What, if anything, makes terrorism distinctively morally wrong?

Although it is widely considered that terrorism is in general, morally wrong, there

is controversy over whether its characteristics make it distinctively morally
wrong from other forms of violence such as conventional warfare. As many
theorists suggest that in some cases warfare can be justified it is important to
assess whether terrorism is distinctive, to determine whether in similar
conditions, terrorism too can be justified. Using Primoratzs definition of terrorism
as being the deliberate use of violence, or threat of its use against innocent
people with the aim of intimidating them, or others into a curse of action they
would not otherwise take, this essay concludes that although conventional
warfare can harm of intimidate innocent individuals the intention of the act is not
to harm and mobilise fear as a means to an end, unlike in terrorism. It is this
distinction that makes terrorism distinctively morally wrong.
Primoratz makes the argument that conventional warfare and revolution can be
justified as they are fought against legitimate targets, whereas terrorism differs
as it is fought against illegitimate targets. His distinction focuses on the fact that
in conventional warfare, it is usually soldiers who are targeting in combat, and as
they pose a direct threat to an individuals life or wellbeing, the individual may
retaliate through the use of violence. Both sides are knowingly involving
themselves in combat. Terrorism on the other hand targets non-combatants, and
according to Rodin it is this that makes terrorism particularly morally odious.
However an opposing argument has been made by Trotsky that in modern
warfare, distinguishing between combatants and non-combatants is almost
impossible, thus blurring the lines. McPherson argues that as a large number of
non-combatants are killed in modern warfare due to the use of bombs, minefields
and the like, conventional warfare is as morally wrong as terrorism. And if
targeting innocents is what makes terrorism distinctive, the death of innocents in
warfare mean that it is not particularly distinctive. Rodin suggests that the extent
to which belligerents in warfare do not limit their harm to non-combatants
reflects the extent to which their actions can be deemed as terrorist.
However, Primoratz highlights an important distinction; the question of intention.
Although it is the unfortunate truth that non-combatants are harmed in
conventional warfare, this is usually as a consequence of targeting combatants,
or militarily-strategic resources. The death of innocents is merely an unpleasant
by-product of warfare. And, although it is true that modern warfare techniques
mean that the line between combatants and non-combatants is blurred, it does
not make it irrelevant. As terrorism does not just harm non-combatants by
accident or as a consequence of targeting combatants or military bases, they
specifically target non-combatants, and the difference in intention is what makes
them morally distinctive. As it is one thing to harm innocents as a by-product of
an action, and it is quite another for the purpose of that action to target
innocents.
Another point raised to distinguish between the moral nature of terrorism and
conventional warfare, is the use of fear. Scheffler argues that terrorism gets its
distinctive moral character due to its use of fear as a means to an end. He
highlights the fact that terrorism produces a widespread fear, affecting more
than those who were directly affected by the act. McPherson suggests that the
same can be said of warfare, which also create widespread fear in the regions
affected, with fear affecting both combatants and non-combatants, especially

now that non-combatants are now often directly implicated. However again it is a
question of intention. Under terrorism, fear is being mobilised as a vehicle to
produce a desired change. Therefore civilian fear is being used as a means to the
terrorists ends. In conventional warfare, however, it is just a by-product of the
violence inherent in warfare.
Whilst there are many examples in recent wars where innocent civilians have
been targeted or attempts have been made to mobilise their fear in order to
pressure the political leadership to act in a different way, these incidents should
be seen as acts of terrorism within the wider context of conventional war. For
example, Hitlers bombing of Britain, targeting non-combatants to break national
morale to pressure the British government into surrendering should be seen as
an act of terrorism. Whereas targeting an enemy bases, where non-combatants
may be harmed as collateral, despite the widespread fear that might arise as a
by-product should not be seen as terrorism. Both examples may have similar
impacts and may or may not be justifiable, but they are clearly morally
distinctive.
To conclude, although Pogge suggests that terrorism is largely seen as morally
distinctive due to the superficial way it is presented by the media and by
politicians, it is clear that the moral distinctiveness is far more intrinsic. Using
Primoratzs definition of terrorism, it is clear that terrorism differs from
conventional warfare in two morally salient ways. Firstly in the fact that it
intentionally targets non-combatants, unlike conventional warfare, in which harm
to non-combatants is a by-product of the action, but not the purpose. And
secondly, in terrorists use of fear as a means to their own ends. Insofar as an
action in the context of warfare specifically targets innocents to mobilise their
fear, it becomes an act of terrorism. Therefore conventional warfare and
terrorism have important differences, which make terrorism distinctively morally
wrong.