the price or other
consideration. Once the transaction is consummated, the drug pusher is
arrested, and can be held to account under the criminal law. The justification
that underlies the legitimacy of the buy-bust operation is that the suspect is
arrested in flagranti delicto, that is, the suspect has just committed, or is in
the act of committing, or is attempting to commit the offense in the presence
of the arresting police officer or private person. The arresting police officer or
private person is favored in such instance with the presumption of regularity
in the performance of official duty.

Decision of the CA

Upon appeal, the CA promulgated its assailed decision affirming the

conviction.

ISSUES

WON the search of his house and his person and his arrest by the police
officers violated his constitutional right against unreasonable searches and
seizures;

Proof of the transaction must be credible and complete. In every criminal

prosecution, it is the State, and no other, that bears the burden of proving the
illegal sale of the dangerous drug beyond reasonable doubt. This
responsibility imposed on the State accords with the presumption of
innocence in favor of the accused, who has no duty to prove his innocence
until and unless the presumption of innocence in his favor has been
overcome by sufficient and competent evidence.

In People vs Lopez (214 SCRA 323), it was held that there was no need for
the prosecution to present the confidential informer as the poseur buyer
himself positively identified the accused as the one who sold to him one deck
of methamphetamine hydrochloride or "shabu." The trial court then properly
relied on the testimonies of the police officers despite the decision of the
prosecution not to present the informer.15

Here, the confidential informant was not a police officer. He was designated
to be the poseur buyer himself. It is notable that the members of the buy-bust
team arrested Andaya on the basis of the pre-arranged signal from the
poseur buyer. The pre-arranged signal signified to the members of the buybust team that the transaction had been consummated between the poseur
buyer and Andaya. However, the State did not present the confidential
informant/poseur buyer during the trial to describe how exactly the
transaction between him and Andaya had taken place. There would have
been no issue against that, except that none of the members of the buy-bust
team had directly witnessed the transaction, if any, between Andaya and the
poseur buyer due to their being positioned at a distance from the poseur
buyer and Andaya at the moment of the supposed transaction.

The foregoing justification by the CA was off-tangent and does not help the
State's cause any. It is obvious that the rulings cited to supp01i the need to
conceal the confidential infonnants' identities related to the confidential
informants who gave information against suspected drug dealers. The
presentation of the confidential informants as witnesses for the Prosecution
in those instances could be excused because there were poseur buyers who
directly incriminated the accused. In this case, however, it was different,
because the poseur buyer and the confidential informant were one and the
same. Without the poseur buyer's testimony, the State did not credibly
incriminate Andaya.

The CA did not find anything wrong or odd in the non-presentation of the
poseur buyer as a witness against the accused. In fact, it justified the nonpresentation as follows:

Indeed, Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9165 punishes "any person, who,
unless authorized by law, shall sell, trade, administer, dispense, deliver, give
away to another, distribute, dispatch in transit or transport any dangerous
drug, including any and all species of opium poppy regardless of the quantity
and purity involved, or shall act as a broker in any of such transactions."
Under the law, selling was any act "of giving away any dangerous drug
and/or controlled precursor and essential chemical whether for money or any
other consideration;"16 while delivering was any act "of knowingly passing a
dangerous drug to another, personally or otherwise, and by any means, with
or without consideration."17 Given the legal characterizations of the acts
constituting the offense charged, the members of the buy-bust team could
not incriminate Andaya by simply declaring that they had seen from their
positions the poseur buyer handing something to Andaya who, in turn, gave
something to the poseur buyer. If the transaction was a sale, it was

Appellant also questioned the failure of the prosecution to present the

informer. The court is aware of the considerations why confidential
informants are usually not presented by the prosecution. There is the need to
hide their identity and preserve their invaluable service to the police. (People
v. Khor, 307 SCRA 295 [1999], citing People v. Gireng, 241 SCRA 11 [1995].)
Foremost is the desire to protect them from being objects or targets of
revenge by the criminals they implicate once they become known. (People
vs. Ong, G.R. No. 137348, June 21, 2004.)

unwarranted to infer from such testimonies of the members of the buy-bust

team that what the poseur buyer handed over were the marked P100.00 bills
and that what Andaya gave to the poseur buyer was the shabu purchased.

such crime against the accused, the presumption of regularity in the

performance of official duty stands."18Such outright rejection by the lower
courts of Andaya's defense of frame-up is not outrightly binding. For sure, the
frame-up defense has been commonly used in prosecutions based on buybust operations that have led to the an-est of the suspects. 19 Its use might be
seen as excessive, but the failure of the accused to impute any ill motives to
falsely incriminate them should not deter us from scrutinizing the
circumstances of the cases brought to us for review. We should remind
ourselves that we cannot presume that the accused committed the crimes
they have been charged with. The State must fully establish that for us. If the
imputation of ill motive to the lawmen is the only means of impeaching them,
then that would be the end of our dutiful vigilance to protect our citizenry from
false arrests and wrongful incriminations. We are aware that there have been
in the past many cases of false arrests and wrongful incriminations, and that
should heighten our resolve to strengthen the ramparts of judicial scrutiny.

