Centre for Middle Eastern Studies

Sakarya University, Turkey.

Saudi Arabias Policy in the Middle East

The role of Saudi Arabia in the Arab Revolution

12th October, 2015

Mohammed Hashiru
M.S Student, Middle Eastern Studies

Abstract
With the continuing struggle in Syria, one can hardly predict when the Arab revolution will end.
The sudden turn of events in Syria raises questions of international and political interest in the
revolution. Saudi Arabia does not only remain unscathed despite earlier attempts by its citizens
to rise against the authorities but has played myriads of role in the political instability of states
in the Middle East. They primarily sought to keep the revolutions away from the Gulf and ensure
their own regimes survival. Riyadh has been extensively diplomatically and to some extent
militarily involved in the Arab uprisings. It is believed that there are traces of evidence revealing
the several roles played by Saudi Arabia in the Arab upheaval (Bradley,2011).
Introduction
The conquest of Iraq in 2003 started another debate of the emerging NEW MIDDLE EAST.
New regional order saw the likes of non-Arab nations (Iran and Turkey) gain more power and
influence in the Middle East. That was predicted to be one of the fears which will see Saudi
Arabia directly and indirectly involved in the Arab spring to compete for a regional balance.
While their ultimate goal was to ensure their regime survival and domestic stability, the Saudi
Arabia with the help of their allies pursued different strategies elsewhere in the region in an
attempt to shape the evolving post-2011 regional order .This paper seeks to research reveal the
role of Saudi Arabia in the Arab struggle. Their partnership with some failed states and their
alliance outside the region to reach their goal. It shall also give some briefings country by
country where the spring was immense vis--vis the direct involvement of Arabia in them. This
paper looks at the obvious historical reasons that prompted the involvement of Arabia. Also the
reactions of both Saudi Arabia, guided by a calculation of threats and opportunities posed and
presented by the Arab uprisings, influenced their own national role conceptions and led to an
evolution of the latter.
A Summary of Events in the revolution held countries
The downfall of Tunisia's President Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali inspired pro-democracy activists
across the Arab world.
Tunisia: Widespread discontent at economic hardship, decades of autocratic rule and corruption
erupted into mass demonstrations in December 2010 after a young, unemployed man, Mohamed
Bouazizi, set fire to himself after officials stopped him selling vegetables in Sidi Bouzid. Around
300 people were killed during the subsequent unrest, which forced Ben Ali to resign in January
2011, after 23 years in power, and go into exile in Saudi Arabia. He was later sentenced to life in
prison in absentia.In October 2011, Tunisia held its first democratic parliamentary elections. The
moderate Islamist Ennahda party won more than 41% of the vote in the constituent assembly
tasked with drafting a new constitution. Veteran dissident Moncef Marzouki was then elected
president. Since July 2013 a stand-off between Ennahda and its secular rivals, triggered by the
assassination of two leftist politicians and other violence blamed on Salafists, has thwarted

efforts to complete the draft constitution (Bradley, 2011). Opposition supporters took to the
streets to demand a non-partisan caretaker government until the constitution was finished and
new elections were held, and in December 2013 the main political parties agreed on appointing
Mehdi Jomaa as prime minister.
Egypt: Eighteen days of mass protests forced Hosni Mubarak to resign in February 2011, after
three decades in power. He was convicted of complicity in the deaths of 846 people killed during
the uprising, but the verdict was overturned on appeal. A protestor was quoted as saying "Our
country's condition was getting worse and worse. There was corruption, torture, injustice,
inequality and no freedom. Someone had to stand up and say 'enough is enough'". Due to the
protest by less than 5 percent of the countrys population, President Hosni Mubarak steps down
and faces charges of killing unarmed protesters (Amin, 2011). Elections held on Nov. 28, 2011.
Protests continued in Tahrir Square.
Following Mr Mubarak's resignation, the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF)
assumed presidential powers. Parliamentary elections in 2011-12 saw overwhelming victories for
the Islamist Muslim Brotherhood's Freedom and Justice Party and Salafist al-Nour party.In June
2012, the Brotherhood's Mohammed Morsi was elected president. He swiftly revoked a
controversial SCAF decree that limited his powers, changed the military's leadership and named
Gen Abdul Fattah al-Sisi as chief of staff and defence minister. Public opposition to Mr Morsi
began to build in November 2012, when he issued a decree granting himself far-reaching powers,
and were fuelled by the passage of what many considered an Islamist-leaning draft constitution.
Mr Morsi was deposed by the military in June 2013 after millions of protesters took to the streets
and replaced by an interim government. Security forces then launched a crackdown on the
Muslim Brotherhood, killing almost 1,000 people at two pro-Morsi sit-ins in Cairo. In December
2013, a constituent assembly finished drafting a new constitution to replace the 2012 charter.
Libya: Libya's uprising began in February 2011 after security forces in the eastern city of
Benghazi opened fire on a protest. Anti-government demonstrations then erupted in other towns
before eventually reaching Tripoli. They swiftly evolved into an armed revolt seeking to topple
Muammar Gaddafi. In March 2011, after the UN Security Council authorised "all necessary
measures" to protect civilians, Nato powers launched air strikes on government targets,
ostensibly aimed at imposing a no-fly zone. With military assistance from the West and several
Arab states, rebel forces took Tripoli after six months of fighting in which several thousand
people were killed. After four decades in power, Gaddafi went on the run and was captured and
killed outside Sirte in August 2011. The National Transitional Council (NTC), which led the
revolt, declared Libya officially "liberated" and promised a pluralist, democratic state. In July
2012, it organised elections for an interim parliament, the General National Congress (GNC), in
which liberal, secular and independent candidates beat the Muslim Brotherhood-aligned Justice
and Construction Party. Since Gaddafi's overthrow Libya has been plagued by instability, with
some 300 revolutionary militias clashing repeatedly, defying requests to disarm and besieging

