Digested Case Public Corporation

Digested Case Public Corporation
Rubi vs Provincial Board of Mindoro

Constitutional Law : Article VI, Sec. 1(Legislative Power; Non-Delegation)
G.R. No. L-14078; March 7, 1919; 39 Phil 660
FACTS:
The case is an application for habeas corpus in favor of Rubi and other Manguianes of the Province of Mindoro. It is alleged that the
Maguianes are being illegally deprived of their liberty by the provincial officials of that province. Rubi and his companions are said to be
held on the reservation established at Tigbao, Mindoro, against their will, and one Dabalos is said to be held under the custody of the
provincial sheriff in the prison at Calapan for having run away from the reservation.
The provincial governor of Mindoro and the provincial board thereof directed the Manguianes in question to take up their habitation in
Tigbao, a site on the shore of Lake Naujan, selected by the provincial governor and approved by the provincial board. The action was
taken in accordance with section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917, and was duly approved by the Secretary of the Interior as
required by said action.
Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 reads as follows:
SEC. 2145. Establishment of non-Christian upon sites selected by provincial governor. With the prior approval of the Department Head,
the provincial governor of any province in which non-Christian inhabitants are found is authorized, when such a course is deemed
necessary in the interest of law and order, to direct such inhabitants to take up their habitation on sites on unoccupied public lands to be
selected by him an approved by the provincial board.
Petitioners, however, challenge the validity of this section of the Administrative Code.
ISSUE:
Does section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 constitute an unlawful delegation of legislative power by the Philippine Legislature to
a provincial official and a department head, therefore making it unconstitutional?
HELD:
No. The Philippine Legislature has here conferred authority upon the Province of Mindoro, to be exercised by the provincial governor and
the provincial board.
In determining whether the delegation of legislative power is valid or not, the distinction is between the delegation of power to make the
law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring an authority or discretion as to its execution, to be
exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the later no valid objection can be made. Discretion may be
committed by the Legislature to an executive department or official. The Legislature may make decisions of executive departments of
subordinate official thereof, to whom it has committed the execution of certain acts, final on questions of fact. The growing tendency in the
decision is to give prominence to the "necessity" of the case.
In enacting the said provision of the Administrative Code, the Legislature merely conferred upon the provincial governor, with the approval
of the provincial board and the Department Head, discretionary authority as to the execution of the law. This is necessary since the
provincial governor and the provincial board, as the official representatives of the province, are better qualified to judge when such as
course is deemed necessary in the interest of law and order. As officials charged with the administration of the province and the protection
of its inhabitants, they are better fitted to select sites which have the conditions most favorable for improving the people who have the
misfortune of being in a backward state.
Hence, Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is not an unlawful delegation of legislative power by the Philippine Legislature to
provincial official and a department head.
Lim vs. Pacquing [G.R. No. 115044. January 27, 1995]
16AUG
Ponente: PADILLA, J.
FACTS:
The Charter of the City of Manila was enacted by Congress on 18 June 1949 (R.A. No. 409).
On 1 January 1951, Executive Order No. 392 was issued transferring the authority to regulate jai-alais from local government to
the Games and Amusements Board (GAB).
On 07 September 1971, however, the Municipal Board of Manila nonetheless passed Ordinance No. 7065 entitled An Ordinance
Authorizing the Mayor To Allow And Permit The Associated Development Corporation To Establish, Maintain And Operate A Jai-Alai In
The City Of Manila, Under Certain Terms And Conditions And For Other Purposes.
On 20 August 1975, Presidential Decree No. 771 was issued by then President Marcos. The decree, entitled Revoking All
Powers and Authority of Local Government(s) To Grant Franchise, License or Permit And Regulate Wagers Or Betting By The Public
On Horse And Dog Races, Jai-Alai Or Basque Pelota, And Other Forms Of Gambling, in Section 3 thereof, expressly revoked all
existing franchises and permits issued by local governments.

In May 1988, Associated Development Corporation (ADC) tried to operate a Jai-Alai. The government through Games and Amusement
Board intervened and invoked Presidential Decree No. 771 which expressly revoked all existing franchises and permits to operate all forms
of gambling facilities (including Jai-Alai) by local governments. ADC assails the constitutionality of P.D. No. 771.
ISSUE:
Whether or not P.D. No. 771 is violative of the equal protection and non-impairment clauses of the Constitution.
HELD:
NO. P.D. No. 771 is valid and constitutional.
RATIO:
Presumption against unconstitutionality. There is nothing on record to show or even suggest that PD No. 771 has been repealed,
altered or amended by any subsequent law or presidential issuance (when the executive still exercised legislative powers).
Neither can it be tenably stated that the issue of the continued existence of ADCs franchise by reason of the unconstitutionality of PD No.
771 was settled in G.R. No. 115044, for the decision of the Courts First Division in said case, aside from not being final, cannot have the
effect of nullifying PD No. 771 as unconstitutional, since only the Court En Banc has that power under Article VIII, Section 4(2) of the
Constitution.
And on the question of whether or not the government is estopped from contesting ADCs possession of a valid franchise, the well-settled
rule is that the State cannot be put in estoppel by the mistakes or errors, if any, of its officials or agents. (Republic v. Intermediate Appellate
Court, 209 SCRA 90)
B. Police Power : B017 Local laws
Regulatory Ordinances
Alde, Elyzaldy B.Balacuit et al., v. Court of First Instance of Agusan del Norte and Butuan CityG.R. No. L-38429 (E)30 June 1988
FACTS
This involves a Petition for Review questioning the validity and constitutionality of Ordinance No.640 passed by the Municipal Board of the
City of Butuan on April 21, 1969, penalizing any person, groupof persons, entity or corporation engaged in the business of selling
admission tickets to any movie orother public exhibitions, games, contests or other performances to require children between 7 and
12years of age to pay full payment for tickets intended for adults but should charge only one-half of thesaid ticket.Petitioners who are
managers of theaters, affected by the ordinance, filed a Complaint before theCourt of First Instance of Agusan del Norte and Butuan City
docketed as Special Civil No. 237 on June 30,1969, praying that the subject ordinance be declared unconstitutional and, therefore, void
andunenforceable. The Court rendered judgment declaring Ordinance No. 640 of the City of Butuanconstitutional and valid.
ISSUE
Whether Ordinance No. 640 passed by the Municipal Board of the City of Butuan is valid andconstitutional and was the Ordinance a valid
exercise of police power.
HELD
It is already settled that the operation of theaters, cinematographs and other places of publicexhibition are subject to regulation by the
municipal council in the exercise of delegated police power bythe local government. However, to invoke the exercise of police power, not
only must it appear that theinterest of the public generally requires an interference with private rights, but the means adopted mustbe
reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive uponindividuals. The legislature may not, under
the guise of protecting the public interest, arbitrarily interferewith private business, or impose unusual and unnecessary restrictions upon
lawful occupations. In other words, the determination as to what is a proper exercise of its police power is not final or conclusive, butis
subject to the supervision of the courts.The Court likewise ruled in the negative as to the question of the subject ordinance being a
validexercise of police power. While it is true that a business may be regulated, it is equally true that suchregulation must be within the
bounds of reason, that is, the regulatory ordinance must be reasonable, andits provisions cannot be oppressive amounting to an arbitrary
interference with the business or callingsubject of regulation. The proprietors of a theater have a right to manage their property in their own
way,to fix what prices of admission they think most for their own advantage, and that any person who did notapprove could stay away.The
exercise of police power by the local government is valid unless it contravenes thefundamental law of the land, or an act of the legislature,
or unless it is against public policy or isunreasonable, oppressive, partial, discriminating or in derogation of a common right. For being
unreasonable and an undue restraint of trade, it cannot, under the guise of exercising police power, beupheld as valid.WHEREFORE, the
decision of the trial court in Special Civil Case No. 237 is hereby REVERSEDand SET ASIDE and a new judgment is hereby rendered
declaring Ordinance No. 640 unconstitutionaland, therefore, null and void. This decision is immediately executory.
Title of the Case:

VICENTE DE LA CRUZ
, et. al., petitioners,vs.The Honorable
EDGARDO PARAS
, et. al.,respondentsG.R. No. & Date:L-42571-72. July 25, 1983Ponente:FERNANDO, J.Doctrine/Topic:
Legislative Process Requirements as to Titles ofBills; Subject shall be expressed in the title
Facts of the Case:1. Vicente De La Cruz, one of the petitioners, is anowner of clubs and cabarets in Bulacan.2. Jointly, de la Cruz and the
other club owner-petitioners assailed the constitutionality of Ordinance No. 84 (series of 1975) known as aprohibition and closure
ordinance which wasbased on Republic Act No. 938 as amended (butwas originally enacted on June 20, 1953).3. The said RA is entitled:
"AN ACT GRANTINGMUNICIPAL OR CITY BOARDS AND COUNCILSTHE POWER TO REGULATE THEESTABLISHMENT,
MAINTENANCE ANDOPERATION OF CERTAIN PLACES OF AMUSEMENT WITHIN THEIR RESPECTIVETERRITORIAL
JURISDICTIONS."4. Its first section reads: "The municipal or city boardor council of each chartered city shall have thepower to regulate by
ordinance the establishment,maintenance and operation of night clubs,cabarets
and other similar places of amusement within its territorial jurisdiction

.
5. Then on May 21, 1954, the first section wasamended to include not merely the power toregulate, but likewise "prohibit."6. The title,
however, remained the same. It isworded exactly as Republic Act No. 938.7. On November 5, 1975, two cases for prohibitionwith
preliminary injunction were filed on thegrounds that (1) Ordinance No. 84 is null and voidas a municipality has no authority to prohibit
alawful business, occupation or calling; (2)Ordinance No. 84 is violative of the petitioners'right to due process and the equal protection of
the law, as the license previously given topetitioners was in effect withdrawn without judicialhearing; and (3)That under Presidential
DecreeNo. 189 (as amended, by Presidential Decree No.259 the power to license and regulate tourist-oriented businesses including night
clubs, hasbeen transferred to the Department of Tourism.8. The respondent Judge issued a restrainingorder on November 7, 1975. Then
came onJanuary 15, 1976 the decision upholding theconstitutionality and validity of Ordinance No.84 and dismissing the cases. Hence,
thispetition for certiorari by way of appeal.
ISSUE
Whether or not a municipal corporation, can prohibitthe exercise of a lawful trade, the operation of nightclubs, and the pursuit of a lawful
occupation, suchclubs employing hostesses
HELD
A. Decision:
The SC held that municipal corporations cannotprohibit the operation of night clubs. They may beregulated, but not prevented from
carrying on their business.
The writ of certiorari is granted and the decision of the lower court dated January 15, 1976 reversed,set aside, and nullified.
Ordinance No. 84, Series of 1975 of theMunicipality of Bocaue is declared void andunconstitutional.B. Rationale:
Since there is no dispute as the title limits thepower to regulating, not prohibiting, it would resultin the statute being invalid if, as was done
by theMunicipality of Bocaue, the operation of a nightclub was prohibited.
A refusal to grant licenses, because no suchbusinesses could legally open, would be subjectto judicial correction. That is to comply with
thelegislative will to allow the operation andcontinued existence of night clubs subject toappropriate regulations.
It is to be admitted that as thus amended, if onlythe above portion of the Act were considered, amunicipal council may go as far as to
prohibit theoperation of night clubs. If that were all, then theappealed decision is not devoid of support in law. Additionally, the title was not
in any way altered,as the exact wording was followed. The power granted remains that of regulation, not prohibition.
There is thus support for the view advanced bypetitioners that to construe Republic Act No. 938as allowing the prohibition of the operation
of night clubs would give rise to a constitutionalquestion. The Constitution mandates: "Every billshall embrace only one subject which shall
beexpressed in the title thereof."

Dela Cruz v. Paras Digest
Dela Cruz v Paras

G.R. No. L-42571-72 July 25, 1983
Fernando, CJ:
Facts:
1. Assailed was the validity of an ordinance which prohibit the operation of night clubs. Petitioners contended that the ordinance is invalid,
tainted with nullity, the municipality being devoid of power to prohibit a lawful business, occupation or calling. Petitioners at the same time
alleging that their rights to due process and equal protection of the laws were violated as the licenses previously given to them was in
effect withdrawn without judicial hearing.
2. RA 938, as amended, was originally enacted on June 20, 1953. It is entitled: "An Act Granting Municipal or City Boards and Councils
the Power to Regulate the Establishments, Maintenance and Operation of Certain Places of Amusement within Their Respective Territorial
Jurisdictions.'
The first section reads, "The municipal or city board or council of each chartered city shall have the power to regulate by ordinance the
establishment, maintenance and operation of night clubs, cabarets, dancing schools, pavilions, cockpits, bars, saloons, bowling alleys,
billiard pools, and other similar places of amusement within its territorial jurisdiction:
On May 21, 1954, the first section was amended to include not merely "the power to regulate, but likewise "Prohibit ... " The title, however,
remained the same. It is worded exactly as RA 938.
3. As thus amended, if only the said portion of the Act was considered, a municipal council may go as far as to prohibit the operation of
night clubs. The title was not in any way altered. It was not changed one bit. The exact wording was followed. The power granted remains
that of regulation, not prohibition.
4. Petitioners contended that RA 938 which prohibits the operation of night clubs would give rise to a constitutional question. The lower
court upheld the constitutionality and validity of Ordinance No. 84 and dismissed the cases. Hence this petition for certiorari by way of
appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not the ordinance is valid
NO. It is unconstitutional. It undoubtly involves a measure not embraced within the regulatory power but an exercise of an assumed power
to prohibit.
1. The Constitution mandates: "Every bill shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof. "Since there is no
dispute as the title limits the power to regulating, not prohibiting, it would result in the statute being invalid if, as was done by the
Municipality of Bocaue, the operation of a night club was prohibited. There is a wide gap between the exercise of a regulatory power "to
provide for the health and safety, promote the prosperity, and improve the morals, in the language of the Administrative Code, such
competence extending to all "the great public needs.
2. In accordance with the well-settled principle of constitutional construction that between two possible interpretations by one of which it
will be free from constitutional infirmity and by the other tainted by such grave defect, the former is to be preferred. A construction that
would save rather than one that would affix the seal of doom certainly commends itself.
3. Under the Local Govt Code, it is clear that municipal corporations cannot prohibit the operation of night clubs. They may be regulated,
but not prevented from carrying on their business. It would be, therefore, an exercise in futility if the decision under review were sustained.
All that petitioners would have to do is to apply once more for licenses to operate night clubs. A refusal to grant licenses, because no such
businesses could legally open, would be subject to judicial correction. That is to comply with the legislative will to allow the operation and
continued existence of night clubs subject to appropriate regulations. In the meanwhile, to compel petitioners to close their establishments,
the necessary result of an affirmance, would amount to no more than a temporary termination of their business.