Another mark of suspicion attending the evidence of guilt related to the

reliance by the members of the buy-bust team on the pre-arranged signal
from the poseur buyer. To start with, the record does not show what the
prearranged signal consisted of. It is fundamental enough to expect the State
to be clear and definite about its evidence of guilt, particularly here where the
conviction of Andaya would require him to spend the rest of his natural life
behind bars. Nothing less should be done here. Secondly, the reliance on the
supposed signal to establish the consummation of the transaction between
the poseur buyer and Andaya was unwarranted because the unmitigatedly
hearsay character of the signal rendered it entirely bereft of trustworthiness.
The arresting members of the buy-bust team interpreted the signal from the
anonymous poseur buyer as the sign of the consummation of the transaction.
Their interpretation, being necessarily subjective without the testimony of the
poseur buyer, unfairly threatened the liberty of Andaya. We should not allow
that threat to perpetuate itself. And, lastly, the reliance on the signal would
deprive Andaya the right to confront and test the credibility of the poseur
buyer who supposedly gave it.

Nor should we shirk from our responsibility of protecting the liberties of our
citizenry just because the lawmen are shielded by the presumption of the
regularity of their performance of duty. The presumed regularity is nothing but
a purely evidentiary tool intended to avoid the impossible and timeconsuming task of establishing every detail of the performance by officials
and functionaries of the Government. Conversion by no means defeat the
much stronger and much firmer presumption of innocence in favor of every
person whose life, property and liberty comes under the risk of forfeiture on
the strength of a false accusation of committing some crime. 20 The criminal
accusation against a person must be substantiated by proof beyond
reasonable doubt. The Court should steadfastly safeguard his right to be
presumed innocent. Although his innocence could be doubted, for his
reputation in his community might not be lily-white or lustrous, he should not
fear a conviction for any crime, least of all one as grave as drug pushing,
unless the evidence against him was clear, competent and beyond
reasonable doubt. Otherwise, the presumption of innocence in his favor
would be rendered empty.

We should look at the situation of Andaya with utmost caution because of

what our judicial experience through the years has told us about
unscrupulous lawmen resorting to stratagems of false incrimination in order
to arrest individuals they target for ulterior reasons. In this case, the arrest
did not emanate from probable cause, for the formless signal from the
anonymous poseur buyer did not establish beyond reasonable doubt the
elements of illegal sale of dangerous drugs under Section 5 of Republic Act
No. 9165.

In affirming the RTC's conviction of the accused, the CA observed that the
defense of frame-up put up by the accused was discredited by the absence
of proof of "any intent on the paii of the police authorities to falsely impute

WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the decision

promulgated on February 11, 2008; ACQUITS accused Pablito Andaya y

Reano for failure to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt; and ORDERS
his immediate release from confinement at the National Penitentiary in
Muntinlupa City.

p.m. However, that Crime laboratory indorsed the request with the
specimens on June 4, 2004 at 2:30 p.m. to the Regional Crime Laboratory in
Calamba
City.
Police Inspector and Forensic Chemist Donna Villa P. Huelgas found the
specimens positive for the presence of methamphetamine hydrochloride, a
dangerous drug, as shown by Chemistry Report No. D-566-04, the
authenticity and genuineness of which were admitted by accused during the
pre-trial.

The Court DIRECTS that the Director of the Bureau of Corrections to

implement the immediate release of Pablito Andaya y Reano, unless he is
confined for any other lawful cause; and to report his compliance within ten
days from receipt.

The trial court found appellant guilty of the offense charged guilty beyond
reasonable doubt as principal by direct participation of the crime of drug
pushing as defined and penalized under Section 5, Article II of Republic Act
[No.] 9165 otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of
2002 and hereby impose on him the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a
fine of P500,000.00.

SO ORDERED.

The period of detention of the accused shall be deducted in his service of

sentence.
G.R. No. 207993, January 21, 2015
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, v. GERARDO ENUMERABLE Y
DE VILLA, Appellant.

Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal. The Court of Appeals affirmed the

conviction of appellant for the offense charged.
Hence, this appeal.

FACTS

ISSUE

About a deal in shabu between the asset of PO3 Edwalberto Villas and a
certain Gerry of San Pablo City, a buy-bust operation was conducted by the
elements of the Batangas City Police Station with the assistance of Police
Inspector Danilo Balmes of the CIDG Batangas Province on May 27, 2004 at
11:30 oclock in the morning at the Petron Gasoline Station along B. Morada
Ave.,
Lipa
City.

Whether the prosecution established the identity and integrity of the

confiscated illegal drug, which is the corpus delicti of the offense charged
against appellant.
RULING
We grant the appeal.

Using two (2) pieces of marked P500.00 bills and boodle money to make the
appearance of about P24,000.00, the police asset who posed as a buyer
transacted with the alias Gerry upon his arrival at the gas station. After the
exchange of the marked money and the three (3) plastic sachets of shabu
placed in a black plastic box, alias Gerry was placed under arrest. He was
later identified as Gerardo Enumerable y de Villa. The marked money was
recovered from his possession by PO3 Villas who also took custody of the
specimen shabu which he marked EMV 1 to EMV 3. The three (3) sachets
of shabu were turned over to the Batangas Provincial Crime Laboratory,
pursuant to the request for laboratory examination of P/Supt. Fausto
Manzanilla, Jr., Chief of Police, Batangas City PNP on May 27, 2004 at 5:25

While appellant waived the presentation of evidence for his defense, he

disputes the identity and integrity of the illegal drug which is the corpus
delicti of the offense charged against him. Appellant maintains that the
prosecution failed to prove the unbroken chain of custody of the illegal drug
which gravely impairs its identity. Without the identity of the corpus
delicti being sufficiently established, appellant claims that he should be
acquitted.
It is settled that in prosecutions for illegal sale of dangerous drug, not only

must the essential elements of the offense be proved beyond reasonable

doubt, but likewise the identity of the prohibited drug. The dangerous drug
itself constitutes the corpus delicti of the offense and the fact of its existence
is vital to a judgment of conviction.10chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Crime Laboratory on 27 May 2004 until it was allegedly delivered to the

Regional Crime Laboratory on 4 June 2004. There was no evidence
presented how the confiscated sachets of shabu were stored, preserved or
labeled nor who had custody prior to their delivery to the Regional Crime
Laboratory and their subsequent presentation before the trial court. This is
evident from the testimony of PO3 Villas, who stated he had no knowledge
on who had custody of the sachets of shabu from 27 May 2004 until 4 June
2004. PO3 Villas testified thus

Necessarily, the prosecution must establish that the substance seized from
the accused is the same substance offered in court as exhibit. In this regard,
the prosecution must sufficiently prove the unbroken chain of custody of the
confiscated illegal drug. In People v. Watamama,11 the Court held:

The prosecution attempted to fill the gap in the chain of custody. However,
such effort proved futile. On re-direct examination, PO3 Villas, who earlier
testified that he had no knowledge on who had custody of the illegal drugs
prior and during their delivery to the crime laboratories, merely restated the
contents of the 3 June 2004 Memorandum from the Chief of the Batangas
Police addressed to the Regional Chief, corresponding to the questions of
the prosecutor. In other words, PO3 Villas testified on a piece of document
he had no participation in the preparation or execution thereof. PO3 Villas
testified as follows:

In all prosecutions for the violation of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs

Act of 2002, the existence of the prohibited drug has to be proved. The
chain of custody rule requires that testimony be presented about every
link in the chain, from the moment the item was seized up to the time it
is offered in evidence. To this end, the prosecution must ensure that the
substance presented in court is the same substance seized from the
accused.
While this Court recognizes substantial adherence to the requirements of
R.A. No. 9165 and its implementing rules and regulations, not perfect
adherence, is what is demanded of police officers attending to drugs cases,
still, such officers must present justifiable reason for their imperfect conduct
and show that the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items had
been preserved. x x x. (Emphasis supplied)

Clearly, PO3 Villas had no personal knowledge on (1) how the illegal drugs
were delivered and who delivered the drugs from the Batangas Provincial
Crime Laboratory to the Regional Crime Laboratory; (2) who received the
drugs in the Regional Crime Laboratory; and (3) who had custody of the
drugs from 27 May 2004 to 3 June 2004 until their presentation before the
trial court. The testimony of PO3 Villas merely attests to the existence of the
Memorandum from the Chief of the Batangas Provincial Crime Laboratory to
the Regional Crime Laboratory.

