Caoqian Mankiw E6

Principles of
Microeconomics6th edition
N. Gregory Mankiw
Harvard University
caoqianseu@163.com)
caoqianseu@163.com
.
2012 3

-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------A
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------I
I
1 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------1
2 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------23
3 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------54
II
4 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------70
5 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------96
6 ------------------------------------------------------------------------------120
III
7 -----------------------------------------------------------------------143
8 -----------------------------------------------------------------------------------164
9 --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------181
IV
10 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------206
11 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------229
12 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------247
V
13
14
15
16
17
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------275
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------299
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------321
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------357
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------378
VI
18 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------405
19 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------432
20 ----------------------------------------------------------------------------------453
VII
21 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------477
22 -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------507

19
.Alfred Marshall
21
.Johnny Depp
NGregory Mankiw
2010 12
Ron CronvichCarthage College David Hakes

University of Northern Iowa
Mark Abajian
San Diego Mesa College
Tina Collins
San Joaquin Valley College
Jennifer Bailly
Long Beach City College
Bob Holland
Purdue University
J.Ulyses Balderas
Sam Houston State University
Tom Holmes
University of Minnesota
Antonio Bos
Tusculum College
Simran Kahai
John Carroll University
Greg Brock
Georgia Southern
Miles Kimball
University of Michigan
Donna Bueckman
University of Tennessee Knoxville
Jason C. Rudbeck
University of Georgia
Rita Callahan
Keiser University
Kent Zirlott
University of Alabama
Mark Abajian
Daren Conrad
Bowie State University
Hamid Bastin
Shippensburg University
Diane de Freitas
Fresno City College
Laura Jean Bhadra
Northern Virginia Community College
Veronika Dolar
Cleveland State University
Benjamin Blair
Mississippi State University
Justin Dubas
Texas Lutheran University
Lane Boyte
Troy University
Robert L Holland
Purdue University
Greg Brock
Georgia Southern University
Andres Jauregui
Columbus State University
Andrew Cassey
Washington State University
Miles Kimball
Joni Charles
Texas State University - San Marcos
Andrew Kohen
James Madison University
Daniel Lee
Jeff Rubin
Rutgers University, New Brunswick
David Lindauer
Wellesley College
Lynda Rush
California State Polytechnic University
Joshua Long
Ivy Tech Community College
Naveen Sarna
James Makokha
Collin College
Jesse Schwartz
Kennesaw State University
Jim McAndrew
Luzerne County Community College
Mark Showalter
Brigham Young University
William Mertens
University of Colorado
Michael Tasto
Southern New Hampshire University
Cindy Munson
Western Technical College
David Mushinski
Colorado State University
Fola Odebunmi
Cypress College
Mark Abajian
Christian Beer
Cape Fear Community College
Afolabi Adebayo
University of New Hampshire
Gary Bennett
State University of New York Fredonia
Mehdi Afiat
College of Southern Nevada
Bettina Berch
Borough of Manhattan Community
Douglas Agbetsiafa
Indiana University South Bend
Richard Agnello
University of Delaware
Thomas M. Beveridge
Durham Technical Community College
Henry Akian
Gibbs College
Abhijeet Bhattacharya
Illinois Valley Community College
Constantine lexandrakis
Hofstra University
Prasad Bidarkota
Florida International University
Michelle Amaral
University of the Pacific
Jekab Bikis
Dallas Baptist University
Shahina Amin
Michael Bognanno
Temple University
Larry Angel
South Seattle Community College
Cecil Bohanon
Ball State University
Kathleen Arano
Fort Hays State University
Natalia Boliari
Manhattan College
J. J. Arias
Georgia College & State University
Melanie Boyte
Troy University
Nestor Azcona
Babson College
Charles Braymen
Kansas State
Steve Balassi
St. Marys College/Napa Valley College
William Brennan
Minnesota State University at Mankato
Juventino-Ulyses
Sam Houston State University
Greg Brock
Ken Brown
College
Balderas
Tannista Banerjee
Purdue University
Laura Bucila
Texas Christian University
Jason Barr
Rutgers University, Newark
Stan Buck
Huntington University
Alan Barreca
Tulane University
Donna Bueckman
University of Tennessee Knoxville
Hamid Bastin
Joe Bunting
St. Andrews Presbyterian College
Tammy Batson
Northern Illinois University
Rita Callahan
Keiser University
Carl Bauer
Oakton Community College
Michael G. Carew
Baruch College
Klaus Becker
Texas Tech University
John Carter
Modesto Junior College
Robert Beekman
University of Tampa
Kalyan Chakraborty
Emporia State University
Henry Check
Penn State University
David Furst
University of South Florida
Xudong Chen
Baldwin-Wallace College
Monica Galizzi
University of Massachusetts Lowell
Clifton M. Chow
Mass Bay Community College
Jean-Philippe Gervais
North Carolina State University
Tina Collins
San Joaquin Valley College
Dipak Ghosh
Emporia State University
Valerie Collins
Sheridan College
Bill Goffe
State University of New York Oswego
Sarah Cosgrove
University of Massachusetts Dartmouth
Ryan Gorka
University of Nebraska Lincoln
Dana Costea
Indiana University South Bend
Marshall Gramm
Rhodes College
Maria DaCosta
University of Wisconsin
Elias C. Grivoyannis
Yeshiva University
Eau Claire Mian Dai
Drexel University
Eleanor Gubins
Rosemont College
Joel Dalafave
Bucks County Community College
Darrin Gulla
University of Kentucky
ii
Maylene Damoense
Monash University South Africa
Karen Gulliver
Argosy University
Lorie Darche
Southwest Florida College
Ranganai Gwati
University of Washington Seattle
Diane de Freitas
Fresno City College
Mike Haupert
University of Wisconsin
Ejigou Demissie
University of Maryland Eastern Shore
La Crosse L Jay Helms
University of California
Richard DePolt
Guilford Technical Community College
Davis David Hennessy
University of Dubuque
Aaron Dighton
Curry Hilton
Guilford Technical Community College
Veronika Dolar
George Hoffer
Virginia Commonwealth University
Fisher Donna
Mark Holmes
University of Waikato
Harold Elder
Carl Hooker
Community College of Vermont
Jamie Emerson
Salisbury University
Daniel Horton
Elena Ermolenko
Oakton Community College
Scott Houser
Colorado School of the Mines
Pat Euzent
University of Central Florida
Fanchang Huang
Washington University in St Louis
Yan Feng
Hunter College, Queens College, CUNY
Gregory Hunter
California State Polytechnic University
Donna K. Fisher
Christopher Hyer
University of New Mexico
Paul Fisher
Henry Ford Community College
Leke Ijiyode
St. Marys University of Minnesota
Fred Foldvary
Santa Clara University
Chris Inama
Golden Gate University
Nikki Follis
Chadron State College
Sarbaum Jeff
University of North Carolina
Kent Ford
State University of New York
Chad Jennings
Tennessee Temple University
Ryan Ford
Pasadena City College
Philipp Jonas
Kalamazoo Valley Community College
Timothy Ford
California State University Sacramento
Robert Jones
Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute
Johanna Francis
Fordham University
Prathibha Joshi
Gordon College
Robert Francis
Shoreline Community College
Frances Mc Donald
Mark Frascatore
Clarkson University
Edward McGrath
Holyoke Community College
James Jozefowicz
Indiana University of Pennsylvania
Shirley Ann Merchant
George Washington University
Mahbubul Kabir
Lyon College
William Mertens
Simran Kahai
John Carroll University
Mitch Mitchell
Bladen Community College
David Kalist
Mitch Mitchell
North Carolina Wesleyan
Camilla Kazimi
St. Marys College
Mike Mogavero
University of Notre Dame
Chris Kelton
Naval Postgraduate School
Prof Ramesh Mohan
Bryant University
Brian Kench
University of Tampa
Daniel Monchuk
University of Southern Mississippi
Hyeongwoo Kim
Auburn University
Vasudeva Murthy
Creighton University
Miles Kimball
David Mushinsk
Colorado State University
Alfreda L. King
Lawson State Community College
Paula Nas
University of Michigan Flint
Elizabeth Knowles
Univeristy of Wisconsin La Crosse
Russ Neal
Collin County Community College
Fred Kolb
University of Wisconsin Eau Claire
Megumi Nishimura
Risa Kumazawa
Duquesne University
Peter Olson
Indiana University
Sumner La Croix
University of Hawaii
Esen Onur
California State University Sacramento
Christopher Laincz
Drexel University
Stephen Onyeiwu
Allegheny College
iii
Ghislaine Lang
San Jose State University
Margaret Oppenheimer
DePaul University
Carolyn Langston
South Arkansas Community College
Glenda Orosco
Oklahoma State University
Richard Le
Cosumnes River College
David Ortmeyer
Bentley University
Daniel Lee
Thomas Owen
College of the Redwoods
Tom Lehman
Indiana Wesleyan University
Jan Palmer
Ohio University
Megan Leonard
Hendrix College
Amar Parai
Larry Lichtenstein
Canisius College
Nitin Paranjpe
Wayne State and Oakland University
Tad Lincoln
Middlesex Community College
Carl Parker
David Linthicum
Cecil College North East
Michael Petrack
Oakland Community College
Sam Liu
West Valley College
Gyan Pradhan
Eastern Kentucky University
Melody Lo
University of Texas at San Antonio
Michael Pries
University of Notre Dame
Volodymyr Logovskyy
Georgia Institute of Technology
Joe Quinn
Boston College
Min Lu
Robert Morris University
Mahesh Ramachandran
Clark University
Gennady Lyakir
Champlain College
Ratha Ramoo
Diablo Valley College
Bruce Madariaga
Montgomery Community College
Surekha Rao
Indiana University Northwest
Brinda Mahalingam
University of California Riverside
Ryan Ratcliff
University of San Diego
Rubana Mahjabeen
Truman State University
Scott Redenius
Brandeis University
Bahman Maneshni
Paradise Valley Community College
Dosse Toulaboe,
Denton Marks
University of Wisconsin-Whitewater
Richard Trainer
State University of New York at Nassau
Timothy Mathews
Kennesaw State University
Ngoc Bich Tran
San Jacinto College
Susan Reilly
Florida State College at Jacksonville
Sandra Trejos
Clarion University of Pennsylvania
Imke Reimers
Julie Trivitt
Arkansas Tech University
Christopher Richardson
Merrillville High School
Arja Turunen-Red
University of New Orleans
Art Riegal
State University of New York Sullivan
Diane Tyndall
Craven Community College
Richard Risinit
Middlesex Community College
Kay Unger
University of Montana
Michael Rogers
Albany State University
Lee J. Van Scyoc
University of Wisconsin Oshkosh
Paul Roscelli
Canada College
Lisa Verissimo-Bates
Foothill College
Larry Ross
University of Alaska Anchorage
Priti Verma
Texas A&M University, Kingsville
Jeff Rubin
Rutgers University
Patrick Walsh
St. Michaels College
Allen Sanderson
University of Chicago
Jing Wang
Northeastern University
Jeff Sarbaum
University of North Carolina Greensboro
Donald Waters
Brayant and Stratton College, Virginia
Dennis Shannon
Southwestern Illinois College
Xuguang Sheng
Patrick Welle
Bemidji State University
Mark Showalter
Brigham Young University
Elizabeth Wheaton
Southern Methodist University
Johnny Shu
Central Carolina Community College
Luther White
Central Carolina Community College
Suann Shumaker ll
Las Positas Community College
Oxana Wieland
University of Minnesota Crookston
Jonathan Silberman
Oakland University
John Winters
Auburn University at Montgomery
Steven Skinner
Western Connecticut State University
Suzanne Wisniewski
University of St. Thomas
Beach, Virgina Campus
iv
Catherine Skura
Sandhills Community College
Patricia Wiswell
Columbia-Greene Community College
Gary Smith
DYouville College
Mark Witte
College of Charleston
Warren Smith
Keiser University
Louis A. Woods
University of North Florida
William Snyder
Peru State College
Guy Yamashiro
California State University Long Beach
Ken Somppi
Southern
Benhua Yang
Stetson University
College
Leslie Young
Kilian Community College
Dale Steinreich
Drury University
Karen Zempel
Bryant and Stratton College
Liliana Stern
Auburn University
Derek Stimel
Menlo College
Carolyn Fabian Stumph
Indiana University Purdue University
Bryce Sutton
Justin Tapp
Southwest Baptist University
Union
State
Community
Jane Tufts
Mike Worls
Jennifer Thomas Katie Yanos
Colleen Farmer Malvine Litten