4. Herein what was involved is a measure not embraced within the regulatory power but an exercise of an assumed power to prohibit.
CRUZ v. PARAS
Nature: Petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction to review decision of Bulacan CFI
Petitioners had been previously issued licenses for their night clubs by the Municipal Mayor of Bocaue Bulacan.
Then Ordinance no. 84, Series of 1975 [Prohibition and Closure Ordinance] took effect in Bocaue, Bulacan which provided that no
operator of night clubs, cabarets or dance halls shall henceforth be issued permits/licenses to operate within the jurisdiction of the
municipality and no license/permit shall be issued to any professional hostess, hospitality girls and professional dancer for employment in
any of the aforementioned establishments. The prohibition also included prohibition in the renewal thereof. (Sec. 3)
It further provided for the revocation of permits and licenses upon the expiration of the 30-day period and that the operation of
such establishments within the jurisdiction of the municipality shall then on be illegal (Sec. 4)
Petitioners thus filed in the Bulacan CFI for prohibition with preliminary injunction on the grounds that:
Ordinance No. 84 is null and void as a municipality has no authority to prohibit a lawful business, occupation or calling.
o
Ordinance No. 84 is violative of the petitioners right to due process and the equal protection of the law, as the license previously
given to petitioners was in effect withdrawn without judicial hearing.
o
That under P.D. No. 189, as amended, by P.D. No. 259, the power to license and regulate tourist-oriented businesses including
night clubs, has been transferred to the Department of Tourism.
Lower court upheld constitutionality and validity of Ordinance 84 and dismissed case.
Issue: WON a municipal corporation (Bocaue, Bulacan as represented by Municipal Mayor Matias Ramirez and Municipal Vice-Mayor
Mario Mendoza) can prohibit the exercise of a lawful trade, operation of night clubs, and the pursuit of a lawful occupation, such clubs
employing hostesses.
NO. The reliance on the police power of the lower court is insufficient to justify the enactment of the assailed ordinance. It must be
declared null and void.
Police power is granted to municipal corporations by Sec. 2238, Revised Admin Code (practically a reproduction of the former Sec.
39 of Municipal Code)
U.S. v. Abendan, Moreland as ponente: An ordinance enacted by virtue thereof is valid, unless it contravenes the fundamental law
of the Philippine Islands, or an Act of the Philippine Legislature, or unless it is against public policy, or is unreasonable, oppressive, partial,
discriminating, or in derogation of common right. Where the power to legislate upon a given subject, and the mode of its exercise and the
details of such legislation are not prescribed, the ordinance passed pursuant thereto must be a reasonable exercise of the power, or it will
be pronounced invalid.
U.S. v. Salaveria, Malcolm as ponente: (applying present Admin Code provision) It is a general rule that ordinances passed by
virtue of the implied power found in the general welfare clause must be reasonable, consonant with the general powers and purposes of
the corporation, and not inconsistent with the laws or policy of the State.
If night clubs were merely then regulated and not prohibited, certainly the assailed ordinance would pass the test of validity. In the
two leading cases above set forth, this Court had stressed reasonableness, consonant with the general powers and purposes of municipal
corporations, as well as consistency with the laws or policy of the State.
It cannot be said that such a sweeping exercise of a lawmaking power by Bocaue could qualify under the term reasonable as
objective of fostering public morals can be attained by a measure that does not encompass too wide a field such as reasonable restrictions
as opposed to absolute prohibition.
Furthermore, this case refers to R.A. 938 which was originally entitled: an act granting municipal or city boards and councils the
power to regulate the establishment, maintenance and operation of certain places of amusement within their respective territorial
jurisdictions.
This act gives the municipal or city board or council of each chartered city the power to regulate by ordinance the establishment,
maintenance and operation of night clubs, cabarets, and other similar places of amusement within its territorial jurisdiction. Then the 1st
section was amended to include not merely the power to regulate, but likewise Prohibit
The title, however, remained the same. It is worded exactly as RA 938. The power granted remains that of regulation, not
prohibition. There is thus support for the view advanced by petitioners that to construe RA 938 as allowing the prohibition of the operation
of night clubs would give rise to a constitutional question.
The Constitution mandates: Every bill shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof. (Art. VIII, Sec.
19, par. 1).
Since there is no dispute as the title limits the power to regulating, not prohibiting, it would result in the statute being invalid if, as
was done by the Municipality of Bocaue, the operation of a night club was prohibited.
There is reinforcement to the conclusion reached by virtue of a specific provision of the recently-enacted Local Government Code
whose general welfare clause clearly provides that municipal corporations cannot prohibit the operation of night clubs. They may be
regulated, but not prevented from carrying on their business.
Respondents cited Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Inc. v. City Mayor of Manila. However, in that case, it
imposed a regulatory measure. Necessarily, there was no valid objection on due process or equal protection grounds. It did not prohibit
motels. It merely regulated the mode in which it may conduct business in order precisely to put an end to practices which could encourage
vice and immorality.
Held: writ of certiorari is granted and the decision of the lower court reversed, set aside, and nulled. Ordinance No. 84, Series of 1975 of
the Municipality of Bocaue is declared void and unconstitutional.
Cruz v. Paras