government buildings. Many Libyans also complain of uneven regional development,

unemployment and a lack of government transparency
Yemen: Ongoing protests since Feb. 3, 2011. President Ali Abdullah Saleh is injured in an attack
on June 4. On Nov. 23, he signs a power-transfer agreement ending his 33-year reign. Yemen's
President Ali Abdullah Saleh was the fourth Arab leader to be forced from power.
Demonstrations calling for the end of his 33-year rule began in January 2011. Mr Saleh promised
not to seek re-election, but the protests spread. Security forces and Saleh supporters launched a
crackdown that eventually left between 200 and 2,000 people dead. In April 2011, Mr Saleh's
General People's Congress (GPC) agreed to a Gulf Co-operation Council-brokered deal to hand
over power, but the president refused to sign. This prompted the Hashid tribal federation and
several army commanders to back the opposition, after which clashes erupted in Sanaa. In June
2011, Mr Saleh was seriously injured in a bombing and travelled abroad for medical treatment.
He returned to the presidential palace in September 2011 amid renewed clashes. It was not until
November 2011 that he signed the deal that saw his deputy, Abdrabbuh Mansour Hadi, assume
power and form a unity government. Mr Hadi was sworn in for a two-year term as president in
February 2012 after an election in which he stood unopposed. Since taking power, President
Hadi has struggled to tackle widespread poverty and malnutrition, an Islamist insurgency led by
al-Qaeda, a secessionist movement in the south, and Zaidi Shia rebels in the north. A National
Dialogue Conference involving rival political, tribal, religious and social groups, is being held as
part of the process to draft a new constitution and hold democratic elections in February 2014

Syria: The wave of popular unrest that swept the Arab world came late to Syria, but its once
peaceful uprising has evolved into a brutal and increasingly sectarian armed conflict. Protests
demanding greater freedom and an end to corruption began in the southern city of Deraa in
March 2011. After security forces opened fire on demonstrators, more took to the streets. By July
2011, hundreds of thousands of people across the country were attending protests demanding
President Bashar al-Assad's resignation. Despite the security forces' concerted and ruthless
efforts to crush the "terrorists" and "armed criminal gangs", the uprising continued unabated.
Opposition supporters began to take up arms, first to defend themselves and then to oust loyalist
forces from their areas. In February 2012, President Assad pressed ahead with a referendum that
approved a new constitution that dropped an article giving the ruling Baath Party unique status as
the "leader of the state and society".
The opposition denounced it as sham. Pressure steadily built on Mr Assad as rebels seized
control of large parts of the north and east of the country and launched offensives on Damascus
and Aleppo, while the opposition National Coalition was recognised around the world as the