In People v. Climaco,12 citing Malillin v. People,13 the Court held: x x x [T]o

establish guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt in cases involving
dangerous drugs, it is important that the substance illegally possessed in the
first place be the same substance offered in court as exhibit. This chain of
custody requirement ensures that unnecessary doubts are removed
concerning the identity of the evidence. When the identity of the dangerous
drug recovered from the accused is not the same dangerous drug presented
to the forensic chemist for review and examination, nor the same dangerous
drug presented to the court, the identity of the dangerous drug is not
preserved due to the broken chain of custody. With this, an element in the
criminal cases for illegal sale and illegal possession of dangerous drugs,
the corpus delicti, is not proven, and the accused must then be acquitted
based on reasonable doubt. For this reason, [the accused] must be
acquitted on the ground of reasonable doubt due to the broken chain of
custody over the dangerous drug allegedly recovered from him.

While appellant admitted during the pre-trial the authenticity and due
execution of the Chemistry Report, prepared by Police Inspector and
Forensic Chemist Donna Villa P. Huelgas, this admission merely affirms the
existence of the specimen and the request for laboratory examination and
the results thereof. Appellants admission does not relate to the issue of
chain of custody. In fact, appellant qualified his admission that the
specimens were not taken or bought from him.16 In People v. Gutierrez, the
Court stated:
x x x That the defense stipulated on these matters,viz: that the specimen
exists, that a request has been made by the arresting officers for examination
thereof, that a forensic chemist examined it, and that it tested positive for
methylamphetamine hydrochloride has no bearing on the question of chain of
custody. These stipulations, which merely affirm the existence of the
specimen, and the request for laboratory examination and the results thereof,

In this case, there was a glaring gap in the custody of the illegal drug since
the prosecution failed to sufficiently establish who had custody of the illegal
drug from the moment it was allegedly transmitted to the Batangas Provincial

were entered into during pre-trial only in order to dispense with the testimony
of the forensic chemist and abbreviate the proceedings. x x x. 17

of the urine test despite its dubiousness having been admitted in spite of the
lack of legal basis for its admission. First, he alleges that the forensic
laboratory examination was conducted despite the fact that he was not
assisted by counsel, in clear violation of his constitutional right. Secondly, he
was allegedly held guilty beyond reasonable doubt notwithstanding the lack
of sufficient basis to convict him.

Since the failure of the prosecution to establish every link in the chain of
custody of the illegal drug gravely compromised its identity and integrity,
which illegal drug is the corpus delicti of the offense charged against
appellant, his acquittal is therefore in order.

THE RULING OF THE CA

The CA found the appeal devoid of merit and affirmed the ruling of the RTC.

G.R. No. 200748, July 23, 2014

JAIME D. DELA CRUZ, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

THE ISSUE

FACTS

Whether or not the drug test conducted upon the petitioner is legal.

Petitioner Jaime D. dela Cruz was charged with violation of Section 15,
Article II of Republic Act No. (R.A.) 9165, or The Comprehensive Dangerous
Drugs Act of 2002, by the Graft Investigation and Prosecution Officer of the
Office of the Ombudsman Visayas.

OUR RULING
We declare that the drug test conducted upon petitioner is not grounded
upon any existing law or jurisprudence.

On or about the 31st day of January 2006, at Cebu City, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, JAIME D. DE LA CRUZ, a public officer, having been duly
appointed and qualified to such public position as Police Officer 2 of
the Philippine National Police (PNP) assigned in the Security Service
Group of the Cebu City Police Office, after having been arrested by agents of
the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) in an entrapment operation, was
found positive for use of METHAMPHETAMINE
HYDROCHLORIDE commonly known as Shabu, the dangerous drug after
a confirmatory test conducted on said accused.

We gloss over petitioners non-compliance with the Resolution ordering him

to submit clearly legible duplicate originals or certified true copies of the
assailed Decision and Resolution.
Petitioner was charged with use of dangerous drugs in violation of the law,
the pertinent provision of which reads:
Section 15. Use of Dangerous Drugs. A person apprehended or arrested,
who is found to be positive for use of any dangerous drug, after a
confirmatory test, shall be imposed a penalty of a minimum of six (6) months
rehabilitation in a government center for the first offense, subject to the
provisions of Article VIII of this Act. If apprehended using any dangerous
drug for the second time, he/she shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment
ranging from six (6) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years and a fine
ranging from Fifty thousand pesos (?50,000.00) to Two hundred thousand
pesos (?200,000.00): Provided, That this Section shall not be applicable
where the person tested is also found to have in his/her possession such
quantity of any dangerous drug provided for under Section 11 of this Act, in
which case the provisions stated therein shall apply.