Facts: The petitioners are operators or nightclubs in Bocaue, Bulacan. they filed prohibition suits to stop the Mun. of Bocaue from
enforcing an ordinance prohibiting the operation of nightclubs, cabarets, and dance h alls in that mun. or the renewal of licenses to operate
them. The CFI upheld the validity of the ordinance and dismissed the petition. Hence, this petition for certiorari.
HELD: A mun. corp. cannot prohibit the operation of nightclubs. Nightclubs may be regulated but not prevented from carrying on their
business. RA 938, as orginally enacted, granted municipalities the power to regulate the establishment, maintenance and operation of
nightclubs and the like. While it is true that on 5/21/54, the law was amended by RA 979 w/c purported to give municipalities the power not
only to regulate but likewise to prohibit the operation of nightclubs, the fact is that the title of the law remained the same so that the power
granted to municipalities remains that of regulation, not prohibition. To construe the amendatory act as granting mun. corporations the
power to prohibit the operation of nightclubs would be to construe it in a way that it violates the constitutional provision that every bill shall
embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof. Moreover, the recentyly-enacted LGC (BP 337) speaks simply of
the power to regulate the establishment, and operation of billiard pools, theatrical performances, circuses and other forms of entertainment.
Certiorari granted.
ERMITA-MALATE HOTEL AND MOTEL OPERATORS ASSOCIATION, INC. vs CITY MAYOR OF MANILA, digested
Posted by Pius Morados on November 7, 2011

GR # l-24693 July 31, 1967 (Constitutional Law Police Power, Ordinance)
FACTS: Petitioners assailed the constitutionality of Manila Ordinance No. 4760 regulating the operation of hotels, motels and lodging
houses on the ground that it is unreasonable and hence violative to the due process clause, wherein it requires establishments to provide
guest registration forms on the lobby open for public view at all times.
RespondentCityMayor contends that the challenged ordinance was a valid and proper exercise of police power measure for the proper
purpose of curbing immorality. An explanatory note for the challenged ordinance made mention of the alarming increase in the rate of
prostitution, adultery and fornication inManilatraceable in great part to the existence of motels and the like.
ISSUE: Whether or not Ordinance No. 4760 is violative of the due process clause.
HELD: No, the challenged ordinance as an exercise of police power was precisely enacted to minimize certain practices hurtful to public
morals. As a due process requirement, an ordinance must not outrun the bounds of reason and result in sheer oppression for it to be valid.
Thus it would be unreasonable to stigmatize an ordinance enacted precisely for the well-being of the people, specially if there is no factual
foundation being laid to prove its alleged violation of due process and offset the ordinances presumed validity.
G.R. No. 122846 January 20, 2009
WHITE LIGHT CORPORATION, TITANIUM CORPORATION and STA. MESA TOURIST & DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Petitioners,
vs.
CITY OF MANILA, represented by DE CASTRO, MAYOR ALFREDO S. LIM, Respondent.
Facts:
On December 3, 1992, City Mayor Alfredo S. Lim signed into law Manila City Ordinance No. 7774 entitled An Ordinance Prohibiting ShortTime Admission, Short-Time Admission Rates, and Wash-Up Rate Schemes in Hotels, Motels, Inns, Lodging Houses, Pension Houses,
and Similar Establishments in the City of Manila (the Ordinance). The ordinance sanctions any person or corporation who will allow the
admission and charging of room rates for less than 12 hours or the renting of rooms more than twice a day.
The petitioners White Light Corporation (WLC), Titanium Corporation (TC), and Sta. Mesa Tourist and Development Corporation (STDC),
who own and operate several hotels and motels in Metro Manila, filed a motion to intervene and to admit attached complaint-in-intervention

on the ground that the ordinance will affect their business interests as operators. The respondents, in turn, alleged that the ordinance is a
legitimate exercise of police power.
RTC declared Ordinance No. 7774 null and void as it strikes at the personal liberty of the individual guaranteed and jealously guarded by
the Constitution. Reference was made to the provisions of the Constitution encouraging private enterprises and the incentive to needed
investment, as well as the right to operate economic enterprises. Finally, from the observation that the illicit relationships the Ordinance
sought to dissuade could nonetheless be consummated by simply paying for a 12-hour stay,
When elevated to CA, the respondents asserted that the ordinance is a valid exercise of police power pursuant to Section 458 (4)(iv) of the
Local Government Code which confers on cities the power to regulate the establishment, operation and maintenance of cafes, restaurants,
beerhouses, hotels, motels, inns, pension houses, lodging houses and other similar establishments, including tourist guides and
transports. Also, they contended that under Art III Sec 18 of Revised Manila Charter, they have the power to enact all ordinances it may
deem necessary and proper for the sanitation and safety, the furtherance of the prosperity and the promotion of the morality, peace, good
order, comfort, convenience and general welfare of the city and its inhabitants and to fix penalties for the violation of ordinances.
Petitioners argued that the ordinance is unconstitutional and void since it violates the right to privacy and freedom of movement; it is an
invalid exercise of police power; and it is unreasonable and oppressive interference in their business.
CA, in turn, reversed the decision of RTC and affirmed the constitutionality of the ordinance. First, it held that the ordinance did not violate
the right to privacy or the freedom of movement, as it only penalizes the owners or operators of establishments that admit individuals for
short time stays. Second, the virtually limitless reach of police power is only constrained by having a lawful object obtained through a lawful
method. The lawful objective of the ordinance is satisfied since it aims to curb immoral activities. There is a lawful method since the
establishments are still allowed to operate. Third, the adverse effect on the establishments is justified by the well-being of its constituents in
general.
Hence, the petitioners appeared before the SC.
Issue:
Whether Ordinance No. 7774 is a valid exercise of police power of the State.
Held:
No. Ordinance No. 7774 cannot be considered as a valid exercise of police power, and as such, it is unconstitutional.
The facts of this case will recall to mind not only the recent City of Manila v Laguio Jr ruling, but the 1967 decision in Ermita-Malate Hotel
and Motel Operations Association, Inc., v. Hon. City Mayor of Manila. The common thread that runs through those decisions and the case
at bar goes beyond the singularity of the localities covered under the respective ordinances. All three ordinances were enacted with a view
of regulating public morals including particular illicit activity in transient lodging establishments. This could be described as the middle case,
wherein there is no wholesale ban on motels and hotels but the services offered by these establishments have been severely restricted. At
its core, this is another case about the extent to which the State can intrude into and regulate the lives of its citizens
The test of a valid ordinance is well established. A long line of decisions including City of Manila has held that for an ordinance to be valid,
it must not only be within the corporate powers of the local government unit to enact and pass according to the procedure prescribed by
law, it must also conform to the following substantive requirements: (1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute; (2) must not be
unfair or oppressive; (3) must not be partial or discriminatory; (4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) must be general and
consistent with public policy; and (6) must not be unreasonable.
The ordinance in this case prohibits two specific and distinct business practices, namely wash rate admissions and renting out a room
more than twice a day. The ban is evidently sought to be rooted in the police power as conferred on local government units by the Local
Government Code through such implements as the general welfare clause.
Police power is based upon the concept of necessity of the State and its corresponding right to protect itself and its people. Police power
has been used as justification for numerous and varied actions by the State.

