Running head: THE FUTURE OF NATO: BEYOND 2010 1

The Future of NATO: Beyond 2010

Mark D. Derham

American Military University

THE FUTURE OF NATO: BEYOND 2010 2

At the end of World War II, the world quickly became divided between the West and the

East. On the West, the United States and Great Britain were strong advocates for democracy. On

the East, the communist Soviet Union was fearful of the democratic policies that the U.S. was

pushing for. This divide created a strong tension leading Winston Churchill to deliver a powerful

speech in 1946 where he stated an “iron curtain” had descended upon the European continent

(Halsall, 1997, para. 7). Churchill’s speech marked the beginning of the Cold War and the need

for a strong and united Western Europe against the communist Soviet Union and its satellite

states. This backdrop became the breeding ground of the highly celebrated North Atlantic Treaty

Organization (NATO), commonly referred to as the Atlantic Alliance. Since its inception, NATO

has steadily grown in power and international respect to become one of the most successful

alliances in history. At the end of the Cold War, many called into question the necessity of a

defense pact that was originally designed to combat a conventional war. NATO’s strategic

concept has evolved considerably over time and continues to evolve to this day through review

boards. The current issues that affect NATO today and will ultimately shape NATO in the future

are the war in Afghanistan; NATO enlargement, with specific concerns regarding Georgia and

Ukraine accession; NATO-Russia relations; and the European Union’s encroachment on

NATO’s roles and responsibilities.

Strategic Concept

According to Hillary Clinton (2010), the current U.S. Secretary of State, NATO was

charged at inception with three goals that could easily be adapted to new challenges: defend

Euro-Atlantic Alliance nations, strengthen transatlantic relations, and facilitate European

integration (para. 4). NATO’s founders understood that the world is a constantly changing place

where one day, the Soviet Union would no longer be the sole concern of the Atlantic Alliance.
THE FUTURE OF NATO: BEYOND 2010 3

NATO proved to be up to the challenge that was set before it. With a common enemy before

them, western European states quickly integrated and established an order that had never before

been present. At the same time, throughout the Cold War, not a single NATO member ever faced

a military conflict with a member of the Warsaw Pact, and transatlantic relations rose to a level

never before seen. The original strategic concept that NATO’s founders envisioned at the start of

the Cold War had proven to be a demanding challenge that NATO members were able to fulfill.

The end of the Cold War created a void for NATO members, and it quickly become clear

NATO’s strategic vision needed to be revised to face new challenges in an evolving security

environment. The new security environment consisted of the potential for political unrest and

small scale wars that required intervention. There was no longer the fear of a conventional war.

In 1999, the strategic concept of NATO was revised, and it remains in place to this day,

although, it is currently being reviewed and revised. The 1999 Strategic Concept changed

NATO’s entire role in the international community. Gone was the fear of conventional war.

Gone was the fear of communist expansion. The new challenges that arose consisted of

economic, social, and political difficulties; conflicts in the Middle East and Mediterranean;

Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) proliferation; and terrorism (NATO, 1999, para. 7-14).

These security concerns were highlighted by NATO’s new Strategic Concept, however, the

importance of the Atlantic Alliance was also reaffirmed. These new challenges would also be

combated by a strong NATO military power coupled with political dialogue (NATO, 1999, para.

14, 19).

There is no question that NATO has been able to successfully adapt their vision

throughout the last couple decades to a changing security environment. The last few years has

proven a difficult challenge for NATO. The rise of global terrorism and the failure of NATO to
THE FUTURE OF NATO: BEYOND 2010 4

truly and effectively employ their forces has brought about new challenges. In April 2009,

NATO launched a strategic concept review with plans to be completed by late 2010 (Mulvany,

2009, para. 1).

According to Chivvis (2009), there are five directions that NATO will likely adopt during

the review of their strategic concept and multiple combinations of these directions (p. 12-14).