Michelle Kunkler Larry Moore
Sheryl Nelson
Cindy Kerr John Carey
Cengage
Allyn Bissmeyer, Darrell Frye, Sarah Greber, Betty Jung, Deepak Kumar, Kim
Kusnerak, Sharon Morgan, Suellen Ruttkay, and Joe Sabatino.
Stacy Carlson Daniel Norris
Josh Bookin
Economics 10
Deborah Mankiw
Catherine, Nicholas Peter
NGregory Mankiw
2010 12
Principles of
N. Gregory Mankiw
Harvard University
caoqianseu@163.com)
caoqianseu@163.com
1
economy oikonomos
scarcity
Economics
Ten principles of Economics
scarcity
Economics
caoqianseu@163.com
1.1
1People face trade-offs

There aint no such thing as a free
lunch
trade-offs
efficiency
equality
aint=is notno
There
is no such thing as a free lunch.
trade-off
trade off
3 trade-off
caoqianseu@163.com
(efficiency)
(equality)
2The cost of something

is what you give up to get it
opportunity cost
caoqianseu@163.com

opportunity cost
3Rational people think at the margin
rational people
24
marginal change
marginedge
marginal benefits
marginal costs
200
100,000 500 =100,000/200
500
think at the margin
10 300
average cost 500
marginal cost
caoqianseu@163.com
rational
people:
marginal
change:
4People respond to incentives
incentive
50
1960 Ralph Nader
caoqianseu@163.com
.Sam
Peltzman, 1975
incentive
2005 2008
2 4
caoqianseu@163.com
A320 737
40%
Demetrius Stroud
.Christy LaBadie
30 4
Diddy
hip-hop
20
2008
caoqianseu@163.com
10
2004
11 23
Ryan Johnson
David Reiley
Juan Carlos Munoz
95%
Austan GoolsbeeSlate.com, 2006 3 16.
1.2
5Trade can make everyone better off
caoqianseu@163.com
6Markets are usually a good way to

organize economic activity
1980 20
market economy
self-interest
well-being
self-interested
self-interested
well-being
10
caoqianseu@163.com

decentralized
.Adam Smith,1776
invisible hand
market
economy:
.
.
1776
1776
11
caoqianseu@163.com
7Governments
can sometimes improve market
outcomes
property rights
12
caoqianseu@163.com
DVD
market failure
externality
market power
willingness to pay
welfare system
property
rights:
market
failure:
externality:
market
power
13
caoqianseu@163.com
1.3
8
(A countrys standard of living depends on its ability to produce goods and services)
2008 47,000
10,000 1,400
2%
35 20 8
productivity
20
1970 1980
14
caoqianseu@163.com
productivity
CEO
...
unintended consequences
broken window fallacy
15
caoqianseu@163.com

...
...
90% 3%
...
Robert D. Mcteer, JR. The Wall Street Journal, June 4,2003.
9(Prices rise when the government

prints too much money)
1921 1 0.3 1922 11
70,000,000
inflation
1920
1970 .
21 2.5%
30
1920
1970
inflation
Luddite19
.Ned Lud
16
caoqianseu@163.com
10Society
faces a short-run
trade-off between inflation and unemployment
1980 1990
business cycle
.2008 2009
business
cycle:
17
caoqianseu@163.com
1.4
1
1
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
18
caoqianseu@163.com
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
www.cengage.com/economics/mankiw.
6.
7.
8.
9.
19
caoqianseu@163.com
scarcity economics efficiency equality

opportunity cost rational people marginal change
incentive market economy property rights
market failure
externality
market power
productivity inflation
business cycle
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
20
caoqianseu@163.com
1.
a. b.
c.
d.
e.
2.
3.
4. 100
5%
5. 500
300
100
6. 65
a.
b. 65
7. 1996
a.
b.
8.
9.
a.
b.
c.
21
caoqianseu@163.com
d. 90%
e.
f.
10.
a.
b.
11.
12.
13. 2010 .
a.
b.
c.
14.
15.
16.
22
caoqianseu@163.com
Principles of
N. Gregory Mankiw
Harvard University
caoqianseu@163.com)
23
caoqianseu@163.com
2.1
scientific method
24
caoqianseu@163.com
2.1.1
Isaac Newton 17
2.1.2 the role of assumptions
25
caoqianseu@163.com
2.1.3
beachball
26
caoqianseu@163.com
2.1.4
circular-flow diagram
factors
of production
27
caoqianseu@163.com
1 loops
circular-flow diagram:
2.1.5
production possibilities frontier
28
caoqianseu@163.com
1000 0 3000
0
600 2200 A
700 2000 B
C
C
efficient
A
D
inefficient
D
300 1000
D A 300 600
1000 2200
29
caoqianseu@163.com
A B 100
200
:
A B 200 100
A 100 200
2
E
F
A G
30
caoqianseu@163.com
3 A
1000
3
3
A
G 2200 2300
600
650
production
possibilities frontier
2.1.6
microeconomics
macroeconomics
31
caoqianseu@163.com
microeconomics:
macroeconomics
George H. W. Bush
Michael Kinsley
Donald Trump
Ben Stein
Meg Whitman eBay CEO
Cate Blanchett
Danny Glover
Anthony Zinni
Barbara Boxer U.S.
Steve Ballmer CEO
John Elway
Arnold Schwarzenegger
Kofi Annan
Sandra Day-OConnor
Ted TurnerCNN
Scott AdamsDilbert
Lionel Richie
Mick Jagger
32
caoqianseu@163.com
Mick Jagger
Mick Jagger
Keith Richard
2.2
2.2.1
Polly:
Norm:
positive statementsdescriptive
normative statementsprescriptive
33
caoqianseu@163.com
set of
beliefs
positive
statements:
normative
statements:
2.2.2
.one-armed
On the one handOn the other hand,
1946
34
caoqianseu@163.com
..John Maynard Keynes
1935
..
Larry Summers
21
.Joseph Schumpeter
35
caoqianseu@163.com

19
20
20
21
Lawrence H. SummersThe White House Blog, September 21, 2009.

http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/A-Vision-for-Innovation-Growth-and-Quality-Jobs/
2.2.3
36
caoqianseu@163.com
2.3
George
Bernard Shaw
Ronald Reagan
Trivial Pursuit 100
3000
2.3.1
Trivial Pursuit
100 100 3000
37
caoqianseu@163.com
2.3.2
100,000 10,000 10%

20,000 4,000 20%
2.3.4
1 20
38
caoqianseu@163.com
1.93%
2.
93%
3.
90%
4./
90%
5.90%
6.
88%
7.
85%
8.85%
9.
85%
10.
85%
11. 50
85%
12.
84%
13.83%
14.
83%
15.83%
16.
82%
17.79%
18.79%
19.78%
20.78%
39
caoqianseu@163.com
Richard M. Alston, J. R. Kearl, and Michael B. Vaughn, Is There Consensus among Economists in the
1990s? American Economic Review (May 1992): 203209; Dan Fuller and Doris Geide-Stevenson, Consensus
among Economists Revisited, Journal of Economics Education (Fall 2003): 369387; Robert Whaples, Do
Economists Agree on Anything? Yes! Economists Voice (November 2006): 16; Robert Whaples, The Policy
Views of American Economic Association Members: The Results of a New Survey, Econ Journal Watch
(September 2009): 337348.
2.4
think tanks
40
caoqianseu@163.com
intellectual
framework
,
.Lawrence Goulder
2004 164 2005 36%

4
Environmental Defense
8
.Caroline
Alkine 1991
1960
1980
1990
1980
1990
.Kert Davies
1990
Jessica E. VascellaroThe Wall Street Journal, August 23, 2005.
41
caoqianseu@163.com
A
A.1
A.2
A-1 a
pie chart
A-1
a 2008 b
2008 c
1950 2000
b
bar graph
c
time-series graph
42
caoqianseu@163.com
A.3
A-1
coordinate system
grade point average
ordered pair
Albert E.25 /3.5
Alfred E. 5 /2.0
x-coordinate
y-coordinate

x y
origin
x y
2
scatterplot
A-2
Alfred E. Neuman Madwhat, me

worry?
43
caoqianseu@163.com
A-2
positive correlation
negative correlation
A.4
A-2
demand curve
A-1Emma
A-1

A-3 A-4
A-1
44
caoqianseu@163.com
3 x y
A-1
5 10
9 9
A-3
negatively related
A-3
D1
4
A-1
D2D1
A-4
shifts
2
D3
45
caoqianseu@163.com
movements along a curve
shifts of a curve A-3 3

8 13 7 17
8 4 13
16
A-4
A-4
D1
3 4
D2 2 D3
x
y
x y
x y
46
caoqianseu@163.com
A.5
A-5
slope
A-5
21
6
13 8 x y
y -2 x +8-1/4
y
,
x
delta
y
y x
y
47
caoqianseu@163.com

3
6 21 8 13
y
68
2
1
=
=
=
x 21 13
8
4
A-5
-1/4
A.6
cause
omitted variable
reverse causality A B
B A
Big Brother
48
caoqianseu@163.com

A-6
A-6
A-6
A-6
A-7
controlled experiment
A-7
49
caoqianseu@163.com
A-7
minivans
50
caoqianseu@163.com
circular-flow diagram production possibilities frontier

microeconomics macroeconomics positive
statementsnormative statements
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
51
caoqianseu@163.com
1.
a.Selena 1
b.Stuart 4.50
c.Shanna 30
d.Sally 10% 10,000
2.
a.
b.
c.
d.
peace dividend
3. 1
4.LarryMoeCurly
10 1 1
1 2 2 1
a. ABCD
A
B
C
(D)
b.a AB
C D
c.
d. a
5.
a.
b.
c.
52
caoqianseu@163.com
d.
e.
6.
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
7.
53
caoqianseu@163.com
Principles of
N. Gregory Mankiw
Harvard University
caoqianseu@163.com)
54
caoqianseu@163.com
3.1
55
caoqianseu@163.com
3.1.1
8
1 Farmer
15 60 Rancher
10 20 1
a
1
aproduction opportunities
bc
bc 8
56
caoqianseu@163.com
b 8
32 0
8 0 8
8
4 16
4 b
b 2
b
1 1
1 4
c 8
48 0 8
0 24 8
4 24 12 c
consumption possibilities frontier

b
c
1 A B 16 4
24 12
3.1.2
Rancher B
Farmer
57
caoqianseu@163.com
32 15 5
17 5 16 4
[
2 a]
6 2
18 12 5 15
13 27 12 24
[b]
2
sets
of consumption opportunities
A* A a
B* B
[c]
58
caoqianseu@163.com
.
.
3.2
3.2.1
absolute
advantage
20 60 10
15
59
caoqianseu@163.com
absolute
advantage
3.2.2
1
opportunity cost
8
1 a 1
10 10 10
1 20 10 1/2
1 1/2
1 15 1
60 15 1/4 1
1/4
1
1
1 1/2 1
2 1 1/4 1
4
comparative advantage
X X
X
1 1/4
1/2
1 2 4
60
caoqianseu@163.com
opportunity
cost:
comparative advantage:
3.2.3
40 44 16 18
15 5
3
1 4
5 15
1/3 1
1/2
61
caoqianseu@163.com
3.2.4
3 1
1 2 1
4
2 4
2
4 2
2 4
.
10
1
Friday
30 2
.
..
.
62
caoqianseu@163.com
1776
.
1817
..
3.3
3.3.1 .
.Tom Brady
2 2 20,000
.Forrest Gump 4
4 40
20,000 40
63
caoqianseu@163.com
40 20,000
3.3.2
imports
exports
2 1
1 2 1
1 1 1/2
imports
exports
64
caoqianseu@163.com
3.4
gold famers
12
12 7 23
wandering 250
65
caoqianseu@163.com
avatars
27 20
40% 50%
David Barboza: New York Times, December 9, 2005.
absolute advantage opportunity costcomparative

advantage,imports exports
1.
66
caoqianseu@163.com
2.
3.
4. 3
5.
6.
7.
1.Maria 1 20 1 50
5
a.
b. 100
2. 4 10
5 1
a. 1
b.
c. 1 1 1
d.
e.
f.
g.
3.(Pat)(Kris)
root beer
4
2 6 4
a.
b.
c.
4. 1000 2 30
67
caoqianseu@163.com
a. 1 1
b. 1000
c. 1000 20
1000
5. 50 1
40 2
a.
b.
c. 1
6.Baseballia
a.
b.
c.
d.
7. 100 20
100 10
a.
b.
c.
d. 100 20
8. 20 60
50 75
68
caoqianseu@163.com
a.
b.
c.
d. 2 1
9.
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
10.
11. 1 1
1 2 3 10
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.(c)(d)(e)
69
caoqianseu@163.com
Principles of
N. Gregory Mankiw
Harvard University
caoqianseu@163.com)
70
caoqianseu@163.com
4.
4.1
4.1.1
market
market:
71
caoqianseu@163.com
4.1.2
competitive
market
perfectly competitive
:1
price taker
monopoly
competitive
market:
72
caoqianseu@163.com
4.2
4.2.1
quantity demanded
20
0.20
law of demand
1 Catherine
12 0.50 10
3 0
demand
schedule
73
caoqianseu@163.com

demand curve
quantity
demanded:
law
of demand:
demand
schedule:
demand
curve:
4.2.2
1
market demand
2
2
Catherine 4 Nicholas 3
7
2
74
caoqianseu@163.com
4.2.3
increase
in demand
decrease in demand
normal good
inferior good
75
caoqianseu@163.com
substitutes
DVD
complements
tastes
2
76
caoqianseu@163.com
4 a
a D1 D2 2
20 10 A B
b 2 4
20 12 A C
shift
shift
move
move
77
caoqianseu@163.com