Syrian people's "legitimate representative". In 2013, the momentum in the conflict gradually
began shifting in Mr Assad's favour, as government forces launched major offensives to recover
territory and consolidate their grip on population centres in the south and west. The rebels'
appeals for heavy weapons were meanwhile rejected by Western and Gulf allies concerned by the
prominence of jihadists affiliated to al-Qaeda. However, Mr Assad was forced onto the defensive
in August 2013 after a chemical weapons attack on the outskirts of Damascus that left hundreds
dead. Although the US pulled back from launching punitive military strikes, the president was
forced to agree to destroy Syria's chemical weapons. Neither side has managed to achieve a
breakthrough on the battlefield nor the government and National Coalition has reluctantly agreed
to a peace conference in Geneva in January 2014. President Assad is refusing to step aside - a
step the National Coalition is insisting on. Meanwhile, the war has produced a humanitarian
disaster, leaving more than 100,000 people dead and forcing millions from their homes
Bahrain: Bahrain has been wracked by unrest since in February 2011, when demonstrators
occupied Manama's Pearl Roundabout, demanding more democracy and an end to discrimination
against the majority Shia Muslim community by the Sunni royal family. The protesters were
driven out by security forces in March 2011, after King Hamad declared a state of emergency
and brought in troops from neighbouring Sunni-led Gulf states to restore order and crush dissent.
The unrest left at least 30 civilians and five policemen dead. Almost 3,000 people were also
arrested, and scores were handed long prison terms by military courts. International
condemnation prompted King Hamad to set up the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry
(BICI), which issued recommendations that included the prosecution of security forces personnel
responsible for the torture and deaths of detainees, the release prisoners of conscience, and the
reinstatement of dismissed Shia workers.

The king accepted the recommendations and the government says they have all been
implemented. However, critics have complained that not only is that not happening, but that the
crackdown is continuing and abuses are on the increase. A national dialogue process has reached
an impasse, with the opposition claiming the ruling Khalifa family have no intention of making
good on its promises. With no breakthrough expected, angry Shia youth are increasingly turning
to violence. Opposition and human rights activists say more than 45 people have been killed in
ongoing clashes between security forces and protesters since the end of the March 2011
crackdown, though the government says the death toll is lower.
Saudi Arabia: Since the Arab Spring uprisings began, relatively small numbers of Saudis have
dared to take to the streets to call for reforms and for grievances to be addressed. The
government sought to discourage dissent by extending additional benefits worth around $127bn
to citizens. But in March 2011, it reaffirmed the ban on protests after several took place in the
capital, Riyadh, and in Eastern Province, home to a Shia majority that complains of
discrimination at the hands of the Sunni ruling family. Since then, hundreds of people have been

arrested and dozens reportedly remain in custody. Specialised Criminal Courts, set up for
terrorism cases, have been used to try opposition and human rights activists on various charges
including "disobeying the ruler". Despite the crackdown, demonstrations in Shia towns and
villages of Eastern Province, and elsewhere by reform advocates, women's rights activists and
relatives of security detainees have continued sporadically. The security forces are alleged to
have used excessive force against demonstrators. About 10 have reportedly been shot dead in
Eastern Province. Officials say troops have opened fire when confronted by armed people something denied by opposition activists

Other nations: Protests and uprisings related to the Arab Spring also took place in other
countries as well, including: Algeria, Jordan, Kuwait, Morocco and Oman. In those countries, the
protests were either not massive or they were halted in the shortest time.

Various roles and activities of Saudi Arabia in the revolution held countries
John R. Bradley reveals in his article, Saudi Arabia has played a singular role throughout the
Arab Spring. With a guiding hand -- and often an iron fist -- Riyadh has worked tirelessly to
stage manage affairs across the entire region. They have with or without obvious reasons
meddled in the affairs of neighbouring regional states to protect their interest. That Saudi Arabia
is taking the lead role during this promising yet difficult phase in the history of the Arab struggle
suggests that the Arab future may not be heading for the better.

From the Arab Spring's beginning, Riyadh reached directly into local conflicts. As far
back as January, the kingdom offered refuge to Tunisia's deposed leader, Zine el-Abidine
Ben Ali. Eager that popular justice not become the norm for Arab dictators, Riyadh has
steadfastly refused to extradite Ben Ali to stand trial. (He remains in Riyadh to this day.)
Moreover, Ben Ali's statements, issued through his lawyer, have consistently called on
Tunisians to continue the path of "modernization." For fear of upsetting his Saudi hosts,
he has not been able to express what must be his horror as a secularist at the dramatic
emergence of Ennahda ("Awakening"), the main Islamist party, on the Tunisian political
scene.
It is sometimes very difficult to understand the game played by Saudi Arabia in Egypt.
Before revolution it was quiet clear that both Saudi Arabia and Egypt were allies of the