The Atlantic Alliance will either decide to refocus on Europe, focus on the Middle East, focus on

failing states, focus on non-state threats, or decide to become a global alliance of democracies

(Chivvis, 2009, p. 12). Each of these directions has its own set of difficulties and complexities

that will challenge NATO’s leaders. For instance, if NATO decides to refocus on Europe, the

United States gains little in return causing them to lose interest and chip away at NATO’s

credibility (Chivvis, 2009, p. 12). Chivvis (2009) believes a combination of refocusing on

Europe, focusing on non-state threats and focusing on failed states is the most likely path to be

taken (p. 13).

This combination appears to be the most likely path to follow for several reasons. First,

NATO would have many difficulties transitioning to a global alliance, and it simply isn’t in their

best interest to attempt this kind of change at this point in time. This makes it necessary for

NATO to refocus Europe in order to get back to their roots. Second, non-state threats are the

future of global security issues, and NATO must learn to deal with them properly now otherwise

they face credibility issues later. Third, failed states have always been a security risk to the

global community, and the Afghanistan conflict has proven that NATO is ill-equipped to deal

with these failed states. This does not mean NATO should abandon helping them, rather, it

means NATO must develop new policies and procedures that will help effectively deal with

failed states. A security risk cannot be ignored simply because it is difficult to protect against.
THE FUTURE OF NATO: BEYOND 2010 5

The Afghanistan War

The Current conflict in Afghanistan has been a point of contention in recent years for

NATO, and it has pointed out many of NATO’s weaknesses. A day after the September 11, 2001

terrorist attacks against the United States, NATO enacted article V, the mutual defense clause,

for the first time in their history. This enactment of article 5 is even more surprising when you

take into account that it was invoked in protection of the U.S. and not Europe (Walt &

Strasbourg, 2009, para. 4). The problem was that the U.S. did not desire NATO’s help. Jamie

Shea (2004), NATO’s spokesperson, points out that the U.S. did in fact request NATO’s help.

The U.S. requested use of NATO bases, exchange of intelligence, over flight rights, and NATO’s

AWACS. What Shea fails to mention is that the U.S. did not want NATO controlling the forces

that were deployed to Afghanistan. This is because the U.S. thought that NATO was not suited

for the task, and the U.S. military was a much more capable fighting force (Betts, 2009, para. 6).

By not allowing NATO to control the Afghanistan conflict, the U.S. basically said NATO was

not as capable a military force, which attacks both NATO’s credibility and ultimately their

capability.

Although the U.S. did not want NATO to control how the war was fought in Afghanistan,

NATO did take control of the United Nations mandated International Security Assistance Forces

(ISAF). ISAF’s mission in Afghanistan is to work towards “stabilizing and rebuilding the

country: train the Afghan army, police, and judiciary; support the government in counter-

narcotics efforts; develop a market infrastructure; and suppress the Taliban” (Belkin & Morelli,

2009, p. 2). NATO has several challenges in fulfilling ISAF’s mission. The biggest challenge is

many of NATO’s members are not allowed to send troops into dangerous areas. Canada, the

Netherlands, Denmark and nonmember Australia support the U.S. in combat operations while
THE FUTURE OF NATO: BEYOND 2010 6

the remaining NATO members impose restrictions on where their military forces can be

deployed. Typically, they are confined to base if they might be in danger (Goldgeier, 2009, p. 3).

Another issue that has exposed a NATO weakness is that many member states have not poured

sufficient money into their militaries in recent years (Ibid, p. 3). Without NATO’s full support,

the U.S. has been left to bear the brunt of the burden in Afghanistan.

Since the start of the Afghanistan war, NATO has slowly lost face and credibility in the

international community. The fact that NATO members were unwilling to fulfill their

commitment to the alliance when it was called upon highlights the fact that NATO has its

weaknesses just like every other intergovernmental organization. Some within NATO believe

that it is impossible to win in Afghanistan because the Taliban refuse to admit defeat (Walt &

Strasbourg, 2009, para. 5). At the same time, others have begun to call Afghanistan NATO’s

Vietnam. Regardless of all this, it is clear that the Afghanistan war cost NATO its credibility as a

military alliance once they refused to provide the resources needed (Walt & Strasbourg, 2009,

para. 7). The Afghanistan war has also forced many to question the validity of NATO

enlargement if the alliance cannot even fulfill its commitments to its current members.