4 b
10% 4%
10% 12%
(normal
good):
inferior
good:
,
substitutes:
,
complements:
,
4.3
4.3.1
quantity supplied
law of supply
78
caoqianseu@163.com

5 Ben
1
supply schedule
supply curve
quantity
supplied:
law
of supply:
supply
schedule:
supply
curve:
4.3.2
79
caoqianseu@163.com
2
Ben 3 Jerry 4
7
4.3.3
increase in supply
80
caoqianseu@163.com
decrease in
supply
81
caoqianseu@163.com
4.4
4.4.1
8
equilibrium
equilibrium price
equilibrium quantity 2
7
market-clearing price
82
caoqianseu@163.com
2 7
7
9
a2.50
10 4
b1.50
10 4
9 (a) 2.50
83
caoqianseu@163.com
10 4
surplus:

excess supply
9 b
1.50
shortage:
excess
demand
law of supply and demand:
equilibrium:
equilibrium
price:
equilibrium
quantity:
surplus:
shortage:
law
of supply and demand:
84
caoqianseu@163.com
4.4.2
1.
2.
3.
1.taste
2. 10
D1 D2
3.2
10 2 2.50 7 10
85
caoqianseu@163.com
10
D1 D2 2 2.50
7 10
a shift in the supply curve

a movement along a fixed supply
curve
86
caoqianseu@163.com
11
S1 S2 2
2.50 7 4
1.
2.
11 S1 S2
3.2
11 2 2.50 7
4
1.
87
caoqianseu@163.com
2. 12
3. 12
a
b
12
a P1 P2 Q1 Q2b
P1 P2 Q1 Q2
P
Q
P Q
P Q
P Q
P Q
P Q
P Q
P Q
P Q
P Q
88
caoqianseu@163.com
competing uses
decentralized system
89
caoqianseu@163.com
2010
price gouging
.Martha Coakley
.Deval Patrik
2004 Charley
A
0.69 B 2.99
A
0.69 A
B
90
caoqianseu@163.com
.
Polar Beverages
Jeff JacobySource: The Boston Globe, May 4, 2010.
91
caoqianseu@163.com
market competitive market; quantity demanded;

law of demand; demand curve; normal good;
inferior good
substitutes; complements
quantity supplied; law of supply; supply schedule;
supply curve equilibrium; equilibrium price
equilibrium quantity;
surplus; shortage; law
of supply and demand
1.
2.
3.tastes
4.Popeye
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
92
caoqianseu@163.com
1.
a.
b.
c.
2.
3. minivans
a.
b.
c.
d.sports utility vehicles, SUVs
e.
4. DVD
a.
DVD
DVD
b.
c. DVD
5. 30
6.
a.
b.
c.
d.
7.
93
caoqianseu@163.com
a.
b.
8. 2015 2020 2030
5 15
9.
10.
135
26
104
53
81
81
68
98
53
110
39
121
a.
b.
c.
11.
12.bagels
a.
b.
13. :
10,000
8,000
8,000
8,000
12
6,000
8,000
16
4,000
8,000
20
2,000
8,000
94
caoqianseu@163.com
a.
b.
c. 5,000
4,000
3,000
12
2,000
16
1,000
20
14. QD=1,600-300P QD
P QS=1,400+700P QS
95
caoqianseu@163.com
Principles of
N. Gregory Mankiw
Harvard University
caoqianseu@163.com)
96
caoqianseu@163.com
elasticity
10% 2.5%
6%.
5.1
4
5.1.1
price of
elasticity of demand
elastic
inelastic
elastic inelastic
97
caoqianseu@163.com
rules-of-thumb
butter
(margarine)
necessities(luxuries)
elasticity:
price elasticity of demand:
1 1
98
caoqianseu@163.com
5.1.2
10% 20%
=20%/10%=2.
2 2
10%
20%
5.1.3
A B B A
A 4
120
B 6
80
A B 50%=6-4/4 33%=80-120
/120
33/50 0.66 B A 33%=4-6/6
50%=120-80/80
midpoint method
P Q P Q
Q / Q Q P

=
P / P P Q
( P, Q )
99
caoqianseu@163.com
4 6 5
4 6 40%6-4/5=40% 6
4 40%
A B
=5
=100
A B 40% 40%
B A 40% 40%
1.
(Q1 , P1 ) (Q2 , P2 )
(Q2 Q1 ) /[(Q2 + Q1 ) / 2]
( P2 P1 ) /[( P2 + P1 ) / 2]
5.1.4
1
elastic 1
inelastic 1
unit elasticity
1
a
perfectly inelastic
100
caoqianseu@163.com
b
cde
perfectly elastic
inelastic
Inelastic II 1
101
caoqianseu@163.com
0.1
0.2
0.5
0.7
1.6
2.3
4.4
5.1.5
total
revenue
P Q 2
P Q P Q 2
P = 4 Q = 100 = 4 100 = 400
3 a
P P Q Q Q
( P P) Q A
P (Q Q) B
A B
102
caoqianseu@163.com
4 5 100
90 400 450
P Q 2 4 100 400
3 a
P P Q Q Q
( P P) Q A
P (Q Q) B
A B
4 5 100
90 400 450
3 b
B A 4
5 100 70 400 350
3
1
1
1
103
caoqianseu@163.com
a
b
total revenue:
5.1.6
4
1 2
1 2 5
104
caoqianseu@163.com
6 3 4
5.1.7
income elasticity of demand

Q / Q Q P
=

P / P P Q
Q / P
P / Q
P / Q
= AP
105
caoqianseu@163.com
normal goods
inferior goods:
necessities
luxuries
cross-price elasticity of demand 1

2 1
2
1
=
2
income elasticity of demand
cross-price elasticity of demand
106
caoqianseu@163.com
5.2
4
5.2.1
price elasticity of supply
elastic
inelastic
price elasticity of supply:
5.2.2
107
caoqianseu@163.com
2.85 3.15 9,000

10,000
=3.15-2.85/3=10%;
=11000-9000/10000=20%.
=20%/10%=2.
2 2
1% 2%.
5.2.3
5
0a
perfectly
inelastic
e
perfectly elastic
6 3 4 100
200 29% 67%
108
caoqianseu@163.com
1 12 15
500 525 22% 5%
1.
109
caoqianseu@163.com
3 4
100 200. 29% 67%
12 15 500 525
22% 5%
5.3
OPEC
5.3.1
110
caoqianseu@163.com

20%.
7 S1 S2
100 110 3 2
S1 S2
3 2
100 110 40% 9.5%
300 =3100 220 =2110
P Q
Q
P
7
111
caoqianseu@163.com
300 220
1950 1000
17%. 300 2%.
70%
1950
5.3.2 OPEC
1970
OPEC
1973 1974
50%. OPEC 1979 1981
112
caoqianseu@163.com
OPEC 1982 1985

10%OPEC 1986 OPEC
45%1990 1970
1990 21
OPEC
21
2008-2009
OPEC 1970 1980
8 a
S1 S2 P1 P2
a S1 S2
b
S1 S2
OPEC
8 b
S1 S2
b
113
caoqianseu@163.com
OPEC OPEC
OPEC
OPEC
OPEC
5.3.3
S1 S2a
D1 D2b
114
caoqianseu@163.com

9 a S1 S2
P1 P2 Q1 Q2
9 b D1 D2
Q1 Q2 P1 P2
5.4
4 5
115
caoqianseu@163.com
1
1
1
1
elasticity; price elasticity of demand; total revenue

income elasticity of demand cross-price
elasticity of demand; price elasticity of supply
116
caoqianseu@163.com

1.
2.
3.
4. 1 0
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
1.
a.
b.
c.
d.root beer
2.
150
2,100
1,000
200
2,000
800
250
1,900
600
300
1,800
400
a. 200 250
b.
117
caoqianseu@163.com
3. 0.2 0.7
a. 1.80 2.20
b.
4. 30% 15%
5.
6. DVD
=1
=1.2
40
50
10
32
45
12
24
30
14
16
20
16
12
a. DVD 8 10 i 1
ii
1.2
b. 1 1.2 i 12
ii
16
7. X Y
X -3.
X Y 2.
Y X
8. 1/3
a.
b.
c.tastes 1/4
9.1996 2 17
1995 12 1.25 1.50
400 4.3%
118
caoqianseu@163.com
a.
b.
c.
10.
10
10
11.
a. 0.4 2
20%
b.
c.
12.
13.
2 2
a.
b.
c.
d.
14.
a.
b.
15.
119
caoqianseu@163.com
Principles of
N. Gregory Mankiw
Harvard University
caoqianseu@163.com)
120
caoqianseu@163.com
6.
6.1
4
3
3
3 cutthroat competition
price
121
caoqianseu@163.com
ceiling
price floor
price ceiling:
price floor:
6.1.1
1 a
4 3
not binding
a 4
3
100 b 2
3 2 125
75 50
b
binding constraint(non-binding constraint)
122
caoqianseu@163.com
2 3
binding
constraint
125 75
50
ration
1973 OPEC
OPEC OPEC
2 OPEC P1
a
S1 S2b
rationing
123
caoqianseu@163.com
P1 P2
QS
QD
P1 b
S1 S2 P1 P2
QD
QSQD-QS
124
caoqianseu@163.com
3 a
3 b
1
125
caoqianseu@163.com
6.1.2
3
a 2
3
100 b 4
3
4 120
80 40
126
caoqianseu@163.com
3
2 4 a
4 b 4
3
120 80
1938
2009 7.25
5 a
5b
127
caoqianseu@163.com
10% 1% 3%.
10% 10%.
1% 3%
2006 47%
128
caoqianseu@163.com
14% 38%
2009 7.25
40
30,160 2/3
1/3
M..M.
Patricia Smith
.J.
Nancy J. Leppink
129
caoqianseu@163.com
Steven GreenhouseNew York Times, April 2, 2010.
6.1.3
1
earned income tax credit
6.2
130
caoqianseu@163.com
0.50
0.25
tax incidence
tax incidence:
6.2.1
1 0.50
4
1
2
3
0.50 2
1.50 P P-0.50
131
caoqianseu@163.com
0.50 6 S1
S20.50
6 3 3.30 100 90
0.50 S1
S2 0.50 100 90 3
3.30 3 2.80
3 3.30
0.30
3.30
3 2.80 =3.30-0.50
132
caoqianseu@163.com
6.2.2
1 0.50
0.50 D1
D2 0.50 100 90 3
2.80 3 3.30
7
0.50
0.50
2 2.50
PP+0.50
0.50
D1
D20.50

133
caoqianseu@163.com
7 3 2.80
100 90
3
3.30
6 7
0.50
0.50
0.50 0.50
FICAFederal Insurance Contributions Act
FICA
payroll tax
2010 FICA 15.3%.
0.50
==3 =3.30 =2.80
134
caoqianseu@163.com
6.2.3
135
caoqianseu@163.com
136
caoqianseu@163.com
9 a
9 b
1990
137
caoqianseu@163.com
1993
1000
1000
6.3
138
caoqianseu@163.com
price ceiling;
price floor;
tax incidence
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
1. 40
139
caoqianseu@163.com

2.
a.
b.
c.
3.
11
15
10
12
10
a.
b.
2
c.
1
4. 2
a.
b.
5.
6. 500
500
140
caoqianseu@163.com
7.
0.50
a.
b.
c.
d.
8.
a.
b.
c.b
d.
b
9.
a.
b.
c.
10. 39,000
5
11. 0.50
0.50
a. 0.50
b.
12. 2008 ..
2008
a.
141
caoqianseu@163.com

b.a
142
caoqianseu@163.com
Principles of
N. Gregory Mankiw
Harvard University
caoqianseu@163.com)
143
caoqianseu@163.com
7.
welfare economics
benefits
welfare economics:
7.1
7.1.1
144
caoqianseu@163.com
1

willingness to
pay
value
10
10 80 80
80
80
100 80 20
consumer surplus
20 80 100
70 70
70
30 10
40
145
caoqianseu@163.com

willingness to pay:
consumer surplus:
7.1.2
1
1 100 0
80 100 1
70 80 2
4
marginal buyer
50 3
70
2
146
caoqianseu@163.com
a 80
80 1. 80 20
1 20
1
2
a
80 20
b 70 40
2 b 70 70
70
30 10 40
2
7.1.3
147
caoqianseu@163.com

a P1 ABC
2
a
80 20
b 70 40
P1 P2b ADF
BCFD
P1 Q1
BCED
Q1 Q2 CEF
7.1.4
148
caoqianseu@163.com
7.2
7.2.1
cost
149
caoqianseu@163.com

