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Kawakita v. United States

Mark D. Derham

American Military University

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In Kawakita v. United States, the petitioner was a dual citizen of the United States and

Japan, and he was accused of committing treasonous acts while living in Japan during World

War II. Congress established in 401 of the Nationality Act of 1940, 54 Stat. 1137, 1168, as

amended, 8 U.S.C. 801, that a national of the United States may lose his nationality in certain

prescribed ways.

"(a) Obtaining naturalization in a foreign state . . .; or

"(b) Taking an oath or making an affirmation or other formal declaration of allegiance to

a foreign state; or

"(c) Entering, or serving in, the armed forces of a foreign state unless expressly

authorized by the laws of the United States, if he has or acquires the nationality of such

foreign state; or

"(d) Accepting, or performing the duties of, any office, post, or employment under the

government of a foreign state or political subdivision thereof for which only nationals of

such state are eligible; . . . ."

The petitioner lived in Japan during World War II, and he was employed by Oeyama Nickel

Industry as an interpreter at Oeyama camp where American Prisoners of War (POW) were held.

He was accused of beating the prisoners, threatening them, and punishing them for not working

faster and harder, for failing to fill their quotas, for resting, and for slowing down. The petitioner

was charged for committing treason against the United States. As defined by the Constitution,

“Treason shall consist only in levying War against them, or in adhering to their Enemies, giving

them Aid and Comfort. . . ." Art. III, section 3. The petitioner was born in the United States of

Japanese parents making him both a citizen of the U.S. and of Japan. In 1939, he obtained a U.S.

passport, taking the customary oath of allegiance to the U.S., in order to travel to Japan where he
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would eventually set up residence. In 1943, he registered in the Koseki family census, changed

his status in Japan as an alien to a citizen, traveled to China under a Japanese passport, and began

facing East each morning to pay his respects to the emperor. When the war was over, the

petitioner returned to the United States and claimed citizenship once again. He was later

recognized by a POW and indicted for treason.

The question is whether the petitioner’s aforementioned details, registering in the Koseki;

traveling with a Japanese passport; and paying his respects to the emperor, prove that he had

denounced his U.S. citizenship, and therefore could no longer commit treason against its citizens.

The court upheld that if the jury found that the petitioner had lost his American citizens prior to

or during the period of the indictment or if the jury found that the petitioner honestly believed he

was no longer a citizen of the U.S. during the period in question, he must be acquitted. If the jury

should find that during the period in question the petitioner was an American citizen, he owed its

citizens allegiance.

During the trial, the court rationalized that the petitioner’s actions, which he considered

the revocation of his U.S. citizenship, were in fact merely incidents of his Japanese citizenship

made possible by his dual citizenship. The idea of a fair-weather citizen was also rejected, and

the court decided that the petitioner could not retain his American citizenship while at the same

mistreating American’s overseas. The court concluded that the petitioner’s job was as an

interpreter and the evidence suggested the acts of mistreatment towards American POWS were

carried out voluntarily and were not a part of his duties as an interpreter.

The court relied on the standard of the U.S constitution “Treason shall consist only in

levying War against them, or in adhering to their Enemies, giving them Aid and Comfort. . . ."

Art. III, section 3. It also relied on the Nationality Act of 1940, 54 Stat. 1137, 1168, as amended,
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8 U.S.C. 801, which establishes how a citizen can lose his citizenship. Hirabayashi v. United

States, 320 U.S. 81, 97 was utilized to establish dual citizenship as well as the legality of dual

citizenship established in Perkins v. Elg, 307 U.S. 325, 344 -349. Chandler v. United States, 171

F.2d 921, 929-930 and Burgman v. United States, 88 U.S. App. D.C. 184, 185, 188 F.2d 637,

640 established that an American citizen living beyond the territorial limits of the United States

may still commit treason against U.S. citizens.

In a Federal District Court, the jury found the petitioner guilty of treason, and the trial

judge sentenced him to death. The Court of Appeals upheld the ruling, and the court granted

certiorari. This case sets a precedence that while a dual citizen can exercise his/her rights in both

countries, one cannot be a fair-weather citizen and thereby mistreat a citizen of one of the

countries that they are citizens of without first forfeiting citizenship in the other country without

committing treason. A U.S. citizen is a U.S. citizen regardless of where they currently reside.

Lack of residence in the U.S. does not preclude a citizen from their responsibilities and

allegiance to the U.S.

References
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Kawakita v. United States, 343 F.Supp. 717 (U.S. Supreme 1952)