The apparent goal of the ordinance is to minimize if not eliminate the use of the covered establishments for illicit sex, prostitution, drug use
and alike. These goals, by themselves, are unimpeachable and certainly fall within the ambit of the police power of the State. Yet the
desirability of these ends do not sanctify any and all means for their achievement. Those means must align with the Constitution.
SC contended that if they were to take the myopic view that an ordinance should be analyzed strictly as to its effect only on the petitioners
at bar, then it would seem that the only restraint imposed by the law that they were capacitated to act upon is the injury to property
sustained by the petitioners. Yet, they also recognized the capacity of the petitioners to invoke as well the constitutional rights of their
patrons those persons who would be deprived of availing short time access or wash-up rates to the lodging establishments in question.
The rights at stake herein fell within the same fundamental rights to liberty. Liberty as guaranteed by the Constitution was defined by
Justice Malcolm to include the right to exist and the right to be free from arbitrary restraint or servitude. The term cannot be dwarfed into
mere freedom from physical restraint of the person of the citizen, but is deemed to embrace the right of man to enjoy the facilities with
which he has been endowed by his Creator, subject only to such restraint as are necessary for the common welfare,
Indeed, the right to privacy as a constitutional right must be recognized and the invasion of it should be justified by a compelling state
interest. Jurisprudence accorded recognition to the right to privacy independently of its identification with liberty; in itself it is fully deserving
of constitutional protection. Governmental powers should stop short of certain intrusions into the personal life of the citizen.
An ordinance which prevents the lawful uses of a wash rate depriving patrons of a product and the petitioners of lucrative business ties in
with another constitutional requisite for the legitimacy of the ordinance as a police power measure. It must appear that the interests of the
public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require an interference with private rights and the means must be
reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly oppressive of private rights. It must also be evident that no
other alternative for the accomplishment of the purpose less intrusive of private rights can work. More importantly, a reasonable relation
must exist between the purposes of the measure and the means employed for its accomplishment, for even under the guise of protecting
the public interest, personal rights and those pertaining to private property will not be permitted to be arbitrarily invaded.
Lacking a concurrence of these requisites, the police measure shall be struck down as an arbitrary intrusion into private rights.
The behavior which the ordinance seeks to curtail is in fact already prohibited and could in fact be diminished simply by applying existing
laws. Less intrusive measures such as curbing the proliferation of prostitutes and drug dealers through active police work would be more
effective in easing the situation. So would the strict enforcement of existing laws and regulations penalizing prostitution and drug use.
These measures would have minimal intrusion on the businesses of the petitioners and other legitimate merchants. Further, it is apparent
that the ordinance can easily be circumvented by merely paying the whole day rate without any hindrance to those engaged in illicit
activities. Moreover, drug dealers and prostitutes can in fact collect wash rates from their clientele by charging their customers a portion
of the rent for motel rooms and even apartments.
SC reiterated that individual rights may be adversely affected only to the extent that may fairly be required by the legitimate demands of
public interest or public welfare. The State is a leviathan that must be restrained from needlessly intruding into the lives of its citizens.
However well-intentioned the ordinance may be, it is in effect an arbitrary and whimsical intrusion into the rights of the establishments as
well as their patrons. The ordinance needlessly restrains the operation of the businesses of the petitioners as well as restricting the rights
of their patrons without sufficient justification. The ordinance rashly equates wash rates and renting out a room more than twice a day with
immorality without accommodating innocuous intentions.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED, and the Decision of the Regional Trial
Court of Manila, Branch 9, is REINSTATED. Ordinance No. 7774 is hereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. No pronouncement as to
costs.
CITY OF MANILA VS. LAGUIO
MARCH 30, 2013 ~ VBDIAZ
CITY OF MANILA, HON. ALFREDO S. LIM as the Mayor of the City of Manila, HON. JOSELITO L. ATIENZA, in his capacity as Vice-Mayor
of the City of Manila and Presiding Officer of the City Council of Manila, et.al vs. HON. PERFECTO A.S. LAGUIO, JR., as Presiding Judge,
RTC, Manila and MALATE TOURIST DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
G.R. No. 118127, April 12, 2005
FACTS: Private respondent Malate Tourist Development Corporation (MTDC) is a corporation engaged in the business of operating hotels,
motels, hostels and lodging houses. It built and opened Victoria Court in Malate which was licensed as a motel although duly accredited
with the DOT as a hotel. On 28 June 1993, MTDC filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief with Prayer for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction
and/or Temporary Restraining Order7 with the lower court impleading as defendants, herein petitioners City of Manila, Hon. Alfredo S. Lim

(Lim), Hon. Joselito L. Atienza, and the members of the City Council of Manila (City Council). MTDC prayed that the Ordinance, insofar as
it includes motels and inns as among its prohibited establishments, be declared invalid and unconstitutional.
Enacted by the City Council and approved by petitioner City Mayor, the said Ordinance is entitled
AN ORDINANCE PROHIBITING THE ESTABLISHMENT OR OPERATION OF BUSINESSES PROVIDING CERTAIN FORMS OF

AMUSEMENT, ENTERTAINMENT, SERVICES AND FACILITIES IN THE ERMITA-MALATE AREA, PRESCRIBING PENALTIES FOR
VIOLATION THEREOF, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.
Judge Laguio rendered the assailed Decision (in favour of respondent).
On 11 January 1995, petitioners filed the present Petition, alleging that the following errors were committed by the lower court in its ruling:
(1) It erred in concluding that the subject ordinance is ultra vires, or otherwise, unfair, unreasonable and oppressive exercise of police
power;
(2) It erred in holding that the questioned Ordinance contravenes P.D. 499 which allows operators of all kinds of commercial
establishments, except those specified therein; and
(3) It erred in declaring the Ordinance void and unconstitutional.
ISSUE: WON the ordinance is unconstitutional.
HELD: The Court is of the opinion, and so holds, that the lower court did not err in declaring the Ordinance, as it did, ultra vires and
therefore null and void.
The tests of a valid ordinance are well established. A long line of decisions has held that for an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be
within the corporate powers of the local government unit to enact and must be passed according to the procedure prescribed by law, it
must also conform to the following substantive requirements:
(1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute;
(2) must not be unfair or oppressive;
(3) must not be partial or discriminatory;
(4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade;
(5) must be general and consistent with public policy; and
(6) must not be unreasonable.
The Ordinance was passed by the City Council in the exercise of its police power, an enactment of the City Council acting as agent of
Congress. This delegated police power is found in Section 16 of the LGC, known as the general welfare clause.
The inquiry in this Petition is concerned with the validity of the exercise of such delegated power.
A. The Ordinance contravenes