600 600
500 600
500
Producer
600 100
surplus
800 800
800
300
200 500
cost:
producer surplus:
7.2.2
4 2
500 0
500 600 1. 600
150
caoqianseu@163.com
800 2
marginal
seller 4 900
3 800
a 600 100
b 800 500
5
a 600
1. 100.
151
caoqianseu@163.com
5 b 800
500
7.2.3
a P1
ABC
a P1 Q1
ABC P1 P2b Q1 Q2
ADF BCFD
BCED
CEF
b P1 P2 ADF
P1 Q1
152
caoqianseu@163.com

BCED
Q1 Q2 CEF
7.3
7.3.1
total surplus
:
=.
:
=.
153
caoqianseu@163.com
:
=
=
:
=.
efficiency
equality
7.3.2
7
AE
EB
CE
ED
154
caoqianseu@163.com
1.
2.
3
3.
Q1
Q2
155
caoqianseu@163.com

laissez faire
Q1
Q2
156
caoqianseu@163.com
157
caoqianseu@163.com
.Chip Case
Wellesley College
.Margaret Mead
1984
11
1000
3000
eBay
1984
.Mike Tice
158
caoqianseu@163.com
Kenmore
Square
1000
2000 Fenway
Park
7 15
2000
Charles SteinBoston Globe, May 1, 2005.
7.4
market power
159
caoqianseu@163.com
externalities
market failure
160
caoqianseu@163.com

welfare economics;
willingness to pay;
consumer surplus; cost; producer surplus; efficiency;

equality
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
1. 120 iPod 80
a.
b. iPod 90
c. iPod 250
2.
3.French bread
4.Bert 7
5 3 1
a.
b. 4
161
caoqianseu@163.com
c. 2
5.Ernie
1 3
5 7
a.
b. 4
c. 6
6. 4 5
a. 2 4 6
b.
c.
d.
7.
a.
b.
c.
8.
7 2 8 5
A3 B: 6 C4 D2
9.
a.
b.
c.
d..
162
caoqianseu@163.com
10. A 120
B 1
QD=150-50O P
a. A B
b.a A
B
c. A B
d. A B
e.
11. 100
20 80
a.
100
b. 20
100
c.
d.
163
caoqianseu@163.com
Principles of
N. Gregory Mankiw
Harvard University
caoqianseu@163.com)
164
caoqianseu@163.com
8 :
1776
..
Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr.
8.1
6
165
caoqianseu@163.com
8.1.1
7
T
Q TQ
2
T Q TQ
166
caoqianseu@163.com
T Q TQ
3
A F
P1 Q1
A+B+C
D+E+F
A+B+C+D+E+F
7
3 1
P1 PB
A
P1
PS F
Q1 Q2 B+D
167
caoqianseu@163.com

A+B+D+F 3 2
B+C
D+E
B+D
C+E
3 3
B+C
D+E
B+D
168
caoqianseu@163.com
C+E
deadweight loss
C+E
3 Q1 Q2
JoeJane
100 80
120 20 40
50
120
70 80
80 130 120
40 20
40
3 C+E
4
PB
PS Q1 Q2 4
Q1 Q2
Q1 Q2
169
caoqianseu@163.com
Q1 Q2 Q1 Q2
8.2
5
a
b
5
c
b
170
caoqianseu@163.com
ab
cd
171
caoqianseu@163.com
marginal tax rate

40%.
40%
underground economy
172
caoqianseu@163.com
8.3
a
bc
2
2
4 3 9
6
a
bc
6 d
173
caoqianseu@163.com
a
b
c
d
e
U
174
caoqianseu@163.com
1974 .Arthur Laffer
6 e U
Laffer cure.Ronald Reagan

.David Stockman
[]
90%
1980
supply-side economics
1980
1980
80%.
175
caoqianseu@163.com
0 100%.
1980
30%
6%. 14 8% 1%.
.Mathias Trabandt.Harald
Uhlig 10%
2%.
self-financing rate 32%
54%. 50% 79%.
14
Brian BlackstoneWall Street Journal, Real Time Economics blog, April 21, 2010.
8.4
176
caoqianseu@163.com
deadweight loss
1.
2.
177
caoqianseu@163.com
3.
4.
5.
1.
a.
b. 1
c.
2.
a.
b.
3.
a.
b.
a
4.
a.
b.
5.
178
caoqianseu@163.com
6. ..Daniel Patrick Moynihan

hollow-tipped bullets 10,000%
a.
b.
7.
a.
b.
c.
8.widgets 1 1
gadgets 10 1
2
9.
2
10.Smalltown 100 1,000

a. 10
108 900
=1/2
b. 2 20 116
800 2
11.
QS=2P
QD=300-P
a.
b. QD=300-P+T
(mushroom)
179
caoqianseu@163.com

c. TQb T T
0 300
d. T
T 0 300
e.
200
180
caoqianseu@163.com
Principles of
N. Gregory Mankiw
Harvard University
caoqianseu@163.com)
181
caoqianseu@163.com
3
3
9.1
Isoland
9.1.1
1 1
182
caoqianseu@163.com
9.1.2
world price
183
caoqianseu@163.com
world price:
Autarka
3 1 2
1
9.2
price takers
9.2.1
2
184
caoqianseu@163.com
C
B+C+D
A+B A
D
185
caoqianseu@163.com
A+B
C A+B+C
A
B+C+D
A+B+C+D
B+D B
D
9.2.2
A
B+C A+B+C A+B+D
C A+B+C+D
B+D B
D
186
caoqianseu@163.com
A
A+B+D
B+C C D
can
will
187
caoqianseu@163.com
9.2.3
tariff
Q1D Q2D Q1S Q2S
A+B+C+D+E+F
G
A+B+C+D+E+F+G
A+B C+G
E A+B+C+E+G
D+F
188
caoqianseu@163.com
deadweight loss
D+F
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Q1S Q2S
Q1D
Q2D
D F
189
caoqianseu@163.com
tariff:
9.2.4
190
caoqianseu@163.com
9.2.5
economies of scale
191
caoqianseu@163.com
Autarka
3 2
35%
United Steelworkers
2001
market disruption
192
caoqianseu@163.com
[]
Edmund L. Andrews Keith BradsherNew York Times,

September 11 and 14, 2009.
9.3
9.3.1
193
caoqianseu@163.com
194
caoqianseu@163.com
5
20
Steven E. Landsburg; New York Times, January 16, 2008
9.3.2
national security
195
caoqianseu@163.com
1960
Thinkpad
(Wal-Mart)
1990
196
caoqianseu@163.com

1990 GDP 2.5% 2006
6%
1990 25%
11% 3%~4%.
.PauL KrugmanNew York Times, December 28, 2007.
9.3.3
2002
20
197
caoqianseu@163.com
infant-industry
argument
9.3.4
Neighborland
9.3.5
198
caoqianseu@163.com
unilateral
19
multilateral
North American Free Trade Agreement,

NAFTA 1993
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, GATT
1930 GATT
GATT
40% 5%
GATT World Trade Organization, WTO
1995 2009
153 97%
Autarka
199
caoqianseu@163.com
9.4
2008
26% 50%
200
caoqianseu@163.com
world
price
tariff
1.
2.
3.-
4.
201
caoqianseu@163.com
5.
6.
1.
a.
b.
2.
a.
b.
a
3.
4.
a.
b.
c.ab
202
caoqianseu@163.com
5.
6.
a.
b.
7..Ernest Hollings
8.Textilia T
20 300 .
T 16 T
400 T 100
a.
b.
9.2008
a.
b.
c.
d.
10.
a.
b.
c.
11.Kawminjelly beans
1
203
caoqianseu@163.com
QD=8-P
QS=P
P Q
a.
b.
c.
1
d.
12.
a. 4
b. 4
c.
13. 100
40 60
a. 100
b. 120 20
100
c. 100
d. 100
14.pro-trade
204
caoqianseu@163.com
205
caoqianseu@163.com
Principles of
N. Gregory Mankiw
Harvard University
10
caoqianseu@163.com)
206
caoqianseu@163.com
10
dioxin
4 9
externality
negative externality
positive externality
207
caoqianseu@163.com
externality:
10.1
10.1.1
7
1
7
208
caoqianseu@163.com

1 QMARKET
QMARKET
10.1.2
social costprivate cost

2
external costs
209
caoqianseu@163.com
QOPTIMUM QMARKET
QMARKET QOPTIMUM
QMARKET
internalizing the externality
210
caoqianseu@163.com
internalizing the externality
10.1.3
QOPTIMA QMARKET
3
211
caoqianseu@163.com
.Ed Glaser
(Once-ler)
Lorax
19
.Matthew Kahn
212
caoqianseu@163.com

2
Nashvill 3
1/3
2 3
Westchester 7
Marin
..Henry David Thoreau
300
Edward L. Glaeser New York Times, Economix blog, March 10, 2009.
technology spillover
213
caoqianseu@163.com
industrial policy
patent protection
property right
10.2
command-and-control
policies

market-based policies
214
caoqianseu@163.com
19.2.1

Environmental Protection Agency, EPA
10.2.2 1
corrective taxed
.1877-1959
Pigovian taxes
500
300
5
215
caoqianseu@163.com
300
sport-utility vehicles, SUV
216
caoqianseu@163.com
2007
2.10
0.40
3.49 /
10.2.3
300
400
500 200 500
100
217
caoqianseu@163.com
4 ab
600
600
1990
218
caoqianseu@163.com
cost-effective
4
a
10.2.4
Edmund Muskie
219
caoqianseu@163.com
2008 .
10 9890
220
caoqianseu@163.com
2760
2007 7
N..New York Times, August 9, 2009.
10.3
10.3.1
221
caoqianseu@163.com
Sierra Club
10.3.2
Ronald
Coase
Coase theorem
Dick
(Spot)Jane
222
caoqianseu@163.com
500
800 600
1000
800 1000
800
Coase theorem
10.3.3
223
caoqianseu@163.com

transaction
costs
500 800
750
550
10.4
224
caoqianseu@163.com
externality;
corrective tax;
internalizing
Coase
theorem;
the externality
transaction
costs.
1.
2.-
3.
225
caoqianseu@163.com
4.
5.
6.
1.
2.
a.
b.
3.
a.
b.
c.
d. 10
4.
a.
5
b.
c.
2
226
caoqianseu@163.com

d.
e.
6.
a.
b.
c.
7. WhovilleZlurp
a. 1.50
b. 1 a
c..Cindy Lou
d.Grinch 1
e.
8. RingoLuciano
227
caoqianseu@163.com
a.
b.
c.
9. 4
a. 4
b.
10.
a.
b.
11.Happy Vally
70
20
80
25
50
10
120 40
a.
b.
228
caoqianseu@163.com
Principles of
N. Gregory Mankiw
Harvard University
11
caoqianseu@163.com)
229
caoqianseu@163.com
11
11.1
7
10
excludable
rival in consumption
1
1.
private goods
4~6 7~9
230
caoqianseu@163.com