When arraigned, petitioner, assisted by counsel de parte, pleaded not guilty

to the charge.
THE RULING OF THE RTC
The Regional Trial Court (RTC) Branch 58 of Cebu City, in its Decision 4 dated
6 June 2007, found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating
Section 15, Article II of R.A. 9165 and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of
compulsory rehabilitation for a period of not less than six (6) months at the
Cebu Center for the Ultimate Rehabilitation of Drug Dependents located at
Salinas, Lahug, Cebu City.5

The RTC subsequently convicted petitioner, ruling that the following elements
of Section 15 were established: (1) the accused was arrested; (2) the
accused was subjected to drug test; and (3) the confirmatory test shows that

Petitioner filed an appeal assigning as error the RTCs validation of the result

he used a dangerous drug.

intent of the law to rehabilitate persons apprehended or arrested for the

unlawful acts enumerated above instead of charging and convicting them of
other crimes with heavier penalties. The essence of the provision is more
clearly illustrated in People v. Martinez24as follows:

Disregarding petitioners objection regarding the admissibility of the

evidence, the lower court also reasoned that a suspect cannot invoke his
right to counsel when he is required to extract urine because, while he is
already in custody, he is not compelled to make a statement or testimony
against himself. Extracting urine from ones body is merely a mechanical act,
hence, falling outside the concept of a custodial investigation.

On a final note, this Court takes the opportunity to be instructive on Sec. 11

(Possession of Dangerous Drugs) and Sec. 15 (Use of Dangerous Drugs) of
R.A. No. 9165, with regard to the charges that are filed by law enforcers. This
Court notes the practice of law enforcers of filing charges under Sec. 11 in
cases where the presence of dangerous drugs as basis for possession is
only and solely in the form of residue, being subsumed under the last
paragraph of Sec. 11. Although not incorrect, it would be more in keeping
with the intent of the law to file charges under Sec. 15 instead in order
to rehabilitate first time offenders of drug use, provided that there is a
positive confirmatory test result as required under Sec. 15. The
minimum penalty under the last paragraph of Sec. 11 for the possession of
residue is imprisonment of twelve years and one day, while the penalty under
Sec. 15 for first time offenders of drug use is a minimum of six months
rehabilitation in a government center. To file charges under Sec. 11 on the
basis of residue alone would frustrate the objective of the law to rehabilitate
drug users and provide them with an opportunity to recover for a second
chance at life.

We find the ruling and reasoning of the trial court, as well as the subsequent
affirmation by the CA, erroneous on three counts.
The drug test in Section 15 does not cover
persons apprehended or arrested for any
unlawful act, but only for unlawful acts
listed under Article II of R.A. 9165.
First, [a] person apprehended or arrested cannot literally mean any
person apprehended or arrested for any crime. The phrase must be read
in context and understood in consonance with R.A. 9165. Section 15
comprehends persons arrested or apprehended for unlawful acts listed
under Article II of the law.
Hence, a drug test can be made upon persons who are apprehended or
arrested for, among others, the importation,9 sale, trading, administration,
dispensation, delivery, distribution and transportation, 10manufacture11 and
possession12 of dangerous drugs and/or controlled precursors and essential
chemicals; possession thereof during parties, social gatherings or
meetings13; being employees and visitors of a den, dive or
resort;14 maintenance of a den, dive or resort;15 illegal chemical diversion
of controlled precursors and essential chemicals16; manufacture or
delivery17 or possession18 of equipment, instrument, apparatus, and other
paraphernalia for dangerous drugs and/or controlled precursors and
essential chemicals; possession of dangerous drugs during parties, social
gatherings or meetings19; unnecessary20 or unlawful21 prescription
thereof; cultivation or culture of plants classified as dangerous drugs or are
sources thereof;22and maintenance and keeping of original records of
transactions on dangerous drugs and/or controlled precursors and essential
chemicals.23To make the provision applicable to all persons arrested or
apprehended for any crime not listed under Article II is tantamount to unduly
expanding its meaning. Note that accused appellant here was arrested in the
alleged act of extortion.