the Constitution
The enactment of the Ordinance was an invalid exercise of delegated power as it is unconstitutional and repugnant to general laws.
The police power granted to LGUs must always be exercised with utmost observance of the rights of the people to due process and equal
protection of the law. Due process requires the intrinsic validity of the law in interfering with the rights of the person to his life, liberty and
property.
Requisites for the valid exercise

of Police Power are not met
To successfully invoke the exercise of police power as the rationale for the enactment of the Ordinance, and to free it from the imputation
of constitutional infirmity, not only must it appear that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class,
require an interference with private rights, but the means adopted must be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose
and not unduly oppressive upon individuals.60 It must be evident that no other alternative for the accomplishment of the purpose less
intrusive of private rights can work. A reasonable relation must exist between the purposes of the police measure and the means employed
for its accomplishment, for even under the guise of protecting the public interest, personal rights and those pertaining to private property
will not be permitted to be arbitrarily invaded.
Lacking a concurrence of these two requisites, the police measure shall be struck down as an arbitrary intrusion into private rights a
violation of the due process clause.
The object of the Ordinance was, accordingly, the promotion and protection of the social and moral values of the community. Granting for
the sake of argument that the objectives of the Ordinance are within the scope of the City Councils police powers, the means employed for
the accomplishment thereof were unreasonable and unduly oppressive.
The worthy aim of fostering public morals and the eradication of the communitys social ills can be achieved through means less restrictive
of private rights; it can be attained by reasonable restrictions rather than by an absolute prohibition. The closing down and transfer of
businesses or their conversion into businesses allowed under the Ordinance have no reasonable relation to the accomplishment of its
purposes. Otherwise stated, the prohibition of the enumerated establishments will not per se protect and promote the social and moral
welfare of the community; it will not in itself eradicate the alluded social ills of prostitution, adultery, fornication nor will it arrest the spread of
sexual disease in Manila.
The enumerated establishments are lawful pursuits which are not per se offensive to the moral welfare of the community. While a motel
may be used as a venue for immoral sexual activity, it cannot for that reason alone be punished. It cannot be classified as a house of illrepute or as a nuisance per se on a mere likelihood or a naked assumption.
If the City of Manila so desires to put an end to prostitution, fornication and other social ills, it can instead impose reasonable regulations
such as daily inspections of the establishments for any violation of the conditions of their licenses or permits; it may exercise its authority to
suspend or revoke their licenses for these violations; and it may even impose increased license fees. In other words, there are other
means to reasonably accomplish the desired end.
It is readily apparent that the means employed by the Ordinance for the achievement of its purposes, the governmental interference itself,
infringes on the constitutional guarantees of a persons fundamental right to liberty and property.
Modality employed is
unlawful taking
It is an ordinance which permanently restricts the use of property that it can not be used for any reasonable purpose goes beyond
regulation and must be recognized as a taking of the property without just compensation.78 It is intrusive and violative of the private
property rights of individuals.
There are two different types of taking that can be identified. A possessory taking occurs when the government confiscates or physically
occupies property. A regulatory taking occurs when the governments regulation leaves no reasonable economically viable use of the
property.
What is crucial in judicial consideration of regulatory takings is that government regulation is a taking if it leaves no reasonable
economically viable use of property in a manner that interferes with reasonable expectations for use. When the owner of real property has
been called upon to sacrifice all economically beneficial uses in the name of the common good, that is, to leave his property economically
idle, he has suffered a taking.

The Ordinance gives the owners and operators of the prohibited establishments three (3) months from its approval within which to wind
up business operations or to transfer to any place outside of the Ermita-Malate area or convert said businesses to other kinds of business
allowable within the area. The directive to wind up business operations amounts to a closure of the establishment, a permanent
deprivation of property, and is practically confiscatory. Unless the owner converts his establishment to accommodate an allowed
business, the structure which housed the previous business will be left empty and gathering dust. It is apparent that the Ordinance leaves
no reasonable economically viable use of property in a manner that interferes with reasonable expectations for use.
The second and third options to transfer to any place outside of the Ermita-Malate area or to convert into allowed businessesare
confiscatory as well. The penalty of permanent closure in cases of subsequent violations found in Section 4 of the Ordinance is also
equivalent to a taking of private property.
Petitioners cannot take refuge in classifying the measure as a zoning ordinance. A zoning ordinance, although a valid exercise of police
power, which limits a wholesome property to a use which can not reasonably be made of it constitutes the taking of such property without
just compensation. Private property which is not noxious nor intended for noxious purposes may not, by zoning, be destroyed without
compensation. Such principle finds no support in the principles of justice as we know them. The police powers of local government units
which have always received broad and liberal interpretation cannot be stretched to cover this particular taking.
Further, The Ordinance confers upon the mayor arbitrary and unrestricted power to close down establishments. Ordinances such as this,
which make possible abuses in its execution, depending upon no conditions or qualifications whatsoever other than the unregulated
arbitrary will of the city authorities as the touchstone by which its validity is to be tested, are unreasonable and invalid. The Ordinance
should have established a rule by which its impartial enforcement could be secured. Similarly, the Ordinance does not specify the
standards to ascertain which establishments tend to disturb the community, annoy the inhabitants, and adversely affect the social and
moral welfare of the community.
The cited case supports the nullification of the Ordinance for lack of comprehensible standards to guide the law enforcers in carrying out its
provisions.
Petitioners cannot therefore order the closure of the enumerated establishments without infringing the due process clause. These lawful
establishments may be regulated, but not prevented from carrying on their business.
B. The Ordinance violates Equal

Protection Clause
In the Courts view, there are no substantial distinctions between motels, inns, pension houses, hotels, lodging houses or other similar
establishments. By definition, all are commercial establishments providing lodging and usually meals and other services for the public. No
reason exists for prohibiting motels and inns but not pension houses, hotels, lodging houses or other similar establishments. The
classification in the instant case is invalid as similar subjects are not similarly treated, both as to rights conferred and obligations imposed.
It is arbitrary as it does not rest on substantial distinctions bearing a just and fair relation to the purpose of the Ordinance.
The Court likewise cannot see the logic for prohibiting the business and operation of motels in the Ermita-Malate area but not outside of
this area. A noxious establishment does not become any less noxious if located outside the area.
The standard where women are used as tools for entertainment is also discriminatory as prostitutionone of the hinted ills the Ordinance
aims to banishis not a profession exclusive to women. Both men and women have an equal propensity to engage in prostitution. Thus, the
discrimination is invalid.
C. The Ordinance is repugnant

to general laws; it is ultra vires
The Ordinance is in contravention of the Code (Sec 458) as the latter merely empowers local government units to regulate, and not
prohibit, the establishments enumerated in Section 1 thereof.