2.
public goods
1
2
3.
common resources
4.
club goods
15 natural monopoly
231
caoqianseu@163.com
excludability:
rivalry in consumption:
private goods:
public goods
common resources:
club goods:
11.2
11.2.1
Smalltown7 4
500 10
5000 1000 5000 1000
232
caoqianseu@163.com
free
rider
2
8
10 2
free rider
11.2.2
2009 6610
2150
233
caoqianseu@163.com
20
234
caoqianseu@163.com
19
11.2.3
cost-benefit analysis
235
caoqianseu@163.com
1.6% 1.1%
236
caoqianseu@163.com
1000
0.5
5 =0.0051000
1
cost-benefit analysis:
11.3
tragedy of the
commons
11.3.1
237
caoqianseu@163.com
17
11.3.2
10
238
caoqianseu@163.com
239
caoqianseu@163.com
2005
38 1982
14
.
405 55 /
variable
tolling
Lexus
lanes
240
caoqianseu@163.com
pilot
toll I-394 I-15
45 /
167
5 21 5.75
241
caoqianseu@163.com
27 6
Eric A. MorrisFreakonomics blog, January 6, 2009.
19 1900
400
242
caoqianseu@163.com
11.4
property rights
243
caoqianseu@163.com
excludability
public
free
goods;
rider;
Tragedy
rivalry
in consumption;
private
goods
resources;
club
goods;
common
cost-benefit
analysis;
of Commons
1.
2.
3.
4.
1.
a. 1 :
b.
2.
a.
b.
3.
a.
b.
244
caoqianseu@163.com
c.
4. Communityville
a.
b.
c.
5.
a.
b. 8
c.b
d.
e.
f.
6.
a. 1
b.
c.a
7.
8.Wicknam 5
245
caoqianseu@163.com
2
X X NX=6-N
a. X N
b.
c.
N 0 5
d.
T
c T
e.
9.
10.
11.
246
caoqianseu@163.com
Principles of
N. Gregory Mankiw
Harvard University
12
caoqianseu@163.com)
247
caoqianseu@163.com
12
.Al Capone 1920
.Ben Franklin
1789 5%
20
1/3
1
8 deadweight
losses
efficient(equitable)
12.1
1
1902 7% 30%
scarface. FBI
. 11
248
caoqianseu@163.com
1
GDP
GDPGDP
Historical Statistics of the United States; bureau of economic Analysis; and authors calculations.
49
28
44
28
37
21
36
20
33
15
32
14
30
1 GDP
OECD, united nations.
249
caoqianseu@163.com
12.1.1
2/3
2 2009 21050
2009
3.07 2009 6846
10
915
2,978
43
891
2,899
42
138
449
161
524
2,105
6,846
100
2 2009
Economic Report of the President, 2010, Table b-81.
4 15
tax liability
taxable
income
250
caoqianseu@163.com
marginal tax rate
100 8375 10%
$8,375
10%
$8,375-$34,000
15%
$34,000-$82,400
25%
$82,400-$171,850
28%
$171,850-$373,650
33%
$373,650
35%
3
2010
25,000 8375 10%

15%
payroll tax
2
social insurance taxes

social security
Medicare
2 2009 2899
corporation
2003
15%
2 8%
excise taxes
excise taxes
251
caoqianseu@163.com

4 2009 35,180 11,441
transfer payment2009
19%
10
683
2,221
19
661
2,150
19
533
1,733
15
430
1,398
12
334
1,086
187
608
690
2,244
20
3,518
11,441
100
42009
Source: Economic Report of the President, 2010, Table b-81.
2001 17% 2009 19%
4
(Temporary Assistance for Needy Families,
TANF)
2006 2009 13% 15%

4
Medicaid
252
caoqianseu@163.com

5%
2 4 14,130
budget deficit
budget surplus
budget deficit
budget surplus:
2009 14,310 2007 8
GDP
GDP
1950 65 13 16
17 20 1950
3 2
253
caoqianseu@163.com
2 a
1950 working-age population 14%
21%50 40%
1950 7 2050 2.5
a 65 20-64
b
GDP
congressional budget office.
2010
2 b GDP
1950 1% 10%
254
caoqianseu@163.com

GDP
1
GDP 10% GDP 30%
1/3
12.1.2
40%
5 2007 23,290
7,574
10
439
1,426
19
383
1,246
16
289
941
12
61
197
468
1,521
20
690
2,244
30
2,329
7,574
100
5 2007
255
caoqianseu@163.com
sales taxes
property
taxes
1/3
6 2007
10
777
2,526
34
389
1,266
17
145
471
955
3,105
42
2,265
7,367
100
6 2007
2007
1/3
256
caoqianseu@163.com
12.2
deadweight loss
administrative burdens
12.2.1
Joe 8
Jane 6
257
caoqianseu@163.com
5
3 1 4
2 7
1
2 3 4 1
3 2
1
2
1 1
0
25 1000 8%
65 21,720
25% 6%=8%75% 6%
40 10,290
the basis of taxation
consumption
2
8% 1000 10001+0.08
=1080 10001+0.082 40 10001+0.0840=21720
258
caoqianseu@163.com
tax
401K
Value-Added
Tax, VAT
2005
Alan Greenspan
2010 1
2011 1 1
2009
2010 1 1
.Joshua Rubenstein
401K 401K 1978 401 K

401K
259
caoqianseu@163.com

5,500 15
2001 2010
2011
.Andrew
Katzenstein
1 1
2010
Laura SaundersWall Street Journal, December 30, 2009
12.2.2
4 15
260
caoqianseu@163.com
12.2.3
average tax rate

marginal
tax rate
50,000 20%
50,000 50% 60,000
15,000 50,00020%+60,000-50,00050%=15,000
25%=15,000/60,000
50%
50% 0.50
average tax rate:

marginal tax rate:
40,000 40,001
50,000
20% 20% 50000
40%
261
caoqianseu@163.com
12.2.4
4000
4000
lump-sum tax
4000 20,000 20% 40,000

10%
lump-sum tax:
12.3
.Russell Long
//
262
caoqianseu@163.com
12.3.1
benefits principle
11
benefits principle:
12.3.2
ability-to-pay principle
equal sacrifice
1000 10,000
263
caoqianseu@163.com

vertical
equity
horizontal equity
7
7
proportional

regressive
progressive
264
caoqianseu@163.com
quintiles 8
1%
8 congressional budget office. 2006 .
8 2 1/5 17,200
1/5 248,400 1% 170
8 3
1/5 4.3% 1/5
1% 25.8% 31.2%.
4 5 1/5 3.9%
0.8% 1/5 55.7% 69.3%
1% 100
18.8% 28.3%
1/4
1/5 4.3%
30%
265
caoqianseu@163.com
30%
SmithJones 10
4 4
6
12.3.3
flypaper theory
266
caoqianseu@163.com
ability-to-pay principle:
vertical equity:
horizontal equity:
proportional tax:
regressive tax:
progressive tax:
267
caoqianseu@163.com
2010
.A.Paul A. Volcker
1 2
3 1
1+1+1=3
3
10% 0.30
10% 1.10
2.20 3.30
10%
268
caoqianseu@163.com
25
.C.
Edward C. Prescott
flat tax
.E.Robert E. Hall.
Alvin Rabushka 1981
flat taxproportional tax
269
caoqianseu@163.com
N. Gregory MankiwNew York Times, April 30, 2010.
12.4
progressivity
1980
. 50%
70%
1981 1986
1989 28%
. 1992
1993
40%.W.
35%.
2008
270
caoqianseu@163.com
budget deficit; budget surplus; average tax rate;

marginal tax rate; lump-sum tax; benefits principle
ability-to-pay principle vertical equity
horizontal equity; proportional tax; regressive tax;
progressive tax
1. GDP
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
1.
271
caoqianseu@163.com

http://www.cbo.gov
2.
http://www.gpo.gov
a. 1
b.
c.
3.
a.
b.
c.
d.a~c
4.
4%
15.3%
3
20,000
40,000
5.
6.
a.?
272
caoqianseu@163.com
b.
c.
7. 5% 6%
20%
8. 1986
9.
a.
b.
c.
10.
a. 7
50,000 100,000 200,000
7
b.
50,000 100,000 100,000
200,000
c.
11. 8
a.
b.
c. b
d.
273
caoqianseu@163.com
e.
12.
a.
b. c.
274
caoqianseu@163.com
Principles of
N. Gregory Mankiw
Harvard University
13
caoqianseu@163.com)
275
caoqianseu@163.com
13
industrial organization
Delta
13.1
13.1.1
276
caoqianseu@163.com
total
revenue
total
cost
profit
=-
1
2 2
total revenue:
total cost:
profit:
13.1.2
1
1
1 1
explicit costs
implicit costs
100
100
277
caoqianseu@163.com
100 500
explicit costs:
implicit costs:
13.1.3
30
5% 1.5
1.5
1.5
30 10
20 5%
1
1.5
1 0.5
13.1.4
278
caoqianseu@163.com

economic
profit
accounting profit
economic profit:
accounting profit:
279
caoqianseu@163.com
.McDonald 20
10 100
200 .
13.2
13.2.1
1
0 0 1 50 2
90 2 a
production function
50
90
120
140
150
155
50
40
30
20
10
5
30
30
30
10
40
30
20
50
30
30
60
30
40
70
30
50
80
30
60
90
1:
280
caoqianseu@163.com
b 1 marginal
product 1
2 50 90 40
2 3 90 120 30
1
a
1 1
1 1
40
30 20
diminishing marginal product
281
caoqianseu@163.com
marginal product:
diminishing marginal product:
13.2.2
1
30 10 1 40
2 50 1
1
2 b
total-cost curve
ba
Jones
1 3 2 5
3 6 100
282
caoqianseu@163.com
13.3
2
Conrad
2.
2
0~10
3 2
2
283
caoqianseu@163.com
2 2
13.3.1
fixed costs
2 3
variable costs
2 0
0 1 0.30 2 0.80
2
fixed costs:
variable costs:
284
caoqianseu@163.com
13.3.2
3.80 1.90 =3.80/2
(
)
average total cost
average
fixed cost
average variable cost
2
marginal cost 2 3
3.80 4.50 4.50 3.80 0.70
2
=/
ATC=TC/Q
=/
MC = TC / Q .
delta
average total cost:

average fixed cost:
285
caoqianseu@163.com
average variable cost:

marginal cost:
13.3.3
2
4 4 4
ATC
AFCAVC
MC
ATCAFCAVCMC
2
1
2 U 3
286
caoqianseu@163.com
U
U 4
1 2
5
1.30 6
tug of war U
U
efficient scale 5 6
1.30
1.30
1.30
4 2
287
caoqianseu@163.com
efficient scale:
13.3.4
5 ATCAFC
AVCMC
288
caoqianseu@163.com
4 22.5 5
25 5
13.4
289
caoqianseu@163.com
long-run
short-run 6
6 U
U
on or above
6
1000 1200
6
6 1000
290
caoqianseu@163.com
1 1.2
1
13.4.2
economies of scale
diseconomies of
scale
constant returns to scale
specialization
coordination problems
1200 1
291
caoqianseu@163.com
9 900
10 950
Jack of all trades, master of none.
20 1
13.5
292
caoqianseu@163.com
FC
VC
TC=FC+VC
AFC=FC/Q
AVC=VC/Q
ATC=TC/Q
MC = TC / Q
293
caoqianseu@163.com
total
revenue;
explicit
costs;
accounting
marginal
fixed
total
implicit
profit;
product;
costs
profit;
costs;
production
economic
variable
fixed costs;
efficient
scale;
costs
marginal product;
average
average
economies
of scale;
profit
function;
diminishing
average
diseconomies
cost
total cost;
variable cost;
of scale;
constant
returns to scale.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
294
caoqianseu@163.com
1.
a.
b.
c.
d.
f.
2. 50
5
a.
b. 51
3.
10
18
24
28
30
a.
b.
c. 10 5
4.Nimbus
----
20
50
90
----
295
caoqianseu@163.com
120
140
150
155
a.
b. 100 200
c. ATC=TC/Q
d. MC = TC / Q
e.
f.
5.
600
300
601
301
600
550
6.
=12
300
350
50
390
90
420
120
450
150
490
190
540
240
a.
b.
7. 200 0.50
296
caoqianseu@163.com
a.
b. 0 10 16
8.Vinnie 200
10
20
40
80
160
320
640
9.
a.
b.
10.
300
1
a.
b.
11.Jane
30
10
40
25
55
45
75
70
100
100
130
135
165
a.
297
caoqianseu@163.com
b.
12.
60
70
80
90
100
110
120
11
24
39
56
75
96
119
21
34
49
66
85
106
129
298
caoqianseu@163.com
Principles of
N. Gregory Mankiw
Harvard University
14
caoqianseu@163.com)
299
caoqianseu@163.com
14
20%
20%
market power
14.1
14.1.1
perfectly competitive
competitive market
market
300
caoqianseu@163.com
price takers
14.1.2
Vaca
Q P PQ
6 1000 6000
2000 12,000
1
6 6
1
TR=PQ
AR=TR/Q
MR = TR / Q
12
18
24
30
36
42
48
301
caoqianseu@163.com
1
1
average revenue
1
6
PQ
Q
1 5
marginal revenue
1 6
PQP
Q P
competitive market:
average revenue:
marginal revenue:
14.2
302
caoqianseu@163.com
14.2.1
2 2
6
3
2
(Q)
(TR)
(TC)
(TR-TC)
MR = TR / Q
MC = TC / Q
MR-MC
-3
12
18
12
24
17
30
23
36
30
-1
42
38
-2
48
47
-3
2 0
3
1 1 2
4
4 5 7
2
6
2 4 -3 1
6 3 3 1 4
5 6 7
1 7 6 5
1
12 3
6,7 8
303
caoqianseu@163.com
14.2.2
1
MCATC U
ARMR
1
MC
ATCAC
P
MR
AR Q1 MR1 MC1
Q2 MC2 MR2
QMAX
1 Q1
1 MR1
MC1
Q1
Q2
1 MC2MR2
Q2
Q1
304
caoqianseu@163.com
Q2
QMAX
1 QMAX
P1 P2
Q1 Q2
2
P1 Q1
P2 Q1
Q2
305
caoqianseu@163.com
14.2.3
shutdown
exit
sunk cost
TR VC
TR<VC .
Q
TR/Q < VC/Q .
TR/QPQ Q P
VC/Q AVC
P<AVC .
306
caoqianseu@163.com
AVCMC
14.2.4
,Dont cry over spilt milk
Let bygones be bygones
sunk cost
the irrelevance of sunk costs
15 10
20
15 10
10
sunk cost:
307
caoqianseu@163.com
miniature-golf course
14.2.5
TR TC
TR<TC .
Q
TR/Q < TC/Q .
TR/Q P TC/Q
ATC
P<ATC .
308
caoqianseu@163.com
P>ATC .
4.
ATCMC
14.2.6
TRTC
=TR-TC.
Q Q
=TR/Q TC/QQ.
TR/Q PTC/Q ATC