In the case at bench, the presence of dangerous drugs was only in the form
of residue on the drug paraphernalia, and the accused were found positive
for use of dangerous drugs. Granting that the arrest was legal, the evidence
obtained admissible, and the chain of custody intact, the law enforcers
should have filed charges under Sec. 15, R.A. No. 9165 or for use of
dangerous drugs and, if there was no residue at all, they should have been
charged under Sec. 14 (Possession of Equipment, Instrument, Apparatus
and Other Paraphernalia for Dangerous Drugs During Parties, Social
Gatherings or Meetings). Sec. 14 provides that the maximum penalty under
Sec. 12(Possession of Equipment, Instrument, Apparatus and Other
Paraphernalia for Dangerous Drugs) shall be imposed on any person who
shall possess any equipment, instrument, apparatus and other paraphernalia
for dangerous drugs. Under Sec. 12, the maximum penalty is imprisonment
of four years and a fine of P50,000.00. In fact, under the same section, the
possession of such equipment, apparatus or other paraphernalia is prima
facie evidence that the possessor has used a dangerous drug and shall be
presumed to have violated Sec. 15.
In order to effectively fulfill the intent of the law to rehabilitate drug
users, this Court thus calls on law enforcers and prosecutors in
dangerous drugs cases to exercise proper discretion in filing charges

A charge for violation of Section 15 of R.A. 9165 is seen as expressive of the

when the presence of dangerous drugs is only and solely in the form of
residue and the confirmatory test required under Sec. 15 is positive for
use of dangerous drugs. In such cases, to afford the accused a chance to
be rehabilitated, the filing of charges for or involving possession of
dangerous drugs should only be done when another separate quantity of
dangerous drugs, other than mere residue, is found in the possession of the
accused as provided for in Sec. 15. (Emphasis supplied)

allowable exceptions to such proscription. Cases where non-testimonial

compulsion has been allowed reveal, however, that the pieces of evidence
obtained were all material to the principal cause of the arrest.
The constitutional right of an accused against self-incrimination proscribes
the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communications from the
accused and not the inclusion of his body in evidence when it may be
material. Purely mechanical acts are not included in the prohibition as the
accused does not thereby speak his guilt, hence the assistance and guiding
hand of counsel is not required. (People vs. Olvis, 238 Phil. 513 [1987]) The
essence of the right against self-incrimination is testimonial compulsion, that
is, the giving of evidence against himself through a testimonial act. (People
vs. Casinillo, 213 SCRA 777 [1992]; People vs. Tranca, 235 SCRA 455
[1994]; People vs. Rondero, 378 Phil. 123 [1999]) Hence, it has been held
that a woman charged with adultery may be compelled to submit to physical
examination to determine her pregnancy; (Villaflor vs. Summers, 41 Phil. 62
[1920]) and an accused may be compelled to submit to physical examination
and to have a substance taken from his body for medical determination as to
whether he was suffering from gonorrhea which was contracted by his victim;
(U.S. vs. Tan Teng, 23 Phil. 145 [1912]) to expel morphine from his mouth;
(U.S. vs. Ong Siu Hong, 36 Phil. 735 [1917]) to have the outline of his foot
traced to determine its identity with bloody footprints; (U.S. vs. Salas, 25 Phil.
337 [1913]; U.S. vs. Zara, 42 Phil. 308 [1921]) and to be photographed or
measured, or his garments or shoes removed or replaced, or to move his
body to enable the foregoing things to be done.(People vs. Otadora, 86 Phil.
244 [1950]) 28 (Emphasis supplied)

Furthermore, making the phrase a person apprehended or arrested in

Section 15 applicable to all persons arrested or apprehended for unlawful
acts, not only under R.A. 9165 but for all other crimes, is tantamount to a
mandatory drug testing of all persons apprehended or arrested for any crime.
To overextend the application of this provision would run counter to our
pronouncement in Social Justice Society v. Dangerous Drugs Board and
Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency,25to wit:
x x x [M]andatory drug testing can never be random and suspicionless. The
ideas of randomness and being suspicionless are antithetical to their being
made defendants in a criminal complaint. They are not randomly picked;
neither are they beyond suspicion. When persons suspected of committing a
crime are charged, they are singled out and are impleaded against their will.
The persons thus charged, by the bare fact of being haled before the
prosecutors office and peaceably submitting themselves to drug testing, if
that be the case, do not necessarily consent to the procedure, let alone
waive their right to privacy. To impose mandatory drug testing on the
accused is a blatant attempt to harness a medical test as a tool for
criminal prosecution, contrary to the stated objectives of RA 6195. Drug
testing in this case would violate a persons right to privacy guaranteed
under Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution. Worse still, the accused
persons are veritably forced to incriminate themselves. (Emphasis
supplied)

In the instant case, we fail to see how a urine sample could be material to the
charge of extortion. The RTC and the CA, therefore, both erred when they
held that the extraction of petitioners urine for purposes of drug testing was
merely a mechanical act, hence, falling outside the concept of a custodial
investigation.