United States. Even at a point where Mubarak was falling Saudi Arabia were reported not
to be in favour of the move at all. They had to implore the intervention of United States to
rescue Mubarak from being sentenced. Things appeared out of hands and America
suddenly lost to the vibrant the Muslim brotherhood that was then seen as the obvious
group to take presidential mandate and lead the country. The kingdom, which is not
known for being proactive, has taken the initiative from the first days of the uprising
against the Brotherhoods rule. It has given the new rule billions of dollars. It then
suggested, or rather demanded, that the Gulf countries do the same. And they did so,
because the Saudi request was accompanied by a reassurance that Egypt after the
Brotherhood will be a base of stability in the region, and because Iran had a significant
alliance with the Brotherhood. So a revolution in Egypt will strengthen the anti-Iran
front. It will also weaken Irans project to "export the revolution" and cause problems for
"Arab conservatives." Iranian strength stems from adopting Hamas in Gaza and
Hezbollah in Lebanon. Hezbollah is the party that resoundingly defeated Israel in the
summer of 2006.
The situation in Yemen is a different game all together. It is an ongoing battle between
two main proxies of Iran and Saudi, with Saudi supporting the government and the Iran
backing the Houthi Shiite group. Martin Reardon explains that it would be an
understatement to say that the internal power politics at play in Yemen are among the
oldest, most complex and most dynamic in the Middle East. Also when President Ali
Abdullah Saleh was injured in the June bombing of his presidential palace, he fled to
(where else?) Saudi Arabia. When Saleh returned to his country after some month, he
found himself more indebted to Riyadh than ever. Essentially, Saudi medics had saved his
life, and in a tribal region such personal debts are not quickly forgotten. But Saleh may
not matter much: In the capital of Sana'a, the exhausted protesters have largely departed
the main square they had occupied. It has been taken over by activists from Islah (or, the
Islamist Congregation for Reform), the country's main Islamist party. Islah was founded
by leading members of the powerful, Saudi-backed Hashid tribal confederation, whose
decision to turn against Saleh was a key moment in the uprising. The biggest intervention
is what is happening between the Saudi backed installed government and Iran backed
Houthis. So much effort is put by Middle Eastern experts to understand and give
meaning to the two countries (Iran and Saudi Arabia) interest in the country. The most
obvious reasons were voted to have been the issue of regional balance and some sort of
sectarian conflict. The sectarian reason isnt so strong because although the Houthis are
Shiites, their doctrines are rather close to the Sunni sects than to the Shiism practiced
wildly in Iran. Martin Reardon believes that for Saudi Arabia, which shares a porous
1,770km southern border with Yemen, the stakes there are high. According to a
November 2013 article by Middle East Voices, Saudi intelligence officials consider
Yemen to be the weakest security link in the Gulf and "easy prey for Tehran to penetrate
and manipulate". The Saudi-Yemen border also serves as the primary point of infiltration
for AQAP, which is still considered the biggest terrorist threat to the kingdom. For both

those very reasons, the Saudis have been providing significant financial and military
support to Yemens central government, and even conducted their own ground and air
strikes against the Houthis and AQAP on the Yemen side of the border. The Saudis are
still reeling from the loss of their longtime ally, Ali Abdullah Saleh, who was forced to
step down as Yemen's president in 2011. From the Saudi perspective, Yemen has been on
a downward spiral ever since.
The cause of the unrest in Bahrain lies in the political and socio-economic disadvantage
that the Sunni rulers impose on the Shiite majority of 50 to 70 percent of the roughly
550,000 citizens. Saudi Arabia acted most decisively in relation to neighboring Bahrain,
where it intervened militarily after protests threatened to spiral out of control and
endanger the rule of the House of Khalifa, which is closely allied with Saudi Arabia. In
Bahrain the Arab Spring demonstrations were only one of many waves of a protest
movement largely rooted in the countrys Shiite majority that began long beforehand.
Even before 2011, Saudi Arabia had been leaning on the Bahraini leadership to refrain
from taking reforms too far and sought in the first place to hinder the emergence of a
constitutional monarchy there. No longer possessing meaningful oil reserves of its own,
Bahrain is highly dependent on Saudi Arabia, which funds about half of its budget
through direct and indirect support. That dependency has been increased since 2011 by
the economic repercussions of the unrest, as tourists stayed away and the financial center
of Manama, which was long one of the most important in the Gulf region.
Syria is one of the pivotal countries in the Middle East. It borders Turkey and Israel, has a
close relationship with Iran and Russia, plays an influential role in Lebanon, and has a
history of rivalry with Iraq. Syria is a key link in the alliance between Iran and the
Lebanese Shiite movement of Hezbollah Lebanon. Syria has been at odds with the US
policies in the region practically since its independence in 1946, and has fought several
wars with Israel, Americas top regional ally. Other than wresting Syria away from Iran, I
dont think that Saudis hold any particular interest in fostering a more democratic Syria.
It is still too early to imagine what kind of role Saudi Arabia could play in the post-Assad
Syria, although the conservative kingdom is expected to throw its weight behind Islamist
groups within the disparate Syrian opposition. But it is notable how the royal family is
consciously positioning itself as the protector of Sunnis against what it sees is Iranian
interference in Arab affairs. Syria is a majority Sunni country but the security forces are
dominated by Alawites, members of a Shiite minority to which Assads family belongs.
And therein lies the gravest danger for Syrias multi-religious society: becoming a proxy
battleground for the Shiite Iran and Sunni Saudi Arabia, with both sides deliberately
playing on the Sunni-Shiite (or Sunni-Alawi) divide, which would greatly inflame
sectarian tensions in the country. Saudi Arabia and their ally, United States of America
are very much on the opposition side in Syria whilst Iran and the Russia support Assad.
There is no sign of ending to this conflict.