309
caoqianseu@163.com
=P-ATCQ.
5 a
P-ATC
QP-ATCQ
P-ATC Qa
b
5 b
ATC-P
QATC-PQ
14.3
310
caoqianseu@163.com
14.3.1
1000
6 a
1000
6 b 1000.
6
b
a
1000
1000.
14.3.2
311
caoqianseu@163.com
=P-ATCQ.
efficient scale
7 a P
MC ATC
a
b
7b
312
caoqianseu@163.com
14.3.3
100
5
3
8
14.3.4
8 a A
Q1 P1
D1
D2b A B Q1 Q2
P1 P2
S1 S2c
313
caoqianseu@163.com

C
P1
Q3
8
a
A
b D1
D2 A B P1 P2
Q1 Q2
S1 S2c
C
P1 Q3
314
caoqianseu@163.com
14.3.5
marginal firm
315
caoqianseu@163.com
14.4
1
316
caoqianseu@163.com
()competitive market; average revenue; marginal

revenue sunk cost
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
1.
a.
b.
2. 40
3.
27 280 30 10
317
caoqianseu@163.com

4.
10
11
13
19
27
37
16
24
32
40
48
56
a.
b.
2 3 2.5
a
c.
5..Ball Bearings
100
100
50
100
70
100
90
100
140
100
200
100
360
a.
b. 50 CEO
c.CFO CEO
6.
a.
b.
c.
318
caoqianseu@163.com

7. 500 10
8. 100
10 8 200
a.
b.
c.
d. 100
9.
a.
b.
c.
10. Ectenia
10
11
12
13
1200
1100
1000
900
800
700
600
500
400
300
200
100
10
12
a.1 6
b. 11
c.b
d.
11.
30
a.
319
caoqianseu@163.com
25
b.
c.
12. 100 16
a.
b. 10
c.
d.
13. 1000
pretzel
U
a.
b. 800
c. 800
d. 800
320
caoqianseu@163.com
Principles of
N. Gregory Mankiw
Harvard University
15
caoqianseu@163.com)
321
caoqianseu@163.com
15
Windows
100
monopoly
price taker
(price
maker)
1994
Intuit
1998
322
caoqianseu@163.com
15.1
barriers to entry
monopoly
monopoly:
15.1.1
Old West
DeBeers
.Cecil Rhodes 1888

80% 100%
15.1.2
323
caoqianseu@163.com
20
15.1.3
natural monopoly
1
11
324
caoqianseu@163.com
15.2
325
caoqianseu@163.com
15.2.1
2 a
a
b
2 b
326
caoqianseu@163.com
15.2.2
1
1
1 1 10
2 9
3 8
total revenue
average revenue
marginal revenue
3 24 4
28 4 4 =28 24
1
327
caoqianseu@163.com

3 4
4 7
4 3 1
3 3 4 7 4 4
PQ
Q
P
0
328
caoqianseu@163.com
15.2.3
4
3
4
A
B
Q1
1
329
caoqianseu@163.com

Q2
1
QMAX
P=MR=MC.
P>MR=MC.
4 B
15.2.4
TRTC
=TRTC.
=TR/QTC/QQ.
TR/Q PTC/Q ATC
=PATCQ.
330
caoqianseu@163.com
BCDE BC
DC
5 BCPATC
DC QMAX
331
caoqianseu@163.com
332
caoqianseu@163.com
fluoxetine
2001
Prozac
15.3
15.3.1
333
caoqianseu@163.com
334
caoqianseu@163.com
335
caoqianseu@163.com
15.3.2
336
caoqianseu@163.com
15.4
price discrimination
price discrimination:
15.4.1
Readalot
200
200
die-hard fans 10 30
40 5
30 10 5
50 30 300 =30
10 250 =550 100 =300
337
caoqianseu@163.com
200 50 =250 -200
40 5
30 200
10
30 40 5
300 200 500
300 30 200
15.4.2
arbitrage
338
caoqianseu@163.com

30 40
15.4.3
perfect price discrimination
9
a
339
caoqianseu@163.com
15.4.4
0.50
0.50
340
caoqianseu@163.com
0.50 12 5
quantity discount
TKTS
.Hal Varian
2.5
1998 31% 24%
341
caoqianseu@163.com
two-for-one deals
TKTS
.Phillip LeslieRand
Journal of Economics2004
1996
14 17
40%
199
TKTS
TKTS 50%
1991 10% 2.5 3.5 10%

1.5 1990
Donald Trump TKTS
TKTS
TKTS
TKTS ticket boothsTKTS

TKTS
47 12 TKTS ticket
T-K-T-S
342
caoqianseu@163.com
Hal Varian; New York Times, January 13, 2005.
15.5
15.5.1
1994 Intuit
1890
1914
15.4.4
343
caoqianseu@163.com

1984 AT&T
synergies
120
.Lisa Richard
1980
344
caoqianseu@163.com
.W.
2008
.Christine Varney
White
& Case.Joseph Angland
2007 Leegin PSKS Leegin

Creative Leather Products v. PSKS
5:4 100
retail price maintenance
Herb Kohl
Arlen Specter
2007
.Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
AT&TProcter & Gamble Verizon

Leegin PSKS Leegin 2002
Leegin PSKS Leegin 20%Leegin PSKS
PSKS PSKS Leegin Leegin Leegin
Leegin 5:4
Twombly Bell Atlantic Twombly

2007
345
caoqianseu@163.com
Verizon .John
Thorne
test cases
1914 5
1914
30
(Jon Leibowitz)
Thomas Catan; The Wall Street Journal, January 31, 2010.
15.5.2
marginal-cost pricing
13
10
346
caoqianseu@163.com
deadweight loss
average-cost pricing
10
15.5.3
public ownership
347
caoqianseu@163.com
first-class mail
15.5.4
.George Stigler
market failure
15.6
13
348
caoqianseu@163.com
TaurusCamry
Ben & JerrysBreyers
15.2
P=MC
MR=MC
MR=P
MR<P
P=MC
P>MC
349
caoqianseu@163.com
monopoly; natural monopoly; price discrimination
350
caoqianseu@163.com

1.
2.
3.
4.
5. 4
6.
7.
8.
1.
100
90
10
80
20
a.
70
30
60
40
50
50
40
60
30
70
20
80
c.
10
90
100
200
10
b. MR = TR / Q
d.
351
caoqianseu@163.com
e. 300 200
f.
2.
a.
b.
3..Johnny Rockabilly CD
CD
24
22
20
18
16
14
CD CD 5
a. CD 1 2 CD 1
b. CD
c.
4. 200
a.
b.
c.
d.
352
caoqianseu@163.com
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
5.
6.Ectenia
240 10
Q D = 10 P P
a.
b. 24
c.
2345
d.c
e.
7.AT&T
a.
b.
AT&T
353
caoqianseu@163.com
c.
8.
a.
?
b.
c.
9.per-unit
tax
10. 300 200

2000
10
100
200
300
300
300
100
300
200
300
200
300
200
300
200
300
200
a.
b.
c.
354
caoqianseu@163.com
d. 2500 2000 a
bc
11.Wiknam
P=10-Q
MR=10-2Q
TC=3+Q+0.5Q2
MC=1+Q
Q P
a.
b. 6
c. 9
ab
d. 6 a
9
12. Ectenia
DVD
P=1000-10Q
TR=1000Q-10Q2
MR=1000-20Q
MC=100+10Q
Q DVD P DVD
a.
b.
c.
d.
355
caoqianseu@163.com
i. 2000 ii. 50%iii. DVD 150 iv.

50%.
13.
a.
b. X Y
Z
c.b X
Y Z
d.
XY Z
e.
C X
YZ C
f.
XYZ C
g.ef
356
caoqianseu@163.com
Principles of
N. Gregory Mankiw
Harvard University
16
caoqianseu@163.com)
357
caoqianseu@163.com
16
Sue Grafton
.Stephen King.David McCullough
...Stephenie Meyer
25 5
monopolistic competition
oxymoron
16.1
14
15
14
15
358
caoqianseu@163.com
imperfect competition
oligopoly
concentration ratio
50%
78%
81%89%
93%95%
monopolistic competition
DVD
14
359
caoqianseu@163.com
oligopoly:
monopolistic competition:
16.2
360
caoqianseu@163.com

14
16.2.1
a
b
a
b
361
caoqianseu@163.com
16.2.2
2 a
362
caoqianseu@163.com
16.2.3
4 14
4 a
4 b
efficient scale
excess capacity
4 ba
363
caoqianseu@163.com
b
a
16.2.4
364
caoqianseu@163.com
the product-variety externality
the business-stealing externality:
365
caoqianseu@163.com
.Joel Waldfogel
..the tyranny of the majority
. 1962
12
366
caoqianseu@163.com
2/3 3%
album-rock
Foot Locker
1.5%
10
Joel WaldfogelSlate, Thursday, October 4, 2007.
16.3
Larry the Cable Guy Daniel Lawrence Whitney

367
caoqianseu@163.com
10%
20%
2%
16.3.1
368
caoqianseu@163.com
1972 .Lee Benham

1960
33
1963 1963
7 26
20%
16.3.2
369
caoqianseu@163.com
PostKellogg
3
3 1000 100
100
1000 300
1000 3600
300
370
caoqianseu@163.com
..John Kenneth Galbraith.Friedrich

Hayek 20
1958
The Affluent Society
1944 The Road to Serfdom

1961
1974 2000
16.3.3
371
caoqianseu@163.com
Bayer
.Edward Chamberlin
16.4
372
caoqianseu@163.com
MR=MC
MR=MC
MR=MC
P=MC
P>MC
P>MC
373
caoqianseu@163.com
oligopoly; monopolistic competition
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
374
caoqianseu@163.com
7.
1.
a.
b.
c.
d.
2.
a. 2
b.
c.
d.
e.
3.
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
4.
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
f.
5.
375
caoqianseu@163.com

a. P<MC, P>ATC
b. P>MC, P<ATC
c. P=MC, P>ATC
d. P>MC, P=ATC
6. Sparkle
a.
b.
c.
d.
7. N
Q=100/NP
MR=100/N2Q
TC=50+Q2
MC=2Q
a. N
b. N
c.
d.
e.
8.Nutville
a.
b.
c.
d.
e.
9.
a.
b.
c.
376
caoqianseu@163.com
10.Sleek
a.
b.
c.
d.c
11..Frank Perdue
a.
b.
12.
a.
b.a
c.
377
caoqianseu@163.com
Principles of
N. Gregory Mankiw
Harvard University
17
caoqianseu@163.com)
378
caoqianseu@163.com
17
Wilson, Penn, Dunlop, or Spalding
oligopoly
game theory
strategic
tic-tac-toe
oligopoly:
game theory:
17.1
379
caoqianseu@163.com
17.1.1
duopoly
Jack
Jill
1
10 110 20
100
1
1
17.1.2
380
caoqianseu@163.com
120
1
60 60
120
collusion
cartel
15
60 60
120
60
30
60 1,800
collusion:
cartel:
381
caoqianseu@163.com
bright-line rule
100 X
95
Alistair Lindsay; The Wall Street Journal, december 13, 2007.
17.1.3
382
caoqianseu@163.com
30
30 60 60
1800 =3060 40
70 50 2000 =4050
40
80 40
40
40 1600
1600 50
90 30 1500
40
40
.
Nash equilibrium
40 40
40 40
383
caoqianseu@163.com
17.1.4
JohnJoan
1
4 10 40
41 40
10
384
caoqianseu@163.com
17.2

prisoners
dilemma
17.2.1
Bonnie
Clyde
385
caoqianseu@163.com
20
8
1
1
8 8
88
020
200
11
8 20
dominant strategy
386
caoqianseu@163.com
17.2.2
30
40 30
40 1600 1600
2000 1500
30 1500 2000
1800 1800
30
40
30
2000 1800
40 1600
1500
40
40
40
jointly rational
387
caoqianseu@163.com
prisoners dilemma:
dominant strategy:
OPEC
Organization of
Petroleum Exporting Countries, OPEC 1960
1973 8
OPEC
OPEC
OPEC OPEC
OPEC
OPEC 1973 1985

