Tatad vs secretary of ENERGY

Petitioners assailed 5(b) and 15 of R.A. No. 8180, the Downstream Oil
Industry Deregulation Act of 1996.
5(b) of the law provided that tariff duty shall be imposed . . . on
imported crude oil at the rate of three percent (3%) and imported
refined petroleum products at the rate of seven percent (7%) . . . On
the other hand, 15 provided that [t]he DOE shall, upon approval of
the President, implement the full deregulation of the downstream oil
industry not later than March 1997. As far as practicable, the DOE shall
time the full deregulation when the prices of crude oil and petroleum
products in the world market are declining and when the exchange
rate of the peso in relation to the US dollar is stable . . .
Petitioners argued that 5(b) on tariff differential violates the
provision of the Constitution requiring every law to have only one
subject which should be expressed in its title.
They also contended that the phrases as far as practicable, decline
of crude oil prices in the world market and stability of the peso
exchange rate to the US dollar are ambivalent, unclear and inconcrete
since they do not provide determinate or determinable standards that
can guide the President in his decision to fully deregulate the
downstream oil industry.
Petitioners also assailed the Presidents E.O. No. 392, which proclaimed
the full deregulation of the downstream oil industry in February 1997.
They argued that the Executive misapplied R.A. No. 8180 when it
considered the depletion of the OPSF fund as a factor in the
implementation of full deregulation.
Finally, they asserted that the law violated 19, Article XII of the
Constitution prohibiting monopolies, combinations in restraint of trade
and unfair competition
II.

THE ISSUES

1.
Did 5(b) violate the one title-one subject requirement of the
Constitution?
2. Did 15 violate the constitutional prohibition on undue delegation
of power?
3. Was E.O. No. 392 arbitrary and unreasonable?
4. Did R.A. No. 8180 violate 19, Article XII of the Constitution
prohibiting monopolies, combinations in restraint of trade and unfair
competition?

III. THE RULING

[The Court GRANTED the petition. It DECLARED R.A. No. 8180
unconstitutional and E.O. No. 372 void.]
1.
NO, 5(b) DID NOT violate the one title-one subject
requirement of the Constitution.
As a policy, this Court has adopted a liberal construction of the one
title-one subject rule. [T]he title need not mirror, fully index or
catalogue all contents and minute details of a law. A law having a
single general subject indicated in the title may contain any number of
provisions, no matter how diverse they may be, so long as they are not
inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject, and may be
considered in furtherance of such subject by providing for the method
and means of carrying out the general subject. [S]ection 5(b) providing
for tariff differential is germane to the subject of R.A. No. 8180 which is
the deregulation of the downstream oil industry. The section is
supposed to sway prospective investors to put up refineries in our
country and make them rely less on imported petroleum.
2. NO, 15 DID NOT violate the constitutional prohibition on
undue delegation of power.
Two tests have been developed to determine whether the delegation of
the power to execute laws does not involve the abdication of the power
to make law itself. We delineated the metes and bounds of these tests
in Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. VS. POEA, thus:
There are two accepted tests to determine whether or not there is a
valid delegation of legislative power, viz: the completeness test and
the sufficient standard test. Under the first test, the law must be
complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves the legislative
such that when it reaches the delegate the only thing he will have to
do is to enforce it. Under the sufficient standard test, there must be
adequate guidelines or limitations in the law to map out the boundaries
of the delegate's authority and prevent the delegation from running
riot. Both tests are intended to prevent a total transference of
legislative authority to the delegate, who is not allowed to step into the
shoes of the legislature and exercise a power essentially legislative.
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Section 15 can hurdle both the completeness test and the sufficient
standard test. It will be noted that Congress expressly provided in R.A.
No. 8180 that full deregulation will start at the end of March 1997,