Enlargement vis-à-vis Russia

Since 1989, NATO has led an aggressive enlargement campaign to integrate the Central

and Eastern European states into NATO. This enlargement has a very large critic base, and many

believe it ultimately alienates Russia and creates more tension between NATO and Russia.

NATO’s admission of the former Warsaw Pact members and the drive to extend membership to

Ukraine and Georgia has certainly negatively affected NATO-Russian relations. Not only that, it

has brought into question the ability of NATO to protect its member states. The purpose of

NATO enlargement according to German Defense Minister Volker Ruhe was to export stability
THE FUTURE OF NATO: BEYOND 2010 7

otherwise instability would be imported into the alliance (David & Levesque, 1999, p. 17).

However, further NATO enlargement will only create instability, especially if Georgia and

Ukraine are allowed to begin the accession process by being accepted into the Membership

Action Plan (MAP).

In 2008, at the NATO Bucharest Summit, NATO members put up a stiff resistance and

decided not to offer MAPs to Georgia and Ukraine, however, a decision was reached that stated

Georgia and Ukraine would eventually become NATO members (Morelli, Ek, Belkin, Woehrel

& Nichol, 2009, p. 2). Russia immediately responded by saying that Russia would take military

action if Ukraine and Georgia were given NATO membership. Prime Minister Putin also stated

Russia would target missiles at Ukraine if NATO military installations ever appeared there

(Shchedrov & Lowe, 2009, para. 1, 7). Russia did not stop worth words. A few months after the

Bucharest Summit, Russia marched forces into South Ossetia supporting the breakaway state

from Georgia. This was most likely a sharp warning from Russia that further NATO expansion

towards Russia would not be taken lightly. All of a sudden, the stiff resistance many NATO

members put up towards Ukraine and Georgia being offered MAPs became clearer. Additionally,

in early 2010, Russia published its new military doctrine depicting NATO Eastern enlargement

as the largest military threat facing Russia today (McDermott, 2010. para. 2). The fact that

NATO-Russian relations has survived NATO enlargement thus far is amazing, however,

relations would not likely survive if Ukraine and Georgia are offered MAPs.

The future of NATO enlargement lies in the Balkans. Macedonia, Bosnia and

Herzegovina, Montenegro and Serbia all have the potential for NATO membership. However,

only Macedonia and Montenegro have MAP status at the moment (Schuchardt, 2010, p. 4).

Macedonia accession was block by Greece at the Bucharest Summit over a naming dispute
THE FUTURE OF NATO: BEYOND 2010 8

(Morelli et al, 2009, p. 2). NATO members push to include all the Balkan states is mostly out of

stability concerns. The Balkan states’ military contribution would be minimal, however, NATO

is currently more concentrated on European stabilization than the military capabilities that

additional countries may be able to provide (Schuchardt, 2010, p. 14). This brings up an

important point though. NATO continues to enlarge bringing in states that provide little military

capabilities. This is another point of contention for many, because NATO still remains a military

alliance with collective defense at heart (ibid, p. 14). Once NATO is no longer able to protect its

members militarily, it will have lost all credibility. Not only that, NATO is walking a fine line

between increasing European security and alienating Russia by pursuing NATO membership for

the remaining Balkan states.

The European Union

When Great Britain decided to support a common European defense policy in 1998, the

European Union began pushing for the development of a European Security and Defense Policy

(ESDP). Although Great Britain supported the creation of a strong ESDP, it does not desire the

ESDP to take over NATO’s roles and responsibilities; rather, they sought, and still seek, two

defense organizations that complement one another. The official European Union stance on the

ESDP is that it is not aimed at “usurping NATO’s collective defense role nor at weakening the

transatlantic alliance” (Archick & Gallis, 2005, p. 16-17). While the major of EU member states

support that statement, there is a minority, led by France, pushing for the EU defense policy to be

autonomous from NATO. Former UK Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher has stated that

“France has for many years wanted to see an alternative military power to an

American-led NATO. The European Union's plans for a separate integrated

THE FUTURE OF NATO: BEYOND 2010 9

European defence provided the French with a unique opportunity to achieve this

goal” (McNamara, 2007).