1972 3 1974 11 1981 35
1980 OPEC
1986 13
OPEC
2007 2008
OPEC
OPEC
388
caoqianseu@163.com
17.2.3
389
caoqianseu@163.com
11
ExxonTexaco
1200 100
500 =600 100
600 =800 200
300
=400 100
200
400
400400
600300
300600
500500
17.2.4
non-cooperative equilibrium
390
caoqianseu@163.com
3
4
17.2.5
2
30
40
40 40
1800 2000
1600
391
caoqianseu@163.com
.Robert Axelrod
tit-for-tat
an eye
for an eye, a tooth for a tooth
17.3
392
caoqianseu@163.com
17.3.1
common law
1890
1914
15
18 .
393
caoqianseu@163.com

1980 1983 2 24
.Robert Crandall.
Howard PutnamBraniff Airways
@#%#$%
$%*& 20%
@#$%&*#@
17.3.2
resale price maintenance

Superduper DVD 300
350
350
394
caoqianseu@163.com
DVD
DVD
11
CoyoteRoadrunner
20% 80%
predatory pricing
395
caoqianseu@163.com
80%
tyingMakemoney
2
2
City 1.5 0.5
Country 0.5
1.5
1.5
396
caoqianseu@163.com
1998
.
.Franklin Fisher
.Richard Schmalensee
Windows
CD
80%
Mac Linux
50 3%
1999 10
.Penfield Jackson
2000 6
2001 9
397
caoqianseu@163.com
2002 11
Google
Google
Google
Google business-to-business, B2B
.
Christine Varney Google
.Dana Wagner Google

Google
.Adam Kovacevich
Google
Google 2.66%
Google
Google Google
70%
Google
Google
30%operating
marginGoogle 1990
Google
398
caoqianseu@163.com
64 .Learned Hand
Google
Google .
Gary Reback.Carr & Ferrell
1990
spit on the sidewalk
Jeff HorwitzWashington Post, June 7, 2009.
17.4
price fixing
399
caoqianseu@163.com
oligopoly game theory collusion; cartel;

Nash equilibrium; prisoners dilemma; dominant
strategy
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
400
caoqianseu@163.com
1. 1,000
8,000
7,000
6,000
5,000
4,000
3,000
2,000
1,000
5,000
6,000
7,000
8,000
9,000
10,000
11,000
12,000
a.
b.
c.
1000
d.c
2.
1993 11 30 OPEC
[] 1990 6
a. OPEC
b. OPEC
c. OPEC OPEC
do their share OPEC
3.
a.
b.
c.1994
4.
10
401
caoqianseu@163.com
2525
1030
3010
2010
a.
b.
c.1993
d. 3 9
5.SynergyDynaco
30,
70,
20
030
5040
a.
b.
c.
6.
A 40
B 30
D 10
25
a.
b.
c.b
d. B 50 A 80
402
caoqianseu@163.com
ab
7.
100 100 200

200 100
200
a.
b.
c.
8. 1
X
a. 22
b. X
c. X
9.Little KonaBig Brew
2,
07
1,
02
a.
b.a
c.
d.
10.
80
a. 80
b. 10
403
caoqianseu@163.com

c.
404
caoqianseu@163.com
Principles of
N. Gregory Mankiw
Harvard University
18
caoqianseu@163.com)
405
caoqianseu@163.com
18.
2010 14
3/4
fringe benefits 1/4
2
factors of
production
derived demand
19 20
406
caoqianseu@163.com
factors of production:
18.1
1
ab

a
b
final
goods
18.1.1
407
caoqianseu@163.com
competitive
profit maximizing
18.1.2
1
1
production
function
1 100
2 180
2 1
408
caoqianseu@163.com
marginal product of labor

1 2 100 180
80 =180-100
diminishing marginal product
409
caoqianseu@163.com

production function:
marginal product of labor:
diminishing marginal product:
18.1.3
10 80
800
value of the marginal product

1
10
1
marginal revenue product:

500
1 1000 500
800 300 600
100
400 500
100 3
3
3
410
caoqianseu@163.com
value of the marginal product:
18.1.4
411
caoqianseu@163.com
1960 2009 183%
labor-saving
labor-augmenting
150% 87%
14
412
caoqianseu@163.com
marginal product of labor,

MPLmarginal cost, MC 500
50 50 500
10 =500/10 W
MPL MC=W/MPL
MPL
MC
PMPLW PMPL=W
MPL P=W/MPL W/MPL MC
W/MPL=MC
P=MC.
14
19
.Ned Ludd
413
caoqianseu@163.com
1813 17
Luddite
18.2
21
18.2.1
1
15 15
20
15
20
slope backward
21
414
caoqianseu@163.com
18.2.3
1950 34% 2009

59%tastes
18.3
415
caoqianseu@163.com
18.3.1
5
416
caoqianseu@163.com
S1 S2 W1
W1 W2
S1
S2 W1 W2 W2
L1 L2
1980
1967
1988
50%
417
caoqianseu@163.com
.Pia Orrenius
12.5% 3800
1100 1200
80%
100 200
40%
GDP
418
caoqianseu@163.com
25
1%~3%
Originally published in Southwest Economy, March/April 2006. Data updated for this edition by Dr.
Orrenius.
18.3.2
6 D1
D2 W1 W2 L1 L2
419
caoqianseu@163.com
D1 D2
W1 W2 L1 L2
420
caoqianseu@163.com
2 1959
2009 2.1%
1.9% 2%
35
2
1959-2009
2.1
1.9
1959-1973
2.8
2.8
1973-1995
1.4
1.2
1995-2009
2.6
2.3
2010 B-49
implicit price deflator
2
1973
1995
2.8% 1.4% 2.8% 1.2%
1995
1995 2009 2.6% 2.3%
421
caoqianseu@163.com
monopsony
15
18.4
capital
422
caoqianseu@163.com
18.4.1
purchase price
rental price
7
a

ab
423
caoqianseu@163.com
capital:
dividends
stockholder
424
caoqianseu@163.com
18.4.2
14 bubonic plague
black death
425
caoqianseu@163.com
50%
18.5
neoclassical theory of distribution
15
426
caoqianseu@163.com
factor of production; production function;

marginal product of labor; diminishing marginal product;
value of marginal product; capital
1.
2.
3.
4.
427
caoqianseu@163.com
5.
1.
a.
b.
c.
2.
a.
b.
c.
3.
13
19
25
28
29
29
a.
b. 10
c. 0 100
d.
e. 10 12
428
caoqianseu@163.com
4. 4 100
50
85
115
140
150
155
a.
b.
c.
d.
5.Ectenia 20 2
Q=100LL2
MPL=1002L
Q L MPL
a. W
b. 200 W
c. 4
6. 7 6
3
7.
a.
b. 2 30%
429
caoqianseu@163.com

c. 30% 50%
8.Leadbelly
150
a.
b. 30
c. 4
d.c
9. 20 1980 1990
a.
b.
10.
a. 3
b.
c.
d. 6
11.
a.
430
caoqianseu@163.com
b.
c.
d.
431
caoqianseu@163.com
Principles of
N. Gregory Mankiw
Harvard University
19
caoqianseu@163.com)
432
caoqianseu@163.com
19
20 5
2
18
19.1
19.1.1
compensating differential
433
caoqianseu@163.com
compensating differential:
()
19.1.2
capital
human capital
434
caoqianseu@163.com
human capital:
1
1980 44% 2008
88% 35% 71%
1
1980
2008
45,310
43,493
65,287
81,975
+44%
+88%
27,324
31,666
36,894
54,207
+35%
+71%
2008
18
435
caoqianseu@163.com
1970
5% 2009 14% 1970 6%
2009 11%
19.1.3
436
caoqianseu@163.com
omitted variables
.Keira
Knightley
.Daniel
Hamermesh.Jeff Biddle 1994
12
5% 5%~10%
beauty premium
437
caoqianseu@163.com
19.1.4
16
19.1.5
Johnny Depp
Serena Williams
438
caoqianseu@163.com
9/11
.C.Richard
C. Reid
selection bias
.Efraim Benmelech.Claude
Berrebi
439
caoqianseu@163.com
2000 ~2005
30
21
18% 26 60%
12%
35
Reid
9/11 26
.Mohammed Atta
33
Austan Goolsbee; New York Times, September 14, 2006.
19.1.6
440
caoqianseu@163.com
16
market
power
union
strike
10%~20%.

efficiency
wages
turnover
union:
strike:
efficiency wages:
441
caoqianseu@163.com
19.2
discrimination
19.2.1
47,370
37,253
21%
36,198
31,509
13%
24%
15%
2008 14
2 median
21% 13%
24%
15%
75%
11%
442
caoqianseu@163.com
.Marianne Bertrand.
Sendhil Mullainathan
1300 5000
.
Lakisha Washington.Jamal Jones
443
caoqianseu@163.com
.Emily Walsh.Greg
Baker
2004 9
50%
19.2.2
444
caoqianseu@163.com
20
1986 .Jennifer Roback
19.2.3
445
caoqianseu@163.com
1988
20%
446
caoqianseu@163.com
1960
1990
10% 13%
.
Muriel Niederle.Lise Vesterlund
Do Women Shy Away From Competition? Do Men Compete Too Much?
447
caoqianseu@163.com
2 2 20
piece-rate basis 0.5

4
2 25%
25%2
0.5
75% 35%
38%
75% 43%
.Terrance Odean
Hal R. Varian; New York Times, March 9, 2006.
448
caoqianseu@163.com
19.3
20
449
caoqianseu@163.com
compensating differential; human capital; union;

strike; efficiency wages; discrimination
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
1.
a.
b.
c.
2. 6
450
caoqianseu@163.com
subminimum
3.
[(job tenure)]
4.
a.
b.
5.
6.
7.
[merit pay]
a.
b.
c.
d.
8..Alan Greenspan
1960
9.
451
caoqianseu@163.com
a.combined labor market
b.
a
10.
452
caoqianseu@163.com
Principles of
N. Gregory Mankiw
Harvard University
20
caoqianseu@163.com)
453
caoqianseu@163.com
20
.Mary Colum.Ernest
Hemingway
3/4
inequality
20.1
human capital
compensating differentials
compensating wage differential
454
caoqianseu@163.com
1/5, 1/5 1/5

1/5 1/5 1 5%
2008
1/5
27,800
1/5
27,800~49325
1/5
49,325~75,000
1/5
75,000~113,205
1/5
113,205
5%
200,000
U.S. Bureau of the Census.

2 2
2008 1/5
4% 1/5 47.8% 1/5
1/5 1/5 1/5 12
2
1/5
1/5
1/5
1/5
1/5
5%
2008
4.0
9.6
15.5
23.1
47.8
20.5
2000
4.3
9.8
15.5
22.8
47.4
20.8
1990
4.6
10.8
16.6
23.8
44.3
17.4
1980
5.2
11.5
17.5
24.3
41.5
15.3
1970
5.5
12.2
17.6
23.8
40.9
15.6
1960
4.8
12.2
17.8
24.0
41.3
15.9
1950
4.5
12.0
17.4
23.4
42.7
17.3
1935
4.1
9.2
14.1
20.9
51.7
26.5
2 1/5 5%
U.S. Bureau of the Census.
2 2008 5%
20.5% 40%
2 1935
1/5 4%~5% 1/5
455
caoqianseu@163.com
40%~50% 1935 1970

1/5 4.1% 5.5%
1/5 51.7% 40.9% 1970
2008 1/5 5.5% 4.0% 1/5
40.9% 47.8%
19
20.1.2
10%
10%
2009Human Development Report 2009

.
1 12
456
caoqianseu@163.com
4.5
40.6
20.1.3
poverty rate
poverty
line
2008
median 61,521 22,025
13.2%13.2%
2 1959
1959 22.4% 1973 11.1%
50%
.F.John F. Kennedy
1970
1973
457
caoqianseu@163.com
2 2
frequency 3
%
13.2
8.6
24.7
23.2
11.8
18
19.0
64
9.7
5.5
31.4
2008
poverty rate:
poverty line:
458
caoqianseu@163.com
20.1.4
in-kind transfers
10
50 65
life cycle
transitory income
459
caoqianseu@163.com
permanent income
life cycle:
permanent income:
.Michael Cox.
Richard Alm 2008
1/5 1/5
2006 1/5 149,963 1/5
9,974 15
1/5
1/5 14
1/5 1/5 3.9
1/5 3.1 1/5