regardless of the occurrence of any event. Full deregulation at the end

of March 1997 is mandatory and the Executive has no discretion to
postpone it for any purported reason. Thus, the law is complete on the
question of the final date of full deregulation. The discretion given to
the President is to advance the date of full deregulation before the end
of March 1997. Section 15 lays down the standard to guide the
judgment of the President --- he is to time it as far as practicable
when the prices of crude oil and petroleum products in the world
market are declining and when the exchange rate of the peso in
relation to the US dollar is stable.
Petitioners contend that the words as far as practicable, declining
and stable should have been defined in R.A. No. 8180 as they do not
set determinate or determinable standards. The stubborn submission
deserves scant consideration. The dictionary meanings of these words
are well settled and cannot confuse men of reasonable intelligence.
Webster defines practicable as meaning possible to practice or
perform, decline as meaning to take a downward direction, and
stable as meaning firmly established. The fear of petitioners that
these words will result in the exercise of executive discretion that will
run riot is thus groundless. To be sure, the Court has sustained the
validity of similar, if not more general standards in other cases.
3.

YES, E.O. No. 392 was arbitrary and unreasonable.

A perusal of section 15 of R.A. No. 8180 will readily reveal that it only
enumerated two factors to be considered by the Department of Energy
and the Office of the President, viz.: (1) the time when the prices of
crude oil and petroleum products in the world market are declining,
and (2) the time when the exchange rate of the peso in relation to the
US dollar is stable. Section 15 did not mention the depletion of the
OPSF as a factor to be given weight by the Executive before ordering
full deregulation. On the contrary, the debates in Congress will show
that some of our legislators wanted to impose as a pre-condition to
deregulation a showing that the OPSF fund must not be in deficit. We
therefore hold that the Executive department failed to follow faithfully
the standards set by R.A. No. 8180 when it considered the extraneous
factor of depletion of the OPSF fund. The misappreciation of this extra
factor cannot be justified on the ground that the Executive department
considered anyway the stability of the prices of crude oil in the world
market and the stability of the exchange rate of the peso to the dollar.
By considering another factor to hasten full deregulation, the Executive
department rewrote the standards set forth in R.A. 8180. The
Executive is bereft of any right to alter either by subtraction or addition
the standards set in R.A. No. 8180 for it has no power to make laws. To
cede to the Executive the power to make law is to invite tyranny,

indeed, to transgress the principle of separation of powers. The

exercise of delegated power is given a strict scrutiny by courts for the
delegate is a mere agent whose action cannot infringe the terms of
agency. In the cases at bar, the Executive co-mingled the factor of
depletion of the OPSF fund with the factors of decline of the price of
crude oil in the world market and the stability of the peso to the US
dollar. On the basis of the text of E.O. No. 392, it is impossible to
determine the weight given by the Executive department to the
depletion of the OPSF fund. It could well be the principal consideration
for the early deregulation. It could have been accorded an equal
significance. Or its importance could
be nil. In light of this
uncertainty, we rule that the early deregulation under E.O. No. 392
constitutes a misapplication of R.A. No. 8180.
4.
YES, R.A. No. 8180 violated 19, Article XII of the
Constitution prohibiting monopolies, combinations in restraint
of trade and unfair competition.
[I]t cannot be denied that our downstream oil industry is operated and
controlled by an oligopoly, a foreign oligopoly at that. Petron, Shell and
Caltex stand as the only major league players in the oil market. All
other players belong to the lilliputian league. As the dominant players,
Petron, Shell and Caltex boast of existing refineries of various
capacities. The tariff differential of 4% therefore works to their
immense benefit. Yet, this is only one edge of the tariff differential. The
other edge cuts and cuts deep in the heart of their competitors. It
erects a high barrier to the entry of new players. New players that
intend to equalize the market power of Petron, Shell and Caltex by
building refineries of their own will have to spend billions of pesos.
Those who will not build refineries but compete with them will suffer
the huge disadvantage of increasing their product cost by 4%. They
will be competing on an uneven field. The argument that the 4% tariff
differential is desirable because it will induce prospective players to
invest in refineries puts the cart before the horse. The first need is to
attract new players and they cannot be attracted by burdening them
with heavy disincentives. Without new players belonging to the league
of Petron, Shell and Caltex, competition in our downstream oil industry
is an idle dream.
The provision on inventory widens the balance of advantage of Petron,
Shell and Caltex against prospective new players. Petron, Shell and
Caltex can easily comply with the inventory requirement of R.A. No.
8180 in view of their existing storage facilities. Prospective competitors
again will find compliance with this requirement difficult as it will entail
a prohibitive cost. The construction cost of storage facilities and the
cost of inventory can thus scare prospective players. Their net effect is