Regardless of the individual member states’ stances concerning the ESDP vis-à-vis NATO, the

EU views the ESDP as a method of developing alternative options for future crisis, especially

when the U.S. is reluctant to become involved (Archick & Gallis, 2005, p. 2). The EU’s

intentions may be innocent, but their methods are a little more enlightening on the subject.

Since 2003, the EU has sent several civilian and military missions to countries of need

under the auspices of the ESDP. Most of these missions were to the Balkans, which is where

most military analysts believed the majority of the EU’s attention would be focused. In 2003, the

EU surprised these military analysts by leading an international peacekeeping force in the

Democratic Republic of Congo consisting of 1400 people. This peacekeeping mission was

completed without NATO assistance, and NATO was also not involved in the decision-making

process leading up to the mission (Archick & Gallis, 2005, p. 20). This was viewed negatively by

NATO, and it does give credit to the argument that the EU does not desire to merely complement

NATO forces.

Presently, both organizations have competing components, however, they also both

require the other to function properly. NATO has established a 7,000 strong rapid response force

while the EU has established rapid response battle groups consisting of a few thousand highly

trained forces. The EU is committed to peacekeeping forces, and NATO is committed to

peacekeeping forces as well. The EU needs NATO for air transport and logistics reasons while

NATO needs the EU for their police forces and their economic development budget. Both

organizations are inextricably tied to one another for the time being. And one of the main

challenges is that both organizations, which share 21 members, compete for the same funding
THE FUTURE OF NATO: BEYOND 2010 10

(Dempsey, 2006, p. 2). This is problematic, because there is not enough money or desire to fund

both organizations and sooner or later there will be a fall out between these two organizations.

Although the EU continues to publicly claim that the ESDP is meant to complement

NATO and NATO remains the transatlantic security alliance cornerstone, former German

Chancellor Gerham Schroders dismantled that story when he stated at a 2005 Munich security

conference, “NATO is no longer the primary venue where transatlantic partners discuss and

coordinate strategies” (McNamara, 2007). The very fact that the EU created the ESDP with the

purpose of acting autonomously in military and civilian missions hints that EU-NATO

cooperation may not continue for long (McNamara, 2007). It will likely be at least a decade

before the ESDP is considered a viable military alliance giving plenty of time for NATO-EU

relations to erode even further.

Conclusion

Despite the various challenges that NATO has faced over the years, it has shown a strong

resiliency to adversity and criticism. It is difficult to predict their demise when one after another,

experts have failed at just that. In 1951, General Eisenhower predicted NATO would fail if U.S.

troops did not return from Europe within ten years. And again in 1989, experts predicated NATO

would meet its demise after the fall of the Soviet Union (David & Levesque, 1999, p. 9). It is

now 2010, and NATO has managed to not only survive but thrive as well. History has proven

that NATO is both a constant and enduring force. With that said, NATO’s future depends on the

following points:

• NATO’s strategic concept review results will be the decisive factor in the future of

Europe. There are multiple scenarios that NATO could decide to follow. The most likely
THE FUTURE OF NATO: BEYOND 2010 11

of which is a combination of refocusing on Europe, focus on non-state threats, and a

focus on failed states.

• The outcome of the Afghanistan War will either give NATO future credibility or be the

beginning of the end. Currently, the Afghanistan War has called into question the

effectiveness of NATO. NATO members have failed to provide adequate combat troops

leading to what many consider a failure on NATO’s part. Success in Afghanistan is a

must for NATO.

• NATO enlargement has all but reached an end. Despite NATO stating Georgia and

Ukraine will become members, this would likely result in either a large scale conflict or

the end of the NATO alliance. Russia will not tolerate it, and they will do whatever it

takes to ensure Georgia and Ukraine are not given NATO membership.

• The EU is slowly chipping away at NATO’s roles and responsibilities. While both

organizations need each other for the time being, NATO will likely be the first to crack

since their funding falls mostly on the shoulders of EU member states.

THE FUTURE OF NATO: BEYOND 2010 12

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