With respect to cafes, restaurants, beerhouses, hotels, motels, inns, pension houses, lodging houses, and other similar establishments,
the only power of the City Council to legislate relative thereto is to regulate them to promote the general welfare. The Code still withholds
from cities the power to suppress and prohibit altogether the establishment, operation and maintenance of such establishments.
It is well to point out that petitioners also cannot seek cover under the general welfare clause authorizing the abatement of nuisances
without judicial proceedings. That tenet applies to a nuisance per se, or one which affects the immediate safety of persons and property
and may be summarily abated under the undefined law of necessity. It can not be said that motels are injurious to the rights of property,
health or comfort of the community. It is a legitimate business. If it be a nuisance per accidens it may be so proven in a hearing conducted
for that purpose. A motel is not per se a nuisance warranting its summary abatement without judicial intervention.
Not only does the Ordinance contravene the Code, it likewise runs counter to the provisions of P.D. 499. As correctly argued by MTDC, the
statute had already converted the residential Ermita-Malate area into a commercial area. The decree allowed the establishment and
operation of all kinds of commercial establishments except warehouse or open storage depot, dump or yard, motor repair shop, gasoline
service station, light industry with any machinery or funeral establishment. The rule is that for an ordinance to be valid and to have force
and effect, it must not only be within the powers of the council to enact but the same must not be in conflict with or repugnant to the
general law.
Conclusion
All considered, the Ordinance invades fundamental personal and property rights and impairs personal privileges. It is constitutionally infirm.
The Ordinance contravenes statutes; it is discriminatory and unreasonable in its operation; it is not sufficiently detailed and explicit that
abuses may attend the enforcement of its sanctions. And not to be forgotten, the City Council under the Code had no power to enact the
Ordinance and is therefore ultra vires, null and void.
Petition Denied.
Tan vs. PerenaG.R. No. 149743.

February 18, 2005.452 SCRA 53
Facts In 1974, Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 449, otherwise known as theCockfighting Law of 1974, was enacted. Section
5(b) of the Decree provided for limitson the number of cockpits that may be established in cities and municipalities in thefollowing
manner:Section 5. Cockpits and Cockfighting in General.(b) Establishment of Cockpits.Only one cockpit shall be allowed in
each city ormunicipality, except that in cities or municipalities with a population of over one hundredthousand, two cockpits may
be established, maintained and operated.In 1993, the Sangguniang Bayan of the municipality of Daanbantayan, CebuProvince, enacted
Municipal Ordinance No. 6 (Ordinance No. 6), Series of 1993.Section 5 thereof, relative to the number of cockpits allowed in the
municipality, stated:Section 5. There shall be allowed to operate in the Municipality of Daanbantayan,Province of Cebu, not more than
its equal number of cockpits based upon the populationprovided for in PD 449, provided however, that this specific section can be
amended forpurposes of establishing additional cockpits, if the Municipal populations so warrants.Shortly thereafter, the Sangguniang
Bayan passed an amendatory ordinance,Municipal Ordinance No. 7 (Ordinance No. 7), Series of 1993, which amended theaforequoted
Section 5 to now read as follows:Section 5. Establishment of Cockpit.There shall be allowed to operate in theMunicipality
of Daanbantayan, province of Cebu, not more than three (3) cockpits.Petitioner Leonardo Tan applied with the Municipal Gamefowl
Commission forthe issuance of a permit/license to establish and operate a cockpit in Sitio Combado,Bagay, in Daanbantayan. At the time
of his application, there was already anothercockpit in operation in Daanbantayan, operated by respondent Socorro Y. Perena.The
Municipal Gamefowl Commission favorably recommended to the mayor of Daanbantayan, petitioner Lamberto Te, that a permit be issued
to Tan. Te issued a mayors permit allowing Tan to establish/operate/conduct the business of a cockpit inCombado, Bagay,
Daanbantayan, Cebu.This act of the mayor served as cause for Perena to file a Complaint for damageswith a prayer for injunction against
Tan, Te, and Roberto Uy, the latter allegedly anagent of Tan. She alleged that there was no lawful basis for the establishment of asecond
cockpit because the ordinance violated P.D. No. 449. She insisted that theunlawful operation of Tans cockpit has caused injure to her own
legitimate business,and demanded actual, moral and exemplary damages.
Issue: Whether or not Perena is entitled to damages as a result of the establishment asecond cockpit which is allowed by an alleged illegal
ordinance being violative of P.D.No. 449.
Held: Yes. The initiatory Complaint filed by Perena deserves close scrutiny.Immediately, it can be seen that it is not only an
action for damages, but also one forinjunction. An action for injunction will require judicial determination whetherthere exists a right in
esse which is to be protected, and if there is an actconstituting a violation of such right against which injunction is sought. At thesame
time, the mere fact of injury alone does not give rise to a right to recoverdamages. To warrant the recovery of damages, there must be
both a right ofaction for a legal wrong inflicted by the defendant, and damage resulting to theplaintiff therefrom. In other words, in order that
the law will give redress for an actcausing damages, there must be damnum et injuriathat act must be not onlyhurtful, but wrongful.A
municipal ordinance must not contravene the Constitution or any statute,otherwise it is void. Ordinance No. 7 unmistakably
contravenes the CockfightingLaw in allowing three cockpits in Daanbantayan. Thus, no rights can be asserted bythe petitioners arising
from the Ordinance