to further occlude the entry points of new players, dampen competition

and enhance the control of the market by the three (3) existing oil
companies.
Finally, we come to the provision on predatory pricing which is defined
as . . . selling or offering to sell any product at a price unreasonably
below the industry average cost so as to attract customers to the
detriment of competitors. Respondents contend that this provision
works against Petron, Shell and Caltex and protects new entrants. The
ban on predatory pricing cannot be analyzed in isolation. Its validity is
interlocked with the barriers imposed by R.A. No. 8180 on the entry of
new players. The inquiry should be to determine whether predatory
pricing on the part of the dominant oil companies is encouraged by the
provisions in the law blocking the entry of new players. Textwriter Hovenkamp gives the authoritative answer and we quote:
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The rationale for predatory pricing is the sustaining of losses today that
will give a firm monopoly profits in the future. The monopoly profits will
never materialize, however, if the market is flooded with new entrants
as soon as the successful predator attempts to raise its
price. Predatory pricing will be profitable only if the market contains
significant barriers to new entry.
As aforediscussed, the 4% tariff differential and the inventory
requirement are significant barriers which discourage new players to
enter the market. Considering these significant barriers established by
R.A. No. 8180 and the lack of players with the comparable clout of
PETRON, SHELL and CALTEX, the temptation for a dominant player to
engage in predatory pricing and succeed is a chilling reality.
Petitioners charge that this provision on predatory pricing is anticompetitive is not without reason.
[R.A. No. 8180 contained a separability clause, but the High Tribunal
held that the offending provisions of the law so permeated its essence
that it had to be struck down entirely. The provisions on tariff
differential, inventory and predatory pricing were among the principal
props of R.A. No. 8180. Congress could not have deregulated the
downstream oil industry without these provisions.]
Garcia vs Drillon
Facts:
Private respondent Rosalie filed a petition before the
RTC of Bacolod City a Temporary Protection Order against her husband,
Jesus, pursuant to R.A. 9262, entitled An Act Defining Violence Against
Women and Their Children, Providing for Protective Measures for

Victims, Prescribing Penalties Therefor, and for Other Purposes. She

claimed to be a victim of physical, emotional, psychological and
economic violence, being threatened of deprivation of custody of her
children and of financial support and also a victim of marital infidelity
on the part of petitioner.
The TPO was granted but the petitioner failed to faithfully comply with
the conditions set forth by the said TPO, private-respondent filed
another application for the issuance of a TPO ex parte. The trial court
issued a modified TPO and extended the same when petitioner failed to
comment on why the TPO should not be modified. After the given time
allowance to answer, the petitioner no longer submitted the required
comment as it would be an axercise in futility.
Petitioner filed before the CA a petition for prohibition with prayer for
injunction and TRO on, questioning the constitutionality of the RA 9262
for violating the due process and equal protection clauses, and the
validity of the modified TPO for being an unwanted product of an
invalid law.
The CA issued a TRO on the enforcement of the TPO but however,
denied the petition for failure to raise the issue of constitutionality in
his pleadings before the trial court and the petition for prohibition to
annul protection orders issued by the trial court constituted collateral
attack on said law.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied. Thus, this
petition is filed.
Issues: WON the CA erred in dismissing the petition on the theory that
the issue of constitutionality was not raised at the earliest opportunity
and that the petition constitutes a collateral attack on the validity of
the law.
WON the CA committed serious error in failing to conclude that RA
9262 is discriminatory, unjust and violative of the equal protection
clause.
WON the CA committed grave mistake in not finding that RA 9262 runs
counter to the due process clause of the Constitution
WON the CA erred in not finding that the law does violence to the
policy of the state to protect the family as a basic social institution
WON the CA seriously erredin declaring RA 9262 as invalid and
unconstitutional because it allows an undue delegation of judicial
power to Brgy. Officials.
Decision:
1. Petitioner contends that the RTC has limited authority
and jurisdiction, inadequate to tackle the complex issue of
constitutionality. Family Courts have authority and jurisdiction to
consider the constitutionality of a statute. The question of
constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible time so that if
not raised in the pleadings, it may not be raised in the trial and if not
raised in the trial court, it may not be considered in appeal.
2. RA 9262 does not violate the guaranty of equal protection of the