The drug test is not covered by

allowable non-testimonial
compulsion.

We note a case where a urine sample was considered as admissible.

In Gutang v. People,29 the petitioner therein and his companions were
arrested in connection with the enforcement of a search warrant in his
residence. A PNP-NARCOM team found and confiscated shabu materials
and paraphernalias. The petitioner and his companions in that case were
also asked to give urine samples, which yielded positive results. Later, the
petitioner therein was found guilty of the crime of illegal possession and use
of prohibited drugs. Gutang claimed that the latters urine sample was
inadmissible in evidence, since it was derived in effect from an uncounselled
extrajudicial confession.

We find that petitioner never raised the alleged irregularity of his arrest
before his arraignment and raises the issue only now before this tribunal;
hence, he is deemed to have waived his right to question the validity of his
arrest curing whatever defect may have attended his arrest. 26 However, a
waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest does not mean a waiver of the
inadmissibility of evidence seized during an illegal warrantless arrest. 27
We are aware of the prohibition against testimonial compulsion and the

In the Gutang et al. case, the Court clarified that what the Constitution
prohibits is the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communication
from the accused, but not an inclusion of his body in evidence, when it may
be material. The situation in Gutang was categorized as falling among the
exemptions under the freedom from testimonial compulsion since what was
sought to be examined came from the body of the accused. The Court said:

warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined

personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing
the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

This was a mechanical act the accused was made to undergo which was not
meant to unearth undisclosed facts but to ascertain physical attributes
determinable by simple observation. In fact, the record shows that petitioner
and his co-accused were not compelled to give samples of their urine but
they in fact voluntarily gave the same when they were requested to undergo
a drug test.

In the face of these constitutional guarantees, we cannot condone drug

testing of all arrested persons regardless of the crime or offense for which
the arrest is being made.

Section 17. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.

While we express our commendation of law enforcement agents as they

vigorously track down offenders in their laudable effort to curb the pervasive
and deleterious effects of dangerous drugs on our society, they must,
however, be constantly mindful of the reasonable limits of their authority,
because it is not unlikely that in their clear intent to purge society of its
lawless elements, they may be knowingly or unknowingly transgressing the
protected rights of its citizens including even members of its own police force.

Assuming arguendo that the urine samples taken from the petitioner are
inadmissible in evidence, we agree with the trial court that the record is
replete with other pieces of credible evidence including the testimonial
evidence of the prosecution which point to the culpability of the petitioner for
the crimes charged.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Decision dated 22 June

2011 issued by the Twentieth Division, and the Resolution dated 2 February
2012 issued by the former Twentieth Division of the Court of Appeals, in CAG.R. C.R. No. 00670 are SET ASIDE. Petitioner is hereby ACQUITTED.

We emphasize that the circumstances in Gutang are clearly different from the
circumstances of petitioner in the instant case. First, Gutang was arrested in
relation to a drug case. Second, he volunteered to give his urine. Third, there
were other pieces of evidence that point to his culpability for the crimes
charged. In the present case, though, petitioner was arrested for extortion; he
resisted having his urine sample taken; and finally, his urine sample was the
only available evidence that was used as basis for his conviction for the use
of illegal drugs.

SO ORDERED.

PEOPLE vs. MORILLA

The drug test was a violation of

petitioners right to privacy and
right against self-incrimination.
Before the Court is an appeal assailing the Decision dated 28 January 2010
of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 03631. The CA
affirmed the Decision dated 16 September 2008 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Binangonan, Rizal, Branch 67, in Criminal Case No. 06-017,
convicting appellant Rolando Laylo y Cepres (Laylo) of violation of Section
26(b), Article II (Attempted Sale of Dangerous Drugs) of Republic Act No.
91654 (RA 9165) or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.

It is incontrovertible that petitioner refused to have his urine extracted and

tested for drugs. He also asked for a lawyer prior to his urine test. He was
adamant in exercising his rights, but all of his efforts proved futile, because
he was still compelled to submit his urine for drug testing under those
circumstances.
The pertinent provisions in Article III of the Constitution are clear:
Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever
nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or

10

The Facts

In
its
Decision
dated
16
September
2008,
the
RTC
found Laylo and Ritwal guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violations of RA
9165. The RTC gave credence to the testimonies of the police officers, who
were presumed to have performed their duties in a regular manner.

In the afternoon of 17 December 2005, PO1 Reyes and PO1 Pastor, both
wearing civilian clothes, were conducting anti-drug surveillance operations
at Lozana Street, Calumpang, Binangonan,Rizal. While the police officers
were in front of a sari-sari store at around 5:40 p.m., appellant Laylo and his
live-in
partner, Ritwal,
approached
them
and
asked, Gusto mong umiskor ng shabu?
PO1
Reyes
replied, Bakit mayroon ka ba? Laylo then brought out two plastic bags
containing shabu and told the police officers, Dos (P200.00) ang isa. Upon
hearing this, the police officers introduced themselves as cops. PO1 Reyes
immediately arrested Laylo. Ritwal, on the other, tried to get away but PO1
Pastor caught up with her. PO1 Pastor then frisked Ritwal and found another
sachet of shabu in a SIM card case which Ritwal was carrying.

Laylo filed an appeal with the CA. In a Decision dated 28 January 2010, the
CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.
Hence, this appeal.

The Ruling of the Court

PO1 Reyes and PO1 Pastor marked the three plastic sachets
of shabu recovered from Laylo and Ritwal and forwarded them to the
Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory for forensic testing. Forensic
Chemist Police Inspector Yehla C.Manaog conducted the laboratory
examination on the specimens submitted and found the recovered items
positive for methylamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, a dangerous drug.

The appeal lacks merit.

The elements necessary for the prosecution of illegal sale of drugs are: (1)
the identity of the buyer and seller, the object, and the consideration; and (2)
the delivery of the thing sold and the payment.9

The police officers charged Laylo for attempted sale of illegal drugs and used
the two plastic sachets containing shabu as basis while Ritwal was charged
for possession of illegal drugs using as basis the third sachet containing 0.02
grams of shabu.

From the testimonies given, PO1 Reyes and PO1 Pastor testified that they
were the poseur-buyers in the sale. Both positively identified appellant as the
seller of the substance contained in plastic sachets which were found to be
positive for shabu. The same plastic sachets were likewise identified by the
prosecution witnesses when presented in court. Even the consideration
of P200.00 for each sachet had been made known by appellant to the police
officers. However, the sale was interrupted when the police officers
introduced themselves as cops and immediately arrested appellant and his

11

live-in partner Ritwal. Thus, the sale was not consummated but merely
attempted. Thus, appellant was charged with attempted sale of dangerous
drugs. Section 26(b), Article II of RA 9165 provides:

Appellant claims that he was a victim of a frame up. However, he failed to

substantiate his claim. The witnesses presented by the defense were not
able to positively affirm that illegal drugs were planted on appellant by the
police officers when they testified that they saw someone place something
inside appellants jacket. In Quinicot v. People,13 we held that allegations of
frame-up and extortion by police officers are common and standard defenses
in most dangerous drugs cases. They are viewed by the Court with disfavor,
for such defenses can easily be concocted and fabricated.

Section 26. Attempt or Conspiracy. Any attempt or

conspiracy to commit the following unlawful acts shall be
penalized by the same penalty prescribed for the
commission of the same as provided under this Act:

Appellant asserts that it is unbelievable that he would be so foolish and

reckless to offer to sell shabu to strangers. In People v. de Guzman,14 we
have ruled that peddlers of illicit drugs have been known, with ever
increasing casualness and recklessness, to offer and sell their wares for the
right price to anybody, be they strangers or not. What matters is not the
existing familiarity between the buyer and the seller, or the time and venue of
the sale, but the fact of agreement as well as the act constituting the sale and
delivery of the prohibited drugs.

xxx
(b) Sale, trading, administration, dispensation, delivery,
distribution and transportation of any dangerous drug and/or
controlled precursor and essential chemical;
xxx

Here, appellant intended to sell shabu and commenced by overt acts the
commission of the intended crime by showing the substance to PO1 Reyes
and PO1 Pastor.12 The sale was aborted when the police officers identified
themselves and placed appellant and Ritwal under arrest. From the
testimonies of the witnesses, the prosecution was able to establish that there
was an attempt to sell shabu. In addition, the plastic sachets were presented
in court as evidence of corpus delicti. Thus, the elements of the crime
charged were sufficiently established by evidence.

Further, appellant did not attribute any ill-motive on the part of the police
officers. The presumption of regularity in the performance of the police
officers official duties should prevail over the self-serving denial of
appellant.15

In sum, we see no reason to disturb the findings of the RTC and CA.
Appellant was correctly found to be guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
violating Section 26(b), Article II of RA 9165.

12