A Mayor Cannot Be Compelled By Mandamus To Issue A Business Permit Since The Exercise Of The Same Is A Delegated Police Power
Hence, Discretionary In Nature
August 8, 2015 by The Lawyer's Post
The Facts:
Naguillian Emission Testing Center Inc., filed a petition for mandamus and damages against Abraham Rimando (petitioner), the municipal
mayor of Naguilian, La Union. In its complaint, the company alleged that from 2005 to 2007 its business is located on a land formerly
belonging to the national government which was later certified as an alienable and disposable land of the public domain by the DENR. On
January 18, 2008, it applied for a renewal of its business permit and paid the corresponding fees, but the petitioner refused to issue a
business permit, until such time that the company executes a contract of lease with the municipality; the respondent is amenable to signing
the contract but with some revisions, which the petitioner did not accept; no common ground was reached among the parties, hence the
company filed the petition. The RTC ruled in favour of the petitioner; ratiocinating that: (a) the Municipality of Naguiian is the declared
owner of the subject parcel of land by virtue of Tax Declaration No. 002-01197; (b) under Section 6A.01 of the Revenue Code of the
Municipality of Naguilian, the municipality has the right to require the petitioner to sign a contract of lease because its business operation is
being conducted on a real property owned by the municipality; and (c) a mayors duty to issue business permits is discretionary in nature
which may not be enforced by a mandamus writ.
On appeal, the CA proceeded to discuss the merits of the case even though the petition itself is dismissible on the ground of mootness. It
held that the factual milieu of the case justifies issuance of the writ; the tax declaration in the name of the municipality was insufficient basis
to require the execution of a contract of lease as a condition sine qua non for the renewal of a business permit. The CA further observed
that Sangguniang Bayan Resolution No. 2007-81, upon which the municipality anchored its imposition of rental fees, was void because it
failed to comply with the requirements of the Local Government Code and its Implementing Rules and Regulations. It held the mayor not
liable for damages since he acted in the performance of his duties which are legally protected by the presumption of regularity in the
performance of official duty; the case against the mayor also was moot and academic since his term as mayor expired. Nevertheless, the
CA reversed and set aside the RTC decision.
The petitioner elevated the matter to the Supreme Court.
The Issue:
Whether or not the issue had become moot and academic;
Whether or not the issuance of a business permit maybe compelled thru a petition for mandamus.
The Ruling:
We agree with the CA that the petition for mandamus has already become moot and academic owing to the expiration of the period
intended to be covered by the business permit.
An issue or a case becomes moot and academic when it ceases to present a justiciable controversy so that a determination thereof would
be without practical use and value1 or in the nature of things, cannot be enforced.2 In such cases, there is no actual substantial relief to
which the applicant would be entitled to and which would be negated by the dismissal of the petition. 3 As a rule, courts decline jurisdiction
over such case, or dismiss it on ground of mootness.4
The objective of the petition for mandamus to compel the petitioner to grant a business permit in favor of respondent corporation for the
period 2008 to 2009 has already been superseded by the passage of time and the expiration of the petitioners term as mayor. Verily then,
the issue as to whether or not the petitioner, in his capacity as mayor, may be compelled by a writ of mandamus to release the
respondents business permit ceased to present a justiciable controversy such that any ruling thereon would serve no practical value.
Should the writ be issued, the petitioner can no longer abide thereby; also, the effectivity date of the business permit no longer subsists.
While the CA is not precluded from proceeding to resolve the otherwise moot appeal of the respondent, we find that the decretal portion of
its decision was erroneously couched.

The CAs conclusions on the issue of ownership over the subject land and the invalidity of Sangguniang Bayan Resolution No. 2007-81,
aside from being unsubstantiated by convincing evidence, can no longer be practically utilized in favor of the petitioner. Thus, the
overriding and decisive factor in the final disposition of the appeal was its mootness and the CA should have dismissed the same along
with the petition for mandamus that spawned it.
More importantly, a mayor cannot be compelled by mandamus to issue a business permit since the exercise of the same is a delegated
police power hence, discretionary in nature. This was the pronouncement of this Court in Roble Arrastre, Inc. v. Hon. Villaflor5 where a
determination was made on the nature of the power of a mayor to grant business permits under the Local Government Code6, viz:
Central to the resolution of the case at bar is a reading of Section 444(b)(3)(iv) of the Local Government Code of 1991, which provides,
thus:
SEC. 444. The Chief Executive: Powers, Duties, Functions and Compensation.
(b) For efficient, effective and economical governance the purpose of which is the general welfare of the municipality and its inhabitants
pursuant to Section 16 of this Code, the municipal mayor shall: x x x x
3) Initiate and maximize the generation of resources and revenues, and apply the same to the implementation of development plans,
program objectives and priorities as provided for under Section 18 of this Code, particularly those resources and revenues programmed for
agroindustrial development and country-wide growth and progress, and relative thereto, shall:
xxxx
(iv) Issue licenses and permits and suspend or revoke the same for any violation of the conditions upon which said licenses or permits had
been issued, pursuant to law or ordinance.
As Section 444(b)(3)(iv) so states, the power of the municipal mayor to issue licenses is pursuant to Section 16 of the Local Government
Code of 1991, which declares:
SEC. 16. General Welfare. Every local government unit shall exercise the powers expressly granted, those necessarily implied
therefrom, as well as powers necessary, appropriate, or incidental for its efficient and effective governance, and those which are essential
to the promotion of the general welfare. Within their respective territorial jurisdictions, local government units shall ensure and support,
among other things, the preservation and enrichment of culture, promote health and safety, enhance the right of the people to a balanced
ecology, encourage and support the development of appropriate and self-reliant scientific and technological capabilities, improve public
morals, enhance economic prosperity and social justice, promote full employment among their residents, maintain peace and order, and
preserve the comfort and convenience of their inhabitants.
Section 16, known as the general welfare clause, encapsulates the delegated police power to local governments. Local government units
exercise police power through their respective legislative bodies. Evidently, the Local Government Code of 1991 is unequivocal that the
municipal mayor has the power to issue licenses and permits and suspend or revoke the same for any violation of the conditions upon
which said licenses or permits had been issued, pursuant to law or ordinance. x x x
xxxx
Section 444(b)(3)(iv) of the Local Government Code of 1991, whereby the power of the respondent mayor to issue license and permits is
circumscribed, is a manifestation of the delegated police power of a municipal corporation. Necessarily, the exercise thereof cannot be
deemed ministerial. As to the question of whether the power is validly exercised, the matter is within the province of a writ of certiorari, but
certainly, not of mandamus.7 (Citations omitted)

Indeed, as correctly ruled by the RTC, the petition for mandamus filed by the respondent is incompetent to compel the exercise of a
mayors discretionary duty to issue business permits.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated March 30, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 112152 is hereby SET
ASIDE. The Decision dated May 26, 2009 of the Regional Trial Court of Bauang, La Union is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
REYES, J.:
Carpio, (Chairperson), Del Castillo*, Perez, and Sereno, JJ., concur.
SECOND DIVISION, G.R. No. 198860, July 23, 2012, ABRAHAM RIMANDO, PETITIONER, VS. NAGUILIAN EMISSION TESTING
CENTER, INC., REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT, ROSEMARIE LLARENAS AND HON. COURT OF APPEALS, RESPONDENTS.
1 Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. Pascua, 456 Phil. 425, 436 (2003).
2 Lanuza, Jr. v. Yuchengco, 494 Phil. 125, 133 (2005); See also Gonzales v. Narvasa, 392 Phil.518, 522 (2000); Villarico v. Court of
Appeals, 424 Phil. 26 (2002); King v. Court of Appeals, 514 Phil. 465, 470 (2005).
3 Soriano Vda. De Dabao v. Court of Appeals, 469 Phil. 928 (2004).
4 Gunsi, Sr. v. Commissioners, The Commission on Elections, G.R. No. 168792, February 23, 2009, 580 SCRA 70, 76..
5 531 Phil. 30 (2006).
6 Although the case involved the issuance of a business permit for arrastre service, the general power of a mayor to issue business
permits is encapsulated in the same legal provision of the Local Government Code without distinguishing the nature of the business for
which a permit is sought.
7 Supra note 13, at 43-46.

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