Why the meddling?

Reminiscent of the "Great Game" played out in Afghanistan between Great Britain and Russia
more than a hundred years ago, Saudi Arabia and Iran are engaged in their own decades-long
strategic rivalry for power and influence in the Middle East, stretching from the Mediterranean
Sea to the Gulf and Arabian Sea. It is built mostly along sectarian and ideological lines - Saudi
Arabia as the leader of the Sunni Muslim world, and Iran as the leader of the Shia Muslim world.
n playing their Great Game, Saudi Arabia and Iran have engaged in a series of proxy wars to
undermine each other, some hot and some cold, throughout the Middle East. In Lebanon, it's the
Iran-backed Hezbollah. In Syria, it's the longtime Iran-backed Assad regime. In Iraq, it's an Iranbacked Shia government which was, prior to the US invasion in 2003, solidly in the Sunni camp.
The Saudi government suspected that Iran might exploit instability in the Arab states to expand
its influence in the region, which from Riyadhs perspective had already increased greatly in
recent year.

Conclusion
Saudi Arabia responded to uprisings in Bahrain, Egypt and Tunisia in a manner that clearly
established the Saudi government as a counter-revolutionary actor in the Arab Awakening. By
providing vast financial aid and weapons to anti-Assad militants, it has sided with forces
promoting regime change. Saudi Arabia's role in the Syria conflict is driven by several regional
and domestic objectives -- from destroying the Syria-Iran alliance to distracting the Saudi
population from domestic problems. In the long run the Middle East in my opinion is going to be
shared amongst Iran and Saudi Arabia based on alliance inspired by Islamic sectarian influence.
Gradually, just like their greatest ally did, Saudi Arabia is alluding to the famous President
Bushs definition alliance If you are not with America you are against it. The only difference is
that Saudi Arabia is implementing that only in the Middle East where it is struggling for
dominance. John Bradly, writes that If the Arab Spring had any hope of ushering in greater
freedom and democracy, it would have had to challenge from the beginning the influence of
Saudi Arabia, the region's Washington-allied superpower and its most antidemocratic, repressive
regime. That is a tall order indeed. The tragic irony of the uprisings is that the exact opposite
happened. And with the recent Mecca tragedy that saw the lives of many Muslim pilgrims
perish, pressure is continuously mounting on the Saudis monarchy to open up the organization

of Hajj so that Muslim countries can get involved. And with its enemy suffering more than 465
deaths, Iran is not only demanding footage of the whole religious exercise but also blaming them
for the death of their nationals.

References:
Amin, G. (2011).Egypt in the Era of Hosni Mubarak. Cairo. The American University Press in
Cairo
Bradley, J. (2011). Saudi Arabia's invisible hand in the Arab spring. Council on Foreign Relations.
Retrieved from https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/middle-east/2011-10-13/saudi-arabiasinvisible-hand-arab-spring
Salman, T.(2013). Why Does Saudi Arabia Back the Egyptian Revolution?. Almonitor. Retrieved
from http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/politics/2013/08/saudi-arabia-support-egyptrevolution.html
Reardon, M.(2015). Saudi Arabia, Iran and the 'Great Game' in Yemen. Aljazeera. Retrieved
from http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2014/09/saudi-arabia-iran-great-game-ye201492984846324440.html