1.7 2.1
460
caoqianseu@163.com
.Mollie
Orshansky 1964 1955 1960
1.3
1995
461
caoqianseu@163.com
21,818 20,444
26,138
1960
18% 23%
Rebecca M. Blank; Los Angeles Times, September 15, 2008.
20.1.5
462
caoqianseu@163.com
mobility
10 1/4
3%
20% 8%
4/5
1/5
20.2
positive
normative
463
caoqianseu@163.com
20.2.1
utilitarianism
.1748-1832..1806-1873
utility
diminishing marginal
utility
PeterPaul 8 2
1
10
464
caoqianseu@163.com
utilitarianism:
utility:
20.2.2
liberalism.John
Rawls 1971
just
an original position behind a veil of ignorance
maximin criterion
465
caoqianseu@163.com
social insurance
liberalism:
maximin criterion:
social insurance:
20.2.3
libertarianism
466
caoqianseu@163.com
.Robert Nozick
unfair
just
fairunequal
equality
PamPauline
20.3
467
caoqianseu@163.com
20.3.1
minimum-wage laws
20.3.2
welfare
Temporary Assistance for Needy Families, TANF
Supplemental Security Income, SSI
468
caoqianseu@163.com
1996
1970
welfare:
20.3.3
12
negative income tax
=1/3 1 .
6 1 9 2
3 0 1.5 -0.5
0.5
Earned Income Tax
469
caoqianseu@163.com
Credit, EITC
20.3.4
food stamps
Medicaid
2008 2009
Fannie MaeFreddie
Mac
470
caoqianseu@163.com
1970 90 90th percentile

50
40
2004
20
471
caoqianseu@163.com
Raghuram Rajan; Project Syndicate, July 9, 2010.
20.3.5
2
2
100%
100%
100%
1 0.3 30%
472
caoqianseu@163.com
workfare
1996
20.4
473
caoqianseu@163.com
.
.
.
poverty rate; poverty line;
in-kind transfers;
life cycle; permanent income; utilitarianism;

utility; liberalism; maximin criterion;
social insurance; libertarianism; welfare
negative income tax
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
474
caoqianseu@163.com
7.
1. 2 1970 19
2. 3
3.
4.
a.
b.
c.
5. 10 10 2
10 20 10 2.2
10
a.
b.
c.
d.
6.
a.
b.
7.
3 1 2.5
a.
b.
c.
475
caoqianseu@163.com
8.
Medicaid
7000
a. 7000
2
b.a
ab
c.a
ac
9.TANF
EITC
a. TANF
TANF
b.EITC
c. TANF TANF EITC

10. 2010 .
476
caoqianseu@163.com
Principles of
N. Gregory Mankiw
Harvard University
21
caoqianseu@163.com)
477
caoqianseu@163.com
21
14
1
21.1
constrained
1000 10
478
caoqianseu@163.com
2
1
100
consumption bundle:90
50 1000
1000
10 2
1
A 100 0 B
0 500 C 50 250
C A B
500
AB
budget constraint
A B 500
100 5 /
5 5
479
caoqianseu@163.com
51 5
budget constraint:
1000 5 10
21.2
21.2.1
indifferent
indifference curve
2 A B C
A B
B C
marginal rate of substitution, MRS
480
caoqianseu@163.com
I2
I1MRS
1
2 I2 I1
D A
D
D
A D C
D D
C D C D
indifference curve:
481
caoqianseu@163.com

marginal rate of substitution:
21.2.2
A B
B C
A C
C A
AB C C A
4
MRS
482
caoqianseu@163.com

bowed
inward 4 A
1 6
6 / B
1 1
1 /
MRS
A
6
/ B
1 /
21.3
483
caoqianseu@163.com

5 1
2 5 1 1 5 1
2.
5 a
perfect substitutes
5 1
a
b
5 7
5
5 b
5 5 5 7 7 5
perfect complements
484
caoqianseu@163.com
5 1
perfect substitutes:
perfect complements:
21.3
21.3.1
6
I2
optimum A
B
485
caoqianseu@163.com
tangent
I2 I3 A
B B
486
caoqianseu@163.com
utility
marginal utility
diminishing marginal utility:
X Y 2 1 X 2
Y 2.
MRS=PX/PY
MUX/MUY=PX/PY
MUX/PX=MUY/PY
X
Y
21.3.2
487
caoqianseu@163.com
initial optimum(new optimum)
7
4
7
normal good
inferior good 8
488
caoqianseu@163.com
21.3.3
2 1
set of buying opportunities
9
1000
489
caoqianseu@163.com
A 1000 1000
500 B D
2 1 10
10 5
normal good:
inferior good:
490
caoqianseu@163.com
21.3.4
income effect
substitution effect
1
1
10
A C
I1 A
B B
B
I2 B C
491
caoqianseu@163.com
B C
I1 B I2 C
10
I1 A B
I1 B
I2 C
B
A B
B C
A B B C
21.3.5
492
caoqianseu@163.com

11 a 2 1
250 750
b
11
a 2 1
A B 250 750 b
21.4
493
caoqianseu@163.com
21.4.1
law of demand
12 AB
C AD E
12
Giffen good
.Robert Giffen
494
caoqianseu@163.com
Giffen good:
19
.Robert Jensen.Nolan Miller
21.4.2
Sally
495
caoqianseu@163.com
100
50 50
50
13 100
100 5000
40 60 2000
13
13
50
I2
50 60 14
BC1 BC2BC2 BC1
496
caoqianseu@163.com

ab
14
BC1 BC2
a
b
14 ab
b
497
caoqianseu@163.com
backward
6 5
5 25%
9% 100
40%
498
caoqianseu@163.com
1993
15
2.5 19 .Andrew Carnegie
21.4.3
Sam
10
15
499
caoqianseu@163.com
10% 1 1.10
15 10
0 10 0 11
15
5 5.5
10% 20% 16
16
aba
16 ab
ab
a
b
500
caoqianseu@163.com
21.5
501
caoqianseu@163.com
budget constraint; indifference curve; marginal
502
caoqianseu@163.com
rate of substitution; perfect substitutes; perfect complements

normal good; inferior good
income effect;
substitution effect; Giffen good
1. 3,000 3 6
2.
3.
4.
3 6
5. 3,000 4,000
6. 6 10 3
3,000
7.
1.
a.
b.
c.
2.
503
caoqianseu@163.com

a.
b.
c.
3.
a.
b.
c.
4.
a.
b.
5.
a. 100 2 4
b. 10%
6.
a.
b.
7. 6 Cup O Soup 1.50

60
a.
A
b. 2 a
30% B
c.
504
caoqianseu@163.com
d. A B
8.
a. 15%
b.
9.Sarah 100
6 8 10
6 8
8 10
10.
11. A
100 A 20 2
a.A
3 A
3 A
A 25
b.
12. 20
10 2
a.
b. 12
c.
13..George Stigler
505
caoqianseu@163.com
14.
a.
b.
c.b
15.
12
12
2 1
506
caoqianseu@163.com
Principles of
N. Gregory Mankiw
Harvard University
22
caoqianseu@163.com)
507
caoqianseu@163.com
22
asymmetric information
political economy
behavioral economics
22.1
information asymmetry
hidden action
hidden
characteristic)
2001 . George Akerlof
Michael SpenceJoseph Stiglitz
508
caoqianseu@163.com
22.1.1
agent
principal
moral
hazard
efficiency-wage theories 19
moral hazard:
agent:
principal:
509
caoqianseu@163.com
-
CEO
compensation packages
2005 -Enron
TycoWorldcom
22.1.2
510
caoqianseu@163.com
adverse
selection
adverse
lemon
adverse selection:
22.1.3
signaling
Adverse selection, anti-selection, or negative selection
lemon
511
caoqianseu@163.com
private information
16
20
as seen on TV
public information
512
caoqianseu@163.com
22.1.4
signaling
screening
deductible 1000 1000

1000 1500 500
513
caoqianseu@163.com
screening:
22.1.5
market successmarket failure

7
.
10 11
15 17
20
22.2
514
caoqianseu@163.com

political economy
public choice theory
22.2.1
18
Marquis de Condorcet
AB C
1
35
45
20
AB C
A BB CC A
B C
1 2 BB A B
1 3 AA A BB C
A
A C
2 3 CC
pairwise
majority votingA BB CC A
transitivity: A B B C A C
Condorcet paradox
515
caoqianseu@163.com
A B C C B
C A A A C
B B
22.2.2
1 2
1 B
Borda
count 18
.Kenneth Arrow 1951
ABC
unanimity:
A B A B
transitivity:
A BB C A C
independence
of irrelevant alternative: A
B C
Arrows
impossibility
theorem
516
caoqianseu@163.com

1
B C
A B A C
A B A B
C
Arrows impossibility theorem:
instant runoff
281
20%
79%
squeaky-wheel phenomenon
The squeaky-wheel gets oil.
517
caoqianseu@163.com
21%
20% 2000
.Al Gore.Ralph Nader
.W.
.Michel Balinski
.Steven Brams
.Rida Larakimajority judgment

1~6
range voting
.D.Warren D. Smith
-
49 6 4 1 3
4 49 3 1
4 3
1936
.Bruce Davis 15
518
caoqianseu@163.com
Rocky
Network
519
caoqianseu@163.com

.Pedro Martinez
Carl BialikThe Wall Street Journal, February 6, 2009.
22.2.3
1 100 200
100
0 200
100
10
median voter theorem
median voter
520
caoqianseu@163.com
50 100
100 90
modal
15 1
100 100
100
80 100 100
100 120 100
100
150
100 150
50% 20 100
15 50 25
60
40%
60%
median
,,
100 50 51
100 1
150 100 35
1 50 25 75
100 150 200 50 50
50 100
1
40 60 100 150
60 40 100
521
caoqianseu@163.com
median voter theorem:
22.2.4
-
20% 9:1, 25% 10:1, 15%
11:1, 40% 12:1
22.3
522
caoqianseu@163.com
range
behavioral economics
22.3.1
Homo economicus
Homo sapiens
.Herbert Simon
satisficers
90%
90%
90%
1000
1000
1001
X

Homo economicus Economic human
Homo reciprocans, or
Reciprocal human
523
caoqianseu@163.com
401K 401K
22.3.2
ultimatum
game
100
A B A B 100 A
B B A B
A
524
caoqianseu@163.com

A B
A 99 B 1 B
A B B
A B B A B 1
17 99-1
B B 1
A B 1
B 30 40
B
99-1
70-30
18 19
B
A
22.3.3
1.A 50 B 60
2.A90 50 B91 60
1 B 2 A
2
1
525
caoqianseu@163.com
2 90
50
1
inconsistency over time
76%
sin taxes
526
caoqianseu@163.com

.A.David A.
Paterson
2
5 2 /
527
caoqianseu@163.com
18
N. Gregory Mankiw; New York Times, June 6, 2010
22.4
528
caoqianseu@163.com
moral hazard; agent; principal; adverse

selection; signaling;
screening; political
economy; Condorcet paradox; Arrows impossibility
theorem; median voter theorem; behavioral economics
1.
2.
3.
529
caoqianseu@163.com
4.
5.
6.
1.
a.
b.
c.
2. 5000
6000
3.
4.
HIV HIV HIV
5.
6.Ken
530
caoqianseu@163.com
7.
a.
b.
c.ab
8.
Dexter
Glee
House
a.
b.
c.
d.
9.
14
10
12
10
15 3
a.
b.
531
caoqianseu@163.com
c.median
d.
e.d
f.
10.
A B B C
A C
A B A B
11. 1
1
12.
a.
b.
532
caoqianseu@163.com

Caoqian Mankiw E6

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Caoqian Mankiw E6

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Principles of

Ron CronvichCarthage College David Hakes

San Diego Mesa College

San Joaquin Valley College

Long Beach City College

Sam Houston State University

John Carroll University

University of Tennessee Knoxville

San Diego Mesa College

Bowie State University

Fresno City College

Laura Jean Bhadra

Northern Virginia Community College

Cleveland State University

Mississippi State University

Texas Lutheran University

Georgia Southern University

Columbus State University

Washington State University

Texas State University - San Marcos

James Madison University

Rutgers University, New Brunswick

California State Polytechnic University

Ivy Tech Community College

Northern Virginia Community College

Kennesaw State University

Luzerne County Community College

Brigham Young University

Southern New Hampshire University

Western Technical College

Colorado State University

San Diego Mesa College

Cape Fear Community College

University of New Hampshire

State University of New York Fredonia

College of Southern Nevada

Borough of Manhattan Community

Indiana University South Bend

Durham Technical Community College

Illinois Valley Community College

Florida International University

University of the Pacific

Dallas Baptist University

University of Northern Iowa

South Seattle Community College

Ball State University

Fort Hays State University

Georgia College & State University

St. Marys College/Napa Valley College

Minnesota State University at Mankato

Sam Houston State University

Georgia Southern University

University of Northern Iowa

Texas Christian University

Rutgers University, Newark

University of Tennessee Knoxville

St. Andrews Presbyterian College

Northern Illinois University

Oakton Community College

Texas Tech University

Modesto Junior College

Emporia State University

Penn State University