laws. Equal protection simply requires that all persons or things

similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred
and responsibilities imposed. In Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workerkers
Union, the Court ruled that all that is required of a valid classification is
that it be reasonable, which means that the classification should be
based on substantial distinctions which make for real differences; that
it must be germane to the purpose of the law; not limited to existing
conditions only; and apply equally to each member of the class.
Therefore, RA9262 is based on a valid classification and did not violate
the equal protection clause by favouring women over men as victims
of violence and abuse to whom the Senate extends its protection.
3. RA 9262 is not violative of the due process clause of the
Constitution. The essence of due process is in the reasonable
opportunity to be heard and submit any evidence one may have in
support of ones defense. The grant of the TPO exparte cannot be
impugned as violative of the right to due process.
4. The non-referral of a VAWC case to a mediator is justified.
Petitioners contention that by not allowing mediation, the law violated
the policy of the State to protect and strengthen the family as a basic
autonomous social institution cannot be sustained. In a memorandum
of the Court, it ruled that the court shall not refer the case or any issue
therof to a mediator. This is so because violence is not a subject for
compromise.
5. There is no undue delegation of judicial power to Barangay officials.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable and to determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on any
part of any branch of the Government while executive power is the
power to enforce and administer the laws. The preliminary
investigation conducted by the prosecutor is an executive, not a
judicial, function. The same holds true with the issuance of BPO.
Assistance by Brgy. Officials and other law enforcement agencies is
consistent with their duty executive function.
The petition for review on certiorari is denied for lack of merit.

Privacy
Ganaan vs iac
Facts:
Complainant Atty. Tito Pintor and his client Manuel Montebon were in
the living room of complainants residence discussing the terms for the
withdrawal of the complaint for direct assault which they filed with the

Office of the City Fiscal of Cebu against Leonardo Laconico. After they
had decided on the proposed conditions, complainant made a
telephone call to Laconico. That same morning, Laconico telephoned
appellant, who is a lawyer, to come to his office and advise him on the
settlement of the direct assault case because his regular lawyer, Atty.
Leon Gonzaga, went on a business trip.
When complainant called, Laconico requested appellant to secretly
listen to the telephone conversation through a telephone extension so
as to hear personally the proposed conditions for the
settlement. Twenty minutes later, complainant called again to ask
Laconico if he was agreeable to the conditions. Laconico answered
Yes. Complainant then told Laconico to wait for instructions on where
to deliver the money.
Complainant called again and instructed Laconico to give the money to
his wife at the office of the then Department of Public Highways.
Laconico who earlier alerted his friend Colonel Zulueta of the Criminal
Investigation Service of the Philippine Constabulary, insisted that
complainant himself should receive the money. When he received the
money at the Igloo Restaurant, complainant was arrested by agents of
the Philippine Constabulary.
Appellant executed on the following day an affidavit stating that he
heard complainant demand P8,000.00 for the withdrawal of the case
for direct assault. Laconico attached the affidavit of appellant to the
complainant for robbery/extortion which he filed against complainant.
Since appellant listened to the telephone conversation without
complainants consent, complainant charged appellant and Laconico
with violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Act.
The lower court found both Gaanan and Laconico guilty of violating
Section 1 of Republic Act No. 4200, which prompted petitioner to
appeal. The IAC affirmed with modification hence the present petition
for certiorari.
Issue:
W/N an extension telephone is covered by the term device or
arrangement under Rep. Act No. 4200
Held:
No. The law refers to a tap of a wire or cable or the use of a device
or arrangement for the purpose of secretly overhearing, intercepting,
or recording the communication. There must be either a physical
interruption through a wiretap or the deliberate installation of a device
or arrangement in order to overhear, intercept, or record the spoken
words.
An extension telephone cannot be placed in the same category as a
dictaphone, dictagraph or the other devices enumerated in Section 1 of
RA No. 4200 as the use thereof cannot be considered as tapping the
wire or cable of a telephone line. The telephone extension in this case

was not installed for that purpose. It just happened to be there for
ordinary office use.
RAMIREZ V CA
7
NOV
G.R. No. 93833 | September 28, 1995 | J. Katipunan
Facts:
A civil case damages was filed by petitioner Socorro Ramirez in the
Quezon City RTC alleging that the private respondent, Ester Garcia, in a
confrontation in the latters office, allegedly vexed, insulted and
humiliated her in a hostile and furious mood and in a manner
offensive to petitioners dignity and personality, contrary to morals,
good customs and public policy.
In support of her claim, petitioner produced a verbatim transcript of
the event and sought damages. The transcript on which the civil case
was based was culled from a tape recording of the confrontation made
by petitioner.
As a result of petitioners recording of the event and alleging that the
said act of secretly taping the confrontation was illegal, private
respondent filed a criminal case before the Pasay RTC for violation of
Republic Act 4200, entitled An Act to prohibit and penalize wire
tapping and other related violations of private communication, and
other purposes.
Petitioner filed a Motion to Quash the Information, which the RTC later
on granted, on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an
offense, particularly a violation of R.A. 4200.
The CA declared the RTCs decision null and void and denied the
petitioners MR, hence the instant petition.
Issue:
W/N the Anti-Wiretapping Act applies in recordings by one of the
parties in the conversation
Held:
Yes. Section 1 of R.A. 4200 entitled, An Act to Prohibit and Penalized
Wire Tapping and Other Related Violations of Private Communication
and Other Purposes, provides:
Sec. 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all
the parties to any private communication or spoken word, to tap any
wire or cable, or by using any other device or arrangement, to secretly
overhear, intercept, or record such communication or spoken word by
using a device commonly known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or
detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape recorder, or however otherwise
described.
The aforestated provision clearly and unequivocally makes it illegal for
any person, not authorized by all the parties to any private

communication to secretly record such communication by means of a

tape recorder. The law makes no distinction as to whether the party
sought to be penalized by the statute ought to be a party other than or
different from those involved in the private communication. The
statutes intent to penalize all persons unauthorized to make such
recording is underscored by the use of the qualifier any.
Consequently, as respondent Court of Appeals correctly concluded,
even a (person) privy to a communication who records his private
conversation with another without the knowledge of the latter (will)
qualify as a violator under this provision of R.A. 4200.
A perusal of the Senate Congressional Records, moreover, supports the
respondent courts conclusion that in enacting R.A. 4200 our
lawmakers indeed contemplated to make illegal, unauthorized tape
recording of private conversations or communications taken either by
the parties themselves or by third persons.
The nature of the conversations is immaterial to a violation of the
statute. The substance of the same need not be specifically alleged in
the information. What R.A. 4200 penalizes are the acts of
secretly overhearing, intercepting or recording private communications
by means of the devices enumerated therein. The mere allegation that
an individual made a secret recording of a private communication by
means of a tape recorder would suffice to constitute an offense under
Section 1 of R.A. 4200. As the Solicitor General pointed out in his
COMMENT before the respondent court: Nowhere (in the said law) is it
required that before one can be regarded as a violator, the nature of
the conversation, as well as its communication to a third person should
be professed.
Petitioners contention that the phrase private communication in
Section 1 of R.A. 4200 does not include private conversations
narrows the ordinary meaning of the word communication to a point
of absurdity. The word communicate comes from the latin
word communicare, meaning to share or to impart. In its ordinary
signification, communication connotes the act of sharing or imparting
signification, communication connotes the act of sharing or imparting,
as in a conversation, or signifies the process by which meanings or
thoughts are shared between individuals through a common system of
symbols (as language signs or gestures)
These definitions are broad enough to include verbal or non-verbal,
written or expressive communications of meanings or thoughts
which are likely to include the emotionally-charged exchange, on
February 22, 1988, between petitioner and private respondent, in the
privacy of the latters office. Any doubts about the legislative bodys
meaning of the phrase private communication are, furthermore, put
to rest by the fact that the terms conversation and communication
were interchangeably used by Senator Taada in his Explanatory Note
